## ANTI-PIONEER POLICY AND UNILATERAL DEPENDENCE ON THE WEST

There is a direct connection between the antipioneer trend in Israel and the international political orientation of Mapai and the government it leads.

Mapam demands a policy of neutrality towards the two world powers. We have always recognized the need to maintain proper economic and political relations with every country ready to respond on a mutual basis. Mapam was cognizant of the need for commercial agreements with the countries of the European Common Market, in order to prevent damage resulting from preferential economic relations between the affiliated countries. Though we realized that our government did not retain sufficient reservations from the political and military nature of this European union, exemplified in NATO's anti-Soviet maneuvering, we supported those efforts of our government which were honestly directed toward preventing discrimination against our national economy, and against our exports to those countries in particular. It follows that we recognize the urgent need to develop competitive strength for our exports while preserving independence on the international market. There are many competitors in citrus, and certainly in eggs and vegetables. Nevertheless, in this realm we have certain climatic and other advantages, which could increase our competitive strength.

It is our view that in the industrial field, Israel is capable of creating technical and social conditions, which will aid her in overcoming competition. But it depends on whether the producers, who bear the major burden of the competitive race, will receive fair re-

muneration for their toil. If, in agriculture, we were able to increase productive capacity and efficiency while preserving a pioneer regime and labor independence, we shall be able increase our capacity in other branches also, under a regime of social equality and by narrowing the social and cultural gap between different sectors of the populace.

Our productive potential will certainly not grow if wages are frozen; real wages fell anyway after the devaluation of the Israeli pound. The workers' standard of living will be further reduced if Mapai's plans are carried through in the government and Histadrut. This policy, supposedly directed toward improving our competitiveness on the world market, would not only fall short of its announced goals but, on the contrary, would weaken our competitive strength and increase cur dependence on outside elements.

## THE WAGES OF UNILATERAL FRIENDSHIP

The United States and France have become used to regarding us as an assured "friend" in almost every instance. They have little fear of a change in attitude or that Israel might become inconsistent in its unilateral policy. They leave us to our fate; there is no mutuality in their treatment of Israel.

The policy of the United States is, in a number of respects, more congenial to the State of Israel. But in a number of critical issues, such as that of the Arab refugees, U.S. policy is not essentially different from that of the Soviet Union. While giving aid to Egypt and Syria, both East and West are not ready to give guarantees for Israel's security.

This dual attitude toward Egypt and our country finds ample proof every step of the way. The United States adjusted without difficulty to Egypt's policy of positive neutrality, which makes cunning use of the economic and military competition between the two blocs. As for Israel, it was naturally understood that Robert Soblen be handed over to the American F.B.I., despite the fact that no extradition treaty exists between the two countries. Israel has always been ready to sign unilateral obligations of the Eisenhower Doctrine type, or other unacceptable agreements filed away in our diplomatic archives.

Some say of the Soviet Union that her policy leaves us no choice, no maneuverability — or that her unfriendly attitude toward our country is final and has no relevance whatsoever to the conduct of our government. They go on to say that this Soviet policy is based on long-range calculations, and that preferential treatment is reserved exclusively for the Arab side. They add that the estrangement of the Soviet Union toward us is related to the time-honored anti-Zionist tradition of the Bolshevist Party. They point out that this policy began back in Lenin's day, took on a outright anti-Jewish character under Stalin, and that even Krushchev has not altogether freed himself of this tradition.

This hypothesis can be verified by many facts. But there are other facts which also speak for themselves. In the months of decision at the U.N., it was the Soviet Union which supported our struggle most consistently. This support lasted even after the Lake Success decision of November 27, 1947 on the right to establish a Jewish State. This policy was maintained by the Soviet Union until 1951, when the Cold War broke out. Throughout those years, the Soviet Union kept faith with us uncompromisingly.

The plan forwarded by Count Bernadotte, which threatened to revoke all the assurances given to the Jewish people, was not inspired by the Soviet Union but by the Americans. It was an American ultimatum which insisted that the Israeli Army not advance south of Beersheba. It was not the Soviet Union but the Americans who placed an embargo on arms shipments

during the War of Liberation, while Soviet initiative led to the shipments of Czech arms at the moment of most crucial need. Socialist countries, whose activities were coordinated with the Soviet Union, cooperated and continue to cooperate with the project of repatriation to Israel of Jewish minorities within their countries. It is well known that, as long as our country remained non-aligned, the Soviet Union supported us almost without reservation.

This attitude changed at the outbreak of the Cold War. No small part was played by our government in its alignment with the West. That was not the only reason for the radical change in Soviet policy on Israel. We disagree as to a number of the contributing factors behind this change, which will be discussed further on.

It should be noted that, after a period of unbridled anti-Soviet vilification, which reached its apex with the dynamiting of the Soviet Embassy in Tel Aviv and the break-off of relations which followed, both sides made efforts to renew relations, efforts which were crowned with success; (this was still in the period of Stalin and Molotov). It is true that the Soviet neutral policy toward us was interrupted in 1954 by the Czech-Egypt arms deal; but it should not be ignored that, even on the eve of the Sinai Operation, the Soviet Union did not relent from its efforts to bridge the gap between us and our Arab neighbors. Just before the Sinai Operation, a statement was made by Dmitri Shepilov, then Soviet Foreign Minister, in Beirut, Lebanon, on the desire of the Soviet Union to remove the Middle East from the sphere of arms competition and to give guarantees, together with three other powers, stabilizing the borders of the region's countries, including Israel. At the same time, the Soviet Union supported negotiations on the basis of the territorial integrity of the region's countries, again including Israel.

We are now reaching the most disturbing level yet in our relations with the Soviet Union. We criticize,

with good reason, her Middle East policy and her part in the local arms race. Soviet representatives, with whom we have had contact at peace conferences, argue as follows: a) Arms supplies to Egypt were not directed against Israel, but towards bolstering those countries who follow a neutral line and refuse to participate in "CENTO" (formerly the Baghdad Pact), which in turn unites those countries who maintain aggressive bases endangering the Soviet Union.

b) Almost in contradiction to their first claim, they hint that the Czech deal with Egypt followed upon the Gaza Raid, which was something of a miniature preview of the Sinai Operation to come.

c) The Soviet Union is not interested in the destruction of the State of Israel. In this respect, they point out that the common decision of the Soviet Union and the United States to put an end to the Suez War and return Israel's Army to its borders was meant, as far as the Soviets were concerned, to restrain Israel from an aggressive policy toward its neighbors.

We are sorry to say that these statements do not express the whole truth. It is known that in the action against Egypt, a major role was played by two large countries, who also retreated under pressure of the American-Soviet ultimatum. But immediately afterwards, the Soviet Union made haste to reconstitute proper relations with these two countries — but not with Israel. The break-off of Soviet economic relations with Israel remains in force to this day.

Mapam has no interest in a policy of unilateral dependence on the socialist bloc. Mapam is whole-heartedly in favor of neutralism and non-alignment, and maintenance of friendly relations with both blocs, and especially with those countries not involved directly in the Cold War. Mapam is as independent in its judgment of the Soviet Union as of anyone else. We shan't hide the fact that the Soviet Union has discriminated against us, not only because of the failures of our

government's policies, but because we are a small country, and perhaps also because of a Soviet consideration reserved especially for the State of Israel. We see that the Soviet Foreign Ministry has, for years, been led by Andrei Gromyko, the man who in 1947 was one of the most outspoken supporters of the establishment of the State of Israel. Now, the same Gromyko represents in the U.N. a line of radical support for the stand of the Arab League nations.

In view of the extreme revision noticeable of late in the Soviet attitude toward Israel, certain conclusions must be drawn. We have shown clear reservations from the one-sided Soviet policy of support for the Arab states. But is the Soviet Union alone to blame for this change? Would we have had to face such a decline if Israel had kept up her policy of international non-alignment, and if she had looked after her security while at the same time seeking actively an outlet to peace with our Arab neighbors?

Some tie the negative attitude of the Soviet Union toward us with certain anti-semitic manifestations in that country. In this way, they try to identify the almost anti-Israeli Soviet policy with an anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic line, supposedly cultivated in that country. We should not blind ourselves to instances of anti-semitism among some sections of the Soviet populace, or to signs of discrimination against the Jewish minority on the part of the authorities, especially in the cultural field. But I propose that our Congress not lend a hand to the pernicious view, so well nurtured by Mapai propagandists. The careful line of a liberal Zionist such as Dr. Goldmann is far more acceptable to a revolutionary socialist party such as Mapam, Suffice to say that the Jewish minority is discriminated against as regards its right to self-determination, both cultural and national. This discrimination is essentially still extant, and we oppose it, no matter what the political considerations from which it stems. Generally

speaking, the Soviet Union has not dropped its line of forced assimilation of the Jewish minority. We find this line reprehensible and of severe consequence.

From time to time, meetings take place, with inflammatory slogans like "Let My People Go". They voice concern for the safety and the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, and quite often receive generous help from our ruling party.

We recall that the above-mentioned slogan was to have graced a conference, planned to take place in Geneva in 1954, and organized in collaboration with anti-Zionist Bundist elements from the United States. These Bundists hide their heads in the sand when it comes to the many anti-semitic occurrences in America itself. But they are ready to take advantage of every opportunity for an anti-Soviet crusade; and it doesn't matter who the sponsor is, Zionist or anti-Zionist.

The Prime Minister's speech in Finland, made during his tour of that country, fits this pattern of concern for the opening of Soviet borders to Jewish emigration.

The truth is, since the inception of our state and to this day, there have always been socialist countries with open doors to emigration. One after another, they allowed mass emigration, which usually resulted in an almost complete exodus. If there were times when almost all the gates were closed, the reason was more than once connected with problematic manifestations on our part, some of which I have pointed out.

It is only fair to emphasize that, despite the drastic change in Soviet policy on Israel, and despite the special interest of Soviet foreign policy in the neutralist bloc, wherein the Arab states play an important role—the gates of emigration from the socialist bloc are still not closed.

It isn't likely that the Soviet Union will re-embrace its line of unqualified support for us, remembered from the first years of statehood. Henceforward, Soviet policy will be influenced by political considerations, in which the Arab bloc carries much weight. But there is no foundation for presupposing that the Soviet attitude could not be improved, were our country to return to the policy of non-alignment which she followed during the first years of our independence. Moreover, I would go so far as to say that, if there is a chance for free immigration from the Soviet Union, an Israeli line of neutralism and non-alignment would certainly be a conducive factor. The other socialist countries solved the problem by evacuation or, say, repatriation of almost all their Jewish inhabitants. They did this on the assumption that those who chose to remain would no longer be a problem.

This is not so of the Soviet Union. Considering the unusual position of the Jewish community in socialist society and economy, there is room for belief that only a portion, of unpredictable size, will choose to emigrate to Israel if given the chance.

It is our opinion that the rights of self-determination and free emigration to Israel should be granted to the Jews of the Soviet Union, unconnected to the present policy of the government, in the same way as is accepted by the other socialist countries. One way or the other, all these calculations can only be approximate. We all want the hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews who so desire to be allowed to come to Israel. We all hope that this will come about soon, and realize how extremely important this is for us. Therefore, whoever truly desires to realize this goal as soon as possible, must see to the creation of a proper, congenial atmosphere and suitable conditions.

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