



ANTI-FASCIST STRUGGLE IN LEBANON

The battles with the Phalangists and other forces have finally subsided. A new government of right wing orientation has been formed. It should be obvious to all that the present cease-fire should not be mistaken for a final or radical solution. We in the resistance movement will not provoke any fights but we know very well that Imperialism and its local collaborators will not be satisfied unless they eliminate our people's movement and our allies — the democratic forces of Lebanon and the Arab world. Hence we remain prepared to defend our revolution from all the attacks be they from the Phalangists, Imperialism or Arab reaction.

Once more the Palestinian resistance movement is defending itself against the attacks of Lebanese reactionary forces. After the attack of the Phalangist party in April, the battle was renewed again by the Phalangist party, allying themselves this time with other reactionary forces and hoping that the Lebanese Army would intervene on their side. In more than one way this comes to prove the previously predicted imperialist attack on the revolutionary forces in the area, and it represents one of the necessary chains for the return of total imperialist domination in the region.

The reader must not forget that since the proposed settlement for the so called Arab-Israeli conflict was introduced in the region and after applying certain steps on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, imperialism, Israel and Arab reaction defined the Palestinian obstacle as the main and most difficult one. For that they set their plans to strengthen Lebanese reactionary forces so as to strike against the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon where its open presence is mostly concentrated. In order to achieve the end of completely liquidating the open presence of the resistance movement or weakening it to the level where it can be forced to become part of the settlement, imperialism and Israel realize the necessity of accelerating the contradiction between the Lebanese authorities and Lebanese reactionary forces on one side and the Palestinian resistance movement and the Lebanese national and Progressive movement on the other. As such the real nature of the battle is not a Palestinian-Lebanese one

but is a struggle between local reaction and the revolutionary and progressive forces, Lebanese and Palestinian. To this point we have to discuss briefly the recent developments on the Lebanese level, however we must precede the discussion by identifying one of the major factors causing an intensification of armed conflict in Lebanon.

One of the major reasons to the present conflict has in fact nothing to do with the presence of Palestinians in Lebanon. Lebanon's

feudal structures accompanied by its mercantile development is increasing the gap between rich and poor. As such, the economy's present development is predicated on increasing social class differentiation. Hence in spite of Lebanon's increasing GNP, we notice a severe uneven development between Beirut and the south of Lebanon. For example, if we were to compare average incomes in the trade and agricultural sectors, it would be noticed that the latter's per capita

income is 1/5 of the former's.

Moreover, if we were to review the price index of general commodities (necessities not luxuries) we find the following: Between 1972 to 74 the general average price index has increased by at least 18% where as it only increased by 14.8% between the six year period of 1966 to 72.

If the present trend of price increases continues, we can expect that the average rate of increase will reach 8 to 10% by the end of 1975. These developments are causing a rapid change in the class composition of Lebanon. During the hey-day of its mercantile development there exist a large middle class (service sector), but as the result of the widening disparity between rich and poor, large sectors of this middle-class are entering the ranks of the working class. For example, the number of industrial workers in Lebanon between 1964 and 74 has doubled numbering approximately 125,000. In addition the number of agricultural workers (agricultural proletariat) has also doubled and they presently number more than 100,000.

The changing class composition of Lebanon and the increasing social problems as a result of the archaic social-political-economic structures is causing an intensification of class struggle. In this context the fascist elements of Lebanon i.e. the Phalangist party etc. in wanting to preserve the present conditions of Lebanon are in fact attempting to negate the present historical trend.

Needless to say, the existence of the Palestinians and their armed movement is not the cause of the existing social disparity which is largely the result of Lebanon's contradictory and dual economic development. However, it is true that the ideology underlying the Palestinian resistance movement has reflected itself positively on the development of the democratic forces in Lebanon.

Moreover since May 1973, when the Lebanese Army attacked Palestinian Camps but failed to liquidate the Resistance movement, Lebanese National and progressive parties witnessed a growth in their popular support. This rise of prominence of the progressive movement coincided with the October

OUR
ENEMIES



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Following the obstacles that Henry Kissinger faced last March in his attempt to arrange a disengagement of forces on the Egyptian front, President Sadat of Egypt has made every effort to prove to U.S. officials that he is still counting on the American initiative in the region. He has gone as far as putting all his political efforts to convince U.S. imperialism that he is willing to accept all its conditions if it is ready to arrange an Israeli withdrawal from part of Sinai. The events came to prove that and these were only an unofficial recognition that the Arab regimes involved in the proposed settlement view the U.S. as the « champion of peace in the Middle East.» As if the U.S. policy for the last 27 years or more, and four wars are not enough for Sadat to discover U.S. policy in the Middle East, he pictured his effort as those of a wishful politician when he said that he was still waiting for the outcome of the reappraisal of U.S. policy. The facts of the developments are different, and Sadat's moves are only part of his policy to transform Egypt into a country completely dominated by U.S. imperialism.

On June 1st, and 2nd, Sadat met Ford in Salzburg. The meeting was an initiative of Sadat to convince Ford personally that American interests really are in finding a way for Sadat from his political dilemma of regaining more areas in Sinai. The aim is to maintain Sadat's successful image which he obtained as a result of the October War of 1973. As such, in his last step of capitulation, the reopening of the Suez Canal, Sadat dressed up in a navy admiral's uniform, and crossed the canal accompanied by the son of the Shah of Iran.

Sadat's dilemma does not lie only in his steps of capitulation, but lie in the fact that he is not receiving the price he expected. The price was to be Israeli withdrawal and huge economic aid that will « secretly change the shape of Egypt ». The most Sadat got from his meeting with Ford was a promise of economic help and more efforts to convince Israel's Prime Minister Rabin to take a softer stand on disengagement talks. For all practical reasons this would take the situation back to what it was before Kissinger's March trip to the Middle East. There is one major and important difference, that is the forces, particularly Arab who were bargaining on Sadat's good will and the ability not to fall completely in the laps of U.S. imperialism have to take a good and serious look and objectively find out if Sadat was really not more American than the Americans themselves. For Sadat has definitely made it clear to all forces that he thinks of the present as regards the future, and in both times he wants his American allies and their forces in the region to be his friends, protectors and defenders. The question that poses itself is : Till when will these forces keep putting their bets on Sadat when he has put everything he has on U.S. policy ?

If that is the situation, why is the U.S. not helping Sadat and paying him off for his services and allegiance ?

President Ford and his administration are in a difficult position — while they criticize Israel for not fully cooperating they do not want to lose the Zionist votes in the coming presidential elections in the US. By the end of this year the Presidential campaign will begin and since the « Middle East Issue » will be a major one in it, the activities where the Middle East is concerned will be frozen. Hence, any step to be taken is supposed to be well prepared but swiftly carried out. From this arises the speculation of a new Kissinger visit to the region. After that a proposed two years is suggested in order to give time for all parties concerned to prepare their situations for an overall settlement.

The reopening of the Suez Canal by Sadat was to give Israel a sign that Egypt will not use military means from now till the period a total settlement is reached. With the Canal opened to International shipping and the Egyptian forces mainly concentrated on its western side, there can be little fear for Israel to concentrate its forces on the borders of Lebanon and Syria, where more of the Palestinian Resistance comes from and where Palestinian bases are mainly concentrated.

As such the Egyptian moves are mostly but not only concerned

with a bilateral agreement at this stage. The step-by-step policy of Henry Kissinger cannot handle rapid developments that will undermine its own credibility of achieving total imperialist domination. This fact does not please the Syrian regime but at the same time does not cause it to give up on the American initiative. On the contrary the Syrian regime aims only to gain a more important position in the proposed settlement. So its policy is to antagonize Sadat's policy of Egypt first without breaking open the conflict that lies under the relations of both countries.

To present itself as equal, the Syrian regime envoyed its Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Abdel-Halim Khadamm to Washington to meet with Ford and Kissinger. More important was the visit of Syria's President Hafez Assad to Jordan on June 10th. It was the first by a Syrian Head of State in twenty years. As part of the inter-arab reconciliation that became dominant after the October War of 1973, Assad sees fit to play inter-arab politics at this period in the hope of strengthening the Syrian position vis-a-vis the Egyptian one in the proposed settlement. This will not pass by without the Syrian regime paying a favour to the Jordanian one. For not only the Syrians will provide a friendly front to the Jordanians, but they carry the

task of bringing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Jordanian regime together. The proposed joint political and military command between Syrian and the PLO will not limit itself to these forces but Jordan, which was isolated from official and mass Arab activities after September 1970, seeks more than ever to present a friendly face to the leadership of the PLO. This present aim was clearly expressed by Assad in Jordan. We quote : « This special role requires greater coordination and consultations and an escalation of unified action.»

This step by Assad does not erase from the minds of the Arab masses the role of the Jordanian Hashemite regime since its existence. It only comes to prove that the real nature of the settlement is the negation of all progressive achievements in the Arab Countries and the weakening of the Arab National liberation movement as a whole.

So what we find out on the Arab front is that while there are minor contradictions or more correctly differences among the regimes involved directly in the settlement, there is a strong line of alliances with the forces that have been part and parcel of the enemy camp of the Arab National liberation movements-Egypt-Saudi Arabia-U.S. ; Syria-Jordan-U.S. ; Jordan-Egypt-U.S. ; Egypt-Iran-U.S. in all cases the circle is one and the nature of the forces is one. It is no surprise that the Egyptian position regarding the clashes in Lebanon was one of support to the Lebanese right wing and the regime. The task of rearranging Arab conditions is first that of the Arab regimes and Arab reactionary forces. Hence the present imperialist attack on the Palestinian Resistance is to strike against it militarily in Lebanon while exerting political pressure from Egypt and Syria.

As such the Israeli Political front has enjoyed the quite period of consolidating its forces and setting more plans to strengthen its presence in the occupied areas of 1967. (see article)

What are then the points of agreement that Arab reactionary and capitulating forces have presented U.S. imperialism with :

- 1) To accept the American initiative represented by a new visit by Henry Kissinger to the Middle East.
- 2) Egypt will accept a new disengagement of forces in Sinai.
- 3) Egypt will give Israel the right of shipping and sailing in the Suez Canal on condition that the latter does not raise the Israeli flag.
- 4) Egypt will adopt a policy aiming at decreasing the hostility of the Egyptian press towards Israel.
- 5) Egypt will limit its relationship with the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries to the lowest level possible.

In addition to these steps which are provisional for the ultimate aim Egypt will recognize Israel as a sovereign state in the area existing or the occupied territories acquired before the June War of 1967.

SADAT:

SERVANT OF IMPERIALISM





HABASH & JIBRIL VISIT LIBYA

Upon the invitation of the political leadership and the Arab Socialist Union of the Lybian Arab Republic, two delegations of the PFLP and the PFLP-General Command visited Lybia during the month of June, 1975. The PFLP delegation was headed by its Secretary General Dr. George Habash and the General Command was led by Comrade Ahmad Jibril.

The two delegations held several meetings and discussions with the members of the General Secretariat. The atmosphere of the discussions was utterly frank and brotherly. The two sides had exchanged views on the conditions of the Arab Masses throughout the Arab World. The discussion centered on the delicate circumstances facing the masses due to Imperialist, Zionist and reactionary attacks aiming at liquidating the Palestinian Revolution and all the National Liberation Movements struggling against imperialism. This plot also aims at uprooting the whole Arab Popular Movement, therefore freeing the hands of reactionaries, the lackeys of the Imperialists.

Sadat's humiliating concessions :

Imperialism has found in the person of Sadat and in his reactionary regime what it has always been looking for. Sadat has been giving in humiliating concessions day after day. These have been serving imperialist interests, solidifying them and in so doing, guaranteeing the Zionist occupation of our land. All this is at the expense of the Palestinian and Arab Masses.

After the Salzburg meeting with Ford, Sadat took pride in speaking in the name of most Arab rulers. He announced his readiness to recognize the Zionist entity on our occupied lands, disregarding the Palestinian right to regain all their land. Sadat even bypassed his own declarations and jumped to the actual materialization of the secret accords passed with the enemy. These provisions were part of the km 101 accords that have been rejected by our masses. The most important development was the permitting of Zionist goods and ships to pass through the Suez Canal notwithstanding the fact that Suez has cost the Egyptian People thousands of lives.

Treason to our struggle :

These dangerous steps prac-

tically mean ending the war with the Zionist enemy. It also means the imposition of relaxed political and military measures in the area. This is considered treasonous to our struggle and to the tens of thousands of martyrs who have given their lives for the goal of liberation and unity of the Arab Nation.

The discussions were also heavily centered on the so-called proposed situations of the conflict, i.e. step-by-step policy, Geneva Conference. It was concluded that these only aim at liquidating the Palestinian cause and weakening the resistance movement prior to forcing it into a recognition of the Zionist entity. Its legal existence and ultimately announcing solidarity with it.

The two sides also reviewed the Palestinian scene and particularly the silence of the PLO official leadership in the face of such dangerous deviations that threaten the core of our just cause. These developments should normally force a clear and frank position on behalf of the PLO.

Failing Capitulationist prospects :

The complete history of our people's struggle since 1948 was also reviewed and discussed during these talks. Ever since the 1948 defeat the masses have been able to halt all the imperialist plans aiming at liquidating the Palestinian cause and ignoring our legal national right to every Centimeter of land in our Arab Nation.

In the light of our political stand and our unified conclusions as to the seriousness of the threat on the future of the Arab Revolution in general and the Palestinian Revolution in particular, the two parties agreed to the following :

1) To reject and fight against all the solutions proposed by the Americans and other Imperialists be it through the Geneva or the Salzburg Conferences or any other conference calling for direct or indirect negotiations with the enemy, for this recognition or for making peace with him. Furthermore to reject all international decisions that concede the legality of the Zionist entity of any part of our nation, or even decisions that ignore the national right of Arabs of total sovereignty over their land in Palestine.

2) To struggle fiercely in order to ensure the continuity of the

Palestinian Resistance's role in escalating its armed struggle as well as other forms of struggle made necessary by the ultimate goal of liberating all Palestinian land, evicting the Zionist entity and building the Democratic Palestinian society as a part of the united Arab Nation. These goals stemming from the conclusion that the Arab-Zionist struggle is a struggle for existence not one over borders.

Condemn the Egyptian Regime :

3) To condemn the Egyptian regime led by Sadat, and to consider its position to be contrary to the aspirations of the Arab Nation, a denial of its struggle and an insult to all its martyrs.

4) To direct a call to all Arab National movements, workers syndicates and unions in order to confront this plot ; to ask them to demonstrate their disapproval by all means possible, because the Palestine Issue is a national issue and does not belong to Palestinians alone. The real scope of the battle extends to every Arab Country just as resistance necessitates a state of mobilization in every Arab Country. All these forces must confront all plots in order to expose and fail them.

A National, Humanitarian and just Cause :

5) To ask the Arab, Islamic and Third World People to state clearly their backing of the Palestinian Armed struggle which aims at liberating the occupied Arab land. All these peoples should also consider the Palestinian Cause as a National, Humanitarian and Just Cause, of concern to all those struggling for freedom, equality, justice and peace.

6) To stress on the importance of increasing the ties of friendship with Socialist Countries headed by the Soviet Union ; with all national liberation movements in the World. The amelioration of our relationship will be based on co-operation in the struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reactionary forces.

7) To ask the PLO's official leadership to follow the principles outlined by the National charter and to respect all decisions taken by the Palestinian congress which clearly specify the rejection of any settlement. The PLO should also be asked to struggle militarily for the liberation of all Palestinian land and

to clearly state its refusal to participate in the Geneva Conference in order to get out of the capitulationist plan. Such steps will make it possible to build a real Palestinian National unity based on sound revolutionary principles.

8) The two sides certify what has been happening in Lebanon, and the initiative of the treacherous Phalangist Party, is only a part of the plot against the Palestinian Cause. The two sides congratulate the progressive Lebanese Forces and their strong stand behind the Palestinian Resistance. We call upon to pursue such courageous stands that will lead to the failure of the imperialist-reactionary plot and will culminate in the victory of the Palestinian and the Lebanese Arab Masses.

The Unified Arab struggle :

9) In order to materialize all of this, the socialist Arab Union in the Lybian Arab Republic, announces its readiness to offer all forms of backing to the Palestinian Resistance. This position emanates from our deep conviction in the united Arab struggle and the shared destiny of the Arab Nation. We consider the liberation of Palestine an Arab national duty, and view the Lybian land as a strategic support in the battle, and will assume our entire responsibilities in this respect.

10) In view of this, the Leadership of the Palestinian Revolution wish to state their full considerations to the people of the Lybian Arab Republic and its Leadership, to the Arab Socialist Union for their sincerity and devotion in preparing the masses for the Arab battle and for their adoption of all national issues and the Palestinian Cause in particular, a Cause that they consider as the prime Arab issue.

During their visit to Lybia, the two delegations took part in demonstrations, Rallies and public meeting condemning the deviation of the Egyptian Regime.

They also associated with the Lybian Masses on the occasion of the Fifth anniversary of the eviction of American Military Forces from Lybia.

— The Arab Socialist Union in the Lybian Arab Republic
 — The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
 — The PFLP-General Command.



OCCUPIED PALESTINE

Although the Knesset refused to increase the Israeli defense budget, it still remains sizeable when we take into account that it amounts to 22 billion Israeli Liras or 40 % of the Israeli national budget. The ordinary citizen would think that this amount is large enough to buy Israel an impenetrable defense and security system. The facts however tell quite another story.

Resistance movement operations are continuously increasing both in number and quality. In addition, the military have taken place in all parts of our occupied lands i.e. Jerusalem, Upper Galilee, Hebron, Beit-Lid, Gaza etc. According to Israeli sources, the resistance successfully carried out 30 operations in April (Yedhat Ahranot May 9, 75). Since the beginning of this year there have been 50 operations carried out in Jerusalem alone (Ha'artez May 29, 75). Moreover, as the fedayee units of seven was captured in that same period, they had already carried out during 1974-1975 over 100 operations. (Ma'arev May 28, 75).

Of course the numbers that the Israeli press cites is indeed below the actual level, but in nevertheless poses the following question — why is there such an increase in resistance movement military activities? Before we delve into this question, it would be useful to look at the sample of resistance operations.

We must remind our allies the world over that the level of our military work should be evaluated in view of the level of our movement's development. We do not have an army comparable to the North Vietnamese Army, nor do we have liberated zones from which we could operate freely. In spite of

these difficulties we are increasingly self-reliant, a fact that is disarming Israel's security.

Only recently, two operations were conducted by a Rejection Front joint unit. One of these operations caused heavy damages in two textile factories situated in the Ben Bark district near Tel-Aviv. The Fedayees who planted the explosive charges continue to lead their lives under occupation as they await other opportunities to inflict more losses on the enemy. It should be clear that industrial sabotage is one of our revolutionary weapons.

More recently, in the first week of June several brave operations were successfully carried out. On June 8th, 75, the building which houses the Israeli news center in Jerusalem was convincingly damaged. On June 9 several explosive charges that were carefully planted near an Israeli patrol in Beit-Lid (town in the West Bank) caused serious damage as they exploded. Immediately thereafter, a direct clash took place between the fedayees and the Israeli forces. The Israeli soldiers suffered various wounds and some deaths. In the course of the battle, Marei Khawajeh was martyred as he gallantly fought against the enemy troops.

On June 15, 75, four members of the martyr Mohamed Jabir Nahban (Abdul Adib) group, which is one of the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) (one of the groups within the Rejection Front) groups operating inside the occupied lands, attacked the north Israeli settlement of Kfar Yuval. At 5 o'clock a.m., the fedayees took several hostages into a building and released a statement in which they demanded the release of Arab and Jewish mi-

litants presently in Israeli prisons. The hostages they took were

MAJOR RESISTANCE MOVEMENT OPERATION IN JERUSALEM

On July 4, 75 the largest Resistance movement operation in Jerusalem since 1948 exploded. In Haifa street near Zion Square, the timed explosive charges gave way and in so doing caused serious damage to various buildings, offices, a bank and several cars. In addition there were at least 115 casualties, 15 of which were killed.

Only half an hour later our revolutionaries armed with their guns and grenades engaged the enemy forces in a battle resulting in more losses for them.

Not surprisingly minister of Police Shlomo Hillel immediately requested from prime minister Rabin to not allow any decreases in the budget allotted for the police ministry. On the contrary he asked for more funds to increase « security » measures.

Neither he nor any of the Zionist leaders bothered to ask as to why the Palestinian Resistance is progressively increasing its military dimension. Can the Zionist State of Israel buy « security »? Obviously if they are to pursue their strategy which is based on the negation of Palestinian rights they will continue to imprison our people, but upon their release our people become more militantly ardent supporters of our just cause.

Israeli authorities immediately following the explosions arrested 300 Palestinians who by chance were near the area. The Zionist authorities will one day learn that no matter how many Palestinians they arrest, they will never be capable of arresting the spirit of the revolution as exemplified by the resistance.

mostly soldiers or members of a Nahal unit. (Nahal is a Zionist para-military youth organization which is instrumental in carrying out Israel's colonial aspirations in the occupied territories).

Some of the militants that the ALF fedayees demanded to be released were; 1) Archbishop Hilarion Capucci; 2) Sheikh Mohamed Abou Teir; 3) Abdel Rahim Jaber (PFLP); 4) Japanese Red Army militant, Okomoto; 5) Mohamed Taha; 6) Fatma Bernawi; 7) Aisha Shakhshiri; 8) Mariam Shakhshiri; 9) Members of the Red Front (Jews); and many more.

Instead of complying to the demands, the Israeli soldiers attacked. In a battle which lasted six hours, the four fedayees were martyred in addition twenty five Israelis were killed and nearly thirty were injured.

In retaliation, Israel conducted a campaign of shelling and aerial bombardment in southern Lebanon — Kfar Shouba and Nabatia. Hours after the attack the resistance movement responded by shelling Naharia, western Galilee, and the settlements of Mattala and Kfar Galladi. The resistance movement's quick response was a clear indication of our ability to defend ourselves against Israeli aggression. Our operations in the occupied areas is one of the reasons for such a large Israeli « defense » budget.

On June 20-21, operations were carried out in Gaza and Jerusalem. In Gaza a Fedayee attack in Israeli soldier, knifed him and took his weapons.

We can conclude that resistance operations in the last six months

number at least forty per month.

THE ISRAELIS ASK: WHY SUCH AN INCREASE ?

To the Zionists' dismay, Palestinians living under occupation are no longer pessimistic. They have confidence in their abilities. Obviously, there is no weapon that Israel possesses that could arrest or destroy this emerging confidence.

The military correspondent of « Yehdot Aharnot » wrote on May 29, 75 : « What distinguishes those who have been incarcerated recently is that many of them were organized through local initiatives. They have conducted their armed struggle with primitive means, and some have actually produced their own weapons.»

Furthermore, the Israeli defense minister, while on a visit to Qalqulia and Jineen, admitted that the inhabitants of the occupied territories were cooperating more closely with the resistance organizations. He then stated : « The authorities will use all means to curtail and stop all fedayee operations » (Ma'arev May 21, 75).

Also, in addition to relying on locally produced weapons, the fedayees have also been using weapons which they have stolen from the Israeli army. As all revolutionary movements have learned — the enemy supplies are large enough to supply the revolution also. (reported in Ha'aretz May 22, 75).

There has been a large wave of arrests recently, and the Israeli authorities claimed that they have found or uncovered most of the Palestinian militants responsible for the operations. However, « Davar » of May 15, 75 writes : « Many of the operations carried out by the terrorists in the occupied territories cause great difficulties for the internal security forces as they are unable to arrest many of those who actually carried them out.»

In response to their failure, the Israeli security forces once again have reverted to searching for new methods to stop the increasing operations of the resistance.

Shlomo Hillel, Minister of Police, has suggested the invoking of automatic executions of any one accused of being a fedayee. (Davar May 7, 75). Other Israeli responsibilities have suggested that the authorities use different forms of punishment, and in particular collective punishments. It has also been suggested to revert to deporting those who are associated with « terrorism » and their supporters. This method according to Israeli authorities would be most effective when accompanied by the taking over of the lands and homes of the deportees by either the army of Jewish settlers of youth organizations like the Nahal. (Davar May 9, 1975).

Of course this policy has been put to practice as part of Israeli colonial policy. To the dismay of the Israeli colonial administrators, their actions had a positive impact in solidifying our peoples' determination to conduct their just struggle.

OCCUPATION OF LANDS: NEW COLONIZATION

Israeli colonization is a fact and continues to expand. As we have indicated in previous articles in the

Bulletin No. 16, such a policy is directed not towards one area of occupied territories but to all areas i.e. Gaza, Rafah, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. Recently however, Israeli colonization has been concentrating on Rafah, so as to enable Israel to create conditions in north west Sinai, on the international Palestinian-Egyptian borders, where by it would be able to confront any future political developments that might arise in the future.

Israeli colonization policy aims at establishing new facts — settlements, as a result of the confiscation of Arab lands upon which these new settlements would be established. Rafah, to Israeli authorities forms a demarcation line between the Gaza strip and Sinai. In addition, immediately after the June, 67 war, the Israeli government's opinion (an internal one), viewed that : The « liberated » sector of the land, constituting one million Dunms, ought to form Israel's western borders with Egypt. By « liberated » the Israeli government meant that its borders should not remain open for the bedouins nor to the resistance movement. To insure this, Israeli policy postulated the need for the importation of Jewish settlers (urban and rural) who would serve as a barricade between Israel and the desert. (Davar March 26, 75).

Israeli policy has been successful in Rafah as a result of the forced relocation of the bedouins, the seizing of lands and other methods of Israeli terror. A small number of the original population remains there, as already 1538 families have been forcibly evicted. Israel is determined to keep this area under its

control, hence they have already planted the area with new artificial settlements that are nothing more than military border guards.

Israeli policy is best rationalized by Mr. Sheif who wrote the following in Ha'aretz of March 21, 1972 : « If the Gaza strip were to remain free of Jews, this would not only help the presence and the rule of the fedayeen, but it could also lead the local population to demand self determination and complete secession from Israel.»

Another explanation given by the Israeli authorities is that for « security reasons », the above mentioned area must come under their military control so as to prevent the fedayees from transporting their weapons into Gaza itself. It is also claimed that the resistance movement in cooperation with the bedouins have large underground arms depots.

We should not be fooled however ; Israeli policy emanates from the political decision of the must of the « Jewification » of all territories so as to forge Israeli rule by negating Palestinian resistance. Such a goal can be accomplished through increasing the border settlements that act as a buffer zone between Israel and the surrounding countries. As such, these settlements are in essence military barricades that serve Israeli colonial policy and aspirations.

WHAT ARE ISRAEL'S COLONIAL METHODS?

The creation of new settlements would have had no military value if the area would have remained surrounded by Arab villages and towns. Hence, Israeli policy was

translated through the confiscation of large portions of the land for « security reasons ». At the outset they were lenient, the local population was initially permitted to continue the cultivation of the land, later they were denied access to the land and finally they were forced to relinquish any claim to the land by signing away their rights. (Ma'arev August 20, 1974).

A quick review from 1969 would clarify and crystalize the aim of Israeli colonial policy. Throughout the year 1969, 20,000 dunms were confiscated and the following settlements were established upon it : Dakla, Sadout, Natif, Ma'arrath. In 1972 110,000 dunms were confiscated, where upon the colonial administration established a regional colonial center at Afe-shloum. In addition, the city of Yameet which is located in this region is to develop « to the point where it becomes a major industrial center and perhaps with time into a seaport (in the southern part) to enhance Israeli trade » (Davar March 26, 1975).

In the same source cited above, colonel Samuel, the porte-parole of the military administration of Gaza (it also incorporates Rafah) stated that since 1969, of the lands that were confiscated 20,000 dunms are being used for planting fruits, 49,000 dunms are planted by palm trees, 58,000 dunms are good for wheat etc. In addition numerous houses have been demolished and tens of water wells have been destroyed. In the meantime, the bedouins and the rest of the local population who were forcibly removed their lands were neither compensated or even resettled.

The former residents of Rafah organized an informational campaign that put them in contact with the International Red Cross. They also sent a telegram to the U.N. so as to take measures in stopping Israeli colonization. To no ones surprise Israel's response was simply the removal of one officer from his position, insinuating that the problem was one of violations of policy and not the policy itself.

Our people however, are not confused by such tactics, for they know that the road to liberation is armed struggle. Consequently, it should not be surprising that the level of our armed struggle is consistently increasing. We have no illusions, and our people are not fooled by Israeli policies.





THE 1936 - 39 REVOLT IN PALESTINE : BACKGROUND, DETAILS AND ANALYSIS

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This is the fifth part of Comrade Kanafani's study on the 1936-39 revolt in Palestine. The study was originally published in Arabic in Sho'oun Falastinia (Palestine Affairs) of the PLO Research Center.



This means that the overwhelming majority of the population was not represented in these parties which, although they represented the feudal and religious leaders, the urban compradors and certain sectors of the intellectuals, they were always subject to the leadership of the Mufti and his class, which represented the feudal-clerical leaders, and was more nationalist than the leadership which represented the urban bourgeoisie. The latter was represented by the effendis at a time when they were starting to invest their money in industry and works? (This trend became more pronounced after the defeat of the 1936-1939 revolt).

The petty bourgeoisie in general (small traders, shopkeepers, teachers, civil servants and craftsmen) and no leadership. As a class they had had no influence and no importance under the Turkish regime, which depended on the effendi class, to which the Turks gave the right of local government, due to the fact that it had grown in conjunction with the feudal aristocracy.

The labour movement was newly established and weak and was, as a result, exposed to oppression by the authorities, crushing competition from the Jewish proletariat and bourgeoisie and persecution by the leadership of the Arab nationalist movement.

Before the Arab Higher Committee was formed, with Hajj Amin al-Husaini at its head, on 25 April 1935, Jamal al-Husaini, the leader of the Arab Party, had been dissatisfied by people's growing belief that the English were the real enemy, and the National Defense Party which represented, first and foremost, the growing urban comprador class, was not really disposed for an open clash with the British.

Only two days earlier, on 23 April 1936, Weizmann, the leader of the Zionist movement, had made a speech in Tel Aviv in which he described the Arab-Zionist struggle, which was beginning to break out, as a struggle between destructive and constructive elements, thereby putting the Zionist forces in their place as the instrument of colo-

rialism on the eve of the armed clash. This was the position on both sides of the field on the eve of the revolt!

In the countryside the revolt assumed the form of civil disobedience and armed insurrection. Hundreds of armed men flocked to join the bands that had begun to fan out in the mountains. Non-payment of taxes was decided on at the conference held in the Raudat al-Ma'aref al-Wataniya college in Jerusalem on May 7, 1936 and was attended by about 150 delegates representing the Arabs of Palestine. A review of the names of the delegates made by Isa al-Sifri⁷⁴ shows that it was at this conference that the leadership of the mass movement committed itself to an unsubstantial alliance between the feudal-religious leaderships, the urban commercial bourgeoisie and a limited number of the intellectuals. The resolution adopted by this conference was brief, but it was a clear illustration of the extent to which a leadership of this kind was capable of reaching.

«The conference decided unanimously to announce that no taxes will be paid as from May 15, 1936 if the British government does not make a radical change in its policy by stopping Jewish immigration.»

The British response to civil disobedience and armed insurrection was to strike at two key points: the first was the organisational cadre which was, for the most part, more revolutionary than the leadership, and the second the impoverished masses who had taken part in the revolt and who in fact had nothing but their own arms to protect them.

This goes a long way towards explaining why the only two elements who were comparatively proficient at organisation were arrested, while the rest were subjected either to arrest or to harassment to the extent that they were totally paralysed. This is shown by the fact that 61 Arabs responsible for organising the strike (the middle cadre) were arrested on May 23. However, these arrests did not prevent Britain from giving permits to four of the leaders of the

revolt, Jamal al-Husaini, Shibli al-Jamal, Abd al-Latif Salah and Dr. Izzat Tannus to travel to London and meet the Minister for the Colonies, which took place on June 12. There was nothing unusual about this incident, which was to be constantly repeated throughout the subsequent months and years. The British High Commissioner had observed with great satisfaction that «the Friday sermons were much more moderate than I had expected, at a time when feelings are so strong. This was mainly due to the Mufti».⁷⁵

From the outset the situation had been that the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement regarded the revolt of the masses as merely intended to exert pressure on British colonialism with the object of improving the conditions of the masses as a class. The British were profoundly aware of this fact, and acted accordingly. They did not, however, take the trouble to grant this class the concessions it desired; London persisted in meeting its commitments as regards handing over the colonialist heritage in Palestine to the Zionist movement and, moreover, it was during the years of the revolt - 1936-1939 - that British colonialism threw all its weight into performing the task of supporting the Zionist presence and setting it on its feet, as we shall see later.

The British succeeded in achieving this in two ways: by striking at the poor peasant revolutionaries with unprecedented violence, and by employing their extensive influence with the Arab regimes, which played a major role in liquidating the revolt:

Firstly: The British Emergency Regulations played an effective role. As-Sifri cites a group of sentences passed at the time to show how unjust these regulations were: «six years imprisonment for possessing a revolver - 12 years for possessing a bomb - five years with hard labour for possessing 12 bullets - 8 months on a charge of misdirecting a detachment of soldiers, nine years on a charge of possessing explosives - five years for trying to buy ammunition from soldiers - two weeks imprisonment

for possessing a stick... etc.⁷⁶

According to a British estimate submitted to the League of Nations, the number of Arabs killed in the 1936 revolt was about one thousand, apart from wounded, missing and interned.

The British employed the policy of blowing up houses on a wide scale. In addition to blowing up and destroying part of the city of Jaffa (June 18, 1936) where the number of houses blown up was estimated at 220 and the number of persons rendered homeless at 6,000. In addition one hundred huts were demolished in Jabalia, 300 in Abu Kabir, 350 in Shaikh Murad and 75 in Arab al-Daudi. It is clear that the inhabitants of the quarters that were destroyed in Jaffa and of the huts that were destroyed in the outskirts were poor peasants who had left the country for the town. In the villages, according to Al-Sifri's estimate, 143 houses were blown up for reasons directly connected with the revolt.⁷⁷ these houses belonged to poor peasants, some medium peasants and a very small number of feudal families.

Secondly: amir Abdullah of Transjordan and Nuri Sa'id started to take action to mediate with the Arab Higher Arab Committee. However, their mediation was unsuccessful, despite the readiness of the leaderships to accept their good offices. But the movement of the masses was not yet (August 1936) ready to be domesticated, although these contacts did have a negative effect on the revolt, and left a feeling that the conflict then in progress was amenable to settlement. And in fact this initiative which started with failure was to be completely successful in October of the same year, only about seven weeks later.

Not that these contacts were the only form assumed by the dialectic of the relations between Palestine and the neighbouring Arab countries. This dialectic was more complicated and reflected the complexity of the conflicts. We have already seen what Al-Qassam represented in this field, and in fact the Qassamist phenomenon in this sense continued to exist. Large

numbers of Arab freedom fighters poured into Palestine; among them were Sa'id al-As, who was killed in October 1936, Shaikh Muhammad al-Ashmar and many others. This influx also comprised a number of adventurist nationalist officers, the most prominent of whom was Fauzi al-Qawuqji who, shortly after entry into Palestine at the head of a small band in August 1936 declared himself commander in chief of the revolt.

Although these men improved and expanded the tactics of the rebels, the greater part of the burden of revolutionary violence in the country and of commando action in the towns, continued to be borne by the dispossessed Peasants. In fact it was the «officers» who emerged from the ranks of the peasants themselves who continued

Although the British officials in Palestine did not completely agree with London's policy of reckless support for the Zionist movement, and thought that there was room for an Arab class leadership whose interests were not linked with the revolt, to cooperate with colonialism, Britain finally accepted, so it seems, on June 19, 1936, the «importance of the organic link between the safety of British interests and the success of Zionism in Palestine»⁷⁸. Britain decided to strengthen its forces in Palestine and to increase repressive measures.

Frightened by this decision, the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement vacillated and lost its nerve. Hajj Amin al-Husaini, Raghib Nashashibi and Auni Abd al-Hadi hastened to meet the British High Commissioner, and it is clear from reports he sent to his government at the time they confirmed that they were prepared to end the revolt if the Arab kings asked them to do so. They did not, however, dare to admit to the masses that they were the originators of this tortuous scheme, and repeatedly denied it.

After this large numbers of British troops, estimated at twenty thousand, poured into Palestine, and on 30 July 1936, when they had all arrived, a decree was issued enforcing martial law. The mandatory authorities stepped up their policy of relentless repression, and September and October witnessed battles of the greatest violence — the last battles, in fact, to cover nearly the whole of Palestine.

Oct.-Nov. 1936 the Arab Higher Committee distributed a statement calling for an end to the strike, and thereby the revolt: «Inasmuch as submission to the will of their Majesties and Highnesses the Arab kings and to comply with their wishes is one of our hereditary Arab traditions, and inasmuch as the Arab Higher Committee firmly believes that their Majesties and Highnesses would only give orders that are in conformity with the interests of their sons and with the object of protecting their rights; the Arab Higher Committee, in obedience to the wishes of their Majesties and Highnesses, the Kings and amirs, and form its belief in the great benefit that will result from their mediation and cooperation, calls on the noble Arab people to end the strike and the disturbances, in obedience to these orders, whose

only object is the interests of the Arabs».⁷⁹

Exactly a month later (on 11/11/1936) the «General Command of the Arab Revolt in Southern Syria-Palestine» announced that it «calls for all acts of violence to be stopped completely, and that there should be no provocation to anything liable to disturb the atmosphere of the negotiations which the Arab nation hopes will succeed and obtain the full right of the country»⁸⁰ Ten days later the same command issued another statement in which it declared that it had «left the field, from its confidence in the guarantee of the Arab kings and amirs, and to protect the safety of the negotiations».⁸¹

As Jamil al-Shuqairi says: «So, in obedience to the orders of the kings and amirs, the strike was called off, and the activities of the revolt came to an end within two hours of the call being published».⁸²

Although at that time Britain was challenging the Palestinian leaderships on precisely the point over which they had deceived the masses — the question of Jewish immigration to Palestine, and although these leaders decided to boycott the Royal Commission (the Peel Commission), the Arab kings and amirs obliged these leaderships to obey them for the second time in less than three months. King Abdul Aziz Al Sa'ud and King Ghazi wrote letters to Hajj Amin al-Husaini saying: «In view of our confidence in the good intentions of the British government to do justice to the Arabs, it is our opinion that your interest requires that you should meet the Royal Commission». In fact this incident, which appears trivial, shattered the alliance in the leadership of the nationalist movement, as the forces to the right of Hajj Amin al-Husaini, led by the Defence Party, immediately opposed the decision to boycott the Peel Commission, and gave numerous indications of their desire to accept the settlement that Britain was to propose. The leaders of this party, which represented mainly the urban effendis, relied on the discontent felt by the big merchants in the towns and on the dislocation of the interests of the urban bourgeoisie, which depended on close economic relations embodied in the agencies they held from British, and sometimes Jewish, industrial firms.

The Arab regimes, especially that of Transjordan, strongly supported the attitude of this right wing, and Hajj Amin al-Husaini and what he represented had no inclination to turn to the leftist front which, in fact, he had started to liquidate. Thus his attitude began to be increasingly vacillating and hesitant, and it was clear that he had got into a position where he could not take a single step forward with the revolt, and where, equally, retreat could no longer do him any good. However, when the British thought that they could now achieve the political liquidation of the Mufti in the period of quiet that followed the end of the strike, they found that this was not true, and that the Mufti's right wing was still much too weak to control the situation. The British High Commis-

sioner, maliciously continued to realise how great a role the Mufti could play while he was restricted to that position between the Defence Party on his right and the Independence Party (its left wing) and the young intellectuals' movements on his left. This High Commissioner realised Britain's ability to take advantage of the wide margin between «the inflexibility (obstinacy) of the villagers who resisted for six months, receiving little pay but not indulging in plunder» and the weakness or non-existence of great qualities of leadership in the members of the (Arab Higher) Committee».⁸³

The correctness of the High Commissioner's view of the limited role that the Mufti's right-wing could play was shown when the Defence Party failed to take an unambiguous stand against the report of the Peel Commission, which published on 7 July 1937, recommended partition and the establishment of a Jewish state.

At the same time, it became clear that the High Commissioner's fear that pressure from the Mufti's left-wing might lead him to abandon his moderate attitude was not groundless. This pressure, however, was not exerted by the quarter from which the High Commissioner had expected it, but by the middle cadre which was still represented on the national committees, and which was daily represented by groups of dispossessed peasants and unemployed workers in the cities and the countryside.

Thus the only course left to the Mufti was to flee. He avoided arrest by taking refuge in the Haram al-Sharif, but events forced him into a position which he had not been able to take up a year earlier. In July 1937 Andrews, the District Commissioner of the Galilee district, was shot dead by four armed commandos outside the Anglican church in Nazareth. Andrews was «the only official who administered the Mandate as Zionists consider it right.. he never succeeded in winning the confidence of the fellahin». The Arabs regarded him as a friend of the Jews, and believed that his task was to facilitate the transfer of Galilee to the Jewish state that had been demarcated by the partition proposal. The Arab peasants disliked him, and accused him of facilitating the sale of the Huleh lands, and the commandos who killed him are believed to have belonged to one of the secret cells of the Qassamits. (84)

Although the Arab Higher Committee condemned this incident in the same night, the situation, exactly as had happened when Al-Qassam was killed, had got out of the control of the Mufti and his group so that, if they wanted to remain at the head of the national movement, they had to hang on to it and mount the rising wave, as had happened in April 1936.

This time, however, the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses was more violent, not only because of the experience they had acquired during the past year, but also because the conflict that was taking place before their eyes had become increasingly clear. It is certain that this stage of the revolt was directed substantially, if not entirely, against

the British rather than the Jews. The growth of the conflict had led to the crystallisation of more clear-cut positions: the peasants were in almost complete control of the revolt, the role of the urban bourgeoisie had retreated somewhat, and the wealthy people in the country and the big middle peasants were hesitant to support the rebels, while the Jewish forces had effectively gone on the offensive.

There are two important questions to be considered as regards this stage of the revolt.

1 — «The Arabs contacted the Jews, proposing that they reach some kind of an agreement on the basis of a complete severance of relations with Britain. But the Jews immediately rejected this, because they regarded their relations with Britain as fundamental». (85) This was accompanied by a rise in the number of Jews serving in the police in Palestine; from 365 in 1935 to 682 in 1936, and at the end of that year the government announced the recruitment of 1240 Jews as additional policemen armed with army rifles. A month later the figure rose to 2863 (86) and British officers played a prominent role in leading Jewish groups in attacks on Jewish villages.

2 — The fact that the leadership of the revolt was outside Palestine (in Damascus) made the role of the local leadership, most of which were of poor peasant origin, more important than it had been in the previous period. These were closely linked with the peasants. This does much to explain to what extent the revolt was able to go. In this period, for example, Abd al-Rahim al-Hajj emerged as a local commander, and the communists say that they were in contact with him and supplied him with information (87). This development might have constituted a historic turning point in the revolt had it not been for the weakness of the «left» in both the relative and the true sense, and had not these local commands been obliged to maintain their organisational link, to a certain extent, with the «Central Committee for Struggle» (Jihad) in Damascus, not only because of their traditional loyalty to it, but also because they depended on it to some extent for financing.

In the whole history of the Palestinian struggle the armed popular revolt was never closer to victory than in the months between the end of 1937 and the beginning of 1939. In this period the British forces' control of Palestine weakened, the prestige of colonialism was at its lowest, and the reputation and influence of the revolt became the principal force in the country.

However, at this time, Britain became more convinced that it would have to rely on Zionists had provided them with a unique situation that they had never found in any of their colonies — they had at their disposal a local force which had common cause with British colonialism and was highly mobilized against the local population.

At this time Britain began to be alarmed to the necessity of diverting part of its military forces to confront the ever more critical situation in Europe. Therefore



viewed with increasing favour « the rapid organization of a Jewish volunteer defense force in addition to the force of 6,500 men already in existence ». (88) It had already gone some way in pursuing a policy of relying on the local Zionist force and handing over to it many of the tasks of repression, which were increasing. However, it did not destroy the bridge which it had always maintained with the class led by the Mufti, and it was in this field and at this time in particular that the British played a major role in maintaining the Mufti as the undisputed representative of the Palestinian Arabs. Their reserves of the leadership on the right of the Mufti were practically exhausted so that if the Mufti were no longer regarded as the sole leader, this would « leave no one who can represent the Arabs except the leaders of the revolt in the mountains », as the British High Commissioner for Palestine said. There can be no doubt that this, among other reasons, contributed to keeping the Mufti at the head of the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement in spite of the fact that he had left his place of refuge in the Aqsa Mosque, in an exiting manner, and had been in Damascus since the end of January 1937.

British oppression, which had escalated at an unexpected level and the escalation of police raids mass arrests and executions throughout 1937 and 1938 weakened the revolt but did not end it. The British had come to realise that both in essence and substance, and as regards its local leadership, it was a peasant revolt. When, as a result of this, the revolutionary spirit that prevailed throughout the whole of Palestine led to everyone in the towns wearing the peasant head-dress (keffiyah and agal) so that the countryman coming into the town should not be subjected to oppression by the authorities. Later, all were forbidden to carry their identity cards, so that the authorities should not be able to distinguish a townsman from a countryman.

This situation indicates very clearly the nature of the revolt and its influence at that time. The countryside in general was the cradle of the revolt, and the temporary occupation of towns in 1938 was achieved after attacks by peasants (90) from outside. This meant that it was the peasants and villagers in general who were paying the highest price.

In 1938 a number of peasants were executed merely for being in possession of arms. A rapid glance at the list of the names of those who were sent to prison or to the gallows, shows us that the overwhelming majority were poor peasants. For example, « all the inhabitants of the village of Ain Karem, three thousand in number, were sentenced to go ten kilometres every day to report to the police

station » (91) During that period Britain sentenced about 2,000 Arabs to long terms of imprisonment, demolished more than 5,000 houses and executed by hanging 148 persons in Acre prison, and there were more than 5,000 in prison for varying terms. (92)

Britain which in November 1938, had abandoned the partition proposal recommended by the Peel Report, now started trying to gain time. The Round Table Conference held in London in February 1939 was a typical illustration of the dubious transaction that was going on silently all the time between the command of the Palestinian revolt and the British, who knew for certain that the command was prepared to bargain at any moment. Of course Jamal al-Husseini did not go to the Round Table Conference in London alone; he was accompanied by representatives of the « independent » Arab countries. Thus the Arab regimes which were subject to colonialism were destined for the second time in less than two years to impose their will on the Arabs of Palestine through the identity (latent and potential) of interests of all those who sat around the Round Table in London.

The speeches made by Jamal al-Husseini, Amir Faisal (Saudi Arabia), Amir Hussein (the Yemen), Ali Mahir (Egypt) and Nuri al-Sa'id (Iraq), who declared that he was speaking as a close friend of Britain and who did not want to say a single word that might hurt the feelings of any Briton, because he was their friend from the bottom of his heart » (93) — only confirmed the success of the policy which Britain for so long been carefully pursuing vis-à-vis the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement; it did not abandon it, and kept it constantly at the end of an open bridge. And the British were confident that Iraq and Saudi Arabia « were prepared to use their influence with the Palestinian leaders to put an end to the revolt and ensure the success of the Conference. »

However, the revolt in Palestine had not subsided; (according to official figures, in February 1939, 110 were killed and 112 wounded in 12 engagements with the British 39 villages were searched, curfew was imposed in three towns three times, about 200 villagers were arrested, there were fires in five government departments, ten Arabs were executed on charges of carrying arms, there were attacks on ten Jewish settlements, the oil pipeline was blown up, a train between Haifa and Lydda was mined, and a search post was set up in the Aqsa Mosque).

The British figures presented by the Colonial Secretary show that « between 20 December and 29 February, there were 348 incidents of assassination, 140 acts of sabotage, 19 kidnappings, 23 thefts, 9 mine and 32 bomb explosions, while the Army lost 18 dead and 39 wounded, and the Palestinians lost 83 dead and 124 wounded; these figures do not include casualties to the rebels »... (94)

Things continued in this way until September 1939, the month in which the Second World War

broke out. In the meantime the Palestinian Arabs suffered irreplaceable losses; the leadership quite apart from the spirit of compromise that was afoot, was outside the country; the newly constituted local commands were falling one after the other on the various fields of battle, British oppression had reached its climax, and Zionist violence had been constantly escalating since the middle of 1937. There can be no doubt that British concentration and the persistence that accompanied it in the Palestinian theatre had exhausted the rebels who, with their leadership, no longer really knew who they were fighting against or why. At one moment the leadership would talk of traditional friendship and common interests with Britain, at another went so far as to agree to the granting of autonomy to the Jews in the areas where they were settled. There can be no doubt that the vacillation of the leadership, its inability to determine a clear objective to fight for played its part in weakening the revolt.

But this must not lead us to neglect the objective factor: the British used two divisions of troops, several squadrons of planes, the police, and the Transjordan Frontier Force, in addition to the six thousand strong Jewish Quasi force; all this was thrown in the gain control of the situation. (The Peel Commission admitted that security expenditure in Palestine had risen from 826 in 1935 to 2,223,000 in 1936).

This campaign of terrorism and the efforts that were made to cut the rebels' links with the villages, exhausted the revolt. The killing of Abd al-Rahim al-Hajj Muhammad in March 1939 came as a crushing blow to the revolt, depriving it of one of the bravest, wisest and most honest of the popular revolutionary

leaders. After that the local commands started to collapse and leave the field. Moreover, the Franco-British rapprochement on the eve of the Second World War certainly made it easier to surround the rebels; Arif Abd al-Razzaq, worn out by hunger and pursuit, was handed over to the French, along with some of his followers; Jordanian forces arrested Yusuf Abu Daur and handed him over to the British, who executed him. Also terrorism in the villages had made people afraid to support the rebels and supply them with ammunition and food, and doubtless the lack of even a minimum of organisation made it impossible to surmount these obstacles.

At the time the Palestinian Communist Party attributed the failure of the revolt to five principal causes:

- 1 — The absence of the revolutionary leadership.
- 2 — The individualism and opportunism of the leaders of the revolt.
- 3 — The lack of a central command for the forces of the revolt.
- 4 — The weakness of the Palestinian Communist Party.
- 5 — The inauspicious world situation.

On the whole, this is correct, but to these causes must be added the fact that the Communist Party was

close to the leadership of Hajj Amin al-Husaini, whom they viewed as « belonging to the most extremely anti-imperialist wing of the nationalist movement », while it regarded his enemies as « feudalist » traitors. (96) And this in spite of the fact that the Mufti's group had absolutely no hesitation in liquidating leftist elements who tried to penetrate labour circles.

The communist left, in addition to being weak, was incapable of reaching the countryside; it was concentrated in certain towns. It had failed to Arabise the Party, as the Seventh Comintern Congress had recommended, and was still a victim of its restricted view of Arab unity, and of relations, as far as the struggle was concerned, with the rest of the Arab homeland, which had organisational repercussions.

It is clear that the shortcoming that was mainly responsible for this defeat was the great gap caused by the rapid movement of society in Palestine which, as we have seen, was undergoing an extremely violent transformation from an Arab agricultural society into a Jewish industrial one. This was the real reason why the Arab nationalist bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie did not play their historical role in the Palestinian nationalist movement at the time, and allowed the feudal religious leaders to lead this movement for a long period without rivals.

Dr. Abd al-Wahhab al-Kayyali adds other important causes. « Weariness with fighting » he says, « constant military pressure, and the hope that some aspects of the White Paper would be applied, in addition to the lack of arms and ammunition, all played their part in making it difficult to continue the revolt. Moreover, in view of the fact that the world was on the brink of the Second World War, France suppressed the rebels' headquarters in Damascus. » (97)

To all this we can add two important interconnected factors which can be discussed together, as they played a prominent role in frustrating the revolt. They are the attitude of Transjordan as embodied in the attitude of the subservient regime led by the Amir Abdullah, and the activity carried on by agents of the counter-revolution in the interior on the periphery of the terrorist activities of the British and Zionist forces.

The Defence Party, led by Raghib Nashashibi, played the role of legal representative of the subservient Transjordan regime in the Palestinian nationalist movement. This link was probably a kind of camouflage because of the party's inability to reveal the links of subservience which connected it with British colonialism in the midst of a battle in which the principal enemy was that same colonialism. Therefore the link with the regime in Transjordan was a sort of camouflage accepted by both sides. The Defence Party consisted of a small group of urban effendis who chiefly represented the interests of the rising comprador bourgeoisie and had begun to discover that its existence and growth depended on its being linked not only with British colonialism but also with the Zionist movement which controlled the in-

dustrial transformation of the Palestinian economy. Because of this class situation it is possible to sum up their history by saying that they « cooperated with the occupation authorities in the administrative field and with Zionism in the commercial field, sold land to the Jews, acted as brokers, disseminated misgivings, impeded nationalist activity, strengthened the link between Abdullah and Husain and the Zionists in 1923-1924, supported immigration and the Mandate in the twenties and partition in the thirties, advocated the establishment of a Jewish national home in part of Palestine and the surrender of the other part to Transjordan... etc. (98)

While the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan was suppressing the Transjordanian mass movement which, on its own initiative had decided at the popular conference held with Mithqal al-Faiz in the chair in the village of Umm al-Amd, to support the Palestinian revolt with men and material, the British decided to consider Transjordan as part of the field of action against the activities of the Palestinian rebels.

The role played by the subservient Transjordan regime was not restricted to this; it closed the roads to Iraq to prevent any support arriving, and restricted the movements of the Palestinian leaders who, after the construction of the barbed wire entanglement along the northern frontier of Palestine, had been obliged to increase their activities from Transjordan. The regime's activities culminated in its arrest in 1939 of two Palestinian leaders. One of them, Yusuf Abu Durrar was handed over to the British whereupon he was executed.

At the time the forces of the Transjordan regime were engaged, side by side with the British troops and the Zionist gangs, in hunting down the rebels. There can be no doubt that this role played by the Transjordan regime encouraged elements of the internal counter-revolution to step up their activities. A number of the Defense Party leaders took part in the establishment of what they called « peace detachments » - small mercenary

forces which were formed in cooperation with the English and helped to hunt down the rebels and took part in engagements with them and evicted them from some of the positions they controlled. Fakhri al-Nashashibi was one of these divisions, in arming them and directing their activities... this led to his being killed a few months after the end of the revolt ». (99) Before that, the savage British campaign to disarm the whole of Palestine had depended on « encouraging elements hostile to the Mufti to supply them (the British) with information and to identify rebels ». (100)

The attitudes of Iraq and Saudi Arabia at that time were not much better than that of the Jordanian regime. At the London Conference they had expressed their readiness « to use their influence with the Palestinian leaders to put an end to the revolt ». (101). But all this could not make of the leaders of the counter-revolution, the agents of the British, a force that had any weight with the masses. On the contrary, it strengthened the Mufti and his leadership, whereas the encouragement of counter-revolutionary elements was intended, among other things, to curb the Mufti and confine him within a field that could eventually be controlled, and throughout the British acted in accordance with their conviction that Al-Nashashibi could never be a substitute for the Mufti.

The small margin employed by the Mufti's command, which was the result of the minor disputes then in progress between French colonialism in Syria and Lebanon and British colonialism, was not capable of leading to a radical change in the balance of power, and it soon contracted to the point where it hardly existed at all on the eve of the War.

These facts as a whole show that the Palestinian revolt was attacked and received blows in its three most vital points :

1 - The subjective point - meaning the incapacity, vacillation, weakness subjectivity and anarchy of its various leaders.

2 - The Arab point - meaning the collusion of the Arab regimes to frustrate it at a time when the weak

popular Arab nationalist movement was only interacting with the Palestinian revolt in a selective, subjective and marginal way.

3 - The international point - meaning the immense disequilibrium in the objective balance of power which resulted from the alliance of all the members of the colonialist camp with each other and also with the Zionist movement, which was henceforward to have at its disposal not an inconsiderable striking force on the eve of the Second World War.

The best estimate of Arab human losses in the 1936-39 revolt is that which states that losses in the four years totalled 19,792 killed and wounded; this includes the casualties sustained by the Arabs at the hands of the Zionist gangs in the same period.

This estimate is based on the first conservative admissions contained in official British reports, checked against other documents. (102) These calculations establish that 1200 Arabs were killed in 1936, 120 in 1937, 1200 in 1938 and 1200 in 1939. In addition 112 Arabs were executed and 1200 killed in various terrorist operations. This makes the total of Arabs killed in the 1936-39 revolt, 5,032, while 14,760 were wounded in the same period.

Detainees numbered about 816 in 1937, 2,463 in 1938, and approximately 5,679 in 1939.

The real significance of these figures can be shown by comparisons. In relation to numbers of inhabitants, Palestinian losses in 1936-1939 are equivalent to losses by Britain of 200,000 killed, 600,000 wounded and 2,224,000 arrested. In the case of America the losses would be one million killed, 3 million wounded and 1,120,000 arrested !

But the real and most serious losses lay in the rapid growth, of both military and economic levels, of the foundations of the Zionist settler entity in Palestine.

It is no exaggeration to say that this economic and military presence, whose links with imperialism grew stronger established its principal foundations in this period between 1936 and 1939, and one Israeli historian goes so far as to say that « the conditions for the Zionist victory had in 1948 been created in the period of the Arab revolt ». (103)

The general policy followed by the Zionists during this period can be seen in their profound determination to avoid any conflict between themselves and the mandatory authorities, even at a time when the latter, hard-pressed by the Arab rebels, were obliged to refuse some of the vigorous demands of the Zionist movement.

The Zionists clearly knew that if they gave the British - who at that time had the strongest and most aggressive colonial army in the world - the chance to crush the Arab revolt in Palestine, this army would be doing a greater service to their schemes than they could ever have dreamed of.

Thus the main Zionist plans ran along two parallel lines : the closest possible alliance with Britain - to the extent that the 20th Zionist Congress held in the summer of 1937, expressed its readiness to accept partition in its determination to conciliate Britain and to avoid any clash with it. Such a policy was pursued so as to allow colonialist imperialism to crush the Arab revolt that had broken out again that summer.

The other line of their policy consisted of the continuous internal mobilisation of Zionist settler society, under the slogan adopted by Ben Gurion at that time of « no alternative », which emphasised the necessity of laying the foundations of a military society and of its military and economic instruments.

The question of the greatest possible conciliation of the British, in spite of the fact that they had, for example, taken steps to reduce Jewish immigration, was a pivotal point in the history of Zionist policy at that period, and in spite of the fact that there were in the movement certain elements that rejected what was called « self-control », the voice of this minority had no effect.

During this period cooperation and interaction between the two lines of policy-alliance with the Mandate to the greatest possible extent, and the mobilisation of Jewish settler society-had extremely important consequences.

The Jewish bourgeoisie took advantage of the spread of the Arab revolt to execute many of the projects that they would not have been able to implement under different circumstances. Suddenly freed from the competition of cheap Arab agricultural produce, this bourgeoisie proceeded to take action to promote its economic existence. Naturally it was not possible to do this without the blessing of the British.

74. Sifri, Op.cit., pp. 39, 40.
75. Kayyali, Op.cit., p. 311.
76. Sifri, Op.cit., p. 60
77. Ibid., p. 93.
78. Kayyali, Op.cit., p. 319
79. Documents, p. 454.
80. Ibid., p. 457.

81. Ibid., p. 458.
82. Collection, p. 8
83. Kayyali, Op.cit., p. 326.
84. Neville Barbour, Nisi Dominus, London, pp. 183-193.
85. Kayyali, Op.cit., p. 338.
86. Jewish Observer, Sept. 20, 1963, London, pp. 13-14.
87. Abdul Qadir Yasin, al Katib, No. 121, April 1971, p. 114.
88. Kayyali, Op.cit., p. 346.
89. Ibid., p. 346.
90. In May 1938, the rebels occupied Hebron after they had already occupied the old port of Jerusalem. On Sept. 9, they occupied Beer-sheba and released prisoners. On Oct. 5, they occupied Tiberias; in early August parts of Nablus, etc.
91. Bouyissir, Op.cit., p. 247.
92. Ibid., p. 247.
93. Ibid., p. 258.
94. al-Ahram, March 1, 1939, Cairo.
95. Yasin, Op.cit., p. 115.
96. Ibid., p. 114.
97. Kayyali, Op.cit., p. 359.
98. Sayegh, Anis. The Hashemite & the Palestine Question, Beirut, 1966, p. 150.
99. Ibid. See also al-Talia'a, No. 4, April 7, 1971, Cairo, p. 98.
100. Kayyali, Op.cit. p. 348.
101. A letter from Baghdad to the British Foreign Ministry, 31 Oct. 1930. Quoted in Kayyali, Ibid., p. 349.
102. Walid Khalidi, ed. From Haven to Conquest, IPS, Beirut, 1971, pp. 836-849.
103. Bouyissir, Op.cit., p. 21.



To Be Continued Next Issue

In Pakistan all those, who have demanded the establishment of democracy and national rights for minority nationalities, have been always victims of oppression and suppression.

Repeated military attacks on the Baluch people in Baluchistan, intolerable treatment of Pakhtoon nationalities, terrorism against the people of Sind and the tragedy of Bangladesh had made the aims of the ruling clique of Pakistan abundantly clear to the world. But the savage treatment which Bhutto's present fascist military-bureaucratic government has meted out to his political opponents, may, perhaps find parallel in the history of Hitler's and Mussolini's fascist governments. The official machinery of coercion and violence throughout Pakistan is busy every day in devising new methods of oppression and torture. But the inhuman treatment to which the Baluch political cadres, intellectuals, workers and students under pretext of interrogation, are being subjected, demands the attention of the world humanitarian organisations and progressive masses.


POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF BHUTTO :

To understand the political philosophy of Bhutto's neo-fascism, it is necessary to know his political background.

Bhutto is the son of a big feudalist, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, of Sind who was very familiar to the people of Sind as a sworn enemy of the Sindi peasants. The people of Sind rejected Sir Shah Nawaz in politics and compelled him to leave Sind. In compliance with a decree of the Sindi people, he left the province and never returned back to the area.

Premier Bhutto entered in Politics of Pakistan through the backdoor by the favours of the hated usurper. Iskandar Mirza, after which he was retained by General Ayub Khan after his military Coup. Today's « hero of democracy » was the first treacherous who supported the army coup which was aimed at preventing the resolution of National autonomy of the people of Baluchistan, Pakhtoonistan and Sind, as the motion was on the agenda to be moved in the National Assembly of Pakistan for the dismemberment of « One Unit » of the four provinces Panjab, Sind, Baluchistan and Pakhtoonistan).

Ayub military Coup (1958) was planned to save « One Unit » which was the political tool of the exploiting punjabi vested interests and was in its death pangs. The



STRUGGLE IN BALUCHISTAN

traitor Ayub Khan conspired with Iskandar Mirza to bring an end to the Constitution and the Parliament. Mr. Bhutto served in Ayub's army dictatorial regime for eight years as minister. He is known to be an admirer of Adolph Hitler and Benito Mussolini. After 1966, when he was dismissed from the Ayub's government, he tried to come to power by fair or foul means. He formed a political party — the Pakistan People's party — which is now known as « Pakistan Police party » among Pakistani people.

In the election of 1970 his party became the second biggest political party in the National Assembly of Pakistan. The Awami League of Sheikh Mujeb-Ur-Rahman got a majority in the National Assembly and General Yahya (then President of Pakistan) once declared that the Prime Minister of future would be Sheikh Mujeb-Ur-Rahman, the chief of Awami League. Mr. Bhutto did not agree to this and publicly declared that he was not prepared to sit on the opposition benches. And he gave an abnoxious theory to the people by declaring that there are three Parties in the country who are inheritors of the future government and these are the Awami League, his party and the Army. He further claimed that his Party has the support of the Army and therefore he has every right to be shared in the government.

In the last week of February 1970, he announced a boycott of the Assembly. As if the army was only waiting for the opportunity, on the 25th, March 1970 Army's General Yahya announced the arrest of Sheikh Mujib whom only a few days earlier he had declared as the Prime Minister of future government. The campaign of mass killing of the people of the eastern Part of Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was launched. On 20th March 1970,

Mr. Bhutto, in a public statement supported the action of the Army and said « God had saved Pakistan ».

After the independence of Bangladesh, the army was not in a position to rule directly as it has been ruling since 1958, the remaining Western Part of Pakistan, therefore they invited Bhutto to serve them. Army generals nominated him as Chief Martial law administrator and also « President » of Pakistan. In the history of the world Mr. Bhutto is perhaps the first civilian who acted as the chief martial law Administrator. Soon after his taking over, general Tikka was appointed the chief of the staff of the army, though the people of Pakistan were demanding the trial of Tikka as he was responsible for the mass killing of the people of Bangladesh and consequently its breakaway. This background of conspiracies and terrorism gave birth to Bhuttoism.

Before proceeding further it is necessary to have a short account of the armed forces, their nature and role in Politics of Pakistan.

The armed forces in Pakistan, since general Ayub first used them for his coup d'état against the established government and existing constitution, have become an instrument in the hands of the Islamabad ruling Coteri for keeping themselves in Power against the will of the people. The armed forces have been used more often against the democratic forces inside the country, against working class people and students and against the oppressed nationalities of Pakistan, than for the defense of its borders from foreign threats.

These forces were mercilessly suppressing Baluch democrats for four years 1958-63 during Ayub's dictatorship of military bureaucratic alliance under the command of the same butcher general Tikka who is their chief today. Then they

were used against the whole people of the eastern wing of the country in a manner the like of which is unknown in history. It naturally suffered humiliating defeat at the hands of the Patriotic people of Bangladesh.

Now this armed Force is again being used against the people of Baluchistan for having refused to vote for a party subservient to the Islamabad clique. It will be remembered that armed forces were used for the same reason in eastern part (Bangladesh) when the people voted for Awami League, against the expectations of the Islamabad junta.

The repeated use of the armed forces in order to keep a certain clique in power over the heads of the democratic masses, getting it embroiled in internal politics against its own people, the military-bureaucratic alliance of Islamabad has, during the course of sixteen years, turned the army into a mercenary force in the service of the hated enemies of the people.

In return for this unpatriotic, anti-people service rendered to keep in power a coteri of traitors and imperialist stooges, the higher echelon of the army has been richly rewarded in the form of illegal commissions in arms purchase, allotments of rich agricultural lands, gratifications to their kith and kin in industry and commerce, freedom to loot and grab in the area of military operations just as was commonly done by Pakistani soldiers in Bangladesh or as is happening today in Baluchistan.

It is no longer an army for the defense of the country and is not fit for that task, after having dabbled too much and for too long in internal politics, and after having been used to oppress the democratic forces inside its own territory and against the toiling masses of its own country.

In Baluchistan, there are almost

five thousand prisoners in various concentration camps without any charge. Even the agents and collaborators of dictatorship in Baluchistan have not been able to bring any charges against them. Among the Baluch political leaders and workers, there are many who have lost their mental balance, whereas about half a dozen have died after torture in seven concentration camps set up in Baluchistan.

The officers who have been appointed to run them have been trained abroad, specially in U.S.A. And there is irrefutable evidence available to support the fact that in this matter there is complete co-operation between the American CIA, Iranian secret police SAVAK and Pakistan's federal investigation department.

Most of the people arrested under Defence of Pakistan Rules and have no rights to defend themselves and disprove allegations. They are not even produced before any judicial authority. They just rot and are the victim of torture and starvation in prison cells.

Mr. Bhutto described his military operation against the people of Baluchistan as a « Social Service », i.e. construction of roads, bridges, dispensaries etc. by military, (which Baluch people can't use). Clearly this farce was meant to camouflage the real plans of the regime. It means not only deceive the world public opinion but also the common people of Panjab who are showing signs of restiveness at the useless war in which their sons are being made to kill and are being killed. More and more politically conscious elements of Panjab are realising the dangers involved in the course being pursued by the ruling Coteri. They are realising that the armed forces of Pakistan which are from Panjab, are being used to sustain a traitor's gang of usurpers with the result that Panjab is becoming a target of wide hatred.

Bhutto believes in the old Nazi theory that the « lie repeated can become truth. » He always used to say that the second task of the army in Baluchistan is to abolish the Sardari (tribal chieftain) system. But he lacks courage to act, because contrary to all his public claims, he and his stooges derive their strength from this very system. The people of Baluchistan had always demanded the abolition of this system but had always been opposed by the central governments of reactionary regimes. It is this system which is an obstacle in the way of development of National democratic movement. Bhutto and his accomplices depend exactly on this system in their op-

position to democratic struggle of Baluch masses. If he is honest why he does not take any concrete step in this direction, when all repressive state organs are in his hands. Would this Mini-Hitler tell the world who is his governor in Baluchistan. Who is Raisani, Yusuf Magri, Zahri? And who are his other agents in Baluchistan? Are they not chiefs of tribes? Yet in a most shameless manner this Demi-Napoleon of Islamabad is never tired of babbling about « ending sardari system ». He is not speaking truth when he claims his opposition to it. He knows that this will benefit the Baluch masses and their democratic struggle alone. His chatter about it is all for the consumption of those who are ignorant of Baluchistan's situation. He wants to go on repeating this fanciful untruth till it becomes truth in his belief.

Again Mr. Bhutto stated many times in his speeches and public statements (including his speech at Kalat (Baluchistan) in a gathering of foreign diplomats - 28th April 1974) that Baluchistan's problem is a political problem and needs a political solution. But not a single step was taken to bring about a political solution. Instead, Mr. Bhutto went ahead holding farcical elections to seats which had been arbitrarily declared vacant in Baluchistan Assembly.

Those unseated from the provincial Assembly have been languishing behind bars. When they were arrested it was announced by Islamabad authorities that there were grave criminal charges including murder charges against them. But these charges never brought to a court of law.

In the meantime efforts were made to pressurise some of the Baluch leaders and political workers to make them accept some sort of terms offered by Islamabad in order to reach settlement with ruling Coteri.

These shameless acts on the part of the Islamabad thugs exposes them as the blackest fascists and political blackmailers. They stand completely exposed before the people of Pakistan as well as to the progressive world for their crimes they have committed not only in Baluchistan but in every part of the Pakistan and against every section of the people.

Long live the heroic youth in Arms.

Long live the Democratic Revolution.

NEWS FROM OCCUPIED PALESTINE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS

A new Israeli ruling which has been put into effect as of mid June this year, provides for either the prevention or the limitation of Palestinian youth from travelling outside. Those between the ages of 16 to 25 have been prevented from going abroad and particularly to the Arab countries for a period of less than 6 months.

Israeli rationale explains the rule as a pre-emptive strike. They seek to reduce the number of youth who allegedly travel to neighbouring Arab countries to undergo military training with the resistance or who go with the purpose of smuggling arms and explosives.

In response to this development, Palestinian youth in various cities and towns of the West Bank demonstrated militantly as they expressed their anger and protest to this new ruling.

The Israeli authorities in turn issued sentences against 3 students incorporating either a 1,000 Israeli Liras fine or 6 months in prison. The students whose ages range between 18 and 20 were charged with participation in the above mentioned demonstrations.

To the enemy's dismay, those who graduate from Israeli prisons, do so with the reinforced conviction that resistance and struggle are the only means to liberation. (June 75)

Immigration and Travel

Israeli foreign minister Allon has recently indicated that of the Jews arriving to Vienna from the Soviet Union in the first 4 months of 1975, 30% of them have not immigrated to Israel. This development constitutes a 100% increase from the same period in 1974.

As regards to vacations and summer travel, an increasingly number of Israelis are going out of Israel. 20% of Israelis are going abroad and to places distant from the Middle East such as the U.S. and South Africa etc...

Israeli Black Panthers

Shlomo Cohen the head of the Israeli Black Panther organization, while on a speaking tour to England illustrated and crystalized the op-

pression of the oriental Jews (Saphardim).

He mentioned that inspite of the fact that the Saphardim today constitute 62% of the Jewish population, Israeli policy continues to impose an artificial westernization in this otherwise eastern setting.

He stated in a press conference



that the « social conditions of the Saphardim after 25 years of rule are getting worse. » He documented the assertion in the following: « The income of the Saphardim in 1959 was 60% that of the Ashkanazi. Since then it has decreased to 45% in 1965 and 38% in 1967. » In the post October war, their gap is increasing even more.

He claimed that 35 to 40% of the Saphardim students upon completing elementary school can neither read nor write. He said that this opinion was presented by the Ministry of Education to the Knesset.

Of those in the last year of secondary education, only 19.4% are Saphardim. These figures decrease to 15.4% as we look at the number of first year university students. Moreover, the percentage of Saphardim of all university graduates is only 9.4%

These few points are a good indicator of how Zionism treats the Saphardim.

OUR ENEMIES

War which was an important historical sign of the ability of the Arab fighter to defeat his enemy. While the Lebanese social problems increased one after the other, and the inability of the governing circles to present a solution to its increasing problems on all levels, economic, political and social, the reactionary and traditional forces found themselves losing their base support in front of the national uprising of the progressive movement. This development by itself was a threat that reactionary forces in Lebanon could not accept for a long time. Not capable neither willing to recognize the new internal developments, the Lebanese reactionary forces threw the blame on the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and the necessity to « control » the Palestinian resistance movement.

As such it was a natural thing for the Phalangist Party to strengthen its relations with imperialism, although each must have been motivated by different priorities but basically the same reason; that is the liquidation of the progressive and revolutionary forces, Lebanese and Palestinian. In detail the aim of this last attack was the following:

- 1) To wage several battles against the Palestinian resistance movement in order to weaken it to the level where it will not be able to protect itself in an overall battle whose aim will be total liquidation.
- 2) To upset the present balance of forces under Lebanese level and bring the regime under more imperialist domination.
- 3) To alienate the Palestinian resistance from the Lebanese national and progressive movement in order to strike the latter and weaken it.
- 4) To split the resistance movement through making declarations that favour some organizations to others — or through objection to the left wing of the resistance movement.
- 5) To disable the resistance movement from concentrating its efforts on the struggle in the occupied territories after the recent increase quantitatively and qualitatively of the mass, political and armed struggle.
- 6) To strike the slogan of the democratic state in Palestine which has been raised and adopted by the whole Palestinian movement. It tries to do so by its attempts to picture the conflict in Lebanon as a confessional one between Moslems and Christians; it then tries to make a comparison of that with the democratic state slogan which calls for a secular society in Palestine including Jews, Moslems and Christians.

It must be observed that in addition to these above immediate aims there lies a natural contradiction between the forces involved i.e. that a struggle between forces which are contradictory on the political, ideological and organizational levels is eminent. This means

that the rise of Arab progressive and revolutionary forces is a definite historical expectation even if the Palestinian resistance were not present at this stage. Not less important is to realize that the region has been and is still witnessing a very strong external influence that reaches the level of controlling and directing the level of contradictions.

Taking these facts in consideration and in particular the present political moves of imperialism, it is clear that the clashes in Lebanon were not the first between the forces involved and will not be the last. Once more here, we only need to look back at the experience of the resistance movement in Jordan and deduce simply how imperialism and Arab reaction collaborated to end the open presence of the resistance there. The similarities of the present conspiracy with what happened in Jordan are striking but the objective conditions are different.

1. The sensitive internal situation within Lebanon which is based on distributing the authority between the different religions and sects. Any major battle which threatens the balance will be catastrophic even to the Lebanese ruling circles.
2. The presence of an armed

Lebanese national and progressive movement which allies itself with the Palestinian resistance movement; while such a movement did not exist in Jordan.

3. The difference between the Jordanian Army and the Lebanese Army. The first has historically shaped the nature of the regime there and as such qualitatively and quantitatively is more capable of carrying the task of oppressing a progressive movement.

4. The economic factor. The Lebanese economy depends heavily on its position vis-a-vis the other Arab countries (political stability, tourism, financial institutions, etc.). Any threat to this situation will have severe economic results.

For a correct appreciation of these objective conditions we only state how the Palestinian resistance movement and the Lebanese national and progressive movement were able to abort this last attack. We consider that these steps represent a development in the work of these two forces, in spite of the fact that there are certain essential points that still need to be emphasized more (see PFLP Bulletin No. 16).

1. The unified position of the Palestinian resistance movement which aborted the aim to split it as the reactionary forces hoped.
2. The participation of the Lebanese masses, mainly through carrying arms with the fighters of the Palestinian resistance movement.
3. The complete coordination

between the Palestinian resistance movement and the Lebanese national and progressive front. This aborted the aim of striking each force separately and increased the strength of the progressive front.

4. The opposition of many democratic forces — even some from within the regime — to the formation of a military government.

5. The position of progressive Arab and international forces that openly declared their opposition to the liquidation of the Palestinian resistance or any possible foreign interference that might take place at an advanced stage of the fighting.

Though the last attack on the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese national movement failed, we have to keep in mind that what imperialism wants at this time is the liquidation of the resistance movement in order to force its complete domination on the region. This can not be achieved except by a military strike directed against the Lebanese-Palestinian progressive front. If this were to succeed the last fighting front will be silenced — or so hopes Israel at least. In this context we understand the role of the Phalangist Party and the other reactionary forces in Lebanon. Once more the events prove that the camp of the enemy is not identified on a pure national basis but is dialectically connected with the class struggle in each and every Arab country. How else can any force explain the hiring role of Hussein, the Phalangists and others?

June 23/75

Comrade Jihad, we can not find a suitable way to pay tribute to you. You were martyred as you bravely defended our revolution. We have made posters in your memory, knowing well that had you been alive you would be angered. But we put your picture on a poster not only to honour you, but to satisfy our weakness and to be reminded that there is only one road to liberation — you have already paved part of that road. To be faithful to the cause for which you were martyred, we will struggle to liberate Palestine so as to establish the Democratic society in our beloved homeland.

Comrade Jihad Al-Tirrawi was commander of the PFLP Emergency Task Forces, and as he defended our revolution against the Fascist Phalangist party, he was dealt a fatal wound on June 25, 75. He died on June 28, and in so doing joined many of our martyrs who have given all they possessed to the cause of our masses.

We are saddened by his death, but such sadness quickly turns into revolutionary anger that enables us to redouble our efforts as we struggle to develop our people's revolutionary movement.

Let our enemies know, that whether dead or alive, comrade Jihad's memory will haunt them until they are totally defeated by the will of the people. We dedicate the following poem to Jihad and Hussain Mustafa comrades who were martyred as they fought to preserve our revolution.



RESIST TILL VICTORY

INTERROGATION (NR. 3)

*It seems not simple to say :
Resist !
after so many hours
as an unarmed gladiator in a cage
full of hungry beasts.*

*Who will blame a broken man
his words of hypocrisy
as only himself ?
And who will shame oneself
for the tears of sorrow over this world ?*

*But even in the shadow of loss,
not more as a crying animal,
wounded and hunted by the wolves
you will be remembered to be a Palestinian,
and die without fear.*

*Then it is your courage, lonely man,
who keep our resistance brave !
It is your hands, tortured comrades,
who keep the torch of revolution
until the victory !*

*So may they triumph at the moment,
the cruelty and mercilessness
over the human value,
maybe they rape your body,
but never your Palestinian soul !*

*Till the last drop of blood,
you will fight with bare hands,
without hesitation,
Then it is written with the blood of
martyred comrades :*

RESIST !

By Ila Ramdane.

PFLP
Bulletin

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