## CONNOLLY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

In the experience of the Irish working class, the role of the Leninist party has not been great. That this has been so is no accident any more than was Russia's development of such a form of organisation and its enjoyment of that organisation's success. The comparative causes of Russia's achievement and Ireland's failure lie in the two countries' different levels of economic development. The highly socialised, (if not, relative to total population, large) Russian proletariat was more suited to develop its socialist consciousness than was the working class of Ireland. The latter's most socialised elements (in Ulster) had their division of skills reinforced by the religious issue. Is a whole its members lost their natural leaders on the emigrant ships. The Russian working class produced the Bolshevik Party; its comrades in Ireland could not (until faced with the example of October 1917) advance beyond the I.T.G.W.U. and the Irish Citizen Army. Except for brief periods, the Irish worker could not look for revolutionary leadership to any vantuard political body, whether for his own island alone or for both the British Isles.

This last point is relevant. In Connolly's time, all Ireland was part of the single State of the United Kingdom. There was the possibility that a revolutionary party might develop to lead the workers of both Britain and Ireland. Such a development would have been in line with the organisational strategy of Bolshevism, which Trotsky summed up as follows; Whereas in nationally homogeneous states the bourgeois revolutions developed powerful centripetal tendencies, rallying to the idea of overcoming particularism, as in France, or overcoming national disunion, as in Italy and Germany - in nationally heterogeneous states on the contrary, such as Turkey, Russia, Austria-Hungary, the belated bourgeois revolution released centrifugal forces. In spite of the apparent contrariness of these processes when expressed in mechanical terms, their historical function was the same. In both cases it was a question of using the national unity as a fundamental industrial reservoir. Germany had for this puppose to be united, Austria-Hungary to be divided.Lenin early learned the inevitability of this development of centrifugal national movements in Russia, and for many years stubbornly fought most particularly against Rosa Luxemburg - for that famous paragraph nine of the old party programme which formulated the right of nations to self determination - that is, to complete separation as states. In this, the Bolshevik Party did not by any means undetake an evangel of separation. It merely assumed an obligation to struggle implacably against every form of national oppression, including the forcible retention of this or that nationality within the boundaries of the general state. Only in this way could the Russian proletariat gradually win the confidence of the oppressed nationalities.

"But that was only one side of the matter. The policy of Bolshevism in the national sphere had also another side, apparently contradictory to the first but in reality supplementing it. Within the framework of the party, and of the workers' organisations in general, Boshevism insisted upon a rigid centralism, impleasing

warring against every taint of nationalism which might set the workers one against the other or disunite them. While flatly refusing to the bourgeois states the right to impose compulsory citizenship, or even a state language upoj a national minority Bolshevism at the same time made it a verily sacred task to unite as closely as possible, by means of voluntary class discipline, the workers of different nationalities. Thus it flatly rejected the national-federation principle in building the party. A revolutionary organisation is not the pretotype of the future state, but merely the instrument for its creation. An instrument ought to be adapted to fashioning the product; it ought not to include the product. Thus a centralised organisation can guarantee the success of revolutionary struggle - even where the task is to destroy the centralised oppression of nationalities." - History of the Russian Revolution, Vol. III p.p. 40-41, Sphere Books Ltd. London, 1967. (Present writer's emphasis).

"In contrast to this, it is a good idea - following the method of contrasts - to compare it with the policy of the Austrian social democrats. Bolshevism based itself upon the assumption of an outbreak of national revolutions continuing for decades to come, and instructed the advanced workers in this spirit. The Austrian social democracy, on the contrary, submissively accommodated itself to the policy of the ruling class; it defended the compulsory co-citizenship of ten nations in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and at the same time, being absolutely incapable of achieving a revolutionary union of the workers of these different nationalities, fenced them off in the party and in the trade unions with vertical partitions."

Ibid P. 59, emphasis as before.

"History has provided an incomparable checkup of the two policies on the national question. Whereas Austria-Hungary, whose proletariat was educated in the spirit of a cowardly halfway policy, went all to pieces under a formal shake-up, and moreover the initiative in this process was taken in the main by the national sections of the Social Democratic party, in Russia on the ruins of Czarism a new state composed of nationalities has been formed, and has been closely welded together both economically and politically by the Bolshevik Party.

"Whatever may be the further destiny of the Seviet Union - and it is still for from a quiet haven - the national policy of Lenin will find its place among the eternal treasures of mankind." Ibid P. 62.

## THE STILLBIRTH OF UNITED KINGDOM BOLSHEVISM.

Though less drematic, the national policy of the revolutionary left of the British Isles before October 1917, may be as much as that of the Austro-Hungarian Social Democrats, an example of how not to go about it. The only Labour political organisation that tried to bridge the Irish Sea was the petit bourgoois and reformist Independent Labour Party. For the remainder, so far were circumstances from these of Czarist Russia, that it was a sign of progress rather than otherwise for Socialists to form separate organisations for Britain and Ireland - not only in the political, but also in the industrial sphere. This was shown by the fact that in forming the I.T.G.W.U., James Larkin was not only breaking from British but from bureaucratic control. By his act he created the nucleus of what would be the leading pace-sotter in industrial action in the British Isles for years to come, even after 1918. In the British Isles, the situation was an early manifestation of what was to prove a frequent international occurrence through the twentieth century; the undeveloped working class of the colony, advancing and outpacing the ancient metropolitan proletariat.

That this was so was due to the British worker's position as employed of the World's first industrial capitalism. From this they were able for a long time to enjoy the benefits (puny in relation to capital's ; are adiose compared to their forcing commades') of their country's manep by position. Lenin surred up the effects of this:-

"1. A section of the British proletoriet becomes wourgeois; 2. a section of the proletariat allows itself to be led by more bounds, or at least paid, by the bour coisie." Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970, p.103.

This result developed in Britain and (if anything, more ) amongst the Protestant workers of North East Iroland. Amongst the workers elsewhere in Ireland, matters developed much more slowly. Partly this was because the British super-profits were spent on subsidising the more numerous peasants' purchase of their farme. Partly it was because the modern Irish Trade Union movement developed after that of Britain. Without the industry of the other islands, its workers were either skilled artisans and unskilled transport employees; workers in heavy industry, the was juand of labour in countries where it existed, was conspicuous by its absence outsile the North East. The organisation of the Irish unskilled was, then, first placed in the hands of the British unions with their graving bure mericies, and with only pitiful interest in Ireland. From 1907, it was run by the Irish Transport and General Werkers Union in opposition to the United Kingdom Labour bureaucracy. The I.T.G.W.U. was, as events were to show, an unsatisfact ry and inclequate apparent of the Labour fakirs in the long run. It cortainly could not advance the cause of workers' power beyond the limits of a "One Big Union". Emetholess, its circumstances made it an inevitable development and the best that could be done by the labour revenant of the U.K.

The imperfections in the two wings of the U.K. labour movement, the rise of the British proletariat, the world's first industrial country and the lack of development of the Brish working class movement, mant that a Polshevik type party was if anything were vital than it was in Russia. It also insured that such a party could not be developed without the example of the original.

These two facts effected decisively the greatest of the Marxists in the islands: James Connelly. Councily's theoretical pre-eminence is undoubtedly counceted with his back round among the Irish emigrants of Edinbur 4, in effect, diving him a foot in both Irish and British working classes. Monetheless, even he could not create (or learn the need to create) a political unit of the calmes of both those classes that could lead them to victory in the class war. In fact, Connelly's whole approach to the question of the political emphisation of his class was an empirical one centred on his personal contacts. As will be seen, he had a rudimentary idea of what is termed Desceratic Centralism, though he saw it mainly as amounts to keep his group at a minimum efficiency, rather than to help develop this efficiency to even his her levels.

In this empiricism, Convolly's attitude to the territorial extent of his or unisation, fitted naturally. His first attempt ( and his only one in Ireland) To to set up a distinct van word party was the Irish Sceinlist Republican Party in 1896, This was an entirely Irish budy, as its new reveals. It sefar as he had a British perspective, it was through his personal connections with the British Social Democratic bederation, and, later, the Socialist Bebour Party.

parties, and his adherence to the the new industrial uniquies (of the I.V.V. & ... the I.T.G.W.V.), Commodity's cross-channel political links became still lose formal. By the onl of his life they were restricted, practically, to his articles in the paper "Yerward"

In this matter, he has been criticised correctly around both by the ultraStalinist B.I.C.O. in its policy statement at. 4 ( Party Or maisation in Ireland &
Dritain pp 7-8, 1971.) and by Stewart Creham of the ultra-scetarian "Trotskyist"
Socialist Labour League ( in their then journal "The Bowslotter" of May 18, 1966).
Without a doubt, his failure was one of decisive importance to the socialist accordance
in the U.K. all that can be said in his defence is that he was not alone; nobely
client triad to build a revolutionary party for that area. It can be argued reasonably
then that even had he seen the need in a U.K. B Ishevisa, he would have had extreme
difficulty in convincing may of the sort of people necessary to such a procument that
such a need existed.

But had he been able to do so, it is equally clear that history would have changed for the better. The Easter Rising as ht not have cocurred, and had it occurred, it would cortainly not have had the same effect it did have. With an immediate all-british strate, y Commolly would not have needed to concentrate on one national issue. But this could have been offset by the victories of the workers of Britain and Ireland, the avoidance of the defeats that they suffered in actual history and their eventual seizure of power. The trouble (and it is very bir trouble is that all this is conjecture. In fact, the real-lee morale and cocial divisions between the workers of Britain and Ireland (for preator than these letween the Ressian workers and may equivalent working class in the smaller Russian nationalities) and a such a party a practical impossibility. Then the lessons of the October Revolution were avoidable to be learnt, the time for a Belshovik section for the whole U.K. was already passed; the national difference between Tritain and Ireland had leveloped into the 1 tter's liberation strugle.

## COLSHEVISM : Interpartional OR GAIN DRITTSH-IRISH ?

This fact must be remembered when rensidering recent revivals (or, rather introductions) of the idea of a single Bolshevik Party for the British Islas. Until 1968, the self-style? "International Constitute of the Fourth International" practical such a strately, its pritich section the Speinling Labour League, or anising to cover both pritain and Iroland, However, for the last five years, it has left Iroland to a separate section: the League for a Workers' Vanguar's Meanwhile, theoretically, a more serious defence of the continuing relayance of the organisational form corned has been presented by the British & Irish Communist Organisation, most recently on its adoption of its present some in Ecourum 1971. Its statement is entitle? "Party Organisation in Irolan's and Britain".

In considering the arguments of the B.I.C.O. (and the previous practice of the I.C.F.I.) it is necessary, too, to consider the levelopments since Compolly's time, not only nationally (the separation of the state machines of Britain and the Republic of Ireland, and the autonomisation of the Northern Brief state) but intermationally. For the fact is that since Bolshevism beam and since the U.K. labour movement was, as has been shown, hardicapped in developing it, a firther lime sion has been given the principle. Bolshevik Internationalism cannot be ically be confined within single states. Its principle requires nothing short of a world-wile

organisation. This was shown first by Levin and the Bolshoviks when they led the most alvanced elements of international Social Democracy out of their state groups and into a new, Bolshovik, Third International. True, orth has communists (Protskyists) insist that Stalin's conversion to the will- o'-the-wisp "Socialism in a single country", led inevitably to a decoration of the lemegrapy in this Democratic Controlist International till it could be called and started animal at the first of the burcaucracy of the U.S.B.R. But they do not see this as an angument against Bolshovism per so. Rather, they amintain a "The International is lead; Long live the International" They are currently working to build a fully developed Bolshovik Fourth International. The practical difficulties in this are real; "they cannot be accepted as reasons for permanently confining party development within state or other recipied limits.

Part of the lifficulty with the D.I.C.O.'s theory of or prisation is that the principle of internationalism over and above the British Isles is treated in much the same casual manner as Connolly dealt with the actual question of the Party, In a debate with fellow a Therents of (Manist) of "Socialism in the country", the ilon was put that the B.I.C.O.'s arguments for a British and Trish group ( literally that Iroland is a Dritish nec-colory and its state power is in reality a part of Britain's) could be extended to a single group for the British Empire. The Oreanisation replied ( Party Or mnisation pp 10-11) by remarking on the practical difficulties ( distance , travel restriction, larguage, labour mobility, economic separation) in the way of such a unit, The trouble is that, at least the first three of them could have been used as arguments against the ori inal Belshovik Party. The or uments for the principle of party unity in Britain and Iroland to not stop either at the English Channel or the Atlantic Ocean, ir at the bour aries of those bits of map worked Imperial Rel. Nor indeed, loes it limit itself to the borders of the status of the E.E.C. Despite the sneers of the D.I.C.O. at the traditional Marxist concept of Imperialism, it does not that the struggle for revolution quet be we rel on an international scale. Britain centrels the economy of Ireland. But, then, the U.S.A. lominates the Germanies of Britain, of the other European States, of the capitalist countries of the world, ( except Japan - and this empire is tied militarily). To fight for a socialist society in the British Isles alone is even more stupil than to fight for such a thing in Russia alone ( at least Russia had reater resources.) may workers' state needs the support of the workers of the world; and this is too important to be left to sportaneous combustion.

but if revolution in the british Isles will be most effective if supported by the revolutionary actions of workers elsewhere, this loss not mean that it must be organised in a single section for the whole region. The Leminist concept is not one of nationally limited revolution (though struggles against national oppression must be supported by the Belsheviks). But nor is it one decided or an estationally (as the B.I.C.O. would have it: Party Or paisation p.6) by trade relationships, citizenship rights, or even inspective of armed forces and supply of maritions. The terms for territorial action are those of the berleas of the immediate state power that is to be smashed. In the last resart, Britain can inspect the Irish army, it has a manapoly of its amountain, but though it sets contain limits, the decision of how to use the forces and amountain those limits lies not with Tel Heath, but with An Thoiseach. As long as he is really to serve British Imperialism ultimately, Britain won't interfere however much it may feel impatient (as it did until last year no loubt) with his methods of doing so. If British Capitalism fell, Irish Capitalism coall survive relatively easily, no loubt hocked

and blessed by American capitalism. The constitutional forms that the B.I.C.O. dismisses contemptuously (Ibid. pp 5-6) express a political reality that divides state power in the British Isles as it does not between England

But, then, why a 32 county section? Surely the B.I.C.O. is correct when it says (Ibil. p 5) "If only the constitutional form of the state is taken into account, it leads to a Unitel Kinglom party, which includes Northern Irelan!, and a party of Southern Irelan!". Superficially perhaps, it is correct, but here solsheviks. The Northern Irish Protestants had their own state power until 1972. It is correct than the Britain was not unknown to the military on the political fields. As for as the mechanics of state power was to 1972. Logically then, it might be concluded that the correct form of organisation would be that of the Stalinists up till 1970; one Communist Party each for the Six and the Twenty-Six Counties.

Here again, there is a snap; the relationship of forces in the Six Counties means that a Workers' Republic Of Northern Ireland with any real authority over that territory could exist only, as a catalyst for Revolution or larger stage. The smaship of Orange power will be as necessary a part of the Irish Revolution as will be the destruction of all more lirectly elerical power of all denominations. Northern Ireland (not just its Parliament) is a expression of Orange power; any successful revolution will sweep it away. The lictatorship or as part of a greater proletarian unit of the British Isles, Europe, or as we intend, as soon as possible the whole worll.

It is these facts that decide our territorial basis of or amisation.

( To be concluded )