


VOLUME X NUMBER 10

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

DECEMBER 1977



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Molefe Pheto —
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Notes to Our Readers . . .

This has been an eventful year in and for southern Africa. Everywhere the people are stating their demands—the right to control their lives, their country, their resources and their future.

Resistance has exploded in South Africa, involving workers, teachers, parents as well as students, and producing brutal retaliation from the Vorster regime.

SWAPO has extended its operational area in Namibia, challenging the South African occupiers militarily as well as politically.

Despite internal problems the two Zimbabwe liberation movements, linked in the Patriotic Front, have drawn thousands of new recruits, and pose so serious a threat to the Salisbury government that Smith, who one year ago declared that there would be no majority rule in Rhodesia for a thousand years, is now offering an unrestricted vote to Africans as part of an 'internal settlement.' Smith has hedged his offer with serious restrictions, and accompanied it by a massive attack on guerrilla camps in Mozambique. He will try to concede as little as possible—but he is being forced to concede.

The power of the peoples' demand is being heard in Washington and London as well as Pretoria and Salisbury. Hence the frenzied increase in Western intervention, the scurrying to and fro of Anglo-American representatives, wearing the well-cut suits of the diplomatic corps, rather than army fatigues, but still seeking to protect non-African interests, by finding a settlement formula that will short-circuit the struggle for real liberation.

To help readers see the patterns in the developing events we have changed our format this month. Instead of bringing you the latest news we have devoted most of our space to reviews of major 1977 happenings and trends in each of the countries we normally cover.

We have also tried to present some basic statistics for each area. Compiling even such scanty facts proved frustratingly difficult. Information is out of date, and often contradictory. We have done our best to check accuracy; nevertheless we suggest that readers regard these as a guide to general orders of magnitude rather than accurate down to the last digit.

Loyal readers will notice that the magazine is shorter than usual. We did not have the money to print more pages. We hope next month will be better, but we need your help. See page 20 for one way in which you can help ensure our survival and growth—by becoming a sustainer. Urging your local school, city, union or college library to take out a subscription is another way of helping us reach new readers.

These are exciting times—they demand more than a passive response from people who care about the future. So join us in supporting the liberation struggle in southern Africa, in opposing US intervention and in building a base of informed opinion in America.

We wish you all strength and joy in the coming year.

A luta continua,

The Editors

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DECEMBER 1977

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Carter in Southern Africa — The Shape of Things to Come

By Edgar Lockwood

Judging by public tone, style and ideological emphasis alone, the casual observer of US foreign policy is impressed by the novelty of the Carter Administration's approach toward southern Africa. Kissinger had stressed America's tangible interests, sought alliances with ideological "enemies" to advance or at least to protect those interests, and operated a clever, manipulative and secretive diplomacy with calculated ambiguity. The Carter Administration now seems once more to espouse American ideals and principles, open diplomacy for announced, clearly-stated objectives, and decision-making by consent. But what is really involved is a reversion to the active use of ideology and salesmanship to manage its political and economic interests. It is of a piece with "helping our little brown brothers" in Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines, making the world "safe for democracy" and saving Vietnam from communism.

A relevant precedent may be the Kennedy-Johnson era. The recently declassified *Africa: Guidelines for United States Policy and Operation* (1963) establishes parallels of intention, orientation, objectives and methods.

Under the section entitled "Basic Approach," we find the following:

What we do—or fail to do—in Africa in the next year will have a profound effect for many years . . . The United States, as a country with no colonial heritage in Africa, has great opportunities . . . We see Africa as probably the greatest open field of maneuver in the worldwide competition between the [Communist] bloc and the non-Communist world.

. . . We propose to build up certain areas of strength and of maximum co-operation which can serve as models to influence others in constructive directions. [Nigeria and Tunisia were identified as possible primary moderate 'bellweather' countries.]

. . . The critical factor in African nation-building is leadership. In choosing countries for special emphasis, we propose to make a major effort to help dynamic and progressive leaders who are reasonably friendly.

Our revolutionary background and democratic aspirations constitute a basis for sympathy between ourselves and the Africans.

Under "Objectives," we find:

Gradual emergence or growth of a middle class capable of creating and managing a private enterprise sector in a mixed economy.

Encouragement, where appropriate, of private enterprise economies.

Gradual and orderly transfer of power to the majority of the African populations during the next few years, with the fullest possible protection of minority rights.

These high-sounding objectives were accompanied by the use of forces to secure American goals in the Congo. Furthermore, covert CIA operations, buying of African "assets," assassination and mercenary recruitment were not thought inappropriate means to the promotion of leaders thought to be favorable and popular.

But as the United States was drawn deeper and deeper into the quagmire of Vietnam, the Johnson Administration lost the missionary zeal of the Kennedy years; Africa became once again a "neglected" area. As the Kissinger-Nixon era opened, Vietnam and the Middle East were the two crisis areas, and Washington chose to draw closer to the white regimes, judging that guerrilla war was futile and a crisis not immediately in the offing: "The whites are here to stay."

The Portuguese coup of April 25, 1974, showed Kissinger that there was indeed a crisis that needed management. When Angolan decolonization devolved into civil war, the National Security Council's covert backing of the FNLA and UNITA was a costly failure, yet also a lesson. Further "Angolas" must be prevented. Kissinger launched an all-out diplomatic effort, with the full backing of the Congress, to settle the Rhodesian and Namibian issues before they developed a momentum that would install

radical regimes threatening to western interests not only in those countries but, more importantly, in South Africa itself.

The Carter Themes

This summary of the Republican years is intended to suggest that it is the threat to western interests that has now rescued Africa from "neglect." The pursuit of American idealism, in this context, should, then, be seen not as an abstract philosophical preference but as an ideological weapon in a very real conflict in which the US acts to protect very material benefits. It would be foolhardy to predict outcomes at this stage, but it is possible to sketch out certain themes which seem to be emerging as characteristic of the Carter approach.

The Promotion of Capitalism and Non-Violence

Perhaps the most brilliant political choice of Jimmy Carter's career to date has been the selection of Andy Young as Ambassador to the United Nations. A man of charismatic charm, aptitude and eloquence, Young is no mere preacher. He is a living advertisement that non-violent political struggle can advance blacks in America into the political elite. This gives him a special role in the developing world, where his task is to create trust in American concern and good intentions. Carter put it this way:

[Third World nations] now look on the United States as having at least one representative . . . who understands their problems, who speaks their language. . . .

Young uses his own experience as proof that America's recent past has equipped it to lead a struggle for revolutionary ends. Thus at the mid-May United Nations conference on Zimbabwe and Namibia in Maputo he took the offensive declaring that the US had a policy that represented "something of a revolution in the consciousness of the American people." We have known those struggles [against racism, colonialism, and imperialism] ourselves, and somehow we have been able to come through them."

In Young's view, boycotts to fight racism ultimately succeeded because

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Donald McHenry, leader of the US delegation of the Western powers talks on Namibia, shakes hands with South Africa's Vorster.

they affected and drew in the multinational corporations. In Johannesburg, he encouraged South African businessman to believe in their own power to overturn apartheid.

Young's apostleship for capitalism is based on a belief that it is so fundamental, so irreversible, so pervasive and so powerful that it amounts to a law of nature, whose inevitability is also, conveniently, beneficial:

... The places where I see the naked being clothed, the places where I see the sick being healed are in places where there happens to be a free-market system.

Moderation in Zimbabwe and Namibia: Disarming the Militants

The key problem for the US is promoting a gradual transfer of power to an African leadership favorable to Western economic and political needs, while at the same time avoiding the appearance of intervention in revolutionary processes.

The history of the struggle for freedom in the Portuguese colonies suggests that a prolonged period of guerrilla struggle may be necessary to establish a unified political ideology favorable to socialist development and a common experience of cooperation capable of overcoming regional, ethnic, and personal divisions.

The same history suggests to the Western powers that they must create a quick solution by devising processes that will delay or short-circuit the armed struggle, put it at a political disadvantage, or transform it into processes subject to Western management.

Clearly, there are limitations on what can be done by the West. The post-Vietnam Congress has demonstrated that it does not favor the use of US funds for covert military, guerrilla, or paramilitary activities. The degree and nature of legitimacy accorded to SWAPO in Namibia and the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe make it difficult for the Western powers to support "internal solutions" such as the Turnhalle Constitution or Ian Smith's various proposals, under which they would too obviously be opting for continued white rule via acceptance of a palpable sham. The necessity emerges of inserting a "neutral" force capable of claiming a type of legitimacy and power which would substitute for militant white and guerrilla forces.

Thus in regard to Zimbabwe, the Administration has worked with the British to devise a package complete with ready-made constitution, development fund and a security arrangement to manage the transition to one-person, one-vote parliamentary elections by the end of 1978. Where the Kissinger plan called for the present white regime and the nationalist movement to co-manage the political transition, the present plan calls for a temporary but total restoration of British rule under a retired field marshal conveniently equipped with dictatorial powers. The liberation movements are left out of the transition. A UN force would be inserted between the opposing armies, whose key units would be demobilized.

In Namibia, the US has been able to use the collective pressure of the five western members of the Security

Council to move South Africa a surprising distance toward elections and withdrawal of its forces. The remaining disagreements seem to center on the size and nature of United Nations control over the political process leading to elections. This success is in part due to the brilliance of Don McHenry, No. 3 under Andy Young. In part it is due to South Africa's need to cut its losses and in part to SWAPO's willingness to compromise on points such as Walvis Bay, a compromise which some regard as dangerous.

Neither the Patriotic Front nor SWAPO have rejected discussion of the western initiatives or even a compromise if essential demands are met. Aside from their own goals, they are under tremendous pressure from the front-line states, whose pragmatic interests are different from those of liberation movements. Angola would like to be able to concentrate on UNITA without having to deal with South Africa, a possibility that would be enhanced by even a "moderate" solution in Namibia. Mozambique's economy is struggling against dependency on South Africa, Rhodesian aggression, and severe organizational and technical problems. Support for the Zimbabwe struggle is extraordinarily costly in financial terms, in personal losses, and in the destruction of infrastructure. Zambia has similar problems. Tanzania is bone poor, dependent on Western aid. Botswana is a hostage of the white states. Under such circumstances, what is surprising is the unity and depth of commitment to liberation among the front-line states and not their understandable prudence or desire for early settlements.

The Protection and Preservation of Private Enterprise Economies

The Rhodesian economy, partly under the spur of sanctions, has become more diversified than it was before UDI. Small national industries have developed using retained earnings, but growth has been slow and exports of minerals and tobacco have remained key elements in what is still largely a dependent peripheral economy.

To capitalize on Rhodesia's growth potential, Britain and the US have proposed an international fund of \$1-1.5 billion that would promote a heavy inflow of foreign capital for private investment, retain existing managerial, technical, and other skills and expand African access to "better" jobs and "better" land. The proposed constitution guarantees the right of private property, and forbids expropriation

unless there is "adequate" compensation. The fund is, in fact, designed to benefit the interests of international capitalists who have been largely excluded from Rhodesia's potentially profitable economy during the last decade.

The Namibian economy is not nearly as industrialized or diversified as that of Rhodesia and is largely dependent on the economy of South Africa. Western mining firms are, however, eager to expand their exploitation of Namibia's copper, zinc, uranium and other minerals. The quiet Western reaction to the annexation of Walvis Bay suggests that South Africa's continued domination of the Namibian economy is not contrary to Western interests.

American spokesmen say that Namibia will get Walvis Bay in the end. Perhaps. But meanwhile, the territory's sole deepwater port constitutes a critical strangulation point. Furthermore, consistent rumors indicate that oil and gas have been discovered in the offshore waters of what is now a South African exclave.

Carrots Instead of Sticks

One time-honored US method of dealing with a crisis is to create client states whose political inclinations are reinforced by dependencies on external aid. During the Kennedy-Johnson years, for example, the US put some \$350 million of its economic and military aid into Zaire. When the crisis eased, aid fell to relatively modest levels. But after the Angolan war, with the Shaba rebellion and a mounting international debt, aid to Zaire is once more rising.

Similarly, as the crisis mounts in Zimbabwe and Namibia, the US is planning to spend unprecedented amounts of "political" money to underwrite the states that border on Zimbabwe, Namibia, or South Africa. For the first time Congress is authorizing large programs of "Security Supporting Assistance" for southern Africa. This category of aid is designed to be used at the discretion of the President to "promote economic or political stability," and was first poured into Indochina, and then the Middle East. In fiscal 1978 Congress has authorized the following sums:

Botswana	\$18 million
Lesotho	\$20
Swaziland	\$15.5
Zambia	\$30
Zaire	\$10
Regional	\$21.5
(training, refugee aid, and AID studies)	
TOTAL	\$115 million

At the same time Congress announced its intent to fund the Zimbabwe Development Fund if the progress of negotiations warranted such a step, which would mean an additional \$100 million or so per year for five years. In short, what we may be seeing in the next few years is security aid at a level of \$200 million to \$250 million to create or support moderate governments in the region during the period of crisis.

The West also holds out the possibility of "progress" with regard to Africa and apartheid. Kissinger saw moral lectures as doubly counterproductive. On the one hand, the Nationalists would harden their attitudes, withdraw into their "laager" and be uncooperative in dealing with American business and political interests. On the other hand, the African states would be encouraged to demand sanctions that the US would not support.

The Carter Administration's initial approach was a ginger but visible public posture against the South African regime. In May Carter declared that America was committed to majority rule in *all* of southern Africa. At the same time, Mondale was telling Vorster that while America had no road map or timetable, South Africa had to move away from apartheid or suffer deterioration of its relations with America.

Pretoria's response was to scream bloody murder, and to seek support from American businessmen, who were told that Carter was trying to promote suicide for South Africa. This attack of paranoia brought reassurances from the US, which indicated a commitment to continued dialogue and no desire to punish or isolate South Africa.

Despite the verbal condemnations, there has been little progress in practical extensions of US pressures on the white-minority regimes. Repeal of the Byrd Amendment in March has not been followed by any form of pressure on the multi-national oil corporations operating from South Africa or on South Africa itself to close off Rhodesia's supply of petroleum. UN Representative Young has adopted an aggressive posture against any form of substantive economic disengagement, and in the Security Council the United States vetoed relatively moderate African resolutions calling for an end to further investments and loans and trade promotion.

Even the apparent US confrontation with South Africa over its nuclear testing in August, 1977, appears to have served South Africa's interests. Carter

publicly welcomed Vorster's assurances that South Africa does not have and does not intend to explode nuclear devices, despite US intelligence reports to the contrary. Vorster later denied that his statement was, in fact, a promise. The US has now rejected an African call at the UN to end nuclear collaboration, on the grounds that the US must retain a nuclear relationship in order to have influence to urge the South Africans to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Building a Black Middle Class

As a substitute for a redistribution of wealth in South Africa or US disengagement, Ambassador Andy Young argues that South Africa's businessmen need to draw blacks into the free-market system by making them consumers. In addition to the traditional white "liberal" constituency the Administration is now seeking to use the American black bourgeoisie to build support for such a strategy. The Urban League, PUSH, the NAACP, the OIC and other black organizations are being mobilized to support the program. State's Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs and AID are expanding studies and programs involving black Americans as consultants. Budding technicians, community action specialists, professionals and other aspirants to middle-class status will come to America from Africa for "enrichment," to make contact with consultants who can help them create programs in southern Africa, or to get education and skills, with an emphasis on "development" and technology. The African-American Institute scholarship programs will be greatly expanded. Crossroads Africa is developing a network of contacts for African visitors.

However, the banning of virtually every black organization in South Africa has recently driven even the most moderate traditional American organizations of the black bourgeoisie to backing the Congressional Black Caucus in demanding at least some modest forms of economic disengagement.

Will It Work?

History has a way of changing human consciousness. To revert to methods, objectives, and techniques of an earlier day may simply be to ignore what has been learned in the interim. Ending colonialism in southern Africa by reviving the models of 15 years ago is not a particularly promising approach.

The people of Africa know very well that it was the liberal, morally idealis-

tic Kennedy Administration that intervened in Zaire and then massively, and with unparalleled violence, in Vietnam. A number of the Carter Administration's top policy executors—Secretary of State Vance and Defense Secretary Brown are two—filled high posts in the Vietnam years. Even those who opposed the war, such as State Department Policy Planner Anthony Lake, were involved only in discrete disagreements over details.

Conversely, liberation movements in Indochina and Africa have demonstrated that they can be a major force in transforming the world. Their victories show that western technical prowess and power can be overcome by ideological awakening and the organization of popular, mass-based resistance. The victories of the liberation movements in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique gave to the people of Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa a great resurgence of hope, and hence a willingness to suffer and to sacrifice.

At the same time, in other countries of Africa, the fruits of western-managed decolonization have proven to be hollow forms of majority rule. There is a rising chorus of Third World protests against continued foreign domination over terms of trade, technology and

the right to nationalize or expropriate resources. It is thus apparent that offers of foreign aid simply do not address issues that have emerged from post-colonial experience.

Furthermore, when Africans examine the domestic record of the US, they must inevitably question Andy Young's advocacy of boycotts, black consumerism and nonviolence as a sufficient nostrum for the ills of colonialism, racism, and imperialism. More than 14% of the black Americans looking for work are unemployed—double the white rate. In the cities, the figures for unemployed black youth average more than 40% and in areas such as New York City, the rate is more than double that figure. The domestic priorities of the Carter Administration so far do not reflect the demands of even those blacks who are alleged to have picked Carter.

If the Carter Administration is aware of these contradictions, it is showing few signs of candor or determination in dealing with them. Its spokesmen seem indifferent, insensitive, or unwilling to confront the depth and reality of African determination to use militant methods to win real change.

At the UN, Ambassador Young's charisma may be wearing a bit thin. The US has now shown its determination to out-manuever the militant Afri-

can states by using strong-arm tactics. It recently assisted Nigeria and Gabon to replace Benin and Libya on the Security Council, notwithstanding strong OAU backing for Niger and despite opposition to Nigeria, which had already served on the Council. Such tactics and the veto on economic restraints are a timely reminder of American determination to defend its tangible interests when push comes to shove.

The Future

If Zimbabwe or Namibia were to become free soon, their economies would not necessarily be socialist. On the contrary, it is probable that the new states would retain many present arrangements while attempting to gain a greater measure of control over mineral resources, agricultural land and productive facilities. And yet people, having taken up arms, or even rocks, to risk their own deaths in order to be free, will not meekly surrender the freedom, the camaraderie, the unity, and the vision that comes from persistence in a growing struggle that seeks profound transformation of an inhuman system.

Current US policy seems primarily aimed at restricting, as far as possible, the depth of the transformation achieved when majority rule comes. □

Special Report

Political Elections In Mozambique

Barbara Barnes, a member of the Southern Africa collective is currently working as a teacher and musicologist in Mozambique. She was recently invited to observe several election meetings and reports on them as follows:

On Sunday, November 5, Mozambicans living in the Marien Ngouabi Communal Village exercised the political right to vote for the first time in their history. The election took place under trees and make-shift bamboo shelters on the grassy plains just outside XaiXai in Gaza province. Massive floods had destroyed the homes and livelihood of several hundred thousand peasants in the area last winter. The

Marien Ngouabi Communal Village is one of several established to accommodate the displaced families.

On this Sunday more than 1000 adult members of the community voted to accept or reject the 35 candidates put forward to serve in their local People's Assembly by FRELIMO, the ruling political party.

The election meeting began and ended with songs and dances. It was a festive occasion—the women wearing bright colored cloths; the men in their best pants, and shoes if they had them. When it came time to decide to accept or reject each nominee, however, the mood quickly turned very serious.

As each name was announced, the question was asked, "Does anyone have anything to say against this person?"

Candidate Rejected

Armando Ndimande was one would-be parliamentarian whose past caught up with him this election day. He had been nominated because he was an active member of the local political organizing committee, the "grupo dinamizador." After his name was read, a villager asked to be allowed to read a letter which described how Ndimande had exploited the people in his capacity as foreman of a Portuguese



Candidates for the elections being presented at a mass meeting

Tempo

banana plantation when Mozambique was still a colony. Peasants in the area often grew corn on land which was not being cultivated. It seems Ndimande had the habit of taking the corn just as it reached full growth and selling it for his own profit. The peasants could not stop him because they had no political power or rights.

Another man told how during the same period Ndimande had stolen bananas from his mother's land. When she complained about it, he had beaten her and assaulted her sexually.

Given the chance to defend himself, Ndimande could only say that these activities had taken place long ago and would not happen again. However, the voters in Marien Ngouabi Communal Village were not in a forgiving mood. With disapproving gestures, they raised their hands in a unanimous vote to reject him.

After the meeting, a FRELIMO official was asked how such an unscrupulous individual could have been nominated. He explained that at independence, many Mozambicans who had collaborated with the Portuguese moved to different areas of the country in an effort to bury their past. Because they had experience in authority roles, they were often able to move into leadership positions. These elections, in which candidates were confronted with direct political judgments by the people, helped to expose such individuals and remove them from power. Nationwide, 159 candidates out of 3256 had been rejected by the voters

as of the end of October, according to government statistics.

Women Candidates

Carlota Massinga, a 32 year old worker in a nearby cashew processing factory, was one of the women candidates for the People's Assembly for the Marien Ngouabi Communal Village. Standing in the open holding her small child, a cloth over its head to protect it from the sun, she too was forced to defend herself. An older woman accused her of having two husbands. Carlota explained her situation. In hushed tones she told how her first husband had left her for another woman. She had married again, but her second husband was reluctant to take responsibility for the child from the first marriage. She did have a problem but only one husband, she said.

Her story was confirmed. A sympathetic electorate voted her into office and then reprimanded the older woman for spreading false tales.

All told, 34 of the 35 candidates were accepted into the People's Assembly from this locality; 17 of them were women.

Importance of Elections

The people in the Patrice Lumumba Communal Village, a few miles down the dirt road from the Ngouabi village were also electing their representatives that day. Mariano Matsinha, a member of the Standing Political Committee of FRELIMO and Minister of Labor, came to their meeting and explained the purpose of the elections.

"The Assembly," he said, "is a means for the organization of power. We need organization of power so that it really is power. We need to discuss our problems to be able to solve them. We can only fight hunger, disease and ignorance if we are united and organized. Assemblies are the organs in which we combine our strengths to study and solve our own problems."

He urged the people to carefully consider each candidate put forward. "The Party presents the candidates, but it is you who choose. You know their strengths and weaknesses. You can say 'this one yes, that one no.' And you must have complete confidence in those you elect."

He also emphasized the importance of contact between the people and their deputies after election day. "Your deputies must be constantly in contact with you. They must consult the people."

Stressing the importance of the democratic process in which the people are now participating, Matsinha spoke of the pre-colonial Mozambican past. "Even before the Portuguese ruled here, the people could not participate in power." This area, he reminded the villagers, was part of the kingdom of Gungunhana, who led a war of resistance against the Portuguese colonialists at the end of the last century. Gungunhana had an assembly of sorts, more like a court, whose members were called "madolas."

"It was only the madodas he consulted. He didn't consult the people. And who chose the madodas?"

The villagers replied in unison. "He did."

Such assemblies could not solve the problems of the nation because the people could not participate in them. "For instance," Matsinha said, "Women are affected by the problems just as much as men. But women could not participate in the assembly of Gungunhana—not even Gungunhana's wife. Today the women will participate, all the people will participate in power. Those who will solve the problems are those who feel the problems."

Elections are now taking place at the grass roots level throughout Mozambique—in communal villages, small towns, and other centers of population. People's Assemblies will also soon be elected at the next higher levels, in the cities, and for each district and province. The election process will culminate in December with the election of a National People's Assembly, the highest organ of the Mozambican state. □

The United Nations

It is commonplace to observe that the United Nations does very little about anything. As an organization it suffers from grave defects which effectively paralyze it. Its most significant defect, of course, is that it is dominated by the major powers, and particularly by the major Western powers, who control finances and most of the machinery.

Yet in the case of southern African affairs this is a paradox. For the organization has accumulated obligations with respect to decolonization and the elimination of apartheid which are quite unique. A whole series of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, which find their origin in the Charter, have forced the organization into a much more activist stand on many issues than most diplomats and international civil servants would like to see. As events in southern Africa have pressed in on the UN one could sense the discomfort and apprehension among the old guard that they might actually have to do their duty and abandon the game of rhetoric for which they are paid so handsomely.

Line Breached

During the General Assembly of 1977 the defense lines of Western diplomacy at the UN were seriously breached for the first time. The line held in some places. On the issue of South Africa, however, the smug and scurrying gentlemen from Foggy Bottom, the Quai d'Orsay and the Foreign Office found themselves routed.

When South Africa was discussed in the Security Council in March the three African members introduced four resolutions in an effort to force the UN off dead center. These resolutions were aimed essentially at imposing a mandatory arms embargo and taking the first step towards economic sanctions. They invoked Chapter VII of the Charter and declared South Africa a threat to international peace and security. In the previous autumn, during the debate on Namibia, the three Western permanent members of the Council had used a triple veto to prevent a mandatory arms embargo being ordered against South Africa. They were not anxious to be pressed into a repetition of that vote in March.

The standard bearer of the new United States Administration, in the person of Ambassador Andrew Young, was sent over the top fairly soon after



Young casts his veto: showing the real direction of US policy

his appointment. He was popular and active. And despite some serious opposition he was successful in winning the Carter Administration a period of grace. After some wrangles about a consensus draft resolution on South Africa in the Security Council the African Group at the UN agreed to pitch camp and wait. In return for their forbearance the Western powers agreed to fly off to South Africa to read Mr. Vorster the Emily Post version of the riot act. Vorster was told that time was running out, that he had to give up his monstrous schemes for Namibia and that he had better clean up his own premises.

Namibian Failure

However, nothing happened. The situation in South Africa itself grew worse. And the two sets of bilateral negotiations undertaken by the Western powers, the "Gang of Five," on Namibia produced nothing but a predictable failure. South Africa refused to withdraw its troops from Namibia, annexed Walvis Bay and refused to discuss the problem of police and paramilitary forces seriously. It was clear that South Africa intended to stay in Namibia. And it was clear as well that SWAPO, despite insistent rumors in-

spired by interested parties, would not capitulate to Western pressure to accept elections in the middle of a war and under South African supervision and control.

As the sham of the Namibia negotiations became apparent, events in South Africa upset the traditional equilibrium at the UN. The arrests and bannings of October 19 immediately put the Western powers on the defensive. They had produced nothing, and the Africans refused to wait any longer for the Carter Administration to produce a miracle.

The question of South Africa was therefore brought immediately before the Security Council. The African Group wanted Benin, Libya and Mauritius, the three African members of the Council, to press for a mandatory arms embargo and for the first stage of economic sanctions. Draft resolutions were prepared along the lines of the four introduced in March. The United Kingdom and France, however, were alarmed at the prospect of such resolutions being passed. They dragged their feet. At the same time the Carter Administration was under intense pressure from the Black Caucus and many groups in the country to take a stand against South Africa.

Limited Arms Embargo

The result, predictably, was a public relations stunt, or an attempted public relations stunt. For a variety of reasons, partly because they were in disagreement, the Western powers did not want a mandatory arms embargo. They certainly did not want economic sanctions. Neither, however, did they want to be put in the position, in the new circumstances of crisis in South Africa, of vetoing the African resolutions. They therefore offered a compromise, a six-month arms embargo which did not invoke Chapter VII of the Charter. This was entirely cynical, for such an embargo would have been meaningless. The time it takes to move government machinery alone would have made it impossible to implement. When President Carter went on television to speak of the need for an arms embargo against South Africa his representatives at the United Nations were actually offering worthless paper.

The Africans rejected this ploy as an insulting exhibit of bad judgement and stupidity. This inspired Western diplomats with considerable anger. They regarded Africa's logic as another tiresome manifestation of impertinence.

The African members, however, pressed their resolutions. And another triple veto was actually cast three times. The first resolution, condemning South Africa's policies of repres-

sion, was passed. The remaining three, involving mandatory economic and military sanctions were vetoed. The hand of Andrew Young in the air pointed the real direction of United States policy at this time.

Conscious of the headlines the next morning, Western diplomats quickly sent Canada and West Germany into the line with an amended resolution for a mandatory arms embargo. Having failed at attempts to bluff or force the African countries into backing off from a vote, they sought to avoid the opprobrium of being responsible for another veto. The African members, however, knew full well what was happening and informed everybody that they required instructions from their governments. The Western powers were thus left standing exposed for a while.

Compromise Accepted

On the first of November a compromise resolution was agreed upon and passed. It called for a mandatory arms embargo under Chapter VII of the Charter. Although it still refrained from clearly identifying South Africa as a threat to peace the passage of this resolution marked a considerable victory for Africa and for the principles upon which the United Nations is supposed to be founded. It marked a serious reversal for the major Western powers in their efforts to provide a diplomatic screen for South Africa.

The passage of the mandatory arms embargo was an event of considerable

importance which put everything else in the shadow. The General Assembly debate on Namibia was fairly inconclusive, mainly because the Western powers had gone to great trouble to keep their negotiations with South Africa secret. Thus it was difficult for delegates to engage the real issues in the debate. Those who did found their efforts met by angry outbursts from Western delegates.

The Security Council debate on Rhodesia was confined to a fairly narrow issue. David Owen, the British Foreign Secretary, came to the UN to ask support for the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General to join Field Marshall Lord Carver in Rhodesia. A number of delegations expressed the view that the Anglo-American plan would never work, that it was unacceptable anyway and that there was no point in the Secretary General involving his representatives in a mission impossible. But the resolution calling for the appointment was passed, almost as a matter of politeness. The subsequent collapse of the Anglo-American scheme and the announcement of an internal settlement by Smith have shown how inconsequential long hours of debate and paperwork in the Security Council can be.

For all that, however, a mandatory arms embargo has been passed, and the United Nations has moved one step further; it could be a very important step further. □

YEAR IN REVIEW



Ambassador Ouattara (right) talks with Ambassador Young at UN meeting in Maputo

Organization of African Unity

The role of the Organization of African Unity in trying to bring about majority rule in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa has been increasing. Ambassador Dramane Ouattara, the OAU Ambassador to the United Nations, talked to Southern Africa about this aspect of the work of his organization over the past year.

SA: What do you feel is the most satisfactory achievement of the OAU on Southern Africa in 1977?

Ouattara: The intensification of the liberation struggle that we strongly sup-

port in Zimbabwe and Namibia has led Western countries to become more concerned about the over-all situation in Southern Africa. They have been propelled to emphasize more concrete measures or steps in order to reach more effective solutions to the conflicts. Diplomatic actions were initiated by the OAU both at the level of the member states and by the African group at the UN.

SA: How does the OAU stand on negotiations based on a) the recent Anglo-American proposals on Rhodesia and b) "Contact Group" negotiations on Namibia?

Ottara: As we stated in the Lusaka Manifesto, we want negotiations where and when negotiation is possible. We favor negotiation on Zimbabwe based on the recent proposals. If Smith exploits it, and if it is being used to win time, then we will have nothing to do with it. But as there are some possible points for negotiation, we want to see if it can work. In fact, it was the OAU who had requested UK representation. In the meanwhile, the liberation struggle must continue. The negotiations will not be used as an alibi to get the liberation movements to lay down their arms. If we discover there is no serious intention on Smith's part, then we will reject these negotiations.

We continue to support the liberation movement. It is unfair to ask them to stop the struggle for a while. We will continue to support this struggle until we get positive results.

The negotiations on Namibia are long overdue. If the move had started a few years ago it might have worked. Now it is too late. Maybe it is better too late than never. If it fails, it will be due to the ambiguous and ambivalent policy of the US government. However, insofar as there is a genuine and sincere Carter policy, we will not close our door, in fact, we will give our blessings to some extent to this negotiation.

SA: To further pursue this point, Mr. Ambassador, since the US government does not accept SWAPO as the sole representative of the Namibian people, how does OAU deal with the resulting dilemma?

Ottara: Well, the US position must be viewed with that of the South African government. The US recognizes SWAPO but they also recognize other political groups. The OAU does not recognize other groups as long as they are under the control of South Africa. We know that the US insists on a free election where all groups participate. The OAU will accept conditions for an election if 1) South Africa withdraws its troops and 2) takes steps to ensure that the elections are organized and supervised by the UN. SWAPO and other groups will take part in this election, i.e., SWAPO will accept the participation of other political groups as long as they are not controlled by the South African government.

SA: If the arms embargo does not work, will OAU push for other sanctions, such as economic or oil sanctions?

Ottara: We know the arms embargo will not work. The South African gov-

OAU Resolutions

The Council of Ministers met in Lome, Togo, in February and in Libreville, Gabon, in June. We reprint excerpts from some of the important southern Africa resolutions:

CM/Res. 537

Resolution on Namibia

Reaffirms OAU support for SWAPO as the sole authentic representative of the people of Namibia . . . Calls on Member States of the OAU to deny recognition to any government installed in Namibia either through the Turnhalle tribal conference or through any other means which are not in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the OAU . . .

CM/Res. 538

Resolution on South Africa

Proclaims that the racist regime of South Africa is illegitimate and has no right to represent the people of South Africa; Reaffirms the legitimacy of the armed struggle to the overthrow of the *apartheid* regime . . .

CM/Res. 550

Resolution on Zimbabwe

Reaffirms its stand that the armed liberation struggle is a legitimate,

inevitable and decisive means for the liberation of Zimbabwe; Pledges increased material, diplomatic and financial assistance to the continuous armed liberation struggle in Zimbabwe; Determined to do everything possible to bring down the rebel regime of Ian Smith and to expedite the advent of independence by establishing a majority Government in Zimbabwe . . .

CM/Res. 551

Resolution on Namibia

Further reaffirming that SWAPO is the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people . . . Reaffirms that any agreement negotiated to lead Namibia to genuine independence must be based on the withdrawal of all the military and paramilitary forces of South Africa from Namibia to allow for the creation of normal political atmosphere; unconditional release of all political prisoners, and the return to the territory of all the Namibians in exile; that any interim authority to be formed in the territory before the attainment of its full independence be of the United Nations Council for Namibia . . .

ernment has declared that it is self-sufficient in arms production, hence the embargo will not affect the South African military build-up. We accepted the Security Council arms embargo resolution as a political gain—it contains a moral sanction. The next step will be economic sanctions. We will not relent on this—we will push for it again at the next meeting.

Under Resolution #533 passed at the OAU Council of Ministers at Libreville we agreed on an oil embargo, binding at the OAU level. However, there are oil suppliers which are not members of OAU, such as Venezuela, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and others. We are sending a mission to them to plead for an enforcement of the embargo.

SA: What do you see as the main obstacle to an oil embargo?

Ottara: Mainly Iran and some Western countries who may not want to go along with it.

SA: How serious is the division within the OAU between "moderate" and "radical" governments?

Ottara: Really there is no division. On the issue of Rhodesia, Namibia and apartheid, there is especially no difference among OAU members. Angola, yes, but that is past history, and even then the problem was resolved within a short period. African countries are all developing countries and we face similar economic problems. It is true that some are more sensitive or accommodating to non-African countries, especially to the superpowers. But in the end the OAU division does not exist. Even during the debate on Western Sahara only 9 out of 49 members were in disagreement. Angola and Western Sahara were exceptions—and, in comparison to agreements among OAU members, these are minimal.

SA: What liberation movements are supported by the OAU?

Outtara: The Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe and SWAPO in Namibia. In South Africa we want to do away with apartheid. The two political parties ANC and PAC are no longer in an antagonistic position—each needs to fight for survival. They all agree on the same objective which is to eliminate apartheid and bring about a majority-rule government. There is no basic difference between them—only that one gets its support from the Soviet Union and the other from China. They have become more seasoned and will not let outside forces interfere. Their aim is to free South Africa from racism and apartheid.

The OAU's commitment remains that of total liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia by 1978 either through a peaceful or a violent solution. If peaceful means do not work then we support armed struggle. Eventually we will compel the whites to accept less than

what they have now. We will not relent on South Africa until apartheid is ended and the government is ruled by majority. It may take a long time but we will not be deterred by South Africa's military build-up or even by their nuclear development. Their nuclear armament will not be utilized. It will be a guerrilla warfare. There is no need for the OAU to march troops into South Africa. Given the political education within the country, urban guerrilla warfare will intensify and so will our struggle. Time is against South Africa. When oppressed people are put in jail they become more politically conscious. The children born after Soweto will carry this struggle. It took Vietnam 20 years to gain their independence. It was the younger generation that brought the final victory. So it will be the young in South Africa, those after Soweto, who will bring about a final victory.

SA: One final question. To put it bluntly, how does the OAU "hang" together?

Outtara: We "hang" together because African countries are first and foremost Africanist and nationalist and we have experienced a history of colonialism. We are "hanging" together for these reasons: 1) nationalism, 2) colonial history, and 3) clear consciousness of being a black man, and African man—men who have been victims too long. It is time to speak out, to assume our self dignity. The OAU is a proper frame to project our dignity. Even though we have crises and disagreements, the Organization must survive. Every little contribution to the world has to be made by the group. Individual countries have no voice and could be under the influence of superpowers. So we must and will work together within the framework of the OAU. □



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Area: 472,359 sq. mi.

Population: 26.1 million (1976)

African 18.6 million

White 4.3 million

Capitals: Cape Town (legislative)

Pretoria (administrative)

Head of State: President Nicolaas Diederichs

Head of Government:

Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster

GNP: \$31.89 billion (1976)

National currency: Rand (0.87 per US \$1)

Political status: white minority-controlled Republic, no black franchise

Illiteracy: none (white); 30-50% (other)

The South African government launched a last-ditch effort at the beginning of November to crack the boycott that has shut down all the schools in Soweto, other black townships and even several "tribal homelands." It called in air power. A plane dumped thousands of leaflets over Soweto, warning parents that their children would fail the year if they did not show up for examinations.

"Are you going to allow dropouts and intimidators to ruin your child's future?" the leaflets asked. All but a handful of students answered by staying home.

In a way, the episode dramatized the experience of South Africa over the past year and a half. A nation long polarized racially by the white minority's conscious design is now being torn apart, as the population is split between the twin poles of resistance and repression. The airdrop has become the government's primary means of communicating with the most populous city within its borders. Having jailed virtually all of Soweto's community leaders and shut down the two newspapers read by residents of the township, the government has eliminated just about every other medium except the truncheon and the gun.

Resistance

Resistance and repression. A year and a half after the first uprising in Soweto, the school boycott is more powerful than ever. Soweto's secondary school students have been joined by others all across the country and by their younger brothers and sisters in the primary schools. Latest estimates place the total number of boycotters at upwards of 300,000.

The school boycott has been the most prolonged, the most visible and probably the most massive expression of resistance. But it has not been the only one. During the past year, squat-

In the South Africa section of the November magazine we printed lists of organizations and people banned, and people believed detained. Unfortunately the captions on two sections were incorrectly reversed; we reprint the corrected lists below, and apologize for the error.

Persons Served With 5-Year Banning Orders

Rev. Dr. Beyers Naude, director, CI
Rev. Theo Kotze, CI director, Cape Town
Rev. David Russell, Cape Town, under charges of producing and distributing banned documents and of blocking demolition of an African squatter settlement at Modderdam
Rev. Brian Brown, CI
Cedric Mayson, editor, CI journal *Pro Veritate*
Peter Randall, CI
Donald Woods, editor, East London *Daily Dispatch*

Persons Believed Detained In Prisons

Veli Kraal
Sylvester Maklaphela, SASO
Vuyisile Maleleni, BPC; Medupe Writers Association
Nosibima Pityana, social worker; wife of Nyameko Barney Pityana, former president, SASO
Nomisa Williams
Mpunelelo Qepe, student
Mackenzie Sloti, teacher
Bonile Tuluma, BPC chairman, East London
Mxolisi Mvovo, BPC vice president, eastern Cape; already banned
Sydney Moletsane, BPC
Skenjana Roje, SASO executive
Diliza Mji, past president, SASO
Norman Dubizane, medical student

ters in the shantytowns outside Cape-town battled both the laws and the bulldozers used to drive them from their homes.

In mid-year more than a dozen organizations answered the call of the Black People's Convention and met to put together a coordinated campaign against "separate development."



Mourners pass Stephen Biko's coffin

Bombings, arson and other forms of sabotage have provided increasingly common reminders that South Africa is a state at war with its people.

Repression

The government response has been predictable . . . and far from subtle. Divide, decapitate and conquer.

Having celebrated the first anniversary of the "independence" of the Transkei (which so far South Africa alone has recognized), the government pressed ahead with plans to usher Bophuthatswana into the company of "free" bantustans on December 6. Paralleling the "homeland" scheme for fragmenting people along "tribal" lines, the government also proposed constitutional reforms offering minimal political participation to the "colored" and Asian populations.

These ideological attempts to fracture the solidarity of black consciousness were accompanied by a full scale attack on the identifiable leadership of the black consciousness movement and other organized forms of resistance.

Literally hundreds of black trade union leaders, community activists and students were banned or detained, culminating in the crackdown of October 19, in which 50 people were detained and 18 organizations outlawed. Dozens more were jailed after a series of carefully staged trials, highlighted by two in which 18 persons were con-

victed of participating in a vast conspiracy by the outlawed African National Congress. And the effort to decapitate the resistance to white minority rule was placed in a glaring spotlight by the death of Stephen Biko and the subsequent inquest.

Through it all, the watchword of the government appeared to be intransigence. In the face of mounting international outrage and pressure Pretoria kept issuing assurances that South Africa could stand alone militarily and hinting that a nuclear arsenal was not far off. To the cheers of a white electorate in which opposition had all but evaporated as election day neared Vorster uttered promises of unflinching determination and denunciations of international interference.

Repression and resistance—these are the common themes in South Africa today. A year and a half after the first uprising in Soweto, national black resistance is more powerful than ever, and although government action has probably done severe damage to organizational structures, it appears to have had little effect on popular militancy.

The critical test in the coming period will be the ability of the black population to find methods of organization that can survive state repression in order to mobilize sufficient force to destroy it. Whatever the difficulties that lie ahead, the indicators make it unlikely that the coming year will be a quiet one inside South Africa. □

Zimbabwe

1977 was a year full of sound and fury for the British and Americans trying to find a formula for a Zimbabwe independence settlement; although ultimately both the State Department and Foreign Office efforts seemed to add up to a total of close to nothing.

For the liberation forces, it was a time of agonizing effort—a year of constantly increasing fighting against the forces of Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith; of negotiation on the so-called Anglo-American initiative; and of internal talks on the all-important subject of unity, military and political, within the Patriotic Front alliance.

The year opened as the Geneva conference instituted by outgoing Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was grinding slowly to a halt. Adjourning in December of 1976 and scheduled to reconvene January 17, that conference never again got off the ground. The problematic issues for both sides at Geneva were similar to those later in the year, when another conference was attempted by the heirs to Kissinger and the late British foreign secretary, Anthony Crosland: the composition of the army, the control of the police and the courts, and the role of the white administration in the transition. Smith's rejection of the Geneva plan came January 25. The stage was then set for another act in the play, the most recent Anglo-American proposals, spearheaded by Foreign Secretary David Owen and Washington's UN representative, Andrew Young.

The proposals envisaged yet another conference, but by the year's end it had not materialized. After the British-American proposals were made public in August and September, the Front presented a detailed, piece-by-piece response to the package, rejecting key points without discounting the possibility of negotiations. In this the Front apparently acted partially out of pressure from the front-line presidents—Machel of Mozambique, Nyerere of Tanzania, Neto of Angola, Kaunda of Zambia, and Khama of Botswana. Thus by late November, neither Washington, London, nor the Patriotic Front had admitted that negotiations around the latest proposals had totally collapsed—although it seemed clear that no one was talking seriously.

Smith was again the first to admit as much. And again the minority leader

quickly spread the impression that all his attention was turned inward—toward an "internal" settlement with pliant, pro-Salisbury Africans.

Internal Settlement

The books had scarcely been closed on the earlier conference in Geneva when Smith launched a series of minor racial reforms and began plans for full-scale negotiations with such groups as ZUPO and Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council.

These efforts have continued, and Muzorewa has left various doors open, thus becoming one of the likely candidates for a role in either Smith's internal settlement or in a Smith-negotiated government instituted through Washington and London.

But moves toward an internal settlement have never been smooth ones in Salisbury. To ward off far-right criticism and provide himself with another

ZIMBABWE (SOUTHERN RHODESIA)

Area: 150,803 sq. mi.

Population: 9,200,000 (1977 est.)

Capital: Salisbury

Head of State: President John J. Wrathall

Head of Government:

Prime Minister Ian Douglas Smith

GNP: \$3.03 billion (1974 est.)

National currency: Rhodesian dollar (0.65 per US \$1)

Political status: British colony; white minority declared illegal unilateral independence November 11, 1965

Illiteracy: none among non-Africans; Africans 70%

"mandate" from Rhodesia's dwindling white population of 270,000, Smith dissolved his parliament and held elections August 31. He won by an overwhelming majority (of white votes) and used the result to argue defiantly that he had a mandate to do whatever he wanted in relation to the Anglo-American proposal.

Such elections, however, do not win wars of liberation or save settler states. And Salisbury's economic and military fortunes, along with the white population itself, have been greatly reduced over the past year. Economic pressure has come from an emigration rate among whites that held at a steady 1,000 a month through 1977; and from the military's need for every available body to fight a liberation war that grew considerably in the same period. Salisbury extended mandatory active duty to all men, 38 to 50, shortly after the Geneva conference collapsed; service



Zimbabwe guerrillas

Moll/Zimbabwe Review

tours have been extended to three months per year; nevertheless, the minority's forces have been stretched to their limit. Defense expenditure estimates tabled in the Rhodesia Parliament on June 30 revealed that some 32% of the government's expenditure was going to pay for the war.

One indication of the manpower shortage has been the presence of foreign mercenaries in the Rhodesian security forces this year. Hardly had the new year dawned when this new, unofficial element of the West's post-Vietnam style of intervention—witnessed most vividly in Angola—reared its ugly head in Rhodesia. January press reports put the number of foreign mercenaries already operating in Rhodesia's 10,000-man security force at roughly 1,000. As *Southern Africa's* story in the January/February issue indicated, Rhodesia's enlistment and use

of mercenaries from the US and other Western countries cannot ultimately be separated from the West's Rhodesian policy as a whole.

Zimbabweans have also been leaving their country in droves. Observers report that entire grades have been shut down in the African schools as a result of mass absences. By the hundreds, students, joined by Zimbabwean farm laborers and others, have crossed either into Botswana or Mozambique in transit to liberation movement military training camps.

Patriotic Front

A major focus of liberation activity during the year came from the Patriotic Front, the working alliance of ZAPU and ZANU. The Front made its first public appearance at Kissinger's Geneva conference. Later the Front's response to the Owen-Young propos-

als in September was issued simultaneously as a joint statement in Maputo and Lusaka, headquarters for ZANU and ZAPU respectively.

Lower- and middle-level talks on unity have continued throughout the year. It will come, ZANU and ZAPU representatives have told *Southern Africa*, in two stages: military unity for the training and command of ZIPA forces; and political unity, to provide the ideological direction of the Zimbabwean revolution.

But progress has been slow. For every two steps forward this year, there seems always to have been a step backward, despite crucial encouragement—at times, pressure—from the front-line presidents. Unity in the Patriotic Front's alliance remains the decisive factor in determining the timetable of Zimbabwe's liberation. It is the event to watch for in 1978. □

YEAR IN REVIEW

Mozambique

Mozambique was subjected to almost continuous attack by the Rhodesian army and air force in 1977, and was forced to divert much of its hard-pressed human and economic resources to military self-defense. Attacks became so severe in some western border areas that people were forced to leave their homes. The government has evacuated families in some areas, moving them into more secure sectors, and in some cases integrating them into the new communal villages being developed throughout the countryside. Explained one FRELIMO official: "instead of leaving the people to continue every day moving from one place to another, seeking the safest place, we felt it better to withdraw them to ones where they could live and produce in peace."

Escalating Attacks

The Rhodesian regime has escalated its attacks in the last year, clearly aiming many of them at targets designed to hurt Mozambique's ability to develop a viable self-sufficient economy. Official target of the Rhodesian incursions is always the so-called "guerrilla base"; it is true that Mozambique has provided bases for Zimbabwean guerrillas; but as President Machel pointed out in a recent interview with *Southern Africa*, these are transit camps, for fighters on their way back to Zim-

babwe. Most of the people killed in the more than 150 Smith army attacks have been Zimbabwean refugees, many of them women and children, as well as Mozambican civilians.

A United Nations fact-finding team noted a "systematic pattern" to the attacks. Penetrating Gaza and Tete provinces and homing in repeatedly on the railway town of Mapai, the invading forces have numbered more than 1000 at a time, are supported by jet planes and heavy artillery, and have destroyed Mozambican villages, airfields, health and educational facilities, precious cattle and transport and communication links. There has been an increasing tendency to fly assault troops in and out by helicopter.

More than 1500 people have been killed in these attacks, including several hundred civilian Mozambicans.

Yet in spite of this tremendous extra burden, added to the legacy of acute

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

Area: 308,641 sq. mi.

Population: 9,200,000 (1975 est.)

Capital: Maputo

Head of State and

Government: President Samora Moises Machel

GNP: \$2.6 billion (1973 est.)

National currency: Escudo (30 per US \$1)

Independence: June 25, 1975

Illiteracy: 80-90%

under-development inherited from hundreds of years of Portuguese colonialism, Mozambique has taken some significant steps along its chosen path towards building socialism. The process of consolidating national independence and expanding the revolution on the basis of a non-capitalist organization of the economy now embraces the entire population.

The most dramatic expression of this mass mobilization is reflected in current voting for Mozambique's People's Assembly, a five-tier structure seen as the repository of supreme power in the nation.

The voting, Mozambique's first ever general elections, began September 25—13th anniversary of the launching of the armed struggle by FRELIMO.

The beginning of the general elections coincided with ceremonies in the provincial capitals, in which the first membership cards in a reconstituted



Allen/Pictorial Parade

Mozambican soldiers view ruins of Navonde School near Rhodesian border, destroyed in raid by Smith's troops

FRELIMO were handed over to outstanding militants. Card number one was presented to President Machel.

February FRELIMO Congress

This re-organization of FRELIMO as a Marxist-Leninist vanguard organization followed on decisions taken at the third FRELIMO congress, held in February. That Congress, the first since independence, confirmed FRELIMO's longtime commitment to the construction of a socialist state. Strategy and division of tasks were defined, economic plans discussed, priorities established. Stress was laid on the need to increase productivity and also on the organization of more effective means of workers control and participation in decision making.

Constantly stressed in the Party documents was the theme that the role of the Party under socialism is not to supplant the people "because it is the people, organized, the broad working masses, who make the revolution." The central task of the party consisted "precisely in uniting, organizing, educating and leading the masses so that they may make the revolution."

Increasing Production

Serious efforts were made during the year to begin work on organizing to improve material conditions for the people; in the countryside communal villages continued to grow, many harvesting their first crops. Production councils were set up in many factory plants, so that workers could become

more than part of the productive machinery but also begin to share in deciding important issues in the factory. An important step in the fight against illiteracy was taken late in the year with the graduation of a group of over 100 people who had been specially trained to begin running adult literacy teacher-training courses.

Floods

At times Mozambicans found themselves having to contend with more than just man-made problems. In February a hurricane swept through southern Mozambique, causing the worst flooding the area has seen in 22 years, and more than \$3.5 million in damages. Some 100,000 families were left homeless and 50 persons died.

Flood damage—from the three rivers in the region—the Limpopo, the Umbeluzi, and the Incomati—has entailed substantial food shortages this year, along with loss of livestock and the entire export citrus crop, an important source of foreign exchange.

The government responded by aiding flood victims to reorganize themselves, in accordance with national objectives, into 17 new communal villages on higher ground in the Limpopo valley.

There are obviously many problems to be solved, not the least of which is Mozambique's continuing economic dependency on South Africa, another colonial legacy.

Yet despite the problems, the Mozambican government has been able to work closely with the Mozambican people in ways that can and do promote a better life and a humane society. One year-end indicator of such progress—as of November 1, under the new law relating to health, most medical care will be delivered free of charge, and on the basis of universal access. □

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

Area: 481,351 sq. mi.

Population: 6,300,000 (1975 est.)

Capital: Luanda

Head of State and

Government: President Agostinho Neto

GNP: \$2.8 billion (1973 est.)

National currency: Kwanza (27 per US \$1)

Independence: November 11, 1975

Illiteracy: 85%

YEAR IN REVIEW

Angola

Angola's second year of independence was an uneasy one. President Agostinho Neto announced to the world in February that his government had discovered a Western plot to invade the country from neighboring Zaire, code named Operation Cobra 77. Immediately thereafter a rebellion in Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba province, brought more threats

of outside interference to MPLA's revolutionary rule.

Throughout the year, dissension continued to split the MPLA. The country is still suffering the effects of the attempted overthrow of the Neto government on May 27. The subsequent revelations that many important military and political leaders had been drawn into the plot have cut even further the already slender ranks of top-notch MPLA militants.

These key events all occurred against a backdrop of continued harassment by UNITA guerrillas and unflagging South African attacks on the southern border with Namibia. The second year of independence has been one of almost year-long crisis for the MPLA.

Attacking the Splitters

It is not surprising then that the tone of President Neto's independence day remarks on November 11 marked a departure from his generally conciliatory attitude toward divisions among the people of Angola. "The second year of independence served to test our capacity to detect our enemies," he told thousands of people's militia members in Luanda's May Day Square. "In this third year all of us, the whole Angolan people, are going to act firmly against those who persist in trying to destroy our unity or our regime."

Referring to the abortive coup attempt, Neto said, "Recent experience has confirmed the need for close links between the party, the mass organizations, the administration, and all sectors in the country in order to avoid deviations." Neto acknowledged that some of the weak political structures the MPLA had created were responsible for allowing the plotters to get as far as they did.

The President went on to criticize some MPLA militants in a more thorough-going fashion. He said that the "incompetence" and "lack of courage" of some militants "sometimes obliges us to accept colonial methods which are actually completely unacceptable. Instead of teaching, learning, and cooperating, it seems as if some former settlers and even some comrades anxiously and actively want Angola's neo-colonialization."

The coup and its serious aftermath seem to have brought a tone to Neto's speeches not present in the past. For the first time, Neto warned against "a moldering petty bourgeoisie—a departure from the national unity line that Neto has always pressed for previ-



Afrique-Asie

President Agostinho Neto

ously. "They think they will re-establish their subordination to capitalism. They are paid or unpaid informers, individuals with a highly dangerous class attitude forcing them into certain positions because of pride and in self-defense.

"It is from them that the factionalists gained support. It is here we find the strong-hold of subversion and intelligent sabotage. The petty bourgeoisie wants power and is thirsty for it."

With the MPLA expected to hold its first congress before the end of the year or soon thereafter, when it will decide upon the formation of a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, Neto concluded, "It is clear that the class struggle in our country has brought the discomfiture of the petty bourgeoisie whose attempts to establish forms of oppression and exploitation of the working classes are visible though subtle."

Clearly President Neto's independence day speech was sharply political, focusing on the severe structural problems the second year of independence has left with the MPLA. Economically, the country is also seriously strained, with many staples rationed and difficult to obtain. But achievements in the economic sphere have been significant.

The Economy

The old Portuguese currency was replaced by the Angolan kwanza. Nationalizations have continued throughout the country. The diamond industry has been partially nationalized—including 61% of the holdings of the largest single producer, Diamang,

a company linked with South Africa's Anglo-American Corporation. However, President Neto is reported to have recently told workers in diamond-producing Lunda province that 70% of Diamang's machinery is out of action because of incompetence or sabotage.

Production of sugar, timber, textiles, plywood and steel has been completely nationalized, and most large plantations and ranches abandoned by the Portuguese have been confiscated. Angola's coffee production is almost completely under state control, as are other key cash crops such as cotton, sisal, and tobacco.

Gulf Oil has been granted a further year's lease on the Cabinda oil fields, and oil sales continue to account for the major part of Angola's export earnings and the government's revenue.

Despite UNITA attacks the Benguela line has continued to function this year, operating as far as the border with Zaire; there is still not traffic with Zaire.

Health and Education

A successful literacy program has seen the enrollment of a million and a half children in primary school—three times the figure during the colonial period. Some 70,000 adults have learned to read and write through programs in workplaces and villages.

Wide activity in public health—although still judged insufficient by Ministry of Health Officials—is beginning to reach more villagers in the countryside. Mass vaccinations were launched this year beginning with the record-breaking children's polio vaccinations in which over one million youngsters received polio vaccine nationwide. Seventeen schools for training health care workers have been established. There were four under Portuguese rule.

Construction and reconstruction is moving forward. Many of the almost 200 bridges destroyed during the war are now operative. The payroll of the Ministry of Building and Housing has increased ten-fold since March 1976. According to one report, of 640 unfinished building sites abandoned by the Portuguese, 572 have been completed.

Thus while the revolutionary government in Luanda has endured strenuous attacks on its political power, it is slowly building the economic and social foundations that should provide security for the political changes that Angola's people will face during the third year of Independence. □

Namibia

Western diplomats have labelled the year now ending as one of breakthrough in achieving a 'solution' to the long dispute over independence for the International Territory of Namibia.

Reports of great and imminent change are bruited about, but 'change' looks suspiciously like the same old thing with only a new and poorly disguised face.

In March, the South African-sponsored Turnhalle conference came up with its 'final concept' for an 'interim government' for an 'independent South West Africa.' The 150-odd carefully selected representatives from the country's 11 'ethnic' groups as determined by Pretoria had labored over a period of 18 months. There were countless committee meetings, on-again, off-again plenary sessions in the refurbished German empire drill hall in Namibia's capital city of Windhoek, much traveling to and from Pretoria to get orders, and occasional trips by certain delegates to the United States, West Germany, Britain and other places in search of friends and backers. After all this, these fathers of a New Namibia uttered not a manifesto but a petition craving the establishment of an interim government—addressed to the 'Government of the Republic of South Africa.'

United Nations Role

Every Namibian knows that the South African regime illegally occupies Namibia in defiance of the lawful authority, the United Nations. The UN and its many constituent entities—the General Assembly, the Security Council, its specially-created administrative body, the Council for Namibia—have been wrestling for over three decades with this unique responsibility inherited from the League of Nations. Security Council resolution 385 of January 1976 had drawn the final tough line in demanding that South Africa commit itself to withdrawal so that the UN could enter the Territory and conduct free nation-wide elections under the supervision and control of the world body.

Fraudulent Scheme

Inside Namibia the people's resistance to minority, foreign rule has reached a degree of political sophistication and intensity matched by a decade of armed struggle by the South West Africa People's Organization and

its military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia. Both worldwide and internal pressures upon Pretoria and its ruling elite in Namibia have been such that Pretoria recognized the need for a face-lifting operation to perpetrate an appearance of independence. Hence the Turnhalle scheme.

Gang of Five

But Pretoria was too ham-handed and its ploy transparent so the West was forced to seek some alternative "solution." During the course of a tense Security Council conclave in New York in March, the five Western powers of that body—the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Canada—undertook to enter the scene with a series of contacts with the Pretoria regime and Pretoria's most hated Namibian opponent, SWAPO. The aptly named 'Gang of Five,' were concerned over the balance of power in southern Africa and sought to protect their ability to con-

NAMIBIA

Area: 317,827 sq. mi.

Population: 1,200,000 (1976 est.)

African 1,100,000

White 100,000

Capital: Windhoek

National currency: Rand (0.87 per US \$1)

Political status: UN trust territory illegally occupied by South Africa

Illiteracy: about 90%

rol investments and the rich resources of the region.

Nine months later they are still conducting what they insist are 'not negotiations' involving Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster's South African regime, the front line African states—Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique—and the core of Namibian resistance, SWAPO. Growing African demands at the UN for economic and military sanctions against South Africa and intensified warfare by PLAN against the 50,000-man South African Defense Force in the occupied Territory gave an urgency to the matter. The decaying strength of Ian Smith's illegal Rhodesian regime in Zimbabwe and widening domestic upheaval in South Africa itself lent a desperate air to the situation. The newer version of American-style shuttle diplomacy dominated the entire enterprise and a US cost-efficient plan of action went into high gear, with enormous pressures exerted on SWAPO to accede to a settlement scheme.



SWAPO guerrillas inside Namibia

SWAPO

Dealings with Pretoria were touted as hard-line, but Vorster and his people have over the years developed a way of handling those who would have a say in how its satrapy was run. In rapid succession, South Africa appointed an administrator general in Namibia, to consolidate Pretoria's hold on the Territory and then seized Namibia's only seaport, Walvis Bay, thus effectively strangling the fledgling nation of Namibia.

Staging Elections

A burst of press releases announced the disbanding of Turnhalle as an incipient interim government. Instead Turnhalle became a political coalition under the leadership of Chief Clemens Kapuuo, the man all along considered to be Pretoria's choice for first president of South West Africa/Namibia. National Party 'moderate' Dirk Mudge led a walkout from the recalcitrant associate organization of South Africa's ruling National Party to form the white Republican Party, which associated with the Turnhalle coalition, to pre-serve a multi-racial appearance.

The stage is set for elections early in 1978, with South Africa still firmly in

control, with SWAPO still insisting upon the United Nations governing the vital transition period leading toward unfettered elections and the subsequent declaration of a State of Namibia. SWAPO continues its battle against the South African army and air force in northern and central Namibia while enjoying country-wide support through its political organization. South Africa maintains its occupation forces, and supplies, trains and provides sanctuary for guerrillas of the UNITA movement attempting to destabilize the People's Republic of Angola just above the Namibian frontier.

Tightening Control

In addition, with an eye to the future, Pretoria has appointed one of its top major generals to head a South West African Defense Force (as distinct from the SA Defense Force). This army is being rapidly put together of battalions from the varying 'ethnic' groups.

The entire South African emplaced administrative structure, including magistrates, secret police, civil servants, the whole apparatus of occupation, remains intact. South African

laws are still in effect, though some restrictions of the more blatant and onerous kind—like the Mixed Marriages Act and some segregation enforcements in major centers—have been voided. South African courts continue to mete out that peculiar brand of retribution which passes for justice in the land. Late in May, a Namibian man was hanged by order of the South African State President. Four men were sentenced to prison under Pretoria's Terrorism Act. Another Namibian, SWAPO official Victor Nkandi, is currently on trial in Windhoek, accused both under the Terrorism Act and of being party to a murder of a South African-approved chief. Economic forces are realigning in preparation for the expected change in front office command.

Beneath it all nothing has really changed. The same powers will remain. The setting up of a South West Africa/Namibia 'government'—after properly managed elections, would put in place a multi-racial 'moderate' regime which both South Africa and the West could live with and to which they could rally against the still struggling people's liberation movement of Namibia. □

YEAR IN REVIEW

Botswana

Tossed between the still powerful, though shaken, white regimes of southern Africa and the rising tide of African liberation, Botswana, landlocked and poor, is struggling to keep afloat. This year Botswana began diverting funds from economic development to strengthening its defense capability and to prepare itself to withstand the economic shock of a break with Rhodesia or South Africa.

According to a special UN mission which visited Botswana in February, its geographical location would force it to spend upwards of \$50 million almost immediately for unbudgeted security, refugee, and emergency measures. By October an international campaign to raise funds for Botswana so it would not have to divert development funds had succeeded in raising only about half the targeted amount.

Rhodesian Attacks

Tension in the Botswana-Rhodesia border area remains very high. The Rhodesian forces make constant incursions into Botswana, killing Botswana

citizens and damaging property. The number of documented violations appears to be up from the 26 incidents reported in 1976. Rural residents report that in some areas along the border it is no longer possible to carry out normal agricultural work. The apparent Rhodesian intention is to create the same kind of no-go area on the Botswana side as they have on their own.

The Rhodesian regime's terrorism was also directed against the refugees in Botswana. The small military force which Botswana has established to deal with these security threats has cost

BOTSWANA

Area: 224,764 sq. mi.

Population: 700,000 (1975 est.)

Capital: Gaborone

Head of State and

Government: Sir Seretse Khama

GNP: \$170.1 million (1974 est.)

National currency: Pula (0.87 per US \$1)

Independence: September 30, 1966

Illiteracy: 67%

\$16.3 million in capital expenditure and will take an estimated \$3.4 million in recurrent annual funds. Military encampments are planned for the border area to better ensure the safety of Botswana citizens and perhaps to keep Zimbabwean freedom fighters from using Botswana territory.

Refugees

For years Botswana has served as haven for those fleeing the political and economic oppression of apartheid. With the increasing level of armed struggle in Zimbabwe and repression in South Africa, the refugee problem has reached serious proportions. Bot-



UNHCR

Zimbabwe refugees in camp in Botswana

swana, with its small population of 700,000, finds itself host to about 4000 refugees at a time. During January and February 1977, 400 people were arriving per week. Many stay only for a short period, waiting for the chance to move on. Those who remain behind must depend on the \$30 a month stipend from humanitarian agencies since Botswana can offer refugees few educational or economic opportunities.

The Botswana government does not allow political refugees to engage in political activities while in the country. Political content was banned from a Soweto commemoration program in Gaborone in June. The government

has perceived continued refugee political activism as a potential source of trouble domestically as well as an irritant to relations with the repressive regimes the refugees have fled. Efforts to connect Botswana with underground armed struggle groups are now a feature of political trials in South Africa.

Economic Problems

High unemployment, drought, and continued poor returns on a costly investment, the copper/nickel complex at Selebi-Pikwe, have added to Botswana's economic problems during the year. Because Botswana's economy is closely tied to South Africa—80% of its imports including much of its food, come from its southern neighbor—it is relatively unprotected from the effects of South Africa economic policy. For instance, when South Africa cut out price subsidies on its staple foods, the increased cost was passed on to the Botswana consumer as well. In response, Botswana revalued the *pula* by 5%, a conservative amount designed to help the poorer citizens without upsetting the big farmers or hurting Botswana's international position. South African plans to cut back on employment of foreign contract workers in mining will directly affect Botswana workers, as 25% of the active male population of Botswana now works in South Africa.

In the past Botswana has counted on the continued operation and use of the 394-mile section of the Mafeking-Bulawayo rail line which connects Rhodesia and South Africa and passes through Botswana. The line carries most of

Botswana's international shipping and generates a large portion of the government's annual income. The government has begun to plan for the emergency situation which would result if Rhodesian Railways no longer operated the line. The cost of alternate operating arrangements are now estimated by Botswana's Canadian consultants at \$47 million.


An all-weather road from Kazungula at the tiny Zambia-Botswana border to Nata was completed in January. However, with the modest level of trade between Botswana and Zambia it is not expected to have great economic significance so long as the railroad continues to serve as Botswana's main link with foreign markets.

Nuclear Threat

Two further developments in South Africa have been of concern to Botswana this year, the reports that South Africa has plans and the capacity to develop nuclear weapons has all of Africa worried. The rumors that nuclear tests would be carried out in the Kalahari desert have particularly disturbed Botswana which, along with Namibia, shares the Kalahari with South Africa.

Bantustan Threat

The existence of the Bophutswana bantustan, scheduled for independence in December, which is located on the Botswana border could prove a new source of difficulty, similar to the problems Lesotho has had with regard to the Transkei. Botswana has made it clear that it regards the bantustans as a negative development for the people of South Africa who are being deprived of any remnants of rights by the granting of "bogus" independence. The coming period is likely to see new tensions developing in this area. □



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Molefe Pheto — Poetry for The Struggle



Molefe Pheto

Molefe Pheto, South African poet, writer, actor, journalist, and musician, was born 42 years ago in Alexandra Township, a black ghetto nine miles north of Johannesburg. Since 1953 he has written about the artist's part in political struggles for freedom.

He has read his poems at the black university in South Africa, at black high schools, in black churches and ghettos, in Nigeria during the FESTAC, and recently in various cities in the USA. He has refused to read or to allow any plays he directs to be performed before white audiences in South Africa.

In 1966 Pheto was awarded a music scholarship at the Guildhall School of Music and Drama in London, where he

studied for four years. He returned to South Africa in 1971 and became the music, education and cultural activities director for the African Music and Drama Association, a black cultural learning center. He helped to found the Mihloti, a black theater, a black artists' organization and a black writers' organization, in addition to working as an actor and director.

On March 5, 1975, Molefe Pheto was detained by the South African Security Police under the deadly "terrorism clause." He spent 281 days in prison, 271 of them in solitary confinement. The spirit that he shares in this poetry, however, could not be confined.

All poems copyright © 1977 by Molefe Pheto

I CAME BACK.

No God, Its not the same.
The Black child is.
His her face.
His her pearly teeth.
His her knotted kinky hair.
His her "not you elder!"
and the games they play are different.

Now three jumps,
back to back,
side to side,
Three this way.
No, three that way.
God, what's going on.
I was away "only" ten months.

Three this way,
into squares like remote control
that reminds me
of the electric button
that switched the steel door
into my oblivion
only this time
three or two Black children played
a new game.

God. I came back.
Days I gave up.
My living grave
my death.

Four walls and the keys
rattle into steel doors
into grill gates
into four dirty walls
dirty stenchy grey blankets.
And eternal toilet.

God. Am I back.
To the Black child
forever at play in the streets
and to touch his Amazon-like
crop of hair as though viewed from the sky.
But what had I done.
Black child tell me. Please.

God. I want to relive
this child for ten months in retrospect,
twenty four hours 281 days
dark months of brutality.
How many kisses of love to the day
I would have smothered
like I have seen other
fathers do.

And torture Black child.
I loved you through it all.

God. I'm back.

2nd after detention. 2:30 p.m.

THERE IS NO SUN IN HERE

There is no Sun in here,
Only the rain outside, incessant.
There is no shade in here,
A mist, grey, blue-black
Through meshed wire-windows . . .
There is no nothing in here
Except my breathing
Which I and the two unblinking
Policemen on the ceiling
Of cell 201 can hear.

April 1975

WHEN THEY COME.

When they come for me
I wonder many times
who the victor is.

Blasts of bangs
on dead doors
in the middle of the night
unconcentrated torch lights
of fear
from those who have
come for me
nights without sleep
are now ended for me
because at last
they have come
and I with victory
know my fate.

Brave talk of fears
emanates from hoarse throats
as the house-search progresses
papers, any sort, strewn around
I watch, they watch
we watch
but who's scared.

Composure from peace
like a quiet morning . . .
inner strength strengthens
a weak me
I stand tall
a proud Black man
for even as I might die
Its with them that
my memory remains
for they alone know
how they committed me
to my death,
me stone cold
strong strengthened
because I am right.

At interrogation I know
I looked the man
straight in the eyes
But who BLUSHED
who blushed I ask
for I know it was not me.

Out in the long black
hollow distance
my face and beard brightened
in a richness
as
Nigerian oil.

I am winning
they are winning
I am incarcerated
in a victory
of ideas.

Calabar was years ago
there's now a new dawn
for me
because they took me
but forgot the mask.

3-3-1977

*To Malebane, who "jumped"
to his death from the tenth
floor during "interrogation."*

24.

Do you know
what love is
Whiteman?

You took me
whilst my baby slept.
And she's as beautiful as yours
loves as yours
but you took me,
took love
when you had yours.

Whiteman,
Do you know
What love is?

When I saw them
my Phello and Gakearesepe sleeping
the day when you released me,
White man, dear God,
You owe me for life
ten months of love to my daughters,

And also
you have taught me
to hate.

4th after detention. 3:30 a.m.

Namibia Talks Stalled

Negotiations over independence for the South African-controlled territory of Namibia have reached an impasse, with the SWAPO liberation movement refusing to talk further unless there is a breakthrough.

The settlement discussions, which involve SWAPO, South African authorities, and five major Western powers, are stalled on the issue of South African military presence in the territory during the interim period before independence.

SWAPO wants the withdrawal of South African forces plus a maximum of United Nations involvement in arranging elections. But South Africa maintains that unless its troops are present, SWAPO militants will terrorize the population into voting for the organization's candidates.

"We haven't made any significant headway on the troop withdrawal issue," says an American diplomat close to the talks. "South Africa hasn't agreed to reduce troop strength to a level we think acceptable—either in absolute terms or in relation to the United Nations presence."

Inside Namibia, meanwhile, South African administrator Judge Marthinus T. Steyn is getting wide publicity for scrapping segregation laws, including the hated passbook system which controlled Africans' movements.

The campaign to clamp down on SWAPO continues, however, as police arrested several of the movement's leaders in early December. Most of the officials were released after questioning, but Ben Bernados, who heads the Windhoek branch of the SWAPO Youth League, was still in detention at press time.

National Party Rides South African Landslide

In South Africa's biggest election landslide in over sixty years, the National Party was returned to power with 134 parliamentary seats against 30 for the entire opposition.

With 17 seats, the Progressive Federal Party (formerly the Progressive

Reform Party) has now become the official opposition. The New Republic Party, successor to the United Party, won only 10 seats—28 fewer than the United Party held three years ago.

Bomb Blasts in South Africa

Bomb blasts early this month damaged a police station and several cars parked outside a suburban train station in the vicinity of Johannesburg, South Africa.

The incidents, in which no one was injured, came two weeks after a powerful explosion damaged at least eleven shops in the luxury Carleton Centre shopping and office complex in downtown Johannesburg. Some 19 people were injured at that time, none seriously.

No group has claimed responsibility for the bombings.

Zimbabwe Guerrilla Leaders Stand Firm

Amidst rumors that the Patriotic Front might be nearing a split, co-leaders Robert Mugabe of ZANU and Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU met in Maputo, Mozambique, early this month and together rejected the two most recent settlement initiatives for Zimbabwe.

Nkomo and Mugabe declared they would not travel to London to pursue any further talks with Britain until Foreign Secretary David Owen is willing to proceed without the okay of Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith. And the Front's leaders reiterated their total rejection of the "internal settlement" now pursued by Smith and moderate nationalists.

Talks on the internal settlement got off the ground following Smith's November 24 announcement that his government was willing to consider universal suffrage as a basis for a settlement, providing sufficient guarantees could be provided to ensure whites' confidence in the new government. Bishop Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau are the three major participants in the current round of negotiations in Salisbury.

The Patriotic Front, which considers the Salisbury talks invalid, in-

sists that any settlement must involve the guerrilla armies, on the one hand, and the formal colonial authority, Great Britain, on the other.

Carnegie Mellon Threatens Rhodesians

Pittsburgh's Carnegie Mellon University threatened early this month to expel eight young members of Rhodesia's civil service who are enrolled in a public management course at the institution.

The eight, who came on a project financed by American corporations with the approval of the State Department and the Rhodesian regime, stirred controversy when they claimed they had been misled about the "non-political" nature of the program. In a statement to the press the students said that, contrary to their original conception of the program, the Carnegie Mellon course was intended to "create a nucleus of pro-Western puppets to stand in the way as a stumbling block against the authentic cause of the people's revolution in Zimbabwe."

As a result of this protest Carnegie Mellon has threatened to expel them and has already demanded that they leave their university housing by December 23.

Rhodesian Raids Hit Mozambique

Rhodesia's security forces claim to have killed more than 1200 Zimbabwe guerrillas in raids on camps in the Manica and Tete provinces of Mozambique in late November and early December.

The attacks were the largest since the August 1976 raid on the Nyazonia refugee camp, after which the Rhodesians claimed to have killed 300 guerrillas. Subsequent reports from Mozambique revealed that the Nyazonia facility was a refugee camp, and that over 800 of its occupants had been killed.

Reporters who visited the site of one of the recent attacks said they found a devastated guerrilla camp 12 miles north of Chimoio, some 55 miles inside Mozambique. The camp had been used by the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) as a guerrilla transit facility.

Some of the bodies found in the camp were those of guerrillas, but the majority of the 100 killed were women and children, including a class of 20 young girls between the ages of 10 and 14. A clinic, school, storage depot and repair facilities were located in the camp.

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