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
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TALK

AUGUST, 1961



THE PROTECTORATES: THEIR FUTURE

THIS IS THE AGE OF AFRICA'S INDEPENDENCE. WHAT OF BASUTOLAND BECHUANALAND, SWAZILAND?

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The views expressed in these articles are not necessarily those of the Editorial Board: they reflect a wide range of opinions on the three countries.

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FIGHTING TALK

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THE PROTECTORATES AND VERWOERD REPUBLIC

by L. Bernstein

BREAK OUT OF THE NET

A traveller flying over Southern Africa would have difficulty in picking out the boundaries of the Republic, or in deciding where the Republic ends and the Protectorates begin.

The Eastern Transvaal is divided from Swaziland only by an imaginary line drawn on the map; nothing marks the frontier on the ground. Perhaps a quarter of Basutoland's frontier with the Republic is marked by the Caledon river; for the rest, there is only an imaginary line, the peaks and foothills of the Drakensberg scattered indiscriminately both sides of the border. On the West, between the Transvaal and Bechuanaland, much of the border is marked by the Limpopo and Marico rivers; but to the traveller on foot there is nothing in the vegetation or topography to distinguish one side from the other. Geographically, it would seem, Republic and Protectorates are indistinguishable.

Thin Lines on the Map

Nor are there any clear racial or ethnic divisions at the frontiers. The inhabitants on the one side of the border are indistinguishable from those across the thin line on the map. They speak the same languages, follow the same customs and trace their ancestries through the same tribal his'ories. They follow the same pastoral lives; the men go off to work in the Republic's minefields and cities in much the same way.

There are, of course, the man-made differences.

In Basutoland there is no White settlement on the land; in the Eastern Free ate peoples.

State little African settlement. In Bechuanaland, White settlement ends with the fertile strips along the border river, and in the hinterland the land is occupied only by Africans.

There are other differences too.

Within the Republic, generally there are more schools, more hospitals, better medical facilities; on the other hand, there are pass laws preventing all free movement of people within the country, filling the jails with petty offenders. Within the Republic there are opportunities for industrial employment, offering an escape from rural poverty and relatively high wages; on the other hand there is rigid apartheid, extending into the most insulting and degrading colour bar in the world.

Life in the Protectorates is perhaps poorer; but then it is also freer.

More Fiction than Fact

The only real divisions between Republic and Protectorates are the divisions made by politics.

75 odd years ago, the first political decisions were made to establish these separate entities; the factors were almost accidental. With slightly less forceful resistance by Mosheshoe to Boer encroachment, without the fanatical Cape to Cairo railroad dream of Rhodes, they might well all have become part of the Republic of South Africa. Until perhaps five years ago, it is doubtful whether this would have made substantial difference to the lives of the Protector-

PROTECTORATE PERSONALITIES ON THE COVER

(Left Panel (Top): MR. MOTSOMAI K. MPHO of the Bechuanaland People's Party. (Centre) DR. A. ZWANE of the Swaziland Progressive Party. (Bottom) MR. NTSU MOKHEHLE of the Basutoland Congress Party. (Centre Picture) SERETSE KHAMA, hereditary chief of the Bamangwato, Bech. Right Panel (lower) CHIEF SOBHUZA, Swaziland Paramount Chief. Right Panel (Top) CHIEF CONSTANTINE BERENG MOSHESH II: Paramount Chief of Basutoland.

Despite the political frontiers, they have been tied to the Republic so closely that the "protection" of the British throne has been a fiction rather than a fact.

Economically all the territories are shackled to the Republic's migrant labour system; the men leave the Protectorates under contract to the Republic's mines and major farms, just as they do from the Republic's own African reserves. Agriculture has become as much the responsibility of the women, the aged and the children as it has been in the depopulated Republic's reserves.

Where there has been European settlement, it has been — as in the Republic — on the most fertile lands, in the best irrigated areas, in the only places accessible to the town markets. Where there are roads and railways, it is — as in the Republic — where there are industries to serve, White farmer's products to carry, or able-bodied men to transport to the gold mines.

Wages and conditions of work have been settled in tune with the Republic's — only on a lower level since labour is more abundant—which have been determined by farm owners and the Chamber of Mines.

The Gaps Grow Wider

The British "protectorate" has not kept the Republic from penetrating deep into the life, economy and administration of the Territories.

Republic currency is the currency of the Protectorates. The Republic's postal services and radio services are the Protectorates services. Customs duties, and import and export control are exercised by the Republic.

The British administration has maintained a colour bar, less rigid and less lunatic than the worst of South Africa's, but still rigid enough to reserve almost all senior administrative posts for Whites, and to keep the clubs, hotels and main sporting amenities for Whites. In this congenial atmosphere, very many of the British-appointed administrators and senior civil servants have been White South Africans.

The divisions thus between Republic and Protectorate are not, generally, substantial — except only the political divisions. For the past few years these divisions have been rapidly widening.

The Republic under the National government has been receding steadily into an ever more cramped and confined political prison for the Non-White people. The last Non-Whites have been removed from the common voters' roll; the last White representatives of Non-White electors have been evicted from Parliament; the elected Transkeian General Council and the elected Advisory Boards are being dismissed.

At the same time the Protectorates one and all — are moving towards new and more representative forms of government, in which the people are, for the first time, voting for local administrations with some measure of authority.

The position is not everywhere the same. In Basytoland, universal male suffrage elects half the national Council, the tribal chiefs the remainder. The Council has real legislative power in many things, but important powers defence, internal security and others are reserved for the British-appointed administrator. In Bechuanaland, a Legislative Council, indirectly elected, partly nominated by the Administrator and heavily weighted in favour of the White minority exercises substantial authority under the Administrator's veto right. In Swaziland, representative government of some type is only now under discussion, with constitutional proposals being formulated. Basutoland is thus closest to the goal of fully responsible government elected by universal franchise.

to divest itself of its blatant imperialist past, and to pose as the friend and protector of backward Africa. Where the imperial stakes are high, there nothing is conceded without a fight. But where the stakes are low, there a demonstration of the 'new look' imperialism is worth while.

And in the Protectorates, the stakes are low. None of the Protectorates have ever been bright jewels in the imperial crown, nor are they likely to be in the near future.

They are generally poor in known mineral deposits; their soil and climate are generally unsuitable for large-scale ranching or plantation farming; they have no known oil, no natural forests of commercial timber. There are no glittering profits to be extracted from places

SOUTH AFRICA'S TONGUE IN CHEEK

PREMIER STRIJDOM in 1955: "If the Territories are transferred to us we will treat them in the same sympathetic way we have always treated the Native Territories within the Union."

But all are moving in direct opposition to the course of the Republic.

High Stakes and Low

There is a close link between the extent of White settlement and the progress towards self government.

The Republic with the greatest White settlement stands furthest from democratic government; Basutoland with the least White settlement stands closest. Swaziland, with considerable White settlement, is further from self rule than Bechuanaland, with little. Partly, no doubt, this close link can be accounted for by the stubborn resistance to Non-White franchise which is put up by the White communities everywhere in Africa. But only in part.

For the constitutional advances of the Protectorates are not only the result of the internal struggles of their peoples, but also — perhaps mainly — the result of external factors.

There has been little political struggle worthy of the name in recent times in Bechuanaland or Swaziland; there was not a great deal either in Basutoland before the present constitution was formulated. Britain, it would appear, has been prepared to concede gracefully in the Protectorates what it resists desperately and forcefully in Kenya, the Rhodesias and Nyasaland.

There are, no doubt, many complex reasons for this.

One at least is that we live in an age of African independence, when the revolutionary struggles of the people against foreign domination can no longer be easily suppressed. Britain clings desperately to its imperialist possessions; but it is a losing fight.

And in an effort to prevent the total loss of its colonial positions it is anxious such as these. True, these are not the only stakes of imperialism. In some places, colonies acquire great value because they are strategically placed to defend imperial possessions; but the strategic value of these three land-locked enclaves is slight. Basutoland and Swaziland are militarily untenable as bases without the co-operation of South Africa and perhaps Portugal. Bechuanaland is locked indefensibly between the desert and South Africa. All three lie anyway outside the main traffic routes and trade-lines of modern commerce and modern military planning.

In the long run, their only substantial value to British imperialism has been their manpower — which has built and continues to support one of the richest commercial enterprises of Empire — the South African gold mines. It is mainly THIS that Britain has gambled within its easy concessions towards self government in the Protectorates.

Setting Made by Struggle

It should be added — lest the people of the Protectorates in their easy fortune forget it — that the decisive factor in deciding Britain's policy has been the struggle of the people of South Africa against their own government. By their own struggles against National apartheid, they have forced South Africa's colour-bar system into the forefront of world affairs.

In a way, they have made South Africa the dividing point between progress and reaction.

Who sides with the South African government brands himself as an arch reactionary; who dares copy the South Afroan colour-bar institutions reveals himself as an enemy of the African people. In this setting, made by the struggle of the South African liberation movement, Britain risks her entire prestige and status everywhere in Africa if she does not lead the Protectorates away from the South African system, towards votes and democratic government.

Elsewhere in Africa — where men still battle desperately against Britain's unrelenting rule — they will doubtless look on the Protectorates' easy passage to self government with envy. But it is proving to be a mixed blessing. Because it comes to seasy, the liberation of the Protectorates take place without the mass upsurge of the people, without the entry of the ordinary people into the arena of political action and economic reconstruction.

There is about it more of the grudging air of cheeseparing reform than the heady effervescence of rebirth. The way in which they approach their day of liberation is conditioning the character of their liberation.

It is difficult to describe the process which is taking place. On the one hand the British government concentrates the attention of the people on detailed matters of constitution, thus obscuring larger matters of principle.

On the other, the local organisations turn more and more attention to the securing of office under these constitutions, and lose sight of the fundamental need to mobilise the population for the tasks of liberation.

Thus, when faced with the serious and obvious economic difficulties of their territories, they can do little better than to demand more assistance from the Colonial Office, and raise false hopes of "what would be possible" if only the Colonial Office made the funds available.

No Charity from Afar

Clearly the Colonial Office will not. It has never been a philanthropic organisation; it invests imperial funds where it can derive either strategically necessary raw materials or military positions, or where it can pave the way for substantial and profitable private capital investments.

None of these conditions exist in the Protectorates. The Protectorates will have to raise themselves by their own boot-straps or stagnate. But to lift themselves by their own boot-straps — as the experience particularly of Guinea indicates—they must mobilise the whole people, inspire them with revolutionary fervour, and enable them to see that they are working for their own future.

This perspective is what, thus far, seems to be lacking in the Protectorates. It is this lack that explains the political rifts appearing in Basutoland at a time when political organisation is still in its very infancy. It is this lack that explains the feeling of popular apathy and indifference which many visitors to Bechuanaland comment on. It is this lack which leads to Basuto passivity in the face of provocative military preparations on its borders, such as happened during

the last weeks of May; here indeed was a great opportunity for arousing the Basuto people to self defence, and thus to laying the groundwork for a Basuto national army of the future — an essential and ultimately inevitable part of breaking the dependence of Basutoland on the Republic and establishing its own complete independence.

Break Out of the Net

No doubt these things will come. The people of the Protectorates will learn from their own experience, as others have learnt. But this does not mean that time is of no account.

There is a situation existing today which may not last for ever, and which may not recur again.

That is the situation in which South Africa is the pariah of the world, without friends abroad, bitterly besieged by its own people at home.

This is the moment for the Protectorates to strike out for their own independence, to break the chains of South African penetration. At this moment, world sympathy and world support can be won for even the most daring, the boldest steps to break out of South Africa's net. The people of the Protectorates dare not miss this moment when conditions are so favourable.

And there is the other side of this matter. Every forward act of the Protectorates weakens still further the already weakened and desperate South African government, at the same time it heartens and inspires the South African people to overthrow their government. Thus well timed, bold action by the Protectorates now can be a decisive contribution to the liberation of South African.

This is more than an act of international solidarity. For, in the long run, the Protectorates and their future are bound up with the future of the Republic. Even as independent states, even when they have achieved full democratic, responsible government, the economic problems of the Protectorates remain to be conquered. And they cannot be conquered fully without co-operation, inter-change and joint assis.ance between the Republic and themselves.

For willy-nilly — boundaries or no boundaries — economically the fate of South Africa is the fate of the Protectorates. They sink or swim together.

"In Swaziland the main need is to create conditions favourable to the economic development that must eventually come in any case and that will enable the Swazi people to participate in the associated benefits." (our emphasis.)

Report of the Morse Economic Survey Mission.

Basutoland:

No nation can enter the modern age riding on ponies, says MARIUS SCHOON

When Basutoland was granted limited self-rule in 1960 many people in South Africa watched events in the Protectorate with considerable interest. It was exciting to envisage an independent African state within the borders of the Republic, and perhaps we even had visions of pressure from there making things uncomfortable for the South African Government.

Did we allow our hopes to be raised too high? Basutoland is still a long way from independence, and possibly even from responsible government.

At the present half the Legislative Council is nominated by the chiefs and only half is elected. The Executive Council is appointed by the administration, and a number of officials are ex officio members of it.

So both the Colonial Office and the chiefs still retain considerable control over the future of the country.

Britain has recently shown that she is not prepared to spend enough money on Basutoland to make it self-supporting in the foreseeable future.

The Morse Report recently recommended an immediate expenditure of £7 million on the three Protectorates. The British Government has decided to allocate £1,200,000 to the three territories over the next two years. At this rate it will take 14 years to carry out the minimal recommendations of this report.

Operation Shop-Window?

Those who speak of "Operation Shop Window", i.e. building the Protectorates into model states to try to influence events in the Republic, seem to misunderstand the very nature of colonialism.

Even the most benevolent colonial power does not spend large sums of money unless there is a possibility, no matter how indirect, of some future return.

Only Swaziland seems at the moment to have a definite industrial future, and Britain is loth to invest on a large scale in either of the other territories.

There are two other important points. Firstly, Britain's own financial affairs are not as healthy as they might be. Secondly, Britain has more money invested in South Africa than in any other country except the United States. Both

Operation Shop-Window?

BASUTOLAND:

SIZE: 11,716 square miles.

An enclave completely ringed about by South Africa.


POPULATION: African 638,857

Total 641,674

ADMINISTRATIVE CAPITAL: Maseru.

Basuto Capital: Matsieng.

MIGRANT LABOUR is Basutoland's chief export and source of income. 43% of the African male population is away at any one time, working on the Rand and Free State Gold mines, on farms and in South Africa's industry.



Well-watered country, with three main RIVER SYSTEMS: the Orange, Makhaleng and Caledon which all unite in South Africa to form the Orange. Yet there is practically no irrigation in the Territory. There are several schemes for HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER (the Ox-bow Scheme, the Kau River Scheme and the Semena River scheme) but all involve delivery of water to areas of the Free State where expanding industry needs it, an othis would involve closer and more complex relations with South Africa.

Known MINERAL RESOURCES are few. The economy leans heavily on the cultivation of CROPS and raising of SHEEP AND GOATS for wool and mohair. Farming is mainly for subsistence (total agricultural output about £4-£5 million a year, but exports worth only £300,000 in 1958). The livestock population has declined over the past 15-20 years, but, apart from mine labour, it is still the principal source of cash income.

The EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM is largely in the hands of three missions — the Paris Evangelical, the Roman Catholic and the English Church. There is only one government school in the Territory — the main technical trades school in Maseru. In grants-in-aid to non-denominational schools the Government pays one-fifth of the country's total annual revenue of £1,600,000 and a sixth of the total expenditure of £2,000,000.

these factors will tend to curtail even further spending on the Protectorates.

Yet, if there is one thing Basutoland needs it is money.

The country has a rainfall of about 30 inches a year, but erosion has consumed so much arable land that the people can not make a living in the country. A start has been made in the fight against erosion, and in the plains it is almost under control.

However, merely to carry out the recommendations of the Morse Report with respect to the mountainous regions is more than the country's resources can cope with at the moment.

In 1957 Basutoland imported £3,012,954 worth of goods while her exports totalled only £2,173,331. There is only one way in which this deficit can be made up, and that is by the men going to work in the Republic. Labour is in fact Basutoland's chief export.

The Morse Report estimates that 83,000 men, or 43% of the adult male population is working outside the Protectorate at any given time. By far the greater proportion of these men are employed on the mines.

This seems to be one place where the Basutos can strike at the Republic. The mines are even more dependant on this labour than the Basutos are on the work. By agitating for better conditions for their citizens, the Basutoland Government could perhaps do much to improve the lot of all contract labour in South Africa.

Riding on Ponies

Not only does Basutoland export labour to the Republic but her economy is intrinsically tied up with that of the Republic.

Republic customs and currency regulations apply in the territory, and almost all manufactured goods are imported from there.

This means that even when or if Basutoland does achieve full independence she will still be dependent on the Republic economically.

The obvious answer is the creation of indigenous industries.

The Morse Report states emphatically: "We cannot recommend the creation of factory type industries at the moment." While this is by no means the final word on the subject, it would appear to have a certain validity. The cost of industrialisation is prohibitive, due to the lack of electrical power. There are however vast water resources, and some form of hydro-electric scheme is imperative in the future.

No nation can enter the modern age riding on ponies.

The British government has shelved the proposed Ox Bow hydro-electric scheme as it was considered that even the first stage was too costly. This scheme would, however, have been double-edged, as a large proportion of the current generated would have been sold to the Republic, and would thus only have bound Basutoland more closely to the Republic's economy.

Blankets and Skill

Basutoland is in the strange position of being an exporter of wool and an importer of blankets. If the power difficulties could be solved, a textile industry could surely flourish.

The Morse Report makes an exceptionally important point on industrialisation. Dealing with Swaziland, the report makes it clear that Africans must be trained to perform skilled tasks both on the proposed railway and in the expanding mining industry. This would prevent a situation arising in Swaziland, as it has on the Copper Belt, where skilled jobs are reserved for whites and Africans are allowed to perform only manual and semi-skilled tasks. If the

Commission were able to recommend this for Swaziland, with an appreciable white settler population, it would obviously hold even more true in Basutoland. Congress leaders in Basutoland must insist on this recommendation being carried out when industrialisation does eventually come about.

What of Mineral Wealth?

A Col. Scott has been granted concessions to prospect for, and mine, diamonds in the territory. As yet no indication has been given of how rich his claims are.

In 1959 Tshekedi Khama signed an agreement between the Bamangwato people and the Rhodesian Selection Trust Group whereby the latter were granted rights to prospect in Bamangwato tribal territories. The Bamangwato people were to receive 12½% of the profits obtained from any of these concessions. In this way some of the mineral wealth of the country would remain there, and would not all be removed by the exploiting company. The details of any similar agreement to be signed with Col Scott are not known at the time of writing.

Forcing the Pace

Apart from economic necessity there is another factor working against the extension of self-government to the territory. This is, surprisingly enough, the Basuto people themselves. On a recent trip to Basutoland I was struck by the complacency of the people. Everyone is keen to tell how much better things are than in the Republic. "This is our country, we don't have passes here" they say. Limited self-rule is not the end. Militant pressure from below can alone force the slow pace of the Colonial Office.

Within the past few weeks a Commission has been established to investigate racial discrimination in the territory. There are clearly certain fields where there is discrimination.

There is the segregated hospital, and system of liquor permits required only by Africans. It seems to be more by custom than by direct administrative action that Africans are kept out of bars.

There is no direct prohibition against people of Asian extraction being allowed into Basutoland. Since the war, however, there have been no Asians who have been granted residence permits. The 247 Asians living there have all been there an appreciable time, and, it must be said, are not discriminated against in any way. The prohibition on any new immigrants does however seem to have a taint of racialism.

Recently leaders from the three Protectorates met in London and Accra to have consultations. Many of these men must have met for the first time. Regular consultations betwen leaders from the three territories could only have beneficial results for their freedom struggles.

BASUTOLAND'S PRESS

"Leselinyana La Lesotho", the oldest publication in this territory, is published by the P.E.M.S. (Paris Evangelical Mission Society.) It meanders the neutral path, determined to demonstrate no support for any of the political organisations which have mushroomed in the past seven years. It concerns itself largely with its own mission work, some events in the British Empire and social activities of its church members. Written in both Sotho and English. Published at Morija. Largest circulation of all the papers recently put on a business basis. A fortnightly sold at 6d a copy.

Moeletsi Oa Basotho: The Catholic paper, this is the most mischievous paper in Basutoland. All Non-Catholics, all Non-Catholic thought, all these are anathema (a word freely bandied by both church and its adherents) to Moeletsi. It covers the Legislature's debates almost verbatim and comment is almost invariably full of recrimination and misrepresentation. Mosletsi supports without qualification, the "BASUTOLAND NATIONAL PARTY" which, it had been hoped would enjoy the unqualified support of the Chieftainship and would preserve the status quo. Needless perhaps to add Moeletsi is violently anti-Communist and Communism is seen lurking behind every bush. Moeletsi is partisan and goes on the rampage from time to time against all and sundry who belong to political parties which are indiscriminately labelled "Communist". Moeletsi is also the deadly enemy of secularists and insists that education must be permanently controlled by the church, especially in Basutoland. Published in Sotho and English. A weekly, sold at 3dor more often distributed free to Church

Basutoland News is concerned mainly with the expatriate (living in the Republic) families' social activities, and also reminiscences of the past days in Basutoland. Some coverage is given of court cases but the paper is largely uninvolved and uncommitted, except that occasionally grim "Kiplingish" admonishments are made to Basotho politicians to beware of their language and threats of treason and sedition. Published in Ficksburg in English. Small circulation, used mainly as a licence-advertising medium.

Mohlabani: Owned by B. M. Khaketla, who, until the end of 1960 was Deputy Leader of the Basutoland Congress Party and is an Executive member of the Legislature. Written and translated into both Sotho and English. It represented, for a long time, the forwardlooking and progressive opinion of the Basotho. It has been known to tackle the Basutoland Administration on a wide variety of political subjects, especially the administration's failure to facilitate Africanisation of the civil service. Mohlabani has advocated "Constitutional Advance" for Basutoland with greater participation of the Basotho in the Legislature. The latest issue carries editorial comment on how Mohlabani looks forward to great advances in the Legislative field, which means, a la Mohlabani — "Responsible Government." This paper has always been regarded as the mouthpiece of the Congress Party of Basutoland.

It is interesting to note that almost six months after Mr. Khaketla's resignation from Congress, during which time we learn he has created his own baby political party — "The Basutoland Freedom Party" he has not committed Mohlabani to the new organisation; not in the latest issue of this paper anyway.

Makatolle (Uprooter) is the organ of the Basutoland Congress Party and is about one year old now.

This is a poorly written paper. The articles are too long and these are made worse by the circumlocution employed in writing. Makatolle reacts too closely to what amounts to stupid criticism by its opponents and does not, therefore, concentrate in politicising its members through this journal. It is becoming a grievance paper on the apparent lack of assistance by central government to local government institutions. There is, creeping in, a frightening feature in the paper: the cult of the person of the B.C.P. Leader, who is no longer referred to as Ntsu Mokhehle but as "MOHLOM-PHELI MONGHALI" (THE HONOUR-ABLE MISTER). There is scope for considerable improvement in both the standard of writing and in greater participation by members in making this paper influential amongst the Basotho people A fortnightly, published in Maseru but printed in Cape Town. 6d a

Mohlanka features a picture of Moshesh on its masthead, and is run by the Chiefs and Catholic supported National Party. Features strong attacks on the B.C.P.. Monthly, published in Cape Town in Sotho.

Lentsoe La Basotho (The Basuto World): The Sotho version of the World which also runs Swazi and Bechuana counterparts for these territories. High circulation, about 26,000 a week and the only newsy publication in the Territory. Has wide coverage of events. Weekly in Sotho and English. The English magazine section is the African Echo.

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SWAZILAND IN THE MELTING POT

by ROBIN FARQUHARSON

In the South African Medical Journal, a recent advertisement read: "Swaziland practice for sale. No politics, amicable race relations"

The advertiser exaggerated, as advertisers will: but his view had foundation.

From Algeria to Cape Agulhas, from Dakar to Djibouti, no spot in Africa presents an appearance so tranquil, so gradual, so unflurried, unhurried and unworried by the tremendous pressures of elsewhere. The gabled dollhouse Secretariat in the ample high street of Mbabane seems a world away from winds of change, crises of colonialism and nations on the march. Is the idyll true?

Until 1949, Swaziland was in an economic and political sleep. In about 1925, a British newspaper had commented:

"It might seem reasonable that an African Advisory Council should be established on the same lines as the European Advisory Council; but European opinion is not yet ripe for such a development."

It was no readier by 1950. But at about that time, the first ripples of economic development began; and now, as economic advance reaches a comparatively hectic pace, there are signs — faint but definite signs — that political advance may, should, could, and conceivably in the not unforeseeable future actually will, arrive.

Certainly even the briefest of visits to Swaziland make it evident how great a change there has been even in the last twelve months.

Ore in the Melting Pot

Throughout the country existing projects are leaping ahead and ambitious plans are being drawn up. Already flourishing are the forest plantations of the Usutu scheme and Piggs Peak, the Big Bend Irrigation Scheme, which is contributing to a sugar production of the order of 80,000 tons per annum, and the Malkerns Cannery, which takes good care to avoid any risk of boycott by labelling all its products "Made in the British Protectorate of Swaziland."

Mbabane and Manzini (formerly Bremersdorp) now have glossy, efficient automatic telephone exchanges, and work is in progress on tarred roads to link them with the Transvaal border and with Stegi.

Everywhere there is talk of the vast new mining project, on which much of the hopes for the Territory's future are built; the opening-up of iron mines at Bomvu Ridge and the construction of a railway to carry the ore to the Portuguese border.

This last project is still to some extent in the melting pot since it would appear that the Anglo American Corpor-

SWAZILAND:

SIZE: 7,704 sq. miles. Bordered by South Africa on the west and south, Mozambique to the east.


POPULATION:

African 245,000 White 5,919 Coloured 1,378

ADMINISTRATIVE CAPITAL: Mbabane.

Tribal Capital: Lozitehlezi.

More than 3/7ths
OF SWAZILAND IS
OWNED BY WHITES
and a map of the
country showing African and White land
ownership is like a
patchwork quilt. Significantly, most of the
big DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS are sited
in the predominantly



White-owned areas, like the 10,000 acres to be planted by the Colonial Development Corporation (only 2,900 acres for the Swazi nation); the £10 million wood pulp export project run jointly by the CDC and the British giant firm of Courtaulds; the projected Anglo-American and Japanese iron ore development programme.

The Swazi nation has a fund the LIFA to BUY BACK land alienated to Whites from the 1880's when immense land and mineral concessions were grabbed.

EXPORTS amounted to £4 million in 1957-8, of which ASBESTOS accounted for more than half.

Hardly more than half the African children are in school at any one time. Many do not go on after standard two. The Trades School at Mbabane turns out each year between 15 and 20 men trained in general building, carpentry and joinery, and motor mechanics. None of these appears to meet the specific requirements of industry.' (Morse Economic Mission.)

ation is having second thoughts about assuming an obligation to subsidise the railway even if it is not used for ore transport, and terms are still being settled between the business men concerned and the British Government.

It has been hinted that some of those planning to invest in these schemes would like to obtain something like a 5 year guarantee of the political future of the Territory: understandably, such guarantees are not for the giving.

Nevertheless, it does seem that Swaziland has as good prospects of long-term tranquility as any reasonable business man could ask and the political life of the territory is still undeveloped, not to say embryonic.

Essentially there are only four elements in the Territory's politics:

- 1. The British Government
- 2. The tribal authority.
- 3. The white settlers.
- 4. The Swaziland Progressive Party.

The British Government is, oddly enough, more progressive than the tribal authority and seems somewhat to regret that proposals for constitutional reform are regarded with such restraint and dubiety by the Paramount Chief.

Votes

Sobhuza II, the Ngwenyama, has reigned for thirty-eight years. In his twenties he spent much money and effort in challenging, through the British courts, the validity of the concessions by which his predecessor, Mbandzeni, and his councillors had granted large tracts of Swaziland to Europeans. The fight was taken right up to the Privy Council
— he lost.

Now he takes the line that nothing must be done in any way to alienate or disturb the European inhabitants, whose presence and participation he feels are vital to the country. His view of the franchise is that "One man, one vote" is unfamiliar to the African and that the traditional tribal system of selection of councillors should be adhered to.

The White Swazilanders, while not noted for any great interest in politics as such, seem to have no objection to the gradual erosion of the enforcement of segregation and to the tentative discussion of some ultimate introduction of elective government.

Talks and Votes

The only spokesmen for universal suffrage, however, are the Swaziland Progressive Party, who maintain a small office just off the main street in Mbabane, hold principles similar to those of the South African Liberal Party, and claim a membership of about two thousand in a country of a quarter of a million.

The Chief's attitude to this group has varied: when discussions on constitutional reform first began, he nominated to the discussions two members of the Swaziland Progressive Party, but within a short time it became evident that their viewpoint was entirely irreconcilable with that of the Chief's Councillors and, after some acrimony, the S.P.P was forced out of the discussions.

The talks still continue; it looks at present as if there is a likelihood of a Legislative Council being established, with approximate parity between European and Swazi representatives, however elected, but little progress has been made on what electoral system, if any, should be adopted.

It is clear that economic advance will have to be accompanied by great social and educational changes.

Till now the Swaziland educational system has been geared to the requirements of Union examinations. It is likely that there will soon have to be a change-over to the English examinations, leading ultimately to General Certificate at Ordinary and Advanced Levels. This goal is a long way off.

At present there is comparatively ample schooling at the very elementary level but most do not reach Standard Six and only a few dozen reach Matriculation. .

The subject of school integration is being discussed; it seems much less explosive than it would be in the Union. The principle difficulty seems to be that of practical problems of difference in present standards, rather than emotional problems of integration. It is likely that the first steps will be the admission of Europeans to the best of the African

Swaziland's Press

Both the TIMES OF SWAZI-LAND and the SWAZILAND CHRONICLE are White-owned, the TIMES doing much government priting. Both are largely parish-pump papers, the CHRON-ICLE being chiefly a social register for Swaziland's Whites, recording comings and goings, parties and gymkhanas. During South Africa's 1960 Emergency when a group of South Africans sought asylum in the Protectorate from detention in the Union without trial, the CHRONICLE had a rash of vehement anti-Semitism, anti-Communism and general anti-refugee propaganda and at one point was threatened with a libel action, after which comment was considerably toned down.

Both the TIMES and the CHRONICLE are entirely out of touch with African opinion. A retired senior civil servant wrote recently to the TIMES suggesting that ambitious young Swazis should seek advance through the traditional tribal institutions rather than form political parties.

The SWAZILAND FREEDOM STAR, roneod organ of the Swaziland People's Party is the welcome newcomer in the publishing world of the Territory.

schools, as a preliminary to a general raising of standards, with integration accepted as a definite, if distant, goal.

White Hands

Wages in the Territory are still very low and there exists virtually no urbanised middle class. Efforts are being made to increase technical education to provide skilled workers for the enterprises at present being established and expanded, but there is a long way to go.

The problem which Swaziland faces in the long run may prove to be that of reconciling economic advance with political emancipation.

The pattern which has predominated until now is that of development in European hands, often European f. nanced, and organised in the form of public companies, with or without Colonial Development Corporation finance. The Swaziland National Council has a few hundred acres of sugar plantations but has played no significant role in the major economic projects

If the country in the future should acquire an elective government and if that government should take the view that the economy of the country could better be developed on socialist than on capitalist lines, then conflict between government and investors could easily arise but, for the present at least, such problems seem far in the future.

THE NEW

General Hertzog, in 1935, reached an accord with Mr. Thomas, the then Secretary of State responsible for the High Commission Territories of Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland whereby the inhabitants of these territories could be "educated" towards the appreciation of the desired way of life: the policies of segregation, now termed apartheid. This was to prepare them for their hoped for acceptance of ultimate incorporation into the Union of South Africa now known as the Republic of South Africa.

This was an authoritative blessing from above upon the policy of separate treatment (segregation of black and white) commonly practised in official circles as well as by the European public in the Territory, adopted clandestinely from the Union of South Africa.

The policy was reflected in the two completely separate councils, the one for the Europeans and the other for the Africans established in the year 1920: the European Advisory Council and the African Advisory Council.

In 1950 a Joint Advisory Council of 8 Europeans plus 7 European Government officials plus 8 Africans was formed, which, in spite of the facade of Black-White unity, in reality maintained racial separation. For the Europeans were elected by ballot by Europeans and saw to it that the interests of their European electors were put boldly to the fore to the prejudice of all else if need be; while the African members of their Council, being mostly the Chiefs and their hand-picked favourites, usually had the mortification of finding themselves coming a bad second both in debate as well as in the resultant legislation. The reasons for this were their comparative inexperience, their poor educational standard and by and large the preponderance of the Whites in the Council, which thus ensured white dominance.

Lopsided Council

The present Legislative Council is but the former Joint Advisory Council writ large under another name.

The composition of the Legislative Council is as follows:—

Europeans:

Resident Commissioner as chairman;

- 3 ex-officio officials;
- 7 appointed officials;
- 2 appointed non-officials;
- 10 elected members
- 23 representing a population of 4,000 whites.

Africans:

- 2 appointed non-officials;
- 10 'elected' members.
- 12 representing a population of 350,000 Blacks.
- 1 Asian representing the small Asian community.

FIGHTING TALK, AUGUST, 1961.

CONSTITUTION FOR BECHUANALAND

Thus in a territory which is overwhelmingly African, the European minority has a two-thirds representation in the Legislative Council against the mere one-third for the numerically superior Africans.

With such an overwhelming majority in the Legislative Assembly the European is given the power to control the country, its inhabitants and to dictate the direction and pace of its development.

To argue as some do that the European official members may not necessarily side with the European elected members is but idle talk; some of us have suffered prejudice and frustration on the grounds of our colour at the hands of such officials who often pander to the racial discrimination as practised by local White communities.

Selections Not Elections

The franchise is on a common as well as a racial roll. It is more advantageous to the Europeans, who, like the Asians, elect democratically and by ballot the best men from their respective constituencies, and send them direct to the Legislative Council.

For the Africans, however, the elections are really selections. The procedure is vitiated by a series of hurdles over a tortuous path.

First there are elections (under the dominating influence of sub-chiefs able to over-ride popular nominations) for membership of the Area Council of his village or area of jurisdiction.

The Area Councils, as electoral colleges, choose men to the Tribal Council of the Reserve, or District Council of a proclaimed township like Lobatsi. This Council in turn acts as the electoral college for the African Council whence members proceed at last to the Legislative Council.

Glaring irregularities have come to light from the selection procedures for the Area Councils.

One headman-chairman is known to have chosen the required quota membership for his local Area Council on his own, by simply announcing his choice to the assembled kgotla gathering.

A headman or Subordinate African Authority, as chairman, can refuse to accept a nominee he dislikes and there can be no appeal against his ruling.

Then, the law of the constitution being in English, it is not generally known by the majority of the African electors, so that the chairman presiding over the 'elections' if he is literate enough to know English, is at liberty to vary its stipulations to his own advantage without anyone else being the wiser, and if he does not know English he carries on in the customary and traditional manner of the chief's word being the law whether that is in consequence with the constitution or not. There is no elec-

toral officer or supervisor to see that justice is done as provided by the constitution.

Not Known from Adam

The African Council travesties the elections, which fact was well borne out at the recent elections at Lobatsi. The electors' ignorance of one another was no advantage but rather a serious handicap. These electors, some separated by as much as a thousand miles were for the first time brought together and required to elect from among their number the best men for the Legislative Council. Many of them did not know the other from Adam, let alone knowing his capability or fitness for such representation. They had either to resort to blind voting or not vote at all.

Special advantage went to those chiefs whose names were widely known and respected, as well as those former minor civil servants, who, while in Government employ, were posted to several villages and townships from time to time, which in fact is well illustrated in the resultant list of elected members for the Legislative Council.

Then again, election procedures were quite new and suggestion played its part, as seen from the coincidence of the result of the elections and the chance order of the names on the blackboard of the nominated candidates.

There were 16 names for the Legislative Council (of which only the first ten need be mentioned) from whom the required five members for the Southern Protectorate were to be elected, viz:—Messrs. Q. Masire, Dr. Molema, L. Mosiele, Chief Bathoen II, Chief Mokgosi, Messrs. J. Mahloane, Segoko, Marumola, N. Molomo and Chief Montshiwa. The first five were elected.

Another five Legislative Council members had to be elected from the following 10 nominees for the Northern Protectorate, the order on the blackboard being: Messrs. Seretse Khama, T. Tsheko, L. Seretse, L. Raditladi, A. Tsoebebe, Gugushe, G. Mosinyi, J. Modise, M. Ngwako and K. T. Motsete — and bravo! the hat trick repeated its former performance — almost, for the first 5 came out except that No. 3, namely, L. Seretse, was displaced by No. 7, i.e. G. Mosinyi after a re-election to resolve the tie between No. 6 i.e. Gugushe with No. 7, G. Mosinyi.

Thus the fortuitous order of the names appears to have acted as a strong guide.

When it is borne in mind that the electoral college, i.e. the African Council as the successor of the old African Advisory Council is a chief's stronghold, the majority of the electors who were subjects of the various chiefs of the Territory may have had it deep in their subconscious mind that that particular order had the blessing of their over-

A CRITIQUE

by

K. T. MOTSETE

President of the Bechuanaland People's Party

lords and they may have felt it their duty to adhere to tribal allegiance and expectations.

This method of election, so open to abuses and misconstruction should be scrapped; it is a hindrance rather than a help to political progress.

Some constitutencies are over represented while others of equal if not of greater significance have no African representatives at all; e.g. the Bamangwato Territory has FOUR representatives (plus the luxury of a white one, namely Mr. T. Shaw) while Lobatsi and the Tuli Block, an industrial centre of increasing importance and a township, have no African elected, not even nominated! Compare this defect with the adequate representation of every scheduled constituency of the European community, with two redundant though statutory White representatives to boot.

This constitution entrenches the racial — black and white — dichotomy, for the representatives of both groups will tend to fight for the interests of their own colour instead of working together to achieve the greatest good for the whole community.

Against all this is the objective of our Party, namely the unification of the various tribal and racial sections by a community of interests and a common roll into nationhood.

One Man — One Woman — Vote

Because of the absence of political organisations in the Territory, the tribal ticket was the only one possible, apart from the nominations by the High Commissioner.

The African members of the Legislative Council are really independents and representatives of tribal groups, more or less unorganised along modern parliamentary lines for well directed and concerted action in the council under the leadership of a political party.

As a matter of fact the present Legislative Council is but a one party affair — a Government-cum-Chiefs' party without an opposition.

The strictly male franchise of this constitution is an anachronism. Women must be enfranchised too. The Bechu analand People's Party advocates universal suffrage for all adults of all races, and of course, one man, or woman, one vote.

Polling should be by a strictly secret ballot as practised elsewhere in the modern world, e.g. Kenya, Basutoland, and voting should be directly for the Legis-

(Continued on page 10)

'NO JEWEL IN THE CROWN'

LEONARD MATSOELE'S view on BECHUANALAND: 'The People's Movements must adjust to the

Realities . . . Utter Dependence on Foreign Aid . . . '

The recent step forward in the political and constitutional development of the Bechuanaland Protectorate was not, alas, marked by a corresponding advance in the field of its economy.

Bechuanaland is a vast and to a large extent, uncharted country, teeming with fauna and folklore, tsetse and tsumma melons, but it is not a rich country. In fact, without regular and substantial subsidies from overseas it would cease to have any organised economy at all, and would, in all probability, cease to be a separate state at all.

Rhodes' Dream

Great Britain's sovereignty over this territory of 225,000 square miles dates back to Cecil John Rhodes' imperial dream and has played an important part in the general scramble for Africa during the late nineteenth century, but its acquisition has added no jewels to the British Crown.

From a purely economic viewpoint, the Protectorate has been a liability to the taxpayer of the United Kingdom since Khama the Great and Queen Victoria settled its destiny over tea and muffins.

Bechuanaland's economy is almost entirely a pastoral one. Its 350,000 Africans, 3,000 Europeans and several hundred Asians and Coloureds, depend almost entirely on cattle for their livelihoods and are completely at the mercy of the rise and fall of the price of beef in Southern Africa and Europe as well as the vagaries of tsetse, nagana, foot and mouth and other cattle diseases.

The revenue derived by the Administration from the export of beef is insufficient to develop the Territory's power, water, communications and the social services, nor to tap it for any of its other resources with the result that grants of money have to be found from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund and other sources if development is to keep pace with the needs of a modern country.

Fortunately the money has thus far been forthcoming. This year Bechuanaland received a million and a half pounds from Britain, the largest grant so far in any one year. Last year the Morse Commission, sponsored by the World Bank, visited the High Commission Territories and as far as Bechuanaland is concerned, made recommendations for substantial funds to develop roads, water resources and education. As difficult as it is to prophesy anything at all in Africa these days, the chances are that more and more money will be sunk into the three High Commission Territories and there is always the possibility that one of the large mining houses at present prospecting for minerals will strike oil or bauxite or something.

Chiefs' Hold

This dependence on cattle is of course the reason why the spirit of nationalism has not yet penetrated into the Kalahari and why the Chiefs, whose badge of office has always been the number of their herds, still retain such a powerful hold over the lives and souls of their tribesmen. There are no "urbanised" Africans to speak of; most are confined to the Tribal Territories over which the various Chiefs hold virtually autocratic sway.

True, there have been rumblings lately but not enough to disturb the status quo to any serious extent. The winds of change will have to blow a lot harder before they disturb the traditional serenity of Kanye, Serowe and Maun.

Faint Glimmer

The advent of the Legislative Council and the new Constitution for Bechuanaland this year has not been as a result of popular pressure and it is almost true to say that it caught the country unawares, unlike Basutoland.

The composition of the Council, with its equal number of seats for Africans and Europeans — out of all proportion to their respective numbers in the country — is only a faint glimmer of true democracy. Its decisions have to be approved by the High Commissioner before becoming law, its African members are largely Chief-approved nominees elected indirectly through Tribal Councils while its European members are, by and large, an undistinguished body of traders.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to dismiss the new Constitution as a "sham", as the Bechuanaland People's Party has done. It is undeniably a step forward in the construction of a multiracial society and presents a vivid contrast to the race-mad Republic with whom it is so closely linked economically.

It provides Britain with the opportunity to display her goodwill towards the emergent African States and its antipathy to apartheid and as such should be welcomed, for all its shortcoming, by the anti-Nationalists of this country.

Added to this is the amendment recently of the Liquor Law, removing the last vestige of the colour bar from the Statute Book. To talk therefore in general terms of "imperialist oppression", as Messrs. Mpho, Matente and other leaders of the Bechuanaland People's Party are doing, is merely to parrot popular demands that have very little practical application here at this stage. It would be disastrous, no less, for Britain to withdraw her protection and financial aid from Bechuanaland before it has reached economic self-sufficiency.

The people's movements must, of course, be maintained and expanded, but unless they adjust their policies in the light of the realities of Bechuanaland today, unless they recognise its utter dependence on foreign aid, they will be hindering rather than assisting the Bechuana people towards independence and true democracy.

NEW CONSTITUTION FOR BECHUANALAND (cont. from page 9)

lative Council, dispensing with intermediary councils of electoral colleges. A common roll is the best and tried solution elsewhere and it is self-delusion to hold that the people of Bechuanaland require different treatment. There should be postal voting for the Bechuanaland nationals living and working in other countries.

White Wooden Horse?

There has been a spree of land and trading-right acquisition by Whites in Bechuanaland.

They have recently purchased farms and ranches on a large scale and obtained trading rights through the unwitting consent of the chiefs and the laissez faire policy of the British Protecting Administration, which purchases are strongly suspected of having the backing of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of South Africa.

This land-grabbing, if not tackled

early enough, will bring about Afrikaner economic domination, thus bringing to fruition the ideas of imperialist expansion of the Republic of South Africa as entertained by Paul Kruger, Smuts, Hertzog, Malan and latterly by Dr. Verwoerd, namely the incorporation of Bechuanaland.

The Legislative Council with its dominant White minority, could be the wooden horse.

An African majority is the sine qua non of the ideal of self-determination. The paramountcy of African interests, who constitute the preponderance of the population, is the policy of the Bechuanaland People's Party.

The new Legislative Council as we said earlier this year about the Constitution, and proved by the election results, has weighted the scale unjustly against fair and equitable African representation in their own country and should be amended.

BECHUANALAND:

SIZE: 225,000 square miles.

Bordered by South West Africa to the west, Rhodesia to the north and South Africa to the east and south.

POPULATION:	African	116:310	 	 				350,000
	White		 	 	*****		*****	3,000
	Asians		 	 		******		250
	Coloured		 411104	 				700

ADMINISTRATIVE CAPITAL: Mafekeng (in the Cape, hence to be moved shortly. Site of the new cauital not yet decided.) TRIBAL CAPITALS and PRINCIPAL Towns: Serowe (Bamangwato capital), Kanye (Bangwaketse capital), Ramoutsa (Bamalete capital), Molepolole (Bakwena capital), Maun (Batawana capital), Mochudi (Bakgatla capital), Mochudi, Gaberones, Palapye, Mahalapye, Pilikwe, Francistown.

Mainly a RANCHING COUNTRY. About 90 per cent of the 1,325,000 cattle are owned by the Africans, but prolonged drought and acute water shortage handicap ranching and the development of tribal lands. Only 5 per cent of the 8 million acres of arable land is under cultivation. Cattle are marketed through the COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPARTION ab-

batoir at LOBATSI . . . but the country's only rail line runs up its eastern border, linking the Republic with Bulawayo and the rest of this vast country is unreached by rail or easily passable roads.

ASBESTOS and MANGANESE are mined in the Bangwaketse and Bamaleti country; Rhodesian Selected Trust is prospect-

ing for COAL and other minerals in the Bamangwato territory.

The OKAVANGA SWAMPS in Ngamiland in the far west are a great untapped water source.

Areas under WHITE SETTLEMENT are the Ghanzi farms (given by Cecil Rhodes), the Lobatsi, Gaberones and Tuli blocks (ceded by the Chiefs to the British South Africa Company in 1895 in connection with the construction of the railway) and the Tati Block (which goes back to the grant of mineral rights by Lobengula; and in 1911 was confirmed on condition an African reserve would be created within the Block.)

15,000 or 20 per cent of the men are away at any given time in South Africa or the Rhodesias, as MIGRANT WORKERS. The WNLA and NRC (labour recruiting bodies of the Chamber Mines) recruit about 18,400 men a year for average periods of nine months; some men return to the mines for 4 and 5 work spells in their lifetimes. Each recruit is debited £3 for TAXES by the recruiting agency as he joins up and this sum is deducted in instalments from his earnings. With recruiting at its present level, the Government is assured of an annual tax revenue from mine labour of about £55,000.



'ECONOMIST' on South Africa's Customs Union with the Protectorates

Before May 1962 agreement must be reached by the South African and United Kingdom governments on their relationship with the Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland Protectorates. There will be a wide range of problems to solve, all flowing directly from South Africa leaving the Commonwealth.

One of the most important topics of discussion will be the customs and currency union between South Africa and the Protectorates.

This agreement was made in 1910 and provides for a fixed percentage of the total collection of custom duties to be paid to the Protectorates.

Swaziland for example receives .149% of the total amount collected and this is the second largest source of Swaziland

It is an equally if not more important source of revenue for the less well endowed Protectorates of Basutoland and Bechuanaland.

This source of revenue will now diminish as a result of the drastic import control measures taken by the South African Government. Whilst the Protectorates are in no way responsible for the situation that forced the S.A. Government to introduce these controls, they will nevertheless be penalised.

All such discussions on import policy, financial policy in general - even on the blocking of currency, are taken by the S.A. Government and imposed on the Protectorates without consultation.

A further disadvantage of this union arises from the boycott of South African produce by African and overseas governments. The Protectorates' entire exports of fruit, cereals and animal products are sold through South African marketing organisations. It will be difficult to avoid their being seriously hit if the foreign boycott of South African produce grows in momentum.


Citrus produced by the Colonial Development Corporation in Swaziland, although still stamped with the South African name 'Outspan' is being put into boxes marked 'Swaziland'. It remains to be seen whether or not this device will be successful.

Swaziland's sugar production is included in the South African quota in the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. The suggestion likely to be advocated is that Swaziland should now be given its own quota.

A further difficulty is the position of South Africans who hold senior posts in the Protectorates. As things stand they would have to become British citizens and lose their South African citizenship or become foreigners in the Protectorates for whom they work.

The United Kingdom is in a position to be reasonably tough when these matters are discussed. One thing she will stand firm on: the Republic cannot have it both ways. South Africa cannot impose her policies on the Protectorates and then discriminate against their products.

The Minister of Agriculture recently stated that he would not permit the sale of meat from Bechuanaland to prejudice the position of local farmers wishing to sell their meat. This is an example of the problems that have to be thrashed out before the 'year of grace' is over.



BRITAIN, UNWILLING PROTECTOR THE YEARS OF HISTORY

HOW DID IT HAPPEN THAT THESE TERRITORIES DID NOT GET SWALLOWED UP BY SOUTH AFRI-CA? WHEN DID THEY BECOME BRITISH PROTECTORATES? AND

The period of history relevant to these questions runs from about 1820 to 1885 in respect of Basutoland and Bechuanaland, and to 1906 in the case of Swazi-

Geographical features — Basutoland's rocky fastnesses, Swaziland's proximity to the coast, Tati's gold - influenced their history; so did the outstanding personalities of Chief Khama of Bechuanaland, Moshesh of Basutoland and the apparently weak character of Mbandzeni of Swaziland.

Military strength and missionaries were also factors in shaping their destinies. More important were their common enemies, the trekking Boers who took their land and killed their people, and other White adventurers who wangled concessions for mineral wealth, timber, land, whatever they had to offer.

Disputes over the boundaries were endless, and inevitable.

Loss of land, defeat in battle, the break up of tribes, some making independent agreements with the enemy, caused the Chiefs at various times to appeal for British protection. Chief Khama's appeal in 1876 is moving. He

"I Khame, Chief of the Bamangwato, greet Victoria, the great Queen of England . . . the Boers are entering it (my country) and I do not like

them, their actions are hard towards the black people . . . let the Queen pity me and hear quickly what I write I wish to hear how the Queen will receive me and my country, and my people. What sort of protection will it be? I am weary with war. I do not like fighting, and I say, Queen place me in peace."

But it was not the appeals for help that led directly to protection. Britain, like others, was influenced by her own economic and political needs.

Chief Moshesh appealed in 1843 and again in 1861 that his people be placed under British protection, but it was not until 1868 that Britain agreed. Diamonds, and gold in Mashonaland, had been discovered the year before.

Missionaries in Bechuanaland, as early as 1840, had wanted Britain to secure for herself the road to the north and to keep Boer expansion in check; but it was only in 1884, after Germany had annexed South West (1883) and declared a protectorate over Namaqualand, that Britain finally agreed.

In the case of Swaziland, she was influenced by Kruger's desire for a port on the coast, East of that country.

Up to 1867 Britain did 'not wish to enlarge the boundaries of the present British colonies nor to extend the area of our responsibilities in South Africa.' Subsequently she felt the need to control these three territories so that their Chiefs would not concede any land to foreign or hostile powers. But she still did not want to have to spend money on them or expend military forces.

She wanted the Chiefs to maintain responsibility for the administration and defence of their own countries. "Khama is an independent chief and he cannot be allowed, while retaining his sovereignty, to put us to the trouble and expense of policing his country. A Protectorate entails no such obligations. Khama is quite strong enough himself to deal with refractory subordinate chiefs . . ."

Britain acceded to Moshesh's plea of 1867 provided that "No military or pecuniary aid should be required from the British Government."

In fact, she preferred where possible that others carry the burden of the Protectorates provided she had ensured that in the matter of foreign affairs they remained under her influence.

Britain annexed Basutoland to the Cape Colony in 1871 (though 10 years later she had to take it over again.) She tried unsuccessfully to give over Bechuanaland to the British South Africa Company. She administered Swaziland jointly with the South African Republic until 1895 when she let the Transvaal be Swaziland's 'protector' with certain safeguards for the Swazi people.

Perhaps her motives for establishing protectorates over Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland explain to some extent their poor economic and politically backward positions today.

They were given protection, not in order to further their own development, but because it suited Britain's imperialist policy of the time to keep others from taking them over.

BASUTOLAN

- 1815 Moshesh becomes Chief of the Bakwana and begins to build the Basuto nation.
- 1835 Trekking Boers and other Whites clash with Basutos over land and Moshesh leads his people in frequent raids and wars to ward off the Free State Boers.
- 1842 Moshesh asks formally for British protection.
- 1843 Cape Governor Napier fixes boundary between Basuto and Boers and Basuto retain part of fertile land between Caledon and Orange Rivers.
- 1845 Moshesh's appeal for protection is not met, but a British Resident is sent to assist him.
- 1849 He fixes the 'Warden' line as boundary giving more land to the Whites.
- 1854 Bloemfontein Convention recognises independence of Orange River Republic - Warden line abrogated.
- 1858 First Treaty of Aliwal North boundary redefined by Sir George Grey in favour of Basutos.
- 1861 Moshesh asks again to be put under British protection.
- 1864 Wodehouse, asked by President Brand to define boundary gives tracts of land formerly belonging to Basutos, to Free State.

from 1815 to 1884

- 1866 Treaty of Thaba Bosigo confirms Free State's annexations.
- 1867 Moshesh again asks Great Britain to take over.
- 1868 British Government agrees to assume responsibility for Basutos. Proclamation 14 of 1868. Volksraad sents deputation to Britain to protest.
- 1869 Second Treaty of Aliwal North Basutoland gains much of land lost in 1866.
- 1871 Basutoland annexed to Cape Colony. The Basuto are not consulted. They are refused representation in the Cape Parliament, their taxes doubled. Basutoland becomes virtually a "native reserve". Resentment flares into open rebellion. (Act 12 of 1871).
- 1878 Peace Preservation Act to disarm Basutos they resist.
- 1880 Gun War. Lasted 8 months. Cost the Cape Government £5 million and still the Basuto are not subdued.
- 1883 Cape asks Great Britain to take over control Britain disannexes Basutoland from Cape Colony (Act 34 of
- 1884 High Commissioner empowered to legislate in the interests of 'peace, order and good government' of Basutos.

SWAZILAND

- 1846 Trekkers get land concessions from Swazis. The Swazis begin by welcoming Whites - Boer and Britain as possible allies against the Zulu.
- 1879 Gold discovered in Transvaal.
- 1881 Pretoria Convention lays down boundaries of Transvaal giving them some of Swazis' former territory, but guaranteeing independence of Swaziland.
- 1884 London Convention confirms terms of Pretoria Convention in respect of Swazis.
- Kruger wants Swaziland as a means of getting Kosi Bay. White inhabitants in Swaziland obtain a 'charter of self government.'
- 1889 Mbandzeni asks for British protection Shepstone appointed Resident Advisor - dissolves White committee, takes over administration of Whites. F. de Winter appointed as Commissioner to enquire into Swaziland affairs. Mbandzeni dies.

from 1846 to 1906

Whites prefer to be under S.A. Republic. Swazis prefer Britain.

- 1890 First Swaziland Convention: joint rule of Swazis by Gt. Britain and S.A. Republic.
- 1893 Second Swaziland Convention never enforced.
- 1894 Swazis repudiate Proclamation of 1890. Dismiss Shepstone as Royal Advisor. Send deputation to London.
- 1895 Third Swaziland Convention. Swazis put under S.A. Republic as a Protectorate (not with their consent) with safeguards.
- 1903 Order-in-Council entrusted administration of Swaziland to Governor of Transvaal.
- 1906 Order-in-Council places Swaziland under British High Commissioner.

from 1852 to 1904 BECHUANALAN

- 1852 Independence of Transvaal granted Boers intensify raids against Bakwena and Baralong tribes.
- 1872 Khama becomes Chief of Bamangwato. Thlaping tribes appeal to Cape for protection.
- 1876 Khama appeals to Great Britain.
- 1881 Rhodes elected to Cape Parliament visits Bechuanaland, wants it annexed because of the road to the North.
- Deputation to England from Transvaal asks for annexation of Bechuanaland.
- London Convention: Britain undertakes administration of Bechuanaland.
- 1885 Protectorate proclaimed over whole of Bechuanaland territory as far North as Zambesi.

- Territory of Baralong and Thlaping in South Bechuanaland wrested from Kruger but proclaimed a Crown Colony and annexed to Cape.
- 1891 Order in Council authorises High Commissioner to provide by Proclamation for the administration of justice, raising of revenue, and generally for the order and good government of all persons in Bechuanaland.
- 1895 Britain wants to hand over administration to British South Africa Company. Three Chiefs sail to Britain to protest. Company gets only a strip of land for a railway.
- 1904 Crown Colony becomes part of Cape Colony.

Letter from an Agent

Dated July 7, 1961 this letter was written from BASUTOLAND to FIGHTING TALK.

I wish to tell you that I received the parcel of papers you sent me at Kokstad on the 2nd May. But they still lie under a block of wood at Ndindindi Forest Station. The story of my coming here is very long and therefore I will be just brief.

It began in April, when the Government had found out that I were "One of those Communists responsible for the bloodshed in the Transkei."

All April I were subject to frequent visits by special branch detectives who came to question me about reports which came out of the Transkei of happenings there. Every time they came I were searched: They even searched under the mattress and felt the pillow perhaps to make sure if I were not keeping guns in my room. One day the questioning was very long and interspersed by outbursts of anger from the S.B. and very hot. The questioning was done at the offices of the Forest Foreman. Two days after the questioning, on Friday of that week I visited Engcobo.

When I went back to Ndindini the Tuesday of the following week, fellow

workers told me that I was wanted by Police on Monday; and that my post had been taken by the Forester saying that he would keep it in my absence. The same day the Forester came to me and told me I must go for my post at his office. Before he gave me my post he phoned and then I was suspicious. He asked me to help him at the office and I helped till 2 p.m.. All the time he had not given me my post. Then I knew what was happening to me. At 2.5 p.m. he gave me only the Parcel you had sent me. The covers were broken as if accidentally, although I knew it was deliberately done. He and his Police friends wanted to see what was in the Parcel. They thought it might be something connected with the End-of-May Demonstrations.

Just as I thought; when I had left the Office carrying my parcel I nearly crashed with a police van, in which were two policemen, a C.I.D. in uniform and the Public Prosecutor of Mount Ayliff. They had stopped the van at a road turn near the office and were standing outside. Just at the time they saw me they quickly climbed into the van and were driving towards me when I hid the parcel under a block of wood lying near the Forest and walked away from the road into the Forest. Everything was instantaneous. I thought they had seen me, but when they drove to the

office I knew they had not. I could not go back and fetch the parcel, because I knew they would be back in an This is how I left Ndindindi.

The evening I left they were blocking the road near the forest thinking they would see me coming out of the forest to my room at the Workers' Quarters. I left them as they were. The following morning they checked at bus stops between Kokstad and Mount Ayliff. I were watching their vans from the mountains.

All May and the first week of June I was hiding. I went back to Engcobo on the 8th June, but detectives were still searching for me, so I could not reach my home in town. Moreover trouble was brewing up in the district again; nine dipping tanks had been destroyed and Trust fences was being cut into pieces as if by a special machine. Then I knew again, if they had caught me then, I would be the Communist to blame for all those things. Our people there decided that I should rather escape, than be caught at this stage of the struggle when we need manpower for the complete liberation of our country.

I think some time in the near future I will be able to slip out to Kokstad and have the pamphlets.

With greetings,

I am.

Yours faithfully, E. MUSI.

PAGE THIRTEEN

IN A CAPE PACKING SHED

We drove the 400-odd miles through the cold night although the banning of Convention had come through that morning. We talked of many things, but chiefly of how to persuade the organisers to set the alternative date of Convention as early as possible. For we knew that the sponsors - and this was one of the most significant things about the Convention movement — came from the section of "respectable" Coloureds: professional people mostly, who had none of the experience of bannings, raids and general police persecution familiar to those long in the political struggle: they were people who had gone on hoping for a change of heart, or simply for something to turn up. Certainly the grim business of defiance of the government was new to them . We thought they would need persuading, and planned for it.

We were soon to discover how wrong we were.

We got to Capetown, grubby and travel-groggy, to be revitalised almost immediately by the news that efforts were being made to hold Convention, in spite of the ban, on a mission station outside the prescribed area. Details would be given to us at a rendezvous.

Off we went, to find a large number of others chatting apparently aimlessly outside a hall in Athlone. There was a relaxed air about the little social knots that did not auger well. They came from various areas - Durban, Johannesburg and Worcester were singled out for us, but they tended to group according to political leanings. So we found ourselves - reputedly fire-eaters -regarded with interest and some little suspicion. The conservative elements (those we feared would set a limit on our demands) seemed in the majority. Periodically, there were rumours of arrangements, only to be countermanded by others, and still we stood around in the bleak sunlight, cuffing the sand.

Hopefield, the mission station outside Malmesbury on which we pinned our hopes, fell through, as the booking of the Malmesbury Town Hall had earlier. Finally, the word was passed: "Kalbaskraal!" We drifted to our cars, and haphazardly formed a convoy.

Hopes picked up then, but not much. Also, the distrust had been dampening.

So out on the national road to Malmesbury, through the rolling lands clothed with the dark green of sprouting wheat under a bright sun quite without warmth.

We turned off to a dirt road, the dust billowing in red clouds behind us until we came to a fork. Then out into the waist-high grass to scout around for some indication. There was a plot with rusted wire around it and inside a few rough wooden crosses; the farm cemetery we had been told to look out for. So we turned and arrived at a building red-brown with mud and bricks, under the pale grey shadows of some scraggy trees. But there were no other cars there, and we knew with a sinking anxiety that we had taken the wrong road. If anything happened, we would be out of it.

A small farmboy who turned up was taken aboard after he had agreed to show us "the place."

Back along the dirt road, then along another, and so past a tree with a board nailed to it: "Dassenberg." Perhaps, I mused, the name will still be famous. A turn-off the road through the long grass, then a low outbuilding and beyond it a sudden concourse of cars, at ease and glittering in the cold sunlight. We had arrived.

Already, in the circular depression in the grass, the crowd was gathering, boxes and chairs were being planted shakily in the grass, a chair and table were being brought for the chairman to sit squinting into the sun.

Then, with a prayer and a little initial fumbling in procedure, we were off, papers were being read and discussed, resolutions were being formulated.

At the back of our mind was the thought: we've pulled it off! For now at any rate. There might still be police interference, some other law might still be invoked (Riotous Assemblies or whatnot) but at any rate we were at Convention and it was under way.

Once it got under way, it moved at top speed. In retrospect, the degree of understanding and co-operation was to prove unbelievable. Above all, the economy of discussion (on the whole), the businesslike approach, the grasp of the bare bones of our problems, brushing aside the frills that clothe and disguise them.

Twice, on the first day and on the second day, Convention steered dangerously close to shipwreck. On the franchise, it was a small right-wing, pledged to a qualified franchise; on nationalisation it was the vocal left. Each time we hammered out a formula which was accepted as the true expression of Convention and which did not abate our demands for a democracy one jot.

From the first discussion came the immediate understanding: We are South Africans, and our concern is with South Africa and all South Africans. After that, as the records of Convention will show, there was no looking back.

So the afternoon raced away with the sun sinking, the shadows lengthening across the chill grass, and the evening so cold that it seemed that liquid cold was being poured into our depression from the edges of the mountains. Fatigue and nervous strain might account for some of the sensation, but the next day Hetty, most acid of hecklers, was in bed and a doctor diagnosed pneumonia and pleurisy.

As the gathering dusk made further business impossible, we instructed the Commissions to deal with specific issues and closed. There was no certainty whatever that we would meet again.

The cars drove off in a long stream,
their tail-lights bright pathfinders ahead
of us into the advancing gloom.

The word for the Monday rendezvous "Rondberg", was passed around in the Cathedral Hall after the BCESL meeting the Sunday night. (One of the six Special Branch police, thinking he was not known, sidled up to ask when I would be leaving the next day. I played safe — and dumb!)

Back towards Malmesbury the Monday, but to a different farm, we were told early that the police were out scouring the roads — and aided by army trucks. So we drew up opposite a car with its bonnet open and people busy underneath. A shirt-sleeved delegate came over to warn us: the police are around; cars must not be seen in groups. Just beyond the rise was a turn-off and we could see the hood of a car flashing as it travelled through the grass. Then it was our turn, and we drove up to the large out-building.

Inside, Convention was already discussing raising money for the defence of the eleven delegates who had been arrested at a house the previous afternoon. Outside loitered members of the Security Police who had discovered that they needed a warrant. Some had gone off to Malmesbury for it. An army truck was drawn up to block egress from the farm.

In the gloomy packing-shed, the air blue with cigarette smoke, the Convention got under way with cut and thrust of argument: all minds bent to the task of shaping a free South Africa.

In the later afternoon, the great doors were flung open and van der Westhuizen, head of the Cape Security Police, strutted, swaggered in, for all the world like a Nazi gauleiter as he stood silhouetted against the blinding sunlight, his eager pack at his heels.

Convention thrust on. Nonplussed, they stood around (did they hope for panic or confusion?) and then stood at a large box, taking notes and looking sheepish.

So we moved to the end, with votes of thanks (a thunderous and prolonged ovation for our hosts of the farm bringing tears to the eyes) a prayer and a hymn. It had grown dusk in the shed, but there was a brightness in the eyes of the delegates and in the place that came from a sense of a job well done. Of having laboured manfully to lay the foundations of a great future where all men would stand up free and equal.

So, with hand-shakings and munching sandwiches, with the Special Branch members still hanging around aimlessly, and our hearts steeled in democratic resolve, we left the Malmesbury farm to take our pledges for freedom across the country.

D.A.B.

RESOLUTIONS OF THE MALMESBURY CONVENTION

"This Convention declares that the "Coloured" people are a separate group only by discrimination.

We declare we have no separate destiny and therefore reject the principle of a separate racial status embracing a culture, politics and economy separate from the rest of the other peoples of South Africa."

Convention unanimously adopted a resolution that it rejected all forms of group or separate representation. That it was convinced that universal adult suffrage "the right to elect and be elected" was the only just form of representation in South Africa.

A few preferred this principle to be stated as follows: a common, non-racial roll with no other arbitrary requirements.

Group Areas: Convention condemned the Group Areas Act and called for its repeal and for people to live together freely without any restrictions based on race discrimination.

Job Reservation and Labour: Convention condemned the colour-bar and all forms of discrimination with regard to Labour: it expressed its absolute condemnation of Job Reservation, which imposes, and has imposed, untold hardship.

Education: Education should be free, integrated and compulsory, and all institutions of learning should be open to everybody. Parents should have the right to decide in which manner their children should be educated.

Convention called for a universal (single) system of education for all South Africans without any form of racial discrimination, agreed to the existence of private schools provided these were integrated and that no form of racial discrimination was practised and called for open autonomous universities within the framework of a democratic society.

Citizen Rights: Convention agreed that there should be full and equal citizenship rights for all.

Economic Policy: Realising that the mere granting of political freedom will not life our people out of the dire poverty and state of semi-starvation to which they have been subjected for hundreds of years ,and knowing full well that this exploitation has been perpetuated under the guise of racialism, we propose the following Economic Policy:

That all restrictions on the right of the individual to enter skilled trades be

(Continued on page 16)

RESOLUTIONS OF THE THE STAY-AWAY

by T. H. GWALA

There are some people who have written off the stay-away as a fiasco. Opposed to these people are those who consider it a tremendous success.

Those who consider it a flop reason that it was too hasty a decision to take when the African people are still divided and not yet ready for a decisive action against oppression. 'But they still have much to learn in tactics, organisation, and political idealism' — New Statesman, 2 June, 1961. "The strike was an attempt to force Dr. Verwoerd, in an orderly, irresistible way to sit down to consultations, and in this attempt it failed — utterly', George Irwin, in Fighting Talk of July 1961.

Those who say that we emerged much stronger argue that the whole state machinery was organised against the people. The whole world was focussed on the struggle of the people of South Africa.

No one can claim to write on social struggles without some amount of bias. It is that one is either on the side of the old decaying order or one is with the new developing order. But at least one must be as objective as social science allows.

In the June issue of Fighting Talk, writing on the 1946 African Miners' strike. Alan Doyle says, 'Was the strike a failure? Some were loud in so calling it. But no great movement of this character is really a failure, even though it may not succeed in its immediate aim.' How true it is of this last stay away? But if by staying away for three days, and for that matter, three days multiplied by three, one expected the Nationalist government 'to sit down to consultations' with the African leaders one would not be different from those people who look at the Stock Exchange every morning to see if the Nationalist government is going to collapse tomorrow.

The All-in-African Conference considered the eve of Republic demonstrations as a beginning of a long drawn struggle against the growing oppression in South Africa. These demonstrations were never thought of as the consummation of our struggle. It was clear to the leaders of the Conference that the Nationalists could not be considered in isolation. For Anglo-American imperialism, and especially British imperialism, has a powerful and dominant interest in the South African economy. These two groups together hold about £115.6 million investments in the economy of the country. Is it surprising therefore that those who supply South Africa with arms which she paraded against the people on

the eve of the demonstrations and after, are those with vested interest in this country? Is it any wonder that there were unexplained manoeuvres by the United States marines on the South African coast on the eve of the demonstrations?

It is clear, therefore, that by attacking Verwoerdism in this country we are
attacking the very chain of imperialism. For Verwoerdism is, precisely a
movement to defend by violent means
the foreign and internal investments in
this country against a democracy representative of all the people of South Africa.

What contribution did the first phase of the campaign make in the struggle for freedom in South Africa? There is no doubt that the impact of this campaign did not only confine itself to the Republican celebrations. For the first time more people of South Africa were drawn into the struggle for democracy for all. It must be made clear that the strategy here was to focus the struggle on a representative sovereign convention. The chorus for a convention is indeed coming from different quarters today. Whether they all want a sovereign convention is another matter.

The eve-of-the-Republic demonstrations marked a turning point in the struggle of the people of our land. The defiance campaign had only a negligible trickle of Europeans and was therefore not representative of the white community. In this campaign University professors and lecturers called for a convention; thus demonstrating in their own way their support for the All-in-African conference's resolution. White students in major South African Universities carried out a massive demonstration for a convention.

Unlike June 26, 1950, very few employers dismissed their employees for staying away. A number of churches have called for a convention and prominent European citizens in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Natal have done likewise.

On the Non-European front practically all schools refused Republican flags and medals. In many boarding schools students staged demonstrations by staying away from classes. More facts of class boycotts are still coming out even on this day.

Those who talk of sharp division among the African people have not explained why, unlike in the past when the government relied on stooges, this time it had to make use of its own police force to distribute leaflets from PAC

(Continued on page 16)

Teetering on the Brink

by RITCHIE CALDER

Professor Ritchie Calder was unanimously elected president of the National Peace Council at its annual meeting in London. These are extracts from his presidential

Never has there been a greater need for the courage of the peace-makers than there is today. Never has there been a greater need, in all the troubled war-scorched history of the world, for people of constancy and vision. In the past men have launched wars as instruments of policy. Today no one would start a war — which Clausewitz said was the "extension of policy by other means"—with any hope of prevailing.

A war, even if it did not start with nuclear weapons — and it could even by accident — would become a nuclear war within weeks or months. There would be no victor, no vanquished, probably no human race, certainly no civilisation, no way of life. It would be a suicide pact. Our leaders everywhere know that, but they are stumbling about, like somnambulists, in a nightmare of their own creation, teetering to the brink of the precipice with every new situation.

Berlin! Is mankind to be threatened with extinction because statesmen cannot resolve what was an act of expediency 16 years ago, or because the wit of man is unable to devise a peace treaty for a war so long over that we expect the people of Wales to have forgotten the enemy their sons died fighting.

It is a mad world in which General Franco can stage a mammoth parade with tanks and guns made by the workers of democratic countries to celebrate a victory over democracy; in which I have seen in the Congo the betrayal of a new state, and its inexperienced rulers, in mockery of the United Nations, by the Belgians, condoned by us and by the United States because NATO, supposed to be for the defence of the "free world," and I put that in quotation marks, is more important than freedom itself; in which we see the obscenities of Angola committed by our ally, Portugal; in which sacred words have lost their meaning; in which democracy means truck with dictatorship; in which freedom means the right to starveas in the Congo; in which peace means piling up horror weapons and in the so-called defence of peace we rob the world, and starve its people.

MALMESBURY RESOLUTIONS

That increased productivity be achieved by raising the level of skill and the efficiency of our working population. This requires adequate basic education and technical training, greater opportunities of self-improvement and freedom for workers to move to where they can be most productively employed. At the same time, it is necessary to encourage stability of all labour by the provision of adequate housing;

That the natural resources of the country should be used to promote the welfare of the entire population.

Labour: In formulating a healthy economic policy, we feel that the Tot-system, Contract Labour, Child Labour, Compound Labour and Convict Labour must be abolished.

Land: We feel that a re-division of the land should take place, so that it can be developed to the full productivity for the benefit of the country as a whole.

Union Council for Coloured Affairs: Convention repudiated the Union Council for Coloured Affairs as an instrument of oppression and discrimination which did not represent the voice of the coloured people. It rejected the Council and all similar bodies.

THE STAY-AWAY

(Continued from page 15) and bogus organisations like Sons of Zululand, and African Workers' Union —leaflets it had itself printed.

When it comes to the actual stay away by the workers it must be boldly admitted that the working class did not come up to our expectations. What was the cause? With the only trade union co-ordinating body - SACTUenjoying only a membership of 55,000. and no political party of their own in the Congress alliance, we must confess that on the working class front we are still very weak. The basic economy of the country - the mines and agriculture - have not yet been seriously tackled. To achieve the next successful national stoppage of work we shall have to assist SACTU to build up powerful trade unions and treble its present membership.

Whatever pessimists may say, the first phase of the campaign more than achieved its aim. All forces of our people were drawn into the struggle. It is for us, now, in the process of the struggle, to build a genuine UNITED FRONT of both black and white in the struggle against Verwoerd's fascism. For Verwoerdism is the last defence of oppression here. It is its last resort, its final desperate throw. Hence anything which will ensure the defeat of Verwoerdism, leads also to the defeat of imperialism and oppression and the establishment of a genuine democracy as envisaged in the Freedom Charter.

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