

ENVER HOXHA

SELECTED WORKS

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WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

ENVER HOXHA

SELECTED WORKS

PUBLISHED BY DECISION OF THE CENTRAL
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LABOUR OF ALBANIA



ENVER HOXHA

THE INSTITUTE OF MARXIST-LENINIST STUDIES
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ENVER HOXHA

VOLUME

I

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FOREWORD

Comrade Enver Hoxha's «Selected Works» in English are published in several volumes on decision of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania.

The first volume includes works of the 1941-1948 period. It is divided into two parts for the reader's convenience. The first part includes works written during the period of the Anti-fascist National Liberation War (November 1941-November 1944), and the second comprises those of the period of the reconstruction of the country and of the development of socialist revolution (December 1944-October 1948).

In the works of the period of the Anti-fascist National Liberation War are studied the problems of the creation, building and inner life of the Communist Party of Albania (today the Party of Labour of Albania) as a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party of the working class. Here the reader will see in what circumstances the CPA was created, and how it remained the sole party of the working class and the sole political party of the country, how within a relatively short time it succeeded in becoming the sole leader of the masses of the people in the Anti-fascist National Liberation War and in remaining as such forever.

The works of the war time dwell on the elaboration of the political line of the Communist Party on the basis of the fundamental Marxist-Leninist principles and of the revolutionary experience as it was continually being gained in the country.

The revolutionary experience of the CPA and of the masses of the people in the Anti-fascist National Liberation War shows that in revolutionary situations any Marxist-Leninist party of the working class can raise itself to the level of a genuine leader of the masses, can organize the revolution and carry it through to the end, provided it is in a position to work out a correct political line responding to the objective tendencies of development of the situations, the political aspirations and demands of the masses, and provided it is capable of implementing this line with determination and maturity.

The fundamental questions of the political line of the Party which the reader finds in Enver Hoxha's Works are: the defining of the strategic aim, of the chief enemy, of the leading role of the working class and of its allies in the war, the laying down and implementation of the fundamental tasks to achieve this aim. To attain its strategic aim, the CPA had to solve three fundamental tasks: the unity of the people in a single National Liberation Front; the organization of the general armed uprising, and the creating of the National Liberation Army as a regular army of the people and of the new Albanian state; the destruction of the old political power and the setting up of the new revolutionary power of the national liberation councils. These were three component parts of the same revolutionary process. Each of these tasks was solved in close connection with the others through an uncompromising struggle against the foreign fascist invaders and their local servants.

In the works of the war time, an important part is occupied by the stand of the CPA towards the foreign allies of the insurgent Albanian people, stemming from these revolutionary principles: differentiated stand towards the allies; non-interference in the internal affairs of any ally; self-reliance.

Hence the treatment of the connection between the National Liberation War of the Albanian people and the world anti-fascist war, in the first place, the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union and the liberation war of the neighbouring people of Yugoslavia and Greece.

In the post-war works of the period 1945-1948 are elaborated the problems of the uninterrupted development of the people's revolution from the anti-imperialist democratic stage to the socialist stage; problems of the strengthening and improvement of the political basis of the new political order in Albania in struggle against both the external and internal enemy; of the reconstruction of the country; of the destruction of the old economic basis and of the construction of the economic basis of socialism; of the socialist organization and the planned development of the economy; of the development of the revolution in the field of education and culture, and of the defence of the country. They work out also problems of the foreign policy of the Party, of its revolutionary internationalist stand in establishing fraternal relations and strengthening the friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, and of its struggle to safeguard in the international arena all the rights the Albanian people had won with blood and sacrifices.

In these works the reader will see for himself the principled struggle, both national and international, of the CPA and of the government of the PRA against US-led imperialism, and against the anti-Albanian and anti-Marxist activity of the Yugoslav revisionist leadership.

Through this struggle the CPA has defended the national independence of the country and guaranteed its development along the socialist road; it has also defended its independence and correct Marxist-Leninist line from the brutal intervention of the Yugoslav revisionist leadership,

and the Trotskyite and hostile activity of its agents in Albania.

In Enver Hoxha's Works stands out the mastery of the CPA in implementing Marxism-Leninism in a creative way in the concrete internal and international conditions.

These works bear the stamp of the time; therefore in order to achieve a correct grasp of their contents, it is necessary to keep in mind the circumstances in which they have been written.

The works included in the first volume have been selected and translated from the Albanian edition of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th volume of Enver Hoxha's Works.

PART ONE

**REPORT DELIVERED TO THE
1ST CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF THE ACTIVISTS
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ALBANIA¹**

[April 8, 1942]

Comrades,

The cause of a certain degree of organizational fragmentation, and the fact that our Party is not yet consolidated as an organization, should be sought in the group spirit which still exists. Comrades, in the Resolution of the Meeting of all the main communist groups in Albania²,

1 The 1st Consultative Meeting of the Activists of the CPA began its proceedings in Tirana on April 8, 1942, and continued for three days with some interruptions. The main report was delivered by comrade Enver Hoxha. The meeting adopted a resolution setting out the tasks to be carried out to strengthen the Party, to establish and consolidate its links with the masses, and to mobilize them in the National Liberation War.

2 The Meeting of all the main communist groups in Albania was held in underground conditions from the 8th to the 14th of November 1941. On the first day of its proceedings it took the historic decision of merging the groups and of founding the Communist Party of Albania (CPA). The meeting heard the reports on the activity of each group, on the successes and shortcomings of the communist movement in Albania, and the vital problems facing the Party.

In the course of the discussions of the ideological, tactical and organizational questions of the Party, pronounced divergencies emerged among the representatives of groups. Comrade Enver

you have seen how things stood in regard to communist work in our country. You have seen what great mistakes these groups have made. Because of these errors, orderly work has still to be established, and we have not yet been able to advance as we should.

Vacillation, liberalism, rivalry, an opportunist understanding of issues, etc., brought about a difficult situation for our movement. Everyone was striving for himself, each thinking that the essential thing was to form groups and to make themselves into a "party", by abusing the others, pointing out all their "mistakes", saying that the others were "to blame" for everything, while they alone were "absolutely right".

As you know, we have had many groups, such as those of Korça³, Shkodra⁴, and the "Youth"⁵ group, and we have

Hoxha and other comrades waged a bitter principled struggle against the anti-Marxist and liquidationist theses of the chiefs of the "Youth" group. The social-democrat viewpoints which had hardly begun to spread in Albania by the renegades of the communist movement, the Trotskyite line and activity of the "Zjari" group which posed itself as the "Communist Party of Albania", as well as alien views which had struck root in the ranks of the communist groups were condemned. The meeting adopted a Resolution which made a thorough analysis and a Marxist-Leninist assessment of the international situation and the communist movement in Albania, it mapped out the ideological and organizational basis on which the CPA was founded and outlined its revolutionary program and tactics.

3The communist group of Korça was formed in June 1929. It was the first revolutionary organization of the Albanian working class, but suffered from marked ideological and organizational weaknesses. Anti-Marxist elements had found their way into the group. The communist literature studied by its members was not entirely Marxist and included also Trotskyite and anarchical materials. Due to these shortcomings it remained isolated from the worker movement and confined itself to the town of Korça only. With the arrival of the distinguished communist militant

also had two people, of the communist group of Korça, who have set up a sort of small group. They have gathered around themselves a few people with whom they have some influence, and have kept them "for their own ends". These comrades are A. and M. There were also two Trots-

Ali Kelmendi from the Soviet Union, where a communist group of Albanians was created as early as 1928, the activity of the communist group of Korça entered a new stage. The members of the group began to combine illegal with legal work, to take active part in legal worker and trade societies and turn them into revolutionary organizations, they began to translate genuinely Marxist literature, extend their activity to other towns, especially in Tirana where a branch was set up which, directed by comrade Enver Hoxha, later became an important centre of the communist and anti-fascist movement in the capital.

4 The communist group of Shkodra was formed in 1934 and extended also to several other towns. The head of the group was an intellectual of wrong theoretical views and marked political unclarity. When arrested under Zog's regime, he knelt down before the enquiry and told on all the comrades of his group. The activity of the group was limited to student and trade circles, and some working centres. This group had not a clear-cut political line, a definite organizational form and a sound discipline and secrecy. Like other groups, that of Shkodra, apart from Marxist literature circulated also Trotskyite and anarchical literature.

5 The "Youth" group was formed in 1940 as a result of the division and weakness of the communist movement. It began as a faction of the communist group of Korça and later on emerged as a separate group. Elements of marked Trotskyite and anarchical views placed themselves at its head. The group swelled its ranks with intellectual elements of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois extraction. Its leadership emerged with an anti-Marxist ideological and political platform. It held that Albania lacked proletariat, that the class struggle did not exist in Albania, and therefore there was no basis to form the Communist Party, that peasantry was conservative and reactionary, and could not become the ally of the working class, that the links with the masses and the work among them would endanger the cadres, that the fascist occupation promoted the development of capitalism and the growth of the proletariat!

kyite groups: that of Fundo⁶ and of Qendro⁷ and, finally, a group of liquidationist opportunists: the "Zjarri" group (we shall have more to say later about all the groups and individuals).

This was the situation in Albania before the Meeting of the main groups. Things could not go on like that. It was necessary to advance to something new, something more organized, to the Party.

We consider that we found the best and most appropriate means necessary in such a situation. We have used the system of unification from below up, under a single leadership chosen from those people who were least infected with the old group spirit, and who have given the surest guarantees that they will carry out the line of the Party. We have set to work. But we should not forget that in the course of such a major job much of the old has managed to smuggle itself into our ranks, and many such harmful elements are still to be found today. Comrades accepted from various groups (who, in the time of the groups, may have been excellent "militants" and first-rate "agitators" for the cause of their own group) have shown themselves to be very weak as members of the Party. This has come about because these comrades were not known earlier, and thus there are many harmful and unstable elements to be found in our ranks. It seems that the spirit of groups is much stronger than we had thought at first. Many of these people have remained in Tirana, in particular where the situation with regard to the liquidation of the groups is least satisfactory, chiefly because

⁶ Llazar (Zai) Fundo, a deserter, enemy of the Albanian communist movement, of the Communist International and the Albanian people.

⁷ Aristidh Qendro, a deserter from the communist group of Korça, chief of a small Trotskyite group in Tirana, placed himself at the service of reaction and occupiers.

it is here that all the representatives of the groups are to be found, including the most quarrelsome factionalists, those who find difficulty in reconciling themselves to the new organizational line. Their former situation is shaken, and the new situation has not entered their heads, and thus they carry on in the old spirit, outside the line of the Party, hindering its work and orderly development.

It is no secret to any communist that two trends have formed, one of which has agreed to support the Party and has vigorously set about the task, carrying out the line, while the other has reservations on all questions, criticizing (objectively it has tried to prevent the Party work from developing systematically), putting spokes in the wheel and hindering the activity of the Party. These elements come from various groups, but mostly from the "Youth" group (particularly in Tirana), whose representatives, Anastas and Xhepi⁸, even after promising to end their former activity and to act according to the directives of the Provisional Central Committee, still maintain their old connections.

Up to now we have been of the opinion that we should be patient with these comrades and convince them to submit to discipline and to understand the necessity that they

⁸ Anastas Lula, ex-chief of the "Youth" group. At the Meeting of the communist groups in November 1941, together with the former vice-chairman of the group, Sadik Premte (Xhepi), he endeavoured to hinder the forming of the Communist Party of Albania. Following the founding of the Party, they fought by every manner of means against the political line of the Party and its Central Committee. At the 1st Consultative Meeting of Activists, the CPA admonished them for the last time to give up their anti-Marxist activity and carry out the directives of the Party. But they did not change their ways. They organized a dangerous faction in the bosom of the Party. In June 1942, the Extraordinary Conference of the Party liquidated this Trotskyite faction and expelled its chiefs from the Party. As they kept up their treacherous activity, the 1st National Conference of the CPA branded them as enemies of the Party and people.

carry out the directives to the letter. Now we should resort to another method, that of purging the Party of harmful elements, of all those who hinder the work and development of the Party. In our opinion, we must resort to this method without fail, if we do not wish to fall into the old bog and if we want the Party to develop in a unity of discipline. An irreconcilable struggle should be waged against all deviations, whatever their origin and whatever group they come from. It is impermissible for us to slip into the position of the old social-democrats, who said: "Better an insecure peace than a good clash". A struggle must be waged also against all those who attack the work of the Party from outside (Z.)⁹, because we should be clear that only through such a struggle can the Party be consolidated. We should unmask harmful elements before the masses of the people. If we don't denounce them before the people they could deceive others who are honest.

1) THE SITUATION WITHIN THE PARTY

A full understanding of the structure of our organization and how the Party is run has not yet been formed. This is due to many causes, and in particular to the fact that the comrades do not have a good understanding of Marxism-Leninism, that they do not appreciate the importance of linking theory with practice, or that they do not have a grasp of the most fundamental questions which must be grasped by a communist organizer, agitator, and propagandist. It is clear that things cannot go on like this. We must do a great deal of work in every field to raise the

⁹ The Trotskyite "Zjarri" group was formed in Greece in 1936. It engaged in an openly hostile activity against the communist groups and against the CPA. In the beginning of 1943 it was finally destroyed.

level of the comrades' understanding, so that they can make progress and become leaders. But we cannot possibly do this if we do not link theoretical work with practical work, because "without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement"*; that is to say, we have to follow the road pointed out by our immortal teacher, Lenin, towards the linking of theory with practice, linking theoretical development with practical work. It is impermissible for us to neglect the one on account of the other, to underestimate the one and give more importance to the other. In the one direction as well as in the other, our work is lagging. It is lagging painfully. Only those who refuse to look at themselves, who close their eyes to the truth, can fail to see this.

Lack of knowledge causes grave elementary errors in our work, and this is to some extent the reason why the spirit of groups still exists.

The best way to understand this question more clearly is to look back at the past, at history. We shall try to avoid going into detail, and will take up only the most important matters, which have an obvious influence on the development of problems in general. We should speak of these matters, even if only in general terms, although some of them belong to the past. In our opinion, we should continue to discuss them for a long time yet, until the spirit of groups is totally eradicated and we have fully mastered the work of the Party. But this must not be taken to mean that we should mark time forever while we dig up the past, or that we should point out only this or that mistake of a group, but we should draw from the experience of the past whatever is of value to us for the present and the future.

* V. I. Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?", Collected Works, vol. 5, p. 434.

The lack of firm contacts and knowledge about organizational matters, the lack of unity, the lack of faith in the cause of the struggle of the working class and the labouring people, the irresponsibility of comrades, distrust of, and failure to implement, the directives of the Comintern which were of historic importance¹⁰, ambitions and cronyism, the influence of the bourgeoisie, the tendency to lie low in order to conceal that one is a communist and many other such things have caused the old group rivalries to flame up to the point where their struggle has come out into the open.

This has led to individuals and groups working without plans, without check-up, without responsibility to anyone. Serious organizational errors have been committed, which will take a long time and a great effort to correct. The hang-overs from such organizational errors which, along with group factionalism include sectarianism and pettiness, prevent progress in the organizational work, and hinder the work of the Party from being reorganized as it should. Thus, it is necessary to begin a decisive struggle against those remnants (sectarianism, misunderstanding, and unclarity), which are totally alien to the Party and the worker movement, but which, unfortunately, still exist among us. We shall not allow harmful, ambitious and irresponsible elements to destroy the party work, to destroy what we have built with such great effort. We shall not allow the old ills and the old teachings to persist. Astonishing things have occurred and are still occurring among us in matter of organization. Frequently a few people have attached themselves to certain elements, falling under their

¹⁰ The directives of the Communist International for the communist movement in Albania were drafted on the basis of the decisions of the 7th Congress of the Comintern, which held its proceedings from July 25 to August 25, 1935. They reached Albania in 1937.

influence, serving them and trusting them blindly. These elements have become steeped in group work. Under the old mysterious cloak of conspiracy of the time of the groups, they have made approaches to some comrades and today are still endeavouring to win over others by various cunning methods. Amongst them there are some comrades with a low level of understanding, or with little awareness of the importance of this question, who believe all they are told by the old group leaders or the quarrelsome factionalists, who place the individual above the movement, above the Party.

This is an evil which we must rigorously combat without fail. We cannot allow this state of affairs to continue any longer. The comrades must be absolutely convinced to have faith in the Party, to love it and its work. Long discussions have been needed to explain the necessity of work with the masses. These comrades have been very slow in becoming conscious of the necessity of work with the masses. They have denied the possibility of working under fascism. They alleged that "It is possible to work with this organizational system in Greece and other countries", or "perhaps this is an old method of work and we should not be exposed", "we should not go into action, because the police may discover us", "we do not want to lose men, and if anyone wants to go into such actions, let him go alone", etc. In other words, they have refused to work and show themselves as communists before the masses, they have refused to undertake actions. How then do they think the revolution will be achieved? This is not clear to us. But one thing is clear; in that way we will never be able to achieve the revolution, and nothing good can be expected from such work.

We have already gone ahead of this, but the organizational situation is difficult and cannot be corrected immediately, because with the passage of time this line has

struck root. It still crops up, though in a new form. Such concepts are hangovers from the old work and are totally alien to the revolutionary worker movements. It is essential that we wage an energetic struggle against them (in the "Youth" and Shkodra groups).

Apart from this, the comrades have held the view that we should discuss problems with all elements. They claimed that we could not fight the enemy, because "we are not strong enough". This led them to a great mistake, and they lapsed into a position of conciliation. As well as this, liberalism and familiarity have pushed them along this road.

Enough about that.

The comrades of the Provisional Central Committee¹¹ have gone to various places and have reorganized the old work, have set up communist cells (among which duties and tasks have been divided). The Provisional Central Committee has not only done the organization, but has in fact unified the organizations of various regions and established contacts between them and the Central Committee. While visiting various places and organizations, it has given the comrades full assistance. In fact, it has directed the entire organizational work, giving advice and directives. It has defined its position on all questions and, through its proclamations, has laid down the political line of the work, and brought the organization to life. Its task has been important and arduous. It has been charged with creating the Party, and you know well, comrades, that this task was not at all simple, especially in a domain where a contradiction might emerge at every step. It has fought sectarianism and has begun the struggle against deviations, it has fought pettiness and parochialism, and

11 The Meeting of the main communist groups in Albania elected a Provisional Central Committee of 7 persons. Comrade Enver Hoxha was assigned to guide it, though there was no secretary elected.

in the course of this work, other problems have emerged, which have been resolved by the Central Committee. The Party is not built in a day. It takes time. The Central Committee will wage a struggle relying on its organizational experience, so true unity can be created through this struggle. This is why the Central Committee has decided that, parallel with the organization of the Party, the comrades should undertake actions, demonstrations, etc., in which they will learn, become steeled, and link themselves with the masses. We have always had to face numerous difficulties in this work, but they have never stopped us, and up to now we have always overcome them successfully. We want a truly unified party, and we must transform our organizations from small isolated cells into big organizations of the Party, closely linked with the masses, with their roots among them. We want organizations which, through the example of their struggle, encourage others to be self-sacrificing and win the trust of the circles in which they are working. We cannot leave a single trace of the old style of work. The spirit of the Party and of communist work should be felt everywhere. We must build such strong organizations that they are invulnerable to the attacks of the enemy. We should link ourselves with the masses and merge with them so closely that the enemy cannot harm us.

Eight leading committees have been set up in various places, and there is nowhere (among the larger towns) that we have not gone. In certain areas also we have organized regional committees.

This is still a long way from what we must achieve, but nevertheless it can be regarded as a major success, considering the external and internal circumstances in which we are working. Besides this, the comrades of the Central Committee have had to carry out even the smallest tasks. They have had to organize the work in the cells,

which is the responsibility of the local leaders. In addition to this, they have spoken separately with every comrade, have had long discussions with them, trying to convince those people who were discontented for some reason, of whom there were no small number at the beginning. Their discontent mainly stemmed from the selection of the regional committees. These comrades did not limit themselves to criticism of the system of selection, but went as far as to oppose the leading comrades, and to refuse to accept discipline. Thus, they have brought confusion into the ranks of the Party, creating tendencies towards anti-party work. See, comrades, what a high level of consciousness they have as party members! They are dissatisfied because they themselves have not been made leaders! How do they know that their representatives have not been appointed? It is evident that discipline has been violated and secrecy betrayed. Old connections have been maintained. These comrades have got the idea into their heads that their group is considered worthless. This, allegedly, is the reason for their revolt. This pretext has been suggested to them by their old chiefs, because the Party has left no room for the slightest doubt on this subject. They have duplicated propaganda material without the permission of the regional committees. They have undoubtedly notified the old leaders of the group (Anastas Lula and Xhepi) about this and have distributed this duplicated material only amongst their former comrades. This has led to the creation of some petty theories among some persons according to which "work in the countryside is impossible. When you talk with a peasant, he agrees, but once you turn your back, he sticks out his tongue and makes fun of you". Others claim that "it is necessary to move the entire organization into the countryside", or that "some comrades who should be freed from all party work should be assigned to the mission of killing fifth

columnists and spies" (professional assassins!), etc.; that "the comrades of the cells lack initiative"; that "the Soviet Union is playing politics like the bourgeois countries".

If these were merely their own opinions, then the problem would have been much easier to solve, but unfortunately such ideas have begun to circulate and to form themselves as a line, and worse still, a line guiding a group (the "Youth" group).

When asked why they maintained their old contacts, they replied that they were indignant at the intrigues going on in their cells, and this is why they kept those old contacts. But is this really the only reason for their discontent? In the course of our talks with them, they accepted that they had been wrong, and promised to put an end to their old connections, but time has taught us to put our trust in deeds alone. These are not the only dissatisfied comrades. Certain elements coming from the strata of "agas" and "beys"¹² are dissatisfied too. They persist in old forms of work, which, like the class they come from, are alien to the worker movement. Some workers too have associated themselves with these "agas". Yes, it is true! The old truth has been proved right once again. They are employing empty phraseology, labelling us as Trotskyites. We tell them openly that it is they who have fallen into the bog of Trotskyism. All anti-party elements are bound to join together in struggle against the Party. We must mercilessly expel these types from the Party.

From these people come accusations that they could not tolerate the orders of the regional committee, because the committee was composed of some *undeveloped work-*

12 Titles of the Turkish feudal military regime. The title "aga" was bestowed on low and middle rung officers, and that of "bey" on high rung officers and officials. After the proclamation of Albanian independence "beys" and "agas" were titles applied to all the rich of the town and countryside.

ers. Admittedly, some regional committees are not at the required level. But why do these discontented comrades not ask for an explanation from the higher organs? It seems to us that they are hiding something else; they do not accept the line of the Party although they say they accept it. The worker comrades, who are very young and not at the required level, but who are most likely to become leaders, cannot answer certain questions or solve certain problems of a purely intellectual nature, but within a very short period these comrades have understood the Party line very well, and carry it out to the letter. They know and apply the political line better than the intellectuals who have studied the booklet: "Certain Economic Developments". It is understandable that sometimes the party organs make mistakes, not knowing how to behave with the comrades and people in general, that there is a tendency to commandism, and this is not correct, it is harmful and should be banned. The higher organs should check up on the work of the lower ones and make every effort to prevent them from acting in this manner any longer.

We also support the greatest possible measure of initiative because today we want the communists to become leaders, and not automatons, we do not want to confine ourselves to the work of the party organs. It often happens that certain comrades, because of their contact with the strata of the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie and their ideas, become subject to various influences and implement ideas that are alien to the revolutionary movement. This is caused by the low level of consciousness of our comrades.

Now, let us return to two people we have spoken of above; one of them has accepted the party line on all points, while the other, who at first expressed his desire and was interested in the selection of the Central Com-

mittee, has shown dissatisfaction because he himself is not in the Central Committee, because "only workers, and not intellectuals, can become members of the committee". In fact, intellectuals can become members — those who are far removed from the group spirit and have the necessary qualities. This man, who formerly had contacts with the Korça group and who now maintains "friendly relations" and contacts with all the groups, is dissatisfied with the selection of these Committees. He raises some astonishing matters, but one thing is clear, he does not have a single correct idea of the Party and is quite unable to distinguish between communists and nationalists. He goes so far as to criticize our statements, which according to him, are not sufficiently nationalist in content. Astonishing! Under the influence of the nationalists, he has formed the opinion that our fight today is a fight just for solidarity and internationalism, and not for the good of the Albanian people! He has other such ideas in his head, but there is no need to comment on them.

He has refused to hand over the names¹³ of his contacts. He claims that they have not yet been trained, but they have been trained to have contacts with him ! Among them there are both young and mature elements with whom he is unable to do communist work, first, because there are too many of them, and second, because he himself is working underground. For this and other reasons these people are often left a long time without communication or contact. The most important thing is that he does not do regular communist work among them. He maintains contacts with people in Peqin whose names he has still not handed over. He also had connections in

13 The Meeting of the main communist groups for the creation of the Party had decided that the leaders of the communist groups were to hand over to the Central Committee all their connections with the members of their groups.

Ishëm, but did not hand over their names until the Party itself discovered them. We advise this comrade not to continue in this way, for it is not the way to act, and cannot be tolerated.

Within a short time he should hand over all his connections, and the names of all his contacts (the Party will not deprive him of his friends). If he does not observe party discipline, then the Party will have to take the necessary steps.

We have always been of the opinion that we should correct our comrades. But we should blame ourselves for not taking the decision to denounce these wrong actions openly right at the beginning. However, we justify this fault by the desire to correct people. We have scored successes in this and we are continuing to follow this method. We bear in mind the teachings of the great Lenin: "We are marching in a compact group along a precipitous and difficult path, firmly holding each other by the hand. We are surrounded on all sides by enemies, and we have to advance under their almost constant fire. We have combined voluntarily, precisely for the purpose of fighting the enemy, and not to retreat into the adjacent marsh, the inhabitants of which, from the very outset, have reproached us with having separated ourselves into an exclusive group and with having chosen the path of struggle instead of the path of conciliation. And now several among us begin to cry out: let us go into this marsh! And when we begin to shame them, they retort: how conservative you are! Are you not ashamed to deny us the liberty to invite you to take a better road! Oh, yes, gentlemen! You are free not only to invite us, but to go yourselves wherever you will, even into the marsh. In fact, we think that the marsh is your proper place, and we are prepared to render you every assistance to get there. Only let go off our hands, don't clutch at us and

don't besmirch the grand word 'freedom', for we too are 'free' to go where we please, free to fight not only against the marsh, but also against those who are turning towards the marsh!"*

Now, comrades, let us speak of a group which is very far from the Party and which is completely in the marsh — this is the "Zjarri" group, a self-styled "party". The Zjarrists claim that they are legal communists. As you can see, comrades, this group occupies a special place. It is a completely liquidationist opportunist group and has been in the opportunist liquidationist marsh since 1935, when it styled itself a party.

Its chiefs have created an arsenal of petty, very harmful theories and hypotheses which every reactionary, even Mustafa Kruja¹⁴ himself, could subscribe to. Here are some of their theories: "We should not engage in agitational work and propaganda, because the time is not ripe", "the USSR today is making concessions such as in the realm of religion", "in the Soviet Union the communists are on the retreat, and so should we be, we should not carry out actions" (according to them they have allegedly received directives from the Comintern about this!), "for this reason, we should not undertake any actions until four days before the expulsion of the Italians" (they say "the Italians" and not "the fascist invaders"), "the communists should not undertake any actions for the time being, because those who undertake them now are not communists" (then, when should actions be undertaken?!). They say the communists should not act at the present time. And this mysterious thought raises a question: then, when should they go into

* V. I. Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?", Collected Works, vol. 5, p. 417.

14 Mustafa Merlika (Kruja), an inveterate agent of Italian fascism, prime minister of the quisling government from December 1941 to January 1943.

action? They say only four days before the revolution! How ridiculous that grown-up men should say such things! They have established contacts with the government of Mustafa Kruja¹⁵. They ask: "Who can guarantee that the USSR will win?" They are slipping into the position of the German fascists who claim that "the war of the Albanian communists (our war) serves Russian Pan-Slavism", because allegedly the USSR is fighting for Pan-Slavism. Then, they declare again that "we should not distribute leaflets, because our people can neither read nor write, and it is not the appropriate time for this", that "those who hold demonstrations, write the leaflets and undertake actions, are not communists, but terrorists"! They claim that "it is not the time for us to fight, it is not the time for revolution", "when we have a communist government and army, the revolution will burst out", etc., etc. There are many such opinions. Here, finally, is a typical example. The Zjarrists declare: "Those who undertake actions today, will be condemned by the people's tribunal". The interesting thing is that they show themselves up. If they act in this manner and fall into the position of the fifth column and spies, it is true that the people's tribunal will pass judgement on them, and they can fall into this position very easily.

Comrades, we should be careful, because there are Trotskyites in our country, as the Comintern itself has defined them, such as the infamous Fundo, and Qendro who is connected with the Greek Trotskyites. Both of them oppose the Comintern and its line, and comrade Stalin. We must not underrate the danger they repre-

15 In December 1941, Zisi Andrea, the head of the "Zjarri" group, together with Mustafa Kruja, the quisling prime minister, signed an agreement in which the former promised that "the Albanian Communist Party" (as he styled his Trotskyite "Zjarri" group) would not fight against fascism.

sent. They are infiltrating among us in various ways, and using every means to try to spread their "ideas". They find various ways to propagate their "ideas", and for this reason we should not underestimate them, but should wage a fiercer struggle against them, and expose them before the people. "We should brand these dregs of society and put them in the pillory of shame and scorn." (History of the CPSU (B)).

The struggle waged against them so far has been almost non-existent, and some have acted in a liberal and conciliatory manner towards them. Yes! There has been conciliation with the Trotskyites, there have been contacts with them, and comrades have sheltered them in their homes. Communists should not have done this (these communists have themselves admitted that this was wrong).

2) EDUCATIONAL, POLITICAL, AND THEORETICAL WORK

Very little importance has been attached to educating, uplifting, and bolshevizing the cadres. And even less importance to other problems.

In order to orientate ourselves in this current complex situation, we should be equipped and armed with the tactics and theory of the proletariat, with the knowledge Marx and Engels have bequeathed to mankind, and which Lenin and Stalin have enriched and developed.

The reason why the cadres are not at the necessary level is not that the comrades have failed to study, or have not wanted to learn, but because the comrades have not translated those works which are indispensable to the working class and the communist cadres. Various booklets and pamphlets have been translated, some of them of

doubtful origin. There have also been good books among them. But the most necessary ones: "The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B)", "Foundations of Leninism" as well as the report delivered to the 7th Congress of the Comintern by Dimitrov, etc., have been neglected. This is the reason that the theoretical and political level of the comrades is very low. Some comrades who have done some study have considered themselves very learned, and have even started writing various articles, deviating from Marxism-Leninism and attempting to create new theories such as "the theory of the class"¹⁶, the "theory of cadres"¹⁷, etc.

We shall not go into the errors of comrades who were in leading posts in the past and who ruined a great number of cadres, because they neglected them and lacked concern for them, or because they educated them in the old group spirit. It is easy to see that they are to blame for this.

But we would be very wrong to lay all the blame on the past; we should look for a large share of this respon-

16 This refers to the erroneous assessment of the situation of the class struggle in Albania by the heads of the communist group of Shkodra and of the "Youth" group. According to this assessment Albania had not yet entered the stage of capitalist development, the working class did not exist, the most progressive class was made up of craftsmen, and as a result, there was no room to wage the class struggle.

17 The "theory of cadres" was borrowed from the archio-Marxists, members of an anti-Marxist organization in Greece, who in 1930 joined Trotsky's International and during the Second World War acted as overt agents of fascism and nazism. According to their theory, the communists must not engage in any activity to organize and mobilize the masses, but sit in their secluded cells and engage themselves only in theoretical education, in "training cadres", and only after the cadres are trained can they start their revolutionary activity.

sibility in the present weaknesses in our work. We should use our experience, benefit from it, increase our knowledge and proceed further ahead on this road. We should take this work seriously in hand. The question of the development and raising of the political level of the comrades should not be left solely to their own initiative. They should study collectively, while at the same time individual study should not be neglected. On this point, the Party should exercise careful check-up and give assistance.

It is very difficult for the worker comrades to raise their political level much by relying solely on their own initiative. When he comes home tired from his work, the worker comrade finds it difficult to read, because he is not used to doing this, and thus very precious time is wasted. For the intellectuals, on the other hand, this is possible, because of the very nature of their work. The workers should be given the possibility of collective study as well as individual study. We should make this possible by preparing suitable literature. There are objective difficulties in this field, in particular because of the lack of literature for the workers. Thus, for quite a while our work will limp along, but we hope that the "History of the CPSU (B)", and the "Foundations of Leninism" will soon be translated. It is necessary to raise the political and theoretical knowledge of the comrades and train comrades for the leadership. There are also other difficulties, such as the difficult conditions in which the work is being carried on, inadequate equipment, etc. We tell the comrades not to be content with the single copy they receive from the Central Committee, but to duplicate it by hand or with a typewriter. It sometimes happens that comrades do not study even those materials that come into their hands, such as books, leaflets, etc. There are also communists who distribute leaflets without even reading them

themselves. What could they possibly say to the people? Sometimes, only the distribution of the leaflets is discussed in the cells. This should not happen any more. All party members should read and study our leaflets, for in them they will find the political line of the Party. We should study the literature, for only in this way can we arm ourselves with knowledge. All the materials of the Party should be the subjects of study in the cells. We should not behave with the party materials as we have done up till now; we should study them, not leave them for months in unsuitable places to get wet in the rain, or eaten by mice. The organs of the Party should be very careful about this, and they should organize the distribution of materials properly, because irregularities on this point, as well as other manifestations of laxity on the part of certain comrades, help the factionalists to win over young people by giving them some books which in many cases they cannot understand.

In order to become leaders we should study collectively in courses and study groups, but we should not exclude individual study. The comrades in the higher organs should supervise and check up on this work. Every course or study group should be led by the most advanced comrades who were previously least infected by the group spirit, that is, by those comrades who have completely eliminated the old group spirit. The factionalists and those instilled with this spirit should not be assigned to the leadership of any study circle, or educational group, or any other sort of work among the youth. This is done solely with the aim of preventing the old group spirit from infecting others. The Central Committee has undertaken the task of supplying the organization as soon as possible with the necessary translated materials ("History of the CPSU (B)", "Foundations of Leninism", etc.).

3) ON THE QUESTION OF NUMBERS IN THE PARTY
(ON CADRES)

It appears from comrades' reports that the number of comrades is low and that the quality of party members is not yet as high as it should be. Today the Party comprises a small number of comrades. Here we observe a narrow and sectarian attitude. Why not bring in all who fulfil the necessary conditions? We should seek the causes of this in our behaviour which is still sectarian, and not only in this, but also in our inactivity; we do not yet know how to select people. We should go further than the desire for increased numbers, and find loyal fighters. It is often said of various people that they are "friends", "comrades", "good fellows", and many other terms which indicate that they are communists, but very little initiative and ability is shown in organizing them. These people are disciplined, devoted and active, but they are communists outside the party ranks. Some comrades claim that they are not yet "sufficiently advanced", and thus do not fulfil the requirements. But what do the comrades expect of them? This practice should be ended. The dedicated, disciplined comrades, those who would make good party members, especially worker comrades, should be admitted to the Party. This applies to the proletariat and the peasantry. But we should not go too far and admit unprepared sympathizers and similar elements into the Party. On the question of admission to the Party, the party organs should check carefully on the candidates, to see that they fulfil all the necessary requirements, because the present period is dangerous for the Party and the enemy may introduce provocateurs into our ranks. In this period the organizational question is the major one. Our primary task is to consolidate the Party organizationally. Those who are conscious, loyal, convinced, steeled, dis-

ciplined, fearless and have an unblemished record can enter our ranks. Without these qualities no one can become a party member, or win the right to take pride in the name of Lenin and Stalin.

The higher party organs should care for the comrades and maintain constant contact with the lower organizations; they should be continually in touch with the organizations and always be informed of the situation within them, because, otherwise, the former state of affairs will predominate. We shall go into battle with the existing cadres, until the Party is renewed with new cadres who will emerge in the struggle. Therefore, we should check up on and observe everything that is done in the organizations. Among the masses there are loyal fighters and communists, who will emerge in the front ranks of the struggle and lead it to victory.

a) Because we are going into battle, we should ensure our replacements. Of course, we cannot all go into battle and leave the masses to be misled by spies and the fifth column, so we must without fail leave our replacements behind. As soon as possible, and this is possible, we must train our replacements and raise their political level so that the organizations will not be weakened when those who cannot stay here go to join the partisan units. In particular, we must train replacements among women. There must not be a single forum without women. On this point, we should not err again and behave in a sectarian manner, but should have a good understanding of the importance of work with women, who will play an important role in our work.

b) Our youth have been organized according to old forms of work. Because the youth organs have imperfectly understood the line of the Party, the youth are fragmented, and in some places there is still a field for the activity of old factionalists. Through their old methods of work

they attract the youth (they have included many of the communist youth in their cells, etc.). The leaders of the youth have not correctly understood the struggle of the youth. Thus they have not been able to wage an energetic struggle against the old group method amongst the youth and in the educational groups. Here too, the factionalists have exploited the situation, doing their old work behind our backs, setting up sectarian educational groups and reviving the old group spirit. We cannot allow the old forms of work to go on among the youth, because this is the most important sector of the Party, from which it is regenerated. We should make every effort, exerting all our energies, to bring about the unity of the Communist Youth of Albania. We should mobilize the youth of town and countryside on a broad scale; this is one of our principal tasks. The task of the Communist Youth of Albania is to mobilize the entire popular youth of Albania. We now have a new method of work among the youth and I shall not speak at length on this, because the comrade from the youth¹⁸ organization will speak to us about it.

c) The work among the workers is extremely valuable. It is essential for us to penetrate among the workers and the poor of the towns, and work among them, among the proletariat. The majority in our Party should be workers. We should henceforth put an end to our old practice. We should not deceive ourselves. No one else can lead, fight and work wholeheartedly for the cause of communism like the proletarians and workers. We should go to countryside too and mainly among the poor peasants in the villages, the semi-proletarians, of whom there are many in our country. We should send the most disciplined and

18 Besides the main report by comrade Enver Hoxha, the Conference heard reports on military, youth, equipment and other questions.

the best organizers, our best propagandists and agitators there, because today we must mobilize the countryside around our Party, because our Party alone is a fighting party, and today the masses of the people want to fight. We must convince the masses and explain to them what is most essential. We should know how to approach them, to discuss with them openly, and listen carefully to the most immediate and concrete questions. We should not speak to them, for example, as the Vlorë comrades are doing, calling the national liberation councils¹⁹ soviets. This is an error and a left deviation.

d) A few actions have been undertaken, but they have not had a abroad communist character. As for the sabotage actions, there have been far fewer of them than there could have been. We should understand clearly that our actions are closely linked with those of other countries, they have an international character and at the same time prepare the people for the struggle for their own liberation. Various forms of action: demonstrations, acts of sabotage, etc., popularize our Party and our struggle.

All our organizations are obliged to undertake actions, and every organization has had the possibility to undertake some, but a very liberal attitude has been maintained towards them. Certain actions which have been carried out have not been given the necessary publicity. One factor which has impeded the carrying out of actions is the fact that we have not yet organized our army. This question has been the subject of much discussion in our organizations, and the absolute necessity of setting up partisan units and town guerrillas has been raised, but they

19 In February 1942, the CC of the CPA issued the directive for the setting up everywhere of national liberation councils as organs of the National Liberation War, of people's uprising, and simultaneously organs of the revolutionary people's power.

are still not in evidence. The comrade responsible for the military line will discuss this question in his report on the army. The comrades will report on what has been done in this sector. One thing must be stressed, that any hesitancy in this matter must be eliminated and we must get down to the reality, to the formation of our army, to actions.

4) DISCIPLINE IN THE PARTY

In every organization there must be some kind of discipline. But in our Communist Party, which is the vanguard of the working class there should exist that particular discipline which arises from the high consciousness of Communist Party members, the most highly conscious sons of the working class and the working people. The difficult conditions of illegal work demand even greater discipline from us. Without steel-like discipline and without the unity of our Communist Party, which has many powerful enemies, we cannot fight the war successfully.

It is mainly alien elements, introduced into our Party with the intention of destroying it from within, who breach our communist discipline; this discipline is also violated by various people who are not yet free of their petty-bourgeois circle, that is, people who are not yet mature enough to become party members, or by various careerists. But if we have our eyes open, it is not difficult to detect these people.

We stress this because recently there have been breaches of discipline in our Party, often quite flagrant ones, and impermissible carelessness on the part of some comrades, that means to say they are not sufficiently awake; otherwise the persistent group spirit cannot be explained. And then there is a tendency to petty criticism

which first of all appears accidental and later becomes a "line".

But we know within what framework to criticize and how far this should go. Outside this framework it is not sound criticism, and it assumes the form of carping criticism — unhealthy criticism. It is noticeable that certain comrades underestimate others and do not reveal their own mistakes; they criticize others but not themselves. In this way they seek to elevate themselves, posing as "the strongest", or "the most developed", boasting about their knowledge of Marxism-Leninism.

Such work implies a return to the old days, to the quarrels and clashes between groups. This means a turning back of the Party. We should unceasingly criticize this backward tendency, not on the basis of the old group spirit, but through a desire to eliminate backwardness and to advance.

Then we must also speak about security in organizational matters. This is generally weak and has gone from one extreme to the other. Much has been said about security and it will also be dealt with by the comrade who reports on equipment and the need for security.

Works, vol. 1.

CALL TO THE ALBANIAN PEASANTRY

July 1942

ALBANIAN PEASANTS!

The flames of war have swept the whole world; millions of people have taken up arms and are locked in a gigantic struggle.

On one side the forces of darkness, the predatory and bloody-handed fascist forces, are attempting to enslave the world, to bleed the peoples white, and on the other side, the forces of progress, the forces of freedom, led by the heroic people of the Soviet Union, with the support of the democratic people of Britain and America and all the enslaved people, are checking the drive of the bloody fascist hordes and are day by day preparing to bury them.

At the time of the greatest blood-letting in human history, the greatest burden of this slaughter, brought about by the will of the fascist gangsters, weighs upon the peasants and the villages. The brunt of every war always falls upon the working people. Every year thousands of peasant families suffer for lack of food and the most basic requirements; misery, suffering and starvation reign in their wretched homes.

Have you, Albanian peasant brothers, ever sought the reason for the poverty, misery, hunger, and gloom, which have been your lot for centuries, and which year by year and day by day are becoming even more terrible?

Peasants of Albania, you who toil to exhaustion the year round, tied all your life to the land drenched with your sweat, who in rain and snow, ragged and always hungry, strive and toil with all your strength; on top of your centuries of oppression and enslavement, bloodthirsty fascism and the traitors of our people, sworn enemies of the workers and peasants, are trying to cast you forever into the most dreadful condition, into the blackest obscurity, into perpetual enslavement.

The Italian fascist invaders¹ fell upon our country like a ravenous beast, they fell upon our fields to enslave us, to plunder us, to bleed us white, to exterminate us. They invaded our plains and our mountains, our hills and valleys, and wherever their filthy jackboots trod, the grass no longer grows; the spectre of war has spread over the whole of our beautiful country. The despicable fascists turned our country into a battlefield, destroyed our towns and villages, they sowed terror and misery; they killed our people with their bombs and destroyed our villages, which became targets for their aircraft; they looted our livestock and our property to feed the executioners of the Albanian people.

ALBANIAN PEASANT BROTHERS!

Vile fascism, the invader of our country, and such traitors as Mustafa Kruja and his cronies are endeavour-

¹ On April 7, 1939, fascist Italy attacked Albania and occupied it in a few days. Despite the betrayal of King Zog and his clique, the Albanian people were not subdued. Groups of patriots fought, arms in hand, against the occupiers right from the first day of aggression.

ing to seize our lands and turn them into the property of the fascist robbers; Mustafa Kruja, the major partner of the rapacious Italian companies, is doing his utmost to lay hands on the wealth of our country; the fascist banks are endeavouring to rob the lands which should rightly be your property, for it is you who sweat to till them: they are trying to turn our villagers into hungry slaves; they are trying to take away everything we have, to suck us dry and starve us to death, to make it easier to oppress us. They are plundering the riches of our soil and our mineral resources to feed their war machine, to feed their bloodthirsty hordes, the oppressors of our country. They have plundered the oil of Kuçova and Patos, they are plundering our mines, taking our maize and wheat, robbing us of our livestock, destroying our forests, and stealing our wool.

Bloodthirsty fascism and the traitors of our people are trying to rob us of our national identity, wipe out our mother tongue, doing their utmost to corrupt our sons, and trying to eliminate our admirable customs; in the place of the hospitality and respect for a guest of our proud people, they are trying to substitute the despicable vices of fascism, with their immorality they are trying to debauch us, to dishonour our mothers and sisters.

Bloodthirsty fascism, the occupier of our country, and his agents, with Mustafa Kruja the traitor at the head, are inflicting deep wounds on our people. They are conscripting the sons of the peasantry and the people, and sending them to be killed for the hangmen Hitler and Mussolini; they are mobilizing the most despised and weak-willed scum of the Albanian people into their militia and police force in order to drive us into the most terrible of wars, a fratricidal war.

The enemy and his despicable tools, with the aid of Mustafa Kruja's traitorous government, *are jailing and murdering the loyal sons of our people. They want us to stain our hands with the blood of the neighbouring peoples who are fighting for their freedom. They are trying to split us into Christians and Muslims.*

PEASANT BROTHERS OF ALBANIA!

In this sacred war waged by the Albanian people to win lasting freedom you are the most important factor for our victory. The enemy knows that you are the living forces of the country, it knows that the unity of your forces with the entire Albanian people will mean a speedy and terrible death to fascism. This is precisely why the enemy and the traitors have exerted all their efforts to squeeze you dry, to rob you and leave you to die of starvation. *Fascism is endeavouring to seize everything you possess, it has left you without oil, it is trying to take your wheat, maize, oil, wool and livestock.* The traitor Mustafa Kruja is busy organizing the plunder of the peasantry, whose fate is closely linked with the soil of our country. He wants your sweat and blood to keep the thieves of Mussolini and Hitler alive, to maintain their military budget, and this year the traitor Mustafa Kruja is trying to squeeze the last little bit from you. *The enemy is demanding to buy a second portion of your grain with money for which you can buy nothing in return. He has increased your taxes tenfold, has increased the levy on livestock, and is raising them everyday.* Now Mustafa Kruja has dropped all pretence and is wielding the law in order to seize your grain, and is threatening to hang any peasant who tries to keep his grain to feed himself and his children.

Mustafa Kruja the traitor is trying to feed you on lies and demagogy, speaking of a "Great Albania"², of a "liberated Kosova".

To the devilry of the enemy, and to his oppression we should respond with guns; we should wage our war more and more fiercely, not allowing the enemy a moment's respite to act with a free hand against our people. Every true Albanian should become conscious of his duty to our people. With pride and self-sacrifice, he should speed the day of the liberation of our homeland.

A terrible famine threatens our peasantry, therefore *keep your grain for yourselves and your own families, help your relatives and pay not a single grain in tithes to the greedy government*, for them to speculate with and sell back to you later at ten times the price. *Unite in every village and one village with another to defend by force of arms your grain and produce which the government is seeking to seize from you. The grain which you have harvested with so much toil belongs to you alone and to no one else.* Do not surrender it to anyone, hide it away, *hide your produce, because it belongs to you and your families.* Hide it away, otherwise next winter famine will stalk your homes.

2 In order to consolidate their position in the Balkans, the Italian occupiers, leaning on the traitors of the country, aroused the old national feuds and chauvinism of the reactionary classes of the Balkan states towards kindling the hostilities of our people with the Yugoslav and Greek neighbouring people and keeping the former away from the National Liberation War. Italy enlarged its occupied area to set up "Great Albania" which included part of the Albanian land left beyond the state borders by the 1913 London Conference of the Ambassadors of imperialist powers. But our communists and people were not taken in by fascist demagogy. They exposed this policy and pursued the road of war against the fascist occupiers and of collaboration with neighbouring peoples in their liberation struggle against the common enemy, relying on the people's right of self-determination.

By holding back the grain, by refusing to pay taxes and the livestock levy you are fulfilling part of your duty to your homeland and at the same time saving the grain for your families, who are threatened by famine. In this way we can help the struggle of the Albanian people; in this way we shall hasten the day of liberation, for we have confidence in our victory, in our united forces, because, as a popular saying goes, where there is unity, there is victory.

PEASANTS OF ALBANIA!

In this terrible war, in which the destiny of all mankind is at stake, the Albanian people, with their age-old traditions, with their militant freedom-loving spirit, are following in the footsteps of their forefathers who fought for the freedom of their homeland against invaders and traitors.

The Albanian people have declared merciless war on the sworn enemy of our country.

In town and countryside, the sons of our people are fighting furiously against the hated occupiers and traitors, the pure blood of our sons is flowing in the streets of towns and villages in Albania. They fall as heroes for the freedom of our country, they go to the scaffold with a smile on their lips, for they have fulfilled their duty to their people. They cannot live without freedom, for they cannot see their own people suffer under the foulest yoke our country has ever known. Our people's uprising is gathering momentum day by day, our people are uniting, and building their strength to strike down the enemy and the traitors without mercy. The Albanian people are forming a common front to win their freedom, they are uniting their forces with those of the people of the Soviet Union,

the homeland of the workers and peasants, with those of the democratic British and American people, they are fighting shoulder to shoulder with the other peoples enslaved by fascism; the Albanian people are taking part in the struggle to save mankind from the fascist barbarians. As in the days long ago, when our forefathers, under the banner of Scanderbeg³, ceaselessly fought the invaders of our country, so we, their worthy sons, under the banner of Scanderbeg, go into battle against the foul fascist invaders and traitors, for the true liberation of the Albanian people.

PEASANTS, DO NOT PAY THE TITHES, DO NOT GIVE UP A SINGLE GRAIN OF WHEAT, OR STRAND OF WOOL!

DO NOT PAY THE LIVESTOCK LEVY AND TAXES!

AID THE ALBANIAN PEOPLE'S WAR AGAINST THE OCCUPIER, A WAR OF PARTISAN UNITS AND SABOTAGE!

DOWN WITH RAPACIOUS FASCISM, THE MON-GREL MUSTAFA KRUIJA AND THE MILITIA!

DOWN WITH FRATRICIDE AND THE BLIND TOOLS OF FRATRICIDAL WAR!

LONG LIVE THE UNITY OF THE ALBANIAN PEOPLE!

LONG LIVE THE ALBANIAN PEOPLE'S WAR AGAINST THE OCCUPIER!

LONG LIVE FREE ALBANIA!

3 Gjergj Kastrioti — Scanderbeg (1408-1468), the Albanian National Hero, fought for 25 consecutive years against the Turkish hordes.

LONG LIVE THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
ALBANIA, THE STANDARD-BEARER OF THE FIGHT
FOR FREEDOM!

The Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Albania

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Works, vol. 1.

"ZËRI I POPULLIT"¹ FIRST ISSUE EDITORIAL

August 25, 1942

"ZËRI I POPULLIT"

has one mission, and one purpose: to unite the entire Albanian people around this paper, to unite everyone who is *honest and anti-fascist*, regardless of *religious beliefs, political groups, and various trends*. "Zëri i Popullit" is determined to make war on the occupiers.

Why has "Zëri i Popullit" appeared?

To provide our people with a road to salvation, to show them who has trampled the Albanian people underfoot, who brought these countless woes upon them, desolated our country with smoke and flames in 1939, reduced half of Albania to ruins during an entire year; who has left our people without food, taking all the products of the country and all the grain, who has taken away the olive oil, the wool, and the petroleum that flows like water from our soil, who has left the peasant without bread and salt. All these evils have been brought about solely by the occupier and Italian fascism, and by the war which is nothing but the off-spring of fascism.

By means of "Tomori"² and of well-paid hacks, headed by that jackal Hilmi Leka³, the Italian fascists are trying

¹ Organ of the CPA, founded on decision of the CC of the CPA, and directed by comrade Enver Hoxha.

² Fascist daily paper (March 1940 — September 1943).

³ Director of the "Tomori" fascist paper, and minister of culture in the quisling government of Mustafa Kruja.

to convince us that we should be content with our lot, for it is war time, but these well-fed gentlemen forget to say that it is not we who brought the war, but the Duce and the fascist occupier.

The Albanian people sent no special invitation to the hangmen of Rome. Indeed, the occupiers must have very clear memories of how the Albanian people farewelled them in 1920⁴, or have the Duce and the hacks of "Tomori" forgotten these things?

Who spilled our people's blood and drove them into fratricide? The fascist occupiers. Having seized our land and trampled underfoot all the rights which we had won with great bloodshed, they have now armed and mobilized the most degenerate section of our people into their militia, carabinieri, and police force, and set them to track down the sons of this people, the cream of our youth, and the fighters who are shedding their pure blood for one sacred aim: *for an independent, free and democratic Albania.*

Entire towns and villages are red with the blood of our sons; in Shkodra, Durrës, Tirana, Korça and Kruja dozens of boys have fallen as martyrs under the bullets of the enemy and the bloodhounds of the fifth column.

Today, young Albanians in hundreds are languishing in the dungeons of the traitorous executioners of the Albanian people and the Albanian race. Hundreds of the sons of the eagle are exiled among the harsh rocky islands of fascist Italy.

Since fascist Italy first set foot on Albanian soil, our people have not had one day of peace, but they have known how to fight. They have stood like men, and when some have fallen they have understood why. The

⁴ This refers to the war of the Albanian people against the Italian imperialists in Vlorë in 1920. The war ended with the victory of the patriotic forces, which drove the occupier into the sea and liberated the Vlorë city and its hinterland.

victims, the prisoners in the jails, the internees and the partisans in the mountains testify how the people hate fascist Italy.

This newspaper, this true tribune of the Albanian people, will tell our people about these things.

"Zëri i Popullit" will denounce the number one agent of fascism, Mustafa Merlika. "Zëri i Popullit" will denounce the agents of the fratricidal war.

"Zëri i Popullit" will mercilessly denounce the fascist demagogy of "Tomori" and its hacks.

"Zëri i Popullit" will rally all the virile energies of the Albanian people, the energies of all those who have understood once and for all that,

*"Freedom is won,
It is not donated."*

"Zëri i Popullit" will be a tribune with its columns open to all *the fighters* for freedom without distinction as to class or religion, to all those Albanians who want to help us with deeds, and not with idle talk, in the true liberation of Albania.

"Zëri i Popullit" will be the genuine tribune of the Call to Arms for the *National Liberation War*, in which our war against the bloodthirsty occupiers will be described and read about.

"Zëri i Popullit" will be the tribune where the people will learn the truth as it really is, the naked truth.

"Zëri i Popullit" will tell our people where our friends are, in Albania and abroad.

We know that in their fight for freedom, our people are not alone, but have many strong and resolute friends throughout the world.

All the freedom-loving people of the world, from heroic China to the heroic people of Yugoslavia and France, are with us.

The three great allies are fighting today for one aim: *to crush fascism.*

The Soviet Union, with the Red Army of workers and peasants headed by comrade Stalin, leads the way as the vanguard. Then come the two great democracies⁵: Britain and America, two great powers with colossal economies, which are preparing for a second front in Europe⁶.

Some time ago 28 countries adhered to the "London Pact"⁷ which guarantees the people freedom and collective peace, guarantees the people the final wiping out of bloody fascism.

"Zëri i Popullit" will be the tribune of the unity, in which our fight for freedom and the fight of the freedom-loving peoples of Europe will be reflected.

This is the one and only aim we have with "Zëri i Popullit".

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5 A denomination for Britain and the USA, which were fighting against the fascist states, to make a distinction between their bourgeois democratic order and the fascist political order in Germany, Japan, Italy and elsewhere.

6 It had been decided that the second front would be opened by Britain and the USA in 1942. But the US and British governments were not as good as their words. They opened this front only in June 1944.

7 The "London Pact" was signed in May 1942 between the Soviet Union and Great Britain on an alliance in the war against Hitlerite Germany and its satellites in Europe as well as on post-war cooperation and reciprocal aid.

**FACED WITH THE FAILURE OF THEIR PLANS, THE
LUOGOTENENZA¹ AND THE TRAITORS ENDEAVOUR
TO FIND A "MODUS VIVENDI"***

November 1942

During these years of the enslavement of our beloved country, the Albanian people have not forgotten the manoeuvres of fascism and its tools, traitors to our country. To every Albanian, from a five-year-old child to the oldest man, the aims of fascism in invading Albania are crystal-clear, but fascism has been trying to fool the people with vile and ridiculous manoeuvres, to throw dust in their eyes in order to achieve its goal more easily. But fascism had to deal with a people who cannot be easily taken in, and the Albanian people smashed these manoeuvres, exposed them one after another, and are showering more and more blows and kicks upon fascism and the traitors.

Here we shall point out to our people the way in which fascism is trying to enslave us, to have us fight one another, to divide us so that it can dominate and rule us.

Let us start from the very beginning. There is no need to comment on how the Albanian people reacted to

1 The administrative apparatus of the Italian occupation regime in Albania, which exercised plenipotentiary power on behalf of Victor Emanuel III and Mussolini.

* *Modus vivendi*" (Lat.) — mode of living, here implying a way out.

the Italian invasion, but we need to comment on the coming of the Italians here. After tossing into the sea the dead bodies of their soldiers which had littered the docks and harbours of Durrës, Vlora, and Saranda, after washing away the blood which had stained our shores, the fascists entered our towns with their trumpets and bugles, flying their colourful ribbons, the plumes of the bersaglieri gleamed as once in Caporetto and Guadalajara², and later on in Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Eritrea, Somalia and elsewhere. Their painted emblems, Lictor's fasces, were brought in shiploads, together with ribbons and shiny tin medals, because they imagined they were dealing with the Zulu blacks, who could be deceived with glass beads.

They sent us Count Ciano³, dressed up like a cabaret queen; and this dandy, who a year ago was godfather to Zog's child, with his hand on his heart and hair gleaming with brilliantine, tried to convince us that the Italians had come to liberate us from "the tyrants of our people". But the Albanian people did not fall for this and the Pepinos⁴ had to change their tune. Like all invaders who aim at enslaving the peoples, but who are still far from achieving their dark aims, the Italian fascists needed time and calm to land their soldiers and ammunitions so that they could quietly fleece our people, rob them of everything they had, and in the end, send them to die for fascism. To achieve this aim, fascism got to work together with its hirelings. They pained our ears with their prattle about Roman civilization (read: fascist civil-

² In March 1937, in Guadalajara of Spain the revolutionary republican troops routed some Italian fascist divisions, which were attacking in the direction of Madrid.

³ Galeazzo Ciano — minister of foreign affairs of fascist Italy from 1936 to 1943.

⁴ Italian fascists.

zation). The opening of dopolavoros* began. The Albanian Fascist Party⁵ forcibly enrolled members without asking their consent; they began to organize the schools in the fascist way, and started to organize the GLA⁶. "Duce", "Count Ciano", "fascism" and "Alala!", bleated the hacks. These rogues started to parade in their black crow uniforms. The building of barracks for the needs of the fascist army, and some buildings for the fascist hierarchy began, as did the organization of systematic robbery. The Italian companies, the banks, the bandits rushed in; the network of leeches was being organized to suck our people dry; Count Ciano paid repeated visits to Jacomoni⁷ to collect the profits, and finally, the ex-emperor of Ethiopia, the dwarf Victor Emmanuel, came too. This was the last manoeuvre which fascism resorted to. The Albanian people did not lose their bearings. They had made up their minds, began their resistance and the exposure of fascism. The Albanian Fascist Party became a center of spies. No one but the crows went to their dopolavoros and GLA-s. The Albanian youth, whom the fascists tried to dress up in the fancy uniforms of the Balilas⁸ and Avanguardisti⁹, whom they tried to teach

* Dopolavoro (It.) — after-work, fascist club to mislead the working people.

5 It was set up by the Italian fascists in April 1939, immediately following the occupation of Albania. It was a branch of the Italian Fascist Party and acted under its directions.

6 GLA (Gioventù del Littorio Albanese) — the Albanian Lictor's Youth, fascist youth organization.

7 Francesco Jacomoni — former plenipotentiary minister of fascist Italy to the Zog government, viceroy of the Italian king till March 1943.

8 This was the name used by the fascists for the children in their organizations.

9 The members of the fascist organization for the youth up to 17 years of age were called Avanguardisti.

to march and think "like fascists", expressed their opinion, and expressed it so well in strikes and demonstrations that the Italianization of the schools and the fascist culture became a thing of the past. The people saw that the short period of work, building roads and barracks, when the workers' wages were raised slightly, was just a bubble, because the cost of living went sky-high, banknotes dropped like autumn leaves and all the wealth of our land was being systematically plundered.

Our people stood up and fought the occupier and the traitors in streets, and the visits by Count Ciano and other fascist parasites were ended by the bullet an Albanian lad fired at the dwarf Victor Emmanuel¹⁰.

Another manoeuvre fascism tried to use to divide our people and to prepare for the war against Greece, was the tool of religion. "Muslims and Christians, Orthodox and Catholics, attack one another!" But, the opposite occurred. "Albanian patriotism is the religion for the Albanian" and "*our faith and religion is the Albanian nation*". The fascists thought that these were only words. Yes, they were nothing but words to the hirelings; *but for the Albanian people they were implanted deep in their hearts and nurtured with the blood of our martyrs of the Albanian renaissance, with the blood of Papa Kristo Negovani, Petro Nini Luarasi, Koto Hoxhi, Naim Frashëri and others*. The war in Greece stripped all the gloss off the fascist emblems and left the plumes of the bersaglieri dropping, but our country footed the bill. Mustafa Merlika, Djevat Kortcha (read: Xhevat Korça, and don't be surprised that His Excellency, the Albanian Minister of

¹⁰ In May 1941, in Tirana, the Albanian worker Vasil Laçi made an attempt at the life of Victor Emmanuel III who had come to visit Albania.

Education, writes his name in a foreign way. The explanation is clear: to him the Albanian people are savages), or the likes of Irfan Ohri, Ndue Paluca, Filip Fishta, Vangjel Koça and Terenc Toçi, etc., are not the Albanian people. The people could not endure scoundrels on their backs; they began their war, organized their resistance, sharpened their weapons, and the Luogotenenza had to change its tactics, because its first manoeuvre did not go smoothly, the fascist thieves had reckoned without their host, they had forgotten the host who was waiting in the street for the settlement of his bill. *So the Albanian people stood up and said: enough!*

The new manoeuvre is radically different from the first because it is based on fascist terror. The host who said "enough" has ruined the sleep of the fascists and traitors; they have begun to tremble before the Albanian people, and measures have to be taken. Fascism has to use terror, but it cannot forget demagogy either. It needs to use terror, but also to maintain the appearance of the Luogotenenza as the "big-hearted friend of the Albanian people".

As the Duce's henchman, Jacomoni must keep a door open for some other manoeuvre which he thinks may work. *In short, the fascist invaders have understood as perfectly as two and two make four that they are openly at war with the Albanian people, that their position here is becoming critical, that their ammunition stores are insecure, that their army is in danger, that their positions in Greece are shaky, and it is becoming impossible to send aid to the fascist troops in Yugoslavia; in short, all the people of the Balkans, oppressed under fascism, are becoming a terrible threat. The fascist generals have openly admitted that fascism has to fight on the Balkan front, too.*

Albania, therefore, is the nerve centre of this Balkan front, and a remedy must be found for the situation that has been created. Fascism believed that it had found the remedy in bringing to power the greatest blackguard, the worst of thieves, the traitor Mustafa Merlika, the Quisling¹¹ of our country. Fascism had looked after this old spy, had fattened him on Italian lire in order to use him when the going would become difficult. And this "big shot" of fascism assured Jacomoni that "he could twist the Albanian people around his little finger and that he was so able (sic!) that in a short time even the most humble Albanian would live and breathe fascism." But it turned out that *this hangman did not know the Albanian people well, whereas the Albanian people knew all about this vile agent.*

Mustafa Merlika racked his brains. Both the fascists and he saw that the Communist Party, the party of the people who toil and suffer, was leading the broad masses of our people with a sure hand towards victory, towards liberty and salvation. Fascism and the traitors saw for themselves that the blood of our comrades who had fallen as martyrs for the freedom of the people flowed through towns and villages, and steeled sound Albanian hearts and energies.

They saw that the Communist Party of Albania was in the forefront of the struggle of our people, that at each moment it showed the way with the torch of freedom, and that black crow who bears the name of Mustafa Merlika, set about his traitorous work once more and came out as a nationalist (sic!), as though the people did not recognize this former member of the Durrës govern-

11 The word "quisling" has been introduced as a synonym of the word traitor and derives from Quisling — prime minister and chief of the Norwegian fascists, who betrayed his own country into the occupation by Hitlerite Germany in 1940.

ment¹² (sold out to the Italians), as though they did not know the anti-patriot who had fought against the Congress of Lushnja¹³, as though they did not recognize the resident of the town of Zara¹⁴, who was stuffed with lire by Mussolini, as though they did not know the man who congratulated Mussolini on the "Tirana Pact"¹⁵ concluded between fascist Italy and Zog, the man who prepared the April 7 invasion, the spy who, together with Qazim Koculi¹⁶, endeavoured to convince the Albanians that "Italy will come to Albania to liberate us."

The traitor Merlika imagined that it was easy to make slaves of the Albanians.

"What do the Albanian people want, these people whom my lackey, Djevat Kortcha, calls 'savage', and what do we want?" Mustafa the traitor asked himself. And, of course, he found the answer himself, with the aid of his

12 This government was set up in December 1918 and was made up of Albanians in the service of Italian imperialism.

13 The Congress of Lushnja, convened on January 28, 1920, repudiated the secret Treaty of London of 1915 for the partition of Albania, demanded its complete independence, declared the deposition of the traitorous Durrës government, and elected the new national government.

14 Former name of Zadar, town on the Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic, where the fascist group of Albanian exiles, directed and financed by the Italian fascists and headed by Mustafa Kruja, had its quarters.

15 "The Tirana Pact" was signed in November 1926 in Tirana between fascist Italy and the government of Ahmet Zog. This pact sanctioned the interference of Italy in the internal affairs of Albania. Mustafa Kruja, on behalf of the Albanian fascist group in Zara, sent a special congratulation to Mussolini on this occasion.

16 Extraordinary commissar of Mustafa Kruja in the battle against the Vlora population in 1943. Following the defeat of the Italian and Albanian fascists in this battle, Qazim Koculi was in his turn shot by the fascists.

other lackey, a certain Kotte¹⁷, who at one time didn't have two leks to buy himself a packet of cigarettes, and now has money and shares to gamble with:

"The Albanian people want freedom; they want to wipe us from the face of the earth, and the Albanian people are led by an iron hand, by the Communist Party of Albania, which gives us not a moment's respite, but attacks us and exposes us. The Communist Party is bringing about the genuine unification of all political trends in the country which hate us, and soon a tempest will be stirred up and crash upon our heads. Whereas, the traitor continues, we want to live while the people suffer, rot, and die so that we can satisfy our greed. Fascism, with which we have linked ourselves closely, must triumph and the Italian occupier must strike deep roots in Albania, or we are doomed. To be able to achieve this, we must use terror against the communists, and for the time being demagoguery towards all the other political trends which are uniting against us."

So the traitor came out in the mask of nationalism, while the Luogotenenza rubbed its hands, for its tool, the traitor Mustafa Kruja and his cronies, had everything lined up.

The manoeuvre began, but it ended in fiasco.

And the traitors bleated: "We are fighting for a free independent Albania in the framework (read: under the yoke) of the fascist empire (read: ex-empire); take no notice of the communists, for they have sold out, and we have not, because they destroy the family, and we build it, because they destroy the honour of women, and we preserve it (an example is Kolë Bibë Mirakaj, the moralist

¹⁷ Kostandin Kotte, member of the Mustafa Kruja cabinet and director of the paper "Roja Kombëtare" (the "National Guardian").

and minister of that vile place, the fascist headquarters (fascio), a name which our people apply to another place* . . . Kolë Biba, who knows very well, and has taught the people how much fascism defends the honour of women). We are a nationalist government (sic!) which together with the Duce will make a happy Albania. And here is proof of this. We are giving you back your original flag, over which you are organizing demonstrations and being killed in the streets. Is it worth doing all this for a scrap of flag? Nothing like this has ever happened under fascist regime. Although at one time we raised the fascist emblem with so much pomp close to the eagle, and now throw it into the rubbish bin, this does not matter to us. What matters to us is that the Albanian people stay quiet, content with things as they are, so that fascism can plunder at its leisure, destroy the Albanian youth, and send the people to die for the hangmen Mussolini and Hitler." However, these tricks did not work. The Albanian people did not swallow the business of the original flag, *for they know that they themselves with bloodshed and sacrifice will raise the banner of Scanderbeg high in a free Albania, without fascists and without traitors. The propaganda against the communists did not work because the people are well aware of who the communists are, that they are their own sons, their honest and courageous sons, who are fighting and dying for one thing only, for the salvation of the Albanian people from the clutches of the enemy.* The fascist occupiers and the traitors endeavoured to mobilize the people and send them to fight and die in Libya and on the Russian front on Mussolini's behalf. The people vividly recall the frequent visits and fiery speeches of Mustafa the traitor

* The word "fascio" was used at that time in Albania to refer to the toilet.

in the barracks, at banquets, in the mountains of Albania, speeches in which the "glorious" army of the Duce fought so "valiantly" against the Greeks that the bersaglieri lost their plumes. The people have read the articles by those hirelings of "Tomori", articles which are served up as letters allegedly written by Albanian soldiers who fell on the sands of Libya cheering for the Duce, by Albanian soldiers "who fought with such zeal against the Bolsheviks". These speeches and these articles bear the traitors' brand, and though the enemy signed them with names, like Fetah Baruti*, the powder was damp and did not ignite, because our people cannot be deceived with such nonsense. The Albanian will lay down his life for the freedom of Albania, but not for Hitler or Mussolini. When this mobilization for the slaughter failed, the fascists and the traitors produced other slogans, "the Serb and Greek spectre", "Great Albania" and the "Albanian militia".

The question of "Great Albania" is the question of suffering Albania, the suffering of our brothers in Kosova. This fascist "Great Albania" is a bitter trick played at the expense of our people and the people of Kosova (when we speak of "Great Albania", we have to exclude part of Kosova and Çamëria, not because there are no Albanians there, but that is of no account, since Nedich¹⁸, who has occupied that part of Kosova, is a fascist, too; similarly, the fascist government of Athens is the servant of fascism). The speeches and visits began, experts began to come stealthily to wretched Kosova in order to plunder and bleed it, as if it had not already been plundered and bled by the

*Baruti (Alb.) — powder.

¹⁸ Premier of the Serbian collaborationist government in 1941-1944.

Belarukos¹⁹ and Stoiadinoviches²⁰. The jackals of fascism and the hireling hacks, such as Hilmi Lekaxhiu* and Vangjel Koça, trumpeted that this year we should have plenty of bread, that the wheat of Kosova would fill Albania (read: the fascists hierarchy would fill their pockets; and proof of this are the demonstrations for bread in Vlorë, Elbasan, Korça, and Gjirokastra; and at what time? At threshing time!). The traitors cried that we would have ample bread, but instead the forcible seizure of the wheat, wool, and livestock of our people began. . . . The Albanian people could not endure this villainy; they took up arms to defend their homeland, to defend the land which others were seeking to seize, to defend the wheat others were trying to steal, to defend the honour of their families, the honour of the Albanian women. The blood of the brave patriots, and fighters for freedom, whom the fascist occupiers and the traitors had labelled "sold out", flowed in the streets of towns and villages, and our mountains were swarming with the units of partisans²¹ and volunteer fighters for freedom.

19 Bands of the "Belaruko", Yugoslav terrorist committee, created in Yugoslavia during the reign of King Alexander Karađorđević.

20 Milan Stoiadinovich, prime minister of Yugoslavia during 1935-1939, a rabid chauvinist. In March 1937 he signed an agreement on "neutrality" with the Italian fascist government which gave Italy a free hand to act against Albania.

* Intentional alteration of Hilmi Leka's name (the lek is Albania's monetary unit, whence *Lekaxhi*, venal).

21 Parallel with the union of the people in the National Liberation Front and with the setting up of the councils took place the extension and strengthening of the partisan armed warfare. The guerrilla units constituted the first stage of this war. The partisan movement assumed a wide extension and a higher degree with the setting up of the partisan units (detachments). Communists from towns, communist youth and sympathizers of the movement, tested in guerrilla warfare, were assigned to form the

The enemy felt the force of our people. He saw that his efforts had failed, that measures had to be taken, but at the same time the Luogotenenza had to deceive the people, saying "the Italians have nothing against you. They like you, so manage your own affairs among yourselves, and we will even change the name of the Albanian Fascist Party and call it the National Fascist (sic!) Party of Albania." "Forget the main enemy," the Luogotenenza went on, "and seize each other by the throat; Mustafa Kruja and company are precisely for this purpose." And Mustafa Merlika and company carried out the boss' plan. He began to mobilize the Albanian fascist militia, he mobilized the most degenerate hooligans, vagabonds and thieves as policemen and spies, and set them to fratricide. The traitor is shedding our people's blood, killing our sons and dishonouring our families. He has thrown into jail hundreds of patriots whose only crime is that they want a free Albania. But the Albanian people do not tremble and fear neither prison nor internment, neither bullets nor the noose; in the hearts of our people there is nothing but hatred for fascists and traitors; hatred and revenge. The Albanian people are united to a man against the occupier, the National Liberation Front has been created²² and is being steeled in battle.

partisan units. With them as a nucleus, the units grew in numbers, drawing from the peasantry mainly. The countryside became the basis and the main source for them. The commander and the political commissar were at the head of the partisan unit.

22 On September 16, 1942, at Peza, in the vicinity of Tirana, was held a conference with the participation of nationalists of various trends, besides the communists. The CPA, which was the organizer of the conference, was the sole political party to attend it. The conference elected the National Liberation General Council and adopted unanimously the platform of the National Liberation War as elaborated by the CPA. It laid the foundations of the National Liberation Front.

The fascists, with Jacomoni, Merlika, Kolë Biba and their like, are becoming panic-stricken. Conference after conference is being held at the Luogotenenza to find another prescription, a way out, a "modus vivendi".

In order to confuse the simpletons who still have hopes of some sort of compromise with the occupiers, the Luogotenenza has sent its spies, Terenc Toçi, Kolë Biba and others, General Gabrielli²³ and Del Monte²⁴, to talk to these elements and sound them out, while encouraging their day dreams.

The spy Terenc Toçi, "broken-hearted" as though he has to bear all the woes of the Albanian people on his shoulders, is wailing, high and low, and spreading what Jacomoni taught him. This agent of the Luogotenenza whispers that "it can't go on like this", that "this Mustafa Merlika is not taking a correct stand", "this and that are not right", that "the Luogotenenza wishes Albania well", that "we should fix something up", that "it is true that the fascist symbol is not for the Albanians", that "we must change this and that". In short, Terenc Toçi means: "Let whoever is fool enough (for the whole world knows that Terenc Toçi is the most villainous spy to come out of Calabria²⁵) come and open his heart to me, and tomorrow I'll send him to *the cooler* (i.e. to prison), while the others, who find my work to their taste, will be introduced to another spy, to Papalilo, who will give them a wage and put them to work." But Jacomoni, Terenc Toçi and Mustafa Merlika

23 Chief of the military cabinet attached to the fascist vice-regency in Tirana.

24 Italian fascist, an agent of the SIM (Italian military intelligence).

25 A province in South Italy inhabited also by Albanians emigrated from Albania since the 15th and 16th centuries to escape Turkish persecutions and massacres. Terenc Toçi, a Calabrian of Albanian extraction, was an Italian fascist hierarch.

and your like, you are deceiving yourselves. The people know who their enemies are.

The tricks of the Luogotenenza are not succeeding. *The fascist occupier is our enemy and you are its foul tools. Your crimes weigh heavy upon you all, on you as well as on Jacomoni. The Albanian people will not compromise with you. Our dealings with you will be settled with guns, and our guns will triumph.* Your manoeuvres to split us up have not succeeded. No one can ever destroy our people's National Liberation Front, nobody can ever make the Albanian youth swerve from the glorious road of the fight for freedom. Nor can your threats against the Albanian teachers ever intimidate them, for they are not afraid of you. They know their duty towards the homeland and the people. The martyrs of our people, who have shed their blood for freedom, have taught them their duty, and they do not wait to be taught it by the Italians and agents of the Italians. The Albanian youth scornfully reject all your efforts, such as the leaflet you allegedly issued "clandestinamente"*, the garbage entitled "The Echo of Truth"²⁶, "press organ of active groups of Albanian (sic!) national (sic!) youth."

The people realized at once that this smelt of treachery and Italian lire, and put it where such paper belongs. . . in the fascio.

Here is how this abortive work was brought forth from the mind of Jacomoni the diplomat (sic!). The fascists saw with alarm that the Albanian youth, who follow the glorious traditions of our people, are in the forefront of the war against the invader. The youth had to be split. But how? In the chambers of the Luogotenenza

* "Clandestinamente" (It.) — secretly.

²⁶ A fascist magazine, began publication at the end of October 1942 and put out only a few issues.

emerged a certain Del Monte (an Italian spy), who, at a time when his fellow countrymen were "scoring success after success in the war against the Greeks", pilfered the funds assigned for the Albanian refugees suffering from the war, and pocketed them.

Kolë Bibë Mirakaj (the moralist of fascism), Ndue Paluca, Vangjel Koça and Filip Fishta, as well as some three or four degenerate students attending the "universities" of the "Via Veneto" in Rome, had a tête-à-tête and formed a group of nationalist youths (sic!) in order to use the manoeuvre of division, and they named the group BRUFSSH²⁷, which in their fascist language means: Banditi Rinnegati dell'Unione Fascista Skipetara, which reads in translation: traitorous thieves of the Albanian fascist union. These youth, with the lure of the Luogotenenza, issued that leaflet. These "pure-bred nationalists" (as you know yourselves) have directed their struggle against: 1) communists, 2) nationalists, who sympathize with the communists, and 3) nationalists who wait and see (dear reader, you must have understood at once who these beauties are, but hold on, there is something else). The paper in question analyses the situation so masterfully and with such telling arguments that it makes you want to vomit, and you can search till you are blue in the face but you will not find a single word about Mussolini, Count Ciano, fascism, the meetings of fascist party cells, as Kolë Biba (the moralist of fascism) calls them; not a single Word about Victor, Rome, or Caesar, and finally, not even the least mention of Terenc Toçi, who at a meeting, without anyone asking him, but in order to secure his position somewhat, said, "I have never been a spy". On the contrary, there you will see that "this pure-bred (sic!) nationalist youth", together with the "genuine nationalists",

27 Union of Albanian University Fascist Youth (UAUFY).

who have got down to creative activity (read: together with the traitors who have got down to destructive activity in our country), emerge with the flag of Scanderbeg (the axes, as we have already told you, have been removed, in order to deceive us). How smart this "pure-bred nationalist youth" is! And just as valiant as it is smart; it can even question the government, and pose not just one question, but two.

1. "Where are the monuments to the heroes of our nation?!" It is good that they put the exclamation mark, for this relieves the people of the necessity to rack their brains and find an answer. How you surprise us, you rotten scum!

2. "Why do the organs of government not visit the cellars of certain hoarders who have stored up food to last them ten years?" (We need to note here something which the "pure-bred nationalist youth" forgot). The people should not get the idea that the word "hoarders" refers to "genuine nationalists" such as Mustafa Merlika and his brethren, Jacomoni and his clique, Terenc Toçi and Roko, Jonuz Shijaku, Gulielm Luka and others! No, the hoarders are Meti, who owns a small café and has "hoarded" a pound of coffee; Osman, who has "hoarded" ten pounds of beans at home to keep the children alive; Smail, who has a tiny restaurant in the old market, and has "hoarded" a few gallons of olive oil for a rainy day! These are the hoarders whom Merlika's government is tracking down and condemning for speculation. These are the hoarders whom the "pure-bred nationalist youth" so courageously ask the government to hunt down. These are the "speculators" about whom "Tomori" writes article after article. It is they who live off the people, "they are the ones to blame," these "scoundrels" of shopkeepers, restaurant owners, coffee house proprietors, porters and carters, and not the fascists, not the likes of Merlika and others.

See how low the fascists have fallen! All their manoeuvres are proving ineffective; lacking new ones, they are obliged to start again with the old ones; to use them over again to brainwash the masses, but no one listens to them. Now, it is our turn to give them a piece of advice and assure the fascists and the traitors that, if they take our advice, the entire people will certainly believe them one hundred per cent.

They should tell our people about the sufferings and misery of the Italian people, who for twenty years have been preyed on by fascism; they should tell them about the crimes of the fascist clique, its villainy, the dishonour brought upon the Italian people by those bandits, the Duce, Ciano, etc. They should tell the people about the innumerable crimes they are committing throughout Europe with their boss Hitler, the arch-hangman, at the head.

Let Jacomoni and his friends tell about the intrigues, thefts, and murders they are committing at the expense of our people, let them tell about the crimes they plot in the chambers of the Luogotenenza. Let Mustafa Merlika and his running dogs tell about the treachery, thefts, and cruelty they have inflicted on the Albanian people, let Merlika tell us about the lire he has received from the Duce for his work of betrayal, about the income he receives from his Italian partners in the general plunder of the people. Let the "famous moralist of fascism", Kolë Biba, who howls like a stray dog that communism "destroys the family", and about "how well he protects the honour of the family", give examples to support his argument.

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November 1942*

Works, vol. 1.

**CIRCULAR TO THE PARTY ORGANIZATIONS OF THE
TIRANA REGION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF THE
PARTY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT**

[November 1942]

Dear comrades,

In these grave moments, when our Party is leading the people in the most savage war ever known to mankind, in a life-or-death fight, at a time when the people throughout the world have stood up to subdue the mad beast, fascism, which is bleeding the people and trying to enslave them, we observe with regret that certain comrades evade the duty with which they have been charged and have forgotten their responsibilities towards our Party and our people. These comrades think that the war can be won by devoting an hour or two a week to the task. They think that they have carried out their mission and have done enough to earn the lofty title of party member by attending a cell meeting once a week or once a fortnight, while the rest of the time they sit by with folded arms to watch events roll rapidly onwards, and thus they lag along at the tail end of the movement.

In our Tirana organization¹ it is evident that not all the comrades have that revolutionary drive that should

¹ From the creation of the Party up to the beginning of 1943, as well as leading the Provisional Central Committee of the CPA, comrade Enver Hoxha was also Political Secretary of the Tirana Regional Committee of the CPA.

inspire everyone. On the contrary, we notice that some of them are apathetic and have a petty-bourgeois spirit, to such an extent that some are completely indifferent to the tasks assigned to them, *tasks which every communist militant who whole-heartedly loves the Party and is willing to give his life for it should carry out with the conscientiousness, unselfishness and conscious discipline which characterizes a genuine communist.* The reports of the cells clearly verify this laxity in the work. *In general, these reports point more to negligence by the comrades than to any lack of knowledge of how to do the work.* In the meetings of the cells, which should be meetings where all our country's problems are seriously thrashed out, where methods of work and struggle are laid down, where comrades are assigned tasks that must be carried out with mathematical precision, where methods of work and organization for educational groups and for conferences of sympathizers and with the broad masses of the people are studied, as often as not there is fruitless discussion on trifling matters which have nothing to do with revolution. These meetings are dominated by a spirit of carelessness at work, by the attitude of "let's get the meeting over with" and "send off a report to the committee", with not the slightest thought that the cell is the school of the Party, its life and soul, on which success in the work and victory depend, with no thought that the cell is the pulse of the Party ensuring the triumph of the sacred cause for which millions of comrades have given and will continue to give their lives.

We are living in critical times, when the masses are in perpetual movement, and for the most part, favourable for the development of our activity. But the comrades do not take advantage of this. They neglect the masses of the people, finding futile and ridiculous excuses, unworthy of a member of a communist party of the Lenin-

Stalin type, excuses such as "I haven't the time", or "I have to go to the office", or "I am too busy in my shop", or "my family is waiting for me", and so on.

These comrades are not interested in the sympathizers' groups, nor in developing new cadres, but are content to report to the cell, "There are three people in my group", "I have four in mine". Quite often these groups of sympathizers have never been brought together for a meeting, nor has anything been done to educate them, raise their level or uplift them. These are simply groups of sympathizers eager to work and to fight, but unfortunately neglected, while the comrades find the usual pretext: "We have nowhere to meet".

The military question has been completely neglected, just as though we were in the era of communism, in the time when class society has disappeared, instead of which we are engaged in a most savage war. The creation of guerrilla units has been neglected, while the recruitment of volunteers and partisans is not even mentioned. The youth have been abandoned too; the comrades consider it superfluous for them to involve themselves in this work because, they say, there is a youth organization. "Let the youth organization look after its own affairs", some comrades say, "we have other work to do". As for the educational groups entrusted to the comrades by the youth, in general, the comrades show little interest in them, don't bother to call meetings, and even despise them, opposing the youth's enthusiasm to work by using the title of party member as an excuse to say, "We haven't time, we have other work to do". It has been noticed that although such elements call themselves party members, they are precisely the ones who do not work, but on the contrary, sabotage whatever their comrades undertake, and the party directives.

Work with the women has also been left in a deplorable state. The comrades consider that work with the women should be done only by women comrades, just as they consider that only young members should work with the youth; often the reports sent in by the comrades contain such phrases as: "I have three women sympathizers", "I have two women", "I have five girls", or "let a woman comrade deal with them". Why do they behave like this? The reason is simple: they want to get them off their backs, they don't want to put themselves out, for they want to be free to go to their offices or shops, and to go about their lives without a worry in the world; the reason for their behaviour is as simple as the party directives to work among the women are clear.

As concerns the printing equipment and party publications, all the comrades shout, demand, criticize: Where is the newspaper? Why doesn't the paper come out? Why doesn't the magazine come out? The communiques are not sufficient, we want books ! But they never rack their brains or stop to ask themselves where these newspapers, magazines and books, which they demand so authoritatively and make such a fuss about, come from, whether they fall from the sky, or require work by the comrades. Everyone makes demands, but no one interests himself about the poor printing equipment — one of the principal weapons of our war. No one troubles himself to find a place where this material can be printed, in spite of the unceasing directives of the Central Committee about this very important work. Not only do they fail to concern themselves with helping to produce the materials, but there are even comrades who will not allow communiques to be left at their homes for even half an hour until a comrade can come to get them to distribute in the organization. Obviously, this is only a small sacrifice for anyone who calls himself a party member, but unfortunately, there are some

members within the organization who are not willing to contribute even that much.

As for security, it is almost non-existent. It is precisely as though our organization were legal, if not worse. Everything, every assignment, every action or movement, becomes common knowledge. The lack of security has reached the point of unwitting provocation. If someone is given an assignment, he cannot rest until he has told his friend about it; if someone is told where an illegal comrade lives, he will lose his appetite unless he goes and tells his friend; if something is discussed in a cell meeting, the whole organization will get to know about it; when an action is carried out, the whole world hears who did it. But when disaster strikes, when the comrades are killed or captured, when printing equipment is seized, everyone asks wide-eyed: "How did it happen?" "Where is the provocateur?" Comrades, we are the unwitting provocateurs. It is our whispering to one another, our failure to maintain security, which cause catastrophe.

In order to avoid any responsibility, to avoid work, there is a general tendency among the comrades to resort to such justifications as: "This is the concern of the regional committee", "the regional committee will do this", "the regional committee will find a place to house the printing equipment", "the regional committee does the work with youth", "the regional committee does the work with women", "it is the regional committee's job to solve the security question", "the regional committee will duplicate the communique", "the regional committee will translate the books", "the manoeuvres of the enemy will be exposed by the regional committee", and finally, "it is the regional committee's fault"!

Those in the regional committee are comrades just like you, and they work in conditions of illegality much more difficult than yours; the comrades of the regional com-

mittee can make mistakes too, but those comrades who justify themselves in the way I have mentioned are making the great mistake of not doing any work at all. What is the regional committee supposed to do when the cell asks such questions as: "We have found a place that sells alcohol at 16 leks a kilogram; is that cheap or dear?" The comrades who ask such questions can't find out for themselves whether it is cheap or dear, but run to ask the regional committee! What is the regional committee supposed to do when two weeks' activity of a six member cell is summed up in the following report, excerpts from which we give as an example of total inactivity: "We propose that, on the occasion of the 7th of November (the report reached us on the 10th of November) parcels of gifts be made up to send to the partisans". "Captain F.A. (entirely unknown to the committee) is going to such-and-such a place". "We are giving you the name of someone who reported that 'three comrades participated in the National Liberation Council.'"

Dear comrades,

We must put an end to these lax methods of work once and for all. We can never tolerate within the ranks of our Party people who think the Party of Lenin and Stalin is like the 2nd International, who consider it a *refugium peccatorum**, a place of refuge for loafers and slugs, intriguers, careerists, cowardly elements with a petty-bourgeois spirit, with no spirit of sacrifice, and elements who regard our Party as a republic of comrades, a place where discipline and security are abandoned.

We have not tolerated them, *and we will not tolerate them*; the party decisions will strike ruthlessly at them.

*Refugium peccatorum (Lat.) — refuge of sinners.

We turn to you, dear comrades, comrades who love the Party with all their hearts, who are always ready to sacrifice your lives for our sacred cause, who day and night think and fight for the triumph of our arms, and tell you always to keep in your minds and hearts the words of the great comrade Stalin, our consummate leader: "To guard the unity of our Party as the apple of our eye".* We must safeguard our Party and make it strong and worthy of our Third International, make it worthy to lead our long-suffering people; and it is in our hands to attain this goal. It is up to us to do our work thoroughly, to steel our organizational work, so that our Communist Party will become, as Stalin says, *"the advanced detachment of the working class. The Party must absorb all the best elements of the working class, their experience, their revolutionary spirit, their selfless devotion to the cause of the proletariat"***.

Resolute party comrades, at these critical moments, any laxity in our work, any evasion of work is a dagger in the heart of Party, any negligence, any breach of discipline is a bullet in the heart of the Party, it is a dagger and a bullet in your own hearts, for you are the Party.

Resolute Party comrades, Stalin teaches us: *"The Party is not only the advanced detachment of the working class. If it desires really to direct the struggle of the class it must at the same time be the organized detachment of its class. The Party's tasks under the conditions of capitalism are immense and extremely varied. The Party must direct the struggle of the proletariat under the exceptionally difficult conditions of internal and external development; it must lead the proletariat in the offensive when the situation calls for an offensive; it must lead the pro-*

*J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 6, p. 48 (Alb. ed.).

** J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 6, p. 177 (Alb. ed.).

letariat so as to escape the blow of a powerful enemy when the situation calls for retreat; it must imbue the millions of unorganized non-party workers with the spirit of discipline and system in the struggle, with the spirit of organization and endurance. But the Party can fulfil these tasks only if it is itself the embodiment of discipline and organization, if it is itself the organized detachment of the proletariat. Without these conditions there can be no question of the Party really leading the vast masses of the proletariat. The Party is the organized detachment of the working class"*.

It is absolutely impermissible for our work to be disorganized, it is impermissible to give up work in the cells, it is impermissible for the groups of sympathizers² to be left without regular meetings, without education, without raising their level, it is impermissible to ignore directives and to neglect work in any sector.

Resolute party comrades, it is absolutely impermissible for you to stand aside from the broad masses of the people, to ignore gatherings of people, workers, or peasants, it is impermissible for us to allow a recurrence of what took place the day the enemy hanged our comrade Shyqyri Ishmi, when the peasants were left to listen to the spies and the militia slander him as a "vile communist, a criminal who wants to destroy the family and religion", and other such base accusations.

Resolute party comrades, protect the party material, read it and distribute it! Our newspapers and leaflets, the party bulletins and pamphlets must reach the most remote cottage, the voice of justice and the call to arms must reach all ears and leave no heart untouched.

* J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 6, p. 180 (Alb. ed.).

² This was the name given to groups of people who were close to the Party and were likely to become its members. Later on these were called groups of candidates for party membership.

Resolute party comrades, comrades who are ready at any moment to shed your blood as true soldiers of Stalin, close your ranks, protect the Party and your comrades, be vigilant towards the enemies and traitors and show them no mercy, maintain the tightest security, because our work and struggle are not a subject for prattle and bragging but a terrible battle against a savage enemy; show no mercy to provocateurs, loafers, cowards, careerists and other opportunist elements who try in a thousand and one ways to hinder and damage the work within the Party.

Dear comrades, the Party has faith in you, for this is its strength. It has faith and is sure that you will set to work zealously, with discipline and self-sacrifice, and that, in this way, our Party will assuredly lead our people towards certain victory.

*Comradely greetings
For the Tirana Regional Committee*

Malo³

Works, vol. 1.

³ One of the pseudonyms comrade Enver Hoxha used during the National Liberation War.

HOW THE ALBANIAN PEOPLE FOUGHT

*(From Path to Path with the Partisan and Volunteer
Units Fighting Furiously Against the
Fascist Occupier)*

January 1943

The mountains and villages of Albania are seeing history repeat itself, are witnessing the repetition of the efforts of our patriots of the Renaissance, they are seeing boys and old men shouldering their rifles, seeing the soldiers of the people, joined together in units and inspired by the ideal of freedom, striking at the hated enemy of our country, bloodthirsty fascism. The doors of the cottages are opened, and the Albanian villages welcome the soldiers of the people, their own sons, with open arms. The Albanian peasants are joining the partisan and volunteer units, taking up their hidden weapons to defend their homeland, their bread, their honour, and to win freedom. The partisan and volunteer units, which make up the army of our people, have set foot in every village, and wherever they go the enemy is defeated and disarmed, and the grain which the fascists and traitors have seized, is distributed to the peasants; the people's army is growing daily, its ranks filling with workers, peasants, teachers, students, and other Albanian patriots. Whenever they go the partisan units carry the word of freedom, and there is great enthusiasm to fight.

This is how the people welcome their own army, which penetrates every region and every path, with rifles on their shoulders, and the banner of freedom leading. So much happens to the soldiers of the people wherever they go that there is no room here to record it all, but we have chosen some incidents which show our people's great enthusiasm for the fight against the hated enemy, who has enslaved our country.

The partisan unit of Martanesh¹ was preparing to go into action. The partisans were singing as they got ready, cleaning their rifles, checking their ammunition and the bread in their knapsacks. Smiling faces everywhere, except for little Mustafa, a fifteen year old partisan, the youngest soldier of the people's army. Sad and red-eyed, he wept in a corner of the cottage, because the unit commander, feeling that the march would be too arduous for the boy, had ordered him to stay behind. Mustafa was burning to fight; he pleaded with the commander and with his comrades, but they told him that this was what discipline meant. When the unit left, he came to the door of the cottage and, with tear-filled eyes, watched his comrades-in-arms march off, cursing himself for being only fifteen.

To reach the spot where the action was to take place, the partisan unit passed through several villages. At S. village, one of the comrades from the unit spoke to the assembled peasants, telling them why they had come out to fight, about this sacred war for the liberation of the homeland. "The day has come", he said, "to take up arms and fight the fascist occupiers". A cheer went up from the circle of peasants and a young man of twenty five stepped forward, turned to the unit commander and said: "I want to join the people's army, too, I'll fight and die

¹ Region in Central Albania.

for the freedom of the country". As he ran to get his rifle, the other peasants brought bread, which they distributed among the partisans. Beside one poor hut, an old woman stopped a partisan and said: "Wait, son, till I bring you some bread, and may God grant you a long life, for if it were not for you, the enemy would have seized our maize". She went into the hut, then came out again with some bread and olives. The partisan took the bread, embraced the old lady and left, but as he turned the corner he heard someone call. It was the old peasant woman. She had brought a spoonful of butter for the partisan's bread. What wonderful people! Such generosity fills the heart of our people's army with joy, and it goes into battle singing to the liberation of the homeland and the Albanian people.

The partisan units in Gjirokastra also sing as they go to war. They cross over to Sopot where the shepherds welcome the anti-fascist heroes, open their arms to the partisans, because they are the true fighters for the ideal of freedom, which the mountain shepherds enjoy among the gorges and peaks, where the enemy dare not set foot. The partisan unit of Kurvelesh² passed through a village in Labëria, where delegates had gathered from many villages of the region, which has a tradition of bravery, to attend a conference at which the political commissar of the unit was to speak. Among the peasants gathered there, listening in silent approval to the words of the fighters from the unit, was an old man, grey-haired, but eagle-eyed, surely a comrade of those brave men of the people who are sung about in the songs of Labëria. On his cap the commissar, who was speaking, wore the partisan badge, the red flag with the double-headed eagle and the red

² Region in South Albania

star. After the conference, the old man left the crowd and embraced the fighters, saying: "Sons, I don't want to know your names, but I just want to say one thing, that Albania is a land of people like Çerçiz and Selam³, and with such sons, she knows how to liberate herself from the dogs who have trampled us underfoot. Let me embrace you and ask you for that emblem you have on your hat."

Gladly the commissar removed the partisan badge and presented it to the eighty-year-old man, who kissed it and put it in his pocket.

Before entering his village, the old man squatted down by a fence, took out the badge the young fighter had given him, sewed it on his white felt cap, and marched proudly into the village to tell the villagers what he had heard from the young man.

The partisan units of Gjirokastra have opened grain stores one after another and distributed the grain paid as tithes among the peasants; meanwhile, all the men from the militia posts, which the agent of Merlika, Tahir Kolgjini⁴, had set up to oppress the people, ran back to their centre with their tails between their legs, because there was the smell of gunpowder in the mountains.

The villages of that region had seen no movement in the mountains except by the partisans. One morning the peasants of Libohova saw a group of armed civilians approaching. They said, "These are sure to be the partisans coming to kick out the government men and distribute the grain", and wasting no time, the peasants came out to meet the partisans with their sacks ready. When they

³ Çerçiz — for Çerçiz Topulli, and Selam — for Selam Musai, the former — commander of a patriotic band fighting against the Turks, and the latter — commander of a volunteer unit in the 1920 Vlorë War, where he fell heroically.

⁴ Fascist prefect of Gjirokastra.

drew closer, the peasants gave the clenched fist salute and shouted: "Death to fascism!" But, instead of the usual smile and the "Freedom to the People!", which is the reply of the people's soldiers, a foul curse was the answer of the armed civilians. These were not partisans, but Merqes Ali, a degenerated scoundrel, with the mercenaries and militiamen of Mustafa the traitor, they were the thieves recruited by the enemy to put down our people's movement. The people of the Gjirokastra region say with conviction: "We were saved from the thieves because now the prefect has dressed them in militia uniforms and keeps them in the city."

The Vlora partisan unit was going into action. On the way the partisans met a goatherd with his flock. "Hey, partisans", he called out. "Where are you off to? Wait a second, I've got something to say." The unit stopped and the goatherd said to the commander: "I know you are going to set fire to the enemy stores, so please take me along too, as soon as I drive the goats home." The commander replied that they would gladly take him, but they had no time to wait for him to drive the goats into the hut, for they had to reach their destination at a particular time. "Death to Fascism, Freedom to the People!", they said as the unit moved on.

Scarcely half an hour along the way, to the amazement of the unit, the goatherd appeared before them with his rifle on his shoulder. He had rushed the goats into the hut and ran like the wind to catch up with the partisan unit to join them in the fight against the occupier.

The heroic Skrapar unit, before beginning a successful operation in which it defeated 1,500 of Merlika's militiamen, was stationed in Th. region. The political commissar of the unit saw a peasant approaching out of breath and in a lather of sweat. Welcoming him with open arms, the commissar asked what was the matter.

"Comrades, you are surrounded by the enemy", said the peasant, and went on to describe the position of the militiamen. The commissar embraced the peasant and asked him what he had decided to do, whether he would return to his village or wished to go with the unit. The answer was simple: "I'm coming with you." After the partisan unit had broken through the encirclement and routed the militia, the peasant, who had fought like a lion, approached the political commissar and embraced him saying: "Please, comrade, let me join the Communist Party of Albania."

The Korça partisan units have wiped out all the carabinieri and militia posts in the mountains of Opar, Devoll, Kolonja, Mokra, and other places. The liberating tread of the partisans echoes through those regions.

At Çezma in Mokra, a partisan unit fought a battle, smashed the enemy and liberated the village, but an old man from the village was wounded. The unit commander went up and embraced the old man, who said: "I'm happy, son, and I wish that the few days left of my life could be added to that of the partisans". When they departed, the old man farewelled the commander with the words: "May the Duce die in a bramble bush!"

The Devoll partisan unit, after routing the carabinieri, set fire to one of their posts. There was an Italian soldier at the post, whose life was spared, and who, before he left, said to the commander in Italian: "Comrade, let me take a photograph of the burning post, for I am overjoyed to see the burning offices and papers of the fascist power, which has enslaved both you and us."

At a village in Devoll, the partisans were drying their wet clothes around a poor peasant's fireplace. Suddenly, the door was flung open and an old man entered, raising his fist as he shouted, "Death to the sick!" He was one of those old men who had seen the heroic guerrilla units

of the Renaissance period, who had fought "the Sick Man of the Bosphorus"⁵. Now he is seeing history repeat itself, and the occupier of our country breathing its last, and thus the old man makes the connection between the past and the present. The partisans made room for him as he was tired from the journey from Korça. They asked for the news from the town. The old man, drawing on his cigarette, said with satisfaction: "They burned it down!" "What did they burn down?" the partisans asked in surprise. "They burned it down, what's it called, that rotten, evil place . . . that . . . the devil take it, the place which does not give us salt." The partisans laughed, for the evil place was the fascist office in Korça, which was burned down by the partisans. The people were overjoyed when the partisan guerrilla unit set fire to the fascist headquarters in the city. Everywhere there was talk of nothing but the courage and determination of the partisans.

In a house, guests were chatting. The hostess brought in some burning coals for the brazier. But one coal fell on the carpet. The host did not allow the opportunity to pass, but picked up the coal and said: "Wife, what are you doing? Do you take our house for the fascist office?"

The partisan unit triumphantly entered Kreshova in the Mokra region; the peasants all came out into the village square to meet the people's army. Among them was an elderly man, holding an old flag in his trembling hands.

The commander addressed the peasants, and explained the suffering brought upon the Albanian people by the fascist occupiers. At the end of the speech, the old peasant with the banner approached and said to the commander: "Take this flag, for you well deserve it. This flag is thirty years old, and it is the flag of the old Al-

⁵ The name given to the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 19th century.

banian fighters units. I have kept it in my chest, but today the time has come to bring it out and to hand it over to our heroic sons." The commander took the flag, embraced the old man and told him: "We will treasure your gift and always keep it flying. The flag of the heroic units of Spiro Bellkameni and Mihal Grameno⁶ is in sure hands. On that red background where the victories of our forefathers have been written, we, their sons, will inscribe with our blood the everlasting desire of the people for the genuine liberation of Albania."

Malo

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Works, vol. 1.

⁶ Chiefs of the Albanian insurgents at the beginning of the 20th century, who fought against the Turkish rule and the Greek chauvinists.

**LETTER TO THE KORÇA REGIONAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ALBANIA ON
THE STAND TO BE TAKEN TOWARDS THE
"BALLI KOMBËTAR"¹**

[January 1943]

Dear comrades,

We have received your letter and well understand the chaotic situation in your region, a situation identical to that in all the other regions, which is caused by the "Balli Kombëtar". In order to solve this problem, *we must understand what the "Balli Kombëtar" is, have a meeting with its leaders, watch our step and separate the wheat from the chaff, for nobody there really knows where he belongs, despite all the efforts of the big shots of the "Balli Kombëtar" to present it as a united single-minded body.*

The "Balli Kombëtar" is a "ramassis"* of elements of various trends, without any foundation, who always

1 Traitorous organization set up by the reactionary bourgeoisie and landowners with the support of fascist occupiers, which rallied reactionary bourgeois intellectuals, landowners and big merchants, the reactionary clergy, rich peasants, etc. It was aimed at undermining the union of the people around the CPA and at opposing directly the National Liberation Front by entering the overt service of the German occupiers.

*Ramassis (Fr. in the original) — hotchpotch.

have the catchword 'nationalism' on their lips. Fazli² is not at all wrong when he says that in the "Balli Kombëtar" there are elements ranging "from dictatorship (what dictatorship is the point in question) to socialism", but what Fazli has forgotten to say is that these elements have no clear principle in their heads, and thus cannot have any "fixe" stand based on sound principles. These elements, "from dictatorship to socialism", have elected some men, or, rather, have elected themselves, to a central committee, and have chosen Lumo Skëndo³ as their head, and this central committee is the unqualified general of a "great" army (any Albanian who is not a communist, they say, belongs to the "Balli Kombëtar", if not organizationally, at least spiritually), a great, but disobedient army, because the people do not go along with this. But let us see what is the make-up the "Balli Kombëtar", which they refer to as an organization. Inside, the "Balli Kombëtar" is like a basket of crabs; some of them consider themselves the left wing: "We are the true 'Balli Kombëtar'," they say. They want to fight, they say this, and write it in the organ of the "Balli Kombëtar"⁴ which they publish in opposition to the opinions of the central committee. (Of course, they are not communists, and they are all pulling in different directions.) Some support the war, but not the way we fight it; others do not want to fight and exhaust themselves, but want an organization to defend the "ethnic boundaries" of Albania; some are partisans of "ninety-nine tricks and one heroic deed",

² Representative of the "Balli Kombëtar" in the Korça region.

*Fixe (Fr. in the original) — clear-cut.

³ Pseudonym of Mithat Frashëri, head of the traitorous "Balli Kombëtar" organization.

⁴ "Lufta e Çlirimit Kombëtar" ("The Struggle for National Liberation"), monthly organ of the "Balli Kombëtar" (November 1942-August 1943).

others sound the alarm, while still others make fine speeches but do nothing in practice. In words, the "wind of the sacred unity" blows over them all, all of them admire our struggle, all respect Lumo Skëndo, all of them recognize him as their chief, but not all agree with his opinion; all would like to send him an ultimatum, but they will all hurl themselves at your throat if you dare to make a pertinent and reasonable criticism of Lumo Skëndo, even if they make the same criticism themselves. This, without exaggeration, is what the centre of the "Balli Kombëtar" is like; this centre has contacts with the regions, of which the Korça region headed by Fazli is a reflection.

We must settle accounts here, because that organization is really a great obstacle. We must not forget the individual influence of its adherents in Albania, or the fact that they have succeeded in creating among the people the idea that there is a nationalist organization with which the communists should reach an understanding and agreement. So our Party has sent some comrades who have been empowered to conduct talks with the "Balli Kombëtar" and take the appropriate decisions. These comrades have contacted either their envoys or individual members. We should not forget that in their ranks there are many good and resolute elements who genuinely want fighting unity. These are the left-wing elements who tell us that they have presented an ultimatum to the central committee⁵, demanding "unity in the struggle, or we will leave the "Balli Kombëtar". The comrades have already made contact with the other nationalist elements (of course, we mean the "pezzo grosso"*; although we concern ourselves personally with the rank-and-file). They received our comrades so warmly that they almost kissed

⁵ The "Balli Kombëtar" too had created its own "central committee".

* Pezzo grosso (It. in the original) — big shots.

them, praising the communists and the Party, and saying that they sincerely want to unite, etc., etc., but that we should first talk things over with the "Balli Kombëtar". Now there are official contacts, and within 15 to 20 days they should assume a definitive form, for these friends postpone every meeting for 10 or 15 days for the simple reason that the leaders of their central committee want to drag the matter out as long as they can, waiting for the defeat of fascism. But together with the results of the talks, let us hope that there are factions within the "Balli Kombëtar", for a card castle cannot stand for long. The "great politicians" sent to conduct talks with our comrades make the same criticism as Fazlli, but their arguments are easily refuted, for their allegations are baseless. For example, when we tell them that the Peza Conference was the first step towards unity and the organization of the war, that the Peza Conference was attended by resolute nationalists with rifles on their shoulders, rifles which they had fired at the enemy, that it was also attended by nationalists⁶ who today belong to the "Balli Kombëtar", and that the "Balli Kombëtar" was not invited to that conference for the simple reason that it did not exist (and if they claim that it did exist, we reply that not even a magician could prove the existence of a political party that does not come out with at least one leaflet), *these gentlemen have nothing to say, but express agreement and have not the courage to deny the importance of the conference.* Their arguments against the conference

⁶ Nationalists — this term was usually applied to patriots who loved their country and strove for its liberation from the foreign occupiers, but did not harbour far-reaching revolutionary aspirations. Pseudo-patriots too styled themselves as nationalists. Therefore, the genuine patriots, in order not to be confounded with the traitor and reactionary elements, were also called honest nationalists or patriotic nationalists.

can easily be refuted, for, if they do not like this solution, we will tell them that we are ready to seek another for the sake of the liberty of our people, and then we shall see how resolute they are.

As for the units of Bazi⁷, Myslim⁸, and Mestan⁹, there are rumours that they have joined the Ballists, and you should not be astonished if one fine morning you hear that all partisan units have joined them. Only Pasho Kolaneci¹⁰ will have to wait a long time for the arms to arrive from Peza and, in the meantime, the next best thing for him to do would be to take care of the white caps¹¹ they have already sent him. In their press organ you will find many gems, but you should not worry, as we did not when they wrote in their organ that "Safet Butka's¹² unit of 1,000 men is going to the aid of Vlora". If they had

7 Abaz Kupi (Bazi i Canës), commander of a Zogite band, agent of the British Intelligence Service, chief representative of the traitorous "Legaliteti" organization (the Zogite Party). He was sent to Albania by the British in 1941 to sabotage the National Liberation War. At the Peza Conference he formally adopted the program of the National Liberation Front and was elected as a member of the National Liberation General Council, and subsequently of the General Staff of the National Liberation Army. With the invasion of Albania by the German nazis (in September 1943) he collaborated with the latter.

8 Myslim Peza, commander of the Peza partisan unit and member of the National Liberation General Council. People's Hero.

9 Ex-commander of a partisan unit. During the war he proved extremely unreliable, showing the tendency to join the "Balli Kombëtar" and immediately after the war joined the counter-revolutionary groups organized by the British-US imperialists.

10 Ballist band commander.

11 White caps and an eagle were the distinctive signs of the "Balli" bands.

12 Representative and commander of a band of the "Balli Kombëtar".

waited in Vlora for the help Safet Butka's unit was supposed to give the city, by this time they would have been pushing up the daisies.

Comrades, excuse me for writing this letter in such a tone on such an important matter, but the pretensions of these "politicians" can really be described only in this way, for they are mere empty talk.

There is one thing we must keep in mind: *we cannot wage the war alone, but only with the entire people, and for this reason we must take matters seriously with regard to these nationalists*¹³. The Party has begun talks with the "Balli Kombëtar". A decision will be taken and their stand, good or bad, will be defined, but we have hopes that the final result will be a positive one. On the other hand, if our views are not the same on all points, we will continue to try and convince some of those people, while the others who do not agree to join the struggle, we will try to neutralize and prevent from going over to the enemy. So it is a very difficult and delicate task, calling for political tact, cool-headedness and dignity, for we must keep in mind that it is our duty to go and convince those who do not understand us. However, if they keep making difficulties, we won't lick their boots, but will attack them; *we will never smear the name of the Party*. So for the moment avoid all clashes and pointless discussions with Fazlli and other nationalists, and of course, make no concessions but always follow the directives which you and

13 A correct stand towards the nationalists who at that time were influential among various strata of the population, especially in the countryside, was of special importance for the links of the CPA with the people. The CPA effected a differentiation between the sold-out reactionary nationalists and patriotic nationalists. The former were being gradually neutralized and unmasked in the eyes of the people, the latter were being won over to the side of the Party, always taking into account their irresolution and vacillations.

all the comrades will certainly have studied. The talks you have with them should in no way hinder our actions and work; answer their criticism about actions or the partisan emblem as you have done up to now, always keeping your temper. As for Pasho Koloneci who may go over to their side, it would be good if he were with us, and if there were comrades with him. You should keep one thing in mind: our unity will be achieved in struggle. Therefore, if they have succeeded in misleading Pasho, the fault can only be yours, at least in principle, for he does not know the situation in Gora, but if our comrades had known it, perhaps Pasho would not have been confused. Nevertheless, you must win the affection and confidence of the men in the volunteer units, and then Pasho Koloneci will realize from his own experience that caps remain caps and never turn into rifles.

As for Gani¹⁴ we do not know what he has done to be deprived of his command. Certainly you must have had good reasons and acted well, but our opinion is that you should not go too far with Fazlli, until the matter is settled. Gani is not a party member, and certainly he must be an ambitious and worthless person; do not be astonished if they collect the rubbish we throw into the wastepaper basket, and create heroes out of it; they will make a hero of Gani. They will make heroes of Fallo¹⁵ and Fundo, but we will be able to put them in their place, despite the threats of General Fazlli, as you call him. *But, comrades, we will not have to put up with as much as we have put up with so far, so do everything to defend our*

14 Ex-commander of a partisan unit, discharged from his post owing to incompetence and irresolution. He deserted and defected over to the "Balli Kombëtar".

15 Dhimitër Fallo, renegade from the communist movement, representative of the "Balli Kombëtar" and collaborator of the German occupiers.

Party and our struggle, but act with caution on the question of the nationalists.

As far as Fetah¹⁶ is concerned, this is a more delicate matter. Here you should do your utmost to convince him of his wrong path, and that his position (for he has formed a unit(?) and is fighting) is the exact opposite of that of "Zjarri". On the other hand, come down hard on the "Zjarri" group, and expose it mercilessly. The latest copy of "Zëri i Popullit" contains an article¹⁷ on this garbage. Read it and take a determined stand towards the "Zjarri".

For the moment, those comrades will not come, but you should be ready as soon as you are notified, although this may not happen. In any case, we will inform you.

Greetings to all of you

*Taras*¹⁸

Works, vol. 1.

16 Representative of the "Zjarri" group who, despite all attempts of the CPA to bring him into the National Liberation Front, defected together with his band to the "Balli Kombëtar".

17 As a result of the struggle against, and denunciation of this group by the CPA, in March 1943 it was disintegrated. The final blow came from comrade Enver Hoxha in the article, "A Few Words On Some Servants Of Fascism: The 'Zjarri' Group", published in the "Zëri i Popullit", January 1943.

18 One of the pseudonyms comrade Enver Hoxha used during the National Liberation War.

"DIRECTIVES OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL¹ AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION WAR"

*(Report submitted to the meeting of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of Albania)*

[February 1943]

On the eve of World War I the Albanian people were not united to face the new situation being created in Europe. The big imperialist powers, which were embroiled with one another and were preparing the slaughter of the great war, intervened in our country, and thus, there could be no solution to the Albanian question. During this war, part of Albania was invaded by the allies, and part by the central powers and their satellites. The territory of Albania was turned into a battlefield and the Albanian people had to endure great hardships. The imperialists wanted to use them as cannon fodder. After the war, the foreign imperialists again tried to turn the Albanian people into a commodity to bargain over. In particular, Italy, which in 1915 had signed the secret Treaty of London²

1 In December 1942, the CPA received the directives of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on the National Liberation War.

2 The "Treaty of London" was signed in secret on April 26, 1915 between the governments of the Entente (Britain-France-Russia) and Italy. This treaty recognized Italy's full sovereignty over Vlorë, its hinterland and the island of Sazan. Another section of the Albanian territory was assigned to the border states.

which sanctioned its expansion in Albania (a treaty which was made public by the Soviet government), became a threat to the future of the Albanian people, and did not withdraw its armed forces from part of the territory of Albania. Faced with this danger, the Albanian people, with their small forces, began the struggle against the invaders and the traitors. A congress was convened at Lushnja with the genuine representatives of the people, honest patriots, who laid the foundations of Albanian independence and the Albanian state. The Lushnja Congress was the culmination of the efforts and sacrifices of the people, headed by sincere nationalists, and of their national liberation struggle, to gain their political rights. With their revolutionary spirit, the people overthrew the traitorous Durrës government, an instrument of the Italians. The people of the town of Vlora and the peasants of the region took up arms and, together with thousands of volunteers from all over Albania, united by a common ideal — the expulsion of the invader, fought an heroic war and drove the invader into the sea³. This battle left its mark on the Albanian people, instilling in them a profound hatred of the invader.

The popular government in Tirana at that time proved unable to cope with the internal economic, social, and political problems or the international situation. The Albanian youth began to organize. The "Bashkimi"⁴ association was set up with the aim of fighting the treacherous reactionaries within the country and the imperialist

3 Reference here is to the war against Italy in 1920.

4 The "Bashkimi" association was created by revolutionary patriots and democrats in October 1922. It carried out an all-sided political activity to mobilize the masses of the people in the struggle for the democratization of the country and played an outstanding role in organizing the June 1924 Democratic Revolution which toppled the government of Ahmet Zog, the feudal landowner.

threat from abroad. Formed by the most conscious elements devoted to the national cause, it strove to guide the people in a popular and democratic spirit, to educate them politically to defend their economic, social and political interests. The reaction, assisted by foreign imperialism, violently overthrew the government and seized power, establishing the personal bashibazouk dictatorship of Ahmet Zog⁵ and his clique. The reactionary system of Zog's regime and its subsequent links with Italy aroused discontent among the Albanian patriots who, together with those who had emigrated abroad, attempted through uprisings to overthrow Zog and avert the danger from Italy, but, unfortunately, all their attempts failed, for they did not have the support of the masses of the people. The leaders of these movements often lacked the necessary determination, did not organize the movements on a large scale, or prepare the people, who hated Zog's regime and fascist Italy. The threat of Italian fascism was becoming greater and greater, and the Albanian people had no desire to suffer the same misfortune as Abyssinia and Spain. Fascist Italy, using treachery and force, and profiting from the erroneous policy of the then Albanian government, which had linked its fate with that of Italy, enslaved our country. The Albanian people met Italian fascism with bullets. On April 7th 1939, at Durrës, Vlora, Saranda and Shëngjin, Albanian blood was shed in defence of our country. The youth, the people, fought an unequal battle

5 In December 1924, Zog's counter-revolutionary forces, coming mainly from Yugoslavia, backed up directly by the imperialists, and reactionary Serbian and White Russian troops, toppled Fan Noli's government which had emerged from the June Democratic Revolution. Zog's dictatorship was re-established to oppress and exploit the masses of the people. In April 1939 Zog sabotaged the organization of the resistance of the Albanian people against the Italian fascist occupiers, grabbed all the gold and fled abroad.

against the invader. The Albanian people understood very well why fascism had come to Albania; they were well aware of its imperialist arms; they remembered the atrocities, sufferings, crimes and internments of 1920. They knew that it was the fault of the fascists that, during Zog's regime, through economic and political treaties which were imposed on them, the country's economy, commerce, agriculture and animal husbandry were ruined. With the coming of fascist Italy to Albania, looting, corruption, moral suffering, internment, jailing and killing recommenced on a larger scale. Italian fascism took control of the Albanian state apparatus and Italianized it. Everywhere, especially in leading posts, Italian functionaries replaced Albanian officials who were reduced to puppets with no responsibility. They began to Italianize the schools, the basis of the education of the Albanian youth. Albanian justice was replaced by extraordinary military tribunals. The Albanian police force and army were suppressed. The administration was turned into an instrument in the hands of the carabinieri and the Luogotenenza to oppress the Albanian people. Italian companies poured their capital into Albania; trade and means of transport were mobilized. Banks and agricultural societies speculated on the sweat and toil of the working people and took over the land of the Albanian peasant. In short, fascism took complete control of the Albanian state and the wealth of the country. That is the balance-sheet of the fascist activity in our country. That is why the Albanian people hate the invader. That is why the Albanian people have begun their resistance to defend their vital rights, a resistance expressed in different forms: propaganda, agitation, strikes, demonstrations, sabotage and fighting by partisan units. The youth were the first to begin the struggle, placing themselves in the front ranks of the National Liberation War of the Albanian people

against the invaders. The Albanian people have understood that only through struggle can they avert the danger of the Albanian nation being wiped off the face of the earth by Italian fascism; they have understood that only through the National Liberation War can they achieve their freedom. This has been understood by both young and old. When given the opportunity, our people have never failed to demonstrate their hatred for the invaders openly and to strike blows at them: moral blows, in sabotaging their lying propaganda spread by the Albanian Fascist Party and the Luogotenenza, and death blows against their apparatus of oppression and their military machine, through sabotage actions. The Albanian people have always been ready to make any sacrifice. All they need is resolute leadership. There are concrete examples of this: the demonstrations of November 28, 1939, those of November 28, 1941 and 1942, the sabotaging of the war against Greece⁶, the April 7 demonstrations, the Tirana and Korça demonstrations against fascism and its attempt to divide the people, the demonstrations for bread, and, especially, the recent demonstrations against the Vlorë reprisals, which were held in Tirana, Durrës, Kavaja, and Elbasan, the protest demonstrations over the death of the martyr Shenasi Dishnica in Tirana and Fier (shops were closed, clerks left their offices, students deserted their schools, workers walked off their jobs, and all

⁶ In October 1940 the Italian troops, setting out from Albania, attacked Greece. Far from sympathizing with the fascist aggression against Greece, the Albanian people did their best to aid the fraternal Greek people in their liberation war. The work of the Albanian communists and patriots brought about the complete failure of the fascist plan to mobilize the Albanians for this war. The Albanian soldiers who were sent to the Greek Front by the Italian fascists at the point of bayonet, refused to fight and deserted in groups. The Albanian people carried out sabotage activities in the rear of the Italian army.

joined together in anti-fascist demonstrations). In Skrapar and Vlora, the peasants, together with the partisan units, fought the fascist forces.

Fascist terror has not succeeded in intimidating the Albanian people, on the contrary their hatred for the invaders and traitors is increasing still more. The National Liberation War is gradually assuming a general character. The fascists are taking a thrashing in both town and countryside.

In the struggle the Albanian people are waging today, the principal guiding role is played by the Communist Party which has taken an active part in this struggle and has not remained a spectator watching the movement of the popular masses. The communists have always stood in the front ranks, and the blood they have shed is proof of their determination in this struggle of the Albanian people. The Communist Party has become the driving force of the popular movement against the invaders and traitors. Since its founding, the Party has explained to the people the activities and aims of fascism in Albania. The people, who up to then had not had a party giving correct leadership, embraced the Communist Party slogans and directives, adopted them, and on this basis, began their struggle. Prior to the founding of the Communist Party, neither the communists nor the honest nationalists were in a position to set the people in motion and lead them in the struggle against fascism. The movement lacked the organizational work which is indispensable in order to fight Italian fascism properly. . .

The Communist International had long been interested in communist activities in our country. After 1924, some young political emigrées went to the Soviet Union to be educated and to become communist militants, so that, when they returned to their country, they could become pioneers in the revolutionary movement of the Albanian

people against foreign imperialism and local feudalism. But most of those who came back to Albania neglected those tasks, forgot the lofty mission the international proletariat had charged them with. Some of them became opportunists and social-democrats, and through their preaching, behaviour and activity, discredited communist work in the eyes of the people. The people expected sound advice and genuine communist activity from them. Others created cliques and instilled the group spirit into the minds of young communists eager for action. Only one comrade, Ali Kelmendi, who laid down his life for the communist cause and whose name all of us communists must hold in high regard, propagated the correct line of the Communist International. He, and only he, carried out his task as a communist pioneer should do. Everywhere he went, he knew how to make contact with the masses and set up circles of sympathizers. In Korça he laid the basis for the organization of genuine communist activity, setting the workers in motion.

On another occasion, too, the Communist International sent directives⁷, but unfortunately they were not implemented, for at that time there were groups with divergent opinions, and the communists were politically unprepared, so that some did not accept the directives at all while others accepted them but failed to implement them. So we see that, at that time, the directives were sabotaged because they did not find favourable soil. Today the Communist International is sending us its directives for the second time, but this time they find us united, with sound leading cadres and a correct and definite political line; in a word, they find us prepared and strong. But to attain this situation the Communist Party had to travel

⁷ This refers to the directives of the Communist International to the Albanian communist movement in 1937.

a difficult road. The Communist Party of Albania had to unite the different groups, eliminate the weak elements, those infected by the group spirit, the factionalists, the opportunists and the laggards, it had to educate the comrades with a sound political line in the spirit of Lenin and Stalin, link them with the masses of the people and carry out concrete actions (strikes, demonstrations, sabotage, actions by partisan units, agitation and propaganda, etc.) against the occupier. The Communist Party has become the main pillar of the National Liberation War of the Albanian people against Italian fascism. The Communists are shedding their blood in this war. The Communist Party has succeeded in dispelling all doubts about final victory, doubts sown by the occupiers, the traitors and the fifth column through their lying propaganda and their terror. The Communist Party is a party born in struggle: in the struggle of the groups and in that against the occupier. In this struggle on two fronts the communist comrades acquired experience in ideological and practical struggle, and thus were able to find the true communist road. This struggle has purified, consolidated, and extended the ranks of the Party, making it monolithic and capable of guiding our people's movement against the occupiers.

Seeing the good work done by our Party, the Communist International has recognized it as one of its members. The efforts of our comrades have not been in vain. We have been recognized precisely because we acted on the basis of the directives of the Communist International which today, through its official recognition of our Communist Party, validates our communist activity. This recognition is of particular importance today, for it is granted in time of war, in a very difficult period, and the Communist Party has succeeded in winning this right through its reliable, sound and correct activity, and the

blood shed by its members. We should be proud of this, because it shows that we have won a right we have earned. But there are also duties which stem from this right, our most important duty being to strengthen the party ranks with sound cadres and to act on the basis of the directives of the Communist International. We must be resolute in our activity, for war is waged with deeds, not with words. Our enemies are strong, and we must know how to combat them and be ready for this struggle. We must eliminate all opportunist elements, be they social-democrats, factionalists, Trotskyites, or saboteurs of the directives coming from higher organs and from the Communist International. We must keep an eye on the "Zjarri" elements and those like Z.F. and A.Q. These elements who parrot communist slogans are much more dangerous than the overt enemy. They cause disruption among the communist comrades and mistrust in the directives of the Party. Their anti-Leninist and anti-Stalinist slogans run counter to the present line of the Communist International, cause splits in the united National Liberation Front, and divide the communists from the nationalists. They are against the National Liberation War of the Albanian nation, and with their extremist and anti-Marxist slogans introduce into nationalist circles the suspicion that the communists are not fighting for the liberation of Albania, but only for communism. They do not recognize the common struggle that the Soviet Union is now waging, together with the great democracies and the other oppressed nations; they do not acknowledge the coalition of the whole world against fascism, against the most dangerous and barbarous imperialism the world has ever seen. Following this political line they become instruments of the invader. No agreement can be reached with them, but they must be unmasked and condemned by the people as the traitors that they are.

We can no longer allow shelter to be given within our Party to elements who want to harm the activity of the Party, who want to hinder the Party's advance in the National Liberation War of the Albanian people. We must be vigilant and ruthless towards those elements which try to hinder the activity of the Party. Such elements deserve our most severe condemnation.

Now we can no longer make mistakes and fail to apply the directives coming from the higher organs, in which, today more than ever, we must have the utmost confidence. Today we are responsible for our actions not only to the Albanian people, but also to the international proletariat, to the Communist International. Only a party politically organized and educated in this way can be worthy to bear the title of member of the Communist International. This depends on us, on our communist activity.

The directives the Communist International has sent us are as follows:

- 1) Organize and develop the National Liberation War of the Albanian people against the Italians and Germans.
- 2) Create and consolidate the National Liberation Front, bringing in all patriots, and avoiding, for the moment, all slogans that go beyond the framework of the National Liberation War of Albania.
- 3) Bring into the leadership of the partisan war, besides communists, as many sincere Albanian patriots and nationalists as possible.

Analysing these directives, we see that they show us the path we must now follow and our immediate tasks; they open wide prospects for us to penetrate among the masses and to mobilize all the Albanian people against the invader. We must organize and wage this war together with the people, for our Party is a party of the people, which has in its program the defence of their in-

terests. We must mobilize the people, set them in motion and direct all their energies against a definite common aim, against the occupier. The National Liberation War is not a war of cadres, but a war of the masses of the people inspired and led by the Party. Here we see that the Communist Party, as the vanguard of this war, as the most conscious section of the Albanian people, together with the conscious and resolute nationalists, has a delicate task, that of leading the entire people. The Party has placed the National Liberation War at the top of its program, and exerts all its energies to develop, organize and lead all the anti-fascist forces of our people against the Italian and German occupiers. The people hate the occupiers, and we must mobilize them, together with all the nationalists of different political trends, and neutralize all those forces that we cannot mobilize. No reserve of forces should remain in the hands of the occupiers. They must be isolated and fought with the greatest fury, and for this purpose we should turn the people's hatred into an open fight against fascism. The Albanian people love freedom, and throughout their history have never spared themselves, as we said before, in the fight against foreign imperialism which tried to enslave our country. They hate Italian fascism as their direct enemy, and also German nazism as an enemy that collaborates with the former. Both must be exposed. From the beginning the Communist Party of Albania understood the importance of the National Liberation War for the people's political education and liberation from fascism. But, in order to achieve this objective, we must first break the chains imposed on our people by fascism, and these chains can be broken only through the National Liberation War which unites all the fighting forces of the people. The Bolshevik Revolution, Stalin teaches us, would never have triumphed if the Russian proletariat had not enjoyed the sympathy and

aid of the peoples oppressed by the Czarist regime. But in order to win this sympathy and aid they had first to break their chains and escape from under the heel of Czarist imperialism, their common enemy. This made possible the establishment of the Soviet regime and the creation of that marvellous organization of cooperation of all peoples, which is called the USSR. Today, too, if the oppressed peoples do not combat fascism, their common enemy, their most dangerous foe, they will never gain their liberty, and the international proletariat will never carry out its revolution. Likewise, the Albanian people will never be able to gain their liberty if they do not first eliminate fascism, the common enemy that oppresses the peasant, the worker, the intellectual, the merchant, and the small capitalist, in a word, the people. The Communist Party of Albania will never be able to carry out its maximum program if it does not first destroy fascism which oppresses the people, hampers their economic and political development, and denies them freedom.

That is the significance of the National Liberation War to the Albanian people and the Communist Party of Albania.

The National Liberation War is organized and waged through mobilizing the people on concrete current issues, issues which directly concern them and come up in their everyday life, issues for which they are ready to make any sacrifice. All their attention, all their will-power, and all their energies should be concentrated on one clear objective, and reflected with all their characteristics in the fight against barbarous and enslaving fascism, against its lackeys, the traitors, against fascism which robs the people of their harvest, their land, their goods, their homes and their trade, and leaves them starving.

The mobilization of all the patriotic forces should be carried out from below and from above.

In the mobilization from below the peasantry should occupy the first place. It is the most numerous class of our people, and the class that knows the greatest suffering, in daily danger of being impoverished by fascism which seizes the harvest and the land. Many times fascism has exploited the peasants, taking advantage of their ignorance, as a reserve force against the National Liberation War (e.g. for the militia, the bashibazouk forces, etc.). The peasantry should become the backbone of the war. Its forces are enormous, but in order to set them in motion, the war must be explained to the peasants so that they understand. We have not worked as much as we should with the peasants, have not made a great effort to go to the countryside and ask the peasants about their problems, as we should do. We have worked in the centers, but not in the districts and villages, which in many areas have been neglected altogether. Whenever we have gone and worked correctly, we have gained their sympathy and the greatest help. Our peasant is good, honest, and revolutionary, so long as we know where to touch his feelings to awaken his interest in the National Liberation War. We must explain that fascism is the cause of all his sufferings today, and only when it is wiped out, will the peasant be able to improve his economic position.

We have not known how to gather in and organize the masses of workers. The Communist Party of Albania should be a party of workers and peasants who are the most resolute elements supporting our cause. In order to mobilize the workers, we must come close to them, live among them, lead their life, and together with them advance against fascism. The worker suffers under fascism which leaves him without work, throws him into the street and today, more than ever, leaves him starving. There are great possibilities for work with the working class, for it is the class which, more than any other, feels

the necessity of the National Liberation War. It must play an active and leading role.

The intellectuals regard our movement sympathetically but some of them are opportunists, and often they have become tools of the occupiers, attracted by "the good life", but we must not forget that some of them are at the head of the movement and are resolute in the fight against fascism. Fascism has suppressed genuine intellectualism. The intellectual who demands freedom of thought and freedom of action should be the first to break the chains of fascism, which poisons the mind and corrupts the spirit. As yet the intellectuals have no clear idea of our movement, and our task is to get close to them, to explain what they are hazy about, to show them the true road which an honest Albanian intellectual should follow today. We should channel the energies of our intellectuals, which are often dissipated and lacking definite direction, and turn them against a specific target, against fascism, which is the greatest enemy of the development of the mind.

The youth have become the standard-bearers of the war today. They were the first to shake off the yoke of the invader. Their youthful spirit could not endure the stifling and corrupting atmosphere which fascism wanted to impose on them. They did not want to become tools of the invader. They have never flinched, and everywhere they have thrown themselves into struggle with zeal and unmatched selflessness. They have made the greatest sacrifices and provided the heroes of a new Albanian epic. The fight for the liberation of the Fatherland is deeply implanted in their hearts and has become their faith, their ideal.

The youth of the urban centers and, above all, the school youth are almost totally mobilized. Instead of corrupting them and causing them to degenerate, the fascist

education had the opposite effect: they revolted and exposed the lying fascist propaganda which was trying to destroy their national feelings.

The working youth, today ruthlessly exploited by the fascist system, have not been adequately rallied and organized, although they are always ready to take part in any action, displaying determination and proletarian discipline.

In general the peasant youth have lagged behind, and this is the fault of party members who have not been interested in them and have underestimated their importance. The peasant youth must play a major role in the partisan war; together with the peasant women, they will be the freedom-fighters' most reliable auxiliary.

The Albanian women are oppressed by fascism, by bourgeois and feudal traditions and laws; they, more than anyone else, sympathize with our struggle, in which they also see their own liberation; they are ready to make any sacrifice for their husbands, their brothers and their sons who are fighting. With their aid, in their role as nurses, as well as fighting with guns, as they are doing in the Soviet Union, they will play a major role in the National Liberation War. We must form an anti-fascist united front of the Albanian women. Just as our women comrades are working, so the women of the people should also work, for they, too, feel strongly about this war.

Mobilization from above can be achieved by uniting with all anti-fascist political trends. After the Italians came to Albania, some nationalists remained more or less passive towards the spread of fascist influence, but others took an active stand against fascism, supporting the movement of national liberation initiated by the youth, who showed the first signs of active resistance with their demonstrations. The war between Italy and Greece ruined the reputation of the fascist power in the eyes of the peo-

ple and the nationalists, who began to understand the anti-fascist movement more clearly. With the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, the imperialist war unleashed by fascism took on a different character, that of a liberation war. The Soviet Union was waging a war in defense of its territories, and its resistance to the Germans aroused great hopes of victory among the oppressed nations. The Communist Party of Albania began an open struggle against the occupier, and the honest nationalists resolutely aided this struggle. The nationalists saw that the only way to save Albania was for the Albanian people to unite and fight the invader, as other oppressed nations were doing, and that this war would run parallel to that waged by the Soviet Union and the great democracies. The former slogan: "The time has not come", which had become the motto of some self-styled nationalists, was done away with. The Communist Party began the fight and made great advances. Its slogans won the sympathy of the people because they expressed their aspirations. Certain nationalists accused us of extremism, alleging that we were going too far to the left, and some of them used this point to justify their failure to take an active part in the National Liberation War together with the Communist Party. The sincere nationalists had sympathies with our Party, our movement and our determination to fight fascism. As for the slogans over which they accused us of extremism, the Communist Party launched them for the following reasons:

- 1) — to strengthen the cadres who had just emerged from the struggle of groups, so that they would form a more genuinely communist consciousness;

- 2) — to explain to the people what communism is, what is the Soviet Union, the Red Army, and comrade Stalin, because the communists of the different groups had worked in disguise and communist work had not been po-

polarized. This popularization was necessary to eradicate from people's minds all the anti-communist prejudices that the bourgeois class and fascism had indoctrinated them with, so that the people would gain confidence in the victory of the peoples of the Soviet Union and take the example of the Soviet Union as the basis of their National Liberation War.

Gradually the international situation changed in favour of the allies. Within Albania sabotage and combat actions by partisan units (the first action being at Skrapar) were started. The national liberation struggle gained momentum. The situation was ripe for the creation of a united National Liberation Front, which found the support of the more resolute section of nationalists. On the initiative of the Party, delegates came from all parts of Albania, representing all trends of Albanian nationalism, the Communist Party of Albania, the Communist Youth and the Young Albanian Women, guided by the lofty aim of the liberation of Albania from the yoke of fascist Italy and the local traitors who had sold out to the foreigners. After careful examination of the situation internationally and in Albania, and in particular, being aware of the common desire and the need for the organization of all the energies of the people and for their total unity in the National Liberation War, they elected the (Provisional) National Liberation General Council which undertook to set up councils in all regions. This conference⁸ had great significance, for it united the people in struggle against the occupiers. We must continue the example of Peza. This was the first step, and now we must take the second, if we are to advance. That was our first contact with the nationalists, and it was of great benefit. The popular masses were

⁸ This refers to the Peza Conference convened on September 16, 1942.

set in motion, the nationalists, previously inactive, began to come closer to us and to sympathize with our movement. Our circle of sympathizers and friends widened, and the movement became broader and assumed a general character. Many disagreements and misunderstandings between the nationalists and the Communist Party had been cleared up, and the people no longer regard communism as a bogey or consider communists as "men without a country", as the fascists like to make out. This was the first step in the creation of a united front in an organized form. This was a great political success for the Communist Party, although it was not as firm as it should have been, because not all the nationalists agreed among themselves, and some of them had doubts about the victory of the Anti-fascist Front (over the German summer offensive).

The councils are of great importance to the war. They are the most democratic organs, and mobilize all the people, of whatever category or trend, in the struggle against fascism.

This is how the resolution of the Peza Conference defines them:

"In the unliberated areas, the councils are organs of struggle. They unite all the people's liberation forces, carry out agitation and propaganda, direct the political struggle against the occupiers, mobilize the masses of the people for the liberation war and, at the same time, mobilize all the material provisions needed for the war; the councils will be councils of the broad masses, which will rally the great bulk of the people. The councils secure arms and food supplies for the partisans and the freedom-fighters. They popularize the National Liberation War, pass on information on enemy movements, enemy strength, etc. The councils set up the press, organize propaganda and agitation, organize sabotage actions (refusing to hand over grain, tithes, wool, etc., opposing any interference by the

occupiers through their banks, companies, monopolies, and agricultural companies). Organized struggle against the Agricultural Bank, against companies which try to rob the peasant of his land, struggle against those who grant land and various concessions to the Italians, struggle against all the agents profiting at the people's expense through the intermediary of the invader. The councils denounce all the profiteers and intermediaries of the invader, popularize the general insurrection as a final stage, as an outcome of the partisan struggle, and organize and prepare the public, men, women and young people.

In the liberated territories, the national liberation councils carry out the functions of government (excluding military affairs), maintain law and order, make war on traitors, control the movement of people, fight crime, theft, etc. In cooperation with the military organs, the councils combat the fifth column, look after the economy and food supplies for the population, organize trade and finance, provide food and other necessities for the partisan and volunteer⁹ units, see to the development of education and carry out educational work among the people, reproduce propaganda and agitational materials, and acquire the necessary technical equipment, such as printing presses, radios, etc. People are mobilized politically for the National Liberation War, the councils are consolidating their strength, and combatting every enemy and every danger. These councils deal with some minor legal matters and, in particular, should try to settle blood feuds, the more so at a time when we are fighting against the

⁹ Following the Peza Conference, besides the partisan units, territorial volunteer units were also set up in the liberated areas. They were irregular units of self-defence which took up arms at every call by the partisan units to attack enemy forces or to resist enemy operations. They served also as the source to fill the ranks of the regular partisan units.

occupation of our country. *The national liberation councils are very important.* Through them the country is governed, and the people are mobilized for the struggle and the armed uprising. That is why they are important”.

Thus we see that the Communist Party of Albania has precisely implemented the directives of the Communist International on the setting up and consolidation of the National Liberation Front with the participation of all Albanian patriots, although complete success has not been attained. Only when we succeed in organizing all the masses of the people can we say that we have fulfilled the directive of the Comintern. Today there is a group of nationalists called “Balli Kombëtar”. They are people of all political trends, but they do not yet have a sound organization. Among them there are men of the people who really want to fight fascism, who have understood the importance of the National Liberation War, but there are also others who have no real determination, and more or less side with opportunists and the occupiers. Our task is to have discussions with them, to persuade them to collaborate in direct struggle against the invader.

There are nationalists who are isolated and have not yet understood the National Liberation War. We must approach them, explain our struggle to them and persuade them to join the fight.

There are also the Zogites; with them, too, we must carry out a policy of rapprochement and cooperation.

There is the Catholic clergy; they are organized and constitute a political force more or less under the influence of the occupiers. Our task is to approach those elements who have understood the infamous role of the occupiers and are determined to fight them, extending our hand to them and convincing them to cooperate.

And we have the “Zjarri” group which has already been discussed.

There are the pro-Germans who play the role of fifth columnists and splitters of the National Liberation Front. We must expose them as fascists, as traitors who have sold out to the enemy.

So we see that the range is broad and that intelligent, determined, and resolute work is called for. The communists should take an active part in this struggle and explain to everyone why they are fighting. They speak a sincere and truthful language which is understood by all: they are fighting for national liberation against a common enemy, fascism, for the self-determination of the people, for a democratic people's Albania. We must not come out with extremist slogans, slogans of the communist revolution, but with slogans about national liberation, for otherwise we will cause splits in the united front. Today the communists are fighting for the freedom of Albania, and not for communism. At present we put forward national liberation slogans, without losing the individuality of the Party. We must popularize our activities, our heroes, and the Soviet Union, as the vanguard of the liberation struggle of the oppressed nations. Our slogans should be broad, meaningful and clear, but always within the framework of the national liberation struggle. Here are some examples :

Long live the unity of the Albanian people in the struggle against the occupiers and local traitors!

Death to the fascist occupier and the traitors to our country !

Out with the fascist invader!

Long live the fraternal union of the Albanian people against the invader!

Long live the fraternity of the oppressed peoples and their struggle against the invader!

Long live the Volunteer Partisan Army of National Liberation!

Long live the great anti-fascist alliance!

Long live the Anti-fascist National Liberation Front!

Long live free democratic Albania!

Long live the National Liberation General Council!

Long live the CPA, the true fighter for the liberation of Albania!

Long live the Soviet Union, the standard-bearer of the fight against fascism for the liberation of the oppressed nations!

These are the slogans of national liberation, broad slogans which, nevertheless, differ from those of the national chauvinists, and the Party does not lose its individuality. We must arouse the liveliest interest in our slogans and our struggle among the broad strata of the population (peasants, workers, etc). When people ask us what the Communist Party is, what communism is and how will it be established here in Albania, we must give our communist answer, explaining their ills and how they can be remedied. We are not opportunists and have by no means forgotten our long term tasks, but before we reach that stage, we must carry out our most immediate task, the National Liberation War.

The Party's role in this war should be to inspire and lead it, not with words and decrees, but through practical work, penetrating deep among the masses, concerning itself with their everyday problems, and making an approach to the nationalists. In the first place the communists should be courageous, resolute, and equipped with a clear-cut political line on the problems that are concerning our people now. The Party is the main pillar of the National Liberation War, but the honest and resolute nationalists should take an active part in the leadership of this movement. The Communist Party, together with the nationalists, in a single anti-fascist bloc, with a definite line and objectives, will lead the people in the struggle against the

invader. The present political situation, both external and internal, is very favourable to close cooperation with the nationalists. On the Soviet front the Red Army is emerging stronger than ever. Its offensive is assuming great and catastrophic proportions for German nazism and its running dogs. Everywhere in Europe the oppressed nations are gaining their breath and beginning to rise. The puppet governments and the traitors are trembling at the knees. In the Mediterranean the fascist empire has crumbled, the allied forces are on the point of liquidating the Italian and German forces in Tunisia, and the threat to Italy is becoming closer and more grave. There have been great changes in the internal situation. Unable to cope with the situation created by the National Liberation War of the Albanian people, Mustafa Kruja's government, a government of fascist terror, has resigned. Fascism is losing control of the situation and killing its own people. It is resorting to reprisals, hoping that through terror it may stop the struggle against it. But here too it is bankrupt, for the people are not intimidated (witnesses the recent demonstrations). The new government, urged on by the Luogotenenza, is trying to split the united front by means of compromises. These are symptoms of the weakness of Italian fascism and the traitors. Our people have understood what their game is, and are more determined than ever to fight the enemy. The recent demonstrations prove that the people are united and ready to fight. This impulse towards collaboration, which comes from below, will certainly influence those nationalists who are hanging back and dragging matters out unendingly. If we work correctly, unity from below will automatically bring unity from above, too, and thus the liberation struggle will assume a general character.

This war is being waged by guerrilla units, and partisan and volunteer units. The role of the partisan units is

colossal. One of the sources they draw on is the members of the Party. The communists are in the front rank, but a unit should include as many men and women of the people and nationalists as possible; it is not an army of the Party, but of the people. There is a cell and a political commissar in a unit, but this does not mean that the partisan unit should remain a unit of cadres. In the unit communists fight not only with the rifles but also with the pen, through agitation, propaganda and conferences. The unit mobilizes the population, mobilizes the peasants and defends their interests. The communists should play a leadership role at the grass-roots of the National Liberation War, but through conviction, firmness, discipline and political clarity, and not through adventurism, so as to gain the sympathy of all the members of the unit and of the people of the district where they are operating. The unit should have a popular character, and to achieve this, the directive says, we must bring into the leadership of the partisan struggle as many honest Albanian patriots and nationalists as possible. At the Peza Conference it was agreed that the General Staff would emerge in the course of the war from the communist and nationalist elements determined to fight. The Party has organized some units, but these do not include sufficient nationalists. These units should be of the people, and all those who want to fight, without distinction of political trends, should be brought into them. From these units we will pass on later to the stage of a people's army when the war will be waged with army corps. Honest nationalists should be included in the supreme command in order to give the movement a general character. The communists should not maintain reservations about this. The people know who the communists are, and that they declare themselves openly; they should have no hesitation towards the resolute nationalists,

but, on the contrary, among fighters for a common cause the greatest sincerity should exist. The common struggle and the blood we shed together will strengthen our trust in one another, and take us forward to the people's victory against the occupiers. So we see that the tasks of the communists are great, and what is required of them is deeds, not words. In order to carry out all these directives which the Communist International sends us, we must be well-organized, have clear views, and expel from the Party all those who do not understand the line of the National Liberation War and who sabotage these directives. Without establishing a united front victory is impossible, and without this front fascism would isolate us and then find the opportunity to annihilate us. These directives, which aim to bring the nationalists closer to us, and not to alienate them from us, should be implemented to the letter. We should expose and fight only those who play the game of the occupiers. Our stand and our political line towards the nationalists should be such that our slogans are never offensive to their ideas and principles. We must realize that our present and future depend on the National Liberation War, and that without it we could not continue our advance, but would be destroyed. These directives should be implemented to the letter, for there is danger of fratricide, of the people being split into two camps, one communist and the other nationalist; this is the greatest harm we could cause our people, our Party, and the cause we are fighting for. The fascists want to divide us, and this they are striving to achieve; they know very well that not even the most barbarous measures, reprisals, and so on, can intimidate and defeat a united people determined to fight. Therefore, we must show the greatest determination in implementing these very clear and correct directives sent by the Communist International, in the certainty that, if we

carry them out, we will always advance, the Party will grow stronger, we will annihilate fascism, the people will win their freedom, and tomorrow we will be in a position to carry out our maximum program.

Works, vol. 1.

**LETTER TO THE KORÇA REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ALBANIA ON THE
DISSOLUTION OF THE "ZJARRI" GROUP AND
THE EDUCATION OF ITS MEMBERS**

March 7, 1943

Dear comrades,

This deals with the matter of the "Zjarri" group. We inform you of the following, and ask you to act as indicated.

The "Zjarri" group has surrendered to the Party unconditionally. This has come about because of the pressure exerted by group members on their leaders, and because the latter saw that the work they were doing was of a factional nature. Their existence as a group led them to catastrophe. This constitutes a success for the Party because it is liquidating the group and incorporating into its ranks communists who had been led on a wrong line and who should be educated to become good communists.

We have often spoken about the "Zjarri" group which was indeed a group with a line that was wrong from both the political and organizational points of view. There were various reasons for this, but the main one was that it had no knowledge of the way to work.

"Zjarri" (Andrea Zisi) introduced alien ideas into his group and committed grave political errors, among others in regard to the National Liberation War. He tried to hide behind a mask of rotten nationalism, tried to establish relations with M. Kruja, and made other mistakes similar to

these, which caused his organizational errors. By hiding himself and by not leaving himself independent, and by reaching a compromise with M. Kruja, from this wrong view of the National Liberation War, he left the group tagging along behind the "Balli Kombëtar" movement, and it was "Zjarri" members, as they¹ have admitted themselves, who initiated the formation of the "Balli Kombëtar".

"Zjarri" deceived his comrades about certain connections (with the Greek Communist Party) which, if they existed, he distorted and misdirected in order to achieve his sinister aims, such as, for example, his agreement with M. Kruja. But it is probable that the connections "Zjarri" claimed to have with the Greek Communist Party were only a hoax to mislead people.

The comrades who believed in these connections of "Zjarri" and in the line he had laid down, have made mistakes.

a — *On the unity of the communists in Albania.* From both the Party and the "Zjarri" group there had been a demand for an approach to unity, but this was sabotaged by "Zjarri" (Andrea Zisi). When he made contact with three of our comrades², errors were committed by both parties in appointing one person to maintain liaisons between the Party and the group³.

This way of acting and maintaining contacts was quite wrong and the Central Committee repudiated it, but the comrades did not inform the "Zjarri" group of that decision. So no links were maintained with them.

1 The members of the "Zjarri" group.

2 The 1st meeting of the representatives of the CPA and the "Zjarri" group to discuss the merger took place in January 1943.

3 The "Zjarri" group.

b — *On the line of work with the nationalists.* They have acted objectively in such a way as to prevent collaboration with the sincere nationalists who wanted unity in the National Liberation War. They have contributed to the formation of the "Balli Kombëtar", and this prevented the achievement of cooperation between the honest nationalists and the Party, making it seem as though there were two types of communists: savage fighting communists and peace-loving communists, and allowing the communist principles to be drowned by right-wing nationalism; they have formed their separate armed units at a time when there are partisan units in Albania which constitute a genuine army of the people; they have adopted various nationalist slogans and have published materials full of errors. They have created their own central committee and regional committees, as well as three-member cells; all these steps were wrong because the Party, based on the principles of Lenin and Stalin, was in existence.

The comrades should always keep all this in mind, whatever may be our stand towards these young comrades who will enter the Party and will be incorporated in its ranks.

First of all, our old experience should help us greatly in this matter. The comrades who will join our ranks are at the stage we were at in the time of the groups.

Our Party has been cured of that disease, and comrades are in a position to cure and to raise to their own level these new comrades who come from a group we were fighting, who are at a very low political and organizational level; they have been misled and still do not really know anything about the Party and love for it, but the majority of them want communism, are communists and love the Party.

What were the weapons the Party used to cure the comrades infected by the spirit of groups? Initially they

were persuasion and explanation, arousing in the hearts of the comrades love for the Party, love for their comrades, for discipline and secrecy, ending personal connections in organizational matters, maintaining the highest vigilance to prevent dangerous elements from establishing themselves, and finally, purging our ranks of wavering, anti-party, and factionalist elements, and others infected by the group spirit.

This is how we will act with these new comrades who need every possible explanation, advice and support. We must explain over and over again to the comrades who will come, what the Party is, what is discipline, and secrecy, what are cells, what are the organizational links and *line of the Party, the line of the National Liberation War, the directives of the Communist International*. And this should be done with the greatest clarity, with the greatest patience, and with full conviction, for in these things, as well as in their organizational line, they were quite wrong. They should be given every opportunity to raise their theoretical and political understanding, putting all the materials of the Party at their disposal for their education. *They should be convinced, convinced and again convinced. And in addition, the comrades should keep their eyes wide open. They should be vigilant to defend the Party as the apple of their eye, to safeguard its unity and the integrity of its ranks and to cut off all possible threats.*

The new comrades should be put to work, should be taught how to work, and we should demand results. In a word, we must be sure guides and true communists, who are concerned to raise the level of good comrades, to correct those who are mistaken, and to eliminate anti-party elements.

As we have noted, this group initiated the setting up of the "Balli Kombëtar", and some of its members have worked under the guise of nationalists.

How should they act now? Those group members who are in the "Balli Kombëtar" will continue to work as a faction within the "Balli Kombëtar", and this faction will try, together with the revolutionary nationalists in the organization, to get the "Balli Kombëtar" to accept close cooperation with the Party and to agree to participate in the national liberation councils; they will try to organize a big conference, with the participation of the Party, the "Balli Kombëtar" and the sincere non-party nationalists, and above all, our faction should shake up the "Balli Kombëtar" to make it participate directly in the war against the occupiers. Within the ranks of the "Balli Kombëtar", they should combat all the advocates of compromise, neutralize the lazy and the cowardly, and encourage the armed detachments of the "Balli Kombëtar" to fraternize with ours in all matters. Within the "Balli", they should insist on the creation of a single command for the National Liberation War. They should combat the opinion of the "Balli Kombëtar" reactionaries regarding the formation of the army and gendarmerie, because the people's army and gendarmerie are formed in the mountains, and not in the barracks of fascism. This is how our Party should work there; as for the other questions, there is no need to discuss them; the work should carry on in a well organized way.

How will you take over the group? Their so-called central committee is discussing the question with their comrades, and after they have informed the regions through those in charge of their work, they will give us lists of all their connections in every locality, and then we will send you a password so that you may contact the person in charge of the group of your region.

This person in charge will hand over his "army", with its arms and "bagagli"*. It would be a good thing for one

* Bagagli (It. in the original) — equipment.

of our comrades to go to these cells and wind up their activities; you should convince the person you come into contact with of the need for this. Otherwise you should closely examine the list of the comrades which is handed over to you, and if you have any doubts, discuss them with him or them, convincing them that, if the work is to go well, it is always necessary to aim at quality rather than quantity, and explaining to them that those whose minds are not made up can remain in educational groups at present and join the Party later if they are good people. Tell whoever is in charge of them that it is better to keep a comrade in an educational group for a while than to expel him from the Party, and at the same time, stress that responsibility rests with the person in charge, for he knows his comrades. With the comrades who come to us, form cells of 6 or 7 people, including among them 2 or 3 of our comrades, who should be good comrades determined to work in the way we have outlined.

The new comrades who come should not be allocated to the existing cells.

As from now, suspend all polemics and criticism against them, and fraternize with them until they are incorporated into our ranks.

Read this letter carefully, to avoid making mistakes.

Comradely greetings

*Selam*⁴

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⁴ One of the pseudonyms comrade Enver Hoxha used during the National Liberation War.

CIRCULAR ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY

April 10, 1943

TO THE REGIONAL COMMITTEE...¹

TO COMRADE . . .

This is the time for the organization of the National Liberation Army; therefore, in order to be able to direct the national liberation movement, which is developing into an uprising, it is necessary to form larger units as well as higher level staffs. As we have discussed and decided, the formation of the central headquarters staff and other staffs is essential. From the technical and practical viewpoint it has become evident that the units and their activity cannot be directed by fighting unit leaders alone, headquarters staff of the operational zone should be set up² This has been judged reasonable and the zone. . . will be the military objective of your activity. A small explanation, before we go on to explain how the headquarters staff is made up. Great prospects are opening before us concerning the organization of larger units of the Albanian Partisan Volunteer National Liberation Army

1 Punctuation as in the document.

2 A zone staff was set up only for the Vlora and Gjirokastra regions, under the name "Staff of the 1st Operational Zone of Vlora and Gjirokastra". In the other regions regional or group staffs were set up.

(APVNLA); now we are faced not only with small-scale actions, but with the question of the liberation of Albania, and this cannot be carried out by one, two or even more independent units, but calls for a regular army. This necessitates large-scale mobilization and the formation of larger military units, battalions and still larger units. Now we will pass to the technical side of setting up the zone headquarters staff.

1) To achieve this, the ground should be prepared politically with the honest nationalists of each zone, explaining the necessity of the formation of the headquarters staff. You should do this together with the organization of the . . .

2) The essential members of the staff are: the commander (preferably an honest nationalist), the political commissar, their deputies (if you have enough cadres to appoint a deputy political commissar, then do so, if not, do without one), the operations sector, one person and possibly his deputy, who must have some knowledge about battle plans (if the former is a nationalist, then the deputy must certainly be a party member). These are the essential members of the zone headquarters staff. In addition, the staff can include other influential people from the base. The headquarters staff has the task of directing all activity in the respective zone. This staff will direct all the lower staffs and units. Its essential members are to stay together in one place from which they can direct operations in the zone, but don't be too rigid about this. When there are important activities, a part of the staff or all of it may go there to conduct operations. The zone can be divided into two or three sectors. The brigade should have its own staff, made up in the same way as the zone headquarters staff ; it should ensure direct contact through two couriers, resolute party members, who will carry the dispatches of the zone headquarters staff, from which ins-

tructions and battle plans will be received. Until the brigades are formed, this will be done by the units and battalions. Two couriers, chosen from among the most resolute party members, are to maintain contact with the APVNLA central headquarters. Likewise, we must maintain contact with the staffs of the border zones. The supply sector of the zone headquarters should be stationed near the zone staff and see to feeding and clothing the army of the respective zone; goods captured from the enemy by the various units are to be handed over to the zone headquarters which will distribute them according to needs.

We are not writing about the duties of the commander and the political commissar, for you know them already. We are writing only about the people responsible for operations. It is they who draw up the battle plans (attack and retreat, and so on) proceeding from their information and knowledge, and present them to the headquarters staff for discussion; following the decision of the staff, directives or orders are sent to various units of the respective zone. The political commissar, or his deputy, maintains contact with the Party through the political secretary of the region where the staff is stationed. The party organization in the army should carry out maximum activity; this activity is led, supervised, and assisted by the political commissar or his deputy.

The organization of the zone headquarters staff in your region is a matter of urgency. Once again I stress that it is necessary to ensure the participation in the zone headquarters staff of influential honest nationalists who have wholeheartedly joined the struggle against the invaders and local traitors.

As previously discussed, as soon as possible, send us the names of people suitable to take part in the central headquarters staff of the APVNLA.

Meanwhile, while organizing your headquarters staff, don't interrupt your activities, but go ahead with your plans.

Comradely greetings
For the Central Committee

Shpat³

PS — Detailed instructions will be sent to you very soon ; this letter will assist you until we send the necessary directives.

First published in "Principal Documents of the PLA", vol. 1, Tirana 1960

Works, vol. 1.

3 One of the pseudonyms comrade Enver Hoxha used during the National Liberation War.

CIRCULAR ON THE CREATION OF THE ALBANIAN ANTI-FASCIST WOMEN'S UNION

April 14, 1943

Dear comrades,

In our war against the fascist occupiers, in this war so decisive for our people, the women play an important role¹. Faced with this important factor of the National Liberation War, the party organization is confronted with certain tasks, the most important of which being the formation of the anti-fascist front of the Albanian women.

In order to form this front, it is necessary to bring together the broad masses of women of every category and every social stratum. Conferences are the best way of bringing the women together, but these must not be academic meetings to talk about problems divorced from practical life; their getting together must arise from their actual needs — the demand for bread, protests against internments, protests against threats, executions, etc. These meetings and conferences should not deal only with high-level politics, but should talk about the oppression of women, their needs, the hated enemy, fascism, and the need to fight it, and the tasks of the women in this libera-

¹ About 6,000 women and girls took part, arms in hand, in the National Liberation War.

tion war. The war itself will provide us with the material for this work. The communiques, proclamations, and various appeals should be explained over and over again in simple and comprehensible terms. By these means and through the organs of the Party and of the Youth hatred for the enemy will be aroused, the barbarities, the burnings, killing of women and children, and so on, will be emphasized. These meetings should also talk about hygiene, bringing up children, the way a good housewife should work, and her various duties. Perhaps these things may seem unnecessary and distasteful to them, but our women party members or the women most suited to do this work should patiently explain these matters in order to convince the women of the necessity for the directives. Various courses to wipe out illiteracy, especially in the countryside, will be of great value and assistance in the formation of this front; sewing and nursing courses are essential, and should be set up as soon as possible, especially now that the war is becoming fiercer every day. It should be emphasized that these various meetings, courses and conferences should be attended by all those who, in one way or another, want to help the war against fascism. All the women from town and countryside who believe in the war against the enemy, women of every political tendency and trend — anti-fascist, Zogite, Ballist, and religious women should take part in them — there must be no sectarianism in this matter. In those cities where there are women under the influence of the "Balli Kombëtar", cooperation with them should be complete and sincere.

Anti-fascist women's councils should emerge from these conferences. The councils are formed in this manner: the suburban council emerges from the suburban conference and is elected by the women themselves. The councils

of the various suburbs each appoint a woman to take part in the city council. This council should comprise as many members as is considered necessary. Councils according to skills and occupations can also be set up. The village council emerges from the meetings and conferences in the villages, and is linked with the city council. This is the democratic method, the best and preferred method of setting up the councils. But it is by no means the only way. If, because of the reaction, this method is not possible, first the city council is selected from above, from among the most suitable and active women. This council then takes on the task of organizing the suburban councils, whose members are appointed by the city council, and not elected by the women of the suburb. In every suburban council there should be one party member, if there is one available, and in the city council this is indispensable. These councils should be the genuine expression of the will of the women. They have the task of rallying as many as possible from the masses of women of the city and countryside to the anti-fascist women's front. They must concern themselves with agitation and propaganda, with all sorts of supplies for the fighting units, with various courses, as well as with increasing the ranks of partisan and volunteer fighters with women and girls. The party members among them should be the best fighters and an example for all the other women.

Wherever possible, a member of the city council should also take part in the national liberation council of that region.

We should seize the opportunity to build our organization. From the various meetings educational groups of the best and most determined women and girls should be set up, from which new party members

should be recruited to increase the ranks of the organization.

Comradely greetings
For the Central Committee

*Valbona*²

First published in "Principal Documents of the PLA", vol. 1, Tirana 1960

Works, vol. 1.

² One of the pseudonyms comrade Enver Hoxha used during the National Liberation War.

**INSTRUCTION TO THE VLORA REGIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
ALBANIA ON THE MEASURES TO LIQUIDATE SADIK
PREMTE'S¹ FACTION**

May 3, 1943

TO THE REGIONAL COMMITTEE

Vlora

Various reports we have received from the grass-roots in your region have confronted us with a bitter reality, with the critical situation this organization is going through. It is faced with a faction hatched up by the corrupt anti-party element, Sadik Premte, who had been thrown out of the Party. The organization there had been advised repeatedly to be extremely watchful and to take the most radical measures to crush without mercy any attempt that this traitorous element might make.

On every occasion, with all organizations and all comrades, and with you in particular, the great danger posed to the Party by elements infected with the old group spirit has been ceaselessly stressed. Various circulars have made clear to you the systematic work of destruction and the incessant sabotage activity of the factionalists led by the

1 The faction against the Party and the National Liberation War in the region of Vlora was organized by the traitor Sadik Premte in April 1943.

two chief traitors, Anastas Lula and Sadik Premte. In particular, the totally negative stand of Xhepi (Sadik Premte) has been explained to you, and we have insistently stressed that he was the most dangerous and perfidious intriguer among the anti-party elements. Precisely for this reason, one of the main concerns of the organization, and especially of the leading comrades, should have been to watch him carefully and, finally, to kick him out of the Party. Facts indicate that things were not done in this way at all.

In the most crucial moments of our history, at this time of bloodshed, when the armies of the occupiers are burning our villages and towns, when they are mercilessly slaughtering our people en masse, when we should be exerting every effort to make our organization strong and worthy to lead this sacred movement, facts prove that today the organization in your region is in a deplorable situation; indifference and carelessness in organizational matters have weakened the organization and allowed the formation of the faction with Xhepi, the traitor, at the head.

In the Vlora region, where the people have taken up arms and are furiously fighting shoulder to shoulder with our comrades, instead of having a strong, disciplined organization, with elements tested in the heat of struggle, we have an organization in which Xhepi has managed to establish himself and, under the very noses of the leaders and communist comrades, is organizing to torpedo the Party. This situation would not have come about had it not been for the carelessness for which you must take full responsibility.

Judging from the reports we have received, no one has gone for months on end to check on the comrades in the cells and raise their political consciousness, but they have been left to their own devices. These elements, who are

certainly resolute, and recruited according to sound principles, but neglected and left without proper education in the spirit and discipline of the Party, and in the directives issued by the CC, have been allowed to become a field of activity for the factionalist elements to carry out their anti-party work. It is useless to excuse ourselves, saying, "We haven't enough comrades", or "they promised us some comrades but haven't sent them". Our people have a saying: "You must cut your coat according to your cloth." This is applicable to us. You have been told over and over again that the comrades should be trained locally, they should be given responsible work, and the young comrades should be helped and their consciousness raised without waiting for the CC to send comrades, whom it does not have and can find only in other organizations, all of which are young and in need of cadres too. But you have not worked in accordance with this criterion. Far from raising their consciousness and giving responsible tasks to the sound elements who wholeheartedly love the Party, you have sometimes worked according to wrong criteria, allowing dubious elements with an unsavoury past to come to the fore. They have been placed in important posts in the Party and the fighting forces. Elements expelled from the Party have been wrongly readmitted, without obtaining the consent of the regional committee, a thing which is impermissible. All these elements, which the regional committee carelessly placed in important posts in the Party, inevitably became the basis of the faction organized by Xhepi.

A remedy must be found immediately for the situation which has developed there. Ruthless, radical measures must be taken at once.

According to your reports, Xhepi, who organized the faction, is being aided in this disgraceful and destructive

activity by Vangjo, Difi, Pali,² and others of lesser importance. Xhepi and the other three started their destructive and anti-party activity by contacting all their old friends, persuading them that it was necessary to organize a conference to overthrow the regional committee, to take the reins into their hands, to take command of the partisan units and impose themselves by force. Xhepi has also been in contact with H. L.³ and convinced him of his personal innocence. Xhepi has spread panic and defeatism among the comrades. Under these conditions, the stand of the Party should be exemplary and the nest of vipers must be crushed immediately. The Party should be up to its tasks. Its name should bring terror to the hearts of the external and internal enemies, just as it raises the spirits of the people and arouses their faith in and love for the Party. This is what should be done: Xhepi and Pali should be shot at once as traitors and factionalists, sworn enemies of the Party and people. At the same time, Vangjo and Difi as well as all those elements who have taken part in this affair should be arrested, and their trial should be held without loss of time. Some resolute comrades of the Party and of the regional committee should take part in the trial, at which the stand of Vangjo and Difi, and others should be clarified, as well as the extent of their participation and responsibility. As for Vangjo and Difi, their minimal punishment should be expulsion from the Party, and dismissal from any function, while being retained in the unit under close surveillance. If they remain in solidarity with Xhepi, express no repentance for what they have done, and continue to

² The closest collaborators of Sadik Premte in organizing the revolt against the Party.

³ Hysni Lepenica, representative of the "Balli Kombëtar" in the region of Vlora.

maintain an anti-party stand, then they should be shot too. The others involved should be tried in a very cool-headed atmosphere, and be sentenced as they deserve. Those condemned to death should be denounced to the people for their treachery. This should be done with the greatest possible speed, and swift measures should be taken to remedy the situation, to reinforce the positions both within the organization and in the regions where trouble is expected, and any move should be dealt with mercilessly. All dubious and wavering elements should be purged from commanding posts and be replaced by loyal party people. Discipline should be tightened up; two people should go to talk with H. L., explain to him the reasons for the measures adopted against these traitors, and convince him of their correctness.

The comrades of the regional committee and comrade Besnik⁴ are charged with implementing these directives; and all comrades of the organization should categorically obey their decisions. There are special instructions for comrade Besnik on how to organize the regional committee and the activity in the organization.

For the carrying out of these measures, putting a speedy end to this situation, and rooting the faction right out, all of you are responsible to the Party.

Comradely greetings
For the Central Committee

Shpati

Works, vol. 1.

⁴ Pseudonym of Hysni Kapo, Member of the CC of the CPA and Political Secretary of the Vlora Regional Party Committee.

**CIRCULAR ON THE LIQUIDATION
OF SADIK PREMTE'S FACTION IN THE VLORA
ORGANIZATION¹**

June 17, 1943

TO THE REGIONAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMRADES
OF THE VLORA ORGANIZATION

On the basis of various reports presented by the regional committee of the organization there, and from the report of the delegate of the Central Committee especially sent to the Vlora region to carry out an investigation into the situation created by the traitor and enemy of the Party, Sadik Premte (Xhepi), we have written this letter, which should be read in the entire organization, and acted upon as follows.

From the time of the founding of the Party, the unhealthy groupist elements, led by Sadik Premte and Anastas Lula, using all their cunning, endeavoured to destroy the foundations of our young Party. They used every move to sow among the comrades lack of faith in the Party, distrust in the leading bodies and lack of faith in the organization of the movement and the war, and

¹ The faction was liquidated in May 1943 with the direct intervention of the Central Committee of the Party, after comrade Enver Hoxha in person went to the spot, and with the active participation of the communists of the region of Vlora led by comrades Hysni Kapo and Mehmet Shehu.

advised comrades not to implement the directives issued by the Central Committee.

The Party used the method of persuasion with these groupist elements. For a long time, it warned them that such work, which they were carrying out deliberately, was anti-party work, and that this road was bound to lead to their being criticised, and that stern measures would be taken against them if they carried on in this way.

At the 1st Consultative Meeting of the Party Activists — you have read and studied its resolution — it was decided that all the wavering elements and those infected by the group spirit should be persuaded to give up their old activity and to carry out the directives of the Party, because, in order to cope with the tasks facing us, and the events which are unfolding at great speed, it is essential for us to have complete unity of thought and action in our Party, to have a common outlook, both in political work and in the organization itself. Although the Party made every effort to reform these unsound comrades, time and facts showed that these comrades persisted in their old methods of group work. These comrades have always opposed the directives of the Party: the directive on proletarian morality against theft, on work with the peasantry, on the line of the youth, on security, on actions. All along they have been disgruntled, criticising the party comrades, and especially its higher organs. Their discontent and their criticism had a collective and organized character.

At our Party's most critical moments when the reaction was attacking us mercilessly and our finest comrades were falling martyrs on the field of honour for the glory of our Party and to liberate the Albanian people from the foreign yoke, Sadik Premte and Anastas Lula tried once again to realize the sinister aims of their anti-party work,

trying to take over the leading posts, and thus to re-establish their old gangster method of work.

Taking all this into account and seeing that these elements did not want to change their course and follow the true communist road, after a conference² at which Sadik Premte, Anastas Lula and other comrades were present, the Central Committee of the Party decided to adopt a definite stand, to purge the party ranks and deal ruthlessly with anti-party elements of every kind and however they might disguise themselves. Following this conference Anastas Lula, Sadik Premte and some other comrades were thrown out of the Party; but even then it was stressed to these groupist elements that we hoped they would see the serious errors of their ways and correct them outside the Party, because they were unable to correct them while in the Party.

To all the party organizations the great danger that group spirit constitutes for the Party has been pointed out, and it has been stressed to all comrades that the struggle against the groupist elements should be severe, that the groupist elements are trying their hardest to systematically destroy what has been achieved, through sabotage, often going as far as provocation in favour of

² This refers to the Extraordinary Conference of the Party, held in Tirana in June 1942. It took up for consideration the question of doing away with the factionalist and liquidatory trend of the former chiefs of the "Youth" group, Anastas Lula and Sadik Premte. The conference decided on the expulsion of both of them, together with their collaborators, from the Party. The struggle against the factionalists brought on the surface other details impeding the work of the Party and its strengthening. The CC condemned the disruptive activity of Mustafa Gjinishi and Koço Tashko, etc., who were disgruntled for not having been elected to the CC and to the regional committees of the Party, as well as the centrifugal tendencies of the Gjirokastra regional committee, for which the main instigator was Bedri Spahiu — at that time political secretary of the regional party committee.

the enemy. The groupist elements are the most pernicious internal disease of the Party, for they try to take the castle from within, using and putting into action everything which is not communist. It has been emphasized to all the party comrades that they should be wide awake, keep their eyes wide open, and watch every move and word of these people. These infectious elements should never be forgotten, even though they are outside the Party, for, as comrade Stalin said, "The chief danger is the deviation against which we have ceased to fight"*. The most effective way to struggle against the groupist elements is to strengthen our organizations, to raise the party comrades to the level of genuine communists, to implement the directives of the Central Committee to the letter, to work tirelessly and systematically to care for and educate the new party cadres, to make them capable in work and struggle. Strengthening the party organizations with staunch elements, with a high political, theoretical and organizational level, means inevitable death to the groupist elements, because germs always develop and multiply in feeble body, and are exterminated in a strong one. Our Communist Party should be a party of the Lenin-Stalin type, a party with unbreakable unity and conscious iron discipline.

The Vlora organization in particular, both the leading comrades, as well as the rank-and-file, have been warned repeatedly of the danger posed by the group elements. The utterly negative and anti-party stand of Sadik Premte has been explained to them, and they have been persistently warned that Xhepi is the most dangerous, perfidious, and cunning of the anti-party elements, and that therefore one of the tasks of the leading comrades and the

*J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 13, p. 369 (Alb. ed.).

comrades of the organization is to watch attentively what he is doing.

Unfortunately, far from being attentive, the comrades have shown almost a complete lack of watchfulness, and have been lax and negligent in their work, which has favoured the treachery of Xhepi and Co. Therefore, we must thoroughly diagnose this disease, for only then can we truly find the cure for it and, thus, get rid of the germ and strengthen the Party.

The danger of factional elements seems to have been almost forgotten in your organization, although Sadik Premte, one of the most dangerous and sinister elements, was active in your region. A clear-cut stand was not taken towards him from the very beginning; the comrades (and not all of them) were informed in undertones of his expulsion from the Party and the harm he had done to our work, and the party members and all sympathizers of the Party were not even warned of the danger such a person might represent. On the other hand, Xhepi's persistent negative stand did not make you think that this element who, despite all the time that had been spent in trying to bring him round, could not be put on the correct road, but was heading towards the foulest betrayal, had to be exposed before the people. Instead you continued to maintain a careless attitude towards him. Quietly, like a filthy germ, Xhepi worked systematically against the Party, profiting from the laxity of the leading comrades and the comrades of the organization. And the mistakes and laxity on your part have been very serious.

First, the organizational work, which is our most important and principal problem, has been neglected. In a communist party of the Lenin-Stalin type all problems are closely interlinked with one another, and the solution of these problems on the basis of the directives constitutes the inevitable success of the party and its triumph in every

field of activity. But, without giving correct consideration and attaching the greatest importance to the organizational question, which is the basis and starting point of all activity, the work will certainly suffer, and in the majority of cases will end in disaster. The Vlora comrades did not have a proper appreciation of this work of such vital importance for our Party, and the laxity they have shown led to the situation created by the traitor Sadik Premte and his followers. It is hard to understand, and it sounds strange that such a thing could happen in the Vlora region, where the people have taken up arms and are fighting fiercely beside our comrades; that in your region, far from having a strong, disciplined organization, the members of which have been tested under fire, we are confronted with an organization in which the traitor Xhepi can try to strike root and torpedo the Party. The cause of this abnormal situation can only be found in the irresponsible carelessness of all the comrades of the Vlora organization. For months on end no one has gone to check up on or assist the comrades of the cells, but they have been left to their own devices. These elements, who are certainly staunch and were recruited on sound principles, have been neglected and left without education in the spirit and discipline of the Party, without being nurtured on the directives issued by the Central Committee, have become a target of the activity of the groupist elements and of their efforts to carry on their anti-party activity.

The cell, which should be a real communist school for every party member, where he is equipped with the daily experience of struggle of all the comrades, and with Marxist-Leninist theory, where lofty bolshevik feelings are implanted in his being, for the Vlora comrades has been something unimportant, where the comrades meet once in a blue moon, and even then not to debate ques-

tions with the seriousness of a communist who is shouldering the heavy burden of being the vanguard of the people, but only for the sake of appearances. It emerges that these comrades, who have our cause at heart, cherish it, and are prepared to shed their blood for the Party without question, have formed in their minds their own way of acting and thinking, imagining that everything they do is always to the advantage of the Party. These comrades have not lived the life of the Party through all its struggle and efforts, and they have an idealistic conception of the Party, a conception which rests on unstable and unsound foundations, so that on the occasions (which in the Vlova region are by no means unusual) when a leading comrade or some other of the organization makes a mistake or goes wrong, great disillusionment is created in the minds and hearts of these immature communists; they are disorientated, and unconsciously slip into the pit where the groupist elements lie in wait for them, seeking to use them for their sinister anti-party ends. Naturally, when these immature comrades, in their disillusionment and confusion, find no support and see no strong arm to lift them from the troubled situation they have fallen into, or to give them the courage, will-power and enlightenment of the genuine communist, they become tools in the hands of the groupist element and victims of the enemies of the Party.

The failure to do the work in the cells, and, as a result, neglect in the work to raise the political level of the comrades, has caused these comrades to be strangers to the directives of the Party; they do not know about the conscious iron discipline of the Party, or sound communist criticism and self-criticism. They do not know the value of organization and centralism, or how to distinguish the lofty interests of the Party from personal interests and ambition. They do not know how to love their comrades

with sound, sincere, unsullied communist feelings, or how to hate and fight without mercy against the vile anti-party element. The Vlora comrades, strangers to these bolshevik principles, their ideological improvement neglected by the leading comrades, consciously or unconsciously have assisted the traitorous activity of Sadik Premte.

On the other hand, the leading comrades of the Vlora region have often worked according to erroneous criteria, promoting and bringing into prominence certain dubious elements with murky backgrounds, ambitious individuals who have been entrusted with important posts in the Party and in the fighting forces. There is no doubt that the leading comrades of Vlora, in promoting these comrades, wanted to help our work, but they have forgotten that, while there is always trust within our Party, there is also check-up. It is check-up that has been lacking there. Sound check-up on the activity of the comrades ensures the smooth running of the Party and the strengthening of its cadres. The genuine communist is recognized by the fact that he is pleased and satisfied to see that the work assigned to him is being checked up on in detail, not in order to find fault with it, not to humiliate or disparage him, but to correct, teach and improve him. This sort of check-up has been neglected by the leading comrades of Vlora and by the comrades of the organization, and this has led to unsound elements and people with a low ideological level, lacking education in the spirit of the Party, frequently making mistakes, mistakes which in turn sow disgruntlement. This turned into hatred towards one or two comrades, and later, stirred up by anti-party elements, was transformed into discontent with the leading bodies of the Party.

Security on organizational and military questions has been almost completely non-existent. The way the party apparatus in the Vlora region functioned was common

knowledge, and the rumours even named the comrades supposedly leaders of the work.

As well as this, the vanguard role of our Party has not been properly understood. The Vlora comrades have not correctly appreciated the fact that the party members are the most conscious section of the people, the true leaders of the broad masses, but have confused the roles and have often fallen into the position of the masses. Mistakes have been made in implementing the directives of the National Liberation War, and often the national liberation councils have been confused with the party cells; the importance and the special role of the councils in this war have not been recognized, and very often the ordinary people have become mixed up in the Party's internal affairs.

All this looseness on the part of the leading comrades and the rank-and-file of the Vlora organization has been a weapon in the hands of the groupist elements headed by Sadik Premte and Pali, enabling them to carry on their vicious activity.

Sadik Premte and Pali started their anti-party activity systematically and with full consciousness, to serve their own ends. Their aim was to gather around themselves a large part of the membership, and together with them, to topple the regional committee, to take the organizational work and the commands of the partisan units into their hands. Hoping to draw other traitors and comrades outside the Vlora region into their activity, they wrote to the Gjirokastra Regional Committee, and in this way they tried to impose their will on the Party. The traitors, the Trotskyites Sadik Premte and Pali, had reached agreement with elements outside the Party too, who supplied them with weapons, gave them advice, and made it easier for, them to act.

This act of rebellion against the Party, inspired and guided by Xhepi and Pali, had as its main participants: Vangjo (unit commander and in charge of a cell), Qazim Çakëri (Difi, political commissar and in charge of a cell), Xhemil Çakëri (political commissar), and Zeqo. The Party had quite rightly promoted these elements from the rank-and-file and had entrusted important posts to them, but their unbridled ambition, the lack of discipline, and lack of obedience to the higher organs and commands enabled Xhepi and Pali to incorporate them into their ranks. These elements maintained close contact with Sadik Premte and Pali, who had studied their weak points and had gauged the importance and influence that these comrades could have within the Party and on public opinion. So these elements were used by Sadik Premte and Pali as a cover for the execution of their plan. Xhepi and Pali, who remained watchful, were informed about everything that happened in the organization, and waited for the favourable moment to stab the Party in the back. They flattered the ambitions of these elements and cunningly incited them against the comrades supposed to be in charge of the work in that region, against the decisions adopted, against the directives of the Party, against actions, and against the line of the National Liberation War. They were able to instil their hatred for the Party into the minds of these unhealthy comrades, arming them for the struggle against the leadership of the Party, which they described as a "clique of traitors" and "band of criminals". These unsound and ambitious elements, headed by Xhepi and Pali, set about the struggle against the Party. With complete conviction, they systematically visited many comrades in whom they aroused and nurtured hostility towards the leadership and, breaking every rule of organization and discipline, prepared them to participate in a conference to be held without the knowledge

of the Party, to pass judgement on the regional committee and make their own laws. In order to mislead innocent comrades, these gentlemen issued the slogan of this conference, which is always the slogan characterizing Trotskyite dirty work: "We are doing this for the good of the Party" (for the good of the Party they break every law and norm of discipline established by the Party), "We have nothing against the Party, but the leaders and the leading organs are a clique of traitors and criminals".

Treason is always exposed, sooner or later, and this is especially so in our Party, in which the resolute comrades love the Party dearly and vigilantly, safeguard it and the ranks of the comrades. Thus, this dagger in the back of the Party, which was being prepared by the traitors Sadik Premte and Pali, in collaboration with Vangjo, Difi, Xhemil and Zeqo, was uncovered, and the Party lost no time in taking measures to end this situation. It mercilessly pursued the traitors Sadik Premte and Pali and summoned the others, who, after they made self-criticism, would be punished according to the gravity of their misdemeanours. The exposure of the treachery brought panic into the ranks of the rebels, some of whom, seeing the abyss towards which they had been led by Xhepi and Pali, gave themselves up to the Party; others were arrested, including Xhemil Çakëri, who accidentally fell victim of the plot they had concocted to attack the Party and met his death together with Dyshek.

The traitors Sadik Premte and Pali, seeing their work had come to nothing, and anticipating the merciless punishment which their treachery well deserved, retreated in haste to the Mesaplik and Dukat regions, where they alarmed the people, attacking the Party and the comrades with the basest calumnies and slanders. The goal of the traitors was to find some support among the people to save their own skins, the support they had once ima-

gined they had among the comrades they deceived. But that support collapsed like a pack of cards. Sadik Premte and Pali tried to place the people between them and the Party as a final barricade to save themselves. From them the people learned all the details of the organizational work, with the names of the comrades supposed to be leaders as well as the organizational links. They uttered vile slanders with the aim of discrediting the Party and the comrades; at the same time Xhepi and Pali tried to prepare the people of that region for an armed attack against the Party comrades and the partisan units. Utilising the accidental deaths of Xhemal Çakërri and Dyshek, they tried to arouse their relatives to vengeance and blood feud.

But each passing day spelt defeat for the traitors, and victory for the Party and its great justice. People became awake to the situation and the traitorous work of Xhepi and Pali. They saw clearly that they were enemies of the Party and of the people, and abandoned these vermins of our country, who hid themselves, like the true criminals they are, in a corner of the village of Gjorm, waiting day by day for the sword of Damocles which would descend upon them and eliminate them forever. The Trotskyite bandits, Xhepi and Pali, with two or three of their collaborators, are trying to find their last support among the peasants of Gjorm, but, undoubtedly, the patriotic peasants of Gjorm, those who fought together with the party comrades against the savage occupiers, far from giving them support, will kick out these traitors, who have raised their heads against the Party and are seeking the defeat of our people. The justice of the Party is unrelenting to the traitors, to the Trotskyites Xhepi and Pali, and to all those who link their fate and their existence with these bandits.

On the other hand, the Party, always abiding by the principle of helping comrades who have fallen victims of factionalists, regardless of their very serious mistakes, uses the method of persuasion and tries in every way to give them a hand to get them out of the marsh they have plunged into. The Party shows them the correct road to follow, enables them to correct themselves and prove that they are convinced about the mistakes they have made, and the damage they have done to the work, so that through effort and struggle they may prove their love for the Party and the cause.

Therefore, Vangjo and Zeqo, who gave themselves up to the Party and made a self-criticism, admitting their culpability and the great treachery they had been plotting against the Party, were expelled from the Party by decision of the Central Committee, and given the opportunity of demonstrating, by their actions in the ranks of the partisan units, their repentance, their obedience and love for the Party and the people.

Qazim Çakëri (Difi) is expelled from the Party, and because he refused to join the partisan unit as ordered by the Party so as to show by his actions that he recognized his errors, and to give proof of his change of heart, he should be kept under the closest surveillance. If his activity is seen to be directed against the Party, then the harshest measures should be taken against him. But again, the method of persuasion should still be used with him.

* * *

This setback should serve as a sound lesson for all the party organizations and for the Vlora organization in particular.

All comrades can see for themselves to what extremes the criminal activity of the groupist elements can go. This is what comrade Stalin says of these Trotskyite and trai-

torous groupist elements: "A long time ago these people ceased to be a political trend in the workers' movement; they have become an unprincipled band without any ideology, saboteurs, diversionist agents, professional spies and hangmen"*. These elements sell out their homeland and their honour. They trade all the secrets of the Party so as to achieve power. They foul their own nests, join the enemies of the Party and the country, and open the gates to the enemy with the sole aim of achieving their shameful goals, the goals of the lowest type of criminals. These Trotskyite elements hide their true face as the sworn enemies of the people behind a clever disguise. Rotten Trotskyites, like Xhepi and Pali, are part of that band of capitulationists who hide behind a mask of hysterical and provocative "revolutionary" phraseology and who, on the other hand, crown their actions by making common cause with the enemies of the Party.

The traitors Xhepi and Pali lost no opportunity to revile the political line of the Party, combatting it with leftist phrases and accusing it of being too "moderate" towards other political trends. Xhepi did his utmost to sabotage the efforts of the comrades and the fruit of their work, by destroying all the national liberation councils of one province, and with his provocative stand threw the people into the lap of reaction. Xhepi and Pali reviled and abused various elements with non-communist political tendencies, so as to weaken the national liberation movement; and their action revealed the objective they were pursuing: the weakening and destruction of the Party, and close collaboration with elements outside the Party. Facts

* J.V. Stalin, "On the shortcomings in the Party and measures for the liquidation of the Trotskyites and other two-faced elements", speech delivered at the March 1937 Plenum of the CC of the CPSU(B), Russian ed., 1954.

show that they were closely linked with these elements who supplied them with arms.

But now their mask is torn off, their true bandit face is seen by everyone, and their shameful aims are clearly revealed. Through deception they were able to drag some isolated individuals into their base criminal activity. They tried to deceive the people, but have not and will never have the support of the masses, for, as comrade Stalin says, "they are afraid to show their true face to the working class and afraid to tell it their real designs. They carefully hide their political character from the working class, fearing that it will guess their real intentions, condemn them as hostile elements, and drive them away"*.

Our struggle against these base enemies should be conducted with the greatest severity, and in order to be able to fight against this filthy disease we should hate these persons and attack them mercilessly wherever we find them and whenever they appear. But the struggle against these elements cannot be waged simply by sitting with folded arms, observing events, but by working and acting with the greatest wariness, and exercising minute control over everything through ceaseless effort. We must realize that factionalist elements lose ground and throw down their arms only when our organization is sound, when our comrades are resolute, and at a high level from every point of view, when they are courageous fighters and wide awake in every field. The achievement of this goal is in our hands. It is up to us to preserve the purity of our organization from every anti-party element. It is up to us to put all our strength and efforts into making the organization a body of extraordinary vitality, to help the comrades, to raise them to the level of genuine commu-

* J.V. Stalin, op. cit.

nists, to endow them with the lofty Marxist-Leninist virtues, to educate them according to the directives of the Central Committee of the Party, and to instil in them the words of our great comrade Stalin: "To guard the unity of our Party as the apple of our eye". This is what the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania demands from you, and it is convinced that the comrades of the Vlora organization will understand their mistakes and laxity, will find the cure and soon, as befits communists, will make improvements and progress in their organizational views. The Central Committee of the Party is convinced that the internal struggle against the factionalists, together with the external war, will temper the Albanian communists, who will raise high the banner of Lenin and Stalin and make the name of the Party strike terror into the hearts of its local and foreign enemies, just as it raises the spirits of the people and increases their confidence and love for it.

DEATH TO FASCISM — FREEDOM TO THE PEOPLE

For the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Albania

Shpati

*First published in "Principal
Documents of the PLA", vol. 1,
Tirana 1960*

Works, vol. 1.

**CIRCULAR ON THE CREATION OF
LARGER PARTISAN FORMATIONS AND ESPECIALLY
OF THE 1ST SHOCK BRIGADE**

June 20, 1943

Dear comrades,

Now that the National Liberation War is assuming a broader character with the formation of the zones and their headquarters, it is necessary to create battalions of 2 to 4 units as soon as possible.

At the same time, we must select a certain number of the best partisans of the regional units who have participated in one or more actions, and send them to a selected place where the 1st Brigade of the Partisan and Volunteer National Liberation Army is to be formed.

For such an important matter it is necessary to ask the commissars and commanders for their best fighters, in accordance with the figures set by the regional committee. But this directive is not to be understood narrowly; the formation of the 1st Brigade and the recruiting of its members should serve as an impetus to the formation of zone battalions, and not a hindrance. The formation of the 1st Brigade and the formation of battalions arouses and strengthens confidence in the development of our struggle towards the general uprising.

The people will see the 1st Brigade and the zone battalions as the sound and reliable nucleus of the Albanian Partisan and Volunteer National Liberation Army. It is

therefore necessary to popularize the 1st Brigade among the fighters.

The importance of this directive calls for speed in recruitment and the formation of battalions. Therefore, speed up the broadest possible mobilization of the people who want to fight, especially young people.

We are sending you 10 copies of a circular¹. This circular is of major importance and should be seriously studied in all the cells of the organizations and in the regional committees.

Do not duplicate the copies, but no comrade should be left in the dark ; it should be studied as well as possible, because it is very important.

Comradely greetings

Shpati

NB — A battalion is made up of 2 to 4 units and comprises 50 or more people. The battalion has a commander and a commissar, as well as a deputy commander and a deputy commissar. The battalion staffs are subordinate to the zone staff.

The brigade will have fighters from all parts of Albania, and will have the character of a regular army. Your region should send 120 people for the brigade and these, under the command of comrade Mehmet Shehu, should set out for Vithkuq (Korça) and be there on July 25, 1943. These picked fighters should have the best weapons.

Send to the Zvarisht barracks by the 30th of June a good comrade with a "musical" ear, whom we want to take part in a special course. Together with this comrade

¹ This refers to the June 17, 1943 circular of the CC of the CPA. (See in this volume p. 130)

you must, without fail, also send to the Zvarisht (Korça) barracks the telegraph operator, whom you had once sent concerning the question of the radio. These comrades will be away for about one month.

Comrade Vjosa² will stay here, so before he leaves you should arrange your affairs over there, and in particular, see about his replacement in Mallakastra.

First published in "Principal Documents of the PLA", vol. 1, Tirana 1960

Works, vol. 1.

² Pseudonym of Mehmet Shehu, Deputy Member of the CC of the CPA and Organizational Secretary of the Vlora Regional Party Committee, who was appointed Commander of the 1st Shock Brigade of the APVNLA.

GREETING TO THE 1ST CONFERENCE OF THE ALBANIAN COMMUNIST YOUTH ORGANIZATION¹

June 1943

DEATH TO FASCISM — FREEDOM TO THE PEOPLE
TO THE 1st NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE
ACTIVISTS OF THE ALBANIAN COMMUNIST YOUTH

Comrades,

The glorious Red Army and the heroic people of the Soviet Union, under the brilliant leadership of great comrade Stalin, have brought the hordes of Hitler to their knees. Under the blows of the Red Army, the armies of the Anglo-American allies, and the partisans and volunteers of enslaved Europe, the downfall of fascism and the liberation of the peoples is under way.

Our people, who have endured countless suffering and hardships, see their road to survival in the National Liberation War. We, the communists, the sons of this people, have poured all our energies into this war. We want to save our country from fascist slavery, and to liberate our people. The one and only road to salvation is that which our people themselves have chosen, and which we are following, that of unceasing and unconditional war against the fascist occupier.

¹ The 1st National Conference of the Albanian Communist Youth was held from the 9th to the 13th of June 1943 in the vicinity of Skrapar.

The Albanian youth have enthusiastically joined this sacred war; they have despised and fought the fratricidal and disastrous compromising of our independence, and have emerged in the front ranks of the National Liberation War. In the most difficult moments of its struggle against the occupiers and rabid internal reaction, the Communist Party of Albania has found its most valuable support in the youth of our country, with regard to its own existence and consolidation, and the extension and strengthening of the National Liberation War. The Albanian Communist Youth have known how to mobilize, organize and lead the mass of youth towards their liberation, towards winning a new world, without slavery or fascism, which can be realized only through the National Liberation War. The Communist Youth have set an example of sacrifice and self-denial, an example of courage, an unyielding spirit in battle and hatred for the occupiers and the traitors; unsparingly they have shed their blood and given their martyrs for our beloved and enslaved homeland.

The CC of the CPA honours the memory of the young martyrs, honours the memory of the Communist Youth members who have fallen in the forefront of the struggle, honours the memory of Qemal Stafa, Political Secretary of the CC of the Albanian Communist Youth, and Misto Mame, Member of the CC of the Albanian Communist Youth.

Comrades of the Youth Organization,

The National Liberation War faces us with new and heavy tasks. We must step up the struggle, and fight even more fiercely against the occupier. We must multiply and strengthen the ranks of the partisan and volunteer units so as to form a strong army, the National Liberation Army of the Albanian people, the guarantee of the liberation of our homeland. We must fill the ranks of our army with

young people, with young people who are impatiently demanding to hurl themselves upon the hated occupiers.

Comrades of the conference,

Our beloved homeland is enslaved. It is calling the youth to battle. Therefore, it is our task, and in the first place, yours, comrades of the conference, to mobilize and organize the youth in this sacred war. You must lead the youth, prepare and strengthen them through work and struggle, and thus make them the greatest and most vigorous source of strength for our young Communist Party; you must arouse and educate the youth, so that their ranks serve as an inexhaustible source of staunch elements to increase and strengthen the ranks of our Party. You must show the greatest care in leading the Communist Youth; you must defend it from every enemy.

Comrades,

We must get firmly behind our young Party and mercilessly crush its internal and external enemies. We must smash the heads of the Trotskyite and factionalist trends and elements, the scoundrels, intriguers, and cowards, who try to weaken the ranks of our Party.

Comrades of the conference,

Keep before your eyes the example of the heroic youth of the Soviet Union, the youth of Lenin and Stalin. Make the Albanian youth well acquainted with the heroic struggle of the Soviet youth, with their sacrifices, work, and achievements.

The CC of the CPA greets you and wishes you success.

LONG LIVE GREAT COMRADE STALIN!

LONG LIVE THE GLORIOUS INVINCIBLE RED ARMY!

LONG LIVE THE SOVIET UNION, THE BASTION
OF FREEDOM!

LONG LIVE THE POWERFUL ANGLO-SOVIET-
AMERICAN ALLIANCE!

LONG LIVE THE NATIONAL LIBERATION WAR
OF THE ENSLAVED PEOPLES!

LONG LIVE THE UNITY OF THE ALBANIAN
PEOPLE!

LONG LIVE THE NATIONAL LIBERATION WAR OF
THE ALBANIAN PEOPLE!

LONG LIVE THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
ALBANIA!

LONG LIVE THE ALBANIAN ANTI-FASCIST
YOUTH UNION!

LONG LIVE THE ALBANIAN COMMUNIST YOUTH!

LONG LIVE THE 1ST NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF THE ACTIVISTS OF THE ALBANIAN COMMUNIST
YOUTH!

For the CC of the CPA

Shpati

*First published in "Principal
Documents of the PLA", vol. 1,
Tirana 1960*

Works, vol. 1.

**LETTER TO THE TIRANA REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ALBANIA ON
ENLIVENING THE ORGANIZATION AND
STRENGTHENING POLITICAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL WORK**

August 1, 1943

TO THE TIRANA REGIONAL COMMITTEE
(comrade Hysen)¹

We have heard nothing about what is going on there! What has been done with regard to the "Balli Kombëtar", that is the main question, and what attitude do they take following the fall of Mussolini ! What are the repercussions of these events in Tirana circles, in fascist and government circles, among the people; what possibilities for work present themselves in the new situation, etc. You do not bring us up to date on any of these matters. We heard that J. Ç. has gone to the mountains with many others, and with carabinieri (!). But what is the significance of this? We have not the least information, and thus cannot utilize such a fact in the interest of our struggle, although so much work has been done to achieve this. We don't even know where the man is! And even if he has really gone, who knows where he is, at a time when his place is elsewhere. You do not even send us information,

1 Pseudonym of Gogo Nushi, Member of the CC of the CPA and Political Secretary of the Tirana Regional Party Committee.

let alone bring him to where we are. The war is not fought simply by observing and recording events, but we should profit from them immediately and to the greatest possible extent.

Get moving, comrades, get moving, and let us shake off bureaucracy, or we are lost.

I. Don't look at the work narrowly, don't see only the Tirana region, take a broader view of things. Whatever happens in Tirana has repercussions in the other regions as well, so break out of your narrow circle, from trifling matters and unnecessary work, and entrust tasks to the youth; don't be afraid, they will certainly accomplish the job better than the old comrades.

II. Consolidate the organization and make it more lively and militant, don't pass on the indolence which might have affected some of you. This is not the time for the cells to slumber, or for groups of sympathizers, or friends of the Party to fall asleep. The organization should work like a bee-hive, with definite tasks, clear instructions, and a clear goal. In this way, you will show that you are real leaders. Your organization there has a most important role, for it is at the centre, where events will develop and the major decisions will be taken. Therefore, all organizations, from that of the youth to that of the women, should be permeated by a profound spirit of work and struggle. They should be ready for events of major importance to our country and our Party.

a — Political conferences should be organized everywhere by comrades and sympathizers (many comrades make excuses saying: I'm busy, I have to go to the office, I've got my family to look after. Those who make such excuses at this time should be sent packing, for they are not communists).

b — The cells should meet regularly and should be given instruction at every meeting concerning the week's

work; concrete instructions, and not mere dreams and high flown words but practical, concrete work, which benefits our movement and the Party. There should never be pointless meetings of the cells, but lively meetings which thrash out the most serious questions that crop up and require solution. *Today more than ever, the comrades should be armed and become revolutionaries.*

The greatest importance should be attached to the groups of sympathizers. They should be the reserve of the cells, their main auxiliary, in which new cadres are developed and instructed.

c — The greatest help must be given to the youth, don't neglect their education, or you will be committing the greatest crime. You should strengthen the youth, make them fighters, make them the strongest weapon of the Party. Spare nothing to channel such sound and pure energies, which will exert great weight on the balance of future events. Bear in mind the future, think of the youth and their role, strengthen the educational groups, enliven and enlarge the meetings of activists.

d — The city guerrilla units must be organized and strengthened. They must become a truly strong army trained to fight in the city. They are to be armed with rifles and grenades. We plan to equip them with automatic weapons, too. Have five or six people from the units who are not underground, ready to be called for training in urban warfare and the use of various explosives, with which we shall supply you. These people will be the instructors of specialized teams which you will form from the units. These units should be trained as well as possible, they should study the map of the city in detail, the strategic points, both in the city and outside it, and at the same time these maps should be sent to the General Staff.

e — *Organize the information service.* How should this service be organized and how should it operate? It should be attached to the regional committee. One member of the regional committee should direct it, or at least, all information gathered should of necessity pass via him. Thus, there will be a person responsible for this work. He should select good, intelligent and determined comrades (none of whom should know the others who are entrusted with this special work), and they should be in contact with him. These comrades should organize and extend the network, bringing in sympathizers, friends and the people. All the persons of the latter group should work individually, maintaining contact with the appointed comrade. All the information furnished by the people, friends, sympathizers, and comrades will be concentrated in the hands of the person in charge of the information service.

The network of informers should be interested in everything, and in particular in the following:

1 — Enemy movements (for example : today 30 enemy convoys have passed, coming from Durrës, heading for Elbasan; they consisted of soldiers, or material, etc.).

2 — The number of soldiers stationed in various places; barracks, ammunition depots or food stores; command offices, offices of SIM (find a map of Tirana, mark their location in red and send it to us); the airfield (the number of planes, their movements, fuel depots), bridges, strategic points, etc.

3 — The movements of German soldiers: where from, where to? Are there any in Tirana? How many? How many leave? Note the number of every soldier on his lapel, his collar or epaulettes, the colour of his uniform, and other distinguishing markings on his cap or chest. Sketch these markings, it doesn't matter if you don't do it very well; for example, you will see different emblems

on their chests, such as eagles of various forms. This information, especially concerning the Germans, should be sent directly to us with the first courier available, for it is very important in order to identify the German divisions that have come here and to ascertain where they have come from.

4 — Identify the fifth column, gather information and documents about them, observe their activity and contacts.

5 — Identify the spies, the agents of the Italians and Germans, and the elements who have sold out to the enemy.

6 — Identify the enemies of our Party, their connections, their circles, and so on.

All information of a military nature should be sent to the General Staff, and that concerning the Party, to the Central Committee. *This work is of major importance, and therefore, within ten days from the date of this letter, this service should be set up and start functioning.*

Enclosed herewith you will find a letter. This is an order to the Tirana region from the General Staff. A detailed report should be made for the General Staff on the military situation of the region, on our military strength. How many men are there? Is it possible to form battalions? Is it possible to effect a mobilization? Who are the commanders of the partisan units? Are they suitable? What comments might be made about these people, and what proposals? What is the situation with the supply of weapons there and what arms are needed in that region? Can weapons be bought there?

Comrade Hysen is to write a letter to Durrës, telling them to organize the information service there (the comrades there should inform us as soon as possible of the movements in the port and those of the German army, as we have told you above), and to organize guerrilla units.

Comrade Hysen should go from time to time to check the work of the Durrës regional committee, or summon those in charge there, and assist and advise them in their work.

We are also sending you a list of medicines. Try to get them donated by the pharmacies there, as we need them for the hospital which is being set up. I believe you have enough friends among the pharmacists to collect these few things. . .

Check on the attitude of Çiça, and inquire into the Pali affair. The experience of the Vlora comrades does not seem to have taught you a lesson, for you are slipping into the same errors!² The grand plans you had designed did not help to get rid of Pali! You reckon without the host and imagine that Pali is alone and without people to warn him. Therefore, fewer high flown words on the carrying out of orders, and more work. The enemies of the Party must be fought through systematic and rapid work, and not through plans and super-plans.

Keep your eyes open, defend your organization, and strike without mercy at those who fight the Party from within!

— What of the question of the Peza cell and of the quarrels in it³? It seems to me that the Central Committee is entitled to know what is happening in every organization. The report brought from Peza by Dr. Rosho should be sent here immediately, and also information about the measures you have taken to organize the work there.

² This refers to the weaknesses of the party organization of the Vlora region which were utilized by the faction of Sadik Premte.

³ This refers to the struggle going on in the Peza party cell between the healthy communists defending the line of the Party and Mustafa Gjinishi, who maintained an opportunist stand and engaged in disruptive activities.

— The other partisan units of the region should be supplied with material and literature.

— We have written asking you to send us an account of your financial situation, and how much you have left.

We don't know whether you have taken a political stand towards the events which are occurring. From our observations, you seem to have lost your bearings in the questions of propaganda. In nearly two months, we have received only two or three communiques, and these were as dry as dust.

You should attach great importance to propaganda, take responsibility, and adopt a definite stand towards every event which occurs. We have no knowledge at all concerning the rest of the party press. Does "Zëri i Popullit" appear? Or, do you wait for articles to come to you from us, or to fall from the sky? What books have you published? You should send us 5 copies for the Central Committee of everything you print.

Comradely greetings
For the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Albania

Shpati

Works, vol. 1.

**LETTER TO THE GJIROKASTRA REGIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
ALBANIA ON THE STAND TOWARDS
BRITISH MILITARY MISSIONS¹**

August 16, 1943

A British major is coming there, assigned to the Gjirokastra region. Such people come on their own business, of course, and also to poke their noses into our internal affairs. They do not keep their promises to supply us with weapons and money. They have a tendency to enquire about every person, every partisan, and every unit commander, and thus find out about the situation and meddle in the affairs of our army and our movement. We should place some good comrades at their service to accompany them, avoiding meetings with people you think they should not meet. Give as little information as possible about our internal affairs!

Comradely regards

Shpati

Works, vol. 1.

¹ Since May 1943 representatives of the British-US Mediterranean Command came uninvited to Albania as allegedly dictated by the interests of the war against the Hitlerites. In words, they undertook to aid the Albanian National Liberation Army with weapons and equipment. But their ends were chiefly political. They were engaged in undermining the National Liberation War, and in supporting and aiding all reactionary forces. The CPA saw in this interference a danger to the achievement of revolution and independence, and maintained a resolute stand towards it.

**LETTER FROM THE CC OF THE CPA TO THE
VLORA REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPA
ON SETTING UP THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY OF ALBANIA, ON
THE TALKS WITH THE "BALLI KOMBËTAR"
AND THE DENUNCIATION OF YMER
DISHNICA'S OPPORTUNISM
IN MUKJE**

August 17, 1943

Comrade S. has informed us about the situation of the organization and the army in your region, and we hope that as far as the organization is concerned, you will obtain good results through determination and persistent work. Concerning the army, we congratulate you on the formation of the zone staff and the commencement of its activity. This will be one of our guarantees for the strengthening of our army and our influence.

Five days ago we sent you a circular¹ informing you of the distribution in Tirana of a leaflet, which will have been sent to you for printing. The circular explains how you should act in this matter. I shall give you some ex-

¹ This circular condemns the agreement reached at the Mukje meeting of Ymer Dishnica and Mustafa Gjinishi with the chiefs of the "Balli" as running counter to the orientations issued by the CC of the CPA. Through this circular the CC orders the Party to reject the leaflet signed by the "Committee for the Salvation of Albania", in which the points of the treacherous Mukje agreement were included.

planations so that you understand clearly how this came about, where it originated, and what counter-measures should be taken. I have not written to you about the development of the talks in Peza; this is a shortcoming, but the reason is that we have been very busy. The formation of the 1st Brigade, the first steps in our work with the staff, the party work in the Korça sector, and the time taken in travelling have prevented me from writing to you. A meeting was held in Labinot of all the members of the General Council² with the exception of Kamber Qafmolla and Ndoc Çoba³ who were afraid to come. Having examined the situation, this meeting decided to set up a General Staff, with Spiro Moisiu as commander, Enver Hoxha as commissar, and the following members: Abaz Kupi, Myslim Peza, Baba Faja, Haxhi Lleshi, Baca (Ramadan Çitaku), Ymer Dishnica, Sejfulla Malëshova, Mustafa Gjinishi, Bedri Spahiu, Dali Ndreu. . . There were discussions on the enlargement of the National Liberation General Council, and the former council was unanimously approved, while Sejfulla Malëshova and Haxhi Lleshi were co-opted. The Council elected its presidium which was charged with the task of organizing a broad conference to elect a wider council, including other elements who have proved themselves during a year of war. There was discussion on the subversive attitude of the "Balli", and on this issue we were all of one mind and our decision was unanimous. Only Abaz Kupi raised some objections concerning the star, claiming that the people did not like this emblem, and so forth. He added that he personally was not at all opposed to the use of the star, "for", he said, "you have consecrated it with your blood

² The meeting of the General Council held in July 4, 1943.

³ Later on he deserted and collaborated with the German occupiers.

and sacrifices. You can put it anywhere else, except on the flag". Following some discussion, we reached agreement. We explained to Abaz Kupa that it was not the people who had raised the question of the star, but the Ballists, whose aims we know so well, and that we cannot remove it merely to please the Ballists. We can discuss it with them when they have entered the war and have shed their blood in the battles against the invader, and not when they are fighting as at present, mainly against us, and not at all against the invader. Bazi accepted our reasoning. It was also decided to make another appeal to the "Balli," and to invite some of its chiefs so as to tell them frankly the aim and the decision of the National Liberation General Council. We appointed our delegates to hold discussions with them, and these were: Bazi i Canës, Myslim⁴, Ymer⁵, Mustafa Gjinishi and Kamber Qafmolla, provided he accepted the position of the Council on all that was decided in Labinot. We also fixed the points on which the talks with the "Balli" should be based. These points were: the "Balli Kombëtar" must cease fighting the councils and immediately join actively in the liberation war, and not only in words; it must agree to take part in the national liberation councils and to attend a broad conference including, besides the National Liberation Council and the "Balli", a great many other honest patriots. At the same time, the "Balli" should expel from its ranks compromising elements such as Ali Këlcyra and company⁶. In particular, we stressed to Ymer Dishnica

4 Myslim Peza.

5 Ymer Dishnica.

6 One of the heads of the traitorous "Balli Kombëtar" organization. In March 1943, authorized by the "Central Committee" of the "Balli", he and the commander of the Italian fascist troops of occupation, R. Dalmazzo, signed a secret protocol, which envisaged the coordination of actions against the national liberation forces.

and Mustafa Gjinishi the stand they should take as communists, knowing full well what the "Balli" and its manoeuvres were, and what game it was playing.

Ten days after we left Labinot, we received the first letter from Ymer which in essence goes like this: In the course of a first meeting⁷ with Lumo Skëndo and Hasan Dosti⁸, after much discussion and hesitation on their part, it was decided to record the conclusions of these negotiations in minutes which were signed by both parties; here are the main points noted by Ymer in his letter (I am putting them down word for word, because they are of great importance):

I. Immediate war against the fascist invader.

II. Both organizations accept the basic idea of forming a joint committee called the "COMMITTEE FOR THE SALVATION OF ALBANIA".

III. Fight for a genuinely free, independent and democratic Albania.

IV. The committee has as its program the liberation of the Albania of 1913; as for the other zones inhabited by Albanians, it claims the universal right of self-determination of people, guaranteed by the Atlantic Charter.

In his letter, Ymer dwelt at length on his opinions and remarks on the "Balli" men, pointing out the manoeuvres of the "Balli", which is trying "to enter history without fighting", "to take the reins of the movement", etc. Then, he adds his own comment that "events are developing quickly", that "the fall of the Duce will have great repercussions", "the whole world is in a fever", "they too are all feverish", etc., etc. He did not even finish this letter, for

⁷ The first meeting with the chiefs of the "Balli Kombëtar" took place on July 26, 1943.

⁸ Representative of the "Balli Kombëtar", war criminal in the National Liberation War, fled abroad where he headed for a while a reactionary organization at the service of the Anglo-Americans.

he went to meet the "Balli" delegates in a village of Dajti. This was the content of the letter, and we understood nothing, either from this letter or from the discussions of which he speaks, to enable us to help him. We saw only four bare points of which the second was obscure, but nevertheless existed in the minutes, while there is no mention at all in the letter of the points we had decided upon in Labinot, though they should have been discussed. Since the time we had specified for their stay there was over, and the result of the first letter he sent us was insignificant, we wrote that they should come back.

We have received a second letter from Ymer, the essence of which is: At the second meeting⁹ with the "Balli" their reckoning was complicated mainly by two points: first "ethnic Albania" and the proclamation of independence, and second, the abrogation of the April 12 decision of the Assembly¹⁰. "The first obstacle", he writes, "that of 'ethnic Albania', has been surmounted through an ambiguous formula, similar to that I mentioned in the first letter". "We surmounted the second obstacle," Ymer goes on in his letter, "by leaving it in the hands of a definitive committee to be set up before August 8." This is the content of the second letter and nothing more; nothing about distributing a leaflet, or even asking our opinion about the distribution of a leaflet; they merely said that we should move nearer to Tirana or send them the necessary directives before August 8.

⁹ The second meeting with the chiefs of the "Balli Kombëtar" was held on August 1-2, 1943 in Mukje near Kruja.

¹⁰ On April 12, 1939, in order to cover up the annexation of Albania, the Italian fascists convened in Tirana the "Constituent Assembly" which sanctioned the "personal union" of Albania with Italy, proclaimed the Italian King, Victor Emmanuel III, King of Albania, and elected a puppet Albanian government headed by the big landowner and collaborationist Shefqet Vërlaci.

We replied that we did not agree with what they were discussing, that this was not the time to proclaim the independence of Albania, but that first the "Balli" should declare war on Italy, that it was seeking through these manoeuvres to hide its murky past, and to annul the April 12 Assembly, and let it become a thing of the past because all the principal "Ballists" had taken part in it. On the other hand, we reminded them of the tasks which had been assigned to them and of the points they had been told to discuss, advising them not to go beyond these points. But they did not even wait for our reply and, on 6 and 7 August, circulated a leaflet in the name of the "Committee for the Salvation of Albania", which speaks of everything except the war against fascism and what our Party is striving for. Instead, it speaks of the "fight for an independant, democratic and popular Albania", of "the application of the principle of self-determination of the people, universally recognized and guaranteed by the Atlantic Charter", and of the struggle for an "ethnic Albania". To us, this leaflet represented a capitulation to the "Balli", for it wiped off all our efforts and our war, ignored the national liberation councils and the slogans with which we led and inspired the war, while on the other hand, the "Balli", which has committed so many infamous deeds, emerged as the saviour of Albania. Following the publication of that leaflet, we sent to all party organizations the circular which you have no doubt received and acted upon.

This, of course, will have repercussions in our work; we should by no means agree to fall in line with the position dictated by the "Balli" and accepted by the Doctor. Nor shall we alter either the form or the name of the national liberation councils. We shall carry on the fight even more fiercely under the same slogans and under the banner of the National Liberation War. For these reasons,

the leaflet distributed in the name of the "Committee for the Salvation of Albania" should be denounced, and as for the question of uniting, we will unite only on the terms we set out below:

1. — War against the fascist occupiers and all their servants.

2. — Unity in the war, but not in a token war waged with the aim of whitewashing former faults, so as to take over the banner of the war and to sabotage it in another way because the first way failed, but unity in a real, fierce, and incessant war against the fascist occupiers and traitors.

3. — In the course of this war, as defined in the preceding point, we shall achieve the formation of a joint operational staff for all Albania, as well as operational zone staffs.

4. — The national liberation councils are the state power, which stems from the people and from the war; they have been democratically elected by the people and should be recognized by all as the people's democratic power.

5. — We are For an independent, democratic Albania, in which the people themselves, after the war, will decide the form of the regime.

6. — Respect for the Atlantic Charter, and the London and Washington Treaties between the USSR, Great Britain, and the United States; in connection with the question of Kosova and Çamëria, this will be resolved after the war by the Kosova and Çamëria population themselves, who will decide their future according to their wishes. We shall do our utmost to create a situation in which this matter can be settled with complete justice. Until fascism is wiped out, our main patriotic task is to encourage and aid the population of Kosova and Çamëria to engage in war against the occupiers and their servants,

for only thus can they guarantee their own existence and their right to self-determination.

7. — We are for a war fought jointly with all the political trends of the country which are in continuous, immediate and implacable struggle against the fascist occupiers and their servants.

8. — We do not collaborate with the "Balli Kombëtar" as an organization, as long as the "Balli" has in its ranks people who have connections with the occupiers, who sabotage the National Liberation War, who fight against the National Liberation Front and against the Communist Party, and as long as it retains criminals and bandits in its ranks.

9. — We collaborate with all those elements who have sided with the invader until now but have not committed crimes against the people, and who, from now on, pursue the genuine line of the war and abandon once and for all the erroneous positions they have been led into by the enemy propaganda.

It is impossible to tell you all our thoughts about the consequences and situations which might arise from this position. You should go into this deeply and draw conclusions yourselves; but we are advising you in general how to act as to do away with this state of affairs, and not only to do away with it, but to surmount it to our advantage; that is where our determination and ability as communists in the most difficult situations will appear.

The first thing to do is to strengthen the organization and not allow any vacillation or discontent to appear. You should do this by clearly explaining our correct line, and that it is the delegates, and not the Central Committee, who are responsible for this business; that one or two people may make mistakes, but not the Party, and it cannot permit its political line to be violated and distorted. On the other hand, the entire organization should be mobilized

immediately and the Party should tighten its ranks. Broad and lively meetings should be organized with the population, to tell them our stand and that of the "Balli", unmasking all those who have resorted to intrigues and rotten trickery, and frankly seek from the people the opinion that we cannot collaborate with such individuals. For example: Ali Këlcyra has done this and that, he is a crook who has fought against the movement, he has compromised with the occupiers, and he is one of the "Balli" too; consequently, we cannot collaborate with the "Balli" until it has expelled such elements. On the basis of the points we have set out, we should tell the people that only in this way will we accept collaboration and unity. The councils, friends, party members, and sympathizers should be mobilized and set in motion. Re-read the first circular we sent you too, and act as we instruct you there, to strengthen the organization. Soon you will receive two leaflets which are to be duplicated and distributed throughout the region, and studied everywhere at meetings and conferences held with the population. One of these leaflets will be from the Central Committee in response to the accusations made against us by the "Balli", and the other, from the council, will explain our attitude to you even more clearly. You should inform Gjirokastra as soon as possible of our position, and they too should act in this way. . .

Concerning the question of the army, we shall write separately to the zone command from the General Staff.

On the 15th of this month we celebrated the formation of the brigade, which was a huge success. More than one thousand people were present at the ceremony, and the parade was applauded with great enthusiasm by the population, and by all the councils of the region which had hastened to be present at the founding of the first

unit of our regular army. And, indeed, comrades, it looked like a regular army. There were many speeches and songs, then a great picnic was organized, where nothing was heard but songs, speeches, and hatred for the occupiers. This is an important date in the history of our movement. This example should be quickly followed by all regions.

Our friends, the allies, do not keep the promises they have made; they have dropped very few weapons, if any at all.

The situation in the regions is unchanged. The organization here has many shortcomings and great looseness. We hope that during the short time it stays here, the brigade will give an impetus to the work.

I am enclosing a letter, carried by a partisan of the brigade. You have eight hundred pounds that the Englishmen gave you; give five hundred to this partisan and help him to buy a quantity of grain, which should be stored for the 1st Brigade in the places indicated. These provisions should not be touched. Take the rest of the money to buy weapons, which should be kept at the disposal of the General Staff.

The telegraphist, who came once and went away again, should start immediately for the place he went to before; he should not come with the idea of going home again, for he is to stay here. When he reaches this destination, he should ask for Nexhip, who will direct him to the right place.

We have not yet met Dr. Ymer, but we will meet him shortly and inform you about this. Since we have not had a meeting of the Central Committee, please give us your opinion on everything we have written to you about; we intend to hold a meeting shortly, and will inform you of it in due time.

With my comradely greetings and those of all the comrades, and especially of Halim¹¹.

Taras

After the error made by the Doctor the comrades of the CC are unanimous in their disapproval of the leaflet and of what the Doctor has done.

Taras

*"Principal Documents of the
PLA" vol. 1, Tirana 1960*

11 Pseudonym of the Yugoslav internationalist communist Miladin Popovich, who, in autumn 1941, having been freed by the Albanian communists from a fascist concentration camp, remained in Albania to maintain links between the CPA and the CPY. He supported the internationalist stand of the CC of the CPA. In September 1944, on orders of the leadership of the CPY, he left Albania and in March 1945 was assassinated by the Yugoslav secret service.

**REPORT TO THE 2nd NATIONAL LIBERATION
CONFERENCE¹ (OF LABINOT) ON OUR ATTITUDE
TOWARDS THE DIFFERENT TRENDS OUTSIDE
THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT**

September 6, 1943

We have almost reached the final point which is of particular importance. I ask that we all remain cool-headed during the discussions over this point. Our comments should be short and to the point. Thus we shall keep this Conference at the proper level. I will not speak at length. The war began from the day fascist Italy occupied our lands. We began to defend our honour, our homeland and our history. At first, the struggle was passive resistance, then it gathered momentum and impetus. We wanted to unite around an ideal, around a flag. The war could not be waged by a solitary group, a minority, but had to be waged by all the people in unity. We did not achieve this at once.

1 The 2nd National Liberation Conference was held at Labinot, Elbasan, from September 4 to 9, 1943. It took up as the main link the question of strengthening the people's democratic power. It approved the Constitution and the Rules of the national liberation councils and launched the slogan: "Recognition of the national liberation councils as the sole people's power in Albania." It elected the National Liberation General Council. It publicly denounced the Mukje agreement as an act contrary to the principles of the Peza Conference and decided to expose to the end the hostile activity of the "Balli Kombëtar".

The Communist Party was the only party to come out openly before the people, the only party to direct its members and cadres towards a single goal: the liberation of the country. The Communist Party was well aware that nothing could be done without the people. It began the war and united with the first patriots who had also understood that it must be waged. We united without distinction of religion or party. Each had faith in the other, and particularly in the communists, who had made great sacrifices. The war gained momentum. From the blood that was shed in the streets, the people understood that their forces were sufficient to prevent the fascists from oppressing them. The Communist Party, together with some nationalists, proceeding from one desire, one sacred aim, called the Peza Conference, to which numerous elements were invited. Among them there were some who were honest and unsullied. Some were sympathizers of Zog, and others had been members of various parties in 1924, but had not declared themselves openly before the people, such as Lumo Skëndo, Azis Çami², Skënder Muço and Thoma Orollogaj, present representatives of the "Balli Kombëtar". Lumo Skëndo sent a delegate. Abaz Ermeni was invited but did not come, or rather was not allowed, although he came to Tirana two days before. As for Skënder Muço, we agreed that he should come, but he did not come in time. At Peza it was decided to fight the occupiers without compromise, and to organize the national liberation councils as organs of the war. The bases for the war were laid. All honest people were to take part in these councils, which would be provisional. Later, these people would be replaced with members emerging from

² Later on he sided with the "Balli Kombëtar", and with the advent of the German occupiers held talks with them on behalf of the "Balli" for the creation of a police troop against the revolutionary forces.

the war. The door would remain open to all political parties which might emerge. The units were to remain under the command of those who had set them up until the General Staff was created. Azis Çami and Skënder Muço arrived at the end of the Conference. Although the meeting had ended, the resolution was read to them, and they accepted it without objection.

The councils began to spring up. It was at that time that the "Balli Kombëtar" appeared. How did this organization present itself to the people? Its first leaflet gave the impression that it accepted the war against fascism. Through its representatives, the General Council invited the "Balli Kombëtar" to send delegates to take part in the Council. They declared that they did not recognize the Peza Conference because in their opinion it was a communist conference. But the Peza Conference was not a communist conference. They objected that the Party attended it in an organized way, while the nationalists did not. The fact is that Abaz Kupi, Baba Faja³, Myslim Peza, Ndoc Çoba, etc. are not communists. On the other hand we ask the "Balli", "Why, since you are a 'powerful organization', you don't join the Council and intervene to control its operations and prevent the Communist Party from leading you 'towards ruin'?" The "Balli Kombëtar" did not recognize the Peza Conference and the National Liberation General Council. Why did it not recognize them? I think we need to look at the essence of this matter. The "Balli Kombëtar" is made up of various elements who have no clear principles. When they describe themselves as democrats or socialists, they have not the slightest idea of what democracy or socialism is. They have

3 Mustafa Xhani, during the war member of the National Liberation General Council and of the General Staff of the ANLA, after liberation deputy to the People's Assembly, was treacherously killed by the enemies of the people in March 1947.

no genuine ideals, but have merely formed an alliance. The "Balli" is directed by a central committee, composed of reactionary elements, with a doubtful or sinister past. Those of them who have been emigrants abroad, have fattened themselves on any foreign pasture, taking the money of every country; they have agreed with Giro⁴ and Co. to topple Zog, have based themselves on the Munich Treaty and been supported by the Axis policy. These people are directing the "Balli" as a reactionary force against the national liberation councils. These elements understand that they must play a role in Albania if they are to seize the reins of power with the least possible sacrifice on their part and with all the sacrifice on the part of the people; in this way they hope to shift from one soft seat to another. Although they have been intent on sabotaging the national liberation movement, the National Liberation Council has knocked three or four times at the door of the "Balli Kombëtar". The "Balli" accepts "cooperation with the Communist Party but not with the 'National Liberation Council'". It refuses to recognize the National Liberation Front. We have insisted that the National Liberation Front should include not only the Communist Party and the "Balli", but also every patriot who is willing to shed his blood for the liberation of the country. We proposed to them that one representative of the National Liberation Council, one of the "Balli", and one of the Communist Party, should come together to discuss the matter so as to bring about the unification of the people, but they refused. Everyone went on working separately. Then, we suggested at least co-ordination of actions between us, who were already involved in the war, and them, who had not joined in the war and did not wish to do so.

⁴ Giovanni Giro, Italian fascist hierarch, expert in Albanian affairs in the plans of the Italian fascist government to occupy Albania.

Our goal was that we should fight together. If the "Balli" had joined the fight, unity would have arisen out of our common sufferings, and Ali Këlcyra would not have found suitable ground to create complications, even though this co-ordination was the minimum basis for agreement. The "Balli Kombëtar" has fought against the national liberation movement in many ways. It has labelled it communist. They look as though they are waging an ideological war. This was the case not because they failed to understand, but because they wanted to cause a split in the movement and to disrupt the ranks of the National Liberation Front. At that time the armies of the Axis powers had the upper hand, and these people of the "Balli" had not the slightest confidence in the victory of the allies or in the alliance. By refusing to fight against fascism, they in fact rejected the principles of the Atlantic Charter and accepted the slogans of Mustafa Kruja, the war against Greece and Yugoslavia, and compromise with the enemy for defence against the Greek and Yugoslav danger. At the same time, the "Balli Kombëtar" started intriguing with individual people, grossly slandering the communists and misleading the crowd about the national liberation movement; it initiated the compromise with Italy to fight the national liberation movement; The "Balli" people made contact with the government of Mustafa Kruja. They dreamed of taking the government into their own hands, but when they saw that Mustafa Kruja, whose hands were stained with the people's blood, was thoroughly exposed, although they liked the compromise, they pretended to break with him. But the compromise continued with the advent to power of Maliq Bushati⁵. The "Balli" people were even invited to the palace to give Jacomoni

⁵ One of the chiefs of the "Balli Kombëtar", quisling prime minister in 1943.

their opinions on the government of the "Albanian people", of which the minister and prime minister should make good the damage done by Mustafa Kruja. The "Balli" had brought Bushati to power, and with his advent began a new series of compromises, intrigues and acts of treachery. While patriots were being killed and villages burnt, the "Balli" concluded an agreement with Jacomoni and Dalmazzo. Through the protocol which he signed, Ali Këlcyra ensured the Italian army freedom to pursue the national liberation units. The troops of Dalmazzo burned villages in the Vlora region. The "Balli Kombëtar" thought that in this way they had damaged the national liberation movement, which they considered communist. Ali Këlcyra paid compensation to the peasants for their burned houses (using Italian money), telling them that the villages had been burned by the communists. But who fired the rifles at Gjorm?⁶ Hysni Lepenica was against our war, but the people told him: "Either you come and fight, or you are against the people". This is the epic in which the Ballists take such pride.

These elements do the job of the common spies. We have facts to prove this, documents signed by the commanders of "Balli" units, such as Bektash Cakrani, Qazim Selfo, etc. We have a document⁷ signed by them (see the

6 In the battle of Gjorm, a village in the vicinity of Vlora, against the Italian occupiers from the 1st to the 3rd of January 1943, Hysni Lepenica, one of the chief representatives of the "Balli Kombëtar" in the region of Vlora, under pressure of the masses, pretended to unite with the national liberation forces, while in fact he tried to sabotage this battle. The "Balli Kombëtar" claimed credit for the battle of Gjorm so as to deceive the masses, but did not succeed.

7 In February 1943, Bektash Cakrani, representative of the "Balli Kombëtar" in the Mallakstra region, together with the commander of the Italian garrison in Fier, signed an agreement of collusion against the partisan detachments.

letter). In the name of the "Balli Kombëtar" Ali Këlcyra went around inciting the population to take up arms against the partisans and volunteers. Where there were reactionaries, the "Balli Kombëtar" succeeded. Where our forces were well entrenched, he did his best to hinder the struggle, saying: "The time has not come yet, we should preserve our forces. Italy is a great power, and we should not forget the Greeks and Yugoslavs, and the danger they represent". On the other hand, the "Balli" tried to uphold and preserve the institutions which protected fascism. It was against the efforts to purge the civil and military authorities in the service of the occupiers, for it was conscious of its inability to organize its own state power without them. It worked with might and main to set up the Albanian gendarmerie so as to employ it as a reactionary force against the national liberation movement. On the other hand, it imagined that with the creation of the gendarmerie, the peasants would not dare to move or to join the fight against fascism.

The "Balli" was for an "Albanian army". When we said that the Albanian army should be created in the mountains, and not in the fascist barracks, the "Balli Kombëtar" distributed leaflets to prevent volunteers from taking to the mountains, claiming that the army should first be created in the barracks, and that it should take to the mountains only when instructed by the "Balli Kombëtar".

The "Balli" wanted to keep the old laws in force, including the law on tithes, while we opposed this, and the peasants did not give the occupiers a single grain of wheat. When we called on the peasants not to pay any taxes to the occupiers, the "Balli Kombëtar" told them: "Pay, or they will kill us, and burn our villages".

From day to day the fight of the "Balli Kombëtar" against the national liberation movement assumed differ-

ent forms. The National Liberation Council has shown great patience. All the members of the movement have wanted to show the "Balli" the correct road, in the hope that it would abandon the road of compromise. But the "Balli" pursued a non-commitment policy. Recently, the struggle of the "Balli Kombëtar" against us has been greatly stepped up, from end to end of the country. Its entire work has been directed against us. In Gjirokastra, Dervish Rexhepi and Rasim Babameto have done all they can to impede the movement. In Libohova, they provoked the entry of the Italian army into the region, and turned their rifles against our partisan units. They have sacked Christian villages of the Greek minority to split them from the rest of the nation. But the minority people have given proof of their devotion to the cause of Albania's freedom. They wanted to extinguish the movement there, but the fighters and the members of the National Liberation Front succeeded in exposing the Ballists at various meetings organized among the people. The people have seen the aims of the "Balli" armed bands, which have been dispersed, while their commanders wander freely about the towns. In Vlorë the "Balli Kombëtar" boasts of its "heroic deeds", but it has committed a thousand infamies there. What, in fact, is this war which the "Balli" is making such a song and dance about? Its members are shouting themselves hoarse about the battle of Gjorm with Hysni Lepenica, the battle of Selenica with Isuf Luzaj, the battle of Mollas with Tefik Çfiri. They claim that it is they who fought these battles against the occupiers, while in reality in Vlorë, Korçë, Elbasan, and elsewhere, they have not fought except against us. In Gjorm, Hysni Lepenica, as I said before, reluctantly took part in the battle, and we fought together, but it was we who fought the battle of Selenica. The partisan and volunteer units captured 80 carabinieri and a

quantity of weapons. Isuf Luzaj did not fire a single shot. The battle of Mallakastra was not fought by the "Balli", but by our units from Myzeqe and Vlora. Tefik Cfiri and Skënder Muço have maintained a hostile attitude towards us.

The National Liberation Council called on the "Balli Kombëtar" to take part in the war. The "Balli" did not reply to the Council but to the Communist Party, because it identifies the National Liberation Front with the Communist Party, alleging that the Party hides itself behind the mask of the National Liberation Front. In the leaflet in which it replies to us, the "Balli Kombëtar" adopts the same attitude as the fascist occupier. We have the leaflet here, for you to see, and you can read it for yourselves at the end of the meeting. The "Balli Kombëtar" says that the Communist Party has nothing else to do but to accuse it of compromise. But the Communist Party has done a lot of other things, and people know what it has done. As for the attitude of the "Balli", the agreement with Dalmazzo is sufficient to prove that it has compromised. "Return to Albanian patriotism", is their call. And who makes this appeal? Precisely those people who have sold themselves to the occupiers and who deny the patriotism of Qemal Stafa⁸, Vojo Kushi⁹, and their comrades. These people are against the war, and they do the work of the fascist militia. According to them, the partisan units are fighting against the Albanian people, and not against the occupiers. They never mention the national liberation units, but speak only about the Communist Party. These falsifiers of history deny the Albanian people their nation-

⁸ Member of the CC of the CPA, political secretary of the Communist Youth of Albania, killed while fighting against the occupiers on May 5, 1942, People's Hero.

⁹ Member of the CPA, commander of a guerrilla unit, People's Hero.

al liberation movement. This is an attack on the National Liberation Front, a provocation aimed at unleashing civil war. In Skrapar, we have made an attempt to unite with the "Balli" bands and get them to participate in actions, but in vain. The "Balli" bands turned against us, killed Ramiz Aranitasi¹⁰, the commander, and his murderer remains in their ranks. In Korça, the "Balli" has engaged in propaganda to split our people into Muslims and Christians; while Safet Butka and company have begun to fight openly against us. We have captured documents which prove their treachery¹¹. The men of the "Balli" in Korça go arm in arm with the fascist spies from Yugoslavia and Greece. The documents declare that the national liberation movement is directed against the occupiers, while Safet Butka is against cutting the telephone and telegraph lines, against the attacks on the carabinieri posts, and so on. The Ballists are acting like gangsters in order to raise money.

The "Balli Kombëtar" sends us ultimatums calling on us to abandon the areas under our control, knowing that, when we withdraw from our positions, the occupier moves in and burns the villages, as occurred in Voskop. We are forced to suspect that the "Balli Kombëtar" is collaborating with the fascist invader against us. When we lie in waiting for the troops of the fascist invaders in Voskop, the bands of the "Balli" attack us from the rear. They threaten that, if we launch attacks in their regions, then they will attack us from behind (for example, Pasho

10 Member of the CPA, commander of a partisan unit, People's Hero.

11 The document mentioned is a note of the Italian Gendarmerie in Erseka, dated February 3, 1943, addressed to the Royal Questura in Korça which notified that Safet Butka, one of the "Balli Kombëtar" chiefs in the Korça region, was engaged in intense activity to sabotage the National Liberation War.

Kolaneci). And Hasan Velçani and Haki Blloshmi in Mokra make the same threats. Abaz Ermeni writes to Safet Butka: "If we go on like this without action, then the British, who are calling for action, will support the other side. Attack the enemy, (he says), regardless of what the Tirana Central Committee says in its order of 29.6.43."

These are only a few documents. We have others; every region has hundreds. We can see the naked reality of the work of the "Balli". We see that they are involved in betrayal. We must open the eyes of the people duped by the "Balli" and bring them on to the right road.

The aim of the National Liberation Council is to create solid unity, unity for the war, and not to hinder it. With this aim in mind it decided to send a delegation to the "Balli Kombëtar" in order to find out clearly what its attitude is, and to see whether it was seriously seeking to unite. The Council appointed as members of the delegation: Abaz Kupi, Ymer Dishnica, Mustafa Gjinishi, etc., and told them the principal points on which unity should be based. These were: the "Balli Kombëtar" must enter the war against the occupiers; the "Balli" must end its fight against the national liberation movement and the Communist Party; through struggle and work, to get the "Balli" to take part in a broad conference to lay on the table and discuss many problems concerning unity. This delegation made contact with the "Balli Kombëtar". Among you some may have attended the meeting at Zall i Herrit and Mukje. Our comrades there did not know how to defend the line of the National Liberation Front, but fell right into the lap of the "Balli Kombëtar" which knew how to impose its aims. It is clear (see the leaflet) that this was a defeat for the National Liberation Council. Why did our comrades go to that meeting? They went to bring the "Balli" into the war, and to hinder its war

against the national liberation movement and the Communist Party. But in fact what they talked about there was "independent Albania" and "ethnic Albania", and the war of today was forgotten.

On July 26, 1943, the first minutes were endorsed. The "Balli" wanted, through some token attacks, to shift from one soft seat to another, profiting from the fight others are waging. It thought that the day had come for it to ascend the throne. When the Duce fell, the "Balli" believed that it was all over, just as Mussolini had thought when France fell. The "Balli Kombëtar" trumpeted to its members to take to the mountains.

The "Balli" tried to impose its own opinions on us. And instead of talking about fighting the bloody war against the occupiers, they talked about setting up a committee. They started at the wrong end. The "Committee for the Salvation of Albania" was set up. This was the first error of our comrades, when they sat at the table with those people who have fought so hard against us, and have categorized us as people without a homeland.

There was talk of immediate fighting. But the "Balli" always talks, and does nothing else but talk about fighting. The "Balli" members themselves call Ali Këlcyra a traitor and, at the same time, regard him as the most patriotic democrat.

They speak of complete independence for Albania. This was also discussed at length at Mukje. The aim is to blot out April 12, 1939, and hastily proclaim "independence". But it is the Albanian people who will proclaim independence, and not the "Balli", which has been collaborating with fascism. The "Balli" wanted to blot out April 12, 1939, because three quarters of the Ballists had recognized the Accord of the Crown, while we had never recognized it. The people have never recognized either the fascist occupation or Victor Emmanuel.

The question of independence was discussed at length, as was the question of Kosova. This question has also served Mustafa Kruja as a bone of contention, as a matter for quarrels and division.

The National Liberation Council has had a clear-line and policy concerning Kosova and Çamëria, and stands by this policy, because it is correct. Our national liberation war is a people's war, a common struggle side by side with the allies against the Axis. This sound alliance tested in battle is more valuable than charters. The aim is that together, united, we should press on with the war, forgetting all the past, because over our heads hangs the threat of the common enemy; later on, we who have fought together in the greatest friendship will clear up our disagreements. The Albanian people, who know what suffering is, would never wish to enslave and dismember other nations who have suffered as they have, and vice-versa. This war has brought the peoples together. We have the protection of the Soviet Union, the defender of the small states and of all peoples. The question of Kosova cannot be ignored. The population there will agree among themselves and decide which way to go. The national liberation movement has a duty to make the Kosova population conscious of their aspirations, telling them that they must save themselves by struggle from the fascist occupiers, or some possible Yugoslav occupier such as Mihailovich¹². We should enable the population of Kosova to make their own decision about which way to go, as we want to do ourselves, and fight against the Yugoslavia which would try to enslave it.

12 In 1942 minister of war in the puppet Yugoslav government in London. He collaborated with the German occupiers against the Yugoslav national liberation movement, and terrorized the population of Kosova.

Our comrades acted wrongly at that meeting. We tell our opinion frankly. These comrades behaved like opportunists. In the second minutes, the "Balli Kombëtar" managed to change several of our clauses: "Immediate war against the enemy occupiers and against all other possible occupiers"¹³. Our delegates discussed this, but they did not know how to defend their views and ended by signing the minutes. Another point was added: "Ethnic Albania". In this way they accepted the thesis of the "Balli Kombëtar", which is not waging a national liberation war, but a war against us, and thus our delegation negated our struggle, our program, and the decisions of the Peza Conference. On the third point the word "popular" was added, for it was only "democratic". The fourth point speaks about a "provisional government", which means: the feverish desire of the "Balli Kombëtar" to become the government. A decision was reached to set up a "provisional committee", then a "permanent committee" which would "decide on the liberation of Albania".

These are the minutes signed by the delegation of the National Liberation Council. We see that our comrades were mistaken, that they slipped into opportunism, that they were unable to stand by the directives they had received from the Council. A proclamation was published, which crowns their work (the leaflet is read). In the leaflet we see that the national liberation movement has been swept aside. Only the "Balli Kombëtar", which did not fire a single shot, and a "Committee" which leads the

¹³ With the words "against all other possible occupiers" the "Balli Kombëtar" meant to turn the attention of the people away from the war against the Italian fascist occupiers, with which it was colluding, by qualifying "the Serbian and Greek occupiers" as the most dangerous enemies of Albania. This was opposite to the instructions the National Liberation General Council had given to its delegation. (See in this volume p. 161).

war emerge from it. They promote the "Balli" which has fought against us so long, and do not even mention the national liberation movement. There is not a single word about fascism or about the atrocities of the Italians. We should be patient no longer. We can not allow our movement, our sacrifices, and our national liberation councils to be swept aside, as happened in Mukje.

Our delegation is greatly to be blamed here. The National Liberation General Council does not agree with them, and even the delegates themselves understood that they had committed a grave error. The "Balli Kombëtar" managed to impose on them its intrigues and its burning desires. How should we act towards the "Balli Kombëtar"? As I have said, the movement demands that all who want progress should unite in the struggle. We seek a strong and healthy unity, and this can be achieved only in the fight. We shall unite with the "Balli Kombëtar" only when it gets down to business, fighting the enemy and shedding its blood, when it no longer has in its ranks sold-out opportunist elements, bandits and criminals, when its ranks are cleaned up (Ali Këlcyra, Safet Butka, Tefik Cfiri and others should be purged). Individuals like these, we shall expose before the people as perpetrators of fratricide, because it is they who threaten us with letters and leaflets, who pour out abuse against us and fight us with arms. We shall cooperate with the "Balli Kombëtar" when the honest elements in its ranks understand where the chiefs of the "Balli Kombëtar" have been driven by their own ideas, because among the Ballists there are people who are not as bad as their chiefs. Only when the "Balli" has given clear proof of its good intentions, can we unite with it. But the "Balli Kombëtar" is becoming a "refugium peccatorum", a refuge for assassins and reactionaries. Irfan Ohri and his agents are being incorporated in it, and all those who were on the side of the

fascists, like Shefqet Vërlaci and his cronies. They want to extinguish the movement and reimpose the forces of darkness so that tomorrow the people will not have the chance to judge them for their treason. The "Balli Kombëtar" is following a completely wrong road, and does not want the Albanian people to find it out. We shall never allow the reactionary elements of the "Balli Kombëtar" to come in and destroy our councils in the places where our comrades have been killed to set them up. We shall punish them with the greatest severity. Now the people have understood who we are and what we want, and they will support us and rally around us. We shall also reply to the "Balli Kombëtar" about the "Committee" which has been created, and about the accusations against us, but we must organize the councils, strengthen the army, make the people conscious, and wage a fierce war against all traitors. This Council¹⁴ has not accepted the "Committee", and I hope this conference will not accept it either. We should unite with the honest elements, and not with worthless people.

As you can see, the National Liberation Front and the CPA, which leads it, have done their best, showing great patience; they have tried in every way and made sacrifices to persuade the "Balli Kombëtar" to join the war against the occupiers for the liberation of our people. But the "Balli Kombëtar" joined in the war against the people, against the Front, against the CPA; the "Balli Kombëtar", or the "Balli Tradhëtar"*¹⁵, has united with the occupiers. Thus they have burned their bridges. We will fight them mercilessly, as the traitors and collaborators with the occupiers that they are.

14 The National Liberation General Council.

* Balli Kombëtar = National Front; Balli Tradhëtar = Traitorous Front.

We have fought and defeated Italian fascism, Mustafa Kruja and the militia. We are fighting and will defeat the "Balli Kombëtar", too, if the misguided elements do not repent and do not take the correct road. I ask each of you to express your opinion, but I do not think that the main point is the question of the "Balli". The main issue is the war against the occupiers. The problem of the "Balli" comes next.

We shall try to bring other trends into the national liberation movement. This is how we acted, for example, with the Greek minority. Today they are under occupation by the same enemy. They have had to fight side by side with us, their war is our war, for the same enemy is oppressing us. The people of Dropull have understood this well. The Greek minority has risen to the occasion, fought with dedication, and defended the interests of the homeland against the Greek reactionaries.

There are also the Dibra chieftains: comrade Haxhi Lleshi and others will speak about them, but I, too, have something to say about them. They have collaborated openly with the occupiers, and are continuing to do so. We have not failed to expose them before the people, so that they renounce the agreement signed with the occupier to the detriment of our movement, the war of partisan units and action. We have told them individually and before the people to participate in the councils, and to set up councils. They imagined that they could avoid war through compromises, and in the end obtain sinecures; but they did not understand that fascism is perfidious (take the example of Qazim Koculi¹⁵). Fascism has attacked them one by one, or has reached a compromise with some. How should we behave towards the elements who

¹⁵ After the defeat suffered by Italian and Albanian fascists in Gjorm, Qazim Koculi was shot by the fascists themselves.

have not totally compromised themselves? We should unite with them and with others who are not on the side of the occupiers. As for those who have killed and burned, we shall settle accounts with them with guns.

As for the Catholic clergy of Shkodra and the mountain regions, we shall try to turn them from the road of war against the national liberation movement, and if this is not possible, then we shall fight them relentlessly.

We should try to detach from the traitors the misguided people from the poor strata of the population, those who go to bed hungry at night. If we try hard enough we can achieve this.

There are many, many isolated patriots and nationalists who have not taken part in the war. These are people of various mentalities. They fought the First World War in a different manner. They are afraid for themselves and they fear us. We should extend a hand to them, rally them, explain things to them, and ask them to help our struggle, no matter how small their aid may be. We should gather them around the national liberation councils.

In our activity we should always uphold the principles laid down at the Peza Conference. We should explain to the people our work and the way we are going so that they do not come to us blindly, but understand these principles clearly. We must go to the people in this way so that the power of the national liberation councils becomes the only power, because it is the only democratic one. Thus, we will achieve a democratic state power, for which we are ready to give what is most precious to us, our lives.

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Works, vol. 1.

**DIRECTIVE ON THE SITUATION CREATED
FOLLOWING THE CAPITULATION
OF FASCIST ITALY**

September 10, 1943

TO ALL REGIONAL PARTY COMMITTEES

Dear comrades,

You are no doubt aware of the situation created, but nevertheless we are informing you about the state of affairs, the attitude you should adopt, and measures to be taken, especially concerning the internal situation.

The great Soviet offensive, carried out with new breadth and style and extending over a front of more than one thousand kilometers, is advancing, liberating towns and wide areas. This powerful offensive has not only stopped the Germans, but has forced them to retreat with countless losses. The words of comrade Stalin are coming true — he said: "We shall liberate our lands from the German fascist invaders within a short time, and they will suffer the most shameful defeat". Cities such as Kharkov, Byelgorod, Orel, Stalino and the entire Donets basin are permanently in the hands of the heroic Red Army. The Soviet armed forces, which are growing in numbers and becoming stronger all the time, armed with the most up-to-date equipment, are marching towards the Ukraine in tenfold forces. In face of the tanks, aircraft, and the brilliant strategy of our great comrade Stalin, Hitler's

gang and the supposedly invincible German strategy suffered ignominious defeat, and the glorious Red Army, led by the Bolshevik Party of the USSR, is preparing the speedy liberation of the enslaved peoples, and a happy future for them.

Italy has surrendered unconditionally. The continuing political and military defeats suffered by fascism in Africa, Sicily and elsewhere brought about the ignominious downfall of Mussolini and the advent of the reactionary government of Badoglio. One of the main causes which constrained the Badoglio government¹ to capitulate was the development of the Italian people's movement, the magnificent strikes of the workers (proletariat) of the North led by the heroic Italian Communist Party and other progressive parties. (We note that the BBC, characteristically, makes no reference to the Italian Communist Party, but only to the Italian Socialist Party, as the leader of this movement ; it does the same with the Polish Socialist Party and other social democratic "progress-loving", "agrarian", etc. parties, as a means of infection from abroad to bring about the creation of parties of this type in other countries too, with the aim of dividing the people's forces in their liberation struggle and diverting them from the objective of their war. The aim is to prevent the fall of Hitler and Mussolini from having serious consequences for the reactionaries and the capitalists of London and New York, to disorganize the proletariat, in the first place, and the people's forces, and to arouse scepticism among the backward masses. This is how they acted in the First World War with the social democratic and social-chauvinist parties led by Kautsky, Scheidemann, Tseretelli, Chernov, Legien, and Co. But the communist parties have the

¹ The Badoglio government came to power in July 1943, and fell in June 1944.

experience of the First World War, and will know how to find their bearings in this situation.)

The alliance between the British and American people on one hand, and the people of the Soviet Union on the other, is a reality, a close alliance in the war against fascism. This is a special and characteristic phase of this war, and the alliance is being strengthened between the peoples of Britain, America and the Soviet Union, and those of the enslaved nations.

Hitler wanted to capture all the countries of the world, and thus threatened the national existence of Britain and America. This is one of the main reasons for the Anglo-Soviet-American alliance. But we should not forget that British government officials rejected the request for this alliance made by the Soviet Union a long time ago, until British interests were directly threatened by German imperialism, which became a real danger to Britain. It is natural that in such a situation a strong bloc was created by this alliance, which is headed by the Soviet Union. More and more anti-fascist forces began to gather round this bloc.

In the highest circles in Britain and in the British government itself, there are reactionary elements who want to establish reactionary forces in the oppressed countries, and this is precisely why they have been trying to form reactionary governments in London to take over in the oppressed countries after the fall of Hitler. The same circles which installed Hitler and Mussolini in power, are now trying to turn the course of the present war against Hitler and Mussolini in the direction of a so-called new Europe, that is, in the direction of a new Versailles². Thus they

² The great imperialist powers, the signers of the Versailles Treaty (July 1919), trampling underfoot the rights of the Albanian people, left out of the border large Albanian inhabited territories to satisfy the greed of the chauvinists of the border states, servants of the imperialist powers.

have set up reactionary governments to represent those peoples; but in fact they are nothing but tools in the hands of reaction to oppress the national liberation movements of those peoples. We cannot exclude the possibility of such government for Albania being set up in London, or of aid to create one here; therefore we are informing the comrades so that, if this happens, they will know what attitude to take. Certain individuals in government circles and some prominent journalists, such as Beveridge³, the "sociologist" of the "new Europe", have promised the revival of a "new Europe" and aid in food, clothing, medicines, etc. We are opposed to the way they give this aid and to the purpose for which it is given. The comrades should be clear about this question and should study it carefully, so that they direct their agitation, not against Britain and America in general, for we are in an alliance with them in this war, but against the reactionary elements in the governments of those countries.

Following the unconditional surrender of Italy a new situation has been created, not only in Italy, but here too. The Germans are endeavouring to concentrate all power in their hands, and thus to occupy "occupied" Albania. In this situation there are contradictions between the German and Italian soldiers. Meanwhile our stand towards the Italian army is changing, and today we regard it with a different eye. We should exploit their contradictions, which are becoming more profound from day to day. If the Italian army is not going to fight against us, we shall invite it to join us under the slogan "fraternization in the war against Hitler's Germany" and we shall consider the

3 Reactionary British economist, ardent defender of the capitalist order.

Italian soldiers as brothers-in-arms⁴; but if they go on fighting against us, then we shall fight them as fiercely as the Germans.

The differentiation of the reaction began some time ago, and this process is now becoming more and more marked, and not to our advantage, but with reaction gaining strength. It is clear that day by day, further reactionary elements are gathering around the "Balli". These reactionary and "Ballist" elements are endeavouring to seize power and establish their reactionary government. They are trying to increase their strength, and thus to profit from a possible allied landing.

The landing of the allies in the Balkans, or even in Albania, is no longer a remote prospect⁵. Therefore our organizations should work to be able to cope with such a situation. If there should be an allied landing, the national liberation councils will have to be genuine organs of the

4 The call of the General Staff of the ANLA to surrender the arms and to join the ANLA in the war against the Hitlerites was answered by only 15,000 Italian officers and men of whom 1,500 were incorporated into the Albanian partisan units, while the others were sheltered in the liberated areas of the country. According to the orders of the CPA, the people welcomed them and supported them fraternally, despite the atrocities the Italian fascist army had perpetrated in Albania, while the chief persons responsible for these crimes were meted out the punishment they deserved wherever they were got hold of. The greater part of the Italian army stationed in Albania surrendered to the Germans and was interned to forced labour camps in Germany, where many officers and men were cruelly massacred.

5 At that time it was rumoured that the allied forces would soon land in the Balkans. The Anglo-American forces did not land in the Balkans either in 1943 or at the beginning of 1944. In summer and autumn when the Allied Mediterranean High Command asked to land its troops in Albania with the specific aim of saving the internal reaction from complete destruction and impeding the triumph of the people's revolution, the General Staff of the ANLA refused permission for such a landing.

people's power. They will have to mobilize the entire people around them and prevent the other forces, such as the "Balli Kombëtar", from exerting their influence on the people. The National Liberation Army must be very strong, must have the whole people behind it, and not permit the creation of military formations of its opponents, such as the "Balli Kombëtar". You should be aware that the allied landing forces will support all the Albanian forces they meet, without any preference for those of the national liberation movement, and moreover, bearing in mind the Darlan affair⁶, with preference for the reactionaries. To avoid this possibility, from now on the national liberation forces should begin to make their presence felt everywhere and, in the case of a landing, should present themselves to the allies, through the councils and the National Liberation Army, as the sole state power of the Albanian people. The allies should be in Albania with their armies only to smash the Germans and their running dogs, but the governing of Albania should be entirely in the hands of the national liberation movement, and the allies should recognize this. Therefore, as from today, all the organizations should work with all their might to this end.

You know that the agreement concluded with the "Balli Kombëtar" on the creation of the "Committee for the Salvation of Albania" was to the detriment of the national liberation movement and our Party, and as such has been repudiated by the Central Committee. We informed you of this long ago. This agreement has put us in a difficult position. At a time when the "Balli

⁶ Reactionary French admiral, former commander of the armed forces of the Vichy fascist government. In November 1942 he handed himself over to the Americans in North Africa, who, furthering their imperialist aims, appointed him as Commissioner for French North Africa.

Kombëtar" should have been in a tight corner because of its activity in favour of the fascist occupiers, at a time when the "Balli" should have been shown up before the Albanian people as a disruptive organization, systematically sabotaging all our efforts to unite our people on a sound basis, we played right into its hands, with just the agreement it wanted to help it scheme and plot among the people. It was the moment to accelerate the differentiation in the ranks of the "Balli", in order to separate the people from the "Balli", to divide the honest elements, who had been victims of the reactionary leaders, from the opportunist, anti-popular, and anti-patriotic policy of the "Balli". Through this agreement we enabled the "Balli" to become more closely linked with the elements who had brought pressure to bear from within to persuade it to reach an agreement with us. We allowed the "Balli" to tighten and strengthen its ranks and retain a strong hold over the backward masses who, deceived and lacking political clarity, still follow it. The reaction and the "Balli" leaders especially, now hope to divide the ranks of the National Liberation War, to consolidate their position through political manoeuvres ; they are thinking of forming a social-democratic party for this purpose. At the head of this manoeuvre they have placed such elements as Skënder Muço and Hysni Lepenica, who, though reactionaries in deeds, are unfortunately regarded as democrats by a section of the people. We should be careful to prevent that section of the national liberation movement, which is still unclear about unity and about how unity with the "Balli" should be effected, from falling into the trap of this manoeuvre. We should be cautious about elements who have entered the ranks of the Party after insufficient work has been done with them, and who have had close links with elements who oppose the National Liberation War,

and we should also be careful about the elements from the former "Zjarri" group.

In order to clarify the situation, to take a definite stand in the situation which had arisen it was necessary to convene the National Liberation General Council and the 2nd National Liberation Conference on a national scale. Because of the haste and because of the conditions in which we find ourselves, it was not possible for a very large number of delegates to attend. At the Conference, a unanimity of opinion was evident, especially concerning the stand we should maintain towards the "Balli Kombëtar". Although we shall shortly send you the resolution of the Conference, we are giving here a summary of the main points of its decisions:

"The 'Balli Kombëtar' is an organization which emerged as a reaction against the national liberation movement; it has fallen into the trap prepared by the enemy to divide the Albanian people and to bring about a fratricidal war. The whole of reaction, with all its various shades, is being incorporated into its ranks.

Our stand towards the 'Balli' should be severe and correct. Its opportunist policy should be denounced without mercy, its demagogical campaign for unity should be combatted, and it should be clearly explained that it is the national liberation movement alone that has striven with might and main for the true unity of the Albanian people; that unity is of the greatest importance to those who support the war and freedom of the people; that unity cannot be achieved when one takes one road and the other takes the opposite one, that unity must be based on a sound foundation, otherwise it is not unity, but division. We call on the 'Balli Kombëtar' to renounce its incorrect policy and join the ranks of the National

Liberation Front, accepting the program of the Council. However, in order not to lose any opportunity for uniting the Albanian people, we are willing to accept even a looser cooperation with the 'Balli Kombëtar' organization, but this cooperation must be subject to the following minimum conditions: 1) immediate and continuous war against the Italian and German fascist occupiers; 2) joint struggle together with the great British-Soviet-American allies, with the oppressed peoples, and in particular, with the national liberation movements of the neighbouring peoples of Yugoslavia and Greece; the acceptance of the policy of the people's right to self-determination, in conformity with the common struggle of the freedom-loving peoples, and on the basis of the Atlantic Charter and the London and Washington Treaties; the solution of the question of Kosova in accordance with the wishes of the Kosova people; 3) recognition of the national liberation councils as the sole democratic people's power, a point which must be insisted on; 4) the 'Balli' must purge its ranks of those elements who have connections with the fascist invaders, of spies, criminals and speculators linked with the speculating cliques of the enemy in their efforts to take the food from the very mouths of the people in these difficult wartime economic conditions; 5) an immediate end to the fight against the Communist Party and the anti-communist propaganda, which is irreconcilable with the struggle to establish true people's democracy in Albania.

The majority of the Dibra chieftains, many Northern chieftains⁷, and many influential figures in South

⁷ Chieftains in some mountain areas where traces of the tribal system were still preserved.

and Central Albania have remained in a position close to that of the 'Balli'. The Dibra chieftains have struck up an 'itifik'* among themselves and made an agreement with the enemy, which is the equivalent of the Dalmazzo-Këlcyra protocol. On the question of unity and cooperation with them and with all those outside the national liberation movement, the same stand should be maintained as towards the 'Balli Kombëtar'.

With regard to the capitulation of Italy, the Conference has decided that we should call on the Italians to surrender to us, for we are one of the powers of the British-Soviet-American alliance. If they persist in their previous stand towards us, we, too, shall persist in our previous stand, and shall be even more severe. But we should bear in mind that today our chief enemy is Germany and that the Italian soldiers want to go home more than anything else, so we should call on them to join us against the Germans, or give us their weapons. We should insist on disarming the Italian army. In the new situation, especially in the liberated zones, the national-liberation councils should truly exercise state power and eliminate the influence of other trends. To this end, the national liberation councils should be strengthened, especially from the organizational viewpoint, and councils should be set up in every village, in communes, sub-prefectures (not for the towns, but for the entire sub-prefecture) and prefectures".

We think that it will be impossible to reach an agreement with the "Balli Kombëtar". We think, too, that the "Balli" has embarked on a road which will inevitably lead to an armed clash with us, and therefore we should work

* Itifik (Tur. in the original) — alliance.

as follows: through intelligent and tireless work we should unmask the "Balli" and discredit it in the eyes of the people, detach the people from it and bring them over to our side; we should cause divergencies in the ranks of the "Balli", and create situations which will encourage and accelerate the differentiation in the ranks of the "Balli", and strike with intelligence and determination at its reactionary leaders; we should present the "Balli" to the people as the source of splits and fratricide, so that they see that the policy of the "Balli" will lead to armed confrontation; we should encourage the entire people to revolt against this, and thus the historic responsibility for this lack of unity among the Albanian people, and for the armed clashes among them, will fall where it belongs, and this should be made clear to everyone in Albania. We must prepare ourselves, we must prepare the whole national liberation movement, and the people for an armed clash with the "Balli". The "Balli" is preparing this clash and must not catch us with our arms folded. We must not allow the "Balli" to prepare itself and choose the conditions most favourable to its attack on us, but should force it into a corner and make it show its hand, and thus we can attack it at the moment most favourable to us, when the people have understood what it is up to, and have united with us against it.

The situation forces us to act, but in order to act we must be prepared, especially, militarily. The organization and strengthening of the military units in the towns is today an urgent problem of great importance. These units should be well equipped with revolvers and hand-grenades and, if possible, with automatic rifles (we should do our best to buy or seize these weapons from the Italians, and not wait a single day for others to send them to us). The units should be placed under the command of the best, most capable and suitable comrades of the Party. We

should study how to attack the most important town centres and, especially, those centres where arms are stored. The Gestapo centers and those of the German commands in general should be discovered and attacked. The most dangerous spies, the agents of the fifth column, people who until yesterday were closely linked with the enemy, and today are going underground or joining other organizations, such as the "Balli Kombëtar", in order to organize the war against the national liberation movement, and especially against our Party, such people as Irfan Ohri, Qamil Xhani, Vehib Runa, etc., must be executed. The spies and agents of the German army must be executed. In the towns, hiding places must be prepared for caches of weapons and for underground activists, in order to ensure the continuous functioning of our organizations and units.

Always bear in mind that in attacks on towns the actions of the guerrilla units inside the town should be combined with those of the partisan units. Never forget the importance of documents in the secret offices of the enemy which should fall into our hands. As from now all party organizations should be mobilized to deal with anything that might occur and be ready to cope with the unexpected. The party cells will be the driving force to bring the entire people of town and countryside into motion, and should be purged of any elements who will not carry out these vital tasks. The Party comrades should be told that now the time has come for them to really prove themselves as the reliable and courageous leading section of the people, and to understand the decisiveness of this moment we are passing through towards taking state power. The cells should be the driving force of the groups of sympathizers and friends of the Party, to whom it should be stressed that today they should give their all for the liberation of the country, to consolidate our Party and

raise its prestige. The Party's technical equipment should be fully mobilized and working day and night, producing leaflets and proclamations to explain to the people the different situations created and the events which are unfolding, always indicating the road they should follow. At every moment you should maintain a clear-cut political stand, based on the directives of the Central Committee. The mobilization of the whole organization should be linked with the mobilization and preparation of the entire people for the general uprising. Great care should be devoted to the mobilization and organization of the youth, because the young people in Albania are the most vigorous and healthiest force of the national liberation movement. The greatest possible help should be given to the youth.

Anti-fascist women's organizations should be set up, and they do not have to be brought together only on the basis of their suburb or village ; they can and should be set up also on the basis of occupation, or say, for example, through setting up societies to abolish illiteracy, through sewing circles to make clothing for the army, etc. These organizations should be given all possible aid, and we should draw elements from them into the Party.

Following the capitulation of Italy, we should anticipate the German resistance on the continent and here in Albania. The Germans are reinforcing parts of our coasts to defend themselves from an allied landing. On the other hand, the German fascists will try to attack us; they will also try to hitch internal reaction to their chariot. The "Balli Kombëtar" has not so far spoken out against nazism, and already the desire for collaboration with the Germans is being expressed in "Ballist" circles. However, the reaction will make another attempt, if not openly (because Germany is heading for its doom), at least indirectly, to beg the Germans to help strengthen its already shaken position. Therefore, you will have to judge the situation

with great cool-headedness, always at the head of the people and in command of the situation.

Comradely greetings
For the Central Committee of the Party

Shpati

DEATH TO FASCISM — FREEDOM TO THE PEOPLE!

P.S. — These directives, without necessarily being read, should be explained in all the party cells, and on the basis of them instructions should be issued to all party organizations, down to the groups of sympathizers. In particular, they should be explained in all the cells of the units and battalions of your region.

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Works, vol. 1.

**LETTER TO COMRADE HAXHI LLESHI ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY
POWER IN KRUJA AND DIBRA AND ON THE
STAND TO BE MAINTAINED TOWARDS
THE MACEDONIAN MINORITY**

September 24, 1943

Dear Comrade Haxhi,

We have received your letter and congratulate you on your success in liberating Kruja. As for the organization of the civil power in the city, we have instructed Dr. Nishani to go to Kruja, and a council is to be set up on the basis laid down in the Constitution¹. Bazi i Canës will certainly have come by now, and we are interested to know his attitude. If he is there, discuss the decision of the Conference² with him, and if he agrees, proceed together with him to hold the elections for the council in the most democratic manner, through conferences and meetings of the people. This should not be done according to the wishes of Bazi i Canës, but according to the wishes of the people, who will choose whom they want, in conformity with the Constitution. If Bazi i Canës does not maintain

¹ The Constitution of the national liberation councils approved at the 2nd National Liberation Conference in Labinot.

² This refers to the decisions of the 2nd National Liberation Conference which Abaz Kupa did not attend.

a good attitude, the comrades should go on with their work and establish the state power. Tell the responsible comrades that they should not fail to organize daily conferences among the people, and with the youth and women. The people should understand that the day has come for them to express their own will, and to decide for themselves, and not the feudal chieftains.

On the question of your departure for Dibra, we agree with you that you should depart immediately, for your presence there is essential. You will certainly find many difficulties there, but we are sure that through organized and careful work, relying on the sympathy of the masses for our movement, you will achieve concrete results. You are better informed on the question of the chieftains than we are. You know about their efforts to take power, as well as the method they are using. In this situation, we should do everything possible to surmount the chaos, dominate the situation, and direct the work for the establishment of our own state power. To do this, we should attach great importance to setting up the councils. They should take full power into their hands, and should be assisted in fulfilling this task by all those former state officials who have not soiled their hands by involvement in the affairs of the occupiers. Our state power must prove to the people that we can govern with the greatest justice. For this reason, for every section of work honest and resolute people should be appointed to the council. No other state power can exist alongside ours; there cannot be dual power. And if any clique, such as the "Balli Kombëtar", attempts to recreate the old form of government, you must sabotage it by every means, denouncing it to the people as a form of government which will restore their old sufferings and misery. You should

immediately set up local and regional commands³ with honest elements from the towns or villages, and the former police force should no longer patrol the streets to maintain order. This task should be carried out by volunteers, who should be organized into different sections: maintenance of order, traffic control, prevention of theft and speculation, ensuring of food supplies for the people, etc. These volunteers should act under the orders of the regional command which is subordinate to your military command. Comrade Haxhi, you should take the question of the commands and the setting up of the state power with the utmost seriousness, for our ultimate success depends on the first steps we take. Always try to reach agreement with those of the chieftains who appear somewhat sympathetic to this state power, and lose no opportunity to exploit the antagonism among them to the advantage of our cause.

The question of the Macedonian minority. — We have received a letter from Tempo⁴ and from the person responsible for Macedonian affairs in Dibra, in which they speak of the situation in this zone and of the work which should be carried out there.

This is how you should act, and you should transmit these instructions to the other leading comrades there: the question of the border should not be mentioned at all for

3 The partisan military administration in the rear was organized since the second semester of 1943. The local and regional commands were the organs of this administration, which fulfilled the tasks of the people's police in the liberated areas, as sound supporters and auxiliaries to the national liberation councils and the partisan units.

4 Vukmanovich Tempo, member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY. During the war he maintained a markedly chauvinist stand towards Albania and the CPA.

the time being, nor should you discuss whether Dibra should be Yugoslav or Albanian. We know that this is a knotty question which will be settled later on; on the other hand, we are against the division made by the fascists and support the self-determination of the peoples. As for Dibra, we know that this town has a Macedonian minority and it is situated on the old Yugoslav border. In the present situation, while the enemy are still in the Balkans, while all Kosova and Macedonia are under the heel of the most savage reaction, while in the Dibra region the leaders of the reaction are active and strong, if not stronger than us, it is impossible and impermissible to implement our correct line concerning the question of the border, for if we act according to the advice of Tempo and leave Dibra, not only will the Macedonians be unable to control the situation, but the reaction will strike heavily at them and us together, and will fight all the more ruthlessly against us. Tempo's proposal does not seem to us to be a good solution. We should set up our national liberation power there, grant the Macedonians the rights of a minority, make efforts to have them participate in the national liberation councils, too, and thus try to convince the population and gain their confidence. When our positions are consolidated, as well as those of the Yugoslavs, in Kosova, Metohia, and Macedonia, when we are stronger than the reaction, then it goes without saying that we shall apply the principle for which we are fighting. We believe that we are not in error if we act in this manner, in the present situation. We have written to Tempo along these lines, but you, too, should try to make contact with him, or with the responsible representative of the Yugoslav Party in Dibra, and explain our standpoint. Let us know how this matter develops; we advise you to act with the greatest circumspection and in a spirit of complete fraternity.

Lose no opportunity to consolidate the position of our Party, organize conferences continually, have the cells meet regularly, and see that decisions are taken and carried out.

Best regards
For the Central Committee of
the CPA

Enver Hoxha

Works, vol. 1.

**LETTER TO THE BERAT REGIONAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ALBANIA,
CRITICIZING ITS OPPORTUNIST STAND
TOWARDS THE "BALLI KOMBËTAR" AND
GIVING INSTRUCTIONS ON STRENGTHENING
THE NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCILS**

September 26, 1943

Dear comrades,

We received your letter of 22. 9. 1943. Your failure to keep the Central Committee informed about your affairs has become a chronic illness which has gone on for over a year. This is no way to work, to leave us in the dark for two or three months without any news, run into trouble, and then to send us a letter saying, "we are ready to accept condemnation for the mistake we have made". In our view, such words do not help our work run smoothly. There is no point in repeating that things cannot go on like this. We assure you that this is the last time we will tolerate such a state of affairs; if it happens again, we will take measures which will do you no credit as communists and leaders.

We have sent you two circulars¹, one for the vice-commissars of the partisan detachments, and the other for

1 These circulars deal: the first with the strengthening of the party organizations in the National Liberation Army, and the second with the establishment of the national liberation councils throughout the country.

the national liberation councils. These circulars should not be duplicated wholesale, but only in a limited number: enough for the vice-commissars and the national liberation councils. Of course, comrades should go to explain these circulars (after having studied them themselves) to a group of activists made up of vice-commissars and commissars of detachments. The same should be done in the national liberation councils by the comrades who participate in them or help in their activity.

We note with concern that in an eight-page report from the leading comrades in charge of the work in the entire Berat region, a report addressed to the Central Committee of the Party, there is not a single line about the organizational situation of the Party. The one thing we know, and not in any detail, is that the reaction has done great harm in the ranks of our comrades. And even this is hearsay, without official confirmation. Does the party organization exist there or not? Is there a leading committee? We cannot answer those questions, because what is happening in Berat is a profound mystery to us. In such a situation, the Central Committee does not know how to help your region, or how to guide your organization. If you take the work of the Party so lightly and consider it unnecessary to keep the Central Committee informed, then that is another matter. This is an error that has been recurring for a year and a half, and not an accidental mistake. This method of work will cause us great harm, and it will place us in a difficult situation. We do not know how things are with the youth, or the state of its organization. Perhaps the youth organization compiles its own reports and sends them to its Central Committee, but you should not forget that this is a sector of the Party, and you should take the greatest care to report to us on its work. On the question of the Party, once again, and for the last time, we repeat that we expect a clear report

on the situation, on the activities in progress, the number of cells and groups of sympathizers, the number of party members, and their names according to their distribution in the different cells. Beside their names, the leading comrades of the regional party committee should give their opinions about the comrades. At the same time, you should not forget to note their occupations. This must be done in the shortest possible time. Within five days we should have a full picture of your organization. We want this every month, as well as notes on any additional activities, cells or new party members. We have asked you many times to do this, but have never received an answer. We cannot repeat this in every letter. If you tell us that there is no one able to do this, we reply simply that these reports are essential to the Central Committee, and these directives must be implemented by every regional committee. Those who do not comply with them are disobeying the Central Committee.

When we have received such a report, we will try to help you as much as we are able, but otherwise we cannot, because, at present, it is impossible to give you instructions for the situations that arise in your region. General instructions will not be enough, for we have always issued such instructions, but it is evident that in practice, in the majority of cases, they have not been implemented, as, for instance, in your region. In your town there are two administrations: one is that of the "Balli", and the other is ours. This is a thing which should not have happened. We cannot tolerate a state of affairs where the "Balli Kombëtar" sets up its administration alongside ours. We cannot allow any dualism in this matter. Therefore you must oppose their power, and only ours must be recognized. You must fight it by every means: through propaganda and meetings, speaking openly in broad conferences about what the "Balli Kombëtar" and its adherents are.

You must expose the "Balli Kombëtar" and its supporters, from Abaz Ermeni to Fazlli Frashëri. There can be no unity with the "Balli Kombëtar". For those who have understood what the "Balli Kombëtar" is, let them come into our ranks, and publicly disown their adherence to the "Balli Kombëtar" and the mistake they have made. Comrades, the establishment of state power is no laughing matter, and if we do not know how to act correctly right from start, we may be sure that we will meet grave obstacles later. Now the councils should no longer be elected according to the criteria followed so far, for in many cases they have been lifeless and formal. Now the councils are the highest form of state power and have many functions. The present councils in the liberated zones, and above all in the towns, not only collect aid, but govern and direct every aspect of the life of the city and region amid all the complications arising in the course of life and the war. Therefore, their election should proceed according to the Rules and Constitution of the councils, which you no doubt possess. These councils should be elected by all the people and should be divided into different sections, such as education, public works, finance, health, etc.; one councillor should be put in charge of each section, a determined and experienced person whose loyalty has been tested in the war. In his section, he may also be assisted by officials of the former regime. Each should have his own office, for this work cannot be done just anywhere. The people must see that we really know how to govern, and anarchy and disorder should be avoided at all costs. No gendarmes or other such people should appear in the cities, but local and regional commands should be organized, and these should have their own partisans who should always bear the distinctive partisan emblem. They should set an example of discipline and justice, and protect the population. In the cities they should stabilize law and

order, ensure hygiene and food supplies, combat speculation, etc. You should do all these things, comrades, without getting caught up with trifles and forgetting your leading role. Do not think that now Berat is liberated we can allow any relaxation. Now more than ever relaxation will do us great harm. The military command should be active everywhere, striking at the enemy, and making every efforts to consolidate and strengthen the state administration. Today more than ever, you should purge all bad elements, enemies of the people and the Party. Over military matters you have shown the same carelessness as on the question of the Party.

The General Staff has asked you for information on many things, but you have never answered. To report on the struggle against Isa Toska², or to disarm Italian soldiers is one thing, and to report on, and concern yourselves with, the organizational questions of the army, is another thing. On this second point it has never crossed your mind to report to the General Staff, and we expect the commissar of that group, comrade Gjin, to do this. We have written to you about the men you should send to the brigades, and the mobilization of the Kuçova workers, about arming them and sending them to an appointed place, but you have not written to us. You have not understood the importance of those matters, and your failure to carry them out, or your negligence, are wrecking all our plans. When we give an order to send men to the brigades, we consider that not only should you demonstrate your organizing abilities as communists, but you should at least inform the General Staff of what possibilities you have of doing this, so that the Staff will know how to act.

² War criminal, commander of a terrorist band in the service of the Italian occupiers.

The General Staff does not have one accurate report on the army in your region, on the cadres of your detachments, their weapons, or the morale and possibilities of the battalions and command there. We cannot expect all this information from anyone except the communists. All these things are closely interrelated, and failure to carry out one order cripples the whole apparatus which we are building, which requires us to display the greatest wisdom, cool-headedness, reliability, and above all, order in our work. You should always keep these things in mind if you want to make progress. You should carry them out, if you want our aims to become reality. Without orderly, disciplined work, and without being guided by clear-cut directives which apply to the whole of Albania, you will never be able to achieve any substantial results. The communists should be in the front ranks of the war. We have always said this, but the war is not waged only at gun point but also through the organization of the state administration and the army. For the organization of these two sectors the communists, and especially, the leading comrades, must be in the first ranks, and must be up to their tasks.

The situation that is developing is in our favour, but only if we are in a position to dominate it. Day by day the "Balli Kombëtar" is being discredited, and day by day we are gaining the ground it is losing, but we must not think that these victories are spontaneous; they need effort. The Tirana party organization should be taken as an example; it manages to publish lengthy daily communiques, proclamations, leaflets, and "Zëri i Popullit" and "Bashkimi", in such great number and so well printed that the entire population is astonished. And you should not forget that the Tirana comrades are working under the constant threat of the Gestapo. Such activity gives people great confi-

dence in our Party and comrades. The streets of Tirana where the Gestapo reigns, are covered every night with stickers printed by the most modern methods, stickers which popularize our heroic Party and the Soviet Union. And this work is so intensive that not a day passes without the population reading our leaflets or our newspapers. Our propaganda in this city has clearly brought out the rottenness of the "Balli Kombëtar" and its organizational weakness, for it is not enough to tell people that there is no hope for the "Balli Kombëtar", but through our work we must make the people see for themselves that the "Balli Kombëtar" is in fact worthless. And the people of Tirana have understood this very clearly. Such an example should be followed by every region, especially by you who live and work in a liberated city. You have complained in the past, but now you have no reason to complain; all that is needed is work, and systematic work. None of our comrades has learned to do this at school, they have learned it in the course of the struggle. You are in the same situation, and so we require you to do unceasing work as good as that which is done in Tirana, or even better. You should have no hesitation about eliminating Ali Këlcyra and any other rotten element.

Devote the greatest attention to the army, consolidate it and raise its consciousness. The automatic weapons should always be in the hands of the Party. Telephone and telegraph communications should be in our hands. Repair the means of communication, and with the help of the Italian soldiers you have there, repair the telephone connections with all the liberated centers; keep in constant contact with the different localities in order to exchange experience with one another and to guide the comrades better. Regular and rapid communications are one of the main conditions for our victory.

Dear comrades,

We are sure that you will act as instructed on the matters about which we have written to you. Soon both you and we will have good results. If this does not happen, it will go hard with you.

Best regards
For the Central Committee of the Party

Shpati

Works, vol. 1.

**LETTER ADDRESSED TO VUKMANOVICH TEMPO
IN ANSWER TO HIS SLANDEROUS ACCUSATIONS
AGAINST THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE GROUP OF
THE DIBRA REGION AND AGAINST THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
ALBANIA**

October 29, 1943

Comrade Tempo,

Your letters have greatly astonished us; their tone is very rude and your judgement of our Central Committee is unjust. Nor do we think that our comrades there deserve the insulting assessment given by you and your Macedonian comrades. In such a difficult situation, it would not be surprising if they may have made some concession or may not have been in a position to utilize every favourable situation, but this is a far cry from labelling our comrades saboteurs and agents of "Great Albania", and it seems to us that your accusations are very grave and quite outrageous. On the other hand, it does not seem to us that such a delicate matter should be judged with such lack of cool-headedness, nor that decisions should be taken or "orders" given without properly weighing up the situation and the moment. On the question of Dibra, this has been and is our opinion, and we have given the appropriate orders to the comrades who are working in that sector.

We do not accept the new boundaries established by the fascists. But what is the situation in Dibra? This is how it has been reported to us, and we believe the report to be true: in that town the Macedonians are the minority, and on the other hand, the influence of the Yugoslav Party is not very great because of its weak organization, and consequently the national liberation movement led by the Yugoslav Partisan Staff is not widespread, but is rather in the embryonic stage.

In Dibra and the surrounding region, apart from reaction and its forces, the only partisan detachment which makes its presence felt is that of Haxhi Lleshi, which day by day is growing stronger and gaining ground. Up to the capitulation of Italy and since then, Haxhi Lleshi's battalion has been the only force which was able in some measure to cope with the forces of reaction, which are very numerous in Dibra. With the capitulation of Italy, all the reactionaries and their hordes went plundering and making a booty, and it was these hooligans who took the rifles. They were not given to them by Haxhi Lleshi (as Macedonian comrade Yanko writes in his letter), and this is the same Haxhi Lleshi, now accused of advocating "Great Albania", who prevented the hordes of the bairaktars not only from taking possession of all the rifles, but also from committing other outrages. So, the capitulation of Italy found Dibra in a situation in which the sole force able to dominate the situation, if this were possible, was Haxhi's partisan forces. The reactionaries were strong, their mercenary forces intact, and not only that, but there was no organized Macedonian force. In short, our position was not good (neither ours nor yours). How should Haxhi Lleshi have acted at that time? We did not and do not share your opinion. We maintain that the moment was not opportune (given the small forces which we had) to establish a Macedonian administration in Dibra, because

if we had done so, both we and you would have aroused the entire reaction against us. And not only the reaction, but also the people, who would have accused us of "selling out", and this would have had grave repercussions for the development of the struggle which both we and you are waging in that region. By doing this, Haxhi Lleshi and his partisans would have lost what prestige they had gained in Dibra. We gave Haxhi the directive for the formation of a national liberation administration, and that Macedonians, too, must be elected to the council, people who are actively devoted to the work and the war (and not addicted to preaching from the pulpit, as you say in your letter) in order to consolidate our positions (both ours and yours) and, through joint work, to strengthen our ranks, temper them, and strike at the reaction. For that moment, and until our position is strong enough to cope with any eventuality, we consider this the most appropriate way to act. We believe that to act in this way does not mean to advocate a "Great Albania!" We believe that the mentality of the Dibra population, and the geographical situation with regard to the former boundaries (the town of Dibra and the few villages which were under Yugoslav rule at that time, too, were completely linked with the part under Albanian rule, and even the Macedonians had very close links with the Albanians), all these things, are as well known to us as they are to you, and in this situation it seems to us that it would be harmful to apply the "correct line" through a decree or order. In any case, we still think that this is not such a simple problem.

Friendly greetings

Enver Hoxha

Works, vol. 1.

DIRECTIVES ON THE STRENGTHENING OF LINKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, ON THE STAND TOWARDS "BALLI KOMBËTAR", "LEGALITETI"¹ AND THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSIONS, ON THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, THE COUNCILS AND THE ARMY, AND ON THE STRENGTHENING OF THE PARTY AND THE OTHER ANTI-FASCIST ORGANIZATIONS

November 3, 1943

TO THE REGIONAL COMMITTEES OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF ALBANIA

Dear comrades,

You know that for some time the situation has turned in favour of the anti-fascist coalition. The main factor in this change has been the heroic Red Army. Ever since Stalingrad, it has not given a moment's respite to the German Army which is going from retreat to retreat, suffering one defeat after another, as it heads for disaster.

1 A British-sponsored traitorous organization formed in November 1943 with the aim of alienating the Albanian people from the CPA and re-establishing in Albania the regime of former King Zog, by presenting it as the only "legal" regime. The chairman of the organization, Abaz Kupa, a spy of the British, a renegade of the National Liberation War, united his forces with those of the quisling government and of the "Balli Kombëtar", and collaborated with the German occupiers.

The great Soviet offensive on the Dnieper is in full swing. The first great tactical successes are being fully exploited by Stalin's brilliant strategy and the courageous Red Army. Germany is approaching a decisive defeat. Its reserves are no longer sufficient to cope with war on such vast fronts, and to face such critical situations. The successive military defeats have immeasurably lowered the morale of the German Army and of the German people, who are beginning to rise up against the nazis. The German Army, routed, worn out and bleeding, is now entering its third winter in Soviet territory. It will be confronted by fresh and well-trained Soviet troops who will continue to deal it more and more even heavier blows until its final destruction.

In this situation the opening of another vast front in Europe by the allies would speed up the collapse of Germany. You know that the Anglo-American contribution to this war has always been much smaller than that of the Soviet Union. The measures to be taken to hasten the end of the war, measures which imply much greater participation by the Anglo-American allies in the war, will undoubtedly have been one of the points discussed at the Moscow Conference.²

Hitler knows that he has lost the war militarily. Only a compromise can save him. That is why he is doing all he can to manoeuvre to mobilize international reaction. He has followed these tactics since his advent to power and, particularly, when he hoped to destroy the Red Army. But we must not forget that yesterday he used these tactics

2 The Moscow Conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of the USSR, Great Britain and USA was held from the 19th to the 30th of October 1943, and proclaimed as the main task: to shorten the duration of the Second World War, to open the second front as soon as possible, to strengthen cooperation among the allies in the war, and to continue it after the war.

to attack, while today he is using them to defend himself, to save his neck. He is trying to activate the reaction in Britain and the United States, to link himself closely to it, and thus to influence the Anglo-American policy, to achieve a compromise which would ensure him part of his war spoils. But in order to give this manoeuvre time to develop and to convince the Anglo-American reaction that he would be a valuable ally, Hitler should not be in a position of great inferiority. This is one of the reasons why he is so fiercely obstinate in his stand on the Dnieper.

Already it is obvious that this manoeuvre of Hitler's has failed. It has failed because the people of Britain and America are becoming more and more involved in open struggle against internal reaction and its methods, and are a mighty force which is terrifying the reaction and making it hesitate. It has failed, because the Anglo-American policy cannot venture on to so dangerous an adventure. But it has failed, above all, because the Soviet offensives, especially that on the Dnieper, are breaking Hitler's back, strengthening the unity of the freedom-loving peoples, and increasingly mobilizing them against Germany and fascism.

Thus reaction cannot save itself under Hitler's flag. That is why it is preparing for a broad manoeuvre, which is already becoming obvious: it is a matter of preparing the ground to oppose the Red Army and the national liberation movements after the defeat the German Army is bound to suffer. This manoeuvre can be seen especially in the occupied countries, in Yugoslavia with Drazha Mihailovich, in Albania with the "Balli Kombëtar", and other groups; it is evident in the stand of the German allies, Rumania, Hungary and Finland.

What will be the stand of Britain and the United States towards this manoeuvre of reaction? First and foremost, we must be aware that Britain and the United States are not trying to crush reaction in Europe, they only

want to take it over from Hitler. They still recognize Drazha Mihailovich, and even help him. The Sikorsky³ affair and the activities of the British mission in our country, show that they are trying to strengthen the reactionary movement and to mobilize it against the national liberation movements. This has undoubtedly been one of the points of discussion at the Moscow Conference.

Every day the national liberation movements in Europe are gaining more ground; the masses of the people are awakening and rallying around them.

In Italy, the reaction, headed by Badoglio and Victor Emmanuel III, and with the indirect support of the allied armies, is trying to establish its domination by other methods. In particular, it tries to attack the Italian Communist Party and drive it from the political scene, because it is the party with the strongest links with the masses, the party which can crush the reaction and lead the people towards setting up their state power. The efforts of the Italian people, and especially of the Italian Communist Party, pose an increasing threat to the reaction and force Badoglio to constantly change his methods.

The German occupiers have undertaken a large-scale campaign throughout Europe to mobilize reaction and snare the people with demagogical nationalist slogans aimed solely at inciting them to war against the national liberation movements. Throughout Europe, Hitler is organizing and preparing the struggle against the communist parties, against the establishment of the people's state power. The reaction is rallying round this slogan, this is the main weapon of the enemy, and this is what we must attack.

³ Reactionary Polish leader, head of the Polish government in exile in London (1939-1943), a servant of the imperialist Anglo-American circles.

In the Balkans, more than anywhere else, the enemies of the national liberation movements, headed by Hitler, are striving to take advantage of national antagonisms to strengthen the reactionary anti-communist front which Hitler calls the "Balkan Federation". Instead of preparing to repel any eventual allied landing, it is fighting and will continue to fight the national liberation movements in the Balkans.

With the assistance of Albanian reactionaries, Hitler is trying to mobilize the Albanian population of Kosova and Macedonia against the Serbian-Montenegrine-Macedonian populations, and to use the Kosova problem to sow confusion among the Albanian people, to divide them, and to incite the pseudo-patriots to struggle against the national liberation movement of the Albanian people. With the help of the local chauvinists, he is trying to rally public opinion here to support the anti-Serbian and anti-Greek policy, which would lead us to armed conflicts with our neighbours, create splits in our national liberation movement, and lay the basis for the organization and strengthening of anti-communist, national-chauvinist parties hostile to the national liberation cause.

The approach of the end of the war against Germany and its stooges, on the one hand, and the strengthening of the Albanian National Liberation Army and our movement in general, on the other, have awakened our people and drawn them closer to our struggle. Everywhere in Albania sympathy towards us is increasing and our influence is becoming stronger. But this has spurred reaction also into very great activity, mobilizing itself and trying to rally the masses around it, in order to turn the situation to its favour.

You know what the "Balli Kombëtar" is and what it does, and you also know the stand we must take towards it. This is explained thoroughly in the Central Committee

circular of September 10, 1943⁴ at which you should have another look. One thing is now quite clear, that the "Balli Kombëtar" collaborates with anyone and in every way possible against the national liberation movement, and in particular, it collaborates with the German occupiers. In Fier and Lushnja the "Balli Kombëtar" has taken command of the towns under the protection of German bayonets and is involving itself more and more in foul deeds and in perfidious war against us. Everywhere it is allying itself with the Germans to fight us with weapons, espionage, and propaganda. Apart from the role of Isa Toska, it also tries to maintain a semblance of independence from the German occupiers and to appear as if it is working underground against them, in order to prevent the people from recognizing it as a tool of the Gestapo, and thus preserve the credibility necessary to take over Hitler's domination of Albania and to have more room to manoeuvre. The "Balli Kombëtar" is concerned to mobilize as many forces as possible, whoever they may be, to fight the Communist Party and the national liberation movement and to oppress the Albanian people today, but more particularly, tomorrow.

But the reaction sees that the "Balli Kombëtar" alone cannot fight our movement successfully, so it tries to organize and mobilize other forces under various flags. It pushes on to the scene new figures who enjoy a certain standing in the eyes of the public, people such as Mehdi Frashëri, or people like Zog who, having exercised power under the past regimes, still have influence in some regions.

⁴ This circular issued the directives of the CC of the CPA concerning the situation created after the capitulation of fascist Italy.

Our enemies intend to mobilize as many forces as possible around the reaction, and organize them as best they can into one or several groups, either within the Gestapo government or outside it, but against us, and solely against us. The tendency is for the reactionary groups to become centralized. At the moment, Mehdi Frashëri (and perhaps someone else later on) has emerged as one of the political figures around whom this activity has been focused. People who were directly at the service of Italian fascism, such as Mustafa Kruja, Kolë Biba, Gjon Marka Gjoni, Shefqet Vërlaci⁵ and other reactionaries, whose forces are as large as any, are also included in this vast combined anti-national liberation ar manoeuvre.

The Zogites, led by Fiqri Dine⁶ and the North chieftains, have been very active recently. They are trying to organize themselves around the figure of Zog, to create a strong party and prepare the ground (and especially, the forces) for the restoration of Zog and his regime. The Germans, too, are playing the Zog card, for they have set up a "Regency Council"⁷, re-established Zog's constitution and returned confiscated property. The reaction, too, is playing the Zog card, reserving the right to discard it or play it more openly in the future. They have begun to use Zog as a bogey to turn the masses from the war, putting him up as the only person capable of "saving Albania

⁵ One of the biggest feudal landowners of the country, agent of Italian fascism, prime minister of the 1st quisling government in Albania (1939-1941).

⁶ Zogite representative and quisling prime minister (July-August 1944).

⁷ In October 1943 the German occupiers convened in Tirana a "National Assembly" which, according to the orders of the Hitlerites, proclaimed the "separation of Albania from Italy" and rigged up a "Supreme Regency Council" with Mehdi Frashëri at the head. On November 5, the traitorous Regency nominated the quisling government with fascist Rexhep Mitrovica presiding.

from anarchy", by which they mean rescuing reaction from our movement. The speeches of many Ballists and other reactionaries, who say that the communists will compel them to join with Zog, the articles of the newspaper "Atdheu"⁸ ("Fatherland"), as well as the wide-scale publicity to boost Zog, are all part of a single manoeuvre aimed at mobilizing reaction around him.

The "Balli Kombëtar" and all reaction have a lot to say about anarchy, chaos, and the confusion occurring in our country, where, according to them, everyone is pulling in different directions. They want to accuse the national liberation movement and our Party of causing this anarchy, trying to present our Party as a party opposed to order, and which would bring only chaos and anarchy.

The German occupiers are endeavouring to give Albania the appearance of an independent country. This calls for a state apparatus in the hands of Albanians and an Albanian military force that would obediently serve Hitler and do his work, that is, fight energetically against the national liberation movement. But reaction has never been more afraid of our movement than today, and it has never been more united to fight us with all its forces. So it gladly accepts Hitler's helping hand, although it tries to conceal its links with the invader so that the destruction of fascism will not spell its own end. Reaction is trying to fight our movement and to strengthen itself during the German occupation, in order to be able to establish its domination more easily later on, for it, too, is convinced that Germany has lost the war.

Another manoeuvre, which the enemy and the reactionaries use and which you must have noticed at the grass-roots, concerns the question of unity which almost

⁸ Principal organ of the traitorous "Legaliteti" organization (October 1943-August 1944).

everyone, from Mustafa Kruja to the "Balli Kombëtar", is calling for. They are trying to mislead our people and the national liberation movement, and in particular, to blame our Communist Party for the lack of unity. This unity is being demanded on any conditions and with everyone: with Zog, the "Balli Kombëtar", Mustafa Kruja, the "Executive Committee"⁹, and the "Regency Council", and even with the German nazis. This is the sort of unity the reaction is after. You are aware that this broad campaign of "fraternization" aims at turning the people away from the National Liberation War, and at disorientating them, at presenting the traitors as patriots, at wiping out our movement and having the people submit to the leadership of reaction. They campaign for the unity of the Albanian nationalists while trying to present the Communist Party of Albania as an alien party, and communism as an alien ideology, in merciless war with Albanian nationalism. Their aim is to lead the non-communist elements away from the national liberation movement, to isolate our Party, and more easily attack it by accusing it of being the cause of the discord, terror and fratricide. On top of all this, they are trying to present our Party as a party which is working against the national interests.

What stand should all party members take in this external and internal situation, and how should they act?

We must look to Moscow and view everything in the light of the struggle the Soviet Union is waging, particularly at present, following the tripartite Conference¹⁰. We must be thoroughly familiar with the decisions adopted

⁹ It was created by the Hitlerite occupiers on September 14, 1943 as a "provisional government" of Albania and was made up of branded reactionaries, close collaborators of the Italian and German fascist occupiers with Ibrahim Bey Biçaku at the head.

¹⁰ The Moscow Conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of the USSR, Great Britain and USA.

at this conference and with Soviet policy, and scrupulously conform to them, for this is the only way we can avoid making mistakes during our struggle. We must widely popularize the Soviets and the gigantic struggle the Soviet Union is waging, and arouse our people's love and respect for the Soviet Union, the Red Army, and Stalin; our people should be made aware that it is the Soviet Union which will defend the interests and freedom of the smaller nations against any attack by reaction. We must work towards convincing our people that the Soviet Union is their most sincere ally. We need not be afraid of slipping to the left in popularizing the Soviet Union but at the same time, we must be careful not to fall into provocations and produce results contrary to our aims.

We must popularize the national liberation struggles going on throughout Europe, and especially those in Yugoslavia and Greece. Openly and without hesitation, we must raise the problem of our brotherhood with the peoples of Yugoslavia and Greece. We must mercilessly expose reaction and chauvinism which are trying to push us into war with our neighbours. We must convince our people that the supreme interests of our country demand that, to fraternize with the Greek and Yugoslav peoples, we must tear the mask from chauvinism which tries to present itself as the defender of Albania against foreigners, and show the whole world that it is we, and we alone (the national liberation movement), that defend Albania against the occupiers and the foreign imperialists. We have to convince our people that the national liberation movements of Yugoslavia and Greece, far from endangering our independence, help us to win it.

About the "Balli Kombëtar". — In various circulars we have often said what the "Balli Kombëtar" is, and what our stand towards it should be. The "Balli Kombëtar" is a hot-bed of reaction, and must be fought without mercy.

The 2nd National Liberation Conference emphasized our stand in regard to uniting or cooperating with all those outside the National Liberation Front, and with the "Balli Kombëtar". Regarding people who have not compromised themselves or who have taken a wrong course in the past, but have now corrected themselves, our stand must be that defined in the resolution of the conference. The question of whether to unite or cooperate with the reaction or with the "Balli Kombëtar" as an organization does not arise; the question is how to combat them. The "Balli Kombëtar", and every other organization outside the national liberation movement, have merged with reaction. In struggling against reaction you must try to create differentiation in its ranks, drawing those who leave it close to us. The main thing is to separate reaction from the people, and to prepare the people to struggle against it. Our correct and determined stand against reaction must not lead us to sectarianism, into scorning misled elements who acknowledge their mistakes, and lumping them together with the reactionaries. In the ranks of the "Balli Kombëtar" and reaction in general, there are many people who are confused, victims who do not understand the significance of our struggle against the internal and external enemies. It is our task to enlighten them, to draw them closer to our position, and with our correct attitude which excludes both sectarianism and compromise, to separate them from reaction once and for all. We must do everything we can to compel them to take a definite stand and abandon their attitude of waiting for the "appropriate moment", either to join the struggle against the invader or to attack us from behind. With these elements we should not be satisfied with platonic friendship and fine words, for this would only help them gain time, maintain their "wait-and-see" attitude, benefit from our support, and tomorrow, with their "good name" intact in the eyes of the

people, manoeuvre at our expense. But you must not understand our attitude as an effort to push them into the arms of reaction. On the contrary, it must enable those who still have not made up their minds and who do not have a clear idea about the situation, to understand that they should abandon their "wait-and-see" attitude, which benefits no one but the enemy.

In order to obtain these results we must make the people clear about our attitude, the viewpoint of the Party, and its political line. The people must be told what the Party has done and what it is doing. We must widely popularize our heroic Party and the sacrifices it has made for the liberation of the country; we must point out its leading role in this National Liberation War, the increased morale and determination of our people, the drive and heroism the Party has aroused among the Albanian youth, and its model spirit of sacrifice and organization. Similarly, it should be made clear to the people what the national liberation movement is, what the national liberation councils and the National Liberation Army are; the people must be made clear about the aims the enemy and the reaction are pursuing by identifying the national liberation movement with the Communist Party. You must try to expand the National Liberation Front and gather into it almost all the people, those who are honest and with a heart to fight, who cherish their homeland and freedom. Thus you can convince the people, and they will see concretely that the Front comprises all those who are fighting for the interests of Albania and to bury the occupiers. Outside the Front, there might be some well intentioned individuals who want to serve the national cause. Nevertheless, by remaining outside the Front, they do not serve it, but harm it instead; as for the political groups and parties that remain outside the Front, they should be fought as reactionary parties which, directly or indirectly,

are playing the game of the occupiers, because reaction, in order to mislead democratically-minded elements and lead them away from the national liberation movement or to prevent them from joining this movement, is attempting to enter the political scene through a puppet "social-democratic" party. "Balli Kombëtar" elements, such as Skënder Muço¹¹, renegades from the national liberation struggle, such as Sotir Kondi, and other agents of the reaction are doing their best to set up such parties, but they dare not come out into the open.

The people must be made well aware that the reaction is a tool of the enemy. We must prevent reaction from giving the people the impression that the struggle between us is merely over ideological questions; we fight reaction, first, because it is from head to heels in the service of the occupiers and, second, because it is working to perpetuate the anti-popular regimes. Our struggle against the reaction is an inseparable part of the struggle against the occupiers. You must point out to the people that the reaction's campaign for so-called unity is rotten demagogy, that it is we who want genuine unity and work for this unity, and that outside the National Liberation War there is not and can be no unity. We must take great pains to do everything in our power to expose the reactionaries and their movement, and expose them as splitters, terrorists, and murderers of their own brothers. We must point out to the people that the "order" the reaction wants is that of foreign occupation, of the bayonets of the militia and the whip of spies. They are doing their utmost, employing criminals and finding other vile methods, to plunge the country into chaos and anarchy, to exhaust the

11 Representative of the "Balli Kombëtar" with whom an American liaison mission was attached which, in turn, was engaged in intensive activities for the reorganization of the reactionary forces shaken by the blows of the National Liberation Front.

people, to deceive them and impose their will, in other words, the blackest terror. When our units were the only formations in the Albanian mountains, theft, blood-feuds and disturbances began to disappear, and our peasants began to live in a security they had never known before. But with the appearance of the bands of the "Balli Kombëtar", crime, theft and other disturbances began again; and it could not have been otherwise, for they had come out to bring the chaos and anarchy, which are great enemies of the national liberation movement. This is the truth, not the opposite that the reactionaries would have us believe.

We must take a clear-cut stand towards Zog and the Zogites. They have begun to move, some individually, others in a more or less organized form; some want to come into the National Liberation Front, while others, such as Bazi i Canës, have been members of the Front for a long time and have taken a vacillating stand. It is rumoured that some sort of a Zogite party has been founded with Bazi, and of course, all the other bankrupt elements, bayraktars and parasites of the Zog regime, and the reactionaries who are abandoning the sinking ship of the "Balli Kombëtar". It is said that this party will seek to enter the National Liberation Front. We categorically and clearly declare to all the Zogites, whether organized or not, and to Zog himself, that before they can enter the national liberation movement, they must totally accept the line of the National Liberation General Council, they must renounce all their lost privileges and thoroughly realize that the past has gone forever, they must not raise the question of the regime, but fight for a free, democratic and popular Albania in which the people themselves will choose the regime they want. They must renounce all their pretensions and desist from their intrigues as well. They must come out openly in the fight against all reactionaries

and enemies of the liberation war being waged by the Albanian people. This is our answer to the Zogites. But we cannot waste time holding discussions with them; it is clear that they are preparing to start their struggle; the reactionaries, exposed in the "Balli Kombëtar", are trying to find other banners under which to fight the national liberation movement, either from within or from outside it. For this reason let us begin to expose them and struggle against them, revealing them to the people in their true light, for they have never done anything to oppose the occupiers, but on the contrary, openly or indirectly, they have collaborated with them, and now they want to take advantage of our struggle to re-establish their regime of slavery! We must not hesitate to use armed force against those who try to hinder our war (as, for example, in Dibra, where our forces have dealt a telling blow to the Zogites). Wide-scale agitation against the Zogites should be carried on among the people, but until a further directive is issued, Bazi i Canës' name should not be mentioned in our leaflets and communiques . . .¹². But this should not prevent you from exposing the newspaper "Atdheu", and the manoeuvres of Zogism and the Zogites in your areas; neither should it prevent you from preparing the ground for a large-scale campaign and an open struggle against Zog, from speaking out against Musa Juka¹³ and his likes or from encouraging anti-Zogite feelings among the people.

Of course there will always be divergencies in the ranks of reaction, but we must not rely too much on them, for the fiercest opposition and hostility of the reactionaries

12 At that time the National Liberation General Council had not yet expelled Abaz Kupi (Bazi i Canës) from its ranks, and had invited him to a meeting to clarify his position.

13 Former minister of home affairs in Zog's government. He crushed in blood every progressive movement.

are directed against us, and not against one another. However, this does not mean that we must not take advantage of their divergencies.

It is through political struggle against the reaction, through armed struggle against the reactionary armed forces and, in the first place, against the occupiers, that the people will mobilize increasingly around us, will become more conscious of the significance of the National Liberation War, and truly make it their own. For this reason we must take the greatest care that we are not alone in either the political struggle or the armed struggle against reaction, but must take the people with us, otherwise, the people will remain neutral and can easily be influenced by the enemy. The German occupiers and their stooges are trying to persuade our people that Albania is not an occupied country, and to make them forget that the German army is here. This is a danger to us because it turns the people away from the war. Besides the armed struggle against the Germans, we must also conduct a wider and deeper struggle against the nazi demagoguery. We must fight the Assembly, the committees, commissions, councils, everything the Germans have set up. We must expose and wage a determined struggle against such traitors as Mehdi Frashëri, Fuat Dibra, Father Anton Harapi, Lef Nosi¹⁴ and others, and point out to the people that these alleged nationalists are agents of the Gestapo, and have not, as they claim, shouldered this task merely because they were forced to do so by the Germans, or for "the good of the country". Using the traitors as their mouthpieces, the Germans tell us that they leave us alone, and so we should leave them alone. To accept this line of action would be a compromise, a denial of the National Liberation War, and would mean the destruction of our

¹⁴ Members of the "Supreme Regency Council".

movement and the strengthening of the position of reaction. Therefore, we must keep the people in constant struggle against the occupiers, and do everything possible to kindle hatred of them.

On the question of the national liberation councils. — Recently you were sent the resolution of the 2nd National Liberation Conference as well as the Constitution and Rules of the national liberation councils. Whenever the Central Committee has sent letters or directives, it has laid particular emphasis on the importance of the national liberation councils, their role in this war, and the way to work in them. We advise you to study these resolutions, regulations and circulars carefully, and apply them in your areas so that sound concrete results are obtained, for you must clearly understand that the national liberation councils are not just formal organizations, but the foundations of the democratic regime and the true organs of the National Liberation War. In spite of the advice and instructions you have been given, the results hoped for have not been obtained; in many places there are still no councils, while in others they exist only formally. It goes without saying that wherever the councils are in this situation, the reaction moves in and makes its nest, while wherever these councils have been set up on the basis of the Constitution and Rules,¹⁵ the entire population takes part in them, participates in the war and gives it every assistance. For the national liberation councils to run smoothly, comrades should be appointed to engage in this work, and devote the greatest attention to it. Apart from setting up these councils, the comrades should give them vigour and life. They should give the councils the benefit

¹⁵ These had been drafted and approved at the 2nd National Liberation Conference (September 4, 1943), and outlined the organizational forms and tasks of the new organs of the state power.

of their experience and determination, and help and encourage all the nationalist elements to participate in the activities of the councils, making these elements conscious of the task with which the people have charged them. The national liberation council should mobilize the entire people, and become a strong organ with a healthy organizational apparatus. Councils should be set up in every village, commune, subprefecture and region, and be closely linked with the National Liberation General Council from which they will receive instructions and directives, and to which they should periodically send detailed reports on their activities and on the political situation of their regions. As has been emphasized in previous circulars, for these councils to function properly, various sectors should be formed within them, and these sectors, headed by a competent person, should organize the work embracing the entire social and political life of the village or town. First of all, the councils should collect aid for our army, and launch winter supply campaigns for the severe winter our fighters will have to face in the mountains. With cash donations we must be careful to see that they don't go into the wrong pocket: funds for the National Liberation War are to go to the councils, which will hand them over to the General Staff of the army, and only aid for the Party is to go to the Party Fund. Particular attention must be paid to this, because the accounts must be accurate. The directives issued by the National Liberation General Council should be studied in the councils by the party comrades who will explain them so they can be implemented, not by decree or force, but through conviction. The publications sent by the National Liberation General Council, such as leaflets or the newspaper "Bashkimi"¹⁶,

¹⁶ Organ of the National Liberation General Council, which began its publication in March 1943.

should be circulated throughout the whole of Albania, should be duplicated and studied thoroughly. To strengthen the national liberation councils is to assist our war, to speed up the liberation of our people and country.

On the question of the Albanian Anti-fascist Women's Union. — With the authorization of the Central Committee an initiative was taken, and a circular¹⁷ sent to all the regional committees recommending that they begin working to set up the Albanian Anti-fascist Women's Union. This must be a real organization, and not just a beautiful name to be mentioned at conferences. The role of women in the war is enormous, and the present war, with all its sacrifices, has brought this out. That is why you must work with them as you work with any other organization. You must build up this organization from the foundations and consolidate it, activating councils of anti-fascist women in city suburbs, towns, and villages. The setting up of these councils should be carried out as soon as possible, and not remain just a good intention. Our women comrades should devote most of their efforts to setting up and strengthening a healthy organizational apparatus of the anti-fascist women. The sooner these councils are set up, the sooner the National Conference of the Albanian Anti-fascist Women's Union can be called. Therefore you should see to it that regional councils are elected at regional conferences, and that delegates are appointed to the National Conference. With the approval of the 2nd National Liberation Conference, the Tirana Council of Anti-fascist Women has undertaken to organize this conference.

¹⁷ Circular of the CC of the CPA in connection with the formation of the Albanian Anti-fascist Women's Union, dated April 14, 1943 (See this vol. p. 121).

On the question of the Albanian People's Anti-fascist Youth Union. — A circular of the Central Committee of the Youth¹⁸ to the regional youth committees clearly explains what this organization is, why it was formed, and how it functions. Study this circular well. The greatest assistance must be given to help the regional committees of the youth organize regional conferences of the Anti-fascist Youth Union which will elect regional committees and delegates to a National Conference. The Anti-fascist Youth Union, within the limits of its possibilities, will send its delegates to the regional conferences. But do not wait; hold the conferences as soon as possible, with one or more delegates of the local national liberation council attending; if the delegate of the Anti-fascist Youth comes, all the better, but if not, carry on the work.

See to it that the comrades of the youth organization whom you send to units or brigades, are accompanied by a note on their work and capabilities, and advise the comrades of the units of each group or zone to assign suitable tasks to them so that the comrades capable of leading the youth work are not loaded with tasks just as easily done by an ordinary partisan.

All the party comrades are responsible for seeing that the work with the youth goes smoothly; any lack of interest on your part could alienate the youth from the Party. But this interest should not be narrowly understood; it does not mean perfunctory bureaucratic control; it means you must study and make yourself familiar with the organizational line of the youth, with its problems and needs in your region, helping and advising it, giving it instructions, encouraging it to work and utilizing it in the

¹⁸ Circular of the CC of the Communist Youth of Albania "On the Formation of the Albanian People's Anti-fascist Youth Union", dated September 20, 1943.

best possible way to strengthen our Party and the National Liberation War. Unfortunately, it is evident that your interest in the youth has been mostly formal. It is absolutely essential that this situation be improved; the reports you send us should speak concretely about the youth, demonstrating your interest and competence.

On the National Liberation Army. — The main problem of the National Liberation War is that of strengthening our army. Alongside the problem of the organization of the Party, the question of the army should concern all the leading comrades and all party members. These two questions are closely connected, but here we will confine ourselves to some observations on the military problem. The battalions stationed in your region should always be on the offensive against the foreign and local enemy, and at the same time, you should raise the political level of our soldiers to make them aware of the significance of the war they are fighting. On the other hand, you should mobilize the people, not with the aim of recruiting unsuitable elements, who will desert at the first confrontation with the enemy, but bringing into our army peasants and workers who have the struggle for liberation close to their hearts. We must choose capable, courageous, and honest leaders for our army. It is impermissible for elements who might discredit or hamper our war to hold leading posts. You must recruit the soundest and bravest elements from the battalions to form the brigades, upon receiving order to do this from the General Staff of the National Liberation Army. There is an element of bureaucracy in our army, which must be eliminated, because it hinders the development of the war and gives some partisan comrades a justification for their slothfulness. This, on the other hand, slows down the rhythm of the war which should always maintain the character of a mobile guerrilla war. In some regions, our army has to

some extent lost that hardness it should have in the war, while in other places some units and battalions, instead of always being where they can attack the enemy, try to bed themselves down in winter quarters. In order to have a strong army, it is essential for you to set up party organizations in the army, and for the party members to be the leaders who give this army fire and vitality. Up to now we have not seen these directives taken with the necessary seriousness or carried out. You have worked hard on military problems and have mobilized the masses, but the effect of this will be lost if the indispensable party leadership is lacking. It is not enough just to have party cells in the battalions and units (as is the sad reality), but these cells must really carry out their task. Often, the party comrades in the army, instead of organizing various conferences and courses, only deal with minor matters, acting as couriers and buying goods for the units, jobs which could just as easily be done by ordinary partisans. This situation must be done away with. Don't let us hear again the commissars and vice-commissars justify their inactivity by claiming that they could not call a party cell meeting or hold a conference because they have been on the march and other such excuses. Movement is the very nature of our war, therefore party members cannot use such excuses to justify failure to fulfil their tasks. Our comrades must be advised to uphold the name of the Party and raise its prestige among the partisans, to be severe towards all party members, especially towards commissars and vice-commissars, if they fail in their duties. The cells in battalions and bureaus of staffs must be on the look-out so that any sign of weakness on the part of a party member is not allowed to pass without reprimand and correction. Our comrades in the army should set an example for the others. Proof that the regional committees have neglected the organization of the

Party in the army is that the number of party members in this sector is not increasing; such a great source of party members, such a source of determined and experienced fighters as the sector of the army, has dried up. Brigades are being formed with various elements from every part of the country, but there is a shortage of party members, because there are not enough in the army. To fill this gap we are obliged to take cadres from the cities. We are telling you this to show that very little work has been done in the army, a sector from which the Party has the greatest hopes of recruiting more members of peasant origin. At this moment, mobilization is on the agenda and must be done systematically. First, the regional committee should study the question of which party members should go into the army. In doing this you should keep in mind that while you must keep some very sound and capable cadres in the cities to do the work there in the event of a reaction on the part of the enemy, you should not sacrifice all of them. Some of these cadres should be sent to the army, with particular tasks and instructions. At the same time the importance of the mobilization and of how it should be done must be explained to the cells; the leaders of the youth organizations, the national liberation councils, and the education groups should be prepared for large-scale mobilization campaigns. The main point to be raised at the broad meetings of the people of towns and villages, and at the youth conferences is that of strengthening the army and the mobilization. At these conferences and meetings, those who are ready to join the units, and especially our party comrades and the youth organization members, should get up at the end of the discussion and say that they are going to join the army, inviting others to go with them. Campaigns should be launched to recruit for the brigades, particularly from among young people of the towns. You must understand once and for

all that without an organized army, and especially, without strong brigades, we cannot wage a serious war against the occupiers, cannot mobilize all the Albanian people, cannot break reaction's head. When the General Staff asks for people for the various brigades that have been formed, the comrades there, instead of sending the best and most militant people, as the directives call for, send those it suits them to send. This shows that the party comrades do not appreciate, or underestimate the importance of the brigades, the genuine formations of our regular army, which little by little will absorb all the sound elements to eventually create our real army. In general the comrades at the grass-roots look at this question narrowly, not seeing beyond their own area. Fearing that their own areas will be weakened, they do not appreciate the great value of the brigades, which, if they are formed with elements one hundred percent determined, will be able to work wonders and assist in every way in all the various zones they pass through. That is why the best comrades must be sent to the army and, especially, to the brigades. In general, our army needs hand-picked commissars, vice-commissars and comrades capable of raising the level of the army, increasing the number of party cells in its ranks and strengthening them, in order to prevent a recurrence of the regrettable situation where the cells in the army are cells in name only. Do not keep too many comrades in the cities, but sent them to the army. In the cities, with just a few resolute comrades, a youth organization, an organization of anti-fascist women, and the national liberation councils, things will undoubtedly go well. In such a rallying point as the army it is a crime not to have party members, not to have cells, not to have an organization. It is necessary for the comrades responsible for areas of work, such as the members of the regional committees, the organizational or political secretaries, to

promote young comrades as soon as possible as their replacements, because they themselves will soon be needed in the army. We must take a decision on this point, and not let things drag on. A circular¹⁹ of the Central Committee to all the political vice-commissars of the various units of the National Liberation Army points out their task and the care that must be taken to organize the Party in the army. In particular, it recommends that you read and study the Report on the National Liberation Army²⁰ which should be duplicated and put in the hands of all party members. At other times it has been stressed that party work in the army does not come under the regional committees. With regard to the brigades, this remains precisely true, but as far as the battalions and the units of groups or zones are concerned, it should not be understood too rigidly. The organization of the Party in these units is responsible to the Central Committee, receiving directives from it and sending its reports through the commissar of the General Staff, but it still maintains contact with the regional committee of the zone and receives its assistance, because they have a lot of tasks in common.

Internal questions of the Party. — Every letter to you has stressed the importance of the organization of the Party, but in the organizations we no longer see the enthusiasm and care previously shown on this very important question. It has been pushed into second place, and this is a great mistake, because we must be aware that without a strong, very well organized party, with sound and educated cadres who have emerged from the struggle, we

19 Instruction of the CC of the CPA, dated September 23, 1943, to all political vice-commissars of units, battalions and brigades of the ANLA concerning the strengthening of the party organizations in the army.

20 Report to the 1st National Conference of the CPA.

cannot expect good results. Neither the army, nor the youth organization, nor the other anti-fascist organizations can be up to the mark if the Party is organizationally weak. Everyone, from the leading comrades to the cell members and the members of the groups of sympathizers, should give themselves a good shake and look at the work and the situation more concretely. Our Party has an enormous responsibility, and in order to be able to shoulder it and emerge victorious, it must have a solid backbone, it must be a strong and well organized Party, and have comrades of a high political and military level, who at such decisive moments and in such difficult situations are capable of finding their bearings and coping with the unexpected. This is why the leading comrades should consistently help the other comrades of the cells, raise their political and theoretical level, assign them tasks of responsibility and demand results. As well as developing and extending the work in hand, you should find new methods of work, because this is the only way you can cope with the essential tasks you are faced with. It is no longer a question of minor work such as when the regional committee meetings discussed half a dozen reports received from party cells. Now broad horizons of work are opening before you. For this reason you must divide it, forming a network of comrades, sympathizers and friends around each responsible comrade so that, together, you can do the work you have been assigned by the regional committee meeting. Different sections should be set up for the press and propaganda, finance, the army, etc.

The greatest importance must be attached to the press and propaganda. Communiques, leaflets, and newspaper should be printed very carefully and distributed everywhere among the people. The propaganda section should always be on its toes, exposing every enemy manoeuvre and explaining the situation to the comrades and the

public. These materials must be attentively studied in the cells and groups, for it is there that the comrades will learn the political stand of our struggle and our Party. Pamphlets and books should be duplicated, especially the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B)". Not only must this book be put into the hands of all party members, but conferences and courses on it should be organized as well. Such work will raise the political level of our comrades and arm them with the most powerful weapon: Marxist theory.

Nothing has been heard about the situation of the party finances. It seems that they have been mixed up with the national liberation fund. This is a mistake, and it should be corrected as soon as possible. Party dues and contributions collected for the Party must go into the party treasury. It doesn't matter if they are spent on the needs of the army, but it is essential that the Party's financial contribution to the war be made known. Campaigns to collect money for the Communist Party have been completely neglected. Such campaigns should be undertaken, for they are a means of propaganda as well.

The work with the nationalists, which is particularly delicate, should be entrusted to good comrades who know how to present the line of the National Liberation War, how to tackle difficult situations and how to inject life into the national liberation councils. The organizations of the Youth and of the Anti-fascist Women must be given serious assistance and in no way be underestimated, because when we have a strong national liberation council, youth council, and women's council in a suburb, then we have mobilized the whole suburb and launched it into the struggle. And it is there that the soundness of the Party in the organizational field will be felt.

Work with the British missions. — In many regions there are British missions which try to poke their noses

into our political affairs, and particularly into our internal organizational and military affairs. They are trying to unite with the reactionaries, to organize them in order to use them in the event of a landing here. The British officers carry out this activity sometimes openly and sometimes secretly. They need a strong movement which has credibility among the people, and therefore they are trying to raise the prestige of the "Balli Kombëtar", to involve it in the war against the Germans so as to have it as a support in the future. But we must not forget that their primary interest should be the war against the Germans, a war which, here in Albania, is being fought by the national liberation movement alone, and therefore, they are obliged to help our movement. We must behave correctly towards them, at the same time taking a clear-cut stand. They must not be permitted to interfere in our internal affairs, and must in no way be accepted as arbitrators between us and the reaction. If our struggle against the reaction is to their liking, so much the better, otherwise nobody is forcing them to stay. If you find out that the British officers are up to trickery, if you have facts or documents concerning this, you must inform the General Staff immediately, and if it is a serious matter which cannot wait, escort them to the Command of the British missions in Albania (via our General Staff); by no means should they be allowed to meddle in our affairs, in our army.

* * *

The letters or reports to the General Staff, the General Council, the Anti-fascist Women and the Anti-fascist Youth should relate only to the competence of each, and you should avoid, for example, writing to the General Staff about party problems, or addressing the same letter to the General Staff and the Central Committee of the

Party, as often happens. Letters should be clearly addressed.

Once again we recommend that you take the greatest care that the circulars and letters of the Central Committee do not fall into the hands of the enemy; neither should the enemy find out their contents. The circulars and letters should enable you to define the line and tactics to follow in your work within the organization, among the people and against the enemy. This does not mean that, if speaking to the people, you should repeat the circulars word for word. We again stress that all the members of the regional committee should read the circulars and letters of the Central Committee carefully and, if possible, meetings of the activists of the region or at least of the town or district should be held from time to time to study the materials. Whatever happens, the word of the Central Committee should be conveyed to all the cells, and its directives studied.

Comradely greetings
For the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Albania

Shpati

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Works, vol. 2.

**LETTER TO THE BERAT REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ALBANIA CONDEMNING
THE WEAK CONTACTS WITH THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMPROMISE WITH THE
GERMANS IN BERAT**

November 5, 1943

Dear comrades,

We received your undated report together with your excuses for the lateness of the reports. Communists never look for excuses, but carry out the tasks entrusted to them with precision. We have never seen reports from the Berat comrades properly compiled or on time. Following two or three months' silence you send us a report, full of apologies for its delay. Such methods of work must be ended once and for all, or measures, and very severe ones at that, will be taken against you. Your style of work and of maintaining contact with the Central Committee will be held up to all organizations as a negative example, to prevent its repetition.

The compromise with the Germans¹ is one of the worst deeds a party regional committee could ever have

¹ During the period September-October 1943 Gjin Marku, the partisan commander of the Berat region, without the knowledge of the General Staff and in opposition to the party line, gave free access to the German forces to Berat which had been previously liberated by the forces of the National Liberation Army. This act was severely condemned by the Party, and Gjin Marku expelled from the CC of the CPA.

perpetrated. We could have expected almost anything, but such a thing we never expected from you. This is what results from break-downs in communications with the Central Committee. Your compromise with the Germans will be one of the topics for discussion at the next meeting of the Central Committee, at which decisions will be taken on this question.

Concerning the question of Fier, this is connected with that of Vlora, and is not as complicated as you make out. In case you have any surplus propaganda material, which we doubt, this should not prevent you from sending it to them.

The circular we are sending you should be studied with the greatest attention in the regional committee, and all its members should take part, including Gjin Marku, who should be summoned precisely for this purpose.

Comradely greetings
For the Central Committee

Enver Hoxha

Works, vol. 2.

**LETTER TO THE POLITICAL COMMISSAR OF THE
BËRZESHTA BATTALION ON PROVISION OF FOOD
AND RAISING THE MILITANT SPIRIT
OF THE BATTALION**

November 8, 1943

TO COMRADE HILMI SELENICA
POLITICAL COMMISSAR OF THE PARTISAN BATTALION

Bërzeshta

Dear comrade,

The General Staff has let us know about all your battalion's requests. In this letter we wish to explain some questions concerning the battalion to you, and these explanations you must convey only to the party comrades. First of all there is the question of provisions. The party comrades in particular must be quite clear that ours is a mobile partisan war, and at the same time they must bear in mind that this war is being waged by the Albanian people, and mainly by the poor. Our movement has no other source of supply for the battalions and units, except aid from the people. In your letter to the command, you even ask for plates and ladles. We do not consider your requests either excessive or exaggerated, but one thing you should know is that the General Staff is not in a position to supply you even with knives. You should try to find such things among the people, and if you cannot find

them, then try to do without them. The tone of your letter indicates that your battalion envisages the need to prepare winter quarters — that is, to lay in stores, because the snow is coming and the roads will be blocked. True, it snows. The Staff will see about the wheat and bread for the battalion, but only for the most critical moments in winter. You should not think even for a moment that you have only to notify the Staff, and everything will be handed to you on a plate. Comrades, you should realize that we are poor, and that our chief weapon in this war is our strong, steel-like will. You should bear in mind that the winter will be severe for us who are fighting in the mountains, but this should not frighten us in the least, for we have experienced other such winters before; you should be the inspiration of the detachment, the inspiration of all the partisans and should, without fail, prepare the partisans to overcome every obstacle. They should know and understand that the war is not waged without sacrifice, that sometimes we may have to go without food for a day or two, and that we will be cold in the mountains. The true fighters, those fighting for our sacred ideal, will stand out in these difficult moments. We cannot achieve our aim at one blow. This is why you, party comrades, and especially you personally as political commissar of the battalion, as well as the vice-commissar, should always be alert to convince the fighters of the situation, and prevent the development in your detachment of an atmosphere of waiting for the things which have been ordered, as though it is not possible to wage the war or get through the winter without them. The General Staff will certainly answer your letters, but in your battalion you must teach the partisans and the commander to be guided in this spirit and to think in this way.

The next matter and the more important one is the work you have to do in the battalion. This is of extraor-

dinary importance, for on it depends the strength of the battalion, its progress, determination and steeling.

If you party members do not work properly within it, the battalion will be only a battalion on paper; if you do not raise the political and military level of the partisans you lead, the battalion will not be able to fulfil the mission the people have entrusted it with. The blame will fall on you alone, you will be responsible. This is no easy job, it is true, but for us communists there are no obstacles, because with our steel-like determination we must overcome them all. You are young, but you have great will-power and courage; in war, in battle you will accumulate the experience of the true communist fighter, for that is our great school. All of you, especially you personally and the vice-commissar, must always be ready to lead the battalion, and counsel the partisans. Once or twice a week you should gather the battalion or the inhabitants of the village or region where you are stationed, to hold a conference in which you explain everything in clear terms, whether it be political or military matters, or some local problem. Divide the work among the other party comrades, and have all the comrades report to the cell on the results. Anyone who does not do his duty as a genuine soldier of the Party, betrays the Communist Party and our people. The party comrades must be in the forefront of the struggle and of sacrifice; it is absolutely impermissible for the commissars and vice-commissars to behave like bosses and high-ranking functionaries. Although the Party has charged them with a truly heavy burden of great importance, their behaviour and attitude must be modest, for the prestige of their office rests on their modesty and on their rigorous performance of their duties.

You should bear in mind that your battalion must earn the title of Partisan Battalion. It must have the spirit of attack, must always be on the alert against the

enemy and the traitors, and be a real organizer of all the councils of that region. Avoid passivity and tendencies to remain at the base. Such tactics deaden the spirit of the battalion. Such a battalion becomes stiff in the joints, and does not deserve the title of Partisan Battalion. Avoid bureaucracy in your ranks. If you manage to fulfil these tasks and all the other tasks as specified in the booklet "The National Liberation Army", which you must surely have received and studied, then you will soon see the fruit of your efforts. You will have a battalion which will be the terror of the enemy and the traitors, and you will have fulfilled the difficult tasks entrusted to you by our beloved Party, for which all of you are ready to shed the last drop of your blood.

Best regards
For the Central Committee of the Party

Enver Hoxha

Works, vol. 2.

**LETTER TO COMRADE NAKO SPIRU ON THE
SITUATION CREATED BY THE ENEMY'S WINTER
OPERATION AND THE NECESSITY OF
STRENGTHENING THE PROPAGANDA
AND THE PRESS OF THE
PARTY**

[February 1944]

Dear Deti¹,

The days pass with the greatest boredom because, while it is impossible to do anything to get out of here or to help the movement, we must go on with this monotonous life waiting to find a way out, but so far in vain. News reaching us from the peasants tell of nothing but skirmishes, retreats, and the organizing of the reaction. We do not take this news as "argent comptant"*¹, but all the same the situation seems very difficult.

We received your letter as well as the two copies of letters you have sent.

Your few lines have enabled us to understand the situation created there and the difficulties of the work, and going on with the little information we have, and in particular from reading the newspaper "Bashkimi i Kombit"

¹ Pseudonym of Nako Spiru, Member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPA and Political Secretary of the CC of the Communist Youth of Albania.

*"Argent comptant" (Fr. in the original) — for granted.

("National Union")², which Sami brings us, a major and well coordinated effort is needed to oppose the demagogical campaign launched by the enemy, a campaign of demagoguery which is far-reaching, sophisticated and many-sided. This work of the enemy cannot be exposed by just one or two people. What is needed is a group of mature comrades, with brains in their heads, and who, under your direction, should write down-to-earth, well-constructed articles, and not turn out fancy pieces of literature. The enemy's own propaganda should supply even sterile minds, which are not really down to earth, with enough material to expose the enemy's game. It seems to me from reading some leaflets distributed in Tirana, which Hysen has sent us, that there must be some comrades who are up to the task (I exclude here the leaflet distributed by the Tirana regional committee at New Year, and a call by the Anti-fascist Women, which I did not like at all). So you should give the weapon of propaganda a special boost; I don't mean that you should write all the material yourself. I am not even suggesting this, for, in the first place, it is too much for you to cope with, and secondly, others should learn to do it. One thing I have noticed with the Tirana comrades is that, although they have the will and the necessary technical equipment to put out papers like "Zëri" and "Bashkimi", they want to put out either a four-page edition or nothing at all. They forget that we are working underground and that it is a great triumph if "Zëri i Popullit" appears, even if it is only half a page. After reading some of the leaflets they have been able to put out, I think they could publish two-page newspapers too. This should be done without loss of time. Many good

² Reactionary paper (December 1943-October 1944), mouthpiece of the quisling government and the German occupiers.

articles, which have appeared in leaflets, could very well have been published in newspapers.

The propaganda we put out for the youth seems rather worthless to me. The last issue of "Kushtrimi"³ which I read, saddened me. In my opinion there was nothing in it at all, and what there was, was badly written, repetitious, full of "lieux communs"*⁴, and lacking enthusiasm. All this must change. The enemy uses every means to attract our youth. We who have so many exploits to our credit but do not know how to make use of them, should bring them into prominence. We have to arouse the interest of the youth, or we shall lose them. It is not enough to proclaim that we have the youth on our side, but we must really have them. The "Kushtrimi" leaflets and the leaflet entitled "Përgjigjemi" ("We Reply") pleased us very much, but one comment you should pass on to the comrades of the press, is that our war has more than just four martyrs: Qemal, Vojo, Perlat, and Margarita Tutulani. These are the only names one sees in all our leaflets. They are symbols, it is true, but we have others, hundreds of others, who have acted and died heroically. It is an error on our part to name so few, firstly because we give the people the impression that our movement has few heroes, and secondly because we should guard against parochialism. The leaflets mention only the fighters of the towns, and not those of the mountains. Our struggle is broad, we have many heroes, and our people should be acquainted with them, know about them, and appreciate our contribution to the war. We should remind our comrades of many things which, although they may

3 "Kushtrimi i Lirisë" ("Call of Freedom") — organ of the Albanian Anti-fascist People's Youth (August 1942 — December 1944).

* Lieux communs" (Fr. in the original) — platitudes.

seem small, are important. Above all, as you know, we must set the tone for all the other regions ; our propaganda and the Tirana leaflets must reach other cities too. But for this to happen, we have to establish contacts. I will not dwell on this, since I know the essential point which must be worrying you is to establish connections with the South: Vlora, Gjirokastra, Berat, and through you, with the Korça comrades and with us.

You should teach the comrades there to work, as well as to combat the police and to protect the cadres.

We must not hit out blindly at the huge and organized reaction. You must be able to show the comrades how to work persistently and methodically (although perhaps more "ralenti"*), without throwing them into the thick of things at a time when the situation is so grave. Bear in mind that the work must be done and, at the same time, the cadres protected, for we shall need them in the future. We cannot find and produce cadres like Deti, Hysen, Dyl⁴, and others any time we like. They must know how to work (I am making these comments, because we have been told that they are hauling in our comrades from the streets like fish).

Concerning the comrades and partisans working underground, it is necessary to find a way to get them out of the cities, where their lives are in danger. Study all the possibilities. There is nothing much I can tell you, for I do not know, but I suggest only that, when danger is imminent, you should not keep to the established patterns, or expect every partisan to get to his own detachment. Send them to Peza. This will be aid and encouragement to Myslim; or sent them to Korça with forged papers (if it is possible).

* "Ralenti" (Fr. in the original) = slowly.

⁴ Abdyl Këllezi.

As for Myslim, do everything possible to assist him. According to what you write, they are fighting every day over there, and it is essential that Myslim and his comrades see that we are with them at every moment. In my opinion, Myslim should be assisted before some of the brigades.

I don't know what the 3rd Brigade is up to concerning Bazi i Canës at Mat.

I have the impression (I cannot say for certain, since I don't know really) that the comrades are keeping quiet about Bazi. Hysen tells us in his letter that he has issued a leaflet in reply to our resolution⁵, but we don't know the content. One thing I have noticed, just from those of our leaflets I have read, is that Bazi i Canës is not being mentioned at all. This is a mistake. We should not allow Bazi i Canës to lie quiet as before, claiming to be a "fighter against all occupiers", while maintaining close links with the traitors. The resolution should be followed by other leaflets and articles against Bazi's equivocal stand. We should hunt him out of his hiding place, and let the people see his dirty face. He is our enemy, and we should attack him. By doing this we shall make him even more of an enemy, but we should not forget that, as far as I know, judging from the reports we have, he is the pillar of the reaction in the North; all the filth will gravitate around him.

We should not allow Bazi to pass himself off to the people as a patriot, for he is nothing but a traitor. (I have been preparing an article on Bazi, but in order for me to do this you must send me information about him, and his work and propaganda during the period we have been cut off from the rest of the world. I am waiting for this.)

⁵ This refers to the resolution of the Presidium of the National Liberation General Council, dated December 7, 1943, "On the Expulsion of Abaz Kupa from the General Council".

Oppose the tendency of the comrades in their propaganda in writing or by word of mouth to attack the reaction only, and to forget about the occupiers. We must link the two closely, putting the Germans first. Every action against the Germans, even small ones, should be made known. On this point, the connections with the regions are important . . .

Instead of assembling the scattered comrades and reforming the battalion into one or two units, Lila⁶ and "our friends" have proceeded to liquidate everything, although the situation was improving and becoming somewhat clearer. Instead of assembling and organizing what partisans they had, they sent them away to the 3rd Brigade, with instructions for everyone to go to the assembly point and then make a triumphal entry to Çermenika. And what is even lovelier is that they are liquidating the army and the partisan units, after all our criticisms of the brigades concerning such grave mistakes, which are little short of betrayal. What can be done with them, Deti? The fish is rotten in the head, and needs a new one. I hit them hard. I spoke to them frankly and sternly, confronting them with their responsibilities. Not one of them had a word to say, or made the slightest self-criticism. This is the way things are.

The Ballists hold meetings every week. Lushi⁷ himself comes and goes as if quite at home. The Ballists move around freely as if on their own estates, and we are at the mercy of the friend whom you know. Thus, I have assigned the comrades here in pairs, to different areas in Çerme-

⁶ Kadri Hoxha, former commander of the Partisan Group Staff of Elbasan. During the war he often was criticized by the leadership of the CC of the CPA for negligence and marked indifference. After the war, he was engaged in anti-party and anti-state activity.

⁷ Commander of a Ballist armed band in the Elbasan region.

nika. Time, work and people are needed here to bring things back to normal. What more can I say?

I have received a letter from D., asking for information on Haxhi and wanting to return, for his comrades have been scattered, and he has no idea where they are; the reaction is in full flood, he says. (60 Germans in Dibra and only 15 in Peshkopia. Fancy the panic of these comrades!)

Do you ever spare a thought for us poor fellows⁸ here, surrounded and bored to death? Have you thought of any way to get us out? By car, to Dumre, Peza, or somewhere else? Write all round, but without saying who it is we want to get out. Leave the comrades to guess it is us (for the letters could fall into the hands of the enemy).

We are thinking of using the same routes as A and T. This is a plan which tempts us. If you can do it quickly, send a letter to T., and tell him about our plan. He should send back details about the situation in that district, and if possible, he should dispatch a unit from Grabova further inland to wait for us. If they can do this, they must do it quickly. That is, within four days you must have their answer, and towards the end of the week, that is by the 12th, we should have word from you. In any case, do as I have said and tell them that we can leave, therefore they must send the unit. Naturally we are not setting out blindly, but nevertheless there is nothing certain about it. We shall need a certain amount of luck.

⁸ At that time, part of the leadership of the Central Committee of the CPA and of the General Staff of the NLA with comrade Enver Hoxha were blocked in a mountain zone of Central Albania. The nazis, Ballists, and Zogites left no stone unturned to discover and annihilate the leadership of the National Liberation War. In the end, affronting heroically and with sangfroid the extreme difficulties, the leaders of the Party and people, with the aid of the peasants, found their way out of the encirclement.

As for the question of the course⁹, these are routine plans. I hope something useful can be done. Concerning the meeting¹⁰ you speak of, it is absolutely necessary, but the question is whether it is possible.

Send us news and don't sit idly by, Deti. Think of what you have gone through and what we are going through now.

Our greetings to the comrades, especially to Hysen, to the Delegate¹¹ and yourself. Greetings from all the comrades here.

Taras

The Major wants you to send him a letter from his little ones. In short, he wants an answer from his children.

(To help you understand our plan of escape: we shall pass through the region with the same name I often use as a signature¹². You are intelligent, and can work it out. So the unit from Korça will be a great help to us, if it succeeds in penetrating fairly deeply into this region.)

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9 In March 1944 the CC of the CPA organized a course with the political leaders of brigades and members of the regional committees.

10 Comrade Nako Spiru proposed holding a meeting of the CC of the CPA. Under the circumstances, the meeting was impossible. The Plenum of the Central Committee was convened on May 15, 1944.

11 Pseudonym of comrade Nexhmije Xhuglini (Hoxha).

12 Comrade Enver Hoxha often used as a signature "Shpati" — the name of an area in the Elbasan region.

**LETTER TO COMRADE NAKO SPIRU ON
THE ESCAPE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF
THE ALBANIAN NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY
FROM THE ENCIRCLEMENT AND ON THE
COUNTER-OFFENSIVE OF THE ANLA**

[March 1944]

Dear comrade Deti,

After many hardships we arrived in Korça and made contact with the comrades. We came via Shpati following a tedious 20-day journey during which we went from friend to friend through the whole Shpati-Vërça zone. When we left, the situation in Çermenika was unchanged, with much reaction, the same as in Shpati and Vërça; although there were several Ballist units, the people hated the "Balli" and were very sympathetic towards us. Wherever we went, to friends and comrades, we could not have been more warmly welcomed. When we were in Kishta, the mere appearance of one of our Korça battalions, commanded by Riza Kodheli, in Shenepremte, was enough to make all the Ballist forces assembled in Vërça take to their heels, without our men having to fire a single shot. The Ballists, from Riza Kishta to Maliq Dushari and Musa Bey Moglica, were so frightened that they did not stop running until they reached Elbasan. The mere arrival of this battalion was enough to clear the zone of Ballists. We saw this with our own eyes, as well as their disorderly retreat. Here, the situation is not as difficult as over there. The 1st Bri-

gade, which has fought well wherever it has been, was urgently summoned by the Berat comrades, and Mehmet Shehu, with three battalions, was sent to Çermenika to rescue us. Mehmet crossed the Shkumbini and is now in Çermenika, but we had already left Shpati. The rest of the brigade is operating in Mokra, and we have just received news that they have been successful in an encounter with the German and Ballist forces. Here is what they have written to us; you should publish it in a communique: "Having cleared out the Tomorrica zone and routed the Xhaf Bali forces, we crossed over to Mokra. At Shkoza and Këmbëtheker, part of a company from the 4th Battalion of the 1st Brigade clashed with a number of Ballists and routed them. The Ballists went to Sovjan and, supported by German reinforcements, launched a surprise attack on our comrades. Other forces of the 4th Battalion immediately went to the assistance of their comrades and routed the enemy again. Two of our men were killed in the encounter, and one on the Ballist side. On March 4, a large German force advanced towards Mokra, from Qukës and Pogradec. After brief fighting, our forces withdrew towards Mokra. During this clash two Germans and one Ballist were killed, and on our side two comrades were slightly wounded. On the morning of the 7th, our forces completed the encirclement of the Ballists. They were completely encircled, and following a two-hour battle 400 Ballists were taken prisoner while more than 70 were killed in the fighting. A large quantity of arms and ammunition was captured. Their commanders were also captured, and after trial were executed in front of the Ballists and the inhabitants of Mokra. The commanders captured, tried, and executed were: Haki Blloshmi, Xhevdet Blloshmi, Bame Trebinja, Sadik Bey Trebinja, Xheladin Ago Selca, Adem Ago Velçani, Adem Kapri, and the son of Hasan

Bey Veçani." As you see, the 1st Brigade is fighting brilliantly and the partisans have a great spirit of sacrifice and courage.

The 4th Brigade is operating in Gora, Opar, and on the plain. It has carried out mopping-up operations without meeting any resistance. During a battle at Lozhan, nearly 400 Ballists were routed, and about ten killed.

We have not yet become familiar with the situation and the work; there are many things we do not know, since we arrived here only two days ago. We have read only two letters of yours but, on receipt of this letter, you should send us a wide-ranging report giving us details on all the activity there. You should report on the entire activity of the comrades, especially of the leading comrades, and on their attitude. You should report on the question of the youth, and send us every report that comes from the grass-roots level for the Central Committee. The comrades complain that you have not maintained regular contact with them. I know nothing of this, but things must be put right, and regular contacts must be established with Korça at any cost. Find out as soon as possible from Shule about the radio transmitter they have there. Get it, and try to repair it, so that we can contact you by radio. It will be a great thing if we can do this, so don't overlook it.

What is Sejfulla up to there¹? Sejfulla has never said a word to me about the question of the "Republican Demo-

¹ Sejfulla Malëshova, member of the Presidium of the National Liberation General Council and deputy member of the CC of the CPA. During the war, he was often criticized for sluggishness and procrastination of work. Through the interference of the Yugoslav leadership in November 1944 he was co-opted as member of the CC and of the Political Bureau of the CPA. After the war he was engaged in anti-party activity.

cratic Party"², about which you wrote to me when I was in Çermenika, and I am not in favour of exerting our efforts to set it up to alienate elements from the Front on the pretext of drawing them closer to us. I don't know how far you have gone in this matter, but I shall speak with the comrades about it, and we shall write to you. But do not do anything before hearing from us here. Dr. Nishani and B. are needed here, so study the possibility of sending them via Peza and ask us for what help you need, for we can send the necessary forces to pick them up at whatever place you consider most suitable.

As for the comrades coming from Italy and elsewhere, from abroad in general, let us know their names and any other information you may have about them. They are not to be admitted to the Party without our consent. No one who says he has been member of a cell in Italy or in the Italian Party can join our Party without an order from the CC.

Be especially careful about the question of the party organization. The comrades should keep their eyes open for enemies of the Party, and for the factionalists, who are no doubt working under the lap. Be careful of them, pay attention to their old contacts, great attention, or one fine day a brick may fall on our heads. After a few day's rest I shall write to you at length and in detail, because there are several things which I have learned about this question which I am so concerned about.

² At the beginning of 1944 there was a proposal to form a "Republican Democratic Party" with elements from the National Liberation Front, allegedly with the aim of drawing into the Front the "Balli Kombëtar" elements who were opposed to their chiefs. The setting up of such a party was regarded as something quite artificial and detrimental to the liberation war, and therefore, the CC of the CPA rejected this proposal.

Send us the newspapers and details of the work of the councillors. We will send you articles, but you must establish communications urgently. Pass this letter on to the Delegate.

Best regards to all the comrades; I miss you a lot, my old comrade in bad times. How is your illness? Our letter to Dibra and Slova should be sent at all costs and with the greatest urgency via Peshkopia. It should not be delayed a single day either in Tirana or Peshkopia. This is urgent, very urgent.

Have you heard anything of Vasil³?

Taras

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³ Vasil Shanto, deputy member of the CC of the CPA, killed in February 1944 in a clash with the enemy, People's Hero.

**LETTER TO COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU ON SAFE-
GUARDING THE LEADING POLITICAL
AND MILITARY CADRES**

April 14, 1944

TO COMRADE MEHMET SHEHU, COMMANDER
OF THE 1st SHOCK BRIGADE

Dear comrade,

During the war a great number of comrades in leading political and military posts have been killed in encounters with the occupiers and the traitors. With the extension of the scope of our work and of the war, and taking into account how young our Party is, as well as the relatively low political and military level of the cadres, these losses have had a considerable effect on us. At most times, and in the different areas, the shortage of leading cadres has weakened the work and restricted the scope of the war. The leading political and military comrades have always set an example of determination for the cause of the Party, and have courageously been in the front lines of the war and in the most dangerous places. This has heartened the comrades and the army, and has enhanced the prestige of our Party; but the comrades have given little thought to safeguarding the best cadres, those who will train other comrades, and direct the work and the war. At the initial stage of the organization of the work and of

the army, this painful sacrifice of military and political leaders of our Party had to be made. This is still the case, now and in the future, but the leading comrades must understand their role and duties as leaders. They must remember that, while being courageous and resolute in the work and the fighting, from now on they should also see to it that they expose themselves somewhat less than they have done, and thus avoid the damage their loss causes the Party. The role of leaders is not just to fight but also to command. It is easy enough for a determined leading comrade to go to the front lines, to fight and fall courageously, but it is difficult to replace him.

In connection with this, you in particular should show the greatest prudence. You should always think in terms of the words of our great comrade Stalin: “. . . to give one's life for the Party and to offer one's blood drop by drop”. You should not consider things narrowly, confined to the region where you have been assigned to work, or endanger your life at any moment, like an ordinary partisan. *You are not permitted, except at extremely critical moments, when there is great danger and when sacrifice is absolutely necessary, to expose yourself to danger; you are no longer permitted to take part in an assault at the head of the partisans and to set the example for them, where your presence is not indispensable.* Only when your brigade is in great danger, should you intervene personally; you are not permitted to expose yourself to danger in matters which can just as easily be solved by another comrade. *This is an order which must be carried out to the letter. Any other course of action will be an act of disobedience to the Party and the Central Committee.*

We trust that you understand the importance of this moment, the motives which impel us to write this to you,

and that, as a leading comrade, you will understand the importance of this question.

Comradely greetings
For the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Albania

Enver Hoxha

Works, vol. 2.

**LETTER TO THE POLITICAL SECTION OF
THE 1ST SHOCK BRIGADE ON THE EDUCATION
AND IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL TRAINING
OF THE COMMUNISTS AND PARTISANS**

April 22, 1944

TO THE POLITICAL SECTION OF THE 1st SHOCK BRIGADE
(To Comrade Fiqret)¹

Following your work, help, and guidance there has been an obvious improvement in the situation in the brigade from every point of view, especially as regards raising the level of the cadres.

You stressed in your report that the partisans have great confidence in the staff of the brigade; this is very good and positive, but we should concentrate especially on arousing in the partisans and party members faith in and a great love for the Party and the Central Committee, which is its wise and correct leader. Morale, enthusiasm, and determination are at a high level in your brigade, but we must not forget that its cadres are at a very low level, and there is a shortage of political leaders. At present our army is growing; the brigades are increasing; and we are in great need of both political and military cadres. Up until now we have not asked for them, since we have been aware of the cadre situation, but from now on we expect that brigade to supply us with the best cadres, especially

1 Fiqret Sanxhaktari (Shehu).

for the staffs of the battalions. You are well aware of the great importance of raising the level of the cadres, and we do not need to stress this. The strengthening of the organization in the brigade depends on your work, so that the best members of our Party emerge from the ranks of the partisans tested through suffering, hardships, hunger, and combat.

On the question of the course, you have done well with the opportunity presented by the assembling of the brigade. You have not done so well in the way you allotted the topics, because all the comrades attending the course should have presented topics, and not just Fiqret and Sadik. It would have been good for Dhori, and especially Atlet, to present something on the youth or some other topic. You write about reassembling the brigade, but this cannot be done, since at least ten days would be lost in doing so. You should meet again only when military duties require it.

Your report shows that the number of party members has increased; this is a success, but you should be careful to recruit them according to sound criteria, without going to either extreme. When various topics are discussed at conferences and during classes you should stress to the partisans that our war will continue not only until fascism is destroyed, but until we give the people a popular democratic government. Put the correct stress on the question of love between partisan women and men. Love is based on free choice, but education is needed to see that it rests on a sound basis. The attitude to it should be serious and there should be complete harmony between the two sides; it should be stressed that there is nothing unnatural or deserving of criticism if there is any attachment between a couple; in any case you should be in a position to solve these questions and don't be influenced by any outside opinion.

Pelivan² has defected to the other side. Of course, you understand why this has happened. There must be sound education and faith in ultimate victory must be aroused, as well as confidence in the Party's successes and in its invincibility. You should make a distinction between desertions by young elements or partisans led on by others, and desertions by elements who have been members of the organization for six months on end. There is evidence of a lack of proper check-up and attention with regard to the members and those who show such signs. Even earlier Pelivan had been suspected, therefore it is the fault of the organization that he has ended up in this way. Greater concern should be shown towards the members and they should be given more assistance; a good, comradely, and if necessary, firm attitude should be maintained towards the cadres. Those needing assistance should be helped, while those who continue to maintain an incorrect stand, despite all your assistance, must be put in their proper place.

You are right to say you need means and equipment, but make do with what you have until more arrives. The duplicator has still not come, and we are taking this matter up.

The agitation and propaganda section should work but needs your help and guidance; everything must pass through your hands. Perhaps the comrades are young and do not know how to work, but you must guide them. However, despite everything that is lacking, you have done something. Comrade Todi³ showed good initiative concerning the Italians; you should work carefully and consistently with them, both politically and from the point of view of organizing them.

² One of the chief members of Sadik Premte's faction in Vlorë; following his desertion from the NLA, he joined the "Balli Kombëtar" and the German occupiers.

³ Todi Naço.

Some days ago we sent you an instruction⁴ concerning the work to be done by the Party organization at the grass-roots level, so we shall not go over this again. We are sure that you will work in this direction and give great assistance to the various grass-roots organizations.

Comradely greetings
For the Central Committee

Enver Hoxha

Works, vol. 2.

⁴ This refers to the letter of comrade Enver Hoxha, dated April 17, 1944, in which he gave instructions on the political, organizational and military work to be done by the brigades of the NLA in the areas they traversed.

INSTRUCTIONS ON THE FUNCTIONS AND TASKS OF THE PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY

[April 1944]

TO ALL VICE-COMMISSARS OF BRIGADES, GROUPS
AND BATTALIONS, AS WELL AS
TO POLITICAL SECTIONS

Our Party, with its correct stand towards the war and with its political and organizational work, has been able to create a regular army. If this army is to be strong, capable of coping with any difficulties and any reaction, unmoved by any enemy propaganda, if it is to be trained to link itself ever more closely with our Party and become the decisive force in achieving our aims, the greatest possible amount of political and organizational work must be done. It must have strong party organizations with loyal and devoted party cadres, capable of leading the national liberation movement. Thus, with strong organizations, we will have a strong army, and the leading role of the Party will be affirmed as the sole political Party which has shown the people the correct road to lead them to victory in the war.

As the National Liberation War extends and new conditions are created, an immense field of activity is opened to our organizations in the army, and new tasks emerge. The organizations in the army and their members should make the leading role of the Party a reality,

should work to raise the political consciousness of the fighters, and train a strong, steel-like, and resolute army. The pamphlet "The National Liberation Army"¹ describes the Party's method of work in the army. However, some mistakes have been made due to lack of experience, and we therefore find it necessary to make some amendments and present the party work in the army units in a clearer way to avoid repetition of mistakes and to ensure that the comrades are better orientated in carrying out their tasks.

There have been a number of misunderstandings which have impeded the work:

1. The leading role which the Party must have in the army, has not been well understood.

a — It has not been clearly understood that the political commissars are party representatives, who will defend, before the people and the military units, the line laid down by our Party in the National Liberation War. The political commissar takes part in the staff cell. In order to play his role fully, he will have the support of the cell in which he takes part, and will carry out his tasks with its assistance. He cannot act on behalf of the cell or responsible organ without first having received instructions and directives from them.

b — The leading role of the cell and the bureau in the battalion, and of the other leading organs of the Party in the larger units, and their relation with the respective staffs, has not been understood.

c — The stand to be maintained by all the party members in the unit has not been well understood; they should be outstanding among all the other fighters and become an example of courage and determination. With

¹ Report submitted to the 1st National Conference of the CPA.

their courage, resolve, and knowledge they will raise the morale of the fighters and, even under the most difficult conditions, will not allow the army to become demoralized and dispersed. First they should look after the welfare of the partisans, and then look after themselves. They should become an example of patience in face of any hardship, in face of hunger, fatigue, the reaction, etc. When the partisans are in difficulties, or when they are wounded, the party members should be the first to help them. They should maintain close comradely relations with the partisans. Lack of consideration, conceit, and arrogance impede these bonds of love and friendship between them and the fighters. It is only by acting in this way that they will earn the love and trust of the partisans, and stand out among all the other fighters. The political commissar above all others should have these qualities. Comrade Stalin says: "The commissar is the moral and political leader of his detachment, the first defender of moral and spiritual interests. . . . The commissar should be the father and inspiration of his detachment"*.

2. The great importance of political and organizational work in the army has not been understood.

We should always attentively guard against allowing the military line to dominate the party line; that is, the party members with military responsibilities in the unit should not restrict themselves to these duties alone to the neglect of their party duties. It often happens that certain military units are very good as such, but neglect the political side of the work, and the fighters are developed one-sidedly, only militarily. The effect of this will be that in certain difficult situations (such as an unsuccessful battle, fatigue, or shortage of provisions) the propa-

* See: Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. Brief biography. Tirana, 1945, p. 41. (Albanian Edition).

ganda of the enemy or of small-minded people could have bad results.

3. The importance of planned work has not been understood.

It is necessary for all work to be carried out according to a definite plan; the cell, the bureau (the entire brigade) will draw up the plan for the period between meetings, or for a longer period. In the unit as a whole (in the company, battalion or brigade) the work must proceed smoothly in every sector and in every part of the unit; for instance, there should not be progress only in the work with the youth while political work is neglected; or great progress in the work in one battalion, but not in another. If the work is carried out according to a common plan (if the same topic is dealt with throughout the unit, the same questions debated and the same educational matter explained), then there will be genuine unity in the military unit.

Work has not been proceeding according to any plan, either short or long term. Planned work will intensify the activity of the members, strengthen check-up on the work, and ensure the strict implementation of the directives and instructions of the Party and of the respective organs.

Besides the misunderstandings that have existed, there have also been some errors in the work.

Often the organizations have been sectarian in recruiting members. Our war, our work under difficult conditions and our constant battles should have provided us with a criterion for recruiting members. We should not be afraid to admit to the Party people who genuinely support us, but who do not have a high level, or who have some faults. Our work will raise the level of these people, and our educational work will improve them. Our organizations in the army will remain weak if insufficient

organizational work is done, and if work is not done to recruit elements who emerge in the struggle and to raise their level in every respect.

In certain military units (brigades) the political commissars of companies have been in charge of the cells, not because there were no other suitable members, but because the political commissar was the most suitable and best prepared. As a result, organizational work has not gone very smoothly, because the political commissar has many responsibilities and cannot carry out all of them properly, and this has also hindered other members from raising their level and gaining experience in the work. Although they do not yet know how to work, the young comrades must also be given responsible tasks and shown how to work.

There has also been some laxity which, following these explanations and after more intense activity by the comrades, must not be repeated. These include the failure to hold regular cell meetings, insufficient attention to raising the level of the party members, insufficient check-up on the carrying out of tasks, etc.

For organizational and military work to go smoothly it is important for the cells of the staffs to be familiar with their tasks and with the relations they should maintain with the respective staffs.

The cell of the staff. — The cell of the staff is made up of the commander, deputy commander, the commissar, vice-commissar, quarter-master, the comrade in charge of agitation and propaganda, the operational officer, the comrade in charge of health, and the information officer; however, this should not be understood rigidly. The quarter-master or others are not admitted to this cell if they are not of a high enough level, for instance, if they are newly admitted party members and are not in a po-

sition to assist the work of the staff cell, but instead hinder it.

The Party, or the higher organs of the Party, bring the party directives and instructions into effect through the staff cell. The staff members are responsible to the military high command for their work in military matters. But members of the staff who are party members are also responsible to the party for all their work. If there are party functionaries (representatives of the Central Committee) in this unit, they can attend the meetings of the staff cell, if they consider it necessary, and on such occasions, it is they who indicate the party line. The comrades who are members of the staff, should be clear that in the cell they are merely ordinary members. They are responsible for their work to the cell, they must be disciplined, and must be aware that they cannot act without the consent and acknowledgement of the cell. The members should show due respect for the commander and the commissar, just like ordinary soldiers. The comrades should strictly implement all the orders of the commander and the commissar. In the cell the commander and the commissar are ordinary members, and the vice-commissar is an ordinary member in the unit. This is the correct relationship between the staff and the cell, and it should be well understood.

It is evident that many comrades consider the staff cell superfluous, but this is a wrong view. The comrades who are members of the staff should become accustomed to looking at the life of the battalion and of the staff from the viewpoint of the Party, and should appreciate the importance of raising their own theoretical and political level.

The cell must pay attention to the development of initiative in the staff concerning the question of actions. It is the duty of the party comrades to prepare the leader-

ship of the staff to be competent in war, and to be an example of courage and discipline. It is up to the cell to enhance and reinforce the authority of the staff and its members.

Work in the staff cell proceeds as in every other party cell and special attention must be shown to raising the level of the cell members from every point of view. Every comrade in the staff cell has his own work sector, for example, the commissar is concerned with implementing the political line and with political enhancement in general; the quarter-master looks after stores, etc., and each presents a report in the cell on his work in his respective sector and renders account for his activity. All the members of the cell are expected to make criticism and self-criticism of their work so that party work will proceed smoothly. The cell sends all its proposals on the work of the party organizations in the battalion through the party bureau (battalion vice-commissar), and in the brigade, through the brigade vice-commissar. At the meeting of the cell, work is allocated to everyone, and at the next meeting accounts of the work carried out are required. In regard to military plans, these are discussed only by the operational command. A report is submitted to the cell meeting concerning the carrying out of the plan drawn up.

Before taking any measures, the comrade members of the staff must first discuss them in the cell. All the members of the cell should support the opinion and decision of the staff, for this is, at the same time, their opinion. If things are not done in this way, the staff will not be able to apply the measures adopted, the unity of work between the cell and the staff will be broken, and the Party will not be able to play its leading role. Such a relation between the measures adopted by the staff, on the one hand, and by the cell, on the other, is especially

necessary when there are factionalist elements, and when alien influences are at work, towards which the party cell must decide the proper attitude to be adopted.

The party organization in the unit cannot become the tutor of the staff. Relations should be such that the Party becomes the true leader, without violating the autonomy and initiative of the military command, only ensuring the implementation of the party directives; on the other hand, in all questions the military command should have the support and certain aid of the party organizations, as the leading factor in the National Liberation War.

In order for the Party to play its leading role in the partisan unit, it is important for the work of the cell to be assisted, and for the life of the Party to develop incessantly. This is achieved only through the correct and strong organization of the communist cell.

The party cell. — All the party members in a company form one cell, which is the nucleus of the Party in the army; one unit — one cell. If there are a lot of party members, the cell may be divided into groups, but these are still parts of the same cell and are led by the same person (the groups can be formed on the basis of platoons, and this is done when the company has a large number of fighters).

The work of the cell should be organized according to the sectors of party work in such a way that every sector has a comrade responsible for organizing work in that sector and for rendering account to the cell on the successes and failures. There should be no specialization in the work, but every comrade should work in the various sectors, and thus gain experience in all kinds of party work. In organizing the work of the cell, the future development of the work in the specific sectors should always be borne in mind, and the work should proceed harmoniously in all sectors.

Organizational work. — All the fighters will be organized in different groups. The whole company should constitute an educational group, or if this is too difficult, two or more party (educational) groups, led by a comrade responsible to the cell for this work, if it is impossible for one person to do this job alone, then others are assigned to it too. The best fighters and those who can become party members more quickly should be worked with on an individual basis, being educated by one or several comrades of the cell, according to the possibilities, in the manner judged best by the cell. When the cell holds educational meetings, it is best for the candidate party members to participate too², but this should be well understood, and an unnecessarily large number of fighters should not attend.

When there is no cell in the company, we should make efforts to set one up as soon as possible.

In organizational work the essential point is that the unit should be completely organized. Each fighter should take part in some group, if he is not a party member. When there is no cell in the company, the fighters who are more liable to become party members are formed into a group of candidate members, and each is assigned responsibility for one work sector. Much work should be done to raise their political and theoretical level. When they have been trained and become party members, the group becomes a cell and there is no need for another group, which would be a second cell in addition to the main cell.

Individual work, that with older fighters and those who do not take part in either the youth or party groups,

² The candidates usually did not take part in every meeting of the cell; special educational meetings were held separately with them.

should not be forgotten. They require special handling, and various methods of education should be used with them. The political situation should be explained to them in simple terms, and the articles studied with them should be those most relevant and appropriate to this group. Intensive political and educational work should be done with the members of the educational groups, and especially with the candidate party members, so they can be linked as closely as possible with our Party, and their faith in and love for the Party can be aroused and strengthened. In the work of the cell criticism and self-criticism is carried out. Not only criticism of the work, but also of the personal stand and life of every member, of his good qualities and shortcomings, for this is the only way to develop the sense of complete responsibility of the members towards the Party.

In quite a number of units, such as in battalions and brigades, which have good and determined fighters, there are very few party members. This points to insufficient organizational work and a sectarian attitude to recruiting members. We should not be sectarian, but bold in recruiting new party members; we should not think that we will weaken the Party by a large number of admissions. The Party is weakened by our insufficient and disorganized work. But on the other hand, we should not think that we can leave the doors of the Party wide open and admit just anyone. We must recruit according to definite criteria: we must bring into the Party sound, honest, and militant workers, peasants and intellectuals, resolute elements who love the Party, are hard-working and capable of making progress, etc. Our organizations are weak because we have not recruited according to these criteria, and because we have not worked hard enough to raise the level of those we have admitted.

There have been some unwarranted expulsions. The mistakes and shortcomings of the members should be pointed out and criticized, they should be given advice and everything possible should be done to improve them; only when they are incorrigible, should they be expelled. The numerous expulsions, desertions, etc., point to the inadequacy in our organizational work and incompetence at work.

Great care should be devoted to purifying the ranks of the Party. There should be no room, in the cells or the army, for factionalists, inactive or suspect people, or still less, for cowards. Purging the ranks strengthens the Party.

Work among the youth. — In each cell there is a comrade appointed whose task is to guide and assist the work of the youth to carry out the line of the Party among the youth, and for this he is responsible to the cell. In a unit there is only one youth activist group, led by a person in charge who may be a Young Communist experienced in work with the youth, or a party member responsible for work among youth in the cell. The person responsible for the activist group, whether a Young Communist or a party member, receives instructions from the battalion youth committee and renders account to it for his work. The party member responsible for the youth reports to the cell on the work he has done among the youth. The youth activist group is at the same time an educational group, but wherever possible, two or more educational groups should be set up. The battalion youth committee is responsible for the education of the youth and is assisted by the cell. The youth must be given the possibility to raise their own level, to equip themselves with understanding of Marxism-Leninism, etc. The Communist Youth in the army should also work among the youth behind the lines, organizing youth unions and work bri-

gades, mobilizing the youth to other ends, and so on. It should assist also in the organizational work by setting up Communist Youth organizations when this is considered necessary by the regional organizations.

Youth committees. — All of the Communist Youth in the units should be organized; it is therefore necessary to set up youth committees. These are made up of the comrades with most experience in work with the youth (those comrades who have been members of the regional youth committees outside the army will be best able to give leadership; they may be members of the youth committees even if they have other military responsibilities such as commissar or vice-commissar, but this is seldom the case). Although the youth committees have complete initiative in their work, they are still directed and led by the party organs, and render account to them for their work. The members of the committees have direct contact with those in charge of the groups of activists and with the educators of the youth groups, whom they guide in their work and from whom they require reports on the work done. Although the youth committees are being set up, the party bureaus should still have someone responsible for the youth. The comrade responsible for the youth in the battalion bureau takes part in the youth committee. The youth committee maintains links with the battalion vice-commissar and receives instructions from him (it should be understood that these are indirect links and instructions). The youth committees of the battalions receive instructions from, and maintain direct links with, the youth committee of the brigade.

Political, cultural and educational work. — As was stressed above, work has not been going as it should to raise the level of the fighters or of the party cadres. This is why in difficult situations, partisans have sometimes deserted and even party members have not maintained a

proper stand. Occasionally, party members have not maintained a correct political attitude. These and other cases show the absolute necessity of carrying out in the unit political, cultural and educational work, with the aim of raising the level of overall knowledge and political consciousness of the fighters and, on this basis, strengthening the moral and political unity of the unit. Fighting capacity and unity are dependent on moral and political unity, because without achieving moral and political unity the unit will not be able to respond to its military tasks. Therefore, the cell should attach importance to this sector of work, it must conduct intense political work — the cultural work should be carried out by the Communist Youth, enabling the youth to develop their own initiative in this work. All available political and educational material should be studied in the unit, and when there is a shortage of such material, the party members should prepare papers and submit them to conferences of the unit.

For this work it is necessary to have conferences, various training courses and lectures. The topics dealt with there should be the current ones in which the fighters are interested most.

Military work. — The cell should learn from the experience of the war, learn the tactics of the war and raise the level of the military leadership. The military work and training must teach the fighters to use various weapons and all types of military equipment. All fighters should get rid of the wrong idea that drill is not necessary. Drill not only teaches the partisans how to master weapons, but also helps to strengthen discipline in the unit. Good military work contributes to improving the combat ability of the unit and of every individual, and to the training and promotion of new military leaders. This work is directed mainly by the military leadership, the staff, which should be assisted by the cell. Political and

educational work combined with military work will make the military units strong, sound, and disciplined, capable of carrying out military and political actions.

Work among the civilian population of the territory.

— This is another sector of work of the cell. The party cell should raise the level and ability of the whole unit so that it becomes an agitator for the line of the National Liberation War in the territory in which it is located. In order to carry out its tasks among the people of the territory, the cell should be familiar with all forms of party work, such as work among the youth, work to organize the national liberation councils, the tasks of the Youth Union, work among women, etc. In regard to conferences and mass rallies of the civilian population, the comrades must be aware that this is one of their permanent tasks; they are to do organizational work only when instructed to do so by their leaders. The cell should ask every member to account for the work he has done among the civilian population.

The Bureau. — The bureau is the leadership of the Party in the battalion. The bureau is responsible for the relations between the Party and the command, for making the Party carry out its leading role. The bureau should pay particular attention to strengthening the party organizations, to raising the level of the cadres and to admitting new members to the Party. The bureau should check up on the work of the cells, assist and instruct them, issue directives, and raise to a worthy level the sense of responsibility of the cell to the Party and that of party members to the cell. Similarly, it should interest itself to see that the party work is carried on uninterruptedly and develops harmoniously in every sector. It should see to it that the work does not run into obstacles, that no cell lags behind the others in work. The bureau draws up a plan which is concretized by the cell in its own company.

In order to accomplish the work properly in all sectors, particular attention should be paid to raising the theoretical and political level of the party members. The raising of the level of the cadres will increase the rate of work and ensure us better results. It is necessary to arouse and develop the members' sense of responsibility towards the Party so that the instructions and directives of the Party are carried out with the greatest determination. As well as studying the pamphlets and other educational materials serving this end, it is essential for the cell to study and discuss the current documents of the Party, the proclamations of the Central Committee and of other party organs, and some of the political articles from "Zëri i Popullit", "Bashkimi" and other newspapers. These materials must be studied and discussed, without fail, for this is the best guarantee that the party instructions and directives will be understood well.

Correct leadership and more intense activity by the members will strengthen the party organizations in the army, purge it of unhealthy elements, increase the ranks of the Party with sound, honest, and militant workers, peasants, and intellectuals who are ready to face all the difficulties of the work and the fighting, raise the level of the cadres, and thereby ensure the implementation of the line laid down by the Party; in this way, all the organizations in the army will carry out as they should all the duties with which they have been charged by the Party.

For the Central Committee
of the CPA

Enver Hoxha

Works, vol. 2.

**REPORT SUBMITTED TO TO THE 1st PLENUM OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF ALBANIA¹**

May 15, 1944

Dear comrades,

Before we begin work, I feel it to be our duty to remember with great respect the hundreds upon hundreds of leading comrades and rank-and-file party members who have fallen as heroes on the field of honour. Our flag is lowered reverently for those comrades who, as disciplined and obedient soldiers, moved by their great love for the Party and people, fought unsparingly to their last breath; let their sacrifice and the blood they have shed become symbols of the great virtues characterizing the members of parties of the Lenin-Stalin type. Glory to the heroic members of the Communist Party of Albania who have fallen in battle, raising higher and higher the prestige of the Party, and the banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.

¹ The 1st Plenum of the CC of the CPA began on May 15, 1944, at Helmës of Skrapar. It defined the tasks for the complete liberation of the country and the prospects for the further development of the revolution. The Plenum approved the decision of the Presidium of the National Liberation General Council to convene in Përmet the 1st Anti-fascist National Liberation Congress, and the measures to form the Provisional Democratic Government and to transform the National Liberation Army into a regular army.

Dear comrades,

It is a long time since we last met. Because of many technical difficulties a plenum of the Central Committee has not been convened since the 1st National Conference. The engagement of many comrades of the Central Committee in different zones, where they had been sent to help the organizations and the army, and the war against the occupier and its problems, made such a meeting technically very difficult. However, we could have overcome these difficulties if we had felt it urgently necessary to meet earlier, had we been confronted with particularly important events which called for a new political stand and organizational methods in the work or in the particular situation. The line of action, worked out so wisely at the 1st National Conference, was clear-cut and far-sighted, and in the light of events and the development of the war after the 1st National Conference, nothing remained for us to do except to implement, point by point in depth and width, the organizational and political line laid down there.

Today we felt it essential that the Central Committee should meet, because events are moving fast and crystallizing into a more definite pattern, our struggle is assuming broad dimensions, and clear-cut and definite decisions must be taken. Today, our Party and its Central Committee are faced with problems of vital importance which demand a correct and rapid solution, for on this depends the future of the struggle we and the Albanian people are waging. At this important turning point of our history, which is the result of both external events and the development of the National Liberation War in our country, led by the Communist Party of Albania, this meeting of the Central Committee and the decisions we take will play a decisive role, laying down for the Central Committee

members and all party members a political and organizational line of action, a line that will hasten the country's liberation from the clutches of the occupiers and traitors, and lead the comrades to an organization of the state power of a higher form, appropriate to the present circumstances. These are the urgent and important reasons that impelled the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to call an extraordinary meeting of the plenum despite technical obstacles and the gaps left by the absence of some comrades of the Central Committee from their leading posts from which they are directing the work and the war.

Comrades,

In Europe events are developing with extraordinary rapidity. Hitlerite Germany, heavily damaged by the incessant blows dealt it by the Red Army, is staggering and its army is losing its morale and aggressive spirit. The continual defeats suffered by the German army have provoked grave discontent among the German people, who have lost confidence in Hitler and in victory. On the other hand, the economy of the Third Reich is no longer in a condition to meet the great needs of the people and the army. The enslaved nations which Hitler had tried to use as cannon fodder have no faith in their quisling governments and now regard the "invincibility" of the German forces as an exploded myth. Like a wounded beast, the German army is retreating to Central Europe where it will try to make its last stand to prolong its existence a little further. The reactionary cliques throughout Europe, who do not want fascism to be eliminated, because their very existence is closely linked with it, are doing their utmost to help Hitler. They are openly in the service of Hitlerite Germany, and scrupulously implement the directives dictated by the Gestapo to the detriment of their

own peoples. The plans of Hitler and all the reactionaries have been wrecked, thanks to the Red Army which bore and is still bearing on its shoulders the brunt of this great war. With its military strategy, which is unprecedented in the history of people's warfare, it has astonished the whole world and has dealt the fatal blow to the most powerful military machine the world has ever seen. The villages and cities of the Soviet Union have been liberated one after another. The Soviet Ukraine is now free. In a lightning offensive, which will halt only when Hitlerite Germany is completely brought down, the Red Army crossed the Dniester, the Dnieper, and the Bug river, entered Bessarabia and Bukhovina, reached the borders of Czechoslovakia, and is now marching towards Rumania and Hungary — Hitler's vassal bastions in Europe. A decisive attack, which will liberate the Soviet territories once and for all, is being prepared on the central and northern fronts. The Red Army has shouldered the heavy burden not only of driving the German occupiers out of its own territory, but also of sweeping away and destroying fascism and the Hitlerite army in all Europe. In his latest speech² Stalin said that to strike the death blow at the Hitlerites and drive them out of Europe is a heavy task, an even heavier task than that the Red Army has had up to now, for the gravely wounded nazi beast will try to prolong its life and defend itself in Europe at any cost. The German Army should be attacked from all sides; the Red Army should strike from the north and east, the allies from the west and south, and thus through combined actions, the smashing of the German forces will be brought closer. The Red Army, with its high morale and perfected armament, enjoying the deep affection of

² This refers to the order of the Supreme Commander of the Red Army, J. V. Stalin, on May Day 1944.

the peoples of the Soviet Union, and headed by the greatest strategist of modern times, Stalin, is carrying out its difficult but glorious task with great mastery. Besides its military successes, the Soviet Union has achieved great political successes in the international field. Following the Moscow Conference, the Teheran Conference³ further consolidated the military alliance and friendship between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Americans. This conference was the death sentence for Hitlerism and its attempts to divide the allies. It defined more clearly the absolute necessity for the active participation of the Anglo-Americans in the war, and gave encouragement and strong support to the enslaved peoples in their liberation struggle. The enslaved peoples increased their confidence in the Soviet Union, which is fighting for the liberation of all peoples and for their protection against any foreign interference in their internal affairs.

Through their bombing, the allies are making a significant contribution to the destruction of the Hitlerite forces but if the forces they have mustered are taken into account, they are not yielding the expected results, and do not meet the expectations of the enslaved peoples. The air war alone is not sufficient to destroy Hitlerism; a force that will fight on the ground is also indispensable. If the Anglo-Americans quickly throw into the war all the forces they have assembled, liberation from the yoke of Hitlerite Germany will come sooner.

With the advance of the Red Army, the patriotic forces of different countries are rallying, and the national

³ It held its proceedings from November 28 to December 1, 1943 with the heads of the three great allied powers: J. V. Stalin, W. Churchill and F. D. Roosevelt. It adopted the "Declaration On Joint Action In The War Against Germany And Cooperation Of The Three Powers After The War", and decided to open the second front no later than May 1, 1944.

liberation struggle of the nations enslaved by Germany is emerging and becoming stronger. Everywhere, in the forefront of the people's liberation struggles, we see the communist parties guiding the struggle of their people.

In Yugoslavia, especially, this war is being waged with great intensity. The war there is no longer the guerrilla warfare of two years ago, but has become a frontal war with a great army tested in bloody clashes. The National Liberation Army of the Yugoslav peoples is growing from day to day and becoming the pivot of the fraternity of all the peoples of Yugoslavia; it has been created and armed only through the efforts and bloodshed of these people. This has forced the traitors to reveal their game to the people of Yugoslavia and all the people of the world. The "Chetniks" of Draža Mihailovich, the government of the Yugoslav traitors in London, and King Peter⁴ have revealed their chauvinist aims, exposing the duplicity, treachery, and trickery, through which they were trying to weaken the national liberation front and the war, and to seize state power.

The formation of a provisional government is a great political success for the national liberation war of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav army today is one of the allied armies fighting against the occupiers.

Bulgaria is one of Hitler's vassal states. Bulgarian reactionaries have linked the fate of Bulgaria with that of Hitlerite Germany, and with the army they have formed they have suppressed any movement in Bulgaria, and have now turned against the national liberation movements in Yugoslavia and Greece. From ancient times the Bulgarian people have felt a particular affection for the fraternal people of the Soviet Union, and despite the systematic terror and oppression by the Germans, are

⁴ Peter II Karageorgevich, King of Yugoslavia, 1934-1945.

throwing themselves into the national liberation struggle. Comrade Dimitrov's declaration⁵ to the Bulgarian people has defined the road they should follow. With the Red Army advancing towards Bulgaria, there are good prospects for an extension of the national liberation struggle of the Bulgarian people, and for close collaboration between the peoples fighting in the Balkans.

In Greece, the movement has taken broad proportions in the political sense, but the fight against internal reaction lacks the necessary fierceness. Foreign intrigues have found a field for action there.

After the liberation of part of Italy by the Anglo-Americans, Badoglio was kept in power there with the support of the allies, and carried on his unpopular policy. But after the mediation of the Soviet Union, some changes are being noticed in the policy of the Badoglio government⁶. The role of the Italian Communist Party became evident in the formation of the anti-fascist front and the enlargement of the Badoglio government, bringing in the representatives of all the parties, including comrade Ercoli of the Italian Communist Party. The discontent, protests and demonstrations of the Italian people brought about the downfall of King Victor Emmanuel, who caused so many misfortunes and was the main supporter of the fascist regime which enslaved the Italian and other peoples. With the reorganization of the Italian army and the fight of the Italian partisans in the occupied territories, an expansion of the Italian national liberation struggle and a

5 This refers to the "Program of the Patriotic Front" of Bulgaria, drawn up by Georgi Dimitrov, and broadcast by "Kristo Botev" radio on July 17, 1942.

6 In April 1944, the Badoglio cabinet was reorganized to include representatives of six parties of the Italian anti-fascist coalition, among whom the representatives of the Italian Communist Party.

consolidation of the positions of the progressive elements in the liberated territories are apparent. In North Italy, the workers have engaged in fierce and bloody clashes with the German occupiers, and although the Italian people are bled white by oppression and sacrifices of the protracted war into which fascism had dragged them, they have begun to recover and revive.

In recent times, the partisan movement in France has made new progress, especially in Haute Savoie. The national liberation front there is being broadened, and the participation of the communists in the De Gaulle government is a step forward in the movement of the French people. We see this government taking a definite stand towards suspect elements, the Vichy collaborators and traitors. Giraud's⁷ removal from the post of commander of the French army and his isolation from political and military affairs are characteristic.

In Poland and Czechoslovakia, with the approach of the Soviet army, the people's movement is gathering strength, and new governments supported by the Soviet Union are being created.

In Europe, the national liberation movements backed by the Soviet Union, and the creation of provisional governments emerging from the people's struggle, constitute a step forward and a guarantee for a better future. These movements confirm Molotov's words that after this war there will be a series of revolutions. The working class and the communist parties throughout the world are playing a decisive role in the liberation of the peoples and the colonies.

⁷ In November 1943 he was removed from the post of the President of the "National Liberation Committee" of France, and in April 1944 was dismissed from the post of commander of the armed forces of the "National Liberation Committee".

How does our internal situation appear at present? With the German invasion of our country, the reactionaries began to mobilize and improve their organization. Under the Italian occupation, part of the reaction, led by the "Balli Kombëtar", tried to liquidate our national liberation movement, divide the Albanian people, and make them abandon the only road to their salvation, the road indicated by the National Liberation Front, which stands for merciless war against the occupiers. Resorting to deceptive pseudo-nationalistic slogans, and open compromise with the occupiers and the quislings, the "Balli Kombëtar" tried to rally all the rotten elements and organize them into bands of thieves and criminals to fight against us. With the German invasion, the "Balli Kombëtar" became a blind tool of the Gestapo. Trained in such dealings and with a long experience of mobilizing and organizing reaction, the Gestapo set to work, taking in its hand all the threads of the reactionary cliques which were acting openly or secretly against our movement. Around the quisling government of Mehdi Bey and Rexhep Mitrovica were gathered everyone, from the "Balli Kombëtar" and "Bashkimi Kombëtar"⁸ to the people of "Legaliteti". Their tactics was to try to annihilate us militarily, detach the people from us, and discredit us politically. They launched a broad propaganda campaign against us through a powerful and well organized press, while at the same time carefully preparing an offensive against our forces. Their campaign was conducted with notorious anti-communist slogans, and the Germans and the reactionaries tried to present our movement to the peo-

⁸ Traitorous organization created in 1927 in exile; in 1937 its heads joined forces with the fascist group of Mustafa Kruja. After the occupation of Albania by Italy they occupied key posts in the quisling government, in the Albanian Fascist Party and in the "Balli Kombëtar".

ple as simply a communist one. The slogans of "Great Albania" and "Independent Albania" were the order of the day; feudal landowners, such as Shefqet Vërlaci, Ibrahim Biçaku, and the Vrionis, brought all their influence to bear in order to mobilize their men, and they placed them directly in the service of the Gestapo. Through terror and anarchy, they tried to shake people's confidence in victory. They did all they could to disrupt the mobilization of the youth, using demagogy and terror.

The occupiers and the "Balli Kombëtar" set up various organizations, which were alleged to have definite political programs, but all of them were closely linked for one aim: to fight the people and our movement. In this way they wanted to disorientate the people and prevent them from following a defined correct road. They aimed to destroy the people's trust in the Communist Party, which, through its correct line, its unyielding stand, and its enormous sacrifices, had won the confidence of all Albania. Gestapo agent Skënder Muço, and other Ballist elements set up the "Social-democratic Party" with the aim of detaching progressive elements from our Front and drawing waverers, who had not yet taken an active part in the struggle, over to their side. Among these organizations were "Roja e Drejtësisë" ("Guardian of Justice") and the "True Communist Party"⁹ headed by the traitor Sadik Premte. These terrorist organizations were nothing but an executive arm of the Gestapo. In the course of the fierce struggle of the National Liberation Front against the Germans and the reaction, wavering elements such as Bazi i Canës, who had simply vegetated in the Front, re-

⁹ These organizations, created on the initiative of the occupiers and of the foreign missions in Albania, and which had a very limited membership, did not play any important role. They were destroyed within the year 1944 as a result of their denunciation by the CPA and of the victories of the NLA.

vealed their dirty reactionary features. Bazi i Canës, a Zogite, took part in the Peza Conference and accepted the directives laid down there. At that time he passed himself off as anti-Italian and opposed to the quisling Mustafa Merlika, but his combat activity was nil. He did not fire a single shot against the occupiers and the traitors, nor did he accept the creation of the national liberation councils in the zones where he had influence. His attitude in the Front became increasingly suspect. He organized meetings and talks with shady characters and all those who were in overt opposition to the National Liberation Front, such as the Dibra and Mati chieftains. With the coming of the new occupier and the sharpening of our struggle against reaction and the "Balli Kombëtar", his stand became more definite and obvious. At the Mukje meeting, to which we had sent our representatives, including Dr. Dishnica, to hold discussions with the "Balli Kombëtar" for the last time, Bazi i Canës revealed his hostile stand towards our movement and influenced our comrades to commit a grave political error, an opportunist error. After the Mukje talks, Bazi i Canës began to come to an open agreement with quisling Mehdi Frashëri, and with the "Balli Kombëtar", and set up the "Legaliteti", a Zogite organization, or rather, the "continuation of Zog's regime", as he described it, "the only regime that should exist" in Albania, because it was allegedly the legal regime, which the Italian fascists had wiped out of Albania by force of arms. With the creation of the "Legaliteti," the Germans and the reactionaries were forging a new weapon to divide the people, to intimidate them, and to mobilize the tottering reaction in the ranks of the "Balli Kombëtar" and the other traitor organizations. Openly supported by the quisling Mehdi Frashëri, who maintains the Zog cult by giving his administration features of the Zogite administration, in direct agreement with the Ger-

man occupiers, the "Legaliteti" is rallying round itself all the clan chiefs of the mountains and the various reactionaries to strike at us and prepare Zog's return to Albania. The press of the "Legaliteti" and Bazi i Canës does not mention the occupiers, but their entire campaign and propaganda centre on the struggle against our movement and their apologia for Zog and his regime. In North Albania, the Dibra chieftains maintain an attitude identical to that of all reaction. Under the Italian occupation, they were tools of the invaders, and fought arms in hand against our movement. Now, under the German occupation, they are continuing on their traitorous road. They are in complete agreement with Mehdi Frashëri and other reactionaries, such as Bazi i Canës and elements of the "Balli Kombëtar", to fight us. Closely connected with other Albanian reactionaries in Macedonia, such as Xhem Gostivari and others, they are trying to extinguish our movement in those regions.

The traitor Mustafa Merlika, closely linked with Gjon Marka Gjoni of Mirdita, is organizing the resistance and, at the same time, their defense in the North. Mustafa Kruja has entered into an agreement with Bazi i Canës and, for sure, with other reactionary elements. They will try to form a bloc to oppose our movement. Although the reaction in the North still lacks cohesion, it nevertheless poses a threat to us. In the North, we should not forget Muharrem Bajraktari¹⁰, who up to now has not joined in open struggle either against us or against the occupiers. The Catholic church has played and will continue to play a great role there, for it is influential in Shkodra and the Highlands. The Catholic church maintained a negative, pro-fascist stand during the Italian occupation. Its pres-

10 Later on this clan chief joined forces with the occupier and treacherously attacked the brigades of the NLA.

ent stand under the German occupation remains unchanged, and opposed to the national liberation movement.

The enemy is doing everything it can to take advantage of all these reactionary cliques which appear on the Albanian scene, so as to control them and launch them into the fight against us, exploiting every contradiction existing among them and, in particular, their main opposition to us. The German occupiers, who have long been using the criminal bands of the "Balli Kombëtar" as irregulars against us, are now turning them into supposedly regular military detachments. They have many aims in doing this. First of all, they always try to have mercenaries at their disposal to meet their needs here; they use them to replace the soldiers whom they are obliged to withdraw, leaving only a few here; secondly, they want to have them as an organized force which they can later on send where the need arises, as they are already doing with the Poles, Austrians, French, and others. In addition, by forming these detachments under the guise of an Albanian gendarmerie or army, the Germans foster the hopes of the reactionaries, who are doing everything they can to build up an organized force to resist our attacks, both now and in the future. All the reactionaries, from the "Balli Kombëtar" chieftains to Bazi i Canës, are pinning their hopes on this gendarmerie or army, and everyone of them gives all he has to his German boss, hoping to be awarded the privilege of using this weapon for himself. We must realize that in the ranks of the reaction there are hesitations and vacillations. Within the "Balli Kombëtar" we see disagreement among the chieftains, but disagreement which never causes them to forget their main goal, the struggle against the national liberation movement. The Germans, together with the reactionaries, mounted their great winter offensive against us which failed because it was unable to achieve the aim

set for it: to annihilate our military forces. Almost the entire reaction is openly at war with us. Everywhere that our battalions and brigades attack and are attacked, they face the reactionary bands of the "Balli Kombëtar", Shefqet Vërlaci, Ibrahim Biçaku, the "Legaliteti", and their stooges. Under such internal and external circumstances, our movement has successfully proceeded through different stages. The Conference of Peza, which laid the foundations of the National Liberation Front, gave our movement the possibility and impulse to expand, both as regards the creation of the councils as organs of state power, and in the development of the war and our army. The national liberation councils were formed as genuine organs of people's democratic power, and in some parts of the country they functioned properly, while in other places they remained weak and yielded few results. The fate of the councils was also linked with the attacks by the enemy and reaction. In the areas to which the enemy had easy access, it was very difficult to organize the councils and have them function properly. In North Albania, they were set up in part of the Dibra district, in some localities of Shkodra, and elsewhere. In some zones we have no organized work, or even comrades to work in them, for reaction is very strong there and has hampered our activity.

The National Liberation Front has always had a clear-cut and well defined line. It has explained the different situations to the people through leaflets and statements, and through meetings. It has also tried to rally into the front all honest and militant people, and has encouraged the participation in the war of all those who had kept aloof, as well as those who had been deceived by the reaction and the enemy, but whose hands were not stained with the people's blood.

At every turn in the movement and the struggle, the National Liberation Front has been able to take a clear-cut and definite stand. It has maintained a correct stand towards the Balli Kombëtar. It called on the "Balli" to join the war against the occupiers, but the "Balli" did not join our fight against the enemy. On the contrary, it followed the path of treachery, starting a fratricidal war. The Front called on elements who had been misled to abandon that traitorous organization.

As the struggle broadened and our army grew, it was considered necessary to call an extraordinary meeting of the Council to elect the General Staff, to reorganize the councils and take a decisive stand towards the "Balli Kombëtar" and the reaction. The 1st meeting, held at Labinot¹¹, is of special importance, for it gave our army a single command which undertook the direction of the war and the work to strengthen and expand the army. This meeting is also important because it assumed a clear-cut stand towards the reaction, the tool of the occupiers, and decided to send a delegation to hold final talks with the "Balli". This was the Mukje meeting, held at the time of Mussolini's capitulation. At that moment the "Balli Kombëtar" thought that the time had come to take over state power, and many of its adherents made a show of going "underground". It was also shaken from within, for some elements, supposedly more liberal than others, were at loggerheads with the chiefs of this organization and called them to account for their activities. Eager to profit from the political situation and from the meeting with our representatives, the "Balli Kombëtar" manoeuvred to control the talks and have its theses triumph. Mukje was a success for the "Balli Kombëtar" and a

11 The meeting of the National Liberation General Council, held on July 4, 1943 in Labinot near Elbasan.

setback for us. There, Bazi i Canës revealed clearly where he stood. Although he had never fought, upon Mussolini's downfall the war was over for him, and he did all he could to reach a rotten, baseless unity, leaving aside any thought of what the "Balli" and the other reactionaries had done. At the same time, the "Balli Kombëtar" was manoeuvring to draw Bazi i Canës over to its side, in order to weaken the Front and strike at it more easily. At the meeting, the decisions taken at the Labinot conference were not discussed, or were referred to only formally, as though they were a minor matter. The meeting discussed "ethnic Albania", the "proclamation of independence", and the creation of a super-organization; it placed the "Balli Kombëtar", which had played a very sinister role, on the same footing as our National Liberation Front. Besides Dr. Dishnica, who was appointed by the Bureau of the Central Committee to defend the interests and line of the Party, Mustafa Gjinishi was also present at that meeting, and made the same mistake. Instead of our comrades taking advantage of the confusion in the "Balli" to bring about a differentiation in its ranks, it was allowed to consolidate its organizational position. The "Balli Kombëtar" managed to quell the dissatisfaction in its ranks, presenting itself to the people through the notorious leaflet signed by the "Committee for the Salvation of Albania" as a patriotic organization which had allegedly done as much for the liberation of Albania as our National Liberation Front. We repudiated the decisions taken at the Mukje meeting, and took a clear-cut stand toward the "Balli". Bazi i Canës was summoned to explain himself, but he did not come. A long time afterwards, following the 2nd Labinot Conference, Bazi i Canës came into contact with the delegates of the Presidium of the Council at Shëngjergj. He had embraced all the "Balli Kombëtar" slogans as his own. He argued that we should recognize the regime of

Zog and collaborate, no longer as a Front, but as a political party, under Zog's banner. He also demanded that we collaborate with the "Balli Kombëtar", and did not take a stand against Mehdi Bey's quisling government. Bazi i Canës tried to repeat Mukje, and this time wanted us to make the mistake of agreeing to collaborate under the regime of the "Legaliteti". We presented Bazi with our decision and our correct and unwavering line of the Front against the occupier and the reaction, and told him that the question of Zog's regime, a question which would be settled after the war, should be left aside for the moment. We said that we would collaborate with a Zogite political party, if it joined the National Liberation Front, joined the war against the occupier, and purged its ranks of traitors. Bazi i Canës did not accept any of these proposals. The Presidium of the Council adopted a resolution¹² expelling him from the Presidium of the Council and the General Staff, and condemning him; it unmasked him before the people as a reactionary element openly collaborating with the reactionary cliques and the Tirana quislings.

The 2nd Labinot Conference was a success for our movement. Delegates from all parts of Albania took part, and elected a broad National Liberation Council as well as a broad Presidium. But the development of the National Liberation War, the proportions it assumed, and the external and internal political situation today oblige us to take still more important decisions and convene a congress to elect the Anti-fascist National Liberation Council, which will have the attributes of a legislative and executive power, and from which will emerge the Anti-fascist Committee with the attributes of a provisional government.

12 This refers to the resolution of the Presidium of the National Liberation General Council, dated December 7, 1943, on the expulsion of Abaz Kupa from the General Council.

The Bureau of the Central Committee thinks that now more than ever is the moment for these important questions to be quickly resolved. The holding of the congress and the election of the Anti-fascist Council, as well as the formation of the provisional government, will bring about the strengthening of our war, the strengthening of the state power within the country, and bring changes in the international relations between the national liberation movement and the allies. In this state power, the masses of the people who have actively participated in the war, will see their own government, and on the other hand, the formation of the provisional government will be a blow to all attempts of foreign and local reaction to form any kind of reactionary government, whether under Zog or under any pseudo-democratic banner. So, the Central Committee is now faced with a question of great importance to our country, on which we must express our views and take decisions.

From the 1st National Conference until now, our war has been greatly intensified, and the National Liberation Army has been enlarged and strengthened, going through various stages. From the former guerrilla units and the territorial battalions existing at the time of the 1st National Conference, today we have a regular army with numerous brigades, and we are on the point of forming divisions. So we have passed to a new form of organization of our army. Our Party was the main factor and reliable leader of this army. The 1st National Conference emphasized that party members should understand that the main sector of work was the army, and in order to make the Party the true leader of the National Liberation War, they must grasp the importance of the creation and strengthening of the National Liberation Army. The Conference laid down as the main task the uniting and mobilizing of all honest patriots and fighters into the ranks

of the army, mobilizing the peasants, and passing from small partisan units to large units, with a view to setting up a regular National Liberation Army. Up to a point we have fulfilled the decision taken at the conference. We have gone from partisan units over to regular formations which have become the terror of the occupiers. Party members have shown courage, determination and military talent; they have set an example not only to the fighters they were leading, but also to the people in general. The army and the people have seen for themselves that our Party is the brave and wise leader of this liberation war. Now that we have numerous large brigades in action and are passing on to the creation of divisions, the Central Committee is faced with the question of military ranks. The Political Bureau has decided that this question should be discussed in detail, for it is of particular significance for our army. With the institution of ranks, our army will look more of a regular army, all those fighters who have shown military aptitude during these two years of war will be distinguished, and discipline will become stronger in our partisan army.

Comrades,

The 1st National Conference was an event of great importance to our Party, for it was there that our tasks, and our political and organizational line were clearly laid down. From this conference emerged the definitive Central Committee which assumed the direction of the work on the basis of the directives from the Communist International. These directives, coming at an important turning point in the history of our people, opened a wide field of action before our Party and our war, and became a significant factor in the successful development of the party work, and in the important role it was to play during this war, as well as in the broadening of the Front and the organiza-

tion of our National Liberation Army. Convened under very difficult underground conditions, the 1st National Conference, attended by delegates elected by all the party organizations of the country, demonstrated the strength of our young Party, the determination of its members, and its correct political line. The 1st National Conference was able to guide the party members in the most difficult moments, enabling them to overcome the numerous obstacles they came up against. Above all, the 1st National Conference confronted us with the problem of strengthening and expanding the party ranks, always remembering that we should defend the unity of the Party and keep our eyes open for all unhealthy factionalist elements who were trying to harm us from within. It taught us how to conduct a fierce and relentless struggle against all anti-party elements, for without such a struggle and without radically purging these elements, the Party could never have made progress, could never have succeeded in attaining the political successes it has achieved, and would never have been in a position to broaden its ranks and strengthen itself organizationally. It took up the important problem of raising the political level of the party cadres by equipping them with sound Marxist-Leninist knowledge and broad practical and military experience. The Conference quite correctly stressed the urgent need for such cadres, because we were facing such important problems as the decision for war against the occupiers, and the creation of the National Liberation Army. At the time the Conference was held, our Party was setting about a task of great responsibility, and our young cadres could not have performed their numerous and varied assignments successfully, nor have distinguished, in complicated situations, between questions of major current importance and those of minor importance, if adequate work had not been done to raise their political and theoretical level. The 1st

National Conference therefore laid down the task of fighting energetically against ignorance, which is the source of many errors and deviations. The 1st National Conference observed, among other things, that insufficient work had been done among the peasants; and that we should at all costs double our activity to bring them into the war, to make the directives of the Party clear to them, and to turn them into the main factor in the war as well as a firm support for our Party. The Conference also emphasized that insufficient work had been carried out to strengthen the unity of the Albanian people, to set up in towns and villages national liberation councils which would be genuine organs of the people's democratic power and of the National Liberation War, and which, together with our National Liberation Army, would destroy the fascist state power. The Conference emphasized the need to popularize the Soviet Union, the Red Army, the unity of action among the allies, and the heroic struggle of the enslaved nations. Those were, in general outline, the directives which the delegates to the 1st National Conference received and which they spread to all the organizations to be carried out in life and struggle.

To what extent have our party organizations implemented those directives? The importance of the organizational question has always been emphasized. The correct understanding of this question by party members, both leaders and rank-and-file members, is an important factor for the progress of the Party, for the expansion and consolidation of its ranks, for the development and extension of the war and of the National Liberation Army. The Party has become stronger organizationally and has taken steps forward. It has been enriched with its own experience and that of other communist parties. It has linked itself closely with the masses of the people, particularly in South and Central Albania. Prior to the Conference, the Party

worked more extensively than intensively, but our comrades realized that such work would not be very profitable, for the people would feel only sympathy towards our Party, a feeling that would vary with changing events. The Party had to strike deep roots among the people, link itself closely with them, link itself with the peasants and workers, and increase its influence among these strata of the population. The party organizations worked to do this, and we have had encouraging results. No longer can we count on our fingers the number of peasants in the ranks of our Party, as was the case before the Conference; now they make up a considerable percentage, as do the worker elements and those from the poorer strata. Our comrades have understood the importance of the peasantry and learned how to win their acceptance; they have seen that the peasants, more than any others, are driven by the enslaving fascist system to embrace the National Liberation War and to unite and link themselves closely with our Party, which is the champion of their interests against enslaving and exploiting fascism. In the cities, our struggle has fared better. The number of party members has increased, the work in the countryside has also been extended and has been taken more seriously. The work of the national liberation councils has been regarded as important, and their significance has been understood. But the work has not made the same progress in both North and South. In the South the work has made great advances, but this has not happened in the North. Although the Shkodra organization has progressed, it has not freed itself of its old inertia. In certain localities of North Albania we have established a foothold, but we have no party organizations there, and the comrades we have there remain isolated.

At the 1st National Conference it was observed that since the founding of the Party, the Communist Youth

Organization had expanded and successfully rallied round itself a great part of the anti-fascist youth. The conference laid down the following main tasks for the Communist Youth Organization: to consolidate its ranks, mobilize the youth in the struggle on a broad scale, and increase the number of party cadres with young people. At the beginning, the Communist Youth had very few links with the countryside, and young people were sent to various regions to mobilize the youth. But in the work of the Youth Organization there have been many errors and shortcomings which have prevented it from making headway. There has been specialization in the work among the youth, which led to parallelism with the party work, and a certain independence which could turn the youth away from the close leadership of the Party. This could give rise to separatism, although there is no sign of this. The role of the Communist Youth within the Anti-fascist Youth Union has not been properly understood. The functions and the existence of this organization have been hidden. As a result, the Communist Youth Organization has been lost within the Anti-fascist Youth Union, and has done little to increase its ranks within the latter organization. The comrades of the Communist Youth Organization have shown themselves to be sectarian in regard to broadening their organization, particularly towards peasant elements. They have not worked to raise the political and theoretical level of the youth, publications have been few, and what is worse, little has been said about the Party and its leadership. To rectify these shortcomings and mistakes, some changes have been made in the organizational forms of the Youth Organization. We have done away with some of the nuclei which had assumed the character of higher organs and had imposed narrow views that hindered the Youth Organization from broadening and consolidating its ranks. This change will help to extend the ranks of the

organization and to raise the political level of the youth; the youth will be more closely linked with the Party, and all party comrades will recognize the work of the Youth Organization. In the army too, we have dissolved the youth nuclei in the youth battalions, and the youth activist groups have been linked with those responsible for youth in the party cells. Youth committees will also be set up in the battalions and brigades to lead the youth in the army. With consistent work in the Youth Organization, with militant young people, our Party will have sound support among the youth; therefore, we should devote particular attention to this problem, and the reorganization of the Central Committee of the Youth Organization should be discussed.

A great deal of work has been done in the ranks of our army. In order to create a powerful army with all the moral qualities which this war requires, and always keeping in view the great role the army would play in the future, it was necessary to establish party organizations in its ranks. For this purpose our finest members, leaders who had acquired a certain military, political and organizational experience, were sent into the ranks of the army, and set about work for the building and strengthening of the army and the party organizations in its ranks. They tried to avoid sectarianism in the recruiting of partisans, and singled out in the course of the war the elements most devoted to the cause of the Party. The units and battalions of our army were filled with young partisans, most of them peasants, and these units became brigades and were given great support by the people, despite poverty and their dire economic straits caused by the war. The doors of the Party were opened to admit resolute people who loved the Party and were ready to lay down their lives for it. Party cells were set up in the army units, bureaus were created in the battalions, and closely

linked with the Central Committee of the Party. Thus in the period from the 1st National Conference up to now, we can say that our army has become stronger and better organized, and we have a sound party organization within the army.

Big advances have also been made as regards the women. To a certain extent we have eliminated the sectarian spirit in which some comrades regarded the work in this sector. Now the Albanian women are participating actively in our struggle, partisan women and girls are fighting valiantly in the ranks of the army, and women make a great contribution among the civilian population. Organizationally, we have taken a step forward in this sector by setting up anti-fascist women's councils in some cities and villages, but more work is still necessary if the Anti-fascist Women's Union is to take its proper place alongside the other organizations which are active in our Front.

But we should not be carried away by the evident successes we have achieved in the organizational field. We should examine in detail our shortcomings, errors and omissions in the work and the war, correct them and prevent their recurrence. We must know our comrades and organizations well in order to make progress. We must not let ourselves be blinded by success, for precisely because of our successes the enemy is increasing its attacks against us, and a small omission could be costly for the Party and the war.

Many of our comrades have not been very vigilant to keep the party ranks free of elements infected with the group spirit. Despite the directives and decisions adopted by the 1st National Conference against those elements who appeared dangerous, some comrades have grossly neglected to keep watch over them, and these elements have greatly harmed our work. Because the comrades of the Vlora

region did not take appropriate measures against the traitor Sadik Premte, a faction developed there. Measures were taken against it, and it was stopped in time. Nevertheless, Sadik Premte, who managed to escape punishment, succeeded in involving some elements in his treachery, and now we see these elements in the ranks of the greatest enemies of our people and the Party. We must keep in mind that the factionalist elements, shaken while the Party is scoring successes, can revive and manifest themselves in various forms. When the reaction is strong and the enemy hits hard, they find support among the wavering and rotten elements vegetating in the ranks of the Party, and try to strike at us from within. Last winter, when the Germans and the reaction tried to hit us with great force, wavering was apparent among some weak elements, and dissatisfaction and criticism among others. Traitors like Xhelal Staravecka and others went over to the enemy and launched a dirty campaign against us, a campaign which caused wavering on the part of some young people who were still not properly formed and inexperienced in the struggle. These things happen because our comrades do not take great care and quickly forget the grave damage these elements cause our Party. The greatest enemy is the one which is forgotten, Stalin says, and our comrades should never forget the words of our great teacher. Symptoms of dissatisfaction and manifestations of the group spirit have been noticed in Berat, Tirana, and Gjirokastra. In Berat, in particular, they became obvious with the betrayal of Xhelal Staravecka who took under his wing the traitors who had deserted the organization. In Tirana, vacillations have been noticed among some young people deceived by the propaganda of renegades and the enemy, but with no serious consequence. In Gjirokastra, too, such manifestations of dissatisfaction and criticism on the part of unhealthy intellectual elements

have not been serious, but have been enough to keep our comrades on their guard. The comrades must realize that we don't have the time to spend in convincing these unhealthy elements, but must take measures against them as soon as possible. In many cases our comrades forget the great threat that recognized Trotskyite elements present to our Party. Nothing should upset the confidence of our comrades in the measures adopted by the Party towards the Trotskyites. The Trotskyite Zai Fundo¹³, who has returned to Kosova from Italy, has always been a sworn enemy of the Comintern and our Party. Nor should we ever forget such Trotskyites as Fallo, Andrea Zisi, Niko Kondi and others who carry out hostile activities and openly collaborate with the enemy.

Although our organizations have always taken a clear stand in their publications on every important occasion, and have exposed the occupiers and their stooges, on many occasions they have not known how to take a determined stand in practice, and rigorously apply the directives given to them. Bazi i Canës and "Legaliteti" have not been exposed as they should have been. Our comrades have been satisfied with the duplication of a resolution of the Council¹⁴, but they have not succeeded in hitting the mark and exposing Bazi and his activity in such a way as to prevent him from deceiving the people with his demagogy and his stand in the mountains.

13 Following the capitulation of fascist Italy, Zai Fundo was sent by the Intelligence Service to Kosova with the aim of disrupting the national liberation movement there. In September 1944 he was captured together with the British military mission attached to the reactionary forces and was condemned by the partisan tribunal.

14 Resolution of December 7, 1943 of the National Liberation General Council concerning the expulsion of Abaz Kupi.

We still see manifestations of the tendency to monopolize work on the part of the comrades working not only in the party basic organizations, but also in the army. Many comrades simultaneously do the work of commissar, vice-commissar, and commander. Likewise, among the civilian population, the young comrades are not allowed to exercise initiative. This has unfortunate consequences, for it stifles the initiative of these comrades, impedes their progress, and prevents the work from making headway, even if this monopolization does not have ulterior motives.

Because of the weakening of communications with the Party cells, often, precisely at the most difficult moments when the reaction is active, the regional committees are cut off from the cells and quite unable to issue directives and give advice. In some regions our comrades have completely left their territory without taking into account the fact that abandoning their ground to the enemy causes us great losses. Such a thing has happened in Vlorë. The Vlorë regional committee has lost all contact within the city. Although the reaction in Vlorë was very strong and the cadres had to be protected from the heavy blows of the enemy, some party members should have been left there to continue the work. Measures should be taken to correct this mistake as soon as possible, and to avoid its recurrence in the future.

Our Gjirokastra comrades too have made some organizational mistakes which should not be repeated. These mistakes also have a political character, for they are related to the question of the Greek minority. They allowed the formation of some institutions completely at variance with those of the Front. This occurred because our comrades there are not clear on the question of nationalities, an extremely delicate question; this could lead to great harm being done if we are not careful. Other errors have been committed in regard to the interpretation

of the Rules of the General Council, resulting in protection of the agas at the expense of the peasants, making it possible for a third of the harvest to be taken by these elements who, far from participating in our Front, have often assumed a hostile stand towards us. Another gross error damaging our Party and the movement is the taking of a third of the harvest from the peasants of Dishnica on the pretext that this was being done to help the Front. In doing so they have acted towards the peasants exactly as the agas did.

The abandonment of secrecy has caused great harm, too. With the capitulation of Italy, many comrades, without weighing up the situation properly, believed that the war was over and began working and acting openly. Young comrades, previously unknown to the enemy, exposed themselves. And this hit our organizations hard.

The work to develop our cadres has been insufficient; worse, it has been totally lacking. We ought to have developed our cadres and shown special concern for them, because everything depends on cadres. The comrades have not been given sufficient help in mastering Marxist-Leninist theory, particularly through an organ of the Central Committee, which the Conference gave us the task of publishing, but which has not yet come out. Various conferences and courses should have been held to develop these cadres, and Marxist-Leninist publications, especially the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B)", should have been made available to them. The translation and publication of this work was set down as a major task by the Conference. Up to now we have printed only two chapters. This is an unpardonable omission. We were also given the task of running an advanced course, which was to be organized by the comrades of the Central Committee. This course has still not been held.

Another error which is apparent among party comrades working in the army is the underestimation of organizational work among the partisan fighters. Everything is dedicated to the armed struggle, and little interest is shown for the political education of the cadres, which has been left to its own fate. In most cases the cadres are not capable of conducting a conference or solving problems they are confronted with. Some political commissars are not even familiar with the directives and political stands with regard to various trends which appear. This is because they do not lead an intensive party life, and have not understood that the cell is a true school for the communists. In the army, where we must have sound cadres, because that is where our comrades are tempered in the process of struggle and battle, we still notice shortcomings and laxity. New members have been recruited into the Party from the ranks of the army, but instead of being educated and further developed, they have been neglected. Discipline and respect towards the military leaders on duty are not satisfactory, and this is because partisan discipline and respect have been misinterpreted. Some of our detachments have not yet developed the spirit of attack, and many of them continue to conduct a defensive war. Even when they clash with the enemy and succeed in routing him, they do not keep up their pressure until he is annihilated. Occasionally there is some evidence in the army of leftist tendencies conducive to political errors. Some people speak only of the Party wherever they go, and some leading comrades in the army use the name of the Party instead of that of the National Liberation Front. These comrades think that by acting in this way they are furthering the cause of the Party, but this harms our war and frightens off those elements who are not particularly sympathetic towards communism, but want to fight the occupiers, and who could be united with the National

Liberation Front. We should popularize the Party widely, but always within the framework of the National Liberation War. We must be particularly careful towards those who favour our war, and show great patience in persuading those who are unconvinced and wavering, trying to make allies of them, since it is better to have a wavering ally than an enemy. For this reason, we must be alert, and be careful about our slogans, because the war is not yet over.

The comrades in general, whether among the civil population or in the army, have misunderstood the question of free love and have often made mistakes. They have understood free love in a narrow sense, and have sometimes made regrettable decisions. This delicate question should be clearly explained to all our comrades, particularly to the younger ones. No manifestation of immorality should be allowed, but we should not fall into the position of monks and suppress any expression of sincere affection and feeling among young people.

Besides this, the comrades of the Party should be careful in their own behaviour. They should be an example to others, both in their personal life and in the struggle.

Criticism and self-criticism are not yet being used as they should be in a genuine communist party; this shows the immaturity of our comrades. Some of them hesitate to open their hearts, to admit and acknowledge their errors and to correct themselves, and this leads them into greater errors which seriously harm the Party.

In the party basic organizations as well as in the army there is evidence of excessive bureaucracy, which both hampers and weakens the work; it deprives the cadres of their enthusiasm for work, and encourages them to be lazy and work in a stereotyped way.

In the work with the national liberation councils, our comrades have often committed errors, bringing in un-

suitable and, in some cases, even anti-popular elements. At times the work has become formal, and because the comrades have not known how to act towards those participating in those councils, they have imposed orders from above, making use of the authority of the Party. Often our comrades have not understood the great role of the councils and their function as organs of the democratic state power, but have used them only for the urgent needs of the army.

From the organizational point of view, the Central Committee is faced with two problems which must be solved. At Mukje, Dr. Dishnica committed an error which has cost the Party dearly, and has given the enemy and the Ballists a weapon to fight the Party, by accusing it of violating the Mukje decisions. Therefore, the Political Bureau has expelled Dr. Dishnica from its own ranks, and puts this matter before the Central Committee¹⁵.

Gjin Marku has also committed a grave error which has seriously harmed the prestige of the Party; that is his compromise with the Germans after the capitulation of Italy. Even a rank-and-file party member should not have dared commit such a fundamental error, let alone a leader, a member of the Central Committee. The Political Bureau has not yet taken any measures against Gjin Marku, and therefore it puts the question before the Central Committee to decide.

Comrades,

We must all be aware of the importance and responsibility of the work we have been entrusted with; we cannot go on making concessions and mistakes which harm

¹⁵ The Plenum decided on the expulsion of Ymer Dishnica from the CC of the CPA.

our Party and our struggle. We, in particular, must be careful, because the whole organization looks to us, and we must set a good example to the party members and the entire people. New battles await us and we must take stands which will prove decisive. Therefore we must be prepared, our Party must be stronger than ever, and our cadres must be sound and trained both militarily and politically, so that we can face any situation that may arise. Important prospects are opening up before us, and we must map out our line of action and our stand, at least in broad outline. With the offensive and advance of the Red Army towards Rumania and the other Balkan countries, we must strengthen ourselves both militarily and politically, and rally the entire people, workers and peasants, around our Party, for with the advance of the Red Army, the proletariat of all Europe, and especially of the Balkans, will shortly have to play a decisive role. The Communist Party, the strong leader and vanguard of the people in this struggle, will enjoy the greatest possible support from the Soviet Union. An allied landing in the Balkans is also possible. It must find us strong and well-organized, so as to leave no room for the allies to interfere in any way in our internal affairs, and to make them respect the Atlantic Charter and the decisions taken at the Moscow and Teheran Conferences. We must not forget that in England and the United States there are reactionaries who are trying to win the war with a minimum of losses. These people are interested in the elimination of fascism because it threatens their existence, are at war with Germany, but they do not favour the national liberation movements of Europe, for as these movements extend, so their possibilities of exploiting the peoples shrink. In such countries as England and the United States, where capitalism is developed, its influence cannot disappear, for

it has struck deep and strong roots, both in the government and military circles of these countries. So these reactionaries will look for elements whom they can support and use to counterbalance our national liberation forces. We can see these tendencies among the officers of the British missions in Albania. They never fail to contact and support the reactionary elements in order to rehabilitate them in the eyes of the people, or to send missions to such traitors as Bazi i Canës and the Dibra chieftains, with the sole purpose of raising their prestige among the people so as to be able to use them in the future. These officers are doing much to prevent our movement from being sufficiently popularized, and their main aim is to intervene in our organizational affairs. We must be extremely careful, and should in no way permit them to meddle in our organization affairs; we must give them no military and organizational information which might harm the Party and the National Liberation Army.

We must also consider the eventual withdrawal of the German forces from Albania, so as not to be caught unawares and unprepared. We must prepare our comrades for this and oppose the opinion that has appeared among some of our comrades and partisans, to the effect that once the Germans withdraw, our work is done, and that we are only waiting for this occasion to down our arms and go home. We must make it clear to our comrades and to the army that we will never lay down our arms, but will keep them in our hands, until our country and the Albanian people have won their full liberty and not one enemy soldier remains on our soil.

Learning from past experience, and especially from the experience gained since the 1st National Conference, learning from our mistakes, we must advance with giant strides to the bolshevization of our Party and have a clear

vision of the war and the future. The greatest guarantee of our victory is the unity of the Party. We have a duty to the Party and the people; we must do our duty, and we will succeed if we devote ourselves resolutely to work, without sparing even our lives.

Works, vol. 2.

REPORT TO THE 1ST ANTI-FASCIST NATIONAL LIBERATION CONGRESS¹

May 24, 1944

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION WAR OF THE ALBANIAN PEOPLE IN RELATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

Economically and politically oppressed, exploited to the bone by the police regime of King Zog, the Albanian people found themselves politically isolated from the external world and disorientated when on April 7, 1939 the Italian fascist armies attacked their country.

Ahmet Zog, the hated butcher of the Albanian people, brought to power by force against the will of the people,

1 The 1st Anti-fascist National Liberation Congress was held from the 24th to the 28th of May, 1944, in the liberated town of Permet. It elected the Anti-fascist National Liberation Council as the supreme legislative and executive body which would defend the sovereignty of the Albanian people both at home and abroad, set up the Anti-fascist Committee with the attributes of a provisional people's government with comrade Enver Hoxha as its premier. The Congress laid the foundations of the new Albanian state of people's democracy and decided to prohibit Zog's return to Albania, not to recognize any other government that might be formed inside or outside Albania against the free will of the people, to annul all political and economic agreements entered into by Zog's government with the foreign states, to carry on the war against the German occupiers and the Albanian traitors until their complete destruction and the establishment of the state power of the people's democracy throughout the country.

had ruled by means of the blackest terror. He and his anti-popular regime had brought the most dreadful hunger and poverty, suppressed any spirit of progress and democratic freedom, and had bound our country to Mussolini's Italy in all respects. The Albanian army and its headquarters were dominated by the agents of fascist Italy in key positions. As a result, the Italian invasion found our people in such a poor economic, spiritual, and military condition that they were quite unable to cope with the invasion and the shameful capitulation systematically prepared by Zog and his stooges through a chain of betrayals.

Albania entered a dark period of slavery, a slavery unprecedented in the whole course of its existence as a nation, which would cost it so much blood, tears, and suffering.

In spite of the revolt in the first days of April, in spite of demonstrations and attempts to fight, in spite of the resistance put up by the patriots in Durrës and Vlorë, we could not keep alive for long the momentum of the people's resistance, because the enemy was armed to the teeth, its fifth column was organized by Italian fascist agents and their Albanian stooges and because their demagoguery, some construction projects of a military character, and the extension of commercial relations with Italy, neutralized our opposition to a certain degree. The Albanian people lacked the necessary political preparedness; even though they mortally hated the Italian occupier, they were not well acquainted with fascism and the consequences of its barbarous regime, for in Albania there was no progressive party capable of eventually creating an anti-fascist front. Therefore, at the beginning, part of the people were deceived by fascism to a certain degree. But the resistance did not remain neutralized for long, because the consciousness of our oppressed nation recovered, the

Albanian people profoundly understood the disaster that had befallen their country, and they expressed their hatred against the invader in concrete form. They saw and understood the enslaving imperialist designs of fascism, and through strikes and demonstrations, they extended their heroic resistance, the resistance of a small people who would rather die than live forever on their knees. Resistance to the occupier increased, as did the struggle against the traitorous pseudo-nationalists who welcomed the Italian troops with open arms, and against those who pretended to be political exiles during Zog's regime and who, in complete agreement with the representatives of fascist Rome, returned to their country to continue their treachery. The Italian occupier brought to power Shefqet Vërlaci, Mustafa Kruja, Maliq Bushati, Eqrem Libohova and other infamous traitors, and with their assistance, started to carry out its sinister schemes for the extermination of the Albanian people, for their denationalization and exploitation as cannon-fodder for its enslaving wars to the detriment of the other freedom-loving peoples. The traitors tried to rally the nationalists as participants in their activities of betrayal and compromise. Many reactionaries joined them and helped them with their intrigues and their terrorist acts against the people. They furiously fought all the patriots, all who were against the invader; they pitilessly murdered, hanged, imprisoned and interned hundreds of people, attacked and burned entire villages. But the movement of the Albanian people was not quelled. Not only were the occupiers and the quislings unable to suppress the people's hatred, but they were also unable to combat the national liberation movement which was growing in strength. The fascists were well aware of the danger this movement posed for them, and they tried by every means to crush it before it really started.

The efforts of the occupiers and traitors to divide the people, to draw honest nationalists to their camp, did not succeed as they had hoped, for in the most critical moments of our history an organization was born from the midst of the long-suffering people: the Communist Party of Albania, which put the life of its members and everything it had at the service of the country and the people. It became the true organizer and leader of our people in the armed uprising against the occupier and the most rabid reaction. It has always stood unyielding in the front line of the fight, has always striven to unite all honest nationalists and patriots in a common front against the occupier. It became the promotor and organizer of the broad Peza Conference in September of 1942, where the foundations of the movement and of the national liberation councils, which were organs of the war and the democratic state power, were laid. The Communist Party of Albania raised the banner of the National Liberation War higher and higher, and today, together with its own people, stands unconquerable. The Peza Conference was a step forward toward unity and the formation of the Front, and it called on all those who were for the National Liberation War to take an active part in it.

The creation of the first partisan units showed that, despite the heavy enslavement and unprecedented terror, our people are indomitable. They are undaunted and ready to make the greatest sacrifices for their liberation. The partisan units, small at the beginning, almost without arms and ammunition, but with a burning desire for freedom and a great fighting spirit, grew in strength and equipped themselves with weapons seized in battle with the occupier. They showed that they could not be wiped out, even by forces so ferocious and heavily armed as those of the occupier, which hurled themselves like wild beasts on the partisan movement in our country in an attempt

to wipe it out. With the formation of the General Staff of the National Liberation Army, these units were transformed into battalions and brigades, and at present they make up our regular army, the valiant army of the Albanian people. Our National Liberation Army, made up of Albania's finest sons and daughters, together with the whole Albanian people, has undertaken to fight the occupier to the end to give the people the liberty they yearn for. In fierce and incessant fighting, entire zones and regions have been cleared from the grip of the enemy and his traitor lackeys, and there our democratic state power has been established. Almost all South Albania, as well as part of Central Albania, is rejoicing in this freedom and this state power. Our army demonstrated that it is capable not only of inflicting heavy blows on the occupier, but also of solving even more difficult problems. Our army gave a great impulse to the war; and in many regions enthusiasm for the uprising has swept over all strata of the population.

National liberation councils were set up in every liberated, partly-liberated, and still occupied area. This shows that they have become the nucleus of the new people's state power, which has replaced the old state power that was totally in the service of the occupier. Right from the beginning, the national liberation councils made an important contribution to the development of the war and expansion of the military units, the mobilization of the population, with aid, food and various services of a political and military character. But following the creating of the National Liberation Army and the 2nd Conference, they were transformed into the only authentic state power of the people. Besides the organization of their network to comprise every village, locality, province, or town, and their assistance to the units of the National Liberation Army, the councils had to cope with many other problems, apart from the task of their cen-

tralization and strengthening. The National Liberation General Council and its Presidium, elected at the 2nd Conference of Labinot, were also confronted with problems concerning the organization of social life in the liberated areas and the necessity of arousing a sense of solidarity among the population to cope with difficult economic conditions caused by this bloody war. The Presidium is successfully carrying out the mobilization of the people around the Front, and through its correct and unwavering political line, has overcome every obstacle, has defeated the propaganda of reaction and the occupier, and has come out victorious. Parallel with the successes of the national liberation movement, the enemy has multiplied his attacks. With the coming of the Germans to our country the reaction re-grouped themselves and organized better. The German Gestapo, with its vast experience as regards the organization and re-grouping of reaction, took hold of all the threads to put it into motion, along with all the traitors and reactionary cliques who openly or secretly were against the national liberation movement. Around the quisling Mehdi Frashëri and the traitorous Tirana government gathered all the reactionary organizations, from the "Balli Kombëtar", the former "Bashkimi Kombëtar", up to the "Legaliteti", with the aim of annihilating us militarily, and separating the Front from the people and diverting it from the only road to salvation: the road of the war. They used every sort of demagoguery: their notorious slogans to present our broad front as simply a communist movement, the slogans of "Great Albania" and "Ethnic Albania". The "Balli Kombëtar", putting all its criminal bands at the disposal of the Hitlerites, tore off its mask and participated openly in the quisling government; the traitorous feudal landowners, like Shefqet Vërlaci, Ibrahim Biçaku, the Vrionis and others, brought all

their weight to bear to recruit reactionary elements which they put at the service of the Gestapo.

By means of terror, demagogy, anarchy they tried to shake the people and shatter their confidence in victory. The occupier and the "Balli Kombëtar" created various organizations allegedly with clear-cut political programs, such as the "Social-democratic Party", the "Roja e Drejtësisë" ("The Guardian of Justice"), the "Bashkimi Kombëtar" ("The National Union"), and others. But they proved themselves to be only terrorist organizations in the hands of the bloody Gestapo.

In the course of the fierce war waged against Germany and its stooges, the reactionaries, suspect and wavering elements, were sorted out from the ranks of the Front. The war forced them to lay bare their true features as people of compromise and betrayal. Bazi i Canës was one of them. He took part in the Peza Conference and accepted its directives, but his combat activity was nil. He did not fire a single shot against the occupier, and far from accepting the establishment of the national liberation councils in the area under his influence, he did his utmost to hinder their creation. With every passing day his attitude to the Front became more and more suspect, for he had contacts and maintained links with all the reactionary organizations and leaders in the service of the enemy. At the Mukje meeting, to which he was invited, too, as a delegate of the National Liberation Council, his hostile attitude towards the National Liberation Front came out in the open. He embraced all the slogans of the "Balli Kombëtar" and the reaction, and set up the Zogite organization, "Legaliteti", or as his own press organs, in which not a word is said against the occupier, have it, the "continuation of Zog's regime which should be the only one in Albania because it was a regime which stemmed from the will of the people and was overthrown only by force

of Italian arms". This traitorous organization, headed by Bazi i Canës, is openly supported by quisling Mehdi Frashëri and his government, and is in direct agreement with the German occupier.

Bazi i Canës was expelled from the General Council and the General Staff. Now the "Legaliteti" assumes the same position as the "Balli Kombëtar". Bazi i Canës is a traitor, too. He has meetings with general Schmol, the commander of the German forces in Albania, and has concluded with him an agreement of friendship and non-aggression, ranging himself alongside the Tirana traitors.

With the formation of the "Legaliteti", the Germans and the reaction forged a new weapon to divide the Albanian people, to frighten them with the possibility of Zog's return to Albania and to re-assemble the reaction and throw it into war against our National Liberation Army.

With all these reactionary cliques which present themselves on the Albanian stage, the enemy occupier collaborates, does its utmost to gain advantage from them, directs them to the war against us, exploiting any contradiction they may have with one another as well as their fundamental opposition to the National Liberation War. The German occupier, who for a time used the "Balli Kombëtar" criminal bands as irregular mercenaries, is now transforming them into allegedly regular armed formations. It thus pursues several aims. On the one hand it always tries to have mercenaries available for its operations in Albania instead of its own soldiers, whom it is obliged to withdraw except for a few of them, while secondly, it intends to keep them as organized formations to be sent wherever they are needed for future operations, the same as it does with the Poles, Austrians, French, etc. On the other hand, with the formation of these units, under the pretext of constituting an Albanian gendarmerie or army, it keeps alive the hopes of the reactionaries who

are striving by every means to have an organized force to cope with our attacks, today and in the future. This gendarmerie and army, conscripted and organized under the shadow of German bayonets, is the hope of the reactionaries, from the heads of the "Balli Kombëtar" to the Zogites, and each of them is ready to sell his soul to the German occupier if only he can use for his own ends this motley assembly of creatures devoid of spirit or ideal.

The Albanian reactionaries, from the heads of the "Balli Kombëtar" to the Zogites and the quislings, under the patronage of Hitlerite Germany are trying to form a single bloc with the reactionaries and traitors of neighbouring and distant countries to suppress the liberation movement of our people. The treachery of the "Balli Kombëtar", the Zogites and the quislings goes to such lengths that they have put themselves at the service of a Greek reactionary staff. Those who hurl insults at us of the national liberation movement, accusing us as being sold out, are shamelessly selling out their country's interests to the reactionary cliques of Rali² of Greece, and Nedich and Mihailovich of Yugoslavia. The document of the betrayal of Lumo Skëndo³, which we have captured, brands the infamy of these scoundrels, who, to satisfy their own ambitions, trample the lofty interests of our country and our people. These men, who all their lives have ex-

2 Head of the quisling government in Greece at the time of the German occupation.

3 A document of the Central Committee of the "Balli Kombëtar" signed by Mithat Frashëri in May 1944, which was an effort at creating a coalition of the Greek-Albanian reaction. The "Balli Kombëtar" accepted that the Albanian armed forces be placed under a Greek general command. The joint forces of these countries would be utilized to suppress the national liberation movement in Albania and Greece. The efforts of the "Balli" failed in face of the strength of the revolutionary struggle of the Albanian people.

plotted our suffering people, are now trying to reap the successes won at the cost of so much blood poured out for freedom and independence.

During the German occupation, we have fought fierce and bloody battles; heavy tasks faced our National Liberation Army. The aim of the enemy offensives was the occupation of the liberated zones and the annihilation of our army. During these battles and in the course of the great winter offensive we had losses, suffered great hardships and privations, through which the sons of our people, wounded, hungry, scarcely clad, through snowstorm and tempest, but always with high morale, displayed unheard of heroism, of which the future generations of our country will boast. Although much superior in numbers and equipment, the enemy was unable to annihilate our army, and suffered heavy losses. Our valiant army did not give the enemy and the bands of reaction a single minute of respite. It hit them hard everywhere, attacked their columns, barracks, concentrations. Every road and track echoed with the rifles of the partisans; they became the terror of the enemy. Hundreds upon hundreds of the sons of Albania fell on the field of honour, and our bloody war has amazed the whole progressive world and won the greatest sympathy.

Let us pay homage to the glorious sons of our country who have given their precious lives for a better and happier future of the Albanian people.

So much of the precious blood of our people had to be shed, so many of the best sons of the people had to make the supreme sacrifice in this unequal war, to clear the way, so that Albania could affirm its position before the world. Perhaps never before has a small people had to pay so high a price to convince world opinion that the blood shed in Albania is its own blood, and not that of

those traitors who, from the hotels in Tirana or abroad, shamelessly seek to appropriate it.

They have abused us and continue to abuse us with a similar plan. The occupier, the quislings, traitors Mehdi Frashëri, Lumo Skëndo, Ali Këlcyra, "Balli Kombëtar", Bazi i Canës, "Legaliteti", etc., etc., have said and continue to say that ours is simply a communist war; they have spoken of the bolshevization of the country, etc., etc. These perfidious insults and lies from the kitchen of Dr. Goebbels have been used by all international reaction, fighting shoulder to shoulder with the occupier. But few believe these lies, and least of all the Albanian people, who through this great war have been convinced that the communists are their most faithful sons, ever ready to make the greatest sacrifices for their freedom.

Since the Peza and Labinot Conferences great changes have taken place, not only in our country, but in the whole world. The victory of the glorious Red Army and the destruction of the Hitlerite armies has created the conditions for the victory of the allies: Britain and United States, in Africa, created the conditions for the landing of the allies in Sicily and Italy and the capitulation of the principal accomplice of Hitler — fascist Italy. Today, thanks to the victory of the Red Army, which has astounded the world with its military strategy, Hitler's plans have been foiled. In a great offensive, which will not stop till Hitlerite Germany is totally routed, the Red Army, having liberated numerous towns, entered Bessarabia and Bukhovina, reached the border with Czechoslovakia, and now is triumphantly advancing towards Rumania and Hungary — Hitler's vassal citadels in Europe. Hitler's military machine faces disaster, and the day of the victory over this chief enemy of mankind is not far away. Hitler's satellites are tottering while the unity between the allies and the So-

viet Union is becoming ever stronger. The Moscow and Teheran Conferences testify to this.

With the advance of the Red Army, the patriotic forces of various countries are gathering their strength, and in this way, the national liberation struggle of the enslaved peoples is emerging and growing strong. The people are fraternizing in order to come out victorious from their common struggle against their common enemy as quickly as possible. Our Yugoslav neighbours are waging a heroic war. Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Hitler's vassals, are tottering; the peoples of these countries, despite the savage terror the enemy and their quisling governments are resorting to, are intensifying their national liberation war.

All these factors are of great importance for our National Liberation War, for they increase our confidence in victory and in the liberation of the areas occupied by the fascists and local traitors; this is proven by the young partisans coming in thousands to swell the ranks of the National Liberation Army.

In connection with the rapid development of events abroad, with the broadening and strengthening of the National Liberation Front in Albania, the liberation of whole areas from the occupier and traitors, in connection with the various important problems facing our people, it is necessary and urgent that we take timely measures for the further successful development of our war. It is necessary that our people, who have suffered so long and shed so much blood, should ensure for themselves a state system that will give genuine freedom and democracy for all social strata. This is the present situation.

On the present congress, which has emerged from the sovereign will of the people and represents all the strata of our society⁴, falls the heavy but glorious burden of

⁴ Participating in the National Liberation War.

taking all the necessary measures. It is charged with creating such popular political organs, both legislative and executive, which will emerge from this congress capable of surmounting any obstacles on their road, of worthily representing the Albanian people both at home and abroad, and of preventing any attempt, from whatever direction it may come, which is aimed at foiling the realization of the aspirations for which our people are fighting and shedding their blood in this great liberation war.

The people's representatives who constitute this historic congress have the sacred task of electing the Anti-fascist National Liberation Council, which will be the supreme legislative and executive body from which will emerge the Anti-fascist National Liberation Committee, an executive organ in the form of a provisional government, which will be capable of managing all state affairs and act as a just and genuinely people's government.

What we are doing today is one of the greatest events of the Albanian people. For the first time in history, our people have their genuine representatives, whom they have themselves freely elected and whom they trust. It is, on the other hand, a great event also in our relations with foreign countries, in our relations with our allies, for through their representatives our people will express their own aspirations and decisions. Our war for freedom and independence, with all its heavy cost, has enabled the Albanian people to gain their right to decide their own future, and this right is in complete harmony with the Atlantic Charter. We are fully convinced that our allies will not misinterpret this historic step of the Albanian people. On the contrary, they will give our people moral and material aid through its representative government elected by the sovereign will of the people.

Now some words on our glorious National Liberation Army. The creation of our National Liberation Army in

the hard conditions of such a terrible war is a rare example in history. From small units equipped with old rifles or altogether without rifles, we succeeded in setting up a whole army, disciplined and well-armed, which has become the terror of the occupier and the traitors. In bloody clashes and battles, our military units seized the necessary arms and ammunition from the enemy. The allied military missions have helped us to a certain degree with arms and ammunition, and we thank them for this, we are grateful for it, but their aid has never been sufficient. With the proportions our war has assumed and the expansion of the National Liberation Army, their aid is relatively small. Our allies should help us more for the success of our common struggle.

Under such conditions, the creation of our army was a difficult task; we had no military academies or schools, we had no officer cadres, but in the process of the war, peasants, workers, students, intellectuals, and other worthy sons and daughters of our people emerged from the ranks of our heroic army to lead it with courage and valour. The entire Albanian people can be proud of such leaders.

The organization of our army is not yet finished. We have many existing brigades and battalions, we are setting up divisions, and intend to organize army-corps. Up to now our army has been built on a voluntary basis, but now that the Albanian people will have their executive organ, it is the task of the National Liberation Committee to issue the decree on general compulsory military service. At the same time, anyone outside the age limits has the right to join the army if he wants to do so.

In connection with the Moscow Conference of the three allies, the Anti-fascist National Liberation Committee should request the allies that Albania too, one of the first victims of fascist aggression, should take part, together with the allies and the Yugoslav and Greek delegates, at

the conference in which the damage caused by Italian fascism in the Balkans will be assessed. Our country has suffered incalculable damage and plunder at the hands of the Italian and German fascists, therefore, the question of the return of Albanian property plundered by the occupiers, the detection and the verification of the crimes of the occupiers and their stooges, as well as the detection and identification of the war criminals in our country, are questions of great importance which should be settled as soon as possible.

We all know that in 1943 British military missions came to the National Liberation Council and the General Staff with the aim of helping the National Liberation War with arms. As I stressed it above, those missions have given us a certain amount of material aid. However, not only were they bound to do this, but they should regard our National Liberation War more objectively from all points of view. We see with regret that other British military missions are attached to the enemies of the Albanian people and the National Liberation War, such as Bazi i Canës and the chiefs of Dibra, who are closely linked with the occupier and execute his orders. On the other hand, these missions do not represent our war in its true light. The BBC and the Bari radio station, the propaganda through leaflets, and the "Mundimi"⁵ newspaper, printed in Bari, far from bringing out to the full the clashes, the fierce fighting against the occupier, the great sacrifices and the blood shed by our people and army, in the majority of cases take an equivocal stand harmful to the National Liberation War. We know that there exist abroad some reactionary circles which do not

⁵ A weekly published in Albanian by the Anglo-Americans in Bari of Italy (1944-1945). It was dropped into Albania from the air.

look upon the national liberation movements with a kindly eye, but we also know that the majority of the democratic-minded people in the allied countries sincerely wish the peoples to determine their own future, and that they appreciate and sympathize with their heroic fight.

Since the General Staff has been and remains in close contact with these allied missions, they have often addressed to it questions which are not simply of military nature, but political questions which come within the competences of a government. Therefore, the General Staff has two or three times requested from the British missions that the Allied Mediterranean High Command should accept a delegation from our General Staff and from the National Liberation Council, which can explain any questions concerning our common war, and coordinate our military actions against the Germans with those of the allies. Our General Staff has not received a firm answer to this.

It is the urgent task of the Anti-fascist National Liberation Committee to demand from the allies that our war should be properly recognized and receive support accordingly in war material and in other means, that an official representative of the Allied High Command should be sent to our Staff and who should have under his authority all the liaison missions in Albania, that no British mission should stay any longer with the traitorous elements of our people, or aid them in any way with war material or anything else. The Anti-fascist National Liberation Committee should be recognized as an organ of state power, emerging from the will of the Albanian people, and the Albanian people, who are fighting heroically, should rank equal with other progress-loving people and should have the rights these other people enjoy.

For all these reasons it is evident how necessary and important it is to form a provisional government which can settle the majority of these questions and can emerge be-

fore the world abroad as the only legitimate and lawful representative of the Albanian people.

With the setting up of the Committee we request that American military missions and representatives of the Soviet Union, of this great state, the banner-bearer of the liberation war and champion of all enslaved peoples, should be sent to the General Staff.

The heroic war of our people and their brilliant successes have aroused great sympathy throughout the whole progressive world; the conditions have been achieved for our people to realize their aspirations for a free and democratic Albania.

*First published in the
booklet "The 1st Anti-fascist
National Liberation
Congress", 1944*

Works, vol. 2.

**CIRCULAR ON THE POPULARIZATION OF THE
DECISIONS OF THE 1ST ANTI-FASCIST NATIONAL
LIBERATION CONGRESS OF PERMET**

June 15, 1944

TO ALL REGIONAL PARTY COMMITTEES,
VICE-COMMISSARS AND POLITICAL SECTIONS

Dear comrades,

At a time when the heroic Red Army has launched its great offensive against the German occupiers and has liberated the Ukraine, Bessarabia and Bukhovina, when it is marching on Hungary, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, dealing mortal blows at the Hitlerite armies, which have been shattered and are retreating like wounded beasts to the Central Europe to make their last stand, when the Red Army is faced with new weighty tasks for the liberation of all the oppressed nations of Europe and for the elimination of the Hitlerite plague, new conditions are being created in Europe. Thanks to these brilliant victories of the Red Army, led by the greatest strategist of our time, comrade Stalin, the conditions were created for the launching of the allied offensive in Italy, for a great upsurge in the struggles of the enslaved nations and, finally, for the successful landing of the allies in France, which is a result of all this preparation, an outcome of the Teheran Conference.

Parallel with the development of the struggle against the occupier, the people's democratic state power is becoming stronger everywhere and is assuming concrete forms, which assist the successful development of the war and the mobilization of the active forces of each people and strengthen their national and international positions, positions based on sound popular foundations and democratic principles. Anti-fascist committees, with all the features of provisional governments, have been set up everywhere in Europe, and especially in Yugoslavia, France, Czechoslovakia, etc. These committees emerged as a result of the bloody struggle of these nations against the Hitlerites and the reactionary cliques closely connected with the occupier, which tried at all costs to weaken the national liberation struggles and to obstruct the progressive development and the will of the peoples. In other countries, such as Italy, Bulgaria, etc., we see the active participation of the people in struggle and in setting up and strengthening the anti-fascist front, which is beginning to bring into being democratic forms of the state that, through struggle and efforts, will eliminate every remnant of fascism and reaction impeding the proper development of the people's war.

* * *

In our country, as the Front extended and grew stronger, as our National Liberation Army increased and became steeled in the course of our people's bloody war, the Central Committee of the Party was faced with tasks of vital importance for the Albanian people and for the further successful development of the National Liberation War. After assessing the situation at an extraordinary meeting, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the

Party¹ considered it an urgent necessity to convene the 1st Anti-fascist Congress, which would adopt decisions of historic importance. In agreement with the National Liberation General Council, people's delegates from all over Albania, democratically elected by open voting in broad meetings, attended the Congress held in the liberated town of Përmet.

The 1st Anti-fascist Congress opened its proceedings amid the indescribable enthusiasm of the people and army, and adopted decisions of great importance to the future of the homeland and our people. The 1st Anti-fascist Congress gave Albania the National Liberation General Council with all the attributes of the legislative and executive power, from which emerged the executive and legislative organ: the Anti-fascist National Liberation Committee, with all the attributes of a provisional government.

1. — The historically important Congress of Përmet expressed the ardent wish of our people to continue the war against the occupier and the traitors with greater severity, till the complete victory of our weapons over Hitlerism, for the complete liberation of our homeland from the parasitical reactionaries, the tools of the occupiers, and the determination of the Albanian people to win all their rights.

2. — The Congress expressed complete confidence in the great allies: the Soviet Union, Britain, and America, declaring that the Albanian people, together with them and with all the enslaved peoples, would continue their fight to the end for the salvation of mankind from the nazi plague.

3. — The Congress expressed its complete conviction and confidence that the Albanian people, as a member of

¹ This refers to the 1st Plenum of the CC of the CPA, held in May 1944.

the great anti-fascist bloc, relying on the declarations of the Atlantic Charter, the Moscow Conference and that of Teheran, would enjoy all the rights guaranteed to them by these historic decisions, and that they would side with all progressive peoples of the world.

4. — The Congress cheered with great enthusiasm for the Communist Party of Albania, the brilliant leader of the Albanian people in the war against the occupiers and the traitors.

5. — The Congress cheered with indescribable enthusiasm for our heroic National Liberation Army, the army of the Albanian people, for its just, uninterrupted and victorious war, for its heroic deeds which have astounded the world and enhanced the prestige of Albania, thus assuring it a place of honour in the ranks of the progressive peoples.

6. — The Congress expressed the Albanian people's will and desire for the unity and fraternity of the whole people in the National Liberation Front, and for the participation of all honest patriots in the ranks of the Front and of the National Liberation Army.

* * *

These events of exceptional importance for our people must be widely popularized and the decisions adopted at this Congress made known to the people in a clear and understandable form. You must duplicate many copies of the material sent to you concerning the Congress, and it must be carefully studied in every cell, and battalion bureau, and at the meetings of activists, as well as in the youth committees. The effective result depends on the proper study of this material, and its being correctly understood. It is impermissible to make mistakes by misinterpreting decisions, or the details of their contents. Such

mistakes would do us great harm. Therefore, we shall provide some additional explanations.

1. — The 1st Anti-fascist Congress, emerging from the war, was attended by hundreds of delegates from the army, from the various organizations with anti-fascist tendencies, which are gathered in the National Liberation Front. They were democratically elected by the people, and the Congress represented the sovereign will of the Albanian people. The Congress created the political, legislative, and executive organs which represent the Albanian people, both at home and abroad.

2. — The Congress elected the General Council as the principal legislative and executive body, which represents the sovereignty of the Albanian people and state. This form of state power is new and conforms to the conditions created by the war. The General Council combines the two powers, and is the council which creates the executive organ, the National Liberation Committee, which, in turn, is responsible to the Council for its work, and is made up of members who may or may not be members of the Council.

3. — Since the conditions of the war do not permit the Council to stay assembled as a whole, it elected a Presidium invested with all attributes of the National Liberation General Council.

4. — The decisions adopted by the National Liberation General Council or by the Presidium are laws, which are implemented by the executive organ.

Great attention must be given to the study and comprehension of the decisions adopted by the National Liberation General Council; misinterpretation of them is impermissible. After proper study and discussion, these decisions should be explained to all councils and their members, and their work should be assisted, not by imposing the decisions on them, but by very patiently teaching them,

always making sure that the councils really represent the people's power.

The Declaration and Appeal issued by the Congress should be put in every hand, even in the most remote corner of Albania, and at the same time the Congress must be popularized, pointing out its importance and the significance of the moment at which it was convened, as well as its historic work.

The National Liberation General Council should be widely popularized as the representative of the sovereignty of the people, as should the National Liberation Committee.

Your other main tasks are:

1) To widely popularize our Party, the leader of this liberation war, the brilliant and unyielding organizer of the armed struggle against the occupiers and the defender of the interests of the working people.

2) To popularize the Soviet Union and comrade Stalin everywhere. This should not be limited to saying only that the Soviet Union is the sole force which smashed the armies of Hitler, etc., but that the Soviet Union is the leader of the labouring masses, that it has ensured its people a free, fraternal, and collective life, a flourishing society and prosperity. Only the socialist system could create that invincible force — the Red Army, an army capable of surmounting all difficulties. Today, no country, movement, or party, can fail to take into consideration the existence of the Soviet Union as a decisive and incontestable factor in the development of present day society. This is how you should popularize the Soviet Union and its brilliant leader Stalin, regardless of the propaganda which the various reactionary cliques will make in our country . . .

4) To popularize the struggles of the enslaved peoples, as well as the fraternity of the peoples of the Balkans,

and to oppose chauvinistic propaganda which seeks to create hostility between our people and neighbouring peoples.

Comradely greetings
For the Central Committee of the CPA

Enver Hoxha

DEATH TO FASCISM

FREEDOM TO THE PEOPLE

First published in "Principal Documents of the PLA", vol. 1, Tirana 1960

Works, vol. 2.

**REPLY TO THE NOTE FROM GENERAL WILSON,
CHIEF OF THE ALLIED MEDITERRANEAN
HIGH COMMAND**

July 12, 1944

TO THE ALLIED MEDITERRANEAN HIGH COMMAND

Through the British liaison officer here, we have been informed of the following:

"General Wilson will not tolerate the Albanian partisans interfering with his strategic aims through civil war, as the National Liberation Movement cannot control the whole of Albania, and cope with the Germans without the aid of the allies."

The British liaison officer also added, on behalf of the Mediterranean High Command, that our movement has been invited to send its delegates to Italy for talks on the coordination of operations and the avoidance of civil war. The liaison officer has verbally notified us that, if Abaz Kupa were attacked by our forces, all the allied aid to the national liberation movement would be cut off.

In order to clear up this question we must declare that there are no internal quarrels in Albania and even less a civil war. *There is only one quarrel and one war: war against the occupier, in the first place, and against its traitorous tools.* Our movement grew up and was strengthened through the war against the occupiers, and all the anti-fascist political trends and our people who are fight-

ing have rallied round this movement. In Albania, there is no political group or party outside the National Liberation Front fighting against the occupiers. Both the "Balli Kombëtar" and "Legaliteti" led by Abaz Kupi, as well as the bands of Shefqet Vërlaci and the Dibra chiefs, are collaborating directly with the German military command in Albania and constitute the principal support of the quisling government of Tirana. These organizations and these people play an integral part in the betrayal of the quislings, and are fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Germans against the national liberation movement in Albania, and therefore, against the allies. Thus, our stand towards these people and organizations is more than correct, and our war is a war against the occupiers, and on no account a civil war.

Thanks to the fierce and incessant struggle we have been waging against the occupiers, our movement has liberated entire regions and has control of the whole of South Albania, while in North Albania, where there have always been partisan battalions fighting, our forces are now liberating from the clutches of the occupiers and traitors all those zones, where our liberation army is being received with open arms. With the extension of our war throughout Albania, with the mobilization of the whole people, with the attacks on vital enemy centers and communications, both in South and North Albania, we are convinced that we are not impeding the aims of the allied strategy, but, on the contrary, giving them the best of assistance. On the other hand, we are well aware that without allied assistance, without the war the great allies are waging against nazi Germany, our national liberation movement could not have been so strong. Our war is part and parcel of the great anti-fascist war of the whole world, and the alliance of our people with the Anglo-Soviet-

American bloc and with all the national liberation movements in the world is a vital condition for us.

The position of the allies in Albania has never been stronger than it is today. The strategic plans of the allies have never before had such favourable ground for execution in our country. Therefore, we consider it our duty towards the people and towards the allies to make known to General Wilson and the Allied Mediterranean High Command that the information they have received on the situation here is unfounded and incorrect. In order to clear up every question and to put the Mediterranean High Command more in touch, as well as to talk in detail about the coordination of our actions with those of the allies, we have frequently sought to send our delegates to Italy in order to reach an understanding on more organized cooperation against the German occupiers. Our requests have had no result whatsoever. Once again we make the request that our delegates be sent to this High Command, which seems to us essential; we hope that this time the Mediterranean High Command will not refuse our request¹.

We duly appreciate the allied aid in war material² etc., and consider it necessary for our war. We do not believe that the arms aid to us will be cut off to impede

1 The talks between the delegation of the General Command of the National Liberation Army of Albania and the Allied Mediterranean High Command were held in Bari (Italy) in August 1944. In the course of these talks all attempts made by the Mediterranean High Command to force the National Liberation Army of Albania into ceasing its operations against the traitorous forces of the "Legaliteti", and to intervene in the internal affairs of the National Liberation War of the Albanian people were foiled.

2 The material aid of the Anglo-Americans to the National Liberation Army of Albania was completely insufficient and insignificant. Their largest aid went to the reactionary forces of the "Balli Kombëtar" and "Legaliteti".

the just war we are waging because we are fighting the Germans and Bazi i Canës, who is a traitor and collaborates with the Germans and the quislings of Tirana. On the contrary, we trust that the Mediterranean High Command will give more consideration to the question and to the interests of our common cause, and that the aid to be given us will be sent quickly and frequently, and that there will be more of it. . .

DEATH TO FASCISM — FREEDOM TO THE PEOPLE

Commander-in-chief of the
Albanian National Liberation Army
Colonel-General

Enver Hoxha

Works, vol. 2.

**CIRCULAR CONCERNING CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS
TO THE ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS OF THE PARTY
IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY**

August 17, 1944

TO ALL REGIONAL PARTY COMMITTEES, TO THE
COMMISSARS OF THE 1st AND 2nd SHOCK DIVISIONS
AND TO ALL VICE-COMMISSARS OF BRIGADES
AND BATTALIONS

With the enlargement of our National Liberation Army and the creation of large units, such as divisions and army corps, it has been found necessary to make some changes in the organizational forms of the Party within the army, as well as to create other organs to aid the complete development and strengthening of the Party in various units.

On receiving this circular, the party leaders in the army should immediately implement it, making it clear to all the party members, and all regional party committees should explain these directives to every cell.

These modifications consist in the creation of party committees in the brigades and divisions as well as in the setting up and organization of political sections in the divisions and brigades. For the Communist Youth, they consist in the setting up of youth committees in the battalions and brigades¹.

1 The instructions issued in this circular for the creation of party committees in the divisions and brigades, and the creation of

I. *The party committee in the brigade.* The brigade committee is to be set up where the work of the Party is not proceeding well, and when the vice-commissar is not in a position to cope with the task assigned to him and needs advice. It need not be set up if the organizational work of the Party in the brigade is proceeding well and if the party members have a high level. In the former case this committee is to be made up of 3-7 persons to be elected by a meeting of the activists of the brigade, convened with the participation of all political and military leaders (in this case, if they are party members). The best comrades, such as the brigade commissars, and battalion commissars and vice-commissars are elected to the committee. The brigade vice-commissar takes part in this committee and is its secretary. If the brigade has a political section, then whoever is in charge of this section also takes part in the committee. The brigade committee does not have authority, as is the case with the other party committees (the regional or district committees), but is only an advisory and directing committee. The brigade vice-commissar, who is also secretary of the committee, maintains contact with the battalion bureau, receives reports, and speaks before the committee in general terms

youth committees in the battalions and brigades, by nomination of members of these committees, and not by elections, could not be considered erroneous in the conditions of war. At that time, it was permissible to apply some restrictions to inner party democracy, especially, in the question of the elections to the party organs. Of course, in time of peace such restrictions are totally impermissible and are considered as serious violations of the organizational principles of a Marxist-Leninist party. As for the political organs in the army (sections, political branches) both in times of war and peace, their members are appointed from above, and not elected. Nevertheless, in the period of the National Liberation War, the party committees of the regions as well as the secretaries of party cells were not nominated from above, but elected.

about these reports, but does not submit a report himself. The brigade vice-commissar also maintains contact with the Central Committee and is directly responsible for party work in the brigade. The members of the brigade committee have no separate work sectors, but go to the battalions and assist the political and military leaders as well as all party members, by giving advice. This committee does not hold routine meetings at fixed times. It meets whenever it is necessary and possible to do so. However, it is best for the committee to meet once every 15 or 20 days. After each meeting, the committee should draw conclusions from the discussion held at the meeting, and pass them on to the organization in the form of instructions. In the absence of new instructions or directives, after every meeting the committee should dispatch an explanation of the political situation to the organization. Usually, the committee members cannot go from one battalion to another, since they cannot leave their other duties, but this does not prevent them from going to various battalions if they find an opportunity. The vice-commissar of the brigade can go anywhere.

II. *The party committee in the division.* The divisional committee is made up of the vice-commissars of every brigade, the divisional commissar, and the person in charge of the political section in the division. In most cases, the secretary of this committee is the political commissar of the division, but this does not exclude the possibility of the secretary being the vice-commissar of a brigade who takes part in the committee. In any case, the secretary of the committee should be the best comrade. The person in charge of the political section cannot be secretary of the committee. The function of this committee is the same as that of the brigade, but it has more power and is more important, since it is made up of appointed comrades who are charged with greater responsibilities. The members

of this committee submit reports to the secretary of the committee, and also send reports to the Central Committee, and maintain direct contact with it. They discuss all the directives from the Central Committee, and find the best way to implement them in the organization. The meetings of this committee are held in the same way and according to the same criteria as the meetings of the brigade committees. After each meeting, the divisional committee, like that of the brigade, should issue either a political instruction, or a work directive, etc., to the organization.

The person in charge of the youth in the brigade or the member of the political section for the youth in the division does not take part in any of these committees. The person responsible for the youth in the brigade maintains links with the vice-commissar of the brigade and the Central Committee of the Youth.

III. *The brigade political section.* Here we shall not speak of the importance of this section, which has been explained in a previous directive, but of some amendments made to it. The political section should have no more than three people, who should work in the following sectors:

1) Organizational sector; 2) political and military sector; 3) youth sector.

The meetings of the political section discuss the work in general, but these meetings should not be like cell meetings with an agenda, discussion of the political situation, etc., but should thrash out the organizational problems of the Party, the weaknesses and the progress of the army and of the youth. The brigade vice-commissar also takes part in these meetings. The members of the political section never issue directives, but help by giving advice. The reports of the members of the political section are sent to the person responsible for the section who is also responsible for the organizational section. He maintains contact

only with the Central Committee. The political section should pay special attention to work in the territory among the civilian population.

IV. *The divisional political section.* With the setting up of the divisional political section all the political sections of the brigades included in the division are replaced. This section is made up of five comrades, three of whom have definite work sectors, the same as those of the brigade section, and two have no definite work sector. The divisional political sections hold the same sort of meetings as the brigade political sections, and the reports are always received by the person in charge of the organizational sector, who maintains links with the Central Committee alone. The person responsible for the divisional political section (the organizer) is also a member of the divisional committee, but there he is only an adviser and observer who does not deliver reports or issue directives, but always maintains links with the Central Committee in his capacity as person in charge of the political section. The divisional commissar and the secretary of the divisional committee can and must go to the meetings of the divisional political section, when they are held in the military detachments. The members of the divisional committee can also go when time permits. The political section also holds meetings without any of these people attending, to discuss questions concerning the committee, various comrades, and so on.

The person in charge of the divisional political section (the organizer) deals with matters of party organization, and especially with strengthening and increasing the ranks of the Party, and is responsible to the Central Committee. As well as working with the brigade and battalion vice-commissars, as long as it is done to help the work, he can act on his own initiative, but whatever he does, such as holding meetings with comrades, leaders, or partisans, he

should inform the secretary of the divisional committee, as well as the vice-commissar of the detachment where he has been working. The members of the divisional political section are respected by the leaders of the division, by the commissar and brigade vice-commissars, and are recognized by them as representatives of the Central Committee. They should earn the respect of the divisional and brigade commands, too, through their work and correct advice, and in particular should be consulted on questions relating to party members, such as legal matters, etc. They should never abuse their authority. When they go to the meeting of the cells and bureaus they do not have the right to say they are delegates from the Central Committee, but are members of the political section. They have free access everywhere — to the party organizations and the staffs, to all army affairs, and to the formations in which they take part, either in the division or in the brigade.

The function of the members of the political section, either of the brigade or the division, should be correctly understood and the mistakes which are made so often in practice should be avoided. The members of the political section do not have the right to give orders and issue directives, since they are advisers, and should assist the party members, political and military leaders with convincing advice; they assist in the correct understanding and full implementation of the party directives; they defend the party line and contribute to strengthening and increasing the ranks of the Party.

Note. The commissar of the army corps has free access to all the party organizations in his own detachment, and should give them every assistance and the benefit of his great experience. The brigade political commissar, as well as his other duties, can and must help with party work in his own detachment and among the civilian population of the territory.

V. *The Communist Youth Committee in the battalions and brigades.* Every battalion company has a group of Communist Youth activists, which is made up of only those young people who deserve this title; the others are anti-fascist youth, but are not organized in an organization of Anti-fascist Youth². The battalion Youth Committee is made up of the activists' secretaries of the companies. They may or may not be party members. The person responsible for the youth in the battalion, who takes part in the battalion bureau, becomes secretary of the Youth Committee. The secretary of the Youth Committee maintains contacts with the vice-commissar of the battalion as well as with the regional Youth Committee of the territory where it is situated. If this battalion is incorporated in a brigade, then the secretary of the Youth Committee, besides maintaining contact with the vice-commissar, also has links with the person responsible for the youth in the brigade. The brigade Youth Committee is made up of all the secretaries of the battalion Youth Committees. Its secretary is the person responsible for the youth in the brigade and must be a party member, either of a cell of the brigade staff, if he is of a high enough level not to impede the work of the staff, or of a cell near the staff, such as that of the couriers. He maintains contact with the brigade vice-commissar and with the Central Committee of the Youth. If the brigade is incorporated in a division, then he continues to maintain contact with the member of the divisional political section assigned to questions of the youth. The member of the divisional political section assigned to questions of the youth maintains direct contact with the Central Committee of the Communist Youth.

² During the war period, the National Liberation Army had only Communist Youth organizations at the company level, but did not have such organizations as the Anti-fascist Youth, which existed only outside the army.

The secretary of the battalion Youth Committee who takes part in the battalion bureau, must be a member of a cell: if he is of a high enough level not to impede work in the cell of the battalion staff, he takes part in this cell. Otherwise, he should take part in a cell of one of the formations close to the staff, such as that of heavy weapons, or of the couriers.

* * *

Addition. In a company where there are party cells there is no need for party educational groups. The whole company should be an educational group. The company has only courses for party candidates.

Enver Hoxha

DEATH TO FASCISM

FREEDOM TO THE PEOPLE

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**REPORT TO THE 2ND MEETING OF THE ANTI-
FASCIST NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL
OF ALBANIA¹**

October 20, 1944

Dear comrade councillors,

More than four months have passed since the Congress of Përmet which adopted decisions of historic importance for our country and people; four months with events which have changed the international situation as well as the situation within the country. As a result of these events of both military and political importance the main culprit responsible for this bloody slaughter, Nazi Germany, shattered on all fronts and mortally wounded, is heading fast for the abyss into which it will disappear forever. Our predictions at the Congress of Përmet are becoming reality and are on the way to complete fulfillment.

During the proceedings of the Congress, with complete and unshakable confidence in the victory of our arms, we witnessed the glorious triumphs of the heroic Red Army which was mercilessly annihilating the Hit-

¹ The 2nd Meeting of the Anti-fascist National Liberation Council was held in Berat from the 20th to the 23rd of October 1944. It decided to transform the Anti-fascist Committee into the Democratic Government of Albania, adopted the Law on the National Liberation Councils, and the "Declaration of Citizens' Rights".

lerite armies and triumphantly liberating its own territories in close pursuit of the wounded fascist beast. The victories of this glorious army, which is carrying on its steel-like shoulders the main burden of this tremendous war and which has astonished the world with its Stalinist strategy, have facilitated the successful development of the anti-fascist struggle on other fronts as well. The victories of the Red Army, which were also victories for all the peoples at war with fascism, have at the same time, constituted the greatest and most valuable assistance that could possibly have been given to the peoples in their efforts to rout the occupiers. These victories of the Red Army, led by Marshal Stalin, have forced nazi Germany to weaken the other fronts, and in the meantime, have helped the allied nations of the great anti-fascist bloc to strengthen and increase their military activity.

During these four months the Red Army has reached the gates of Warsaw, liberated Rumania and forced the quisling government of that country to capitulate ; the Red Army has entered Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Prussia. The Soviet government and the Red Army have guaranteed independence to the nations oppressed by nazism. The recognition of the Polish National Liberation Committee and the great assistance given to it, Molotov's assurances to the Rumanian people, the transit permission accorded by the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia, and the solemn assurances given this committee by the Soviets to the effect that the state power established in that country would not be violated during the passage of the Red Army through Yugoslavia, are the complete guarantee of the just world of tomorrow.

The great allies, Britain and the United States of America, which with their heavy and incessant air-strikes have inflicted great damage on Germany, both in the

interior of the country and on all western fronts, have launched in France the attack expected by all the peoples at war, an attack that will hasten the liberation of Europe from German nazism. Even prior to the opening of the second front and the drive mounted by the great Anglo-American army, the resistance of the demoralized Hitlerite hordes has been hopeless. The Anglo-American troops have liberated almost the whole of France, Belgium, and part of Holland, and now they are at the gates of Germany.

In this terrible war in which the oppressed peoples of Europe have fought with rare heroism, the heroic people of Yugoslavia and their courageous National Liberation Army occupy a special place.

Despite the important victories of the great anti-fascist bloc, despite the progress of the allied troops and the heroic struggle of the enslaved peoples, nazi Germany, although in its death throes, is not laying down its arms, but is putting up a last-ditch struggle to preserve its position. At the time of the Congress of Përmet the German occupiers and the local traitors, from the Tirana quislings headed by Mehdi Frashëri, the "Balli Kombëtar" headed by Mithat Frashëri and Ali Këlcyra, to the "Legaliteti" headed by the traitor and bandit Abaz Kupi, with feverish bodies and hope in their hearts, were preparing their second large-scale offensive against the National Liberation Army. The traitorous reactionaries had not lost hope of achieving their end. Any disagreement among them had been put away, and looking through the German bayonets, which were still strong, they saw only their main objective: the destruction of the National Liberation Front and our army. The criminal bands of "Balli Kombëtar" were unconditionally at the disposal of the Germans. Together with the quisling gendarmerie and the "Legaliteti" bandits, they unleashed a campaign of terror in the oc-

cupied areas which defies decription not only against those actively participating in the National Liberation Front, but against the whole population. Anarchy reigned in our cities; innocent old people, women, and children were shot down with the sole purpose of suppressing the resistance. The plundering of the property of the people knew no limits and the life of every citizen was in danger. In South Albania these bandits pressganged the sons of the people, keeping them locked in barracks ready for their final act, feeding them with their filthy demagogy the better to deceive them and use them for their bloody activity against the people. In North Albania all reaction had rallied around the bandit Abaz Kupa, the quisling Fiqri Dine and company, around the abject traitors Mustafa Kruja, Kolë Bibë Mirakaj, Gjon Markaj, and others. The Tirana traitors, headed by Mehdi Frashëri, the infamous Mithat Frashëri and other traitors such as Ali Këlcyra, orchestrated and conducted this ugly performance, this grave crime against our people. These pseudo-democrat and pseudo-republican traitors were making common cause with the bandits and criminals of the old Zogite regime, and nazi Germany, their master, supplied the arms, money and food for their motley hordes. Three German divisions and thousands of Albanian mercenaries, well trained and armed to the teeth, threw themselves on us like wild beasts, and swarmed over the liberated territories which had been cleansed with the blood of the finest sons and daughters of our people. Their diabolical plan was to annihilate us as a military and political force, to consummate their barbarous undertaking once and for all, and to set up their state power of bandits and vampires upon our dead bodies. But our heroic army was not asleep. It was ready to confront any danger, it was ready, as always, to fight to the last man for its suffering people, for its beloved country,

and to give a fitting reply to the German divisions and the bands of traitors. The army and the people rose to their feet, men and women, with rifles in hand, old men and children, united as one, with a spirit of selflessness and heroism that will remain legendary, standing firm to save the Fatherland, to defend the people, to defend the liberated areas, to defend our honour and our customs, for the triumph of liberty and justice. Our army made an important contribution in blood to the common cause of the allies and engaged the German divisions in bloody clashes precisely at the time when the Anglo-American allies were landing in France. Comrade councillors, our triumphant army waged an epic struggle against the German savages and the local traitors. Our partisans, men and women, the commanders and commissars of our courageous battalions and our legendary brigades, had understood that this was a life and death struggle, and they did not spare their lives for their great ideal. With unprecedented self-sacrifice, they defended every inch of land, washing it with their blood. Hundreds and hundreds of Germans and traitors paid with their lives for their bloody deeds. In epic battle after epic battle that will be passed on as legends from generation to generation of our people, our valiant comrades fell heroically fighting like lions, with a song on their lips for the new Albania we are building. Other comrades stepped forward to replace them with the same courage and selflessness, and our glorious army emerged victorious. It defeated the second German offensive, annihilated the forces and crushed the hopes of the traitors, and triumphant and stronger than ever, marched towards the objectives defined by the General Staff and the Anti-fascist Committee, throwing itself into a fierce counter-offensive to liberate Albania. Glory to the heroic sons and daughters of our people who

have fallen on the field of honour! Honour and laurels to our glorious National Liberation Army!

Our military victories against the second German offensive came immediately after the important decisions taken at the great Congress of Përmet, after the foundation of the Anti-fascist Committee.

The founding of the Anti-fascist Committee, the natural offspring of so many sacrifices and sufferings of our movement, was the most vivid expression of the wishes and aspirations of our people, who during this terrible struggle, knew how to consolidate the military, political and organizational positions they had won at the cost of their blood. The Anti-fascist Committee is the natural result of the concretization of the form of the democratic state power and the necessary form for the centralization of the work. At the same time, for international opinion among the allied nations the founding of the Committee was a lawful expression of the sovereignty of a people who, while fighting, were at the same time making their self-government a reality.

The founding of the Anti-fascist Committee was received by the entire Albanian people with indescribable enthusiasm. Thousands of letters of congratulations and confidence have come to the Presidium of the Committee from the most remote areas of Albania, and these express the deep affection and lofty sentiments of our militant people, demonstrating their firm determination to continue their liberation war with the greatest drive possible, and their complete confidence in the Anti-fascist Committee, which is leading this war with success. The formation of the Committee fell like a bombshell among the ranks of the traitors who were closely collaborating with the occupiers and making detailed preparations to annihilate us. At the same time, the formation of the Committee ruined the plans hatched up by Albanian reactionaries

abroad with the support of certain foreign reactionary circles. These people had hidden the truth about our country and our fierce fight from our brothers in emigration, who, though they are linked heart and soul with our people and their struggle, because they are democrats in spirit and in deeds and are ready to give everything for the land of their birth, are still in the dark and cannot contribute as much as they should to our war.

The constitution of the Committee has liquidated and made a mockery of the efforts of the Albanian reactionaries within the country and abroad to form puppet governments, without any popular basis and against the will of the Albanian people, in which, naturally, the participants would have been all those who, today and in the past, have done nothing but play the game of the enemies of the people.

The Congress of Përmet and the constitution of the Antifascist Committee have consolidated our Front and rallied almost the entire people, mobilizing them for this sacred struggle. The people's power has been strengthened and the decisions taken at the Congress of Përmet have been implemented, one after the other, by the Anti-fascist Committee and the National Liberation Army.

One of the major decisions, the decision to step up the war and to liberate the occupied areas, has been implemented. After foiling the second German offensive, our brigades and divisions have marched towards North Albania to liberate the territory and our people there, who have suffered extremely at the hands of the Germans and traitors. One after the other, the bands of Shefqet Vërlaci and Abaz Kupi, of Fiqri Dine and Halil Alia and company, the bands of Gjon Markagjoni and Muharrem Bajraktari have melted away like snow in the sun. And like snow in the sun, their plans to deceive the people, to present us as people who destroy everything, and not as those who

are bringing liberty and justice to the North, have melted away too. In vain the Germans and traitors tried to muster their demoralized forces to stop our bold drive for liberation. Our triumphant army, welcomed with great affection and indescribable enthusiasm by the population of the North, has liberated towns and entire regions. Çermenika, Mati, Dibra, Peshkopia, Zerqan, Lura, Luma, and Mirdita have been liberated. Every night our forces are at the gates of Tirana and Elbasan; they are marching towards the Malësia e Madhe and Shkodra, they have reached Has, and are now marching across the Malësia e Gjakovës, in the interior of Kosova.

After this heavy blow which our army has struck, the Albanian traitors can find nowhere to hide. The time has come, as we had correctly and confidently predicted, when, hotly pursued by the army and people who are demanding retribution on account of their criminal deeds, they will try to save their skins behind the battered German bayonets or the intrigues of foreign reaction. But they will not escape justice, their ignominious end is imminent.

Dear comrade councillors,

As you can see, since the Congress of Përmet our National Liberation War has assumed vast proportions and our army has been consolidated, tempered, and expanded. Thousands of young partisans are filling the ranks of our army and fighting with unheard of determination on the forefront of the war against the barbarous Germans. The detachments of our army have gone beyond the stage of partisan units, battalions and brigades. Today our army operates in big units. Four divisions and an army corps have already been set up. The General Staff is unifying the staffs of the other brigades that are being formed, and soon we will have more divisions and army corps. The fighting spirit of our units is high and their discipline

steel-like. Our commanders and political commissars have gained much experience, and with their fighting tactics, have led their detachments to victory. We can say with pride that through its fierce battles, our army has also won the admiration of our allies. In these clashes the enemy is appreciating the fighting strength and level of our partisan units. In a secret report of the German Air Force in Albania, dated August 16, 1944, captured by our forces, the enemy said of the National Liberation Army: "In their Dibra offensive, for the first time, the partisans carried out a large scale and well-organized attack against a locality defended by German troops. Following a pre-determined plan, the enemy captured Dibra". But the Germans had seen before and were to see again other operations carried out in the same style and with the same precision. They learned of the value of the partisans and commanders of our army, they learned about them in the course of the attacks they mounted to liberate Peshkopia, Zerqan, Pogradec, Berat, Gjirokastra, Kruja, Saranda, Delvina, Vlora, Fier, they learned about them at Kuçova and on all the roads of Albania, they are learning about them every day through their attacks on their convoys. These lightning attacks of our army are costing the enemy hundreds and hundreds of men killed, wounded and captured, as well as hundreds of vehicles knocked out or burnt. The occupiers have been met with bullets since they first set foot on Albanian soil. They have not been given a moment's respite or allowed to act freely, and now, in their final retreat, they are being pursued step by step by our army.

Our people are fully justified in being proud of their invincible army. They are fully entitled to hold their heads high before their friends and allies around the world.

In the course of its titanic battles our army has seized its weapons from the enemy in attacks on its columns and stores. Our army has been fed and supported by our people who, despite their extreme poverty, despite unimaginable economic difficulties caused by this terrible war, have shared their last crust with those who, barefoot and ill-clad, but with high and unshakable morale, were fighting in rain and snow, without sparing even their lives, for a free and independent Albania. Our allies have helped us with arms and ammunition too. We do not forget the aid we have received, and are grateful to them for what they have done, but the assistance they have given us has not been sufficient. Hundreds of partisans have no rifles and ammunition, hundreds of partisans who are burning with the desire to fight have nothing to fight with but stones. Because of the shortage of weapons many localities are still in the hands of the enemy. In the common interest of this sacred war, to cut off the road of retreat for the German forces and to annihilate them, we demand from our allies arms, arms, arms! We believe that no one will deny us the right to fight, to step up the war even further, so we demand again arms and ammunition.

Dear comrade councillors,

Our victories have been numerous and continual in every field of activity, and this is due to the correct political and military stand of the national liberation movement. The principles of our just struggle embodied in the platform of Peza and amplified at the Labinot Conference and at the historic Congress of Përmet have been carried out to the letter with good results. In three-quarters of Albania national liberation councils have been set up, and soon they will be established all over the country. The people participate wholeheartedly in them and see them

as the expression of their sovereignty. In them the people have found the best method of government, or rather, self-government. The setting up and functioning of the national liberation councils during the war has been one of the factors in our triumph. In their role as organs of state power and with their untiring political work, the national liberation councils have been the right hand of our army. The activity of the army and the activity of the national liberation councils have been closely linked, and these splendid results have derived from the full harmonization of the two powers,² from their struggle and indefatigable work in an atmosphere of great mutual affection. Let us honour and applaud the untiring work and struggle of the national liberation councils, these worthy representatives of our people.

The creation of the Anti-fascist Committee gave a great impetus to the work of the councils and state power. It was then that the centralization of work began, that the people mobilized themselves around the Front and the army, and gained the greatest confidence in their own work and struggle. The Committee has issued instructions and directions for the strengthening of the state power and the extension of its activity in all fields. The results can be seen. In the educational field, hundreds of schools have been opened in the liberated areas and thousands of children have begun to attend them regularly. With untold zeal the innocent little children of our people, protected by the arms of the National Liberation Army, and with full confidence in their splendid and prosperous future, have resumed the lessons they had abandoned. Courses are being organized to train teachers of a new type who will dedicate their lives to educating the younger generation, the hope of the country. Literacy courses are

² The power of the councils and army.

being organised and houses of culture are being set up to lift the cultural level of the population. In the field of culture and propaganda, conferences and rallies are being organized everywhere, our press is being strengthened, and musical and theatrical groups are being set up to educate and raise high the spirit of our people. In the field of the economy, markets are being organized and all the necessary steps are being taken for the successful development of activity in this sector of such great importance to our country. The question of the economy is the most important question which concerns the Committee and which should always concern us. Our people, hard hit by the war, are in dire economic straits. Whole regions are short of bread, without mentioning other important daily necessities. Despite the war, it is our duty, even if we cannot solve this problem completely, to put our shoulders to the wheel, to improve this situation. We must work persistently and untiringly to build up the economy of the country, just as we have done in the war against the occupiers. For this, not only must we toil and sweat, but we must also arouse a sense of solidarity and mutual assistance amongst the people. In this war, in which all are shedding their blood to save the homeland, it is necessary to help one another in the economic field. In these times, he who helps his comrade helps himself, helps the army and helps the homeland. In the field of public health, despite the shortage of medicines, every thing is being done to set up first aid centres and hospitals, to organize courses to train nurses, to ensure the health of the people and the army.

In four months of life, the Anti-fascist Committee has done its utmost to intensify the struggle against the occupiers and the internal enemy, to consolidate state power in the liberated zones, to reconstruct the country and raise the cultural level of the people. We are already seeing

the first fruits of this work, and progress is being made every day. We shall prove to all the pessimists that our people, and the new men and women tempered in this war know how to work and build their sacred homeland just as they knew how to fight heroically for its freedom.

One of the principal tasks of the Anti-fascist Committee has been to work out and draft the basic laws of our democratic state power on which our new state will be soundly established. These laws of capital importance will be submitted for approval and will set down concretely the organization and functioning of the state apparatus.

The greatest concern of all the members of the Front should be to see that this whole structure we have built has sound foundations which will resist all dangers and threats. We must not be satisfied with its superficial appearances, but must look reality in the eye, and whenever the work is going badly, we must rebuild it on a sounder basis. The state power we are building is not a thing of the moment, but has to do with the entire future of our country and our people, who have suffered all their lives, who are shedding precious blood, and burning with desire for happier days after the war. Therefore in all the branches of this state we must bring the people to power, and they must be the masters of their own fate. For this important task to be thoroughly achieved, we must understand the essence of this state power; we must understand it ourselves, and all our people must understand it. The fundamental laws of our democratic state power are clear, simple, comprehensible, and applicable to everyone. Everything has been stripped from the complicated procedure of the former laws which were formulated in this way expressly to keep the people at a distance, and at the same time, to usurp their rights. But it is not enough to understand the laws, we must apply

them with the greatest vigour, and defend them with the greatest severity against anyone who tries to distort and violate them. Anyone who violates these laws, anyone who abuses them, violates and abuses the will of the people, must not remain unpunished in the new state power we are setting up.

Up to now the national liberation councils of the villages, subprefectures and prefectures have simultaneously exercised the role of state power and political functions. With the new decisions on the organization of the state power, the national liberation councils and the executive committees are only organs of the state power, and all the councillors appointed by the national liberation councils to the executive committees are state functionaries. As such, they are responsible to the national liberation councils which have appointed them and to the population of the subprefecture or prefecture of which they are part. These functionaries of the new state, from the ranks of the people, must carry out the orders they receive from the National Liberation Council and from the government, working tirelessly and conscientiously for the people who have given them their confidence. As state functionaries, they should be respected by all, and on their part, through their work and behaviour, should earn this respect and affection. In this new state power no one should think that with his advent to a council he will be permitted to commit abuses and do bad things to the detriment of the people; the people will be close by him, will help him and control him, but they will criticize him, and dismiss him if he does not work well. On the other hand, the people will wholeheartedly love and defend those who work fair-mindedly for the people. Since we have decided that all this blood which has been shed must not be in vain, we must have these principles clear, both

we and the people, and with these sound criteria, let us set to work, devoting all our sweat and toil to it.

Around this state power we must rally the entire Albanian people so that none remains outside the Front, and the broad masses of the people are guided and nurtured with the correct policy of the National Liberation Front. To carry out this large scale political work among the masses of the people, the National Liberation Front should itself become a political organization³. Comrade councillors, the honour of forming this political organization belongs to you, as worthy representatives of our people.

Another important task of the Anti-fascist Committee was to unite the entire Albanian people in the National Liberation Front, and to wage a fierce struggle against the occupiers to speed up the liberation of the country. The Anti-fascist Committee has followed the correct road of the unity and fraternity of all Albanian patriots with the greatest loyalty, as the only course for the salvation of our people. The Committee has always been awake to utilize every opportunity for the complete realization of this union of the healthy energies of the people, and to snatch any weapon from the hands of the occupiers. In recent times things have been rapidly coming to a head in Europe and in the Balkans. The German troops stationed in Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania were cut off by the Red Army and the national liberation armies

3 The 2nd Meeting of the Anti-fascist National Liberation Council decided that the national liberation councils would remain as organs of the people's power, while the National Liberation Front would create its own specific organizations, which would serve as the main support of the power, and it was through them that the education and mobilization of the masses as well as the strengthening of the unity of the people around the Party would be effected.

of the Balkan people. Our army and the national liberation armies of neighbouring peoples attacked the enemy forces from all sides as they were frantically preparing their retreat. The German ship was sinking and, naturally, the rats on board rushed to abandon it.

The bands of Albanian traitors, who were still at large and assisting their patron with his last massacres and devastation, began to collapse. The Albanian bandits saw their men at arms desert, one after the other. These elements surrendered to the detachments of our army, and, recognizing their error, some gave up their arms and some asked us to let them fight side by side with the partisans. We were witnessing the great differentiation in the ranks of the reaction. The Anti-fascist Committee, in the interests of the war and the people, and in order to remove from the Germans' hands the last weapon they had forged to cause fratricide, made the call you all know of⁴. This supreme call to all those who found themselves taking the side of the enemy made it possible for them to leave the ranks of the occupiers, in the highest interests of the country, and gave them the opportunity to reduce their guilt. The Anti-fascist Committee has the duty to accelerate the liberation of the country. Our just call, with its highly political character, was the last summons to all those who might still have a drop of fraternal blood in their veins, to all those who, whatever they had done, still had some scrap of feeling for their country. Our call was a great demonstration of the lofty aim our move-

⁴ On September 22, 1944, the Presidium of the Anti-fascist National Liberation Council and the General Command of the National Liberation Army called on all those collaborating with the occupiers to pass over to the ranks of the National Liberation Front within 15 days. Those who would act accordingly were to benefit from attenuating circumstances. As an answer to this, many misled persons went over to the ranks of the Front.

ment has consistently followed, that of uniting the entire Albanian people. Now at the zenith of its power and on the eve of decisive victory, our movement still held out a hand to help those who, until yesterday, were fighting against it. The great majority of these misled and only half-guilty people have accepted our call and surrendered. Their response to this call will be taken into account in extenuation of their guilt, but they will not be pardoned. They will be judged by the people's tribunals with the great justice characteristic of our war and our Front. All those who bear the heavy burden of treason will be punished with severity and the greatest justice. We advise all those who until yesterday have been alien to the Front, who have taken the stand of the enemy and stood in open confrontation with the national liberation movement, and whom today our Front accepts, giving them the possibility to rehabilitate themselves, to renounce their former erroneous mentality, their unmerited pretensions and their aims to infiltrate into the Front in order to destroy it from within. We advise these people to carefully analyse their past, to take a correct view of things now, and work well in future. They must not forget, even for a single moment, that we are not the sort of people to rest on our laurels. We tell all these elements to change their ways if they do not want the people and the state power to take measures against them.

All those others who have consciously committed treason are fleeing in terror from the vengeance and justice of the people, for they know that the blood of thousands of our martyrs cannot be forgotten, that the blood of our parents and sisters barbarously slaughtered in cities and villages cannot be forgotten, that hundreds of villages turned into rubble and ashes are crying out for vengeance, that the burnt and plundered property of our people must be restored. The sword of justice will fall

inexorably upon the base traitors. Some of these still pin their hopes on the help of certain foreign reactionary circles, and cherish the vain dream that foreign reaction will protect them and save their skins; others will play out the game of intrigue to the bitter end.

With the bandit Abaz Kupa, that cunning creature of a thousand tricks, the man of Mehdi Frashëri and the Tirana quislings, collaborators with the Germans, who have supplied him with food, war material and clothing, and given him the aid of the Wehrmacht in his fight against us, there are allied officers, and Abaz Kupa and all the other traitors of the country use the presence of these officers to mislead the people by saying that Britain is with them and helps them. Certainly, the stand of allied officers towards such elements is harmful to our common struggle. We will never accept or approve of the stand of these officers. Our attitude is most correct. Our loyalty to our great allies is complete and grows stronger day by day. The delegates of our General Staff who have gone for talks with the Allied Mediterranean High Command in Bari, have signed the first military agreement in a cordial atmosphere. Throughout our just and unceasing war, we have overcome all obstacles and will emerge victorious, because in this war we are inseparable allies of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, because the peoples of those countries support us, in spite of the manoeuvres of some conspirators who will not get far, just as they support the other peoples who are courageously fighting the occupiers for their freedom. Facts confirm my words: now attached to the General Staff of our army are the representatives of Great Britain which, with its continuous attacks, is tightening the noose around Germany on the Western Front. We have our military representatives attached to the Allied Mediterranean High Command. Attached to our General

Staff are military representatives of the great land of the Soviets and of the glorious Red Army, to which the world and all mankind are singing hymns of praise for the heavy burden it carries on its steel-like shoulders and for its titanic struggle that has astonished the world. The unanimous demand of our people, expressed through their representatives at the Congress of Përmet has been fulfilled. We are grateful to the great leader of the Soviet people, Marshal Stalin. Our General Staff also has military representatives of the United States.

Comrades,

The Congress of Përmet, convened at a difficult moment and attended by representatives from all the liberated and occupied areas of Albania, gave our country the Anti-fascist Council, a worthy representative of the Albanian people. It was at this congress that the will of our people was freely expressed for the first time. For the first time, broad strata of the population, men and women, old and young, took part in the political life of the country. The Congress of Përmet vested the Anti-fascist Council of Albania with both legislative and executive powers, and on the basis of its rights, the Presidium of the Council nominated the Anti-fascist Committee its main executive and directing organ. The Anti-fascist Committee had all the attributes of a provisional government, and as such it was faced with the following problems: to lead the Albanian people in the war, to strengthen and intensify this war against the occupiers and traitors, to liberate the occupied areas, to strengthen the National Liberation Army, and to extend and consolidate the power of the councils. At that stage of our struggle, the Anti-fascist Committee, with the attributes of a provisional government, was the corner stone in the setting up of the people's power, the outcome of our bloody battles. The Anti-

fascist Committee, as an executive organ of the state power, appropriate to the political circumstances of that period, paved the way for a democratic government of Albania, as an executive organ of the state power suited to the present political circumstances. And the present political circumstances differ from those of four months ago. Our movement has extended immeasurably, our war has assumed considerable proportions. We are no longer in the time when the second German offensive was being prepared in South Albania, and the reactionary traitors were still in a position to pressgang their bands and launch them against us. We are no longer in the time when almost the whole of Central and North Albania languished under the heel of the occupiers and traitors. Today, not only are there no longer armed traitors and mercenaries in the South, but Central Albania and the greater part of North Albania are totally liberated, awaiting the speedy liberation of the whole country. In the South and in the North, the traitors are taking to their heels in terror before the triumphant advance of our army. Their mercenary bands have been liquidated, and today we can state confidently that more than three quarters of Albania have been liberated, that in more than three quarters of Albania the anthem of liberation is being sung, the state power of the national liberation councils is being established, the commands of the rear areas are being set up and strengthened, and a great army is being raised to combat the occupiers, to defend the people and their state power. Our army is no longer what it was during the Congress of Përmet, it has trebled in size and energy, and its determination in the fight and its discipline have increased tenfold. At present we have a great number of brigades, divisions and army corps on a war footing, and day by day our army is moving towards the total and rapid liberation of the cities and the

whole of Albania. Events are moving abroad and the allied armies are advancing, tightening the pincers on Hitlerite Germany. Therefore the motto of our war and policy should always be: Forward! Under these political circumstances, comrades, circumstances which are totally in our favour, we must adopt important decisions, and one of these decisions should be the transformation of the Anti-fascist Committee into the Democratic Government of Albania. A new factor has emerged on the horizon of our political life, and must be taken into consideration, and the reason which yesterday prevented us from forming a new government, today when three quarters of Albania have been liberated, when our state power is being extended and strengthened, when our army is expanding and growing stronger, when Nazi Germany is being dealt mortal blows, and when the traitors of the country, completely routed, cannot find a place to hide, today the same reason impels us and obliges us to transform the Committee into the Democratic Government. Our movement has always had a sense of proportion, it has shown political insight, it has never gone beyond the political reality, it has always tried to follow the tempo of internal and external events, and has based itself entirely on what is politically correct and necessary.

The transformation of the Committee into the Democratic Government requires the passing of a law, and this law can be passed by you and only by you, for you are the representatives of the people, vested with legislative and executive powers. The law you will pass, after thoroughly examining the question, will most certainly fulfil one of the most ardent wishes of our people, strengthening our internal state power and consolidating our international position.

The Democratic Government, which will emerge from this historic meeting, will remain loyal to the political and

military platform of our movement. It will abide by the decisions of the Congress of Përmet, and will be the continuation of the Anti-fascist Committee. The principal tasks of this Democratic Government will be, first and foremost, to continue the war against the occupiers and their lackeys, to bring it to a speedy conclusion, to strengthen the democratic state power of the councils, to safeguard all the democratic rights of the citizens, including their beliefs and the protection of private property. The Democratic Government, abiding by the Përmet decisions, will prohibit Zog from coming to Albania until the people express their will about the form of the state. The Democratic Government, following the complete liberation of Albania and the stabilization of the situation, will organize free and democratic elections to the Constituent Assembly which will determine the form of the state, and draw up the Founding Constitution of the Albanian State.

Our Democratic Government will seek recognition by the great allies — Britain, America and the Soviet Union, from Yugoslavia and all the other allied and friendly nations of the great anti-fascist bloc, as the sole government of the Albanian people emerging from the war, and from a courageous people who have shed so much blood and whose heroic sons have given their lives for the freedom of their own country, and at the same time, for the freedom of all the peoples oppressed by fascism.

We are fully confident that our great allies — Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States, and all the other friendly nations will recognize our government, a government that represents the entire Albanian people and expresses their will. They will recognize us, for they have seen with their own eyes the sacrifices we have made in this terrible and unequal war, they have seen with their own eyes the acts of heroism performed by this small but indomitable people. They will recognize our government,

for they have recognized us in the war, and at the most difficult moments, they have seen our army, in difficult conditions, hurl themselves furiously and with untold self-sacrifice on the enemy at a time when our great allies were fighting with the same selflessness and heroism on other fronts.

Dear comrade councillors,

At these decisive moments, I'am convinced that the worthy representatives of our people, called on by the Presidium of the Council to adopt decisions so important to the fate of our people and our dear country, will, as always, rise to the occasion as required by the present historical moment. On behalf of the Anti-fascist Committee I convey to you our greetings and wishes for the successful outcome of your meeting, and on behalf of our heroic army and its General Staff I greet you as the worthy representatives of the people, conveying to you on behalf of the army, which you all hold dear, its love for and its boundless devotion to our people and our sacred cause!

Long live the Anti-fascist National Liberation Council of Albania!

Long live the heroic National Liberation Army of Albania!

Long live the Albanian people!

Long live free, independent, and democratic Albania!

Long live our great allies, Britain, the Soviet Union, and America!

Long live all the people of the great anti-fascist bloc!

*First published in the booklet
"The 2nd Meeting of the Anti-
fascist National Liberation
Council", 1944*

Works, vol. 2.

DECLARATION
OF THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT OF ALBANIA
AT THE 2nd MEETING OF THE ANTI-FASCIST NA-
TIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL OF ALBANIA

October 23, 1944

In this great anti-fascist liberation war, in which all the progressive peoples, united in face of the danger threatening mankind, have thrown in all their energies in a common effort against the nazi fascist barbarians, our heroic people, with the greatest self-sacrifice, have made their contribution to the liberation of the homeland and the wiping out of the fascist plague. The Albanian people courageously undertook the most terrible, and at the same time the most glorious war ever known in our history, and have shown in deeds, which will remain as lasting monuments for the future generations of our country, that the blood of their heroic ancestors still flows in the veins of the Albanians, and that their spirit is endowed with the lofty virtues characteristic of our people. In face of the great torrent threatening to engulf our country, the people, regardless of the sufferings, hunger, burnings, and killings, embarked on the only road of salvation through which they were to smash the dreadful shackles of slavery, the road of merciless war against the occupiers and the traitors of the country. Through their war against savage and powerful enemies equipped with the most modern weapons, the Albanian people fought their way step by

step to glory to raise high the name of Albania and the Albanians, earning for our country the respect of the whole world, and through the blood of their glorious sons, the right to take their place alongside all those peoples who undertook the great task of the salvation of mankind.

In the flames of this liberation war our heroic National Liberation Army was set up, the army of our invincible people, which dealt mortal blows to the occupiers and traitors and, in fighting bloody battles, armed and steeled itself with determination, discipline, and great experience. Through struggle and efforts the national liberation councils were set up, which became the true democratic state power of the people and which, together with our army, constituted the principal factor in our victories. Parallel with the victories of the army, the organization of our state power, too, passed from one glorious stage to another, gradually becoming perfected. Peza, Labinot, Përmet, and Berat are the four glorious stages of our war. The great Congress of Përmet, where the delegates of the Albanian people elected the Anti-fascist National Liberation Council of Albania and vested it with legislative and executive powers, gave Albania the *Anti-fascist Committee*, the principal executive and directing organ of the Anti-fascist National Liberation Council. The second historic meeting of the Anti-fascist National Liberation Council of Albania, held in the liberated town of Berat, gave Albania its first Democratic Government, the principal executive and directing organ through which the Anti-fascist National Liberation Council fulfils its executive functions.

The Democratic Government of Albania, conscious of the duties it has been entrusted with, will remain loyal to the decisions adopted at the Congress of Përmet, will be the continuation of the Anti-fascist Committee, and will implement and uphold all the military and political principles of the national liberation movement on a wider scale.

The Government, exercising its functions, declares to the entire Albanian people:

1. The Democratic Government of Albania will remain loyal to the decisions adopted at the Anti-fascist National Liberation Congress of Përmet and by the Anti-fascist National Liberation Council of Albania. This Government will continue in the footsteps of the Anti-fascist Committee.

2. The objective of the Government is the continuation and extension of the war, the rapid and complete liberation of Albania, and the defence of its independence.

3. The Democratic Government of Albania will rally all the forces of the Albanian people around the national liberation state power, and will strengthen the power of the national liberation councils.

4. The Democratic Government of Albania, after the complete liberation of Albania, and after stabilizing the situation, will proceed to hold free and democratic elections to the Constituent Assembly, which will decide on the form of the state and formulate the Founding Constitution of the Albanian State.

5. The Democratic Government of Albania will review all the political, military, and economic agreements concluded with foreign states by the Zog regime, and will cancel all those which are to the detriment of the Albanian people and state.

6. The Democratic Government of Albania will guarantee and defend all the civil rights of the citizens.

7. The Democratic Government of Albania will try to establish closer cooperation with the great allies: Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States of America, as well as with all the other members of the anti-fascist bloc.

8. The Democratic Government of Albania will seek recognition as the sole government of Albania from the

great allies: Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, as well as all the members of the anti-fascist bloc.

On behalf of the Democratic Government
of Albania

PRIME MINISTER

and Supreme Commander of the National
Liberation Army of Albania
Colonel-General

Enver Hoxha

*First published in the booklet
"The 2nd Meeting of the Anti-
fascist National Liberation
Council", 1944*

Works, vol. 2.

SPEECH DELIVERED TO THE 1ST CONGRESS OF THE ALBANIAN ANTI-FASCIST WOMEN'S UNION¹

November 4, 1944

Dear comrade delegates of the organization of Albanian Anti-fascist Women,

On behalf of the Democratic Government of Albania and the General Staff, I convey heartfelt greetings to the worthy representatives of the organization of the Anti-fascist Women of our country, gathered at this historic Congress.

For the first time in the history of our people, the Albanian women are taking a brilliant part in the political and military life of our country; their courageous and valuable participation has been sealed by the blood of the heroines who have fallen on the field of honour, side by side with their brothers, in the struggle for the liberation of Albania and, at the same time, of the Albanian women.

In this bloody anti-fascist liberation war, the women of our country recognized the danger threatening their country and themselves. With matchless heroism, they broke the chains of obsolete prejudices and, following the example of anti-fascist women in progressive nations,

¹ This congress was held from the 4th to the 8th of November 1944, in Berat, with the participation of delegates from all regions of Albania and from the detachments of the NLA.

proudly decided that "it was better to die on their feet than to live on their knees."

At the most difficult moments for our country, at the most critical hours of the beginning of this heroic struggle, the Albanian women, although still unorganized and lagging behind politically, felt a great pain in their hearts, a pain which they did not know how to express. Shaken by the upheavals of the war, they searched for a way out, a way to salvation. The echo of our first clashes with the enemy awakened in their hearts the protective instinct, the instinct of mothers, sisters, wives, for their sons, brothers, and husbands who were fighting an unequal war against a ferocious enemy. However, the Albanian women could not yet comprehend the importance of this struggle, they could not yet understand the great contribution the country expected from them; yet right from the beginning, they were one, body and soul, with the boys who were fighting. In the difficult moments we have gone through, they opened the doors of their homes to us, they opened their hearts, they gave us courage. We will never forget the heroic deeds of our mothers and sisters when the indescribable terror reigned in Tirana, when every night there were rifle-fire and bomb explosions, when our valiant comrades were falling in the streets for the liberation of Albania. Undaunted, they helped us and protected us as the apple of their eye. I always remember the bright open face of an old mother, one of our indomitable fellow fighters right from the beginning. A symbol of the Albanian woman in her mighty efforts, she said to us at the most critical moments, "I'm not as good at speaking as you are, but I have great faith that we will win, so forward, my sons, and I will die along with you!" This old mother, a comrade of our struggle and suffering, never lost her faith, and neither did all the other Albanian anti-

fascist women. Today, despite her age, from the North Albanian mountains, where she is fighting rifle in hand, she writes to me, "What Qemal Stafa and the other comrades told me has come true, and now I feel stronger than ever".

Albanian anti-fascist women found their road, the road to salvation which they were seeking, and this was the road of the war. In our towns and villages, the precious blood of our mothers and sisters which flowed in the streets was the signal of a new determination and a new world that was arising. The legendary struggle of our women comrades, who would not be stopped, but hurled themselves like lionesses upon the Germans and traitors, expressed a great new factor emerging in our country, one which we are witnessing at work today at this congress, and which will play a role of primary importance in the new Albania we are building.

The anti-fascist Albanian woman has won her rights at the price of her blood, and these rights are guaranteed by the people's power which she, together with her brothers, has set up, sacrificing all that was dearest to her. These rights are guaranteed to her by the army of her people.

The great historic Congress of the Albanian Anti-fascist Women, which we are now attending, will give a great impetus to the development of the Albanian women who, to achieve their objectives better and more rapidly, will close their ranks in the organization of Albanian Anti-fascist Women. All the women of Albania should take part in this organization. There they will rise to a higher cultural level and become educated in a new, progressive spirit. There they will become fighters for the defence of their rights, and worthy mothers of their country. New and brilliant horizons are opening before the organization

of Albanian Anti-fascist Women, and in order to achieve the lofty ideals for which their heroic comrades fell, our women, side by side with their men, and enjoying equal rights, must fully participate in the war and political and social life of our country. Only in this way can we hasten the complete liberation of Albania, reconstruct our beloved country, and the Albanian women attain the goals they desire and merit to achieve. The organization of Albanian Anti-fascist Women will have the full support of the Government and people's power on its road to progress, just as the people's power and the Government will enjoy the valuable help of this organization.

To the mothers and sisters of our fighters who have liberated the whole of South Albania and are now poised around Tirana and Shkodra to realize the liberation of the whole of Albania, I bring the greetings of the National Liberation Army, assuring them that our fighters are proud of them. They feel stronger when they see their mothers and sisters, united as one, beside them in the fight for freedom. And you, the mothers of our comrades who have fallen heroically on the field of honour for the liberation of their people and country, lift up your heads and let your hearts be strong, because all our people and all the other freedom-loving peoples bow with respect and veneration before the precious memory of your beloved sons and daughters whom you raised and gave to your country. The bones of your sons and daughters, who shed their blood to shape and consolidate the foundations of the new Albania, form the sacred altar of the nation. From them, daily and for evermore, our entire people, united and organized, will derive the spiritual strength which will carry them forward, towards progress and prosperity, towards the ideals for which they have sacrificed their lives.

Glory to our heroes, who laid down their lives for the liberation of the country!

Long live the 1st Congress of the Albanian Anti-fascist Women's Union!

Long live the anti-fascist women of our country!

Long live the Albanian Anti-fascist Women's Union!

Long live free democratic Albania!

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OUR NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY

November 1944

When our homeland was threatened by the greatest danger it had faced in the course of centuries, the most loyal and beloved sons of our people took up arms to fight the savage occupiers who were armed with the most modern weapons. Their undertaking was as courageous as it was sacred, for a handful of people were fighting at a time of great crisis, against enemies who were strong and at the height of their victories. But the Albanian patriots who undertook this gigantic deed, had complete faith in themselves and in our people, from whose bosom they had emerged. On the shoulders of these men weighed the heavy burden of the centuries-long servitude of our people, the misery and foreign bondage, the pain and suffering of the Albanian people. Brought forth by a long-suffering people, these men did not doubt for a single moment the mighty strength of the Albanian people, their freedom-loving spirit, their unyielding stand in the face of catastrophe and their iron will, which would carry our country on the road to salvation and victory.

And the war began, fierce and pitiless. The pessimists cried: "Blood will be shed in vain, with no hope of success!" The traitors went about their usual work, but our people rose up, closed their ranks, and threw themselves unsparingly into the war. They knew that without sweat and toil they could not earn their bread, and without war and bloodshed freedom could not be won, nor the home-

land saved. Only the traitors and the opportunists, the parasites of our social life, were predestined to go over to the other side of the barricade, because all their lives they have been preying on the people, have lived at the people's expense, treating them as a commodity to be bought and sold to foreigners. Inevitably, they would take the side of the occupier, whose aims were their aims, and in open contradiction with those of the Albanian people.

Our army, the glorious saviour of the Albanian Fatherland, educated and inspired in quite the opposite way from Zog's army, which submitted to the enemy, was born and grew up in the war, was formed and led by sons of the people, whose spirits were afire with the indescribable enthusiasm, unprecedented bravery, and great self-sacrifice, which are decisive factors of our victory. These factors assumed greater importance with every passing day, were formed and tempered through bloody battles, which made our fighters mature in thought and action, and enabled our youth to understand the importance of the moment and the heavy tasks they bore upon their young shoulders.

But these shoulders proved to be like granite, and our army surmounted great dangers and emerged victorious. At first, though small in numbers and inadequately armed, it undertook the most courageous actions against the Italians. During the German occupation, it armed itself with weapons captured from the enemy and wrote a brilliant epic.

In this great war our army learned to organize itself, and this organization passed through different stages. From the initial fighting units and detachments, battalions, brigades, divisions, and army corps were organized. These units, formed of workers, peasants, intellectuals, sons of the people, and closely linked with them, were led with great courage and wisdom by officers who emerged in the war from the ranks of the army.

The character of our army is that of a people's army, and the initial partisan warfare itself, waged by small detachments, maintained and fed by the people and sleeping in the peasants' cottages, emphasized this character very well and linked our partisans closer with the broad masses of the people. The enthusiasm of our partisans and their will to fight never abated, but on the contrary, increased from day to day, and likewise their love for the leaders. This love for the leaders and loyalty to them and their orders came from their hearts, and was expressed in a simple way because the leaders, coming from among them, were always together with them, and they saw them at every moment, for the units were small. Similarly, the discipline at the beginning was not a truly military discipline, but a discipline which resembled rather that of past times, that of the armed bands of our ancestors. The current war, of a different character, fierce and brutal, waged with sophisticated modern weapons, inevitably required from us a greater concern to cope with these ferocious enemies, and their subtle military tactics. We had to give our army, which was in the process of creation and growth, the character of a truly modern army, and around its brilliant qualities, its courage, enthusiasm, and popular character, we had to raise to a higher level the sense of iron discipline, indispensable for the progress of a real army which had to shoulder such a grave responsibility. We had to arouse in every man the sense of responsibility towards himself and towards the army commands, we had to develop the awareness that our army should pass from the stage of small armed units to the stage of a modern, regular army, and to develop in it the inexhaustible qualities which would allow the meticulous and faultless organization of all the branches of activity, which make an army invincible.

The leaders, first and foremost, had to understand their important and many-sided role, to understand that war is not waged with courage and enthusiasm alone — though without these two qualities no progress can be made — but that in order to triumph over the enemy it was necessary to use subtle tactics, and never let the enemy impose his tactics upon us. Our army had to be constantly on the offensive, to attack the enemy at any time and any place, to cut off communications and supplies, to attack the headquarters, to destroy the rear-line, and thus foil his plans. Despite the mobile character of our war, a war waged on our own soil, in the midst of our own people, who protected and loved us as an inseparable part of themselves, it was essential to strengthen discipline in our ranks, to see that the military intelligence network was strong and perfect, to raise the political and military level of our leaders, and to see that everyone, from the humblest partisan to the highest commander, should learn to make the best possible use of their weapons. In short, we had to understand the importance of the moment, to be well acquainted with the enemy confronting us, and lead our army in the direction of faultless organization, at the same time making it a political army.

The development of the war and its increasing harshness brought about the extension and growth of our army and, as a necessary result of these factors, an improved organization, and the formation of a modern army. But we are far from the desired result, and our principal task is to proceed in such a way as to give our army a genuinely modern character, not only in form, but particularly in content. And this great duty falls on all the members of our army, and especially on the leaders, of both low and high ranks. Those military and political leaders who led our army to victory, those who conquered the Italian and German officers who were endowed

with great military knowledge, should modernize and improve our army, making it a model army, equipped with all valuable qualities, worthy of carrying on in best way the struggle for the complete liberation of the Fatherland, and the defence of the people and their state power set up with so much sacrifice and bloodshed.

First of all we should protect and further raise the enthusiasm and sound morale, characteristic of our army, and this should be done through constant fighting against the occupier and through sound military and political education. Inestimable qualities are found in the ranks of our army, qualities which will serve as the unshakable base of our army and of our state power. These qualities should be brought out and enhanced, we should create and educate our cadres, and increase their numbers. If we neglect this, we shall be forced to our knees.

Our officers should be trained in modern warfare; they should be equipped with the necessary knowledge to lead a modern army. For this, it is necessary to set up courses in every unit; and special schools will be set up.

Courses should be organized to train the army in the use of modern weapons, and the most modern means of communication. Everyone should know how to use these weapons, and following this, specialized units should be formed. The structure of the detachments should be strengthened, and life in them invigorated, so that everyone understands that work and struggle is proceeding to modernize the army.

A fight should be waged against old and harmful sectarianism, against opportunism, and against the exaggerated and harmful spirit of exclusiveness on the part of the detachments; discipline should be strengthened, and become conscious, steel-like. Without a military hierarchy and such a discipline, we cannot advance, orders cannot be carried out and respected. There is no room in our

people's army for those who fail to carry out and obey the orders of the superiors.

The various sections of the detachments, from the information section to the quarter-master's section, should be organized and strengthened along modern lines. We should clearly understand that the earlier forms of organization have to be improved, modernized, and run according to the circumstances which have been created.

We should develop to the maximum love for the people, on the one hand, and hatred for the enemy and traitors, on the other. We should immortalize in our army the memory of the heroes who gave their lives for the homeland.

We should develop among the people a great love for the army, and everyone should understand that for every citizen capable of bearing arms it is a sacred duty and a matter of honour to take part in the National Liberation Army.

All these reforms, all this many-sided organizing, which will help strengthen our army, are closely linked with one another, and laxity in this direction will hold us back.

A new life and a new spirit should permeate our entire army. Our heroic army, through its triumphant war, gained the affection and admiration of the people; we must see that in every respect it occupies the deserved place, which it has earned with its own blood shed in glorious battles.

Enver Hoxha

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Works, vol. 2.

SPEECH DELIVERED ON INDEPENDENCE DAY, AND ON THE ARRIVAL OF THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN TIRANA

November 28, 1944

People of Albania,

On a memorable day such as this, in 1912, after a long period of bondage, independent Albania was born. When our country was menaced from all sides by foreign enemies, when new chains of slavery were being forged for our people, old Ismail Qemali¹ with a handful of valiant patriots hoisted the banner of freedom in Vlora, and the Albanian people paused for breath. We emerged victorious, but new cruel waves dashed over our poverty stricken people, and that banner of freedom was violated. It was misused, and became an object of barter for the satraps of past regimes; it was used to hide the shameful deeds and robbery perpetrated upon our people. But the banner of the people, the banner of Ismail Qemali, remained unsullied in the hearts of Albanian patriots; that banner was raised high, held aloft by the steel hands of the people's fighters, and passed through storms and tempests, always defiant and unbowed, the symbol of freedom and independence.

¹ Ismail Qemali (born in 1844), diplomat, politician, patriot and undaunted fighter for the freedom of Albania. On November 28, 1912 he hoisted the flag of independence in Vlora and led the first Albanian government. He was poisoned by the Italian imperialists in 1919. People's Hero.

Today, after so much heroic fighting against fascism, the red banner of Vlora, dyed with the blood of the people's heroes fallen in this anti-fascist war, flies proudly in the skies of free Albania. Five years have passed since the beginning of the cruel fascist slavery, and five times over on each November 28 the blood of the heroic sons of the people, who faced the bayonets of the occupiers and traitors, has flowed in the streets of Albanian cities. The Day of the Flag has become doubly sacred, the day of the independence and the union of the Albanian people.

On April 7, 1939, we fell into bondage, into heavy servitude, when fascism, the greatest enemy of our people and of all mankind, invaded our country. The great war was in the making, the great slaughter was being prepared by Hitler and Mussolini. We paid the first toll. The international outlook was gloomy. Europe was arming at a feverish pace, and not a single voice was raised in our defence save the cries of our people betrayed by the government of the time, crying out for weapons to fight the Italians. The betrayal was complete. The intriguing politicians, the speculators were riding high. They extended their hands to the occupiers who made common cause with them in order to suppress the people, to make them slaves, fodder for their guns. The fascists and the traitors worked systematically to quell any resistance, to smother all patriotic feeling, to trample underfoot the honour of our country, to obliterate our customs and language, and to colonize Albania, so that the Italians could strike out from our country at our neighbours and at the Soviet Union. But amidst the black terror, the great resistance was born among our people, who rose to their feet to win back the freedom which had been stolen from them. Barbarous fascism, armed to the teeth with the most modern weapons and aided by the traitors, came up against our brave fighters who had freedom in their hearts, their iron will,

and infinite self-sacrifice. The sons of the people, who felt the agonies of their homeland and who bore on their shoulders the sufferings, the hardships and the sorrows of an entire people, stood up to fight. Many of those who, in the first hours of the war, fell martyrs for this people whom they loved so much, fell with a song on their lips, happy because they knew what they were fighting for, and that with their life's blood they would raise a new Albania. This was the battle cry and the people's call to arms sounded by the vanguard; it told them that the country was threatened with death, that they must take up arms and, with merciless and unceasing war, liberate the homeland. The Albanian people heard the call of their sons; the blood flowing in the streets of towns and villages was their own blood, and so the people took up arms.

Our glorious National Liberation War began. It was an unequal war, we were unarmed, barefoot, and empty-bellied, but we were strong, for we were fighting for a great cause, fighting for the liberation of the people, to give them a happy life and to take our revenge on the enemy who sought to drown us in blood. We were a small people face to face with a huge beast; but we were strong, for in our hearts we nurtured a deep hatred for those who had invaded our homes and robbed us of our possessions. We took up arms and threw ourselves into the fight, certain of victory, because justice was on our side, and because in this war we were not alone. The whole of the progressive and anti-fascist world, united in a solid front, was at war against the same enemies, the enemies of mankind: nazism and fascism.

People of Albania,

Three years of armed struggle: glorious pages in the history of our country, written with the precious blood

of the sons and daughters of the Albanian people. Our national liberation movement grew and gathered strength in a fierce armed struggle, in a political struggle. Our enemies were strong and cunning, they resorted to terror and demagogy and exerted all their efforts to crush our resistance. The traitors to the country, Mustafa Kruja, Mehdi Frashëri, Ali Këlcyra, Mithat Frashëri, Abaz Kupa, Shefqet Vërlaci and all the other quislings used every tactic to divide our people; their demagogy was powerful, and at the beginning a section of the people was duped to some extent by these bandits, who were always the short-sighted instruments of our internal and external enemies. The "Balli Kombëtar", "Legaliteti" and all the other terrorist organizations became active weapons of the occupiers. With extraordinary ferocity, together with the Germans, they hurled themselves upon the people, killing and cutting down innocent people en masse, women, old folk and children, while they looted and raped. These murderers hurled fire and venom upon our national liberation movement, upon our army, but our movement was undamaged, because it had sound foundations; because it was a people's movement, a progressive, democratic movement. Around our National Liberation Front rallied the honest people, the working people, the people who earned their bread with their own sweat, and not with intrigues and treachery. Our National Liberation Front rallied all the democratic elements, without discrimination as to political or religious tendencies, and became the sound and proper body to carry out this difficult and sacred mission. Our National Liberation Army, which grew and gathered strength in bloody battles, was the army of the people, where the peasants, workers and intellectuals, united as one, fought for a common goal, for a free Albania, for an independent Albania, for people's democracy. After three years of heroic efforts, after so much bloodshed,

suffering and sacrifice, we emerged victorious, we smashed the German barbarians and their traitor lackeys.

In the course of these three years of war, our National Liberation Front became a reality; the national liberation councils were created as organs of the war and as the foundations of state power, and these, in turn, were strengthened and became the true democratic state power of the people. This new people's power overthrew the old power, which had been the blind tool of the occupiers and the traitors. To create the Front and the state power, thousands of sons of Albania fell, fighting selflessly, convinced of our people's happy future. Our movement, with its correct political platform, opened broad vistas to the people and showed them the road to victory. Our national liberation movement had as its goal the unification of the whole Albanian people; by shedding its blood, it tried to make the misguided understand that the road they were following was harming our homeland. The Anti-fascist National Liberation Committee and the Presidium of the Anti-fascist Council of Albania, in the call they sent out to those who still remained in the ranks of the enemy, gave still another vivid proof of the aims of our movement.

After three years of heroic efforts, after so much bloodshed, we emerged victorious. The bloodthirsty German enemy has been driven from almost all our country², the reactionary bands who committed fratricide have been smashed, and today the 28th of November is being celebrated with indescribable enthusiasm by the Albanian people, who have won their freedom with their blood. Today, to Tirana, liberated after fierce fighting

² Shkodra, town in Northwest Albania, was liberated a day later, on November 29, 1944, and this date marked the complete liberation of Albania.

from street to street and from house to house, today to the capital of free, democratic Albania, and to the midst of those heroic people who stood unflinching in the vanguard of our war, who were undaunted by the massacres perpetrated by the Germans and the traitors, which only strengthened their resolve, came the Democratic Government of Albania.

People of Albania,

Our victorious war raised high the prestige of our country, and made the name of Albania and of the Albanians honoured in the progressive world. Thanks to that struggle, we are spoken of with respect, for we stood and shall stand loyal to the great alliance of the anti-fascist bloc, and have poured out our blood in torrents beside our allies in the war to save mankind from the clutches of German nazism.

Our heroic war was closely linked with that of our great allies, the Soviet Union, Britain and America, and with the war of the enslaved nations. In our struggle we had unshaken faith in victory, for we had the great support of the Anglo-Soviet-American alliance. When the glorious Red Army, led by the great strategist of our time, Marshal Stalin, was ruthlessly crushing the Hitlerite hordes, liberating its territories and triumphantly marching towards the West for the decisive attack on Hitler's last citadel, our people's fighting strength was refreshed and multiplied, and their energy and confidence increased. The brilliant victories of the Red Army were also our victories, and the victories of the entire world, because they were the principal factor in the destruction of nazism. Thanks to these victories, the national liberation wars of the enslaved peoples grew stronger; these victories of the Red Army contributed to the arrival of this day which we are now celebrating so wonderfully.

Our nation, small but unbroken, expresses its boundless gratitude to the heroic peoples of the Soviet Union and to the glorious Red Army. In this great war, Britain and the United States did not yield to German nazism; they fought and are fighting bravely for the common cause. Their land, air and sea war, which is doing so much damage to the German war machine, is an invaluable aid for our people³. The opening of the second front and the smashing of the German resistance in France hasten the final victory.

In their National Liberation War, our people have had the support of the heroic struggle of the Yugoslav peoples. Our neighbours and brothers, from the very first days they were occupied, threw themselves into a resolute liberation struggle. Our army and that of Yugoslavia are shedding their blood side by side on the fields of Kosova and Metohia: our soldiers and the Yugoslav soldiers bind each other's wounds suffered in fierce battles against the same enemy, and our friendship is being consecrated in the mingling of their blood; our brigades, which have been ordered not to let a single German escape alive from our country, are crossing into Montenegro⁴, where together with the Yugoslav brigades, they will put an end to the German resistance in those areas. The bonds of friendship

3 Despite the attempts made by the British and US governments to sabotage our National Liberation War, the British and US armies fighting against fascism and nazism, despite the ends pursued by their governments, objectively accelerated the victory of our people.

4 Immediately after the liberation of Albania, upon decision of the CC of the CPA and on order of the Commander-in-chief, Comrade Enver Hoxha, the 5th and 6th divisions of the NLA of Albania followed the Hitlerite troops into Yugoslavia. In December 1944 and January-February 1945, the Albanian fighters, together with detachments of the NLA of Yugoslavia, liberated Montenegro, Sandjak and the southern part of Bosnia and Hercegovina.

between our people and the peoples of Yugoslavia are bonds of blood and hardships faced together. On this great festive day for our country, we send our greetings to the fraternal peoples of Yugoslavia.

We have fought and bled together with the neighbouring Greek people. We have bandaged each other's wounds in this common anti-fascist war, and it is our desire to be always on good terms with this generous people. With regret, we observe that the chauvinist and reactionary bands of Zervas⁵ are martyring the Albanian minority, robbing them of their possessions and hounding them out of their territory. Zervas elements are crossing the border on the sly to kill or wound our partisans. We will never tolerate such acts in our country. The Greek Prime Minister, Papandreou, has presented claims to annex our regions of Gjirokastra and Korça, or as it pleases him to call them, Northern Epirus. Such claims, naturally, do not make for good relations with our Southern neighbours. Our borders are indisputable, because within them there is nothing but our land, the land bequeathed to us by our forefathers, land on which our blood has been shed. No one will dare to touch them; we shall know how to defend them if they do.

Our national liberation movement has given the Greek minority in Albania equal rights with the Albanian people. The Democratic Government of Albania will guarantee the Greek minority in our country the freedom, and the democratic and national rights, for which their sons fought heroically in the national liberation brigades.

People of Albania,

Today another page is being opened in our history, a page which it is in our power to write, and which we

⁵ During the Second World War, he was a tool in the hands of British imperialism, a rabid chauvinist.

shall make as glorious as our war against the occupiers: this is the battle to reconstruct Albania, restore the economy, raise the culture and education of our people, and raise their social, economic and political level. At the critical moment, our movement undertook that gigantic and unequal war and emerged victorious because our people were united as one around the National Liberation Front. Our national liberation movement will undertake this second struggle too, and will emerge victorious, because that is the dying wish of those who fell on the field of honour, because that is the entire life of the people and their future. The German nazis and the traitors have sown disaster and sorrow in our country, entire regions have been burned, the fields have been desolated, the economy of our country has been ruined, thousands of families are without shelter and without food, schools need to be opened and the people's health must be protected. We shall accomplish all these important tasks if we strengthen our state power and bring into it those who deeply feel the sufferings of the people. Therefore, the task before us is to put everything we have into our state power to make it strong, and to mobilize all the people around it so that it can accomplish these vital tasks. We must strengthen our National Liberation Front, and this, in turn, should rally round itself the entire people, whom it should nurture with our correct policy, link closely with the state power, and make conscious of the tasks ahead of them. Here too, we must understand, as we did in the war with guns, that in order to carry out these tasks, in order to guarantee the people a happier and more prosperous life, it is vital for the entire people to become involved in this great undertaking. No honest Albanian should remain outside the Front, no energy should be wasted. On the occasion of the 28th of November, on the occasion of the Liberation of Tirana, the Presidium of the Anti-fascist National Libera-

tion Council grants a general amnesty to all the members of the "Balli Kombëtar", "Legaliteti" and other organizations which collaborated with the invader. Excluded from this amnesty are the war criminals, all those who killed, burned, raped, or looted the wealth of the people. This is an additional proof of the lofty aims of the national liberation movement, the movement which fought and will fight for the people, and which has the greatest justice as its principle.

Let the whole of Albania become a construction site, and let old and young understand that they are not working for foreigners, but working to build their own country. For the country for which we did not spare our lives, neither should we spare our sweat or toil. We must exert all our energies so that our army, the major factor in these victories, will be strengthened and become a modern army in the true sense of the word. It must be the true defender of the people and of their state power. In order to fulfil this main duty, it is necessary to make it a politically conscious army, for only thus will it be in a position to finish the war with the greatest success, and become the living defender of the interests of the people.

People of Albania,

You must gather the fruits of your heroic war yourselves, because they belong to you, and you have paid for them in blood, so that they will not be snatched from you and stolen by thieves, speculators, intriguers, and tricky politicians, by those parasites who used to live on your backs. We must close our ranks more tightly than ever, all of us must rally round the state power, round the Front, round the Democratic Government, and thus march together towards our desired objectives, the improvement of the social and economic life of our country.

Long live free democratic Albania!

Long live the Albanian people!

Long live the National Liberation Army!

Long live our great allies: Britain, the Soviet Union
and America!

Long live the brotherhood of the freedom-loving
Balkan peoples!

Long live the heroic people of Tirana!

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Works, vol. 2.

PART TWO

**NOTE TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE ALLIED
POWERS: BRITAIN, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ON BEHALF OF
THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT OF ALBANIA,
REQUESTING THE RECOGNITION OF THE
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT OF ALBANIA,
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS**

January 4, 1945

Mr. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain,
Marshal Stalin, President of the People's Commissars
of the USSR,

Mr. Roosevelt, President of the United States of
America,

On behalf of the Democratic Government of Albania
I have the honour to submit to You the following:

On April 7, 1937, when the troops of Mussolini landed
in Albania, the Albanian people met them arms in hand,
thus proving to the whole world that they did not accept
the occupation of their country by a foreign power. In a
short time they organized and launched an open war
against the fascist occupier.

In September 1942 the most distinguished Albanian
fighters gathered at the Conference of Peza where, without
discrimination as to religion, region, or ideology, they

united under the leadership of the National Liberation General Council to wage a fierce and unrelenting war against the occupier and the traitors. At that conference, the Albanian people, through the voice of their fighters, expressed their unshakable confidence in the victory of the great Anglo-Soviet-American allies, and in the victory of the freedom-loving peoples and nations.

The well-known declarations of the foreign ministers of Great Britain, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union in December 1942¹ were a great moral and political support to our people's struggle, and a promise to guarantee the freedom and independence we were to win through our struggle and efforts. The war of the great allies was a guarantee of victory for the Albanian people. . .

With faith and confidence in the great cause of the anti-fascist bloc, with faith and confidence in the sacred cause of national liberation, our people continued its ceaseless fight side by side with the great allies and other freedom-loving peoples. In this war our people became united, strong, and organized as never before.

In the struggle for freedom and democracy, the Albanian people organized their anti-fascist national army, which has been raised and moulded with the ideal of democracy, with the brotherhood of arms both with the great allies and with the neighbouring peoples fighting the same enemy.

In their war for freedom and democracy, in their war against the occupiers and traitors to the country, the Albanian people forged their national unity.

1 Through these declarations the great allied powers recognized officially the war of the Albanian people against the fascist occupiers.

The Congress of Përmet and the Berat Meeting² were the crowning of these five-years of struggle and war. They gave Albania a new state power, a democratic government, a government which is the authentic expression of the will of the whole Albanian people, and which has in its ranks the men most tested in this anti-fascist liberation war.

The Democratic Government of Albania enjoys the support of the entire Albanian people, united in the National Liberation Front.

Now that Albania is liberated, the Democratic Government of Albania is the sole representative of Albania both at home and abroad. There is no one, either inside or outside Albania, who can deny the existence of our government. Today the authority of our government extends over all regions of Albania, and over the entire Albanian people.

The Democratic Government of Albania has publicly stated its democratic principles; it has also stated that it is the only one that defends and guarantees the rights of man.

Our Government has publicly declared its allegiance to the great Anglo-Soviet-American alliance. Our army not only liberated our country, but also fought the German armies in the territories of Yugoslavia for the cause of the great alliance.

The Democratic Government of Albania — the true expression of the will of the Albanian nation and people — will continue to strengthen the great alliance of the anti-fascist bloc, as well as the relations of friendship between the Albanian people and Your great peoples.

² The 1st Anti-fascist National Liberation Congress was held in Përmet on May 24, 1944, while the 2nd Meeting of the Anti-fascist National Liberation Council was called in Berat on October 20, 1944.

Today, to ensure the final victory over fascism and the construction of our country, and tomorrow, to guarantee democracy and peace in the world, our Government will stand loyal and sincere to the cause of democracy and the independence of the peoples, and faithful to the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, and the Moscow and Teheran Conferences.

In order to maintain, consolidate, and strengthen the friendly relations which were born in the course of the common struggle against fascism, and to strengthen the collaboration between Albania and the great allies, I have the honour to express to You the desire of the Albanian people that the Democratic Government of Albania be recognized by the great Anglo-Soviet-American allies, and that diplomatic relations be established between your governments and our government.

Please accept my heartiest greetings.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Democratic Government of Albania
Colonel-General

Enver Hoxha

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Works, vol. 3.

THE YOUTH AT WAR AND AT WORK

May 5, 1945

"Youth is the hope of the Fatherland"; this would be an empty phrase used in each and every article, if we do not think deeply about this great truth, and if the people in the organs of state power, together with the youth leaders, do not give first importance in their activity to the problem of the correct and sound development of the younger generation in our country.

The problem is as delicate, as it is vital to our country, for now more than ever it is time for us to give the young plant healthy nutriment and tend it with the greatest care so that it can grow up straight and flower. People of resolute will overcome all obstacles and attain their goal, and there is no lack of good and resolute will. Our people gave proof of this in the war. During this critical period for our homeland, the anti-fascist youth above all showed themselves capable of fulfilling their mission; they broke through all the old, swept away all the rubbish which was suffocating them and would not let them breathe; thus they emerged into the light, following a titanic struggle, with great confidence in themselves, with pronounced humanitarian and altruistic sentiments, and with complete faith in the state power which they gave so much to set up. Our youth knew what life is, with its suffering, toil, misery, hopes and realizations. They broke out of the narrow vicious circle in which the fascist and pro-fascist regimes sought to confine them, and became active in all

fields of the nation's life with their youthful vigour, and with a maturity of thinking which astounded even the most optimistic. It is up to us to shoulder the great and difficult task of constantly reinforcing these sound qualities which have struck root among our youth, developing and improving them, and involving the youth as closely as possible with the life of the entire people. Our youth should be an iron link in the revolution which our people made; they should be the fresh and healthy blood which will be the driving force towards the new life in the new Albania.

During this war our youth felt profoundly the urgent need for sound unity among all the youth, to accomplish so heavy a task as the war against the occupiers. Besides this, they understood at once that this undertaking, on which the fate of their country depended, required them to sacrifice their petty personal interest to the great general interest; they went even further: for their long-suffering people whom they loved so much and wanted to see happy, they worked, fought, and laid down their lives.

During this war our youth understood very well that their happy future and the improvement of their personal life, from both the moral and the material points of view, was closely connected with the spirit of collectivity in their country. They understood that without the participation of the entire people in the war against the occupiers, freedom could not have been won. They understood also that without the raising of the economic, cultural, and political level of the entire people, there would never be a genuine improvement in their personal lives. In such a case, a great wall would separate them from collectivity, a wall which they would never allow to be erected again because, to knock down this centuries-old wall, they had shed too much blood.

As a result of so much effort, as a natural result of this anti-fascist war, the democratic power, of the people and for the people, was set up, the power which makes the aspirations, feelings, and hopes of the entire working people a reality, the power which will realize, one after another, all the needs of the people. The youth who have been one of the main factors in attaining these results, have unshakable faith in the people's state power, because it is their own power.

The youth, therefore, have a great role to play in this second stage of the struggle to reconstruct the country and raise the living standard of our people. Their role is as great in this stage as it was in the time of the war against fascism. Just as there were young heroes in the war, there will be young heroes of labour and the reconstruction. In this new stage the youth are armed with great experience of life and the war, and in every field of activity for the development of the country they should be pioneers in this great work, pioneers with sound judgement and iron will. This reminds me of an experience in the war. It happened in a forest in the mountains of Mokra. After a tiring march, a young former pupil of mine, who had given up school to take up arms, said to me: "Comrade Enver, when I studied Albanian geography at school, I was bored to death, but if I get out of this war alive, I will learn it eagerly, and teach it to others, for I feel an astonishing change has occurred in me. What seemed as dry as dust to me at school, has now come to life. I know our mountains and plains like the back of my hand ; I have crossed its rivers and streams in winter and summer, with the heavy load of my partisan weapons, and the heavy tasks the people have charged us with. Now I know our villages, and I have fought to defend them; it was as if part of my body was burning, when I saw a burning

peasant hut, where I had found a brother's and sister's welcome at the most critical time. Now I know our peasant well; I love him as a brother and as a comrade, because I have seen for myself how generous he is, despite his poverty, and how noble and courageous. At first the peasant would listen with some disbelief to me, the young boy from the city, who kept aloof from him and looked down on him when he came to town; but as he saw how I fought and realized why I was fighting, as he saw my comrades falling for an ideal which was his too, he received me with open arms, and embraced me; now we have become inseparable, and are fighting together for a happy future. We will never lay down our weapons, till we reach this goal." This was what that former pupil of mine, who later fell fighting courageously at Shëmbërdhenj bridge, said to me in the Mokra forests; he fell like a hero to accomplish the task the people had entrusted him with; he fell a martyr to his lofty ideals. That young pupil and great fighter fell, but hundreds of thousands more young people, rallying around the Anti-fascist Youth Union, are following in his footsteps with the same drive and in the same spirit, with the same feelings and ideals which inspired the heroes of the anti-fascist youth who shed their blood for freedom.

I saw our heroic youth at their great 2nd Congress held in Tirana, and I was elated! The eyes of our youth reflected their great energy, their eagerness to work and make new sacrifices, their thirst for a sound education and progress; their eyes reflected their steel-like will, as it was with QEMAL STAFA and MISTO MAME at the peak of their efforts. With such youth our people will certainly achieve progress and prosperity. The state power will see to it that our youth lack nothing which will uplift and strengthen them, educate them and train

them for work. Our state power knows that without a healthy, well-educated youth, it would be short-lived; the youth too have understood that it is only with such a state power that they can live and progress. Therefore, the state power and the youth are closely and inseparably bound together. The state power has opened every door to the youth, and they should be the mainstay of every undertaking. Very well educated with the new principles, and organized according to new and most appropriate methods, our youth should be everywhere, in the state power organs, in the Front, in the trade unions, the cooperatives, in the plains and the mountains, in factories and workshops, where they will pour out their mental and physical energies with exemplary discipline, and their great constructive qualities will emerge increased ten-fold. The present democratic state power will be more interested in educating the youth than even a parent could be in educating his own children. On the other hand, this education will no longer be the privilege of a few wealthy exploiters who believed that they alone were born to master science, and of course, used it to oppress others. Education will be made available to all, especially to the children of the long-suffering working people, who will place their knowledge and science at the service of the people, and not use it for their own base ambitions. There is still a mistaken attitude, especially among some old people who tend to disapprove of the participation of the youth in all spheres of social activity, and consider the education of the youth very narrowly, still viewing it in the light of past regimes. The dream of these people is that their sons or daughters, who have been through the fire of this war, should not pursue their own aspirations and inclinations, but follow the road laid down by their parents. They consider it a misfortune if their son

stays in the army, where there will be splendid military schools and academies; they are distressed if he goes to an agricultural or vocational school, or takes a course in livestock breeding. According to them, their son should go to a gymnasium or lyceum, to learn the classics and to graduate for medicine or law, otherwise his future will be ruined. One day a mother said to me, "Please release my son from the army, for he needs two more years before he graduates from the lyceum". Her son is an army captain, a post of great responsibility. I had to convince his mother, who acted only out of love for her son, that the state is as interested in her son as she is, and that in the army her son, either as a captain or as a private, will be fully able to study and sit examinations just like the others. The same holds true for many youths working in various branches of the state power. But the young people who emerged from this war think differently from many of their parents. They know that no one will miss out an education, and that their future is guaranteed by their state power, for the strengthening of which they should engage in many-sided activities. They know that our people need not only lawyers or doctors, but also good peasants, qualified workers, capable administrators, engineers, agronomists, and staunch soldiers to defend the rights we have won with our blood. They also know the great drive for progress which has swept over our country, they know that our heroic army needs capable officers who must add a high level of culture to their heroism and courage. Our anti-fascist youth have understood all this well.

At the 2nd Congress¹ it was clear that the youth fully comprehended these tasks and have enthusiastically set

¹ The 2nd Congress of Anti-fascist Youth of Albania was held in April 1945.

about carrying them out in life. This is a sound guarantee for our prosperous future, and a great victory for our people.

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Works, vol. 3.

SPEECH ON THE OPENING OF THE PARTY SCHOOL

May 25, 1945

Dear comrade functionaries and leaders of the Party,

No doubt you understand the great importance of the Party School which we are opening today. Our cadres, who during the war knew how to fight heroically and work selflessly, will emerge from this school armed with Marxist-Leninist culture, to light their way in solving problems and carrying out the great tasks confronting them in this new stage. The stage is new, but the tasks are just as important, even more important than those of the stage of the war against fascism.

Our young Party, with its young cadres, with cadres as yet inexperienced, took on a task which was as difficult as it was majestic. During three and a half years of war, at the head of the people, in the front line of battle, our Party did its duty honourably and gloriously, accomplishing the tasks the people had entrusted it with, and the tasks the Comintern had laid down. Our Party mobilized the people and launched them into a general uprising, organized the army, and steeled it in fierce battles against the occupier; it established the democratic state power and won the war, and now it is in the positions of command. This is not a lucky miracle, but the result of the hard work and bloodshed of the party comrades. It was their great revolutionary drive, their incon-

tainable enthusiasm, their great love for the people and hatred of fascism, it was their great faith in the Party, their great and unshakable faith in the Soviet Union and our great Comrade Stalin, that made our communists raise our Party's banner high. Our Party emerged triumphant, because it never lost its bearings. At every moment our compass was the Soviet Union, it was the Bolshevik Party of Lenin, it was Stalin. We followed in their unerring footsteps which took us to victory.

Our party members went through a great school, the school of the war; they learned many things, but we cannot say, and we would be greatly mistaken if we did say, that they are in a position to cope properly with the important work they will be doing. Our comrades, in general, lack the important weapons which, together with an invincible will, enthusiasm and steel-like discipline, will make them advance; I mean that they lack Marxist-Leninist knowledge. Therefore, the aim of this school is to arm the party comrades with this powerful weapon.

You should be well aware of one thing: it is not enough for the Party to hold the reins of power; it must know how to keep them and consolidate its hold so as to advance for the maximum fulfilment of our program. We cannot fulfil this program and make our ideals a reality through bluff, through arbitrary decisions, through superficial Marxist culture, or through amateurish work. If the party members imagine for a moment that the complicated problems which they will meet can be solved in rough and ready fashion, in a way which might "à la rigueur"* have been appropriate in time of war, if the party members imagine that, in order to conceal their ignorance, laziness, and lack of discipline, they can solve problems, incorrectly, of course, by abusing the prestige

*"à la rigueur" (Fr. in the original) — hardly.

and authority of the Party — if we think and work in this manner, we will not be able to hold the commanding positions we have won. And in this case, we would be committing a grave crime against the Party and the people.

The comrades should understand well the importance of the moment and their great responsibilities. Today we are guiding a nation, we are guiding a state; our Party has taken the destiny of the country in its hands. No one is allowed to make concessions, neglect the work, or be satisfied with the little he knows, and thus stop learning. Those who act like this are not communists of the new type; they harm the Party. No one is allowed to violate the iron discipline of the Party, without which we cannot forge ahead, to sacrifice the task he has been entrusted with, and leave it unaccomplished in order to pursue his own comfort and pleasure. The communist of the new type feels rested and relaxed only when he has done the work he has been charged with even better than was expected. The party member should be in the forefront everywhere, in every field of activity; he should lead the masses in every respect, he should stand out, above all, for his will power, knowledge, determination, patience, modesty, and justice. Every party member should realize at every moment that his correct and untiring work strengthens the Party, enhances its prestige, and arouses the people's admiration for it. There should be no party member who thinks otherwise, because he would not deserve to stay in the party ranks.

Comrades, this school is being opened at a favourable moment for us, judging from both the internal and the external circumstances. Nazi Germany has been vanquished, the Soviet Union is at the height of its power and glory, and in many countries, especially here and in Yugoslavia, the Communist Party is in command. However, we should never for a single minute forget that inter-

national reaction has not been conquered, but on the contrary, is endeavouring to regain its position and to restore the pro-fascist cliques to power, to our detriment. Therefore, we should be more wide awake than ever, always on the attack to eliminate every fascist remnant and exerting all our energies in the work and struggle to reconstruct the country. And, if we are to do this, we must make our Party stronger than ever, we must educate and steel our cadres. We should always be wide awake in our internal and foreign policy, and never for a single minute turn our eyes away from the experience of the great Soviet Union, and our beloved comrade Stalin; as Dimitrov says, we should "learn and fight — fight and learn. We should know how to integrate the great lessons of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin with *Stalinist consistency* at work and in struggle, with *the principle of Stalinist irreconcilability* with the class enemy and the renegades to the Bolshevik line, with *Stalinist fearlessness in the face of difficulties*, and with *Stalinist revolutionary realism*."^{*}

Dear comrades, I have nothing else to say but to wish you, on behalf of the Political Bureau and Central Committee of the Party, success in your work, and advise you to pay the greatest attention during the courses so that you profit as much as possible, in your own interest and in the great interest of our beloved Party.

Long live our Communist Party!

Long live the heroic Bolshevik Party of the USSR!

Long live our beloved comrade Stalin!

Works, vol. 3.

* See G. Dimitrov, "On Cadres", published by "Zëri i Popullit", "Bashkimi" Press, Tirana, 1945, p. 24 (Albanian ed.).

REPORT TO THE 4th PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPA

October 17, 1945

Comrades,

At this broad session of the Plenum of the CC of the Party, many problems face us, the most important of them being the problem of the Party in all sectors of its work: the state power, the army, the Front, etc., and the question of elections to the Constituent Assembly. In accordance with the agenda, we will discuss and decide upon the convening of the 2nd Party Conference¹. At this meeting, we will not put forward a new political or organizational line, but by listening to the comrades of the Bureau, and all the other comrades, we will try to get a clear view of the situation in which we live and work, to get an exact idea of the strength of our Party and its whole development during the war. This will help us to define the new method of work required to solve correctly the problems facing us in this situation, which is different from that of the war period.

At every meeting, and especially at the sessions of the higher organs of the Party, it has become a custom to put at the top of the agenda the item: "The external and internal political situation". This is a commendable practice if it is interpreted correctly and does not degenerate

¹ After the discussions, the Plenum decided to call the 1st Congress of the CPA, and not the 2nd Party Conference.

into the enumeration of simple chronological facts; but if we are in a position to define the external and internal situation on the basis of these chronological facts, and to draw correct political conclusions from them, then we will be able to orientate our work correctly, determine our political stands, and facilitate the solution of complicated problems. The party member who does not see the development of events clearly and does not make the necessary deductions, will never be able to implement the party line correctly.

How does the external and internal situation appear to us in this new post-war stage?

We would be very mistaken to think like the average man who took part in the war, and now believes that everything is fine. Things are not so simple now in peace time, any more than they were simple in war time. We fought fiercely to win the war against fascism, but now we must fight and work with determination to defend and consolidate the peace.

We threw ourselves into a great war to annihilate fascism, the most ferocious enemy of democracy, but at the same time, we also fought for a happier life, for a sounder and more progressive democracy than that which existed in Western Europe before the war. The people took to arms not only to regain the freedoms the fascists had robbed them of, but also to shake off the yoke the imperialists and reactionary cliques had imposed on them under the guise of democracy. For this reason the war was not a simple matter, because in the allied anti-fascist camp there were states which had put all their forces into the struggle to defend their genuine freedom and democracy and that of the other enslaved nations, but there were also states which interpreted and waged their war against fascism in a different way. In the anti-fascist bloc, the Soviet Union was the standard-bearer of the liberation

war; it bore the greatest burden of this war on its shoulders, it was the backbone of the anti-fascist alliance, the inspirer, encourager and defender of the enslaved nations, and the major factor in the defeat of nazi Germany. Britain and America went to war against fascism after they saw their existence threatened by Germany, but their fight never assumed the character of a total war; on the contrary, they did not make great efforts to hasten the end of the war; they held back their forces to defend and consolidate their imperialist positions, and did not throw all of them into the war; they tried to slow down the struggle of the enslaved nations, and strove to strengthen the position of reaction throughout Europe in order to have its support in the present period of peace. The development of events during the war made all the facts I have mentioned above apparent, but despite all these contradictions and diverging views which existed between the Soviet Union and the Western allies on the anti-fascist war, nazi Germany and the British and US imperialist cliques did not succeed in splitting the great alliance of the anti-fascist bloc, for the sole reason that the Soviet Union, through its correct policy and heroic war, foiled all the manoeuvres of fascism and reaction.

So the tasks facing the communists, and the stand they should take were clear, just as the Soviet Union's stand was clear. The communists in all the enslaved countries had to rouse their people to a general uprising and merciless war against fascism and its lackeys. Through their open war against the occupiers and against their efforts to split the bloc, they had to defend and strengthen the alliance of the Soviet Union with Britain and America. At the same time, they had to consolidate the position of democracy, strengthen the position of the people and seize the reins of power and of government.

All the contradictions and divergencies in the anti-fascist bloc: different concepts of democracy, efforts to repeat the past, to strengthen the position of the reaction and to deprive the people of their power, became more evident after the defeat of Germany, and are deepening daily in the present period. So, in this stage of preparatory work for peace, matters are not so simple or easily solved. We must defend the peace at all costs, this is the concern of the Soviet Union, and should be our concern too. Just as we always orientated ourselves towards the Soviet Union over the whole period of the war, and achieved victory, now too we must look to the Soviet Union, closely observe its international stand, march along its Leninist-Stalinist path, back up its efforts and defend its interests, for only in this way will we defend the interests of our country.

What is happening in post-war Europe, what are the positions and aims of the Anglo-Americans and of the Soviet Union in the international arena, and how do the interests of peace present themselves?

On the eve of Germany's defeat we noted a phenomenon which ought not to have surprised us: while the fighting continued on the Eastern Front and at the gates of Berlin with the greatest ferocity, the Western Front had totally disintegrated, the German resistance was insignificant, and the Anglo-American armies were pressing in on Germany. On all the other fronts where the Soviet Army or people's resistance armies were fighting, the fascists fought hard. We should be clear about this. The Anglo-Americans are trying to save as much as they can of the remnants of fascism; they are trying to strengthen the position of the reactionaries, to regroup and reorganize them in order to use them as a barrier against the establishment and triumph of genuine democracy. The great

«exode»* of all the fascist war criminals and quislings found asylum and support in the bosom of the Anglo-American army in their occupation zones. Besides this, wherever reaction is in a strong position, the British and Americans, the former directly and the latter indirectly, violating every democratic principle with the greatest brutality, are intervening militarily to suppress progressive movements, bring the reactionaries to power, and strengthen the positions of reaction and fascism. This is happening in Greece. Thus on the eve of Germany's defeat and its unconditional surrender, we see the first open offensive of the reactionaries to consolidate their positions at all costs, of course, to the extent that this fleeting moment allows, until they encounter the powerful resistance of the Soviet Union, and the resistance movements of all the enslaved nations in general.

Thus, under cover of the anti-fascist alliance and the common victory, international reaction, headed by Britain and America, is waging a "sournoise"*** and provocative war against the Soviet Union and all the people's democracies which have emerged from this liberation struggle. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and all the other countries where people's democracy has been established, as well as all the progressive nations of the world, whose guiding principle is the preservation and strengthening of the peace, and the consolidation on a sound basis of the alliance concluded in this war, are striving for the triumph of democracy in Europe, for the elimination of fascism and its remnants, and the preparation of a just and lasting peace.

Of course it was not easy for Britain and America, at the beginning of the post-war period, to embark on an

* "Exode" (Fr. in the original)

** "Sournoise" (Fr. in the original) — sly.

open campaign against the Soviet Union, but this campaign of slanders and denigration is gradually taking form and becoming sharper. Despite the divergencies between the Anglo-Americans and the Soviets, the Yalta² and Berlin Conferences were successfully concluded; but the recent London Conference ended inconclusively. Besides the innumerable difficulties which they raised there, the Anglo-Americans wanted to impose their will in the drafting of the different peace treaties, thus violating the decisions taken by the Big Three in Berlin. This was the first step towards open disagreement, not only on questions of principle. The world reactionary press launched a savage campaign against the Soviet Union, and the camouflaged fascists resorted to their usual threats and shameless provocations in their press organs.

The Anglo-Americans and world reaction are trying to bring within their grasp all the peoples who, through their struggle, succeeded in seizing state power during the war. The efforts of the reaction in this direction take first place. In many countries of Europe the fierce struggle of the people against the occupiers and their tools not only dealt a hard blow at the local reactionary cliques, but also gravely compromised the positions of Britain and America. During the war sympathy and friendship for the Soviet Union were awakened and grew strong. International reaction is now fiercely fighting to change this situation. The foreign policy of all the states of Europe which were

² The Yalta Conference (Crimea-USSR) of the heads of governments of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, with the participation of the ministers of foreign affairs and chiefs of staffs, was held from the 4th to the 11th of February 1945. After drawing up the plans for the final destruction of Hitlerite Germany, the Conference laid down the principles of the allied policy for achieving lasting peace and organizing a system of international security.

previously occupied by nazi Germany, especially those of Eastern and South-eastern Europe, is orientated towards the Soviet Union, which defends them and supports their efforts to strengthen democracy. In Poland and Yugoslavia the reaction tried to resurrect and bring the old reactionary cliques back to power, but it failed. The Yalta Conference solved the question of what governments these two countries would have. But this does not mean that reaction laid down its arms. The offensive of reaction against Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Albania is exceptionally broad, especially now on the occasion of the electoral campaigns, which will be decisive.

International reaction is restoring and strengthening the shaky or seriously weakened positions of the reaction in each country. The organization of the reaction in various European countries is taking concrete form. The Soviet Union and all the other progressive nations and governments are opposing the rise and strengthening of the reaction. But in this fierce struggle for the triumph of democracy, the main concern of the Soviet Union and the other progressive governments is to defend the peace. We take the same stand towards the Anglo-Americans. They do not look favourably upon our government and people's democracy, but struggle against them. Up to now they have no intention of recognizing us, and in our opinion, recognition will not come easily or quickly. All our just demands in the international field have remained unanswered, or have received a negative reply. They bring accusations against our government, just as they do against those of Yugoslavia, Poland, etc. But, of course, this struggle has its variations, depending on the importance they attribute to each country, and the position it occupies. The reactionary press has not yet unleashed an open campaign against us as it has done against other countries, but this does not mean that this will not happen. On the

occasion of the elections an all-out offensive will be mounted against us.

The thing is that we must know how to manoeuvre so as to give the foreign and internal reaction as few weapons as possible to fight us with. This calls for a policy which is flexible without slipping into opportunism, a policy aimed at strengthening our internal and external positions. Our stand and tactics will be determined in the discussions to be held here, after considering the situation concretely, and analysing the work we have done. The strengthening of our international position depends on consolidating our internal position which, in turn, hinges on our intensive and correct activity, and the correct implementation of the party line.

In such an international situation, without saying that the interests of peace have been jeopardized, we can say that they are very difficult to defend. We must exert all our efforts to defend and strengthen the interests of genuine people's democracy and guard against provocations which have occurred and will occur in the future, both from Greece and from the Anglo-Americans. The Soviet Union shows particular concern for us. Apart from the great moral support it gives us in the international arena, it is also giving us material and cultural assistance. The doors of the Soviet Union are open to us; our officers have been admitted to Soviet military schools; the first contingent of our university students will soon be sent. Seeing our difficulties in the economic field, the Soviet government acceded to our request and sold us 20,000 tons of wheat, and deliveries have begun; we have also concluded a trade agreement. We have friendly relations with Yugoslavia and other Balkan states, such as Bulgaria and Rumania, and with Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Bulgarian, Rumanian and Polish governments have proposed recognition of our government.

This is a general outline of the external situation, and our international position, as I have said, will be further strengthened as our internal position becomes stronger.

How does the internal situation appear and where does our strength lie? Since the time of the liberation of Albania, our internal situation has become much stronger. In our country, as everywhere else, the reaction was armed by fascism, and they fought us together. Although our internal reaction had only weak links with international reaction, and especially with British and American reaction, still it enjoyed their direct and indirect support. However, internal reaction has been dealt a heavy blow both militarily and politically. Its chiefs either went into exile or were captured and tried. The opinions of those comrades who claimed that we had completely eradicated the reaction were without foundation. Even after the liberation of Albania we had to carry out an operation in the North to suppress the aggressive armed resistance of the reactionary chieftains and bairaktars who had remained inside the country³. We cannot say that our reaction has been rooted out; despite the blows it had been dealt, sooner or later, under more favourable conditions, it will act and organize. Over the first period after liberation, the reaction had its claws blunted and lay dormant. Faced with our strength and our lightning actions, the remnants of the reaction lay low. Their activity consisted in spreading rumours against the government, the state power and the army. The attitude of the Anglo-American allies towards our government and their intervention in Greece boosted their courage. They began to extend their activity and intended to attack the institutions which were

3 This refers to the suppression of the armed resistance and the annihilation of the bands organized by the clan chiefs and the other war criminals who were fugitives within the country.

strongest and posed the greatest danger to them. They openly tried to organize desertions from the army. But we may say that all the attempts of the remnants of the reaction to arm themselves and organize in fairly broad units, and to carry out open actions have failed. Our forces have pursued such chiefs and bairaktars as Muharrem Bajraktari, Fiqri Dine, Gjon Marku and others, not giving them a chance to organize and arm themselves. It is true that they have succeeded in eluding our forces, and this should deeply concern us, but it is also a fact that their freedom of movement has been greatly restricted. Naturally, these elements are a headache to us, because in many Northern regions our work has been and still is inadequate. Sometimes their slogans catch on, and there are still people who maintain a wait-and-see attitude. Only if we do intensive political work and our state organs directly concern themselves with finding a concrete solution to their problems, will these people be closely linked with our state power. The strength of the reaction does not lie only in its armed bands; we also see it displayed in various forms among other elements who, supported by external reaction, are preparing the resistance against our democratic state power. This process of the regrouping of the reaction is not a simple development. It would be a great mistake for us, who direct the policy of the Front and state, to let bygones be bygones, and take an idealistic view of our internal situation and of our state power.

We must look at the situation realistically, and maintain close contacts with the masses, for otherwise we will be deeply disillusioned, and the reaction will gain ground. The international situation and the unfriendly attitude adopted by the Anglo-American allies towards our government and state power favour the consolidation of the reactionary and dissatisfied elements, the Catholic clergy,

confused intellectuals who previously were either on the side of the enemy or did not commit themselves, the strata of the big merchants who have been hit by the emergency taxation on profits⁴, the internal speculators, and the strata of beys and agas who have been affected by the Law On Land Reform. If we do not act correctly and do not properly implement the line of the Front, we may be sure that around these elements will rally all those uncommitted people who are not involved in politics, and who are unable to see through the manoeuvres of the reaction and understand our efforts in this difficult situation. People of this category are quickly influenced by every reactionary slogan and stand by us only if we keep continuous contact with them. All the strata I have mentioned should be carefully considered, not from the administrative viewpoint, but in order to work with them. It is not easy to work with them. It is not easy to work with the Catholic clergy. The clergy is influential in Shkodra and the surrounding region, and this influence cannot be eliminated merely by administrative measures. The Catholic clergy is a well-organized body, with strong traditions and close links with external reaction and the Vatican. Therefore we should confront its organization with our better organization, confront its policy with our correct political line, and oblige it to fight on our ground, and not on its own, or with the slogans it wants to use. We must find the correct method of struggle and appropriate tactics to use against individual elements of the clergy. There were moments when the Catholic clergy was openly at war

4 In January 1945 the Presidium of the Anti-fascist National Liberation Council issued the Law On Emergency Taxation of War Profits, which was levied on all merchants and industrialists who, during the time of fascist occupation, had realized profits over 500,000 Albanian franks. The taxes were progressive from 15-80 per cent of the amount over 500,000 franks.

with us, even with armed force. We replied by attacking it. But the Catholic clergy is not so naive as to insist on open struggle against our people's power at a time when its own position is weak and threatened, and the international situation is not in its favour. As our enemy, the clergy knows how to act politically, not for the good of the people, but to strengthen its own position. It would be political immaturity on our part if we did not know how to exploit circumstances and situations. We must be intelligent in our policy towards the Catholic clergy. We should never lose our sense of proportion and go from one extreme to the other, a mistake which comrades often make. The manoeuvre of the Catholic clergy will be the focal point of all the schemes of reaction, of the fugitive chiefs in the mountains, of the dissatisfied and the confused. This is where our political maturity will be demonstrated. We should know how to adapt the political line of the Front to different situations and places, to break up the concentration of the reaction, and to gain a strong position for ourselves. The strata of wealthy merchants, and the rich beys and agas, directly affected by the just laws of the state, are increasing the ranks of the dissatisfied. The rich merchants put up organized resistance in the first days of the tax collection, but had to pay up because of the measures taken by the state power. That does not mean that they were won over and became the readiest of tax-payers. On the contrary, they tried to avoid paying the remainder of their tax.

The description of the internal situation would not be complete if we did not show how strong we are, where our strengths and our shortcomings lie. We will emphasize this later on, when we speak about the Front and the state power. Here let me say that, confronted by these opposition forces, which should not be underestimated, we have

reached the situation existing at present on the eve of the general elections. With regard to the elections, we must work hard, and in order to win, we should know the political line of the Front well and apply it properly. To apply the line of the Front does not mean only to organize a meeting, but to implement it in practice, in various circumstances and with different categories of people, whose mentality, frame of mind, and aims should be studied attentively. To implement the political line well in practice means to understand well what the state power is and how it works, to know the laws well, to be the first to respect and apply them properly, to understand and implement the policy of the government in every field of activity, and to be in close contact with the masses of the people. We should base our propaganda and agitation on a sound foundation and make them understandable to the people, that is, we should base them on the various achievements of the state power in which the people, politically educated and enlightened, have taken an active part. It is only in this way that the Front becomes a reality, a mass organization which defends and supports the state power. This is precisely where the enemies are directing their attacks, against the state power, the Front and the army. There is no need to go into detail in this report about the manoeuvres of international reaction at this time of the elections. Its principal line of attack is the charge that our government is a communist government, and therefore there is no democracy here, only the dictatorship of one party, i.e. of the Communist Party, and as a consequence, free elections are not being held. Relying on these false accusations, the Anglo-Americans are trying in a thousand ways to sabotage the elections, or to intervene directly. Naturally this tactic of international reaction has become the tactic of our internal reaction.

Gjergj Kokoshi's words at the last meeting of the Council⁵ expose the whole program of the reaction. In Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Rumania, foreign reaction, in collaboration with local reaction, is very active, while here the reaction has just begun its work. We must not dream that, because conditions are different here, the reaction cannot act here as it has elsewhere. It is true that situations always vary, but the tactics of the reaction also vary. The first warning of the offensive of the Anglo-Americans against us on the occasion of the elections was given by Tajar Zavalani⁶, although in a somewhat veiled manner. They are flying "ballons d'essai"* such as the rumours that "Zog has gone to Cairo", that "an Albanian government is being formed abroad", etc. General Hodgson⁷ wrote me his first letter and asked if we would leave all the British officers free to control the election campaign on voting day⁸. This is only the beginning, without doubt there is more to come,

5 At the 5th sitting of the 3rd meeting of the Anti-fascist National Liberation Council (September 1945), Gjergj Kokoshi, the mouthpiece of the reactionary forces within the Democratic Front, opposed the Law on the Elections to the Constituent Assembly, labelling it as anti-democratic. As came out later, he and a group of traitorous deputies, with a certain Shefqet Beja at their head, had set up a reactionary organization, which was nipped in the bud by the organs of People's Defence.

6 Speaker of the Albanian section of the BBC, a pseudo-democratic bourgeois intellectual who had placed himself at the service of British imperialism.

*"Ballons d'essai" (Fr. in the original) — test balloons.

7 General D.P.E. Hodgson came to Albania in March 1945 in his capacity of head of the British military mission.

8 The US government also made such a demand. It consented to recognize the Democratic Government of Albania, provided the liaison officers of the US military mission in Tirana were allowed to supervise the election campaign, and all agreements the USA had entered with the Zog's regime were recognized, which had been clearly repudiated by the Congress of Përmet. The CPA turned down these demands.

on the other hand Gjergj Kokoshi, who had the courage to express the point of view of reaction, is certainly on the move. He is striving to extend his influence, naturally among the strata of the dissatisfied intellectuals and the bourgeoisie, among the strata of the capitalists and merchants. Without doubt Gjergj Kokoshi and his associate Mirash Ivanaj⁹, who has just returned from emigration, allegedly known as opponents of the Catholic clergy, will try to direct this reactionary force in Shkodra against us. There are still no signs of a party being formed within or outside the Front, although rumours are being spread here and there about efforts to create parties. But in any case they are carrying out a campaign to encourage abstention from voting using the propaganda arguments I have already mentioned, saying, "There is no freedom here", etc. Gjergj Kokoshi resigned from the Front, but the question remains: did Gjergj Kokoshi not have his supporters in the Front? We should have no illusions that all the non-party nationalists in the Front are one hundred per cent on our side. There are some who are very close to us and have linked their fate with our Party, there are the waverers who, given good sound work on our part, will always stand by us, but there are also others who do not think the same way we do, and who will be our opponents tomorrow. These people do not feel strong enough to come out openly against the Front, and up to now no serious attempt to form a group or a party within the Front has been apparent. Most of those people will remain in the Front until the elections are over, in order to have themselves elected to the Assembly under the banner of the Front. They will certainly form a group or a party, an

⁹ Former minister of education and later on, in the period of Zog's regime, chairman of the State Council. He left Albania in April 1939 to return in October 1945. He was engaged in hostile activity in the service of British and US imperialism.

opposition within the Assembly. There seem to have been disagreements on this point between Gjergj Kokoshi and the other wavering and hostile elements which are still in the Front, i.e. they disagreed on tactics. As the electoral campaign develops, it will become clearer what tactics¹⁰ the reaction is resorting to in order to undermine the state power and sabotage the elections. Faced with this situation, our Party should mobilize all its forces, and the Democratic Front should become a reality. We have many times laid down the political line of the Front, so I will not repeat it.

To work in the Front, which is the duty of every communist, means to work with the people, to go beyond the bounds of your duties in the state organs or the army, to carry out the special work of the Party, the work which is most crucial — the education of the masses. Unfortunately some party members have viewed this in a very narrow way. Let us start from the political work with the masses of the people. Work in the Front has been interpreted like this: go and make a speech every fifteen days, and you have completed the task the Party has charged you with. This is only small part of the work, but unfortunately even this small part is not carried with the seriousness with which communists should work. The lower the political level of the comrades who hold meetings, the less they prepare themselves. They think the public is obliged to listen to the blather they prepared only half an hour before. This has had the result that no one wants to

10 The hostile tactics of internal reaction towards the people's power to sabotage the elections surfaced in two forms. Part of those in the Front, in order to make a sensation, stepped out of the Front demonstratively on the eve of elections, while the rest, under the guise of the Front, was aiming to be elected to the Assembly and undermine the power from within, through a group, a "legal" opposition, or a separate party.

attend meetings, and we should not seek the cause in the passivity of the masses, but in the ignorance, negligence, and underestimation of the masses by the speaker, and if he is a party member, the mistake is inexcusable. But how can we prepare a good speech? I am convinced that many comrades have not yet understood this, for otherwise, they would find it simple, and the meetings would be more interesting. Speeches are not prepared by piecing together newspaper articles or other people's reports. I can understand this if a speech of a scientific nature is being prepared, but if it is a question of agitation and propaganda among the masses of the people, as most of our meetings are (unfortunately we have done nothing about scientific meetings), the speaker will find the themes of his speech, the thoughts he will expound to his audience, only in the life of the people, and not in newspapers and magazines. But this source of knowledge, from which he will learn how to become a good agitator, is neglected, he does not live with the people, he does not know their problems or their complaints; he is up in the clouds and his speech harps on the same phrases. But the masses of the people are not satisfied with words alone. The masses will be pleased to listen to a good speech, but the things that are said there, they want to see realized in practice, they want concrete results. This is a characteristic of the masses. The strength of our Party lies in its deeds. Here I am not trying to tell you how to prepare a speech, but to point out what half-hearted methods we use to educate the people. Party members are often heard to say: "I have no time, I am up to my neck in office work, I can't go there, I can't do that". I say categorically on this point that in ninety per cent of cases this is not true. All of us, from me down to the rank-and-file party member, if we revise our sense of duty towards our work, will see that we can find time. It is impossible that a party member

should have no time to do the job the Party charges him with on top of his official duties; but even if he has no time, he must find it; he can take it out of his sleep. That is the sort of people we should be. I have good reason to emphasize this. This is a serious weakness which we should fight because it harms us, and is the source of all political laxity and mistakes. I understand and respect the party member who is up to his neck in work and on his own, but who never fails to carry out his special party work. But this does not happen with everyone. With such a mentality and such a spirit we cannot make progress. On the pretext that they are very busy, comrades shirk their duty, or worse still, what they do they do not do properly. If you ask such-and-such a political secretary of a regional committee, he will answer, "I've got a lot of work to do", but at the same time many unpleasant things of an anti-Party nature occur in the organization he leads, and he sees them, just as all the people see them; a general secretary of a ministry says that he is snowed under with work, but when asked to explain something, either he is not in a position to tell you anything, or produces false and unverified statistics. This is point one. Point two: our comrades do not make efforts to learn and raise their level; in general they are marking time. The people working in the state organs, and in the first place our comrades, do not know and do not try to learn the laws of the state. Astonishing things happen, which it would take days to list. A subprefecture, allegedly because it is self-governing through the people's council, accepts neither the directives of the region nor those of the centre, but becomes an "independent republic"; in another region, subprefectures spring up like mushrooms only to disappear in three months' time. One collects taxes in this way, the other in another way, one respects the law, the other completely violates it and cancels all taxes, because he

considers this "reasonable" in his region. Such things are not unusual. But there are even more critical cases where the state power is not respected and government orders are disregarded. The centre may send twenty telegrams to a region without any reply. Why does this happen? It happens because some comrades have still not understood what the state power is, what centralism is, how the Party leads the state power, and what their responsibilities to the Party and the state power are. And, above all, a dangerous mentality is beginning to appear which should be swiftly combatted: once admitted to the Party, the communist becomes conceited. He becomes authoritarian, works less than others, and considers that he is untouchable and can do anything he likes. I am saying these things so that we may think deeply about them and eliminate such faults, because if we do not improve, the Front will be weak and the state power likewise. The Front is not something detached from practical reality. The political line of the Front becomes a concrete reality in the work of the state power, in the achievements of the state power. If we do not properly understand the political line of the Front, it will be difficult for us to properly understand the policy of the government in all the fields of activity, and vice-versa. The policy of the Front and the policy of the government are two things that go together. We have said that we should broaden the Front, convince the dissatisfied, and activate the entire people. We have not done this in the proper way, or to the correct extent; sectarianism and hackneyed methods exist in our work, people persist in obsolete methods which may have been appropriate two years ago, but do not keep pace with time and the development of events. We forget that now questions can no longer be solved with partisan methods; we forget that the method of work should change, not only in form, but also in essence; we forget that the peo-

ple now demand many things, the things we have promised them; they have begun demanding in a year things which they have never had in hundreds of years ; the most remote village wants a school, and it wants electric power, for there is a stream close by. We fought and liberated the country, and this is a great achievement for us. This is our strongest recommendation, but it is not enough ; now we must work hard in the correct way, for otherwise our laurels will wither. Apart from the important questions of the Front, the Party has been confronted with a host of problems. The important problem of the state power, and the implementation of government policy in the various fields of social and economic activity have been dominant throughout this period after liberation, and always remain on the agenda. Everything will be solved in the best way when our Party is strong, and we can see improvement in it from day to day.

I will deal in general outline with the question of the state power and the policy of the government.

With the state power we will be able to solve all our problems, and this is where our strength lies. We should know how to perfect the state power and make the best use of it. Our Party leads the state, and it is self-evident that the stronger the Party the stronger the state power. Before we go deeply into the question, the comrades should understand one thing: our Party leads the state power through its people whom it has everywhere in the key positions of command. All the decisions are worked out in the Party and implemented by the organs of the state power. The party members transmit these decisions of the Party to the state power. It depends on the party members how these decisions are presented to the people in the state power, to those in the Front. From this it becomes apparent how well we have understood the party line, and how we are implementing it in the Front and in the organs of the

state power. Besides this, the party member should be conscious that the Party is there, wherever he is working, and that he is responsible to the Party and to the state power simultaneously, to his superiors in the state power, whoever they are, whether party members or not. The ability of a party member is recognized and evaluated in the work he does in the position the Party has appointed him to. That is where it is seen how capable he is, how disciplined and how loyal to the Party. Misunderstanding this question leads to such mistakes as: failure to respect the authority and the hierarchy in the state power, breach of the law and failure to fulfil tasks ; and hence sectarianism, both in the Front and in the state power organs. These shortcomings exist among our comrades, and for this reason our state power is not as strong as it should be, and mistakes are made.

In the first place, the bases of the state power in the village, the people's councils, are still weak, because they are not elected according to sound criteria, and still do not properly understand their role in the village. These councils, especially in the North, are not given the necessary help by our comrades.

In form, the state power in the North appears to be more or less the way we want it to be; but in practice work carries on in the old way, that is to say, the subprefecture councils show very little, if any, interest in the work. Laws and regulations hardly reach them. Likewise, the press, agitators and propagandists very seldom go to them. This weakness of the grass-roots councils inevitably causes shortcomings in the district and subprefecture councils. Some regional councils are not in a position to properly guide the whole region, all the councils of the sub-prefectures. There are no strong contacts between them, and the work is not co-ordinated. Our comrades are young, they lack experience and foresight,

and they are not very good organizers. They often take a narrow and rigid view of things, get tied up with trifling matters and forget major questions. The comrades do not make serious efforts to learn and to raise their ideological level; many of them do not know the laws, or know them only superficially. They do not study the local problems with the due seriousness, and the centre receives very few suggestions or proposals from them. In general, they are not abreast of the situation, because their contacts with the centre are purely formal, and thus the plan of work in their region is not well co-ordinated with the general plan of the government. They often slip into the position of one section of the people, through a wrong interpretation of the spirit of the law, and create baseless and unnecessary administrative divisions; they view issues and problems in a parochial spirit without considering problems as a whole. All these shortcomings make the state power weak in some centres. On account of this the people are not properly mobilized around the organs of their state power, and this prevents them from becoming the most important support for these organs, especially at this moment when the economic and financial situation is not at all prosperous. This leads to bureaucracy, lack of responsibility and work being left undone. Our comrades have not understood the importance of the state power, the importance of organization, the importance of leadership. There is a process developing, which may turn to our disadvantage if we go on dreaming ; the state power could slip from our hands, if we are not skilful. A sectarian spirit exists in many cadres of the state power. Many people, who have had scientific training but are not communists, are not made good use of. They are engineers, doctors, agronomists and technicians of various kinds, without whom the state machine cannot function. It often happens that the organs of the state power are filled with communist com-

rades who are incompetent and incapable and who, in order to conceal their incompetence, treat these cadres badly. Such a situation cannot be tolerated. The communist should be in the place he deserves, he should show himself more capable than the others in deeds and not in words, for words are only wind. Without correcting these mistakes we cannot have a strong state power, because the state power is not something infallible, ideal, and beyond reproach, but is a reality which improves with the improvement of work. Nevertheless, we have achieved many things through this state power, which I will not analyse here one by one; I will only put forward in broad outline some major problems of the government and its policy in the most important state sectors. The state organs will apply this government policy in the various, complicated and difficult circumstances which face us, and the whole Party should be mobilized to solve these problems, a task which will be properly carried out when the Party is in the lead, and when the state power is strong.

It is not the first time that the Party, and when I say the Party, I imply the government too, has defined its policy for the different sectors of state activity. This policy has been defined through the various laws approved by the Anti-fascist Council which have been worked out in advance in the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party. During this period, the government has also laid down the program of work for the various sectors, a program that has been carried out with the good results and shortcomings which we have often spoken about.

At the Berat Plenum¹¹, decisions were taken in broad outlines on the urgent measures dictated by the situation,

¹¹ This refers to the 2nd Plenum of the CC of the CPA called in Berat on November 23, 1944 (See note page 480).

but later, under the new circumstances created with the complete liberation of Albania, these decisions were better defined. We now have more experience in solving problems, and we are in a position to define our economic and social policy better and more clearly.

What are the major problems which we should devote our attention to solving? In our opinion, the main problems are: the question of the economy, agriculture, education, finance, reconstruction, and the army, but this does not mean that other government questions cannot also be discussed here.

The economic question is the most important for us, but it is also the most difficult, so I shall try to give a general outline of the situation and lay down our economic policy. Our economy is at a very low level, it is seriously damaged. Various sectors, such as industry, the mines, and home and foreign trade are either very weak or completely paralysed. Our country was devastated and ruined by the war, and its production is low, which creates a critical situation. The war is the main reason for this situation, and then come other factors: lack of tools, transport, capital, and foreign markets, the international situation with regard to our state power, etc.

What must we do to improve our economic situation? First, we must increase production and improve our product, rebuild the small-scale industry that existed in our country prior to the war, strengthen the state sector: especially the oil wells, the Selenica bitumen mines, and then the other sectors, and we should enliven both local and foreign trade¹². Our state cannot be strengthened and the situation of our country improved unless

¹² The first measure adopted in foreign trade was the establishment of state control over it, later on it became a state monopoly.

we correctly tackle the question of economic reconstruction. The process of large-scale reproduction and of the industrialization of the country is closely linked with the form of our state power. In this process of development, the state sector should be constantly strengthened. In the first stage of reconstruction we should rebuild all that was destroyed by war in the economic field, and reach the prewar level within a short time. To achieve this, the small merchants and industrialists should begin work again under new conditions, obtaining, under our control, a certain profit, but being barred from speculative activity. Yugoslavia has supplied us with materials, on the basis of an agreement under which we repay Yugoslavia with the equivalent value in our products. We must meet these commitments. We have signed a trade agreement with the USSR to buy 20,000 tons of wheat and a small quantity of chemicals. Repayment of their total value is due at the end of 1946, either in other goods which we have available, or in foreign currency. If we do not improve the economic sector, our obligations to our people and to the states, with which we have entered trade agreements, will cause us to become politically dependent. We should never forget this; we have had a bitter past. Apart from the Soviets towards whom we must act very correctly from every point of view, the Anglo-American allies do not help us because they like the colour of our eyes¹³. We know their aims.

Before the war, our state, despite its backwardness and the measures taken by Zog's regime, still managed

13 The US and British imperialists planned to exploit the grave economic situation for their specific aims, and hurried to offer their "aid" to Albania. The CPA rejected this enslaving "aid" and chose the road of building the country relying, first of all, on the internal efforts and the fraternal aid by the Soviet Union and the states of people's democracy.

to export something abroad. Of course, export is connected with the development of the different sectors of production: agriculture, livestock farming, the fishing, timber, and other industries. The war has done great damage to these sectors, but with better organization and through activating all the capital in the country, we can achieve satisfactory results. We have made the large state sectors operational, but they are at a rudimentary stage of development. Our country's main income comes from the output of the mines which will help us strengthen the other sectors as well. Oil is our main resource, and interests everybody. Of course, in this vital sector we will rely on the help of the Soviet Union, but we will consider the interest of our country first. Preliminary talks have been conducted, and the Soviets have agreed to send some specialists to study the question on the spot, to see what assistance they can give us and what equipment is needed for the maximum exploitation of the Kuçova and Patos oil fields.

The question of agriculture is also very important and very complex. Our agriculture is extremely backward, our peasants are very poor and their farming methods and tools are antiquated. With the changing situation of the peasantry as a result of the land reform, the nature of their work and production should also change. We should produce as much as possible, leaving no inch of land unsown, encouraging the peasants to cultivate other necessary crops which they did not previously grow, either because of ignorance or because of the difficult conditions of their existence. That will be our policy in this field. It is imperative for us to work systematically. The question of agriculture, the land reform, and the problems stemming from them should be considered broadly. Concrete assistance should be given to all sectors of agriculture as regards seeds, tools, and draft

animals, in the field of livestock farming and the setting up of small factories to process livestock products, and also to forestry and the timber industry. For this purpose it appears necessary to set up an agricultural bank to assist agriculture, and not to skin it, as was the case in former times. This bank is being set up, but we should see to it that the credits advanced to the peasants really go towards developing agriculture. We must do large-scale educational work with the peasants so that these credits will be used correctly. A good policy in this field will be one of the main factors in raising the economic level of the country. If we increase the production of wheat and maize, as well as other crops, we shall reduce the quantity of grain which we have to import from abroad, and this will enable us to import other things to help develop other sectors and increase their production. Apart from this, the improvement of livestock will enable us to export wool and to establish an industry in our country. At present, hides are in great demand everywhere. Our timber industry has been very backward. We imported a great quantity of timber from abroad, whereas now we can set up a local wood-processing and paper industry to meet at least the needs of the country. Apart from the heavy burden which falls on the state, we can quite easily mobilize private capital, too, especially in the sector of livestock and related industrial products.

The land reform¹⁴ was one of our greatest reforms which will certainly boost our agriculture. But, first of

14 The Law on Land Reform, which gave the land to the tiller and prohibited its sale, purchase, and renting, was issued in August 1945. In the beginning, as a result of Sejfulla Malëshova's opportunist stand towards the former exploiting classes, the law had some errors. After the measures adopted at the 5th Plenum of the CC, the errors were corrected, and in November 1946 the reform was concluded with success.

all, we should work to implement the land reform well and as quickly as possible. Closely connected with the land reform is the question of land settlement and land improvement schemes. Will we be able to achieve this under the present circumstances? It will be difficult to do it properly, but this does not mean that we should not begin. According to available statistics and the first results achieved after the division of large estates, at present we do not anticipate that we will have much land to populate, and settlement will be limited until the large-scale land improvement schemes have begun. We must at least ensure a minimum of work tools for the peasants' families which we transfer to these newly reclaimed lands. We must see to it that the families of martyrs, soldiers, and poor peasants are the first to be settled on the expropriated land. Owing to budget problems and technical difficulties, the land improvement schemes cannot yet be carried out on a large scale. But the masses of the people have begun with great determination to dig drainage and irrigation canals. This activity should be further encouraged and assisted.

The financial question is also a great problem which should concern all of us. Expenditure — and everyone should know this — is far greater than our normal income. If we add to this the emergency taxation, then we manage with much difficulty to balance the budget. As you know, more than half of our budget comes from emergency taxation. The rest of the income comes from various taxes. It is self-evident that with trade paralysed, industry in ruins, agriculture weak, the people impoverished, and almost all direct taxation abolished, the income from taxation is small. This situation, of course, hampers various projects from being realized. Many regions complain because credits allotted to them in the budget are not forthcoming, but they do not think about where these

credits are to come from. Many regions have totally neglected the collection of taxes, and maintain themselves only with the funds allocated by the centre. Some regions, without giving any serious thought to financial problems, even break the law, asking to be allowed not to collect taxes at all, for in this way they would make a good impression on the people. We all know that it makes a good impression if we ask for nothing from the people, but if no one pays or does not pay the set amount, how can the work be done? How will we cope with this fiscal year? In the first place, by economizing, and when we say economizing, we should not think that we must pay thousands of civil servants who do not work, and abandon our projects. We can economize by clearing out the parasites from our offices, as well as by activating the people to do voluntary work for their own good and that of the society. People must be given to understand that the situation is difficult. Then, above all, we must save state money, use it properly, and duly check up on it. We are lagging far behind in this, and we must take a turn for the better, otherwise we will find ourselves facing bankruptcy. The foreign goods which we bring in and sell allow us to meet the needs arising from delays in collecting taxes, but we must not forget that these sums will always remain on the debit side of the state budget. With the circulation of the new currency, the question of a new deflation also arises. While we are discussing money matters, I want to emphasize that the party comrades who work in the organs of the state power and, especially, those who are in the offices concerned with the distribution of goods, both at the centre and in the regions, should be rigorous on financial matters and keep their accounts in good order. This is no small matter. Millions are involved, and I say this because there have been abuses in different sectors, even in the army and by some people who con-

sider themselves party members. Such things will be dealt with mercilessly, whether they are done wittingly or unwittingly. The party member should have a good head on his shoulders, and a clear conscience.

Let us look briefly at the *question of reconstruction* and of what we should do in this sector. All of us know how things stood. The government plan was to give urgent priority to normalizing communications, roads, bridges, and transport. We achieved great success in building bridges. Why? In my opinion we succeeded because the work was carried out conscientiously, and those responsible for this sector themselves stood in the front-line of the work. In addition, a great deal of material was found by our people and bought by the state organs. These factors contributed to the success in this sector. Almost all the power stations are now operational, but they are very out of date. After rebuilding the bridges and repairing the roads more or less adequately, the most pressing problem is that of housing, many people have lost their homes as a result of the war. Can we do much in this direction on a long term basis? At present it is difficult. We are unable to build new mass-product houses in the various villages burnt down and ruined by the war. But we must try to see that all our people have somewhere to lay their heads. Therefore we must do everything within our means to help private or collective initiatives for the provision of huts or temporary housing for this winter. On the other hand, in this sector we should work out projects and plans for rebuilding the burnt out villages or ruined towns, so as to start their reconstruction as soon as circumstances permit. But this important question, like the electric reticulation of the country, requires more favourable conditions than those we live in at the moment. The sector of transport is very weak. Take for example the question of vehicles. All of us know

that we face difficulties which may become even worse. No one will supply vehicles, because they are needed everywhere. All of us keep saying that we should economize and maintain them carefully, but nothing is done about it. Those who drive vehicles for the state enterprises take little care of them. Those who have none criticize loud and long, but when a vehicle is handed over to them, they belt it along until they wreck it. This is not a laughing matter. Those motor vehicles we inherited were obsolete, but it is a fact that we have misused and continue to misuse them. As in any other field of activity, especially in the field of transport, the party people should without fail put things in order. On those five trucks we have, depend the people's bread, the transport of salt and kerosene, the functioning of industrial enterprises, public works and the exploitation of the mines. If we attach due importance to this major problem, then we should think in earnest about it. There is no other solution. The prospects are not bright. This is the reality of the situation.

The question of education should become the concern of the entire Party. What should be the educational policy of our Party and state? Everyone should be educated. We must fight illiteracy and make elementary schooling compulsory for all, we must try to provide the younger generation with a sound general education, channel the largest and most dependable section of the youth into the branches of agriculture and industry, train reliable cadres as teachers, and increase their numbers. We must do away with the attitude that "even without education and culture we can do everything". We are now acutely aware of what it means to have a shortage of trained people to direct the work, to have no engineers, technicians, agronomists, and others. What will happen later if we do not begin to take the necessary measures now, and if we do not follow a sound and broad educa-

tional policy? We shall begin with what we have. We have to devote special importance to the elementary school teachers, for they have the new generation in their hands. With a correct policy towards them, we can be successful with them; it should not be forgotten that the majority of them are the sons and daughters of the people, they are poor, and close to us, close to the people, with whom they live. The teacher means everything to the villagers. But this does not mean that we should not also adopt a correct stand towards the secondary school teachers, though many among them are indifferent or still remain aloof from our state power. The demands to open schools are great and exceed our possibilities. Every village wants a school. The budget does not permit this, and technically we are not in a position to do it. Nevertheless, we should open a number of schools, and try to train young teachers in pedagogical courses which we should set up. In time these young teachers will improve and expand their knowledge. It will be difficult to draw up the school programs for this year. We are in the process of studying the programs of the Soviet secondary schools, but it will be a long time before we have translated and studied them, and then decided on a program suitable for our schools. For the time being, we are compelled to work according to the old programs, paying attention to the way history, education, psychology, and moral education are taught, because in these subjects teachers with the old mentality could easily confuse the youth, and head them not in the way we want them to go, but in the opposite direction. The opening of boarding schools, which is essential, also presents great difficulties because of the economic conditions of the country and, in particular, the lack of the material base. We have decided to open four boarding schools which will mainly admit the sons of peasants and workers, children of martyrs and

fighters, and children from poor families. In addition we are trying to send some students to study at universities abroad. Here too we are handicapped by financial worries and financial relations with other countries. We have asked friendly countries to admit our students on bursaries.

The question of the army is, of course, important, and we should discuss it. In such an international situation, with everything so unstable, we should maintain a strong standing army. We have an effective army of... strong. As you see, this army is very large for our country. It is impossible to maintain an army of such numbers for long. By maintaining an army of such a size on a long term basis, not only might we harm ourselves economically, but we could also impede the strengthening and modernization of the army itself, because we have a great shortage of army officers to educate these large masses of rank-and-file soldiers. Therefore, we are faced with the task of reorganizing the army from the point of view of the rank-and-file and cadres, and with the related task of drawing up the basis for recruitment, and for what army personnel is needed in peace time. Now we have just begun to regulate the question of recruitment, which must be done before we can proceed with demobilization and the next intake. Until we have organized the recruitment and prepared the list of personnel needed in peace time, as well as the troop effective, reserves and weapons required, we think that the existing divisions should be amalgamated into a smaller number. Of the troops left over, some of them are to be demobilized and incorporated into the reserves, while another section can be transferred to the Defence¹⁵ detachments to complete their

15 Defence detachments which had the task of destroying the bands of war criminals and diversionists.

effective force. The soldiers of the Defence detachments and those of the police will receive pay. The situation later on will show whether or not we should reduce the size of our army. The territorial organizations of our army are still quite weak, and our cadres, despite the numerous difficulties they encounter, have not yet accumulated the necessary experience of organization and responsibility. This is why we find ourselves facing a difficult situation, as for example in providing barracks and clothing for the army. In this direction things are bad, to say the least of it. Our soldiers still sleep in the open, or we are obliged to adopt measures which are not suited to the present time. The problem of clothing for the army should be solved locally, and the soldiers should always be supplied with clothing and footwear. We must not imagine that their enthusiasm will last for ever, if we do not know how to nurture it and keep it alive. The party comrades should exert all their energies and pay great attention to this question, for many things depend on it. We must work hard to improve the political and educational level of the young cadres. We are lagging behind in this. Without trained officers, we cannot have a modern regular army. Of the old partisans, some have become officers, some have entered the state service, and others will be demobilized, because they cannot be kept in the army all their life. They will pass into the reserve army. In this way, our army will be renewed with the new age-group whom we must educate in a new way, instilling love for the army in them, and training them properly. This will be done when we have good, well-trained cadres and officers, or otherwise our army will be like Zog's army, in which ignorance reigned. We note with satisfaction that the officers emerging from the war, whom we have sent to the Soviet Union to study, are keen to learn and are making good progress. So we have a generation of offi-

cers who promise a fine future for our army. We should also work to improve training in our country, by improving the existing schools, the various courses, and the entire method of education in the army. This education should not be superficial, but thorough.

In this internal and external situation, with this state power and this program of work, the Party faces the great test of the impending elections for the Constituent Assembly, to determine the form of the regime and of the Founding Constitution of the state. The elections are not a simple operation, and in them the strength of the Party, its leading role, will become evident, and the ability of every party member will be evident. The values of the Party will be put to a test in this election campaign, and this great test will serve as a guide in the distribution of the party cards¹⁶. The work for the elections does not consist solely in holding some meetings. Success in the elections will be ensured through carrying out the work program, constructing roads and houses, making a fair distribution of maize, wheat, salt and kerosene; success will be ensured through the proper implementation of the Election Law, the strengthening of the state power, and the participation of all the people in the voting. The people should see concretely that those who liberated the country from the occupiers and traitors are able to govern, are able to reconstruct the country and to improve its economic and social life. The comrades should come out of the election campaign with great experience, it should be a school for them, and should arm them to solve other great problems which we shall face.

Works, vol. 3.

16 This refers to party membership cards, distribution of which began in 1946, after a general revision in the Party.

**GREETING TO
THE 1st CONGRESS OF TRADE UNIONS**

October 31, 1945

Comrades,

Delegates of the Trade Unions of Albania,

My comrades and I are deeply moved and rejoice at the great love you show for your government, which sees in you the mainstay of the people's power.

I have followed with the greatest attention the proceedings of your Congress and have observed that, as everyone, you are living up to the challenging times the Albanian people are living through.

Today, as in the difficult times of the war, you are showing yourselves to be outstanding leaders and organizers, just as you proved to be brave and heroic in the bloodiest battles.

Among you, more than anyone else, the feelings of sacrifice, selflessness and safeguarding the people's common interests are uppermost. Together with you, who are endowed with such qualities, we scored successes, defeated the enemy occupiers, and established a new regime, the people's regime, the regime of those who work, your regime. Through great sacrifices, you coped with the situation, left your wives at home, and your children short of food, because you could not endure the enemy. You took up arms and went off to the mountains; the war of resistance was organized around you, and it was from

your ranks that the organizers and leaders of the great victory emerged.

Today, in the struggle to defend the democracy established with so much bloodshed, and to reconstruct our dear homeland, to improve the people's social, economic and cultural conditions, you are again in the frontline, you are the vanguard.

Comrades!

Who knows better than you that life is a struggle, and a harsh struggle too. The Albanian workers with hand and brain, who for hundreds of years laboured in slavery and misery, know better than anyone else how dear is freedom, how dear is democracy. For them you shed your blood, and for them you are fighting now, day by day, and your struggle is becoming more conscious, for you have realized that your daily, systematic work will uplift the conditions of our people and improve it in every respect.

We know how much our people have suffered, and we know that a great number of you here have many troubles, and that the economic position of many families is not what it should be; some are even short of food. This everyone knows, but faced with these hardships, we have thrown in all our energies to wipe them out, and wipe them out we shall. Certain people talk a lot and weep crocodile tears about your miserable situation. But who are these people, and why do they do this? They have never gone short of food, their cupboards have always been full of provisions, and still are, they have plenty of money in their pockets, but they do this to break up the sound unity of the Front, and to be able to fish more easily in troubled waters. There are others, too, whose hearts bleed for "democracy"! They claim that there is no democracy and freedom here. Who are those

people? They are the rotten hangers-on of the regime of Zog, and of other regimes. They are the very ones who bound and gagged us, and put the noose around our neck; they are precisely the ones who hate democracy.

For such people and for their deeds, no, there is no freedom, but there is freedom for the honest man, for him with feelings for the people, for Albania. With these people we are dealing not in words, but in deeds, and it is with deeds that we shall defeat all those trying to harm us, trying to undermine the foundations of our regime. We are sure that we will achieve this, because all the honest working people, who have raised high the banner of democracy, are united around our state power. Therefore, comrades, tighten your ranks in your organization, and strengthen your unity around your Party and in the Democratic Front. I am firmly convinced that through sacrifices, which are inevitable, and through toil, we shall achieve happy days: we know this, therefore we accept the sacrifices, and shall march forward.

Long live the workers of hand and brain of Albania!

First published in the newspaper "Bashkimi", N° 261, November 6, 1945

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WE DEMAND THE EXTRADITION OF THE WAR CRIMINALS

(Article published in the newspaper "Bashkimi")

December 23, 1945

After such a fierce war against the fascists and their agents, an astonishing thing is happening. Those directly responsible for so many vile crimes which history will remember, the war criminals, are being protected. The fascist dictatorship of Mussolini first arose on Italian soil, where it was established with terror and bloodshed, and organized the hordes of the black shirts and the Italian Royal Army that savagely attacked our country; this Italian soil continues to be the cradle of fascism and a danger to world peace and the security of our country. The Albanian people have not forgotten the source of the attacks which caused them so much suffering and misery, and they see with concern that many things in Italy go on as they did in the past. The Italian war criminals, who tortured our people, stroll in the streets, live a comfortable life in their mansions, or hold high offices in the Italian state apparatus. Still others, whom the Albanian Government has claimed from the allies as the chief agents to the occupation of Albania, are being given ludicrous sentences in some Italian mock courts.

Such acts we denounce before the progressive and anti-fascist world. The Albanian people will regard it as a great injustice, and will always remain on the alert,

until the Italian and German war criminals, whom they have demanded, are handed over to the Albanian courts.

Certain naive Italians fancy that, since we once extended a hand to the defeated Italian soldiers following the capitulation of Italy, we have forgotten what we suffered at the hands of Italian imperialism; they imagine that this gesture will serve as a springboard for the Italian imperialists to recommence their infamous activities; they imagine that, if they bleat out the notorious slogan: "Mussolini alone is responsible for all that has happened", we will close our eyes to the scheming of the Italian reaction, which regards our democracy as a thorn in its flesh. We may reach an understanding and cooperate with the Italian working people. In the course of the war, we showed good will towards those few Italian soldiers of the "Gramsci" battalion, etc., who united in arms with us and fought against Nazi Germany. The Italian working people should be made aware of their great obligations towards our people, and not merely acknowledge these obligations, but begin a merciless fight against the Italian and Albanian war criminals who are sitting pretty in their midst, and see to it that the past is not repeated.

This is the way to sincere cooperation. Our people ask in amazement and indignation: Why are the Albanian war criminals not handed over to us? Why is it that those individuals who collaborated with the Italians and Germans to the last, and who are responsible for so many atrocities in our country, walk freely in the streets of Italian cities, receive salaries and favours? The answer should be given us by the allies with whom we fought against the common enemy, because these criminals are in their hands.

It is clear to everyone, and there is evidence and facts to prove, that Lumo Skëndo, Ali Këlcyra, Abaz Kupi, Xhafer Deva, Mehdi Frashëri, Gjon Marka Gjoni, Kolë

Bibë Mirakaj, and all their bands are war criminals, responsible for collaboration and massacres. Why, then, is the solemn decision of the allies to hand over the war criminals to the respective countries not put into effect?

Those who guided the Germans in their operations against the National Liberation Army, who organized the propaganda against the allies through leaflets and radio, those whom the BBC denounced as traitors who had sold themselves body and soul to the Italian and German occupiers, who rejected our appeals and the call of the allies to desert the ranks of the occupiers, are today free in Italian cities, and vent their hatred against those who shed their blood for the freedom of the people

The blood shed on the field of honour by the sons of Albania, and by the best sons of the allied countries, cannot permit the war criminals to be granted such treatment. The martyrs of the National Liberation War, and the entire Albanian people, demand the justice for which they fought and died. The war criminals whom we have demanded should be handed over to us, to account for their crimes before the people. This is the most elementary right, sealed with the blood of the progressive peoples in the anti-fascist war for liberation.

First published in the newspaper "Bashkimi", N° 305, December 23, 1945

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SPEECH TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ON THE PRESENTATION OF THE RESIGNATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

January 11, 1946

Members of the Constituent Assembly,

On October 22, 1944, in Berat, the Anti-fascist National Liberation Council of Albania entrusted me with the great honour of heading the first Democratic Government of Albania, which had the attributes of a provisional government.

Responsible to the people for the accomplishment of the heavy tasks assigned to it, and loyal to the decisions adopted by the Anti-fascist National Liberation Council of Albania, the Government acted in the most democratic way for the election of the Constituent Assembly¹ of the Albanian people.

Today I consider it my duty to present to this sovereign Assembly, which represents the will of our entire people, the resignation of the Government I have the honour of leading.

I am confident that the Democratic Government of Albania has carried out with honour, loyalty, and success

¹ The December 2, 1945 elections were democratic, secret, free, equal, and direct. Despite the manoeuvring of the British and US imperialists, and the efforts of internal reaction, 90 per cent of the voters went to the polls, and 93 per cent of them voted for the candidates of the Democratic Front.

the tasks which were laid down before it. Under its direction, the heroic war of our people against the occupiers was continued with the utmost intensity, and our beloved country was liberated. Under its leadership the people's power was consolidated, and order and tranquility were established. The deplorable economic conditions of our country which had emerged from a devastating war were improved, part of what the enemy had destroyed was reconstructed, major social and economic reforms were implemented for the benefit of the labouring people, public education was restored and improved, and our heroic army, the invincible defender of the people's interests, and of Albania's independence and sovereignty, was strengthened, and its modernization begun.

Through its just and wise policy, the Democratic Government of Albania ensured for our people the sound and sincere friendship of the democratic peoples, their allies and friends, and consolidated the international position of Albania by gaining recognition from many powerful and progressive European states. The Democratic Government of Albania works successfully to make our small country an important factor for fraternity and peace in the Balkans and Europe.

We pledged to our people that we would carry out the duty with which you charged us at the most critical moment. It is now up to you to judge our actions and adopt the necessary decisions in the interest of the homeland.

Along with the presentation of the resignation of the Government², I have the great honour to thank the Anti-fascist Council of Albania, all state functionaries and the

² At the proposal made by a group of deputies and after its unanimous approval by the Constituent Assembly, comrade Enver Hoxha was charged to form the 1st Government of the People's Republic of Albania.

entire Albanian people for the great aid they have rendered to the Government in the exercise of its functions, and we pledge to our people that we shall remain their invincible soldiers, loyal to the death to their sacred cause.

Long live the Albanian people!

First published in the newspaper "Bashkimi", N° 320, January 12, 1946

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INTERVIEW WITH JOURNALISTS IN THE CAPITAL

January 26, 1946

QUESTION: *Could you tell us something to explain to the world about the arrests mentioned in the communique of the Defence Directorate published in the newspaper "Bashkimi" on January 24, 1946?*¹

ANSWER: For a long time the organs of Defence have had under close observation the fascist and pro-fascist activity of some institutions and individuals who, in conjunction with one another, attempted to organize the struggle against the state power, with a program of actions aimed against the people's power, and attempts on the lives of its leaders. These remnants of fascism, pinning their hopes on foreign intervention, are enemies of the people and the progressive democracy of our country. Working in disguise and in great secrecy, they imagined that they could realize their treacherous plans and escape the observant eye and the justice of the people. Their activity, down to the minutest detail, is known to the state power. The open and underhand inspirers of these activities are clearly known; the leaders of these traitorous organizations and of these terrorist activities are in the hands of justice.

QUESTION: *Could you tell us, on the basis of the documents in the hands of the state power, what was*

¹ The communique referring to the arrests in various towns in Albania of a number of spies, saboteurs, terrorists in the service of the British and US imperialists.

the aim of these elements, and how they tried to achieve it?

ANSWER: The aim of these elements was to overthrow the people's power and to restore to power the old exploiting and anti-popular regimes. To this end they had managed to organize several groups, prominent in which were big merchants, speculators, former officers of Zog, pseudo-intellectuals and pseudo-democrats, feudal land-owners and their administrators, all of them people of the likes of Xhelal Staravecka and Ali Këlcyra and company. Their activity was to begin with assassinations of the state leaders, such as General Myslim Peza and many others. They had even appointed the assassins. These assassinations were aimed not only at physically liquidating these personalities, but also, and even more important, at splitting the unity of the Democratic Front by making out that these assassinations had been carried out by the communists.

These elements tried to organize armed bands of common criminals to carry out various actions, such as cutting roads and tearing down telegraph poles, aiming to reach the stage of an uprising. To this end they had established contacts with war criminals. Their main hope and support was armed foreign intervention. The Greek fascists were one of their sources of support; and to ensure this they entered into close collaboration with them and recognized their claims to South Albania.

QUESTION: *Could you tell us if there is a link between these individuals and elements of the Catholic clergy arrested some weeks ago in Shkodra, who were involved in fascist activity through their fascist organization "Bashkimi Shqiptar"², and if their aims coincided?*

² "Bashkimi Shqiptar" ("The Albanian Union"), traitorous organization set up under the direction of the reactionary Catholic clergy in Shkodra after the liberation of the country, acting on

ANSWER: Yes, there is a close link between these fascist terrorist groups and those of the Catholic clergy of the "Bashkimi Shqiptar" organization. This link is clear, in the first place, from their common aims, but there were also organizational links between them. The elements of the Catholic clergy involved in the Shkodra events, under the mask of religion, had made their seminaries the centre of a fascist organization, which, in league with non-clerical elements and war criminals, was carrying on organized activity against the people's power. The Catholic clergy and their acolytes were caught red-handed with documents in their hands, and in their seminary material was seized which served them in their work; this work consisted of preparing for an armed uprising, the overthrow of the people's power, and the assassination of members of the Front.

QUESTION : *Do you think that the activity of these elements has arisen simply out of the situation following the liberation of Albania, or that it is a continuation of their great treason towards the Albanian people during the occupation?*

ANSWER: Undoubtedly, the situation arising in our country after the liberation of Albania has to some extent influenced these elements to attempt to regroup their defeated forces in order to recommence the struggle against this situation, which is developing in the people's favour. But these elements belong to the category of those who were on the other side of the barricade when the people were fighting against the occupiers and the traitors. These people have a dark record, and the facts we possess show

direct instructions from the Vatican and the British and US imperialists. This organization aimed at the armed overthrow of the new democratic people's order in Albania. When discovered, its heads were arrested and condemned by the people's tribunal in 1946.

that their activity is nothing but a continuation of their great betrayal of our people during the occupation. The interests of these elements, and of the strata they represent, have been and are in open opposition to the interests of the people. They consider the fact that the people are in power to be fatal for them, and about this they are quite right. For this reason, they aided the occupiers during the National Liberation War, and today are attempting to regroup their forces. The big landowners, the fascist and anti-popular clergymen, the servants of the obscurantist regime of Zog, the big speculative merchants, used to living off the sweat of the working people, could not reconcile themselves to this regime, which brought the people to power, gave them the reins of command and made them masters of their own property and labour. It cannot be considered accidental that elements of the Catholic clergy, especially those from the higher circles, came out openly against the people and their power. Such elements employed religion as a mask to fight the people. The agents of the OVRA³ and the Gestapo, such as Father Anton Harapi, Rev. Lazër Shantoja, Rev. Ndre Zadeja, and others, will remain the most typical figures of clergymen who sold out their homeland. Top people in the Catholic hierarchy in Albania, even to the present day, justify their collaboration with the enemy by saying: "We would have participated in a national alliance, had we not been disorientated by the clouds of various ideologies which were in direct opposition to our conscience and our religious principles".

The "ideological clouds" which hindered these gentlemen from participating in a national alliance were the

3 OVRA (Opera Volontaria Repressione Antifascismo) — secret terrorist police organization of Italian fascism in the struggle against the anti-fascist movement.

dazzling forces of the people which saved the homeland from slavery. But they were able to reconcile their "conscience" and "their religious principles" to collaboration with Italian fascism and with the German Gestapo to become their agents and the hangmen of the people.

Certain pseudo-democrats, like Gjergj Kokoshi and Suat Asllani, who inspired and collaborated with these fascist groups, imagined that they could easily profit from this new situation to recommence the work of a Mithat Frashëri or Ali Këlcyra. Such enemies of the people and negative elements played the part of spectators before the great tragedy of the people, or hypocritically tried to add lustre to their reputation with the blood and sacrifices of others. These individuals, in collaboration with these fascist-terrorist groups, presented to the allies a memorandum, through which they attempted to mislead them about the real situation in Albania. The people and their power had held out their hand to these people, but they sharpened their knives to stab us in the back.

The demagogy of these fascist and pro-fascist elements could not last for long in such a country as new Albania, whose people fought so many years and triumphed over the weapons, deception and demagogy, the greatest history has ever witnessed, of the German Gestapo, a country where the people are vigilant and jealous of the power they have in their hands, which they have won after so many centuries of slavery and so much sacrifice and suffering.

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REPORT DELIVERED TO THE 5th PLENUM OF THE CC OF THE CPA

February 21, 1946

At the meeting of the 4th Plenum the possibility was mentioned of convening the 5th Plenum to revise in detail the preparations for the party congress¹. The present meeting is of especially great importance for all our Party, because for the first time since the heroic National Liberation War, which the Party organized and led, it is preparing to appear before the Albanian people with its congress. This party congress will be one of the most significant events in the history of our country and of the Albanian working class. At the congress, our Party, which has been, is, and will always be the reliable leader of the people and the instrument for the realization of their wishes and aspirations, will emerge united and monolithic, with an open, clear, and correct program.

To prepare for the congress means to come before the people with a clear-cut, correct political and organizational line and to define the party program concretely. This is the specific reason we are meeting today, and it is therefore my duty to point out to the Central Committee the great responsibility we bear. We should tackle the

¹ The 5th Plenum of the CC of the CPA decided to call the 1st Congress of the CPA on May 25, 1946. But due to the interference by the leadership of the CPY, this decision was not carried out, and the convening of the congress was put off indefinitely. It was held in November 1948.

question most seriously, because the outcome of today's meeting will serve as a valuable basis not only for the proceedings of the congress, but also for the correct development of the work we do in the future.

Our Party cannot consider things in isolation. It owes its strength to the experience it has gained, past and present, as well as to its clear perspective for the realization of its aims. Therefore, in the light of political achievements and events, both inside and outside our country, it is more than necessary for the Central Committee to review the work done and face up to the responsibilities assigned to it by the Party. This naturally, will be done when we have concretely analysed the political and organizational line pursued by our Party and the people's power for the long period from the Berat Plenum up to now.

To have a correct line is the main thing, but to implement it properly is equally important. It is on these two principal questions that we see in our Party the characteristics of a new party which, despite the great struggle it has waged, has not been able to escape from sectarian or opportunist tendencies which have appeared in the understanding and application of the line. It has not been able to foresee obstacles and avoid them in time, to fight ruthlessly and radically against erroneous tendencies and mistakes, to deal severely with these mistakes and tendencies, to draw the proper lessons from them, and educate all its organizations and members accordingly. The correct understanding and implementation of the line should be the greatest concern of every member of our Party and of every party forum. No one can avoid responsibility. But we cannot say that everyone has viewed this correctly, because the healthy spirit of criticism and self-criticism has been lacking, responsibility and discipline at work have been inadequate, method and style in carry-

ing out the tasks assigned to us have had shortcomings. This is even worse when it happens in the ranks of the party leaders.

In face of some critical tests the Party has undergone, many comrades have been thrown into confusion, and it has taken them a long time to understand what had happened. Their confusion was due to the fact that they did not have close ties with the work, with its development and growth. Such a thing brings in its wake grave and bitter consequences for the work of the Party. The great upheavals, which are caused either by an internal crisis, or by the creation of a new situation, far from being understood, are regarded as a simple operation or as an ordinary self-criticism of an organ or of an individual. The origin of the mistake and the circumstances in which it was committed are not examined in depth. The general and individual responsibility must be weighed up, the problem studied in detail from all sides, and then the entire organization should be armed properly with the experience gained.

To analyse the party line, in order to precisely define the true line, and to strike at mistakes and alien tendencies, is therefore a weighty, delicate and extremely serious task. From a detailed analysis of the political line our mistakes and dangerous tendencies, which have been manifested in the political line of the Party, will emerge automatically, along with our general and individual responsibility. After analysing and dealing severely with all erroneous tendencies, it is very important that our line from here on must emerge a sound, correct, and clear line, which will lead us in the impending congress of the Party and in our future work.

All the comrades of the Central Committee have the duty to discuss this question with the greatest attention,

and not simply to record facts, for otherwise, this would be sterile work.

* * *

The Berat Plenum was an important meeting for our Party². There, an analysis was made of the political and organizational line we had followed during the entire war period. It also defined the political and organizational line to be pursued in the new circumstances and changed situation brought about by the complete liberation of Albania. The Party was faced, therefore, with a very important task, that of the administration of the entire state.

The erroneous tendencies manifested during the war period were criticized, and firm decisions were taken; but some comrades have had erroneous tendencies, because they underrated the work accomplished by our Party up till that time. They implied that "only after the Berat Plenum did the work really begin." Such a viewpoint was fraught with danger, because whoever thought that, in fact neglected the experience of struggle of our Party, an

² The 2nd Plenum of the CC of the CPA was held in Berat in November 1944. The convening of this plenum was necessary to make an analysis of the activity of the Party during the National Liberation War, and to define the tasks for the new stage which began with the liberation of the country.

But the correct intentions of the Party were distorted by the hostile intervention of the Yugoslav leadership through the agency of Velimir Stoinich, an envoy of the CC of the CPY. He organized a backstage plot against the CP of Albania in which Sejfulla Malëshova, Koçi Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and others were involved, and thus the plenum was developed in the spirit of the Yugoslav anti-Marxist line.

However, the main aim of the Titoite plan to overthrow the leadership of the Party, with comrade Enver Hoxha at the head, and to replace it with a new, pro-Yugoslav, leadership, was not attained due to the opposition of the majority of the members of the plenum. Nevertheless, the 2nd Berat Plenum opened the way to a deeper and all-sided intervention of the Yugoslav revisionist leadership in the internal affairs of our Party and country.

experience comprised of successes and faults, and intended to pass on to the new stage without preserving this great experience of our Party as a priceless treasure. Whoever thought this way and forgot about the continuity in the development of the Party, was bound to make more mistakes in the future. To see the mistakes and to deal with them severely is a matter of first rate importance, but it is necessary to teach the organization to draw lessons from these mistakes, and at the same time to protect it from the erroneous views. Individual experience should be added to the experience of the Party, but the latter should always be the foundation stone for every party member who loves the Party and the people. Animosities and lack of a sound faith in the role of the Party and in its great experience are the source of mistaken tendencies, great errors and deviations of this kind. We mention this because our young Party may often find itself facing such situations, which wittingly or unwittingly lead to wrong roads and endanger our future.

Did the Party define a political and organizational line for the liberation period? Yes, it did, and I believe that we are all of one mind. We defined the political line of the Front, the political line in connection with the allies and Yugoslavia, we defined the economic and social line to be followed by our Party, we defined the organizational line of our Party. Of course, experience was to teach us many things enabling us to concretize the issues better both from the political and the organizational point of view, but what was important for us, which we could never forget for a single moment, was that we had to advance rapidly, but with well measured steps, towards socialism. This required us to take care that every political or organizational action must assist progressively in this respect. Everything had to be mobilized and channelled to this end, and the activities in various sectors all had to be

brought into harmony to achieve the goal. The goal could not be achieved through half measures or vacillations. The war period proved this to us. Here, I think, it was a question of not losing our sense of proportion and of making the past serve us. There are comrades who might claim, like Sejfulla Malëshova, "To tell the truth, I did not properly understand the line of the Party on the Front." Sejfulla was the most severe in attacking "the sectarian tendency" and "vacillations" in the Party line at the Berat Plenum. In fact, he continued right up to the present time to support a vacillating line dominated by opportunist tendencies. (I will say more about this question later.)

What did the Soviet Union mean to us and how should we have acted towards it? I think that the Party had defined this line well. A distinction was made between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and Britain and America on the other, and it was underlined that work had to be done in this direction. The economic question, which was of first hand importance and which the Berat Plenum had to insist on for a clearer definition was raised in a general way. We spoke of the importance of the state sector, and the main measures that had to be taken following the complete liberation of Albania, but we did not study the question as a whole, as we shall do at this meeting. It would have been naive of anyone to claim that we would not run into difficulties in carrying out our tasks, but we had to overcome these difficulties while preserving the purity of our political and organizational line. We had not only to instil this line deep into the party members, but to make it acceptable to all the working masses of our country, for unless they were strongly mobilized round the Party and were clear about this line, it would have been difficult for us to advance and to realize our goals and tasks. Now let us consider how we understood and applied this line after liberation.

It is true that in Berat, concerning the line of the Front, we saw the sectarian tendency which had appeared in our work, but we looked for it even where it did not exist, and the question of sectarianism was raised as the greatest danger to the Party. This had its own dangers. A young party lacking long experience, such as our Party was, might go over the other way, to an opportunist stand. Great care was necessary to maintain a balance, because it was easy to slip into an opportunist position. Those who lost their sense of proportion were those who did not rely to the necessary extent on the experience of the Party and who saw the sectarian tendency everywhere in the past. In the building of a great mass movement, when the people threw themselves into the armed uprising, the merit of all this work rested with our Party, although it was young and inexperienced; and as well as harmful sectarianism, there were many valuable things which should have been taken into account and which must be considered as a great capital for every party member. The great drive, enthusiasm, determination, sacrifice, self-denial, discipline and love for the Party which every party member felt during the whole of the war period, could not have existed in a party "where they did nothing but made mistakes and were dominated by sectarianism from top to bottom." The opposite is true: where pronounced opportunist tendencies are manifested (and especially in this danger-filled period we are passing through), it is easy for the party member to lose all these qualities, which are essential conditions for the progress of our work. Everyone should understand well what I am saying; this is not a question of defending errors, but of defending the Party from charlatans and careerists.

During the war period, it was the task of the Front to mobilize the broad masses of the people for war against the occupier and the traitors, to link them closely with the

Party, and to isolate the traitor organizations. The Front not only brought about the strengthening of the Party, and waged total war against the enemy and the traitors, not only consolidated the army and the new state power which we were setting up, but was to become the sound force and base in peace time for the realization of our goals. Our Party, which led the broad masses in the war and aroused their love for it, also had to lead them in peace time, it had to link them strongly to its line, to lead them towards socialism. This was the main task of the Front in the period after the Berat Plenum. On the eve of the complete liberation of Albania, the conditions to embark on this road were favourable from both the military and political points of view. To conceive the Front as detached from the vital problems of the country, and to conceive the political line of the Front as separate from the economic and social line, and from the stand towards foreign policy means to conceive it wrongly and, naturally, to implement the line wrongly. Even wavering elements could join the Front, with the exception of enemies who had fought against us openly and with arms. The door had to be closed to such enemies. As regards the wavering elements who might join the Front, there was little hope that they would embrace the line of the Front, but by including them in the Front, we tried to detach them from their misled circles of friends who influenced them to our detriment. Two-faced people and those with bad intentions had to be fought within the Front in order to unmask them. Therefore, here it is not a question of why Cen Elezi or Jahja Çaçi joined the Front; these people could be in the Front formally, but when the stand is correct and unwavering with regard to the line and its implementation, the differentiation is made very quickly. The enemy will profit from incautious and incorrect attitudes in order to sabotage everything. In general, the role

of the Front has not been correctly understood. In fact, it is a broad mass organization, but it is closely linked with the Party and is led by it. This link cannot be established just through a meaningless formal conference which deals with out of date subjects, but through the entire life of the state power, through the concrete and vital problems of the economy, the needs of the broad masses of the people who fought for so many years and demanded to see these needs met. The struggle for the realization of these measures, and the realization itself of reforms, for which our people fought, is what links the broad masses of the people with our Party. This is the only form which makes the Front a reality. The mobilization of the masses concerning the problems of the people's power and of the country, which also means the solution of everyone's individual problems, is the political line of the Front. To seek to mobilize the people in the Front with words alone is just a waste of time. Looking at the line of the Front from this angle, that is, closely connected and in harmony with the home and foreign policy, with the economic and social policy, we reach the conclusion that opportunist tendencies have been manifested in our line. What has happened? Right after the liberation of Albania a series of immediate measures had to be taken: the nationalization of the mines, land reform, measures against war criminals, and the imposition of emergency taxes on the profits of the big merchants and the speculators. These just and indispensable measures had to serve as a support to strengthen our political and economic position, to carry out as rapidly as possible the bolder reforms, either economic or political. Such just and well-implemented measures had to be carried without wavering or tremors through to the end; not to do this would have been harmful. In the face of such correct and clear-cut stands as : the strengthening of the state sector, control over the private sector

of the economy, and a correct stand towards the allies, it was certain that the fight waged by internal and external reaction would be as bitter as the stand of our Party was just and resolute. Meanwhile, the differentiation in the reaction and the consolidation of the position of the Party among the people would be brought about.

If we make a separate analysis of every sector of our activity, we shall see a telling analogy between the stands taken and results of the work. These were not what they should have been. This does not mean that the political line of the Party has been wrong and opportunist, but the facts show that opportunism had been taking root and was becoming dangerous. Concerning the question of the Front itself, an opportunist political stand has been maintained towards the remnants of the reaction, a stand which has reached the point of becoming a danger to the Party and the state power. While strengthening the Front, that is, rallying the broad masses of the people around the Party and the state power, around their vital problems, it was necessary at the same time to understand well the incessant fierce struggle that had to be waged against the remnants of fascism, and internal and external reaction, which, stunned for the moment, would raise their heads and organize against state power, against the reforms. This danger was not properly appreciated. "We shall defeat the reaction with struggle and through struggle", "we shall defeat the private sector through struggle", and other such "theories" were continually mentioned, but in practice it was forgotten that we were in struggle with the reaction and the private sector of the economy, and that we had to keep this struggle going and not slow it down. I mentioned earlier that at the time of liberation of Albania, conditions were very favourable to continue this struggle, but it was slackened, and this is where opportunism appears. I stress once again that it

is not a question of whether or not Suat Asllani was in the Front, whether or not the Catholic priest or the bey attended the meetings of the Front, but the question is that, faced with the negative and hostile stand of Suat Asllani, the clergy, the bey or the merchant, the masses were not properly mobilized in struggle against them. When the Catholic clergy of Shkodra, despite the telling blow dealt them in the Koplik³ operation, still went on fighting openly against us, in word and action, when they went on mobilizing their men and sent them to the highlands to organize the "resistance" (facts which were known to us), the flirtation with them continued. Later on things went even further. Reaction became accustomed to this mild and opportunist policy, and that false calm suited to people who avoid struggle and strife was almost becoming a line. Similar stands in other circumstances meant that these remnants were not only left untroubled in their preparations, but there was even some sort of acceptance of the inevitability of the creation of an open opposition against the Front, either from outside or from inside it. This reached the stage where enemies of the people, representatives of the reaction, were invited to stand for elections to the assembly, and a coalition in the elections and similar suicidal actions were proposed to the Catholic clergy. Naturally, the result of such an opportunist stand (and it would have been still worse if all the representatives of reaction⁴ had accepted the invita-

3 In January 1945 the reactionary forces launched an armed attack against this locality, but were routed in a few hours' time by the forces of People's Defence.

4 The CPA decided that a single list of candidates of the Front should be presented in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, but as a result of the opportunist deviations of Sejfulla Malëshova a number of representatives of reaction were also included in this list.

tions sent to them) was an assembly where the so-called nationalists could not have many seats. Reasons and excuses for such a thing might be sought and found, but this is the reality, and it cannot be hidden. Such viewpoints and results are not reached "à l'improviste"* but following a series of events and incorrect and opportunist stands.

The same stand appears in our policy towards the allies: the Soviet Union, Britain and America.

The question of the Soviet-Anglo-American alliance has been of great importance to us. But this should exclude any opportunist stand towards the British and the Americans either at the time of the war, or now in peace time. Each of these three allies should have its proper place. The enemy has attacked us a great deal because of our Party's initial stand towards the Soviet Union, which we did not put on the same footing as Britain and America. But this bore fruit and, in my opinion, was essential. When the Soviet Union joined the war, the masses of our people became more confident of victory, of ensuring freedom and self-determination. Britain had accepted the invasion of Albania⁵. Our people had faith neither in Britain nor in America, but in the Soviet Union, even though they were not well acquainted with the reality of the Soviet Union. The correct stand of our Party made a great contribution to strengthening this faith. And its stand throughout the war has been correct, as it has been generally correct towards the British and Americans and their military missions stationed in Albania. The harmful activity of the British and American officers in Albania

* "A l'improviste" (Fr. in the original) — suddenly.

5 On April 6, 1939, the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, declared in the House of Commons that Britain had no special interests in Albania. With this he practically approved of the fascist aggression in Albania.

was restricted by all available means; we guarded against the traps they tried to set for us in their efforts to lead us towards erroneous stands which would have had grave consequences for our country.

It could not be said that, after the liberation of Albania, our international position was not strong, and indeed much stronger than that of many other countries which had been similarly enslaved. We had every possibility and a wide field of action, much better than during the war, to strengthen our people's love and friendship for the Soviet Union and to differentiate among the allies. In order to reach this goal we had not only to work in a planned and systematic way, but also to manoeuvre skilfully. But to manoeuvre should not be understood as making concessions and slipping into opportunism. To manoeuvre to our advantage, in order to strengthen our international position, and to weaken the position of the Anglo-Americans in Albania as much as possible — this is how we should have seen the line of our foreign policy. What the British and Americans could not achieve in war time by means of "Balli Kombëtar" and "Legaliteti", they would try to achieve in peace time with the remnants of these organizations which represented the reaction in our country. Our international position would grow much stronger when we had strengthened our internal position, that is, when we had strengthened the Front, the economy and state power, and had created in the broad masses of the people a genuine, soundly based love for the Soviet Union. To this end, it was necessary for the people to distinguish clearly who were their true, firm, and sincere allies. This could not be achieved without first differentiating among the allies so that the people could see the reality clearly. We had a wide scope of action and numerous opportunities to march boldly and unhesitatingly, without fearing that

we might violate even in the slightest the meaning of the great alliance and the preservation of the peace, which is indispensable for all nations. We had to coordinate our policy with that of the Soviet Union, our every action had to help the Soviet Union in its great task, for this was also in our interest. Our people had to learn from the Soviet Union, not in a formal way, but with their whole heart and soul learning from all sectors of its social and economic activity. For us and for all our people the Soviet Union should be the great motherland of socialism, and our small country too should make a powerful contribution to strengthening it. Some may say that no party member could think otherwise. This is true, but there might be some party members who use different tactics to reach this goal; I mean that there might be some party members who, while keeping this aim in view, at the same time employ mistaken and opportunist tactics on this question. This is precisely what happened with us. It is true that our press has written and spoken about the Soviet Union, but not enough and not in the right way; and it was not the lack of technical means that stopped us, but the mistaken view that we should not separate the allies and speak more of one and less of another. The question of the recognition of our government has been dominant. This was something which preoccupied us, as did other international questions, the question of meetings, such as various international conferences, etc., to which we should have been invited, as we were entitled. But there was another erroneous view, that we must sacrifice something in order to achieve this goal, that is, not only in words, but also in concrete stands, we should lead the Anglo-American allies to believe that there was a liberal democracy here. The mild stand towards the reaction, the opportunist stand towards the private economy, the vacilla-

tion about the collection of emergency taxes, the drawing up and composition of electoral lists, and finally, the stand and the interpretation given to the Anglo-American notes concerning the recognition of our government, and later on, the question of the treaties with the Americans, which remained an internal matter of the Bureau, all these not only constituted an opportunist stand towards the Anglo-Americans, but at the same time created among the people the opposite effect from what we were aiming to achieve concerning the popularization of the Soviet Union.

The expression of the same stand towards the allies, in the press and in speaking, as towards the Soviet Union, gave the people the impression that the question of the recognition of our government by the Anglo-Americans is a condition sine qua non for the people's regime in Albania. This was what the Anglo-Americans were aiming at, this was a favour the internal reaction was after in order to gain time to reorganize itself. This, on the one hand, and many other concessions have raised the hopes of the reactionary bourgeoisie and encouraged it to try to direct our economic relations towards the West, and in the first place towards Italy, towards which we have not maintained a stand as towards a state which has great obligations to our country and people.

The position of compromise with the reaction in the political line of the Front was also reflected in the economic policy. It is not a question here of enumerating the measures taken, such as the nationalization of the mines or the implementation of the land reform, but a question of how is the strengthening of the state sector and the cooperative sector understood in reality. Until recently the cooperative sector was a dead letter. This situation is not merely the result of negligence, it has its roots elsewhere, and is in fact a more serious matter. It is connected

with the existence of the private sector of the economy. A very liberal and opportunist stand was maintained towards private capital and the private sector of the economy. Far from giving serious consideration to placing its activity under sound control, restricting speculation and the black market, through draconian and at the same time just measures, it was promised support and aid under the pretext of encouraging private initiative and promoting production. There was talk of the "great experience" of the big merchants, from which we should "profit"; about giving bank credits to those who had been taxed, and to make it easier for them to pay the taxes, and to leave them in peace to continue their experience at our expense; there was talk of ceasing the severe but just measures against the big merchants who had been taxed, but there was never a serious word spoken, or any action taken, on the question of setting up the cooperative sector. This, of course, means to maintain an opportunist stand towards the private sector of the economy; it means the weakening of the state and cooperative sector. "Private capital will be defeated through struggle," it was said, but it was precisely this struggle that was not being waged and was, in fact, being dodged. The struggle was slackened in all sectors, and this had its origin in the marked opportunist tendency which appeared in the political line. It was not possible to see this at once and to take measures, for, as I said before, we have not reached the stage of maturity where we can advance without being subject to influence, which, when incorrect, leads into a blind alley. But this by no means implies that matters passed through our Bureau without discussion and opposition on the political line, opposition which constantly deepened until two distinct tendencies emerged, as was observed at the meeting of the Bureau, beginning

on December 6 and ending on December 11⁶, last year. The conclusions I pointed out earlier concerning the line, which were reached by the Political Bureau on December 11, 1945, called for the Plenum of the Central Committee to be convened without fail, in order to consider the line, to define future stands correctly and, at the same time, to put an end to, and find a correct solution for, the situation created in the Bureau of the CC of the Party where opposing views dominated concerning the question of the line. In particular, the standpoint of Sejfulla Malëshova was in opposition, and has been so throughout the talks held on this question, which is of vital importance for our Party.

Sejfulla Malëshova has set the tone for the opportunist tendency in our line, and defended it to the end. But the Bureau cannot be exonerated from this, and the entire Central Committee of the Party cannot evade its responsibility towards the Party. But there are collective as well as individual responsibilities, and Sejfulla Malëshova cannot avoid either. I stressed earlier that it was difficult for such a tendency to be seen immediately by the Bureau, which had just emerged from the very arduous test of Berat. On the other hand, the lack of experience in a new stage made this job more difficult. Nevertheless, the matters in the Bureau, as I said earlier, did not pass without heated discussions, whether on the question of the army, the land reform, the stand towards the allies, or on the economic policy.

On economic questions, Sejfulla endeavoured to pose as a man of great experience in these matters, and the Bureau had appointed him to direct the work of the Econo-

⁶ In December 1945, the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPA had criticized and condemned the opportunist activity of Sejfulla Malëshova. But even following this meeting Sejfulla Malëshova obstinately continued to stick to his own views.

mic Council. The economic question is a key of vital importance in our work, and affects the entire work in other sectors of state activity. Far from being able to give correct direction to this sector of such great importance, Sejfulla has always been a partisan of a sort of excessive liberalism, which went as far as opportunism. The question of the nationalization of the mines, of the National Bank of Albania, and other similar questions are one thing, but it is quite another thing, on the basis of these victories, to direct the state sector properly and to strengthen it daily. Sejfulla has always maintained a vacillating and very often opportunist stand towards the private sector of the economy. He considered this sector as a reliable support for the state. He argued this by saying that private capital was very strong and of considerable amount, and that the private owners, at this initial stage, were better able to administer and direct an enterprise successfully, because they were experienced. On the question of land reform, Sejfulla was of the opinion that not only should the portion assigned to private peasant owners be greater than it is today, but also that in the implementation of the land reform the rich peasants should be protected. The tendency to give relief to those paying emergency taxation on war profits, the deferring of payments or the granting of credits by the State Bank to capitalist elements ; all these, and many other things, not only showed an accentuated opportunist tendency in his views on our economic policy, but have also had repercussions in the development of our work, and in our trade. With the setting up of the import-export sector on an incorrect basis and with people appointed without investigation, and owing to the spirit which dominated in the Economic Council because of the views we discussed earlier, matters reached the stage of the emergence of the view that our foreign trade should be directed towards Italy.

On the question of foreign policy, Sejfulla has always been a partisan of a moderate and opportunist policy towards the Anglo-American allies and under-rated more than anyone else the danger of foreign reaction. He thought that by making some occasional concessions to the British and Americans in our day to day stand, recognition of our government would be hastened and our international position would be normalized. Such a view became ever clearer with the arrival of the Anglo-American notes concerning the recognition of our government⁷. What was not in fact recognition was taken for recognition and placed on the same plane as the recognition of our government by the Soviet Union. Although the mistake was discovered and the matter went no further, Sejfulla insisted that the notes were an act of recognition. As for the American condition of the recognition of the treaties existing between the two states, Sejfulla advocated their acceptance in principle. He was in opposition to the other members of the Bureau, who did not accept this condition, because it committed us to accept treaties which were to the detriment of our country and violated our state's independence.

On the question of the Front and in our internal policy, Sejfulla was the one who defended the theses of extending the Front to include as many elements as possible, even enemies. He was the defender of a mild policy towards the Catholic clergy, and at the same time supported a coalition with them in the matter of elections.

⁷ The US and British governments formally declared the establishment of regular diplomatic relations with the Democratic Government of Albania. But in fact they did not establish diplomatic relations, their ministers never reported to the Democratic Government. What they did was a political manoeuvre spearheaded against the people's power, and was aimed at encouraging internal reaction in Albania.

In the discussions held in the Bureau concerning the question of the line, Sejfulla Malëshova has always insisted obstinately that our line had no trace of opportunism, and claimed that the contrary was the case. Besides this, he has said that "in the Bureau there have been discussions and opposition, but it has been possible to adopt decisions, and in these decisions we have all been of one mind." This is not true. There is no questioning the fact that the Bureau has been influenced in this direction, and it is precisely here that its responsibility lies, for it has not taken steps to prevent such a situation. Here, in my opinion, there are two questions: first, the question of the line and of its application, and second, the responsibility of the Bureau, and especially of Sejfulla Malëshova. That Sejfulla Malëshova is the man who has set the tone for this marked opportunist tendency, cannot be doubted. This is proved by his incorrect stand just a few days ago, when he expressed the opinion that "in fact, he had not viewed the question quite correctly, he had made mistakes". His admission, in my opinion, was not sincere or convincing. These two important things, which are connected with the question of the line and with the composition of the Bureau, should be taken up for serious consideration by the Central Committee of the Party⁸.

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⁸ The 5th Plenum pointed out the marked opportunist viewpoints of Sejfulla Malëshova in the political and economic field. His opinions that the new democratic order had to be constructed after the model of bourgeois democracy, that the class struggle had to be keyed down, that the private capitalist sector had to be given a free scope of action, that no distinction had to be made between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the USA and Britain, on the other, etc., had seriously damaged the Party and revolution. The 5th Plenum expelled him from the Political Bureau and the CC. Later on he was expelled from the Party, too.

The purging of these unhealthy tendencies is urgent and should be done thoroughly. Meanwhile, the entire Central Committee, which also bears responsibility in this, should not only be clear about the line to be pursued in the future, but should also take great care to implement it well and exercise control at the same time, because many comrades, in my opinion, whether in the Bureau or in the Central Committee, have not been able to cope with the functions entrusted to them by the Party. Without slipping into alarming mistakes, these comrades have shown indifference and inactivity not only in understanding matters, but particularly in resolving them. The Central Committee should be not only a genuine leading body of our Party, but every one of its members should be an authoritative figure in the entire organization. This authority must be created through his own ability, through his clear standpoint on everything, and through his work in the sector assigned to him. He should do this as a leader, and not as an ordinary member. A member of the Central Committee should be an example, not only of tireless and positive activity, but an example for all as a leader with broad and clear political and organizational views. I say this so that the discussions going on at present in various meetings of the plenum should not be considered as questions concerning one or two people, but as questions which concern the whole Party, and in the first place the entire Central Committee, which bears as much responsibility as the Bureau for the progress of the work.

It would be a mistake to think, as has usually happened following a plenum, that now we are emerging with a new line, and that we are putting forward this line for the first time. This is not true, and it will be harmful if the matter is presented to the organization in such a way. It is precisely to this that I draw your attention so that you will show the greatest care in presenting these matters

to the organization. If they are presented in a careless and unstudied way, this could very easily confuse a party organization or the whole of the Party. The Party has had a line, and a program with which it has worked and scored successes, but a marked opportunist tendency has been observed in this line and has created difficult situations in various sectors, it has impeded our work from advancing at the desired rate, and has allowed the creation of situations which could have become a threat to our country, if they had not been seen in time, if some sectors had not remained alert and checked them. The opportunist views have by no means eliminated the possibility of sectarian views cropping up below in the organizations, or in the state power. These two tendencies give rise to one another. Therefore, today we are not putting forward a new line, but analyzing the errors and erroneous tendencies which have appeared in our line, and defining the stand we should maintain in the future by drawing lessons from these mistakes we have committed.

The Berat Plenum should have been a turning point in the work of our Party and state power. It is not possible to measure exactly to what extent a change was effected, but in my opinion there is still much to be desired. A long time has elapsed since the Berat meeting; a long period of new experience in the direction of all sectors of the state has been added to the previous experience of the Party, and armed with precisely this new experience, we should point out to the Party in a correct manner our errors and shortcomings, from both the political and organizational standpoint. We should re-enliven the Party, make it come alive, and advance with a new spirit and a new style, mastering questions well and solving them correctly. This is also a turning point, and a serious one at that, but the organization should understand the true essence of this change, and not be like that party cell

which said: "Well, I understood that external change, but it is this internal change which I do not understand."

The transition to socialism cannot be achieved by sitting with folded arms or by maintaining vacillating and opportunist attitudes; the organizations should understand this well. It is conditioned by the external situation, but especially by our internal situation. The strengthening of our internal situation accelerates this process, and this is achieved through correct and resolute stands.

Our economic policy should concern us in the first place. Today it is the most difficult, delicate, and important question. It will influence all sectors of our work. This is where we should concentrate all our forces, because here the enemy is preparing to attack us. The economic problem cannot be considered as the problem of just five or ten specialists, but a problem of all the masses of our people, who should be really mobilized to solve this problem of vital importance to our people and state. For the solution of such a great problem we must mobilize all our technical, organizational, and political energies at the same time. But first, the problem should be put forward correctly. The existence of our state and its future are closely connected with the existence and the strengthening of the state and cooperative sectors. The strengthening of the state sector is not done merely with the nationalization⁹ of the mines, the nationalization of the banks, the control over the private sector and the monopoly of foreign trade, but with the organization of all these sectors and the crea-

⁹ The shift in the balance of power of the classes in Albania allowed, while rapidly bringing into effect democratic transformations, to pass over immediately to transformations of a socialist character. Among these, the most important and decisive one was the socialization of the principal means of production through nationalization. State control over production and distribution served as a first step and preparatory measure.

tion of a state owned heavy industry, which must be the main support for the setting up of light industry and for the entire economic development of our country. The organization, increase, and improvement of production should be on the order of the day. The good and sound organization of the exploitation of the mines will invigorate small-scale industry in particular, and both of these should be in the hands of the state. So far, the capital of the bourgeoisie of our country has largely gone into the trade sector. Now, seeing no prospect for development in this sector, this capital will try to extend into the development of industry, to create bases of support to fight us and to strangle our economy. In no way should we allow this. On the contrary, through strict control, not only should we force the owners of private factories to work in the direction determined by the state, but also the products they turn out should be controlled and handled as seen fit by the state. All these measures should be adopted and their implementation should be followed through with the utmost strictness so that within a short time our state can become master of these small factories, and this industry be merged with the state sector. We should cut off all possibilities for private capital to develop and strengthen itself. Any laxity in this direction means allowing the bourgeoisie to become strong, allowing the creation of a new industrial bourgeois class to impede our progress towards socialism. Control over the private sector of the economy will be exercised simultaneously with the restriction of its market, whether internal or external. The state alone should handle foreign trade, whereas in the internal market the state should exercise control over all the most important goods. This will be achieved through the consumer and producer cooperatives, through the state stores which should be opened on a wide scale, and through various trading units. The oil wells and copper, bitumen,

and chromium mines constitute the most important state sector. The greatest concern should be shown for this sector, for it is the most important support of our economy. Our budget will rely on the maximum exploitation of this sector to ensure aid for the other sectors. Private capital and the reactionary bourgeoisie of our country, aided by foreign reaction, will wage the fiercest struggle against us in this sector. We shall have aid from the Soviet Union to carry out our economic plan. It is a mistake to think that we shall receive support from the West. The state sector cannot be extended and strengthened without having a definite work plan in harmony with all the branches of the economy. The rational exploitation of the mines, the activation of light industry, control of the private sector of the economy, the development of foreign trade, and the setting up of the cooperatives and state stores are one whole complex which calls for strong organization, parallel with the work plan and coordination. But the political activation of the masses in support of this sector, to do tireless and systematic work, to be ready for extraordinary sacrifices and self-denial is more than necessary. This is where the work of the Front in connection with the economic policy should be concentrated.

This is the course we should pursue in the economy. Everything for the strengthening of the state sector; merciless struggle against private capital; as much help as possible from the state for the consumer and producer cooperatives, so that these become a great support for the state. The extension and strengthening of the state sector is on the order of the day, and is one of the most important tasks facing us. Here I shall not dwell at all on the organizational forms which will aid us in the development of this sector or on the method of work we should adopt, but I shall try to define the situation in this sector and our prospects.

All of us are aware of the situation of our mines at the time of the liberation of Albania, and of our own situation. At first, it was a difficult undertaking to get all these mines working. We lacked organization, we lacked tools, we lacked finance, and many other things. Nevertheless, we gave special attention to the Kuçova oil field, which was of great importance, for without oil and petroleum there can be no progress; as for the copper, chromium, bitumen and coal mines, they remained unexploited. At Kuçova fuel had to be produced and an Albanian administration set up. We encountered many difficulties in the organization of the work, but the technical difficulties were even greater. The oil refineries were destroyed and the supply of electric power to the plants was difficult. Despite these difficulties we managed to set up three distilleries, some generating centres, various necessary repair shops and the oxygen plant. From November 1944 till December 1945 we succeeded in putting about 661 oil wells into operation. In the Kuçova field there are still 260 wells to be put into operation. The conditions of work so far have not permitted a detailed study concerning productivity, in order to make an appraisal of the Kuçova oil field. To achieve this it is necessary to operate the oil wells continuously for some months, so that their real production is extracted, and then see how much of this production should be consumed. Since consumption (the amount handled by the refineries) in the present conditions stands at about 150-200 cubic metres of crude oil per day, the pumping of the wells is rationed. This impedes the study of the decline of the wells and the oil field of Kuçova. When all the oil wells were in normal activity, the average production of gas was 50,000 cubic metres and that of gasoline 3,000 litres per day. The present production of gas is 18,000-20,000 cubic metres per 24 hours, with gasoline production of 1,000 litres. The

amount of gasoline, along with the production of crude petroleum, could be increased to 2,000 litres, provided there is not a shortage of electric power.

In the opinion of oil experts, the Kuçova oil field is a field in decline as far as productivity is concerned. Nevertheless, it still is an important field for us. In the future these fields should be exploited to the maximum. First of all, we intend to utilize crude oil at home because its by-products constitute only 34% of the crude which undergoes the first stage of distillation. The remainder, which has such substances as heavy oil, lubricant and bitumen, goes to the sullage ponds. The lubricant sections we have set up produce fuel which is 99% pure, but it contains a small amount of sulphur, oil kerosene, etc. These substances make this fuel corrosive. With the regular functioning of the three refineries, we anticipate that after March 1946 we shall have:

Benzine	525,000	litres per month
Oil	716,000	litres per month
Kerosene	356,000	litres per month

The monthly average from June 1945 to January 1946 has been:

Benzine	486,890	litres per month
Oil	518,920	litres per month
Kerosene	178,970	litres per month

If we take into account the statistics of crude oil production for the last months of 1943, we can base ourselves on an annual production of 144,000 tons of which 60,000 tons are needed to supply the refineries and 84,000 tons can be exported. But, in order to achieve the total produc-

tion of Kuçova, it is necessary to build storage tanks for at least 2,000 cubic metres and to bring into working order the other 25% of the oil wells. Likewise Kuçova-Vlora transport must be put in order, as well as the Vlora depots.

The site, or rather, the oil field of Patos, according to the specialists, appears much richer than that of Kuçova, only the density of oil in Patos is greater than that of Kuçova. Besides this, in Patos it is harder to solve the problem of drinking water and the question of electric power. There are 69 wells at this site, of which 44 give good production. As we know, Patos was greatly damaged from the war, but on the basis of August 1943 production reports, daily production of crude oil was 119.6 cubic metres for 30 active wells. At the time when the Patos oil field was operating it had a production of 36,000 tons of crude oil. This was transported to Fier, where it was mixed with the crude product of Kuçova before being sent to Vlora. In order to attain this production, it is necessary to reconstruct the entire work site of Patos and build a pumping station on the spot. Thus, the crude production destined for export from both oil fields would be 120,000 tons.

Thus, we are faced with the task of urgently putting into operation the Kuçova and Patos oil fields. The technicians say that there are numerous difficulties, especially in machinery and electric generators, as well as in finance. The financial expenditure they foresee for both oil fields in 1946-1947 amounts to 54,887,810 francs.

As for the exploitation of the bitumen mine in Selencia, it has a clearer perspective and can be more easily operated because there is no need for machinery as in the case of the oil fields. The organization of the work and the bringing in of a great number of suitable workers for this mine will allow us to extract a considerable amount of bitumen for export. This is the direction we shall follow

this year. The increase of bitumen extraction is on the order of the day.

Concerning chromium ore, its exploitation presents no technical difficulties, such as equipping the mines with machinery, but its transport poses problems. Without ensuring transport and markets, for the time being it will be a frozen asset.

As for the copper mines, these are an important resource of our state sector, and we should show great concern for their exploitation. The opinion of specialists is that after reconstructing the mines, we can begin to extract copper which will amount to about 40-50 tons per month in the Bulqiza mine, and 60-80 tons in the Derveni mine. The Bulqiza mine can employ up to 1,000-1,200 workers. During 1942-1943 the Italians were able to extract about 20,000 tons of copper from Bulqiza, and this contributed to the impoverishment of the mines. Although the specialists cannot make categorical statements on the situation of the mines and its potential, the copper mines are none the less considered a great resource of our country.

The mines, in general, are the principal support of the state sector; their exploitation should be studied very seriously, not only for the short term and for narrow local interests, but we should think at the same time of the importance of their maximum exploitation in order to aid our allies, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. We should never forget Stalin's speech¹⁰ on occasion of the elections, in which he mentioned and specified the norms to be reached in the production of steel, pig iron, and other

¹⁰ J. V. Stalin delivered this speech on February 1, 1946, before the electors of the "Stalin" electoral district of the city of Moscow.

essential mineral products. This should make us think that here too we should exploit our underground wealth to strengthen our economy, which will be the base of any progress in the various sectors, both today and in the future.

The question arises: are we in any way able, with our own forces, to exploit these mines properly, first and foremost, for the interest of our country? It seems to us that this question is pertinent and will very soon become urgent. As you know, a number of Soviet experts have come to our country to help us form a clear idea of the situation of the mines, and the prospects for their exploitation. The question of collaboration or concrete aid has not yet been discussed with them, but it will undoubtedly come to this, because, in our opinion, there will be sectors where we can rely completely on our own efforts, but there will also be other sectors where we shall ask the Soviets or Yugoslavs for various kinds of material or technical aid, to use within our capabilities. Meanwhile, there will be cases when we shall cooperate with them in some sectors, especially in those sectors where we are in no position to begin exploitation with our own forces and possibilities. But questions should be set down in concrete forms. This, in my opinion, should emerge from the discussions to be held here. After carefully studying this very broad and important sector, we should emerge with definite decisions. As for the finer details, these could well come a bit later. Cooperation with the Soviets and the Yugoslavs in this direction is essential, but this can only be realized correctly when we are in a position to know what we have done and what we should do in order to make a great stride forward with a clear and certain prospect.

The agricultural problem is also a great problem which should concern the whole Party. We have often stressed

the great importance of the land reform, but we should bear in mind that the shortage of bread grain has always preoccupied our country, especially last year, but this year too its solution remains uncertain. We should raise the problem that we absolutely must grow our bread grain for the whole year ourselves, and not be obliged to import it from abroad. The state should give great aid and show great concern for the development of agriculture, and this aid should be many-sided, both in finance and work tools. On the other hand, the entire Party and the Front should be mobilized to arouse in the peasants the feeling of systematic work. They should understand the importance of the moment which calls for great sacrifices. The extensive cultivation of the land, sowing, and economizing should become questions of honour. The principal problem in agriculture, as we pointed out before, is ensuring bread grain. Besides the encouragement by the state power, we should launch an all-out propaganda campaign to induce the peasantry to sow as much wheat and maize as possible. On the other hand, we should give special encouragement to the development of agriculture, forestry, and livestock farming.

The maintenance of the forests, and afforestation in particular, are of special importance both for the timber industry and for land improvement. The problem of the reconstruction of the projects destroyed by the war¹¹ remains unsolved. Albania has imported timber, but if we set up

11 As well as the houses burned down or ruined in towns and villages, all the factories, mines, seaports, communication means, etc., were either completely destroyed or heavily damaged. With investments of the government and with the response of the masses of the people to the call of the Party for the reconstruction of the country, all these were again functioning within a very short span of time.

our own industry we shall be in a position not only to fulfil our own needs, but also to export.

The question of livestock farming is of special importance for us. We should improve the breeds of our animals and increase their numbers. This, naturally, will take place when we have not only aided the peasants to plant and ensure the food for themselves and their animals, but after we have educated them to improve this important sector. The success of our small-scale industries, such as cheese, leather, etc., depends on such an improvement.

Concerning our prospects in agriculture, we should proceed towards the creation of some model farms, apart from the existing ones, where work should be done with the greatest care not only to improve production, but so that they become an encouragement for the acceleration of the collectivization of land¹². In this respect we should also work to mechanize agriculture, to create centres of farm machinery which should be placed at the service of peasants to improve production and cultivation methods. These centres should also help boost the movement towards collectivization. We should encourage the holding of courses in agriculture and farm machinery. We should bring into production grains and other products whose value and importance is still not appreciated by our peasants. This, of course, requires not only the concern of the specialists working in this direction, but also tireless political work by the Party and the mass organizations.

Educational policy. We cannot say that we have not been concerned about the educational question from the Berat Plenum until now. But to say that we have had a well defined educational policy would also be inexact. Our

¹² The collectivization of agriculture in Albania started in 1946.

educational policy has consisted only in opening the previously existing schools, in opening as many elementary schools as possible, and in encouraging education as much as possible among the people. But this is not sufficient, and the problem has not been tackled properly. The problem of education is a very broad and important one. Just as we made a great revolution in the social and economic sphere, so we should march at the same pace in the cultural and educational spheres. But in this sphere we encounter many serious obstacles. First, there is the question of the educational cadres, who are to train the future cadres and generations in the spirit we require. Education in Albania used to be the privilege of a minority, and, therefore, unfortunately, the number of teachers in general is small in relation to our needs. Second, and vitally important for us, is the question of school programs, which without fail must be revised, new programs should be constructed with a new spirit, based on the Soviet programs and adapted to our country and to our conditions. This is urgent and essential. Since our entire policy is orientated towards the Soviet Union, it should also be orientated towards it in the field of education. Besides these two important questions, of the cadres and of the school programs, the question of the review of the existing school system in our country arises. Our schools should be created in line with the orientation which we should give the development of the country. Not only have the schools opened in Albania been set up according to the old criteria, but the number of lyceums and gymnasiums has been maintained, if not increased. As for the industrial or vocational schools, there are very very few of them. Another question which should concern us in the matter of education is that of orientating the broad masses of peasants and workers towards being educated and taking edu-

cation into their hands. Education should no longer be a weapon in the hands of the bourgeoisie, but in the hands of the workers and peasants. The state should give all possible support and attention to this. In addition to the question of the schools within our country, there is also the problem of education of the broad masses of the people, not only through the struggle against illiteracy¹³, but also by spreading general education, by creating various courses and people's universities. Here I am dealing in general outlines with the question of education which is, of course, much broader, and from this we should come out with a well and clearly defined line on the basis of which we should work from now on for the new school year.

To be able to carry out our economic policy properly, and to deal with other matters, in the first place, we should have a *strong state power*. This should be correctly understood, for in this matter there have been erroneous views and tendencies, both opportunist and sectarian. Ours is a people's power, but this should not remain only a principle; it must become a reality. The state power must be a democratic people's power in its structure, composition and content. To achieve this completely we still have much to do. In fact, the councils, whether those of the grass-roots or of the subprefectures and prefectures, have in many cases remained formal, do not carry out their real task, or still have the old method of work very evident among them, I mean, the method of past regimes. The

13 The liberation found Albania with over 80 per cent of the population illiterate. The struggle against illiteracy had started as early as the time of war in the partisan ranks and in the liberated zones. After liberation this struggle was intensified, especially in the countryside, where in response to the call of the Party, all those who could read and write served as teachers.

state power means everything to us and is the instrument which will solve all problems, therefore it should be right up to date both in its structure, the composition of its personnel, and its content. The need for specialists has introduced into the state power and its offices white collar workers of the past regimes, who have brought into the state power the old spirit and methods. In this broad sector our Party has been quite unable to control the situation. There have been manifestations of cronyism and negligence, manifestations of bureaucracy, laziness and many other unpleasant things. This has brought about the infection of some of our cadres, and the frequent appearance of sectarian tendencies in the state power. Our new state power has also preserved many old forms of organization, unsuitable for the new period and the work which must be done. The former staff and the old forms of organization have impeded, and will greatly impede, progress in the future if we do not arouse in our Party the feeling of responsibility and sound work.

Honest men from among the people, who enjoy the people's confidence should come into the state power. They should be, in the first place, from the ranks of the workers, peasants, and honest intellectuals; they should be taught and developed by working alongside those who are specialists. Great care should be taken of these specialists too. They should be put to work; their work should be appreciated, but at the same time, the work they do should be checked on, and no opportunist stand should be maintained towards them to the detriment of the work. Besides this, regarding the question of the state power, not only should we exercise the maximum of check-up from within and accept constructive criticism and self-criticism, but at the same time we should encourage the initiative of the masses in giving direct assistance to the

state power and exercising check-up over the people employed in it. The councils, from which the executive committees emerge, should truly exercise their powers both in appointing cadres to the committees, and in controlling them and dismissing them when they do not carry out their work well. To act otherwise means to preserve the form of the people's power, but in content to allow the old spirit and method to hold sway. We should struggle against this with the greatest severity.

On the question of the state power, the enemy will do its utmost to fight us. It will fight against the form of the regime, using as arguments the mistakes and laxity of some officials who, in the majority of cases, are the enemy's men, whom it has infiltrated into the state power, and presenting the matter as though these mistakes are committed because the form of the regime is unsuitable. On the other hand, the enemy will endeavour to penetrate the state power in order to sabotage, to slow down the work, and to introduce all the vices of the bourgeois regime into it, and if given a free hand, it will capture the key positions in various sectors. There are numerous examples of this, and they should teach us a lesson.

The Front should play a great role. We should not regard this as an unimportant question. It is by no means a trifling or an easy matter to activate the masses of the people, to make them conscious so that they serve as the real support of the laws and all state undertakings. But it becomes easy and fruitful if we know how to mobilize the masses wherever they are, and if we know how to link their immediate interests with the general interest. Only thus can they be educated and mobilized to a man, concerning general matters of a national character, and only in this way will they become closely linked with the state power. The people of the Front who are in the

state power and who have the direction of the state in their hands should, through their honest work, make it clear to the people that the state power is theirs, because the state power solves the problems which concern them, and is entirely at their service. The Front should rally the working masses who support the implementation of the program of the Front, and who defend this program not only in words and speeches, but also by working conscientiously. We should mobilize the broad masses of the people in the Front for an organized fight against the reaction, against the saboteurs. In no way should we avoid the struggle within the Front against these hostile elements. The masses of the people in the Front should always be in movement and in struggle, just as they should be at work. Otherwise, this political organization of our people loses all significance. The activity and vigour of the Front will reflect the activity and vigour of our state power. By working in this direction we strengthen the Front, and this is the road we should follow. The Front should be active everywhere, in city quarters, factories, schools, and shops, in a word, wherever there are concentrations of people. And all these masses who constitute the Front should be made interested in the immediate issues, and these issues should be linked with their interests. The Front should be active in the struggle against the black market, against speculation, in the implementation of the laws and regulations of the state power, against saboteurs and enemies of the state power, against illiteracy, etc. A Front which acts in all these directions of daily life is also in a position to understand the great problems of the country, to defend its cause with might and main, to understand what the state power is and how it should be defended, because it is the power of the people. By acting in this way the Front will be

better able to send into the state power those who deserve it, and who have its complete confidence; it will be better able to control their activity, to make suggestions and open prospects for them.

In foreign policy, we should be clear about the relations with the allies, Britain and America on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, and the stand we should maintain towards them. We should proceed cautiously in this matter, for a small mistake could cost us dear. To uphold peace does not mean to maintain an opportunist stand or to make concessions to the Anglo-Americans, but to strengthen the positions of democracy, which means to strengthen, as much and as well as possible, the positions of democracy in our country, and to defend the Soviet Union by supporting its correct policy.

For us the Soviet Union cannot be placed on the same plane as Britain and America. The formula "formally" should no longer exist. This by no means implies that we shall declare war on Britain and America, but that we shall openly and unhesitatingly defend the policy of the Soviet Union, and fight against the reactionary stands of Anglo-American policy. The independence of Albania is closely connected with the strengthening of the Soviet Union; it is our genuine defender and supporter.

Open contradictions are appearing between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Americans. The policy of the latter is an openly reactionary policy to strengthen reaction at the expense of democracy, to restore fascism and the pre-war situation. Their tendency is to create in the West various groups and anti-Soviet blocs to suppress people's freedom and to bring fascist cliques to power. The Soviet Union is the champion of genuine democracy, of people's freedom, and their right to self-determination. The British and the Americans are shamelessly defending the Greek

fascists, and are shamelessly seeking to hide the atrocities committed by their armies in Greece, Indonesia, and elsewhere; they have openly launched a broad campaign of slanders against the Soviet Union and all those countries which have established a progressive democratic order, such as Albania and others. They are maintaining a whole Polish fascist army¹⁴, they are maintaining the German and Japanese fascist armies; they support the chauvinist claims of the Greek and Italian fascists at the expense of our country; in a thousand and one ways they are trying to aid the reaction in our country, to create fascist groups and parties to disturb the order and topple the democratic power; they are the instigators and organizers of the activity of saboteurs of every hue. In a word, the British and the Americans, by every means and at any cost, are seeking to tear from the hands of the people the victories which cost them so much bloodshed and sacrifice.

Faced with such a situation, our stand should be clear-cut, resolute, and wide-awake. Our people should be clear about this situation, should sense the danger and march shoulder to shoulder with the government to defend the country, to defend its independence, to defend its territorial integrity and democracy from such brigands. "We should manoeuvre", we are told. This is correct, but this formula should not conceal any sort of opportunism, and no concessions should be made. A correct, but clear-cut stand, severe where necessary to defend our rights, is the only correct stand. The Party must lay down such a correct line and the people must make it their own. We should explain to the people, through the press, conferences,

14 This refers to the Polish army (in exile) incorporated into the 2nd Polish army corps under the command of the reactionary general Anders, and stationed in Italy. In the end of the Second World War, far from being dispersed, the Anders army became the centre of fascist propaganda.

and small scale agitation, about what the Soviet Union is for us, and what the others, like the Anglo-Americans, are. The people should love the Soviet Union, communism, its leader, the great Stalin, just as they love their own country and their Communist Party. But to achieve this end, we should not be satisfied just with writing two or three articles in the newspapers about the Soviet Union. This would be quite inadequate and ineffective. A many-sided, concrete campaign, various sports activities, cultural displays, and exhibitions are needed. The people should love the Soviet Union and defend it with all their might. They should also love and defend the people's power in Albania. With Yugoslavia, correct and sincere relations should be created in all spheres of activity. The possibilities for this have been created, and the war has made this job much easier. Economic relations, in our opinion, have not been established properly, on the contrary, they are in a state of chaos.

The danger from abroad is great and should not be underrated. The Anglo-American side is making vile threats and disgraceful blackmail, the essence of which should be known and understood by our people. Defense against this danger is legitimate defense, because such manoeuvres are spearheaded against the Soviet Union, and against our people. If we do not point out to the people the stand of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the stand of the Anglo-Americans and their satellites, on the other, then we have failed in our principal duty and have kept the people in the dark, we have not heightened the sense of legitimate defense against the threats being made by the imperialists. The British or American officer who is in our country has come here to fight us, to organize sabotage activities and "uprisings" against the state power; he is the most dangerous informer of imperialism. We

should be clear about this, and so should the entire people, and we should cherish no illusions. We should teach the people how to defend themselves from such evil-doers, because they are working against the people.

Comrades of the Central Committee,

To have a clear line, to understand it, to make it our own and to implement it means everything to us. At every moment we should have our goal in mind: where we are going and how we should proceed. The Central Committee, in the first place, which is the guiding head of the Party, should not only set the tone and the line of the organization, but should be an example of maturity in dealing with questions, and should wisely control the way they are solved. Confusion at the head, vacillation or erroneous viewpoints mean the weakening of the entire life and activity of the Party. Therefore, we should fight against such manifestations and deal with them mercilessly. At a time of peace we should have a militant, monolithic, disciplined Party, a Party of the new type, which should truly lead, which should be the vanguard, and not slip into errors and traps set by the enemies of the people, which are also its enemies. We are responsible to the Party, and the entire Party is responsible to the people; therefore its role is historic and decisive. It is impermissible for party matters to be judged frivolously and in a spirit of unhealthy familiarity. We should place the interest of the Party above everything, because everything depends on it. Therefore we should defend the Party with all our strength against any unhealthy spirit. We should never forget that the explanations, which we are making today, should not remain for us alone. Our laxity and errors have repercussions in the Party, for which we should find the remedy. If we fail to go deeply into how matters

have gone, and how they should go, then, we will again give a wrong orientation to the organization, because the problems are not so easy, nor are they minor ones, but they are the principal problems of the Party, for which we, in the first place, are responsible. We should never forget this.

Works, vol. 3.

**PROGRAM OF THE 1st GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC¹ OF ALBANIA PRESENTED TO
THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY OF THE PRA**

March 24, 1946

Comrade deputies,

With the proclamation of the Founding Constitution of the State², the supreme Constituent Assembly accomplished the historic mission the people had assigned to it. The proclamation of the Constitution gave the State a genuinely popular character, and gave Albania a republican regime expressing the aspirations of all our people. With the proclamation of the Constitution, a brilliant stage is closed, a stage full of heroic exploits and sacrifices, of relentless struggle and tireless work, achieved under the most difficult internal and external conditions. With their own forces, our people liberated their homeland from heavy bondage, won their independence and sovereignty, established their people's power, and set about the reconstruction of their ruined country. During this post-war stage, the Albanian people scored successes not only in consolidating their state power, but also in reconstructing

¹ On January 11, 1946 the Constituent Assembly proclaimed Albania a People's Republic.

² The CPA presented the draft Constitution to the entire people to pass judgement on. After two months of discussions, it was presented to the Assembly, which adopted it on March 14, 1946.

the country's economy, and in the political and cultural development of the broad masses of the people. The proclamation of the Constitution opens up a new stage for the whole people, and in this stage they will advance steadily towards the objectives laid down by the Constitution.

The mobilization of the whole people has been indispensable to achieve the victories we have won so far, because neither the great liberation war nor the first stage of the country's reconstruction could be carried out without this broad participation. The liberation of the country concerned all the people and was a sacred task, but equally sacred and vital was the task of the country's reconstruction, which required the same sacrifices, the same energies and the same sense of duty that characterized our people during the war. Our task is difficult, for obstacles will bar our path. The first government of the People's Republic of Albania, set up on the basis of the Constitution, is conscious of this, just as it is aware of its great responsibility towards the Albanian people. We must and will carry out the heavy tasks which face us, because the Albanian people have proved conclusively that they are capable of building and creating, because they have great vitality and inexhaustible energy, they do not fear hardships and obstacles, and are conscious that they are building their future, building new Albania. For the accomplishment of these tasks, as well as enthusiasm, drive, and a sense of duty, sound organization and work to a plan are required. Planned work and sound organization must become second nature to the Albanian people and the state functionaries.

If these tasks are to be carried out well, all must understand that they have obligations towards society; they must realize that personal interest is closely linked with the general interest, and that the improvement of everyone's economic lot depends entirely on the economic

situation of the whole country. Therefore, in order to perform its mission successfully, the new government requires the support and assistance of the entire people. On the other hand, from the state functionaries, from the lowest to the highest, from the oldest employee to the youngest is required discipline in work, conscientiousness, honesty, and enthusiasm. Those officials who imagine that in new Albania work can go on in the old spirit of cliquishness, bureaucracy and idleness, are grossly mistaken; those, whether old or young, who fancy that the state administration is a *refugium peccatorum**, where they can draw a salary without tiring themselves or doing anything, will soon be bitterly disillusioned. Work must become an honour to every Albanian.

With the Constitution given to us by the Constituent Assembly, vast prospects of work are opened for the construction of a happy society which will guarantee us everything we need to march forward successfully. The Government of the Republic, relying on the successes scored on the first stage and, in particular, on the creative efforts of the masses of the people, on the energy and vitality of the Albanian people, will certainly surmount all the difficulties which it may meet in solving our country's vital problems.

The question of the construction of new Albania

This is the most important question which will preoccupy the government and the whole Albanian people, because it is a most delicate and difficult question, although not an insoluble one. We must mobilize all our forces, since the country's happy future depends on this.

* "*refugium peccatorum*" (Lat. in the original) — refuge of sinners.

To build new Albania means, first and foremost, to reconstruct everything the enemy burned and destroyed, and to march forward with redoubled energies; to rebuild gutted houses, improve and extend communications, which are indispensable to a more rapid economic development, repair and bring into operation the mines, our country's greatest wealth, rebuild light industry, and encourage the growth and improvement of production. To build new Albania means to rehabilitate the national economy, to improve and enrich the people's life, give them a sound culture and education — in fact, to build a new society in a new Albania.

These are the difficult tasks which fall, first and foremost, upon the Government of the Republic and the whole Albanian people, and the solution of them requires the mobilization of all our energies, from the political, technical and organizational viewpoints.

We should be clear about one thing: all the vital projects we are going to carry out cannot be financed by means of the ordinary state budget alone. The gap must be filled by the living energies of the people, by their spirit of initiative and the sacrifices they are ready to make in the service of their country. This is our people's second glorious war, the fight for the construction of our new society, from which heroes of labour will emerge.

The new government is preparing a work plan and a new state budget, this government plan provides, first of all, for:

a) The restoration and the maximum exploitation of our oil fields, bitumen, copper and chromium mines. The best possible use of these precious resources will form the main basis for setting up and reinforcing the other industrial sectors. The government will devote all its energies to this important sector of work, and it calls on the Albanian workers to give their valuable assistance,

strengthen their class feeling, and become conscious of their important role in leadership and reconstruction. With their spirit of sacrifice, our workers should set an example to the entire people, an example of organized and disciplined work.

b) The achievement of maximum efficiency, in the service of the general interest, in the whole light industry of the country, which up till now has operated without criteria, and has served merely to enrich a few at the expense of the people.

c) The restoring of damaged houses. Up to now, the government has done its utmost to provide shelter for those left homeless by the war; it has assisted with materials for temporary repairs to most of the houses in villages destroyed during the war. But this was never sufficient. This year we will still not be able to draw up a general plan for the construction of razed villages and towns, but the new government does provide for the reconstruction of the houses in those villages which have suffered most from the war, and first and foremost, the villages of the Kurvelesh, Vlorë, Mallakstra, Gjirokastra and Korça regions. This is not only an obligation of the motherland towards those who fought heroically, who were killed or lost their homes, but also an urgent need which must be met next summer and autumn. For this purpose, the government requires the support of the entire people: saw-mills and brick-yards, cement factories and lime-kilns should rapidly increase production, the broad masses of the people should be mobilized for voluntary work, and technicians, brick-layers, carpenters and all those who can help their brothers, who had their homes burnt during the war, should be mobilized to work conscientiously in the reconstruction of the ruined homeland.

d) Our country needs new roads, both local and national. In its program, the government provides not only

for the maintenance of the existing roads but also for the construction of new ones. Projects will be carried out in both North and South. Certainly it will take a long time to build up a perfect road network, but we should begin this year to build roads in our North mountain regions, in order to assist the mountaineers in those areas and to raise their economic and cultural level. The roads will be an important means in uprooting the surviving medieval and feudal practices in those areas. No longer will the voice of the Jesuits, or of Maliq Bushati and company, go there, but the voice of free Albania, new Albania.

In our country's reconstruction, the war reparations we are to receive from Germany and Italy will also assist us. Those two countries started the Second World War; they burnt our country and laid it waste. They have to pay for this devastation unprecedented in history. The Reparations Conference held in Paris³, fixed a quota for our country, which consisted of a number of factories. In order to take possession of these, the Albanian Government has sent its own commission to the Reparations Committee in Brussels. The Reparations Conference quite unjustly gave us a quota, very small in comparison with the destruction Germany wrought in our country, but our government will insist that this does not happen in connection with the reparations we demand from Italy. Italy plundered and ransacked our country for years on end, stole our country's riches and mineral wealth, and finally burnt down or destroyed our villages and towns, maiming and murdering hundreds of thousands of Albanians, and must pay for all that damage. The government will insist on this point, and some allies of ours should not forget

3 The Reparations Conference was held in Paris in November — December 1945; it was attended also by a delegation of the People's Republic of Albania, headed by Hysni Kapo.

that our country was the victim of the most villainous aggression, and resisted it, arms in hand, up to the end.

In all these undertakings of the government, powerfully backed by all strata of the people, we should have as our first aim to increase and improve production. The achievement of these objectives will mean the supply of goods to the masses of peasants, workers and other citizens, to the extent possible and, at the same time, the opportunity to expand industry and factory products. In our poor and war ruined country, frugality, and concern to preserve and defend state property, should be encouraged to the maximum, because economizing, protecting state property and cutting down production costs means to lower the cost of products, to create confidence in the present administration among the people, and to strengthen the unity of the peasants, workers and intellectuals in the People's Republic of Albania.

In the cultural and educational field, the government shoulders a heavy burden. Our people need more bread, but they also need more culture and education. Culture and education should not be useless adornments, but should serve the general interest, helping to increase and improve production, and to raise the living standard in our country. We need the kind of culture which will make our people capable of working better and producing more; we should make this culture and education a weapon of the broad laboring masses. The government will fight everything that hinders advance in this direction. In the new Albania, which we are building with the new Constitution which guides us, the old method of organizing work and the old programs cannot be continued any longer. Everything must be adapted to the time and the existing situation, and must be changed not only in form but also in content.

As for schooling, the government will increase the number of primary schools and will temporarily solve the problem of teachers by opening short term teacher training courses. It will be severe towards those teachers who fail to carry out properly the important function assigned to them, as well as towards those parents who do not respect the law⁴ and refuse to send their sons and daughters to school for the whole period required by law.

The doors of secondary schools must be flung wide open to the broad masses of peasant and town youth. The government will strive to create greater facilities for the poor strata, to enable them to continue secondary school; the government will also do its best to have as many girls as possible attend school so that the Albanian woman may be capable of playing her great role in new Albania.

Educational reform and changes in school programs will be the first tasks of the government in the educational field. The reform and the changes in the programs will take into account the conditions created in our country, and the needs emerging in the process of the construction of new Albania.

The education of cadres will play the principal role in this direction, and will be the greatest concern of the government. Capable young people will be sent abroad to continue their studies.

In order to raise the people's cultural level, the government will mobilize all its energies to fight illiteracy. It will organize evening courses, special workers' courses and courses for specialists. It will give the theatre, radio

⁴ In August 1946 the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania approved the Law On Educational Reform, according to which education became general, free of charge, equal and secular, and the school system was given a state unified character. Tuition fees were abolished and elementary education became compulsory.

and cinema all the necessary support to turn them into useful media to raise the people's cultural level. The government will encourage sports and physical culture, so that the younger generation is tempered, and becomes capable to work and fight for the new Albania.

The question of agriculture

This question is one of the most essential, and must be correctly and rapidly solved. Our country is an agricultural country, and the first measure adopted, which is of historic importance, was the implementation of the land reform, which gave the land to those who till it, first and foremost, to the poor and middle peasants. Progress has been made in allotting land to the peasants on the basis of the Law On Land Reform, but this work has not yet been completed. The government will endeavour to do this as quickly and as well as possible. For this purpose it will increase the number of personnel to carry out the land reform. Besides this, the government calls on the peasants' committees⁵ to give the greatest possible support to do this work quickly and fairly in conformity with the interests of the peasants and of Albania. The Albanian peasants should fight with the greatest severity against any trickery or injustice, or misinterpretations of the law, on the part of any irresponsible official involved in the implementation of the land reform. No one should spread illusions or resort to trickery. The government will not allow any trifling with the land or the future of the peasants. If some clause in the law is open to more than one interpretation, this must always be done in the peasant's favour. The government will not only speed up the

⁵ In order to implement the land reform quickly and correctly, the CPA set up the committees of poor peasants which had a great influence in enhancing the class political consciousness of the poor peasants themselves.

land distribution, but will also help the peasants with agricultural credits in money and tools ; it will increase and improve the farm machine stations to be put at the service of the farmers. This year it will be difficult to carry out a broad plan of land reclamation, but the government program provides for digging numerous canals, and draining swamps, such as that of Maliq, etc. All these measures are aimed at raising our agriculture from its primitive stage to a more advanced level, tilling as much land as possible, increasing and improving agricultural production. Here our motto should be: "We must make our bread ourselves, and not depend on imports". The concern of the government alone is insufficient to accomplish these vital tasks, therefore the whole people should be mobilized to work voluntarily and make sacrifices for a happier future.

In connection with agriculture, we will pay great attention to livestock farming, in which we will increase the numbers and improve the breeds of our animals. Naturally, this will come about when we have not only helped our farmers to plant and ensure food for themselves and their livestock, but when we have taught them how to improve this important sector. Besides agricultural courses and schools, the government will open up special courses for peasants. Many branches of our country's light industry, which will grow and flourish in the near future, depend on the improvement of this sector, and milk, wool, and leather processing factories are closely linked with it.

The question of the conservation of forests and of the afforestation of our country will also be the subject of particular attention of both the government and the people, because forests are not only beneficial for improving the land and weather conditions, but they also constitute a great asset for the development of the timber and paper

industries which are indispensable for the reconstruction of our country. To promote agriculture and eliminate anarchy in agricultural production, it must be under the control of the state organs. Peasants must be supplied with good seed, fertilizers, and farm tools, and at the same time be given instructions on what they should sow and what products the country needs most. We should take advantage of the varying weather and soil conditions, and encourage the production of crops whose value and importance our farmer does not yet appreciate. It is only in this way that agriculture will make progress and become more productive, and this in turn will consolidate our economy. The setting up of peasants' cooperatives, provided for in the Constitution, will have energetic support from the government, and these cooperatives will be a primary concern of the state, which will ensure that they remain in the hands of the masses of poor and middle peasants, and are not exploited by speculators.

The financial problem

We are going to solve this important problem through our own resources. The principal source of income will be ensured by the correct development of the country's economy and industry. The problem of the development of the economy and the financial problem go together, and will be solved together, in harmony. The Albanian State Bank will be an important factor in the correct development of the state sector. It will no longer supply credits to enrich the big merchants, but will help the large state enterprises, the economy and agriculture. Besides this, volunteer work, initiatives of the masses in work, sacrifices, and the people's help for public undertaking will contribute immeasurably. We should never lose sight of the fact that the needs of our war devastated country are great; as I have already mentioned, they cannot be met by

our ordinary state budget. We must work hard, and economize, too. Our taxation will be aimed at all those who have grown rich at the expense of the poor people, and taxes will be heavier for those who have most.

The social question

The government, guided by the provisions of the Constitution, will adopt measures in the social field. It will take proper care of orphans made homeless by the war, and the disabled. It will create special employment for the war invalids, and public works will, first of all, employ people who have no income. The state has given considerable aid to the poor, but some people who had no right to this aid profited from it, including some who were quite able to work. We must put an end to such irregularities, and the State Control Commission, set up within the government, and proceeding on the basis of the Constitution, will adopt measures to make the state apparatus function correctly, eliminating these faults and abuses committed by parasitic, unscrupulous elements, which damage the state and society. The government will be harsh with those who violate or bend the law, or those who do not fulfil their obligations towards the government and the state.

The government will end the exploitation of workers, and will assign them to work according to their capabilities, particularly as far as women and young people are concerned. It will also organize state insurance for those disabled by accidents at work⁶, set up holiday camps for working people, and see to it that the eight-hour working day and rest days are observed as laid down by law. In

⁶ This refers to the Social Insurance Branch at the Labour Department.

particular, the government will try to ensure a dignified life for the war invalids.

In the domain of justice

Important changes will be made in the field of justice, in harmony with the basis outlined in the Constitution. In order to have a truly people's system of justice, we must proceed to make reforms. The system of justice must conform to the new social and economic conditions. The principal task of the judges is to ensure that the laws made by the people are scrupulously applied, and every decision they take should reflect the new spirit. In electing their judges, people will take into account not only their professional ability, but chiefly the qualities needed to guarantee the defence of their interests and the fruits of the war, which cost them so much blood.

The people's health

The government will show particular interest in the people's health by engaging in extensive propaganda for hygiene and prophylactic care. It will also intensify its concern for hospitals and specialists, and supervise them to ensure that they do not trade on their profession, but consider it as a great humanitarian mission. The government will also make efforts to build some more hospitals, and to set up as many clinics as possible, especially in the countryside. The government will take severe measures against all those who try to speculate with medicines. Setting up nursing courses is also included in the government's program.

Foreign policy

The foreign policy of the new government will be a continuation of the previous government's policy. The government will defend the interests of peace and demo-

crazy just as it defends the interests of the country. Albania is no longer a country to be trampled on, or an object of barter for the diplomacy responsible for the Second World War. The position of Albania among the anti-fascist nations was not donated; it was won at the price of bloodshed and superhuman sacrifices. Having fought unreservedly in the anti-fascist war for their rights, the rights of mankind, the consolidation and triumph of democracy, and for the people's freedom, our people hold their heads high and insist that their rights be respected. The Albanian people, loyal to the end to the great anti-fascist alliance, are angry and indignant to see the postponement of their legitimate demand to be admitted to the United Nations Organization, and they are even more grieved to see this instigated by their allies, Britain and the United States of America. I cannot even imagine the motives behind these obstacles placed before our country, which is demanding "de jure" its deserved place in the United Nations Organization; neither Mr. Bevin⁷ nor Mr. Stettinius⁸ were able to formulate or express them openly in response to our request, or in reply to the friendly defence of the heads of the Soviet, Yugoslav, and Polish delegations; our people are very grateful to these delegations, and their countries.

We believe that the United Nations Organization should include those states which made sacrifices for the attainment of the objectives this lofty organization aims at: the consolidation of peace, and sincere international cooperation. Fully convinced of this, we say that we

7 E. Bevin (1881-1951), British politician. From 1945 to 1951 he was foreign secretary; one of the organizers of the NATO in 1949.

8 E. R. Stettinius (1900-1949). During the 1943-1945 period he was under-secretary and later secretary of state of he USA.

deserve a seat there before those countries which openly or indirectly collaborated with the Italian and German fascists. The government I have the honour to preside over will not only strive to win these rights, which our country deserves, but will make everyone, particularly those who have Hitler and Mussolini in their blood, respect the freedom, independence and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Albania. The government of our Republic enjoys the support of the whole Albanian people in this resolve.

But small Albania has great friends in the world, sincere friends who love our people, and do all in their power to help them on the road of reconstruction and progress, because they have seen the sacrifices our people made for the great common cause, because they have seen our country burned and devastated, but never yielding to the German and Italian machine of oppression. Today they see our country marching steadily towards restoration, progress and genuine democracy, and becoming an important factor for peace in the Balkans and Europe. In the interests of our people, peace and democracy, the Government of the Republic will do its utmost to consolidate and be worthy of the sincere friendship and confidence that our friends have towards Albania.

One of the most important factors in the victory over fascism, the principal external factor for the liberation of Albania, was the glorious Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Soviet Union is a major factor in the defence of small peoples, in the defence of their sovereignty, freedom and independence. The Albanian people have understood this well, and for this reason they have a great heartfelt, sincere love for the Soviet Union and its great leader, J.V. Stalin. In the course of their history, our people have never before felt themselves so closely bound by sincere friendship to any other people as they do to

those of the Soviet Union. During the terrible war, our people saw with what legendary heroism the Red Army fought for the liberation of nations, and they observe how, with every passing day, the Soviet Union and the Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Stalin defend our legitimate rights in the international arena, and how they help the Albanian people to restore their economy and culture.

The Albanian people, and the Government of the Republic representing their will, cherish these lofty sentiments of friendship and sincere affection on the part of the Soviet Union for our country, and will do their utmost to make the relations, and the political, economic and cultural cooperation between the Soviet Union and our state a sound reality. The Albanian people are grateful to the Soviet Union and to Generalissimo Stalin for their great friendship towards our country and the assistance they have given it.

With regard to the great British and American peoples, the new government will continue, as in the past, to strengthen friendship with them, and fight against the manoeuvres of the neo-fascists and the international reactionary cliques. Our government has diplomatic and friendly relations with many European countries, such as Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and France, and it will strive to consolidate these good relations. We have been bound by an old friendship with the Bulgarian people, ever since the epoch of the Albanian Renaissance during which they supported and helped our patriots. Our government will place this friendship on a new, firm basis with the Bulgaria of the Patriotic Front.

The cordial relations established during the war between our people and the Greek people, in opposing the common occupier, have unfortunately been severed; this is not our fault nor that of the Greek working people; the fault lies with the fascists ruling in Athens, who suppress

the aspirations of the Greek people and seek to disturb the peace in the Balkans and in Europe. The fascists of Athens and international reaction are playing the most disgraceful and perfidious game against our country. A vast, systematic press and propaganda campaign of slanders and provocations has been directed against an honest nation which fought so hard against fascism and asks only to be allowed to live in peace and freedom in its own territory. Slanders, armed provocations along our borders, abduction of Greek minority women by the Hitos bands⁹ and the shameful, brutal torturing of the mother of the martyr and patriot Thanas Ziko, an elderly Greek minority woman, by the men of Athens, bring great disgrace both on the Greek fascists and on those who help these bandits.

The Albanian people must be well aware what the Greek fascists are demanding. They want nothing less than Gjirokastra and Korça, up to the Shkumbin river, because, they say, this is their land. Moreover, international reaction is helping them in this great farce, since they want Albania to be turned into the private estate of the Albanian war criminals living in the palaces of Rome and Cairo¹⁰. Every Albanian, young or old, is astonished and enraged to see that, after this terrible war against fascism, there are still people and states who pose as democrats and yet support such a crazy and disgraceful claim as that of the Greek fascists. Can there be a single Albanian who is not revolted against such claims? Can there be a single Albanian who does not want to take up arms and defend his homeland against any aggressors, be they Italian, German, or Greek fascists? No, there can be

⁹ Members of terrorist bands in the service of the Greek gendarmerie.

¹⁰ Ahmet Zog and his suite resided for a while in Cairo as guests of King Farouk of Egypt.

none; the Greek fascists and those backing them must be clear that if anyone dares to shift the markers of our southern border even an inch, blood will be shed, and a bitter experience will be the lot of those who wish to provoke such a thing. The government of Athens, and Mr. Rendis, its foreign minister, try to make the Albanian people responsible for the Italian-Greek war, putting them on the same plane as fascist Italy and, on this basis, demanding reparations. "Albania declared war on Greece," screams fascist Rendis, with the aim of adding weight to his ridiculous thesis of "Northern Epirus". The Albanian people have never declared war on Greece; on the contrary, better than anyone, they fought the Italians and the Albanian quislings, the perpetrators of this crime. The Albanian people sympathized with the Greek people. They attacked the Italian forces and supply convoys heading for the southern front; they fought skirmishes with the Italian carabinieri in the streets. Those few Albanian soldiers who were conscripted by the Italians threw away their arms, deserted, and were either shot or interned by the SIM. Our war against fascist Italy is witnessed by our victims, our burnt out villages, the declarations of the allies, and the testimony of the sons of the Greek people; they saw with their own eyes the firm will of the southern Albanians, who wanted to fight side by side with them against the Italians, but were refused by the commanders of Metaxas' army¹¹.

Let our people clearly understand the perfidity of this argument: the Greek fascists and international reaction accuse our people of a crime they never committed, but which, instead, they opposed with all their might. Now

¹¹ Fascist Greek general, head of the fascist dictatorship in Greece, 1936-1941.

the real authors of this crime are living it up in big hotels in Rome, where certain people vie with each other to offer them fat salaries. The fascists forget the wolf in order to hunt for his tracks. Why do Mr. Rendis and company protect Italian war criminals and Albanian quislings, the instigators of the war against Greece, such as Victor Emmanuel, Shefqet Vërlaci, Mustafa Kruja, Kolë Bibë Miraka, and others?

They are responsible for that base deed against Greece, not the Albanian people. The Albanian people and their true government have never declared war on Greece; on the contrary, they sympathized with the Greek working people and helped them in their efforts for liberation. Mr. Rendis and company protect the war criminals who were responsible for the Italian-Greek War, perhaps in order to repeat the tragi-comedy of Mussolini. But the gentlemen in Athens must be well aware that the Albanian people are not like Mussolini's Italian fascists.

The progressive world must put these people in their place, who are endangering peace and the normal and peaceful development of relations between states. Our country wants to live in peace and maintain good relations with everyone, but it will allow no one to trample on its rights; it knows how to defend them heroically, and to triumph.

The Government of the Republic will show the greatest care and affection for its heroic army, which liberated the motherland through bloody battles, and assured its independence and sovereignty. The government will do its utmost to ensure that our people's army, the reliable shield of the independence and territorial integrity of Albania, becomes a really modern army, the symbol of the great affection of our people, who gave birth to it and raised it, amidst so many tempests.

Comrade deputies,

In setting out briefly the tasks of our new government, I wish to stress once more that the happy future of the People's Republic of Albania depends on accomplishing these tasks. We will solve these vital problems by relying on our own material resources. Therefore, it is necessary that the entire Albanian people mobilize themselves and be conscious of the fact that we must make sacrifices and give up many things, until we have overcome the major difficulties. With such mobilization in work where we shall pour out our sweat and demonstrate our skill and consciousness, we shall succeed in building new Albania, as would have been wished by those who fought and fell on the field of honour, in order that Albania may be proud, prosperous, cultured and happy.

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Works, vol. 3.

**BEQUEST TO THE CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN PARIS, CONCERNING
ALBANIA'S RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
DISCUSSION OF THE PEACE TREATY
WITH ITALY**

April 27, 1946

TO THE CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS¹ OF GREAT BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, AND FRANCE

Paris

The Government of the People's Republic of Albania has the honour to submit the following for the kind consideration of the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, the United States of America, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, and France:

On the occasion of the gathering in Paris of the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the principal allied powers to discuss various questions connected with the Peace Treaty with Italy, the Government of the Peo-

1 This refers to the Paris Peace Conference held from July 29 to October 15, 1946, to consider the draft peace treaties with the European allies of Hitlerite Germany during the Second World War: Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Finland.

pie's Republic of Albania, interpreting the deep feelings of the Albanian people, draws the kind attention of the Conference to Albania's right to be invited to set forth its views in the discussion of the Peace Treaty with Italy.

Albania is an interested party in this discussion, because it has suffered a great deal from the aggression of fascist Italy.

As is known, on 7 April, 1939, fascist Italy, using large armed forces, attacked and occupied Albania.

The Albanian people resisted the occupation and shed their blood at the ports and on the roads through which the fascist troops entered.

The occupation of Albania by Italy was the result of an armed aggression, based on nothing but its brutal military power, and lasted till the unconditional capitulation of fascist Italy.

The Albanian resistance against the occupier began right from the day of the aggression, on 7 April, 1939, and continued and developed in all forms. The great demonstrations of the masses of the people in 1940 and 1941, against the occupiers were drowned in blood. Six thousand and five hundred anti-fascist Albanians were thrown into jails or concentration camps by the Italians; thousands of others were massacred in cold blood in the towns and villages of Albania, for their anti-fascist activities.

As early as 1939, there were 3,000 anti-fascist Albanians in the mountains, from where they attacked the Italian fascists. They were the nucleus of the partisan units, which later on would cover themselves with glory in the war against the Italian fascists, and then against the German nazis who replaced them.

The war carried on by the Albanian people against both occupiers, side by side with the great allies, forced

the Italians and the Germans to maintain a considerable number of their best divisions in Albania on a permanent basis. By 1942, certain zones of Albania had been liberated by the partisans, and in 1943, on the eve of the capitulation of Italy, more than half of Albania was liberated.

Amidst the war and the most painful sufferings, the Albanian people created their National Liberation Army, the partisan army organized into brigades, divisions, and army corps which by the end of the war was 70,000 strong. It fought bravely against both enemies and, after the liberation of Albania, pursued the Hitlerites beyond our borders into Yugoslavia.

In this way the Albanian people showed that the allied cause was also theirs. With the blood they shed and the sacrifices they made in the same war and against the same enemy, the Albanian people courageously ranked themselves on the side of the great allies and declared their unshakable loyalty to the allied cause.

For the common victory they made the maximum contribution: more than 50,000 dead and wounded, 35% of the towns and villages of Albania razed to the ground, communications destroyed, the national economy ruined by the fascist occupier — all these bear witness to the extent of the war the Albanian people waged against fascism.

This was how the Albanian people won their freedom and independence, created their National Liberation Army and, through this same war, established a democratic regime.

Through such sacrifices in human lives and such huge material damage in the common war, Albania earned the right to present its demands against Italy and Germany.

Therefore, in submitting this legitimate request, in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the Government of the People's Republic of Albania

has the firm conviction that this conference², concerned with the observance of the rights and interests of the small states, will have the goodness to consider this request with all the necessary attention, and to give it a favourable hearing, allowing the Albanian people to raise their voice on this occasion.

Prime Minister and Minister
of Foreign Affairs
Colonel-General

Enver Hoxha

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April 7, 1946*

Works, vol. 3.

² Due to the hostile stand maintained by the USA and Great Britain towards Albania, the PRA was not invited as a participant in the conference, just as it was not invited to the conference for war reparations from Germany.

THESES ON RE-EXAMINING THE WORK OF THE 2nd PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ALBANIA¹

*(Report submitted to the meeting of the Political Bureau
of the CC of the CPA)*

June 9, 1946

Comrades of the Bureau!

I wish to raise before the Bureau a question which I think is important for our Party. I will try to weigh my words carefully, and on the other hand, I ask that they be correctly understood. I say this because we bear

1 Unaware of the backstage dealings in Berat, of the plot hatched by the leaders of the CPY, and of the participants in this plot, comrade Enver Hoxha, analysing from a Marxist standpoint the proceedings of the 2nd Plenum of the CC, held in Berat in November 1944, had come to the conclusion that, at that plenum, the line of the Party had been unjustly condemned, and that the Berat Plenum was the source of a number of weaknesses which were evident in the work of the Party. Therefore, in the report he submitted to the Political Bureau, he called for a re-examination of that plenum and the rejection of its erroneous decisions. These just requests were opposed and turned down by Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo. They feared lest a re-examination of the proceedings of the Berat Plenum might reveal their anti-party activity and the hostile interference of the CPY in the internal affairs of the CPA. Nako Spiru, too, did not dare to disclose the backstage activity of the plotters.

a great responsibility towards our Party and our people, especially at the present time, on the eve of the 1st Congress, at which the line of the Party will be determined and its highest leading organ, the Central Committee, will be elected. I raise this important question neither in order to topple organs nor to bring down comrades; such a thing is impermissible, for it is to the detriment of the Party when these organs and these comrades make up its sound leadership, even though these organs and comrades may have erred in certain minor matters, but can be corrected. The valuable experience of our Party shows us that such reckless moves, whether undertaken inadvertently or deliberately, have harmed our work and hampered its normal development, and are the main source of the laxity and shortcomings that have been observed in our work in general. There have been, and will continue to be, errors committed in our Party, because it is a young Party and the comrades in general do not yet have the maturity of tested communists, and do not make proper use of the great experience of the Bolshevik Party, and of our Party. This should in no way make us lose heart, for it is not easy for everyone to acquire experience and put it to use. It is precisely in order to achieve this as quickly and as well as possible, that I am raising the question which I shall go on to discuss. I want to add one other thing, that while the Party should be lenient towards those comrades who do great and useful work for the Party, but also make mistakes in the course of it, mistakes which the Party should correct and not allow to become more serious, it should be stern in its judgment of those who deliberately seek to harm the Party and lead it into a blind alley. We should learn to be cautious in our decisions and judgments, to be dispassionate and put aside unhealthy friendships or sick sympathies that

may arise, and which stem from non-bolshevik work; we should avoid the prejudices, lingering discontent and cynicism, created and developed in the petty-bourgeois spirit, we should behave and work like communists who are determined to bolshevize their Party and their comrades. To ensure that these matters are put right, and that our work proceeds correctly, we communists possess two strong weapons which no one else has and which constitute the strength of our Party : criticism and self-criticism. Always bearing in mind its own interests and its consolidation and bolshevization, the Party should always analyze its activity, even if this activity is free of errors. This analysis is even more essential when mistakes are made. The Party may come back to the same problem many times, at short or long intervals, and this does not at all imply that the Party has been confused or that it has been shaken and weakened. On the contrary, this shows that our Party is strong enough to undertake any analysis, no matter how difficult it may be, and to study and solve the problem; this means that in our Party which undertakes such analyses, there exists a sound unity, a unity of thought and organization, iron and conscious Party discipline, and great love for the Party and the comrades. I am not afraid of cliques and factions arising in our honest and unblemished Party which has emerged from a hard-fought war, organized and consolidated in the heat of this war, if we keep alive and continually add to the qualities I have mentioned, which constitute the strength of our Party, if we utilize the experience we have gained to heighten and improve the fighting spirit of our Party, if we know how to distinguish the good from the bad, and major errors from minor ones, and can find the proper remedy for both. I am fully convinced that our Party is capable of doing this, of proceeding in this

way, which is the way to bolshevizize itself, therefore, frankly, and without fear, I am raising before you the question referred to earlier.

The activity of our Party, from the early days of its founding until now, can be broadly divided into two main stages: that of the war, and that of the liberation of the country. Between these two stages stands an important event, the meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee in Berat. This meeting took place at the end of the National Liberation War which our Party led, and at the same time, on the eve of the new stage of the reconstruction and governing of the country under new conditions, again led by our Party, which had the reins of power in its hands. I particularly wish to make an analysis of the proceedings of that important meeting of our Party, and the decisions made there, for I consider it essential for matters to be put right, and our work to be going correctly, before the 1st Congress, where the line of the Party will be defined and the Central Committee elected.

What should Berat have meant for us, and in what spirit should the proceedings of the Plenum have been conducted on the one hand, and on the other, what did happen at that meeting and what decisions emerged from it? I shall try to analyse these two questions in order to draw my conclusions which the Bureau should discuss, taking specific decisions to be put before the Central Committee of the Party and the organization.

The Berat Plenum was an irregular meeting, for the following reasons: the agenda of the Plenum had not been worked out by the Bureau in an objective and properly communist way. In the Bureau, problems were not raised in a comradesly and communist way, but in a cut and dried form as decided outside the Bureau, thus not

after a Marxist analysis which could have been made by the Bureau itself without passion and prejudice. Issues were put forward in a brutal way, like a "coup d'état"* , which neither the circumstances and conditions nor the methods of our Party permitted, nor would such a thing have happened if the entire activity of the Party preceding the meeting of the Berat Plenum had been properly analysed in a Marxist manner. At the meeting of the Plenum, matters were put forward not in the right way, and in front of new elements who were not members of the Plenum but whom it had been predecided would be made members of the Plenum, and this has had bitter consequences in the further development of the affair, as I shall prove later in my report. At the Berat Plenum the issues were put forward in a distorted way, and thus a number of mistaken conclusions emerged.

The Berat Plenum should have been an indispensable and important meeting for our Party, it should have marked a major turning point in our work and in our methods of work; it should have been a continuation of the glorious activity of our Party during the entire period of the war in a new and very difficult stage. The Berat Plenum should have been a sound link between these two stages. The stage of the war, prior to Berat, was the entire activity of our Party, its heroic battles, its organization and consolidation, the general uprising of the people, the immortal work of our Party, it was the creation of the National Liberation Army which fought without let-up against the occupiers and traitors, the overthrow of the old state power and the laying of the basis of the new state power, the defeat of the reaction, the liberation

* Fr. in the original.

of Albania, it was the taking of power by our Party and the keeping of it in sound hands. In short, the stage of the war, prior to Berat, was everything on which our future activity would be based. The Berat Plenum blackened, spurned and condemned this brilliant stage. Herein lies its great error and the source of a number of serious mistakes which appeared in our work later. During the stage of the war and prior to Berat, there were mistakes in our work, there were organizational errors, sectarianism and opportunism, laxity and shortcomings; the method and style of work were not very good, the policy about cadres was not quite correct, but our Party had not been wrong politically, the line of our Party was correct, not mistaken, as Sejfulla Malëshova and Velimir Stoinich² claimed at the Berat Plenum. Our Party was a Communist Party, created in the heat of battle, which fought with heroism; Sejfulla Malëshova was wrong when he said at the Berat Plenum that it was "neither Marxist nor communist". Our Party was not "a gang of criminals" where "political work was confused with crime", as Sejfulla Malëshova said at the Berat Plenum. The leaders of the Communist Party, and I in particular, had not emerged accidentally, as Sejfulla Malëshova claimed at the Berat Plenum when he propounded his theory about the "chiefs and the leader", but had emerged from the strug-

² Velimir Stoinich came to Albania in August 1944 in his capacity as head of the Yugoslav military mission and envoy of the CPY to the CPA. On orders from the Yugoslav revisionist leadership, he organized the Berat backstage dealing and was engaged in markedly hostile activity against the Marxist-Leninist leadership of the Party and its correct line. At that time, when comrade Enver Hoxha criticized the delegate of the CC of the CP of Yugoslavia, the treachery of the Tito's clique had not yet been revealed. But in fact, this criticism was levelled at the same time against the Yugoslav leadership as well.

gle of our people. But I will enlarge on these matters later on. The Berat Plenum did not know how to sort these things out, and this was deliberate on the part of some, and unintentional on the part of others. The duty of the Berat Plenum was to make a Marxist analysis of all our work, but regrettably, those who claim to have Marxism in their veins and at their fingertips, like Sejfulla Malëshova, acted in an anti-Marxist and anti-party way. The Berat Plenum should have corrected the mistakes that had been committed, and hit hard in the right place and where these mistakes had become a tendency; in particular it should have put right the question of the organization of the Party, and that of the policy on cadres; it should have pointed out the shortcomings and laxity which had appeared in our work so that they might serve as lessons, and should have clearly defined the political and organizational line to be carried out rigorously and with the greatest maturity during the stage after Berat. On the other hand, the great achievement of our Party, which could not have been made if its political and organizational line had been wrong, ought to have been brought to the fore and to have dominated the whole proceedings of the Berat Plenum and the entire assessment of our Party's work. However, the opposite was done. Here I am defending our Party, and the prestige of our Party, which should be something concrete and real, which even the simplest party member, who has not spared even his life for this, should see, feel, and be proud of. My sole aim in saying these things is to defend the Party from the careerists, and not to defend individuals, but individuals too, and first and foremost, the party leaders, are linked with the Party.

A wrong practice was followed at the Berat Plenum. The party line was condemned and the people who im-

plemented that line were condemned. The Berat Plenum cast overboard most of those who had organized the Party, who had organized the war and guided the Party and the war. . .

That Plenum also condemned Liri Gega³, and I must say that the only correct and fully deserved condemnation was that of Liri Gega. Liri's conduct was unhealthy, cliquish, and full of ambition and sectarian tendencies. She did not work for the Party but for herself, to strengthen her position in the Party. Her work was full of serious political and organizational mistakes which had nothing to do with the line of the Party, but which Sejfulla Malëshova made capital of in order to attack the Party and its line . . . Liri's work after Berat and up to the present makes even more obvious the sort of a person she is and where she is heading. Not only should Liri Gega not be a member of the Central Committee, but if she does not change her ways, and alter her opinions and methods, she will not be worthy to keep the title of a member of the Party.

As for myself, who, according to the conclusions of the Berat Plenum, was "the person who had made most of the mistakes", I not only remained a member of the Bureau and of the Central Committee but also General Secretary of the Party. This was an anomaly for me as an individual and as Party leader, a false and formal situation. Thus, after the Berat Plenum, the Party had no real political secretary, and the leadership of the Party,

3 A member of the CC of the CPA, she was severely criticized during the war for her pronounced sectarian, egoistic attitude, and careerism. The 2nd Plenum of the CPA expelled her from the CC. In 1956 she placed herself in the service of the Yugoslav revisionists, betraying the Albanian people.

and especially of the Bureau, apart from Nako⁴ and Koçi⁵, was new.

How did it come about that the proceedings arrived at these results and conclusions? In my opinion two people were chiefly responsible: Velimir Stoinich and Sejfulla Malëshova. Nako and Koçi too have some responsibility, but lesser responsibility, because I think that their aims and inclinations, which were inspired by the other two, later degenerated and were misused in a non-Marxist manner⁶. I have never been convinced about what was decided upon at Berat, for the sole reason that all that our Party had done was rejected and underestimated, and not because individuals were ousted. . . I have had great confidence in the Party for which I had fought as hard as its best comrades. I trusted these comrades, trusted and loved them, because I had fought together with them and I knew that they were as devoted to the Party as I was. But people make mistakes. They make mistakes intentionally or unintentionally. We must be very careful about this and understand the nuances of these errors, which is vital for our Party. Velimir Stoinich was wrong all along. Did he do this purposely to harm our Party? All I can say is that his mistake cost us

4 Nako Spiru, member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPA, political secretary of the Communist Youth of Albania. In 1947 he was driven to suicide by the intrigues of the Yugoslav revisionists and Koçi Xoxe.

5 Former organizational secretary of the CC of the CPA, he had placed himself at the service of the Yugoslav revisionists and resorted to criminal methods in the CPA and in the new Albanian state, endeavouring to realize Tito's plan to attach Albania to the Yugoslav Federation.

6 Comrade Enver Hoxha still knew nothing about the roles Koçi Xoxe and Nako Spiru had played in the backstage dealing in Berat.

dearly. Velimir Stoinich interfered in an unlawful and dangerous way in the affairs of our Party. . .

Having made this great mistake, Velimir Stoinich, as a young inexperienced cadre, later tried to repair it in the wrong way; thus he erred again. He realized that at Berat he had done something quite impermissible, he had rejected the great work done by our heroic Party and lowered the prestige of the leadership of the Central Committee, and he tried to correct this mistake in a non-Marxist way. Many months after the Berat Plenum he came to me, trying to persuade me that I was truly the General Secretary and Prime Minister, the principal leader of the people, and that I should, therefore, take the work in hand and give effective leadership; he got hold of Koçi and said to him, "We should bring Liri Gega and Ramadan Çitaku back on to the Central Committee"; he got hold of Ramadan Çitaku and, no doubt, Liri Gega, and said to them, "Your affair will be put right; I've spoken to the comrades, and you'll be going back on to the Central Committee". Velimir manipulated our Party and our comrades. But this manoeuvre did not succeed with me. Velimir Stoinich went still further. He did not have a correct understanding of the cooperation and connections which we should have with the Yugoslav Party; he had a wrong idea of the independence of parties. The case of Brana Perovich⁷ with our youth organization is one of these manifestations of the wrong concept regarding the relations of our Party with the Yugoslav Party. And the final request Velimir Stoinich made to me, to hand him all the reports that came to the Party from its organizations so that he might read and take a copy of

⁷ Member of the CC of the Yugoslav Youth, and a delegate to the 2nd Congress of the Anti-fascist Youth Union of Albania, she tried to force the views of the Yugoslav leadership on the CC of the Anti-fascist Youth Union of Albania.

them, made it clear that he had a wrong view of the relations between the two parties and of the independence of parties.

Velimir Stoinich was unable to adapt his very limited experience to the circumstances and conditions of our country and our struggle. Although, in broad outlines, our conditions were almost the same as those in Yugoslavia, there also existed differences, variants, and circumstances which were not the same. . . He used to speak with the greatest assurance on matters he did not know about, and which we knew more about than he, for we were Albanians and had led a whole war. He undervalued the experience of our Party and of the members of our Party. . .

Velimir Stoinich's mistakes had bitter consequences for our Party in many directions. Let us look at them one by one:

The question of Sejfulla Malëshova: Who was Sejfulla Malëshova? Certainly, he was neither a fascist nor a traitor. It was known that he was an old communist, an anti-fascist and a patriot. None of us knew more than that about this man. He came to Albania with great pretensions, very great pretensions. "The war had begun and was being developed" in our country, because of the work Sejfulla Malëshova had done in Moscow and in France (without the slightest connection with our movement); this emerged from his pretensions. But what this man had done in Moscow, we did not know then, and even now we do not know with certainty. It is our duty to test people ourselves; the Bolshevik Party never forces people on you. What had Sejfulla Malëshova done in France? Nothing concrete, and the results are almost nil. How should we have acted towards this man when he came to Albania? My opinion is: with the greatest caution, not because he was a suspicious character, that's not

what I mean, but in order to have him earn his position in the struggle. Sejfulla Malëshova should have given proof of his worth, but profiting from the fact that he had been a political exile in Moscow, and in the way things were done at that time, he was named an alternate member of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party a few weeks after his arrival in Albania. Sejfulla Malëshova was not at all content: "his place was at the head of the Party". For him the leadership of our Party "had no leadership qualities", he was "a trained revolutionary, versed in the great Marxist theory and in practice, too." Sejfulla Malëshova never made any effort, nor did it ever occur to him to fight as he should and earn the post he was assigned to, and prove that he deserved promotion. But he sat in his ivory tower, doing nothing but criticizing and waiting for the chance to achieve his predetermined objective by other means. In the discussions with Tempo on whether or not the "Balli" should be attacked at a particular time, Sejfulla Malëshova associated himself with Tempo⁸ and emerged as the sole person who saw that "the Party was making a mistake", and sounded 'the alarm', as he said in Berat. But what alarm? That alarm is a matter for discussion. We shall see whether or not the "Balli" should have been attacked at that moment. The Party will make even more detailed analyses of these matters, based on facts which should be collected and studied carefully, because this is the history of our Party, and the fact that Tempo or Sejfulla Malëshova have said something is not sufficient to prove that it must inevitably be right. But now this is not the problem. Even if we

8 In July 1943, Vukmanovich Tempo, one of the principal leaders of the CPY, who had come to Albania on a special mission to set up the so-called "Balkan Staff", deliberately accused the CPA of an opportunist stand towards the "Balli Kombëtar". Sejfulla Malëshova sided with Tempo's accusations.

accept that the "Balli" should have been attacked at a particular moment, would this mean that the political line of the Party was wrong, that the leadership was not worth a cent? Whether the "Balli" as an organization was unmasked today instead of a month earlier or a month later, is a tactical question but not a wrong line, because the fact is that the "Balli" was attacked and crushed, and this not because Sejfulla Malëshova sounded "the alarm", but because the party line was not wrong. Sejfulla had other intentions. These were apparent in Berat and after it. But Sejfulla Malëshova's activity has not been sporadic, but consistent: his erroneous line has not been accidental; it has been his own opportunist line which is in his blood and which he has always manifested, to the point where it has become really alarming for our Party.

For Sejfulla Malëshova, the Berat Plenum was his field of action where he could and did manoeuvre. What had Sejfulla done for the war and the Party up to the Berat Plenum? We may say very little, or even nothing at all. At Berat he emerged above everyone as "the man who made the law, the infallible man", "the man who had foreseen all the great mistakes of the Party", "the man who sounded to alarm but went unheeded", and now the time had come for him to strike out left and right at the Party and the leaders without exception, and to lay down "the new line" with the greatest assurance.

What were, briefly, the theses which Sejfulla Malëshova submitted to the Berat Plenum?

"The policy of the Party towards the Front has been wrong; in fact it has not had a line regarding the Front.

The Party's stand of not attacking the 'Balli Kombëtar' as an organization after its emergence was an opportunist one. The Party waited for a sponta-

neous differentiation to occur within the 'Balli Kombëtar'. This was an opportunist tactic.

Following the 2nd National Liberation Conference at Labinot, we attacked the 'Balli' with arms. Thus we went from opportunism to sectarianism, and vice versa. I, (Sejfulla Malëshova — Ed.) upheld the thesis that the 'Balli' should only be exposed, and not fought with arms. Tempo and I were opposed to taking severe measures against Dr. Ymer Dishnica and Mustafa Gjinishi regarding the Mukje agreement. We considered it a serious mistake not to have gone to meet and hold discussions with the 'Balli', as had been decided at Mukje.

There have been terrorist tendencies in the Party, in the Army, and among the people. This shows the weakness of the Party's policy and the absence of links with the masses. Thus, symptoms of degeneration appeared in the Party, and if we fail to take steps it will degenerate into a bunch of criminals. It is in our Party itself, and nowhere else, that we should look for the root of errors. This would not have happened if it were a genuine communist party. One of the main causes of our mistakes is the social composition of the Party, which stems from the petty-bourgeoisie. The second main cause is the political traditions of our country, putschist and terrorist traditions. The Party has not been educated in a Marxist-Leninist spirit. The cadres come from bourgeois schools and are not equipped with Marxist-Leninist theory. They have read Marxist-Leninist books, but this is not enough, they must work with a Marxist-Leninist method and style. Can we call Marxist-Leninist what our press writes about Enver being a principal factor of the National Liberation

War? We have neither a Marxist-Leninist Party nor a Marxist-Leninist leadership.

Communist Parties must have a policy of chiefs and the party leader. How has this been raised, and has it been solved in our Party? Here, too, we have been wrong, for we have not thought like Marxists. The chiefs and the leader are not appointed by decree, but emerge from the struggle. Let us take the case of Enver, as leader of the Party. In our Party we have not and could not have had a leader because it has not been a Marxist-Leninist party with a correct line. It is not enough to have a General Secretary, it is necessary to have a leader. He can emerge only when our Party has been consolidated. At Helmës⁹ it was decided to popularize Enver. Was this the opinion of the Party? The Party was not able to have its say. Thus, the policy of chiefs and the leader was put forward incorrectly and solved badly.

The National Liberation Front should be broadened to include people who have authority on and the confidence of the people. There is no limit to the expansion of the Front. It can also include certain people like Cen Elezi, for we must detach them from reaction and mobilize the masses. And in the work of courts we should not be severe, because our position has been incorrect.

The Central Committee has not been clear about the role of the national liberation councils as the organs of our people's power. The Constitution of the councils was drawn up at Labinot, but no one knew what it meant. Since we have the reins of power in our hands, we will bring about economic and social

⁹ At the 1st Plenum of the CC of the CPA, May 1944.

transformations, but they will have a bourgeois-democratic character. Today we have a government and the national liberation councils, and on these foundations we must set up a state, therefore, we have to do some hard thinking.

Our military successes have not kept pace with our political successes. Our national liberation councils and our grass root organizations are weak. The army is not properly linked with the state power; it has separatist tendencies. This is due to the weakness of the political work of the Party in the army, work which becomes increasingly complicated as our army grows.

As members of the Political Bureau, Koçi Xoxe and Nako Spiru should have done more to change the situation in the Party. Since the state of affairs could not be changed without the intervention of the Central Committee of the CPY, they should have sounded the third alarm. The first alarm was sounded by Tempo, and the second by me (Sejfulla Malëshova — Ed.). Sectarianism remains the greatest danger for the Party. But this does not mean that there are not also opportunist tendencies! We should direct our heaviest fire against sectarianism.

This Plenum marks only the beginning of a change in our Party. There should be a change in all the organizations of our Party, in the whole movement, in the Front, the councils and the army."

In Berat, Sejfulla Malëshova became a member of the Central Committee and of the Political Bureau.

Thus Sejfulla, who drew the conclusions of the Berat Plenum (he has always had a mania for drawing conclusions, and in this he had a purpose), condemned the line of the Party, and called it wrong.

Now the question arises: Was the line of the Party before Berat wrong? I don't think it was. There may have been, and indeed there were, occasions when tactics have been faulty, but this has been corrected. In cases when the tactics were at fault momentarily, this, I think, was not because the line of the Party was incorrect, but because there were serious defects in the method and style of work, because in organizational matters the Party was not beyond reproach, and because the circumstances of the war (and this was the main reason) did not allow us to have regular contacts with all our organizations. With the work conducted under the conditions which we are all familiar with, and taking into account the experience and capacity of our comrades, sectarianism and opportunism were bound to crop up. But they never reached the point of becoming a great danger, of isolating the Party or liquidating the Front. This did not happen, for the reason that the line of the Party has not been incorrect. Otherwise, we would not be in this position. Mukje was not "the offspring of the wrong line of the Party", as was said at the Berat Plenum, but the offspring of Dr. Dishnica, who fully deserved the condemnation he received. Here I want to make an aside: Sejfulla Malëshova has been consistent in his tactics ; he described Mukje as "the logical consequence of the erroneous line of the Party", and hence he considered the condemnation of Dr. Dishnica as unjust, therefore, he twice proposed that the Doctor should come back on to the Central Committee. There were mistakes in our work before the Berat Plenum, but of a different nature. In general, questions of party organization had not been tackled correctly, and there had been shortcomings and laxity. When we analyse these mistakes and shortcomings now, with the present life of our Party and its greater experience, we take a broader view and are more indulgent about these mistakes

than we were at the Berat Plenum. We know what the particular circumstances and our experience were at that time; nevertheless, these mistakes and shortcomings should have been remedied and corrected by the Berat Plenum. These included the problem of the Central Committee and of the Bureau; their work as the genuine leading organs of the Party should have been put on a correct course, the style and method of work should have been altered; the question of cadres and the policy in regard to cadres required a sound and thorough revision. Around these major issues there were also many minor ones which had created discontent, which was not expressed freely, in a Marxist way, as should be done in a healthy party. This attitude was apparent in the whole method and style of our work. Yes, on top of the analysis of the entire work, the Berat Plenum should have corrected these mistakes and eliminated this discontent, to put things right as far as possible for the future. The essence of this discontent was well grounded and not unhealthy, but it was put forward wrongly, in the way I have mentioned and for the purposes I have spoken of, and therefore developed in a distorted way. In my opinion, Velimir Stoinich was mainly responsible for the matter being raised wrongly; he gave the orientation to the proceedings of the Plenum, and encouraged it to take this course which was also adopted by Sejfulla Malëshova, who gave the finishing touches to the proceedings of the Plenum and put his seal on it.

After liberation, the Party gained new impetus, fresh hopes were awakened among our cadres, and confidence in the Party was strengthened; the future seemed clearer, and we felt confident that our work would proceed better and more correctly in solving the difficult problems facing us following the complete liberation of Albania. The Party's organizational matters were straightened up in

a more normal and concrete form. The liberation of Albania itself was an important factor in making our organization more coherent and more compact from the organizational standpoint, because the communications and contacts became normal and much easier than during the war. The whole Party was aware of its heavy responsibility in running the state; the leading cadres, though inexperienced in running the new state apparatus and in solving the vital economic problems of the country under the difficult postwar conditions, fulfilled their arduous tasks. They had confidence in themselves, for they had been through the war. The Berat Plenum helped in this direction.

However, the turning point in the Party would have been complete if the Berat Plenum had really been the kind of meeting I spoke of above, and if the mistakes I have mentioned had not been made. The Berat Plenum left in our Party and our cadres some erroneous and harmful views which became dangerous to a certain point and which, if we fail to eliminate them, will hamper our work.

1. As a consequence of the Berat Plenum, the view was created that in the leadership of the Party there are people who have made serious mistakes and others who have made none at all, so that it is clear whom confidence should be placed in. There was sharp criticism of the way the Central Committee and the Bureau functioned during the war. This should have served as a great lesson after Berat, too, and should have prevented us from repeating the same mistakes. But the question of the Central Committee and especially of the Bureau did not go as it should. This question was still put forward wrongly, because the Bureau's new composition and the inherent and subjective shortcomings of those who formulated the criticism at the Berat Plenum were to lead us again into

mistakes. The Bureau which was reorganized at Berat, as I said earlier, was a new one, with the exception of Nako, Koçi and myself. On the surface there appeared to be unity of opinion and harmony in this Bureau, but in reality this was not the case. First, my position was considered by the others as merely formal, for in the eyes of the comrades I was the one who had made mistakes, and I had remained there simply because nothing else could be done. Sejfulla had failed to win not only my confidence but also, I am certain, that of Koçi and Nako; I mean confidence in the sense of believing that Sejfulla could be a sound element in the Bureau. This opinion about Sejfulla was because he had given no "tangible"* proof of concrete work.

Pandi¹⁰, Bedri, and Tuk, all three, were newcomers to the Bureau. I was the only one to hesitate about you three joining the Bureau, and I hesitated because I doubted whether you would be able to give real leadership as members of the Bureau. I don't mean that we, the others, were infallible, but we had a little more experience. Now, with a Bureau like this, there was a danger that we would make further mistakes, and we did. In Berat we "criticized" the old method of work, but the question was to learn from this. Instead of the Central Committee and the Bureau effectively directing all the work, instead of problems being raised and effectively solved there, and the Party and state organizations being run by an effective centre on the basis of democratic centralism, things were done differently. It is not a matter of problems not being raised in the Bureau, but the

* Fr. in the original.

10 Pandi Kristo, a collaborator of Koçi Xoxe, placed himself at the service of the Yugoslav revisionists, and tried to carry out their criminal methods and chauvinist plans.

method of work in the Bureau was almost the same as before, except that meetings were held more often than during the war. However, the style left much to be desired and, apart from a few modifications, was the same as before the meeting of the Berat Plenum. The effective leadership was shifted; leadership was given not by the Political Bureau, but by the offices of the Central Committee of the Party and by those working there, that is, by Koçi Xoxe and the cadre apparatus, and also by Nako Spiru, who was in closer contact with them as far as work was concerned. Thus, the work was not and could not be concentrated in the hands of the Bureau or supervised by it. Responsibilities were not defined and competences were confused. What was said in the Bureau (to the extent that decisions were taken), and what did Sejfulla do? Often he did the contrary. He theorized about everything and tried in this manner to push his way to the top, but his theorizing did not conform to reality, and was often at variance with it. He continued to give very little help in implementing decisions, and his output was negative. When our work was analyzed at the 5th Plenum and in the Bureau prior to this Plenum, it was said that Sejfulla had exerted the most influence on the markedly opportunist trends which had appeared in our line. In this we were not wrong at all, for Sejfulla had displayed these tendencies and raised them to the level of a theory as far back as the Berat Plenum, but they appeared more clearly after liberation. Where were our eyes, that we didn't see this earlier? The trouble was that for a considerable time after the Berat Plenum there was no unity in the Bureau, because I was in the position I have spoken of, because Tuk Jakova took less interest than anyone, and showed a surprising indifference towards problems, because Pandi's nature and his method of work caused him to view things narrowly, without a broad perspective,

because Bedri worked hard but was easily influenced either for good or for bad, as was the case in regard to sizing up Sejfulla. There were objections within the Bureau, especially about Sejfulla's tendencies, but these objections did not develop into a sound analysis of our line. The reason for this was the composition of the Bureau. We are still facing the difficulties we had at the Berat Plenum, but on a minor scale. There is no healthy trust between the comrades, they speak with reservations, prejudice, hesitancy and coldness. Here again Sejfulla found the opportunity to use his influence to cause mistakes in our line. You may think about this and ask, "Why did you not see these things and bring them up as you are doing today?" It is not true that I did not see them, but there are also things which I did not see before, but realize now; you and I together may realize them even better later on. But it is a fact, as I have already said, that I was not convinced about the decisions taken at Berat. Why did I not say this openly? For two reasons. First, because I saw that it was not the right moment, and I feel my responsibility for this, and second, because I, like all of you, have the qualities and shortcomings inherited from our old work. But only I was clearly aware of one thing, and expressed this to both Koçi and Nako: that I was obliged to hold my hand, that I could neither work nor lead, and by this I wanted to make them realize that the Bureau was not leading. I had often spoken of the duality which existed between the Party and the state power, and said that guidance of the state power was not being done in the way it should be done. On the other hand, I saw the currents which came and splashed over me. When Sejfulla in that way of his came to complain to me, crying, "Why am I not being popularized and why popularize Nako?" etc., when Velimir Stoinich came, and in order to show how friendly he was towards me,

said that I should lead because I was the Secretary and the Prime Minister, or implied, "If Sejfulla is anything he is ambitious", etc., I drew the necessary conclusion. But the comrades should have seen one thing clearly, that the Party line prior to the Berat Plenum was not wrong, and that I had not made the mistakes attributed to me at Berat, and did not deserve the characterization that was made of me. I am not accusing any comrades, either of the Bureau or of the Plenum, of lacking affection and appreciation towards me, but there in Berat, it was the Party line which was under attack in the first place, and I was one of the main ones to be struck at. Thus, in effect, after this I could not have the necessary authority. This is evident, and this is why I did not put forward my views earlier, lest they be taken as personal issues. But I have always had confidence in the conscientious comrades, and I knew I would find the opportune occasion to raise these important issues. And having this unshaken trust in my comrades, for they all love the Party as I do and work for it in the same way, I shall continue to analyse frankly the other shortcomings which we have inherited from the past and from the Berat Plenum.

At Berat, new, straight-forward, good people with a promising future in the Party came into the Central Committee. However, these new people who were present in the Central Committee for the first time, in addition to learning what was good from the Plenum, also learnt what was bad. Those people thought that from Berat onwards mistakes had been brought to an end, and that there was no danger of further mistakes being made; those who had made mistakes had been thrown out, and the work would be faultless. Conscious faith is good, but groundless faith is dangerous. In our work we would see whether we would go wrong again or not. Only to a very small extent did we of the Bureau see the mistakes that

were being made by the comrades who were working in the Cadres Commission, and who effectively ran things for a long time. Not only was the work not going very well, but there were also many mistakes and shortcomings, and these shortcomings and mistakes were similar to those we were supposed to have criticized too strongly at the Berat Plenum. Instructions to the Party and the state power went out from the apparatus of the Party Central Committee ; problems which should have been solved in the Bureau were solved there. This could have continued without controversy for a brief period, but not for long, because when the Bureau does not give leadership, everyone does so according to his own ideas, orders contradict one another, and everyone tries to defend his own viewpoint and insists obstinately, even when his view is mistaken, or else he gives way when he is not convinced that he should do so, for the sake of political expediency.

In the Political Bureau of our Party and among the comrades there is no room for "political dealing", because to resort to this means to aggravate problems, to create discontent, to give rise to unhealthy views, to create cliques, and in the end, factions. The source of these things, which are at variance with the principles of our Party, should be eliminated. We should fight these evils without mercy. Such a fight is not an easy job, but it can be done in our young Party which has emerged from the war with young, sound cadres who are not infected with these things and have no traditions of them.

2. Another question is the way these important issues were raised in Berat, I mean in the form of a "coup d'état". The solution of problems at the 5th Plenum was not done as at Berat, it was not achieved with a method of work like that used in preparing the Berat Plenum. Nevertheless, many comrades unjustly considered it, and still consider it, identical with the "coup d'état" in Berat.

I say they are not the same. The proceedings of the 5th Plenum should be assessed differently by the whole Party, for the reasons I shall now put forward.

When the problem of doing away with opportunist manifestations in our political line was taken up in the Political Bureau prior to the 5th Plenum and at the 5th Plenum itself, this was done because it was the most important, most critical, most dangerous, and most tendentious problem of all. But there was something else that should have been raised there, and was not. These questions are precisely what I am bringing up today.

The Berat Plenum did great harm to the Party, and I never want to see that mistake repeated. We should have corrected the political line and sharply condemned Sejfulla Malëshova, because he deserved it, but we should also have criticized, of course more mildly, those comrades who may have erred unintentionally, but were also hard workers. He who works makes mistakes, but Sejfulla Malëshova did not work, and still made mistakes. We should understand this well. We must understand correctly the difference between the 5th Plenum and the present meeting, and that of Berat. What was that other matter, apart from the question of the political line, which was not brought up at the 5th Plenum? It was the analysis of the organizational line of the Party, the whole management, the internal organizational work of the Party, the Front and the state power. Have there been serious wrong tendencies in our organizational work as there have been in our political work? I think there have been mistakes, shortcomings and laxity. The wrong tendencies, which appeared in the implementation of our political line, have had repercussions on our organizational work. The Berat Plenum has had its repercussions, and so has our work prior to Berat, the old method and style of work. Let us have no illusions about

this. All of us could, and all of us did, make these mistakes, some more and some less, and we should not be surprised, after this analysis and after repeated analyses, to find further traces of these mistakes. But how long will this last? We shall have greater experience and shall make fewer mistakes, and this will be the sign that our Party is becoming bolshevized.

The first and principal mistake lies with the Central Committee and the Bureau. These organs have not given leadership as they should have done for the reasons I have already stated. But this is the source of a number of other mistakes. The Cadres Commission, composed of members of the Plenum headed by Koçi Xoxe, whose principal responsibility was towards the Bureau, directed the whole work. But the Cadres Commission had exceeded its competences, and consequently its members, even if they were comrades with great experience, were not able to carry so heavy a burden as that of directing the Cadres Commission itself and running the work in general. They began to take over the competences of others as well. This was an organizational shortcoming which has had bad consequences in our work. Besides, they seemed to take it easy and gradually formed the conviction that everything was being run well and without mistakes. In reality, however, this was not so. The policy of cadres was not resolved correctly. Our cadres were not being educated as they should, the courses were not making progress, many mistakes were being made by those in the state power, and the various conferences with the cadres were not as substantial and concrete as they should have been. Party and government cadres come to the offices of the Central Committee, and precisely to the Cadres Commission, for instructions on how to solve problems, which were very important, and even vital for our Party. How far were these instructions

helpful, and to what extent did they have the required result? I am doubtful about this, because the Bureau itself was not clear about these problems, because the Bureau was not working in a way which would enable it to solve these problems and guide the whole Party. The comrades of the Cadres Commission did what they could (their tireless work cannot be denied) but the way things were going, the work in both the Party and the state power was falling off. This was the source of many shortcomings in the state power. A kind of Party-state power duality was created. The way the Party guides the state power was not well understood, because work had been confused in the leadership. The role of the state power and its primary importance to the Party were not clear. Even if the minister were one of the best and most tested communists, he was regarded as of little worth by the men of the Party. They did not see the Party in the state power, but only in certain offices. From this stemmed all sorts of laxity, lack of responsibility in work, lack of respect and discipline, lack of security, distorted positions, nepotism, false friendship, careerism, and many other evils. The way things were going, the Party was unable to supervise the work, follow a correct policy on cadres, mobilize the broad masses, and properly resolve the major problems lying before us. Thus, a rather haughty attitude was being taken by the Cadres Commission, and criticism was not welcome. But for criticism to be accepted, it must lead to self-criticism, both by the one against whom this criticism is made, as well as by the one who makes it, for in the Party we may say without fear: there is not one who does not make mistakes, but there are mistakes and mistakes. The worth of a communist lies in the fact that, when he sees these mistakes, he tries to correct them, and to correct his comrades as well. The method of work that developed, and the way

of running things, has created certain unpleasant situations which could even be dangerous if we fail to act quickly.

Let us take the question of youth. The youth is the most important sector of our Party, it is the source of our cadres, of the cadres who will strengthen our Party and lead it ahead. It is an undeniable fact that our youth are a decisive factor now, just as they were in the war, because they have enthusiasm, force and vigour, and if they are properly educated by the Party, they will become a good support for it. Youth represents initiative, courage, the great present and the clear perspective for the future. The question arises: has the Party given effective leadership to the Youth Organization? I think not. And with the way the work has been running, the Party could not have guided it. To guide this extensive and important sector means not only to keep in contact and to issue a few instructions now and then, but also to thrash out the problems of youth in the Bureau, to study them in detail and give the Youth Organization these directions, and these when they have been properly solved and worked out. Have we done this? I think not. On the contrary, the comrades of the Youth Organization have presented them to us. Someone may say that they are more in touch with their problems. All right, they are people who are making progress, but why should the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the Party not be properly informed about these things? This should be done so that the lead can be seen, and the connection felt, so that the youth feel cohesion with, and respect for, the leadership. Otherwise there is a danger that the Youth Organization will break away from the Party. This has been a permanent danger, but it seems to me that the fault lies not so much with the Youth Organization as with us. In our country, the youth movement is proceeding

by leaps and bounds, we should rejoice and be encouraged by this, but we should also guide it. But to guide does not mean to hinder. We should understand this, and change our thinking if need be. I have noticed a spirit of duality between our Party and our Youth Organization, I mean, between some comrades of the Party and of the Youth Organization; I am referring to its leadership. But why does this happen? To me, it is a question of direction. One seeks to impose himself on the other. There should be only one directing power: the Party. No one can deny this. The question is that we must direct the Youth Organization properly and effectively. There is a tendency among some comrades of the Central Committee, especially of the Cadres Commission, to fail to see the question of the youth from the right angle, to give great prominence to mistakes, not only where they exist, but also where they do not exist. This is not right. Some friction has arisen between good comrades of the Party and of the Youth Organization. This must be cleared up and fought, because it is very harmful. The experienced members of the Party should be more broad-minded towards the minor mistakes of youth; it is our imperative duty to detect and correct these errors, but for the same mistake we may be more severe with an old member of the Party, for he can bear it, while with a boy we should be more careful, for he is young and tender and can be straightened up more easily. Moreover, it seems to me that the comrades of the Cadres Commission should analyse their work and mistakes somewhat more clearly. These are not alarming, but if they are pointed out correctly, they will have a clearer view of the work of the youth, which will mean an end to those misunderstandings and that spirit which is alien to our Party. Here I don't want to whitewash the shortcomings evident in the work of the Youth Organization, but I think they are less harmful than ours.

However, this does not mean that we should overlook them.

I will conclude by referring to something else which also springs from the old method of thinking and work, and from the way problems were raised and dealt with at the Berat Plenum. I mean sincerity and full freedom to express opinions. An unhealthy mentality has been created among the comrades, a fear of expressing what they think in case this is taken wrongly, or there are consequences. As a concrete example I shall take the work here in the Bureau, and this should be a model for all the Party. It is essential that there should be great trust in the Party and in its leadership. But this will be the case when everything is dealt with in a communist way, openly, and in a comradely manner, and when this trust is firmly established and arises from sound analysis and arguments. Is this what usually happens in our Bureau and afterwards in our Party? I say that things are not like this. There are degrees, some have more courage, others less, some have more confidence in their own opinions, others less, some put issues forward well, others not so well. We all have these handicaps, but to a greater or lesser extent. I have often noticed that Bedri is uncertain in his opinions and hesitates to express them. He has often spoken to me about the army, about the personnel who make no headway, about the obstacles and difficulties he comes up against in this sector, but merely as facts. I have the impression that, as far as Bedri was concerned, these were not just unrelated facts from which he could not draw a conclusion just as the others had done. I have had the impression that Bedri did not express his views exactly as they were, but with hesitancy and reservations. Why should we not speak out openly? I, on my part, had doubts about Bedri's stand towards Sejfulla, but I did not despair. Bedri had not sized up Sejfulla

and had not succeeded in getting to the heart of these matters. Of one thing I am sure, and this holds good for all of us, that we do not hang our Party and our love for it around the neck of one or another individual. We love, respect, and help our comrades when they are for the Party, but we love our Party above everything else. Tuk's conduct and attitude are of a different character. Tuk is an unemotional person, which is a good thing, but this lack of emotion becomes bad in the form in which Tuk manifests it. Tuk gives a superficial and ill-considered judgment on the question of Sejfulla. He reaches an opinion without going deeply into the question. This also happens on many other issues, like his views at the recent meeting of the Plenum about popularizing and legalizing the Party¹¹. Those are immature thoughts, but Tuk could judge things better. As a leader of the Party, he has shown little interest. Tuk may justify himself as he likes, but I do not agree with him. It is true things did not go as they should have in the Bureau, but under those conditions, if Tuk has not concerned himself as much as he should, the fault is more his than anyone else's. As for Pandi, he does concern himself, but over trifles, which he views narrowly, seeing everything as though through a microscope, and is not able to grasp the full extent of the issue. He is always waiting for others to decide, for others to take the initiative, afraid he might do something wrong. He has not acquired confidence in himself and his judgment. My intention here is not to make a criticism of comrades, but I want to illustrate what I spoke

¹¹ At the 6th Plenum of the CC of the CPA, held in April 1946, Tuk Jakova and Koçi Xoxe, reflecting the views of the Yugoslav leadership, expressed the view that the Party should remain illegal, at variance with the opinion of comrade Enver Hoxha that the Party should be made legal and popularized as the sole leadership of the whole life of the country.

of before: hesitation and fear to express opinions in case they may be mistaken. Here we are in the Bureau, not in the market-place, here we are among comrades, and we are all responsible to the Central Committee. It has become the fashion, when criticisms are made or matters reconsidered, for two or three persons to bear the brunt, and the others to have the impression that they have no responsibility. This is what happened at the Berat Plenum : three or four people were the "culprits" and were condemned, while the others took no blame at all. This is not correct and cannot be correct for the 5th Plenum either. Who is making mistakes? The Bureau as a whole and two or three members of the Bureau, those who do the most work. But we must understand things somewhat better. Pandi, Tuk, and Bedri make mistakes too, even more than others in many cases. However the other members of the Central Committee and of the Cadres Commission should not think that we are going to allow them to slumber on, and we must not do so, for they, too, have made many mistakes. I do not mean to say that in our Party only mistakes are made, but matters should be considered correctly and put right.

If issues are not viewed from the right angle, mistrust in the leadership, or false trust without a sound basis are bound to arise. Even good comrades, when issues are not put forward correctly, may err in their judgment. Without any doubt, there are mistakes in our work, but there are both serious and minor mistakes. Both these categories of mistakes should be corrected, and we should strive to make as few mistakes as possible. This should be the objective of all these analyses.

If we abide by these principles, if the analyses of our work are made in this spirit, we will achieve good results in our work. Let us not forget that we are on the eve of our congress, and should resolve all these issues in the

right way. Such a solution is half the preparation for the congress, we shall see more clearly the line which will be worked out there, the Central Committee, which will emerge from the congress, will be elected on a sounder basis, and we will have a better view of our work and carry it out better, with the real Bolshevik method and style which is so necessary for all the activity of our Party to develop. I have dealt with these questions in general and put them on paper in rather a hurry. You will excuse me if there are mistakes, but here we are, let us correct them; that is precisely why we have met, and we should leave here with sound, correct, communist results.

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SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE CONFERENCE OF WAR INVALIDS

July 9, 1946

Comrade invalids of the National Liberation War,

Who better than you can feel so deeply, both morally and physically, the great sacrifice made by our people to win their independence and freedom? Our heroes fallen on the field of honour, you who are maimed by the war, and the burnt-out villages and towns are the loftiest example of this solemn sacrifice. The sworn enemies of the people, the fascist occupiers and the traitors of our country, prepared detailed plans to exterminate us, they resorted to every barbarous means to execute these plans, but our people did not submit. The oppressive regimes of the past, which paved the way for the country's invasion and heavy fascist bondage, were quite unable to extinguish our people's love for freedom and independence, and our fighting traditions; in fact, they increased the strong desire for vengeance in the hearts of our people, and the will to organize an unprecedented resistance, which will remain a legend for generations to come. Every Albanian realized the importance of the moment which the country was passing through, understood that it was a fight for life or death, and therefore in order to realize our people's centuries-long aspirations, the supreme sacrifice was on the order of the day. They were ready to make the greatest sacrifice for the liberation of the home-

land and of the people. They were fighting for freedom, for a happier future, they were fighting for a new Albania, where the present and future generations would be able to live and work in freedom and honour. For years we fought with the greatest self-denial regardless of the sacrifices in men and material; we fought for ourselves and for the whole of mankind which was threatened with death by German and Italian fascism; we made our contribution in blood to the common anti-fascist war, in which the great Soviet Union and its glorious army played the decisive and historic role in saving mankind from certain destruction. Germany was defeated thanks to the legendary heroism and superhuman sacrifices of the glorious army of Stalin, and like all the peoples of the progressive world, our people, too, are eternally grateful to them for this.

Comrade war invalids, tomorrow is the festival of our army, of which you have been worthy members. For the Albanian people, tomorrow symbolizes the innumerable sacrifices and untold heroism of the Albanian partisans, who for years on end, through rain and snow, in the mountains and in the towns, against ferocious enemies armed to the teeth, kept aloft the banner of our war and carried it from victory to victory. Thousands upon thousands of our comrades were killed, tortured, or maimed, but we did not stop for a single moment on the road history had assigned to us. Our glorious army became the steel-like shield of the people, became the champion of the liberation of the homeland. From the great people's revolution the People's Army was born, endowed with all the virtues that constitute the glory and immortality of our people. The dynamism, vitality, selflessness, heroism, progressive spirit and unprecedented zeal in the construction of the new happy life, which are evident among our people, are also evident in our People's Army. The army and people are one and indivisible. This is the greatest guarantee for

the defence of the victories we scored, which cost us so much blood. This is the incontestable guarantee for us to build a flourishing country. Our People's Army, which so well understood its mission during the war which it proudly accomplished, now too, in this time of peace, in this period of reconstruction, has understood its mission and will accomplish it with honour. Everyday we see our vanguard army being modernized and strengthened, and becoming an example and model for its love for the country and the people, an example and model of discipline in doing its duty and in work, an example of sacrifice, selflessness, and political maturity. Precisely because of these lofty virtues which distinguish our army, our people have surrounded it with profound and ardent love, as a people loves its most glorious offspring, to which it gave birth and which it tempered with such suffering and toil, in the fierce flames of battle.

New Albania, which is the result of our National Liberation War, is marching with sure steps in the glorious traditions of this war. We drove the occupiers out of our country; once and for all, we broke the chains of medieval servitude imposed on us by the feudal beys who sucked the people's blood; we conquered and liquidated the traitors, those who had always sold themselves to the foreigner, those who had made Albania and her people an object of barter; we forced the usurers and speculators to give up what they had plundered from the people. Work and reconstruction are underway in our country, and the broad masses of the people, conscious of the great and decisive role they play in the present popular regime, have set to work to strengthen and modernize the state power, giving their invaluable support to the state power in the carrying out of its program of work. The Albanian people are participating actively and in an organized way in the reconstruction of Albania, and in the political and

cultural life of the country. Our people, who came to the forefront in the war, have become the decisive factor of the life of this country. The Albanian people, who have the reins of their own government in their own hands and are determined never to let them go, see their future clearly and, to build it the happiest and the best, are striving and toiling heart and soul.

Our bloody war against fascism, the establishment of democracy in our country, and the great constructive efforts which are going ahead at a staggering rate, have raised our prestige and strengthened the real affection felt for small Albania by our loyal and sincere friends. They defend us with great determination, and fight in the international arena for our rights and for those of all other small nations, whom the international reactionary cliques seek to trample underfoot and enslave.

In their darkest days, the Albanian people recognized their close and sincere friends, who helped them unreservedly during the war and are helping them now in time of peace.

Comrade war invalids,

Today you have gathered to lay the foundations of your organization, with the aim of helping the state power as much as possible, and serving the people to the end, our people whom you love so much and for whose sake you threw yourselves into the flames of war without sparing your lives. Albania is grateful to you; you are a testimony to its sacrifices, sufferings and pains, but at the same time you are an example of the pride, the courage, and the progressive spirit of the people. You have a place of honour and enjoy the respect of all the people. The state power and the people always need your valuable aid, and the Government of the Republic will do all in its power to relieve your suffering, to improve your life, to

make you able to live better, and to help as much as possible in the construction of new Albania, for which you have sacrificed so much. More than anyone else, you deserve the special care of the state power, and you may be sure that this will never fail you.

Long live our beloved Albania!

Long live our heroic people!

Long live our glorious army!

Long live our heroic invalids of the National Liberation War!

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**REPORT ON THE GENERAL DRAFT-LAW ON THE
PEOPLE'S COUNCILS, DELIVERED TO THE 5th SESSION
OF THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY¹**

August 5, 1946

Comrade deputies,

Following the Founding Constitution of the People's Republic of Albania, the draft-law on the people's councils will undoubtedly be the main and most important measure to be approved so far by the People's Assembly. The importance of this draft-law rests in the fact that it deals with the ways and means of reinforcing and fully developing the people's councils, which are the bases and organs of the state power.

The creation and development of the people's councils, as the political bases and organs of the state power, occurred during the glorious period of our people's National Liberation War against the fascist occupiers and the local traitor cliques. The entire apparatus of the people's councils, from the smallest local council to the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania, is the principal achievement of the National Liberation War. When the Albanian people took up arms to throw off the yoke of Italian and German fascist slavery, at the same time they organized the national liberation councils of the broad

¹ Following the approval of the Constitution of the PRA, the Constituent Assembly was transformed into the People's Assembly.

masses as political and auxiliary organs of their war. From the beginning, the national liberation councils replaced the state organs of the old quisling traitor power, which, from the very first days of the occupation, placed itself fully in the service of the enemy. Through their uprising, the people destroyed the old state power, and on its ruins, set up the new power of the national liberation councils. These organs were born in the heat of war, from the will of the masses of working people, in order to cope with the conditions created by the anti-fascist war itself and to enable the people to take into their own hands their future, along with their self-government, which until then had been in the hands of the traitorous feudal and bourgeois cliques who had sold the country to the foreigners. Thus, the national liberation councils, set up in these circumstances, were a living expression of the will of our people and of their centuries-old aspirations to take power into their own hands and institute a truly popular, democratic regime. The great role of the national liberation councils throughout the war has been a glorious one; they were the organs for the general mobilization of the people in the struggle, they rendered invaluable assistance to the war, and they were the political organs and bases of the new state power in all the zones liberated from enemy occupation. The Congress of Përmet, with its historic decisions, strengthened the political and juridical foundations of the national liberation councils. Under the guidance of the Anti-fascist General Council of Albania, and thanks to the brilliant victories of the National Liberation Army, the network of the people's power was immensely extended in both North and South Albania. Satisfactory results were achieved in the functioning and improvement of the people's power. From the liberation of Albania till the approval of the Constitution by the Constituent Assembly, the Democratic Government of Al-

bania undertook the great task of constructing this power in the best way possible, and improving the state administration. After liberation, the national liberation councils, which were re-named people's councils, faced many new tasks, more important and more difficult ones, which arose from the situation brought about by the complete liberation of Albania. The state problems and the needs of the people, after such a severe and devastating war, were important and called for a speedy and correct solution. It was therefore necessary for the Democratic Government of Albania to concentrate on improving the state administration and setting up this administration in many regions where the people's power was still organized in the simple forms of war time. Day to day experience enabled us to build up and greatly improve this administration through the people's councils, and to solve in a correct and satisfactory manner the important problems which were urgent and vital for our people, for the very existence of our state.

In the Founding Constitution approved by the Constituent Assembly of Albania, the people's councils were defined in a clear, definitive way as the bases and the organs of the state power, and thus the foundation was laid for the whole state power and administration. As a result of this major decision, clearly defined in our Founding Constitution, it is necessary to approve this draft-law on the people's councils, which the Government of the Republic has the honour to present to the People's Assembly. This draft-law legalizes the system and the organization of the councils, and permits their development in all the organizational forms in the future. Besides this, the draft-law on the people's councils is of first rate importance, because it determines the relations between the state power and the state administration. It is vital that these relations, as well as the relations of the people's councils

with the supreme organs of the state power and of the state administration, should be set on a strong juridical basis. Without this basis, work cannot advance; on the contrary, it will be obstructed time and again, which will not permit the development of our state organization, the further implementation of the Constitution, or the complete preparation of all the necessary conditions for the development of the people's councils as local organs of state power.

The draft-law on the people's councils is divided into six parts. The first part deals with the fundamental principles of the councils, more fully developed in accord with the concepts determined by the Founding Constitution of our state.

One of the main principles is this: "The people's councils are organs of the people's power, by means of which the people exercise their power in the local administrative units".

This principle brings out well the democratic character of the people's councils. It is the fundamental basis of self-government. The Constitution, in its second article, laid down the juridical basis of the organization of our new state.

The people's councils, which arose in the course of the National Liberation War against fascism and reaction, are representative organs of the state power, through which the people exercise their power. As the highest organs of the state power in their district, the people's councils carry out tasks of local importance. But they also have another equally important job: to fulfil the tasks of a general character. This ensures the unity of our people's power.

On the other hand, the raising of the people's councils, from organs of state power in local administrative units, to the level of organs of the overall state power,

is the logical outcome of the harmonization of the principle of self-government with democratic centralism.

The people's councils, elected through universal, equal, direct voting by secret ballot, exercise their power and take decisions of a general character in conformity with the Constitution and with the laws and ordinances of the higher organs of the state power and state administration. These dispositions will guide these organs in solving local problems.

The law determines sound criteria for the links which should exist between the organs of the state power, ranging from the local councils to the People's Assembly.

Article 7 explicitly states: "The links between the people's councils themselves, and between the people's councils and the other state organs, are based on their rights and duties defined by law and by other general dispositions".

These links, based on their rights and duties as defined by law, clearly indicate that we are far removed from bureaucracy which is a great obstacle to the progress of work, and seriously damages the interests of the majority.

The tasks of the people's councils are not limited to the mere implementation of the decisions and ordinances of the higher organs. This would run counter to the democratic character of the people's power, as well as to the principle expressed in Article 7.

"The people's councils have the rights to consider all questions which are within the competence of the higher organs of the state power, and to put forward their proposals concerning these questions" (Article 6).

From this article, it is understood that the lowest people's councils have the right to certain control and initiative. This is required by the general interest, be-

cause in this way they can effectively assist the higher organs.

The draft-law requires that close, constant links be ensured between the organs of the state power and the broad masses of the people, and between this power and the various worker organizations. The broad working masses, the peasants and the workers, rose and fought the invading forces and their collaborators; they fought against the restoration of the tyrannical regimes of the past and their apparatus of oppression, which immediately entered the service of the foreigners. The people fought and overthrew the old forms of government, and the blood of their best sons was shed to set up the new government. Through their popular uprising, they established the people's power and the people's councils. Therefore, they are entitled to take the widest possible part in the state power. With the participation of the people, these councils became strong organs for waging the war, and today, in the period of reconstruction, they are becoming organs of work and peace.

The participation of the people, manifested and consecrated in various ways, is a victory of the people's uprising. The people elect and are elected to all the organs of the people's power; the people are the support of these organs in carrying out their tasks.

The draft-law defines, in general terms, the administrative divisions and the councils for each of these divisions. We have people's councils in villages, towns, communes, subprefectures and prefectures.

One of the important changes in the new division, in comparison with the former one, is the setting up of communes. The distribution of the villages and the great distance between the village and the subprefecture create a gap in our administrative apparatus. In order to strengthen the state apparatus and meet the needs of the

people more directly, it was necessary to create the communes. This is also provided for in the Constitution.

In the long series of fundamental principles is included the right of the people's councils as legal bodies which administer the people's common property of local importance, according to their economic plan, and according to the provisions and general instructions of the higher state organs. The administration of this property will become a source of income for their budgets.

The principle of self-government could not be implemented in practice, if the people's councils did not have their local finances and budget. This is a right and a need of the people's councils, connected with the tasks of the councils in the raising of the economic and cultural level of the country.

The definition of the common property of the people under the administration of the people's councils makes no distinction between local and state property. This property is in the hands of the people, and the people's councils administer it according to the law. The Presidium of the People's Assembly will decide which common property of the people will be placed under the administration of the people's councils of the prefectures, subprefectures, communes and localities².

The first part of the draft-law concludes with the endorsement of the principle of collaboration and assistance between the people's councils.

The second part of the draft-law is of particular importance. It solves one of the most delicate problems in the organization of our state: the problem of competences. The past two years have been for us a period of study, and a stage of practical testing for all the organs of state

² In the Law On People's Councils, dated August 8, 1946, the word locality indicates a basic administrative unit, such as a small town or village.

power. The amendments in the structure of the councils and in the field of competences are the result of these two years' experience.

What is the characteristic of our laws, or rather, our state organization, as far as the competences of the people's councils are concerned? The duties and competences of the people's councils are defined by law. A higher organ cannot reduce the competences of the lower people's councils, nor deprive them of a right granted them by law. Only a legislative act, from the People's Assembly, can make amendments to the competences of the people's councils.

Article 23 of the draft-law enumerates the joint tasks of the people's councils one by one. Foremost among these tasks is to encourage and organize the direct participation of the masses of the people in the state administration, and to implement the policy of the unification and fraternity of the people. During the war, the national liberation councils played a great role in unifying the people. This unification became a decisive factor in the triumph of the liberation cause. The Albanian people, once divided by the policy of the ruling cliques, became brothers, united in the National Liberation War. In new Albania the unification of the people has become a reality; this is one of the strongest factors of the people's power. Today there are no privileges or distinctions based on origin, position, property, on level of culture. Article 23 continues: "The people's councils have the task of implementing the policy of unifying the working people of the town and countryside, raising the cultural level of the masses, helping the working people to unite and defend themselves against economic exploitation, etc.". Besides their joint tasks, the people's councils have their particular duties. There are, for instance, the duties of the people's councils of the localities, communes, subprefectures, and prefectures.

These duties are connected with the state plan, agriculture, commerce, and repair and trades services, with finances, employment, education, and other sectors of state activity; the scope of competences of people's councils are not the same; those of the higher councils are wider.

The organization of the people's councils constitutes the third part of the draft-law. The number of members of the people's councils is determined by the Presidium of the People's Assembly, but the law lays down the minimum and maximum number of members each council should have. The importance of economic and cultural ratios, the number of residents, and other circumstances, are the criteria by which the number of members in each people's council is determined. The Law On Elections To The People's Councils sanctions the principle of division into electoral districts. Each electoral district elects one member of the council. This is necessary in order that the electors can exercise their right of recall. The people's councils exercise their rights either directly, at the meeting of all the members, or through their executive committees. Executive and judicial functions are exercised by the executive committees. The duties within the exclusive competence of the people's councils are these: election and dismissal of the members of the executive committee, dissolution of lower councils and of their executive committees, calling elections to the lower councils, drawing up the economic plan and the budget, contraction of loans, setting up enterprises and institutions, drafting the regulations for the internal organization and functioning of the people's councils, adopting decisions, assessment of local taxes, annulment, suspension, or alteration of the decisions of the lower people's councils, and election or dismissal of the judges and assistant judges.

Proceeding from the principles of the Constitution, from this fundamental law, the sole organs of the people's

power in the local administrative units are the people's councils. The law also defines matters which are exclusively the province of the executive committees, of course, in conjunction with the sections and offices which may be set up within the people's councils. The executive committees cannot delegate to the sections or offices the following tasks: the issuing of ordinances, the drafting of the economic budget and plan, the contracting of agreements and obligations, the approval of extraordinary expenditures, and other duties mentioned in Article 57. The law which determines the exclusive competences of the people's councils and the executive committees has had as its criterion the importance of the nature of questions, and the principle that the people's councils are the highest organs in the local administrative units.

Prior to determining the tasks of the executive committees, Article 56 of the law says: "The executive committee as a whole carries out all the tasks and duties which have been assigned to its competence as an executive and administrative organ, and jointly guides all branches of state administration."

The executive committees lead the state administration as collective organs. This guarantees the democratic character of the people's power.

Within the people's councils, with the exception of the small local people's councils, there may be set up sections or offices directed by members of the executive committee, to deal with the economy, agriculture and forestry, finance, public works, education, social welfare and the people's health. The setting up of these sections or offices within the people's councils depends on the importance of the work of these councils. The sections and offices shall be set up wherever it is found necessary, and to the extent required.

The links of the people's councils and the executive committees with the higher organs of the state power, and of the state administration, comprise the content of the fourth part of the draft-law presented for approval. The people's councils, as has been stated many times before, are organs of self-government in the local administrative units, and act on the basis of the Constitution and the law. In this respect, the people's councils are entrusted with the task of solving questions in their own district and of promoting local interests and needs. But the people's councils are at the same time organs of the overall state power, with definite tasks, and should become a powerful support in solving day to day problems.

Seen from this angle, the people's councils cannot and should not bring about division in the unity of the state power, or be raised to autonomous organs detached from the higher organs. For this reason, the Constitution and this law acknowledge the right and the duty of the higher organs of the state power to aid and control the work of the lower people's councils. The organs of the state administration, the government, and the executive committees have the task of aiding and controlling the activity of the lower executive committees.

This aid consists in issuing general directives, determining administrative policy and checking on the carrying out of their duties in conformity with the Constitution, laws, and general decisions of the superior organs.

The principle of democratic centralism imposes the necessity for close ties between the organs of the state power and the state administration, as well as strong and fruitful check up.

According to Article 67 of the draft-law, the Presidium of the People's Assembly and the higher people's councils have the right to annul, suspend, or amend unlawful or irregular decisions, ordinances, and instructions, issued

by the lower people's councils, whereas the government and the executive committees can only stop the implementation of these acts.

This draft-law is a great step forward in the elaboration of our Constitution and the construction of our state apparatus, as well as in the strengthening of the new, genuinely democratic power of our People's Republic.

This draft-law represents the full legality of a new power, democratic in form and essence, throughout all the levels of our state organization.

In the conviction that such a draft-law responds to the needs of the stabilization and development of our state organization, and accords with the interests and aspirations of our people, I propose to the People's Assembly that this draft-law be discussed and approved.

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SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

August 21, 1946

Mr. Chairman,

Messrs. Delegates,

On behalf of the Albanian people and their government, I greet the Paris Conference, wishing it full success in its noble work.

I feel it my duty also to greet the French government and the heroic French people, and to thank them for their traditional hospitality.

Following this incomparably savage war, during which the civilized nations, their very existence menaced by German nazism and Italian fascism, threw themselves into the terrible conflict with the single slogan: "Victory or death", we have arrived at this high level conference, which must establish the lasting peace which is so greatly desired. The civilized nations waged a liberation war, and now they are waiting anxiously for this peace to be established in accordance with the principles and ideals for which millions of people gave their lives, in order to ensure mankind a happier future and genuine justice.

The Paris Conference has been convened to work out the peace treaties between the former allied countries and the satellites of Germany, and to put an end to aggression by ensuring sound relations among the peace-loving peoples, eager for freedom, justice, and democracy.

To this end, Albania, too, has been invited to put forward its point of view in relation to the Peace Treaty with Italy. However, Albania considers that the decision not to invite it as a participant in this Conference was unjust. The Albanian people were the first to take up arms against the Italian fascists, who had brought the torch to set Europe ablaze, and they ceased their fight only when Hitlerite Germany was defeated. They deserved greater justice.

The Albanian people, loyal to their fighting traditions for freedom and independence, and loyal to the end to the allied cause, from April 7, 1939 till the day of victory, never shirked any sacrifice. Albania rendered a major and unstinting contribution in bloodshed for the common cause. Albania's fight earned it the right to participate in this Conference, with the same title and same rights as those of the twenty-one victorious nations.

The small Albanian nation, alone and defenceless, was the first victim of Italian aggression. The fascist Italy of Mussolini attacked our country on April 7, 1939, thus crowning the predatory policy of expansion it had obstinately pursued against our country for half a century.

The civilized world recalls that black Friday in the year 1939, when 173 warships moved into our ports, 600 bombers roared in our skies, and over 50,000 soldiers armed to the teeth hurled themselves like wolves on our small but valiant people. The Italian fascists wanted to capture us, to crush us, to rob us forever of our freedom and independence and enslave us. But Mussolini's fascists were wrong in their reckoning. The Albanians are not the kind of people who endure slavery. Our history is proof of this; our mountains and forests are filled with the echoes of the heroic struggles of our ancestors, who fought fiercely for centuries against their oppressors.

In 1939, while Europe stood by in silence, our country's sons were falling on the field of honour for a just cause which, before long, would become the cause of all mankind.

The Italian fascists might invade our country, but they could never crush us. Our bones were tempered by the suffering that had befallen our country over the centuries.

Completely alone, facing a ruthless enemy, we have kept our head erect in the storm, and have declared war without quarter on the enemy. Our mountains, plains and valleys, our cities and villages testify to the heroic struggle of my people, who are jealous of their independence and freedom, and would rather die arms in hand than bow their heads in servitude.

Fifteen thousand Albanian volunteers fought heroically in Durrës, Vlorë, Saranda, and Shëngjin as well as in the interior of the country, against the hated occupier. But what could this small nation do, with so few arms and so little ammunition, against such an enemy? But, although the country was occupied, our people never considered themselves defeated. With heads held high and unshakable will, we followed the path of suffering and glory. We were sure of victory, for our cause was just.

Following the bloody days of April, the resistance continued and grew; 3,000 armed Albanians took to the mountains, our people's eternal strongholds. The whole people knew the perils and sacrifices of the heroic deed they were undertaking, but at the same time they also knew that their destiny, their very existence, would be decided in those battles. In the towns, bloody skirmishes against the occupiers followed hard one on another; our men fell under the bullets of the enemy's machine-guns as it tried to break our resistance.

From the towns and villages, from the streets and alleys, the Albanian partisans hurled themselves on the enemy to sabotage its military machine, to attack roads, transport, and bridges, blow up munitions depots and to kill spies, officers, and collaborators. It was a ruthless war. The Italians responded with a reign of terror in the towns and villages. The prisons were filled with patriots; dozens of Albanians were hanged and thousands more were exiled to the death islands of Lipari, Ventotene¹, and elsewhere.

But all this terror, these hangings and shootings, merely increased our people's hatred for the Italian fascists and incited them to fight. When the Italians attacked Greece, the daring and powerful armed actions of the Albanians were a great assistance to the Greek people who were suffering the same fate as ours. We were bound to each other by the same misfortune, caused by our common enemy. Along the roads of Durrës, Tirana, and Gjirokastra, the Albanian partisans attacked Italian military convoys heading for the Greek front.

Clearly seeing the danger threatening them, the Italians and the Albanian quislings redoubled their efforts and stepped up their terror. The mountains were full of partisans, organized in regular formations, who made incessant attacks on the enemy.

In reprisal, hundreds of villages were burned, but we defended the liberated territory inch by inch. The Italians were obliged to take refuge in the towns, because the mountains were not so good for their health. The quisling governments, under Italian domination, fell and were replaced every ten months. The Albanian people made life impossible both for them and for their bosses. This

1 Barren island on the Tyrrhenian Sea used by the Italian fascists as a place of exile for the anti-fascists.

showed the great gulf which separated the quislings from the heroic Albanian people.

Following the capitulation of Italy and the occupation of the country by German troops who came from Greece, the Albanian people closed their ranks still tighter because they knew they had to deal with another ferocious, blood-thirsty enemy.

As soon as they entered Albania, the Germans were attacked by our partisan formations along the Perat-Korça highway. Dozens of trucks were set on fire, and hundreds of Germans were killed. As a reprisal, the Germans razed the village of Borova, and murdered everyone in it: women, old men, and children. With the aim of annihilating us, the Germans mounted two great offensives. Four German alpine divisions, expert at fighting partisans, were thrown in against us. We were in the middle of winter, without food, without boots, but the partisans fought bravely and emerged victorious.

When the British and the Americans, our allies, landed in France, we were fighting furiously against four German divisions. We felt proud, in this bloody clash, to be doing our duty towards the allies and the friendly French people.

The war of the Albanian people against the Germans was crowned with the heroic battle of Tirana, where we fought day and night for 19 days on end, from street to street, from house to house, liberating every inch of our capital, sacrificing our best fighters, but killing thousands of Germans. The remnants of the German army tried to get through to help their besieged garrison in Tirana, but they were wiped out at Krraba Pass. The National Liberation Army had received from our General Staff a firm order not to let the Germans cross Albania's borders, but to annihilate them on Albanian territory.

This was how we understood the great anti-fascist alliance, this was how we understood loyalty towards the allied cause.

The pursuit of the German troops outside our borders, in the Yugoslav territory of Montenegro, Sandjak, and Hercegovina, is another clear proof for those who really want to know and have the heart to feel how great the sacrifices of our small nation were.

For more than five years the Albanian people fought the Italian and German fascist occupiers as well as their Albanian lackeys. Organized in the National Liberation Front, they fought an unequal but decisive war. Facing hunger and cold, but armed with courage and unshakable confidence in their own forces and in those of the allies, they marched forward boldly towards their objective, the liberation of Albania and the destruction of fascism.

Albania became a bastion of the struggle for freedom and independence. Our liberation war was soon recognized abroad. In December 1942 Messrs. Eden, Hull, and Molotov sent their congratulations to the Albanian people for their resistance, which ensured their independence, and contributed to the common struggle.

The National Liberation Army, which arose from the first partisan units, was organized and consolidated through fierce battles, and became a strong and valiant army. It crushed the enemy's military machine and seized the weapons, with which it triumphed. It successfully coped with the great offensives organized by the Italians and the Germans, who tried to crush our National Liberation War. The enemy suffered heavy losses during these offensives, whereas our army emerged ever stronger and more tempered. Our war was essentially a people's war, inseparable from the people; it was their sole means of salvation. The fascist and nazi occupiers resorted to the blackest terror in order to alienate the people from the

just liberation war; thousands of people were murdered or hanged in the towns and villages; more than 300 were gunned down in broad daylight in Korça, Tirana and Vlora, during the protest demonstrations against the occupation, 10,000 Albanians were thrown into Albanian prisons, into the concentration camps of Porto Romano, Mborje, Burrel, Kavaja and Prishtina, as well as the death camps in Germany, because of their anti-fascist sentiments and activities.

They burned down and drowned in blood entire towns, such as Leskovik, Pogradec, Saranda and Përmet, and whole regions, such as Mallakastra, Kurvelesh, Peza and Skrapar, were laid waste and suffered savage reprisals at the hands of the fascist and nazi soldiers. But, despite these things the Albanian people themselves, with their incessant war, and with great sacrifices, liberated the whole of their country with their own forces.

The following figures clearly show the size of our resistance on the eve of the liberation of Albania: our National Liberation Army had 70,000 fighters in its ranks, including 6,000 women. Italy was obliged to maintain over 100,000 soldiers in Albania, and Germany over 70,000 to counter our resistance forces.

The sacrifices of our people were very great. Out of a population of one million, 28,000 were killed, 12,600 wounded, 10,000 were made political prisoners in Italy and Germany, and 35,000 made to do forced labour; of the 2,500 towns and villages of Albania, 850 were ruined or razed to the ground; all the communications, all the ports, mines and electric power installations were destroyed, our agriculture and livestock were plundered, and our entire national economy was wrecked.

On the other side, the enemy suffered these losses: 53,639 Italians and Germans were killed, wounded or taken prisoner, about 100 tanks and armoured cars

knocked out, 1,334 artillery pieces and mortars, 1,934 trucks and 2,855 machine-guns captured or destroyed, not to mention the rifles, munitions, and stores destroyed or captured.

The allies appreciated our contribution to the common cause. In June 1943, they sent military liaison missions to the General Staff of our National Liberation Army, and dropped supplies by parachute. I want to mention here some of the heads of these missions: the Englishmen Major Bill Mclean, Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer, and General Davies, the American Captain Thomas Stephen, and the Russian Major Ivanov. From 1944 an Albanian military mission was accredited at the Allied Mediterranean High Command in Italy. The allied leaders have often acknowledged our people's contribution to the common cause. Mr. Winston Churchill, answering a question in the House of Commons on November 4, 1943, declared:

"Thousands of Albanians are fighting in their mountains for the freedom and independence of their country and, according to the reports of the British military mission in Albania, they are carrying out brilliant actions."

Mr. Cordell Hull, on the occasion of Albanian National Day, November 28, 1943, in a letter to Mr. Charles Hart, ex-ambassador of the United States of America to Albania, and President of the "Friends of Albania" Association, wrote:

"The Government and the people of the United States have always been aware of the struggle of the Albanian people to safeguard the integrity and independence of their own country.

We have followed closely, with sympathy and admiration, their resistance against fascist Italy, as well as their patriotic determination to defend their national sovereignty. Today these valiant fighters are continuing their

war, fighting the nazi enemy, like all those who love freedom, as we do ourselves.

On November 28, 1912 the Albanians proclaimed their independence. Today, on the anniversary of this date, they could hope for the complete fulfilment of their great objective.

Although the Albanians do not have a government abroad to express their national aspirations, we see in their national will the ideals and principles which inspire us and our allies, as well as the desire to carry on the war until nazism is totally wiped out."

Mr. Hull's successor, Mr. Edward Stettinius, on May 22, 1945, sent me the following message:

"I am well aware of the incessant war the Albanian people have waged against the aggressor, and I fully appreciate the sacrifices they have made to achieve the liberation of their country, and their contribution to the attainment of the ultimate victory against the common enemy. . . I want to assure you of the sympathy and friendship the people of the United States cherish for Albania and its people, and I know that in the future Albania will make the same important contribution to the cause of peace as it has made to the achievement of victory".

The General Commander of the allied forces in the Mediterranean, Maitland Wilson, wrote me these words on the October 12, 1944:

"I have watched with admiration the way your National Liberation Army has fulfilled its tasks, in its brilliant attacks on our common enemy, for our common goal".

I could, gentlemen, also cite a great number of documents demonstrating how much our efforts were appreciated by the allies. But the brave deeds of our people do not need documents. They speak for themselves:

when the aeroplane in which they were travelling was damaged, 13 American women were obliged to land in German-occupied territory. Those women let the whole world know about the sacrifices and selflessness of the Albanian partisans who risked certain death to save them from the Germans' clutches. As the New Zealand and Australian airmen whom our men rescued from the German shells were leaving our Staff Headquarters, they shook hands with me and said:

"Our wives and children will be grateful to you for saving our lives".

But our partisans were merely doing their duty by their comrades-in-arms and allies.

With the aim of distorting history and denying facts that are as plain as day, great efforts are being made to prevent those who fought heroically for the common cause from being treated equally. A great deal has been said at this high level Conference about defending the interests of the small nations, but in reality the opposite has occurred as far as our people are concerned. The Albanian people, few in number but mighty in terms of the deeds they have done, should have been present now, at this Conference, with the same rights as the other victorious nations, rights for which they have paid very dear.

The Albanian people feel offended at being put on the same plane as Austria, which did not fire a single shot against the Germans, but on the contrary, sent its soldiers to murder our women and children, and burn out towns and villages, in collaboration with the Germans.

No one can deny the Albanian people's loyalty to the allies and the great anti-fascist cause. All those who try to prove the contrary, using false arguments, will make themselves ridiculous and suffer a great defeat.

The Albanian people come proudly to this Peace Conference convinced that they have completely fulfilled their duty as allies. Albania appears here to claim its right to reparations and to demand justice from Italy, which set it ablaze and drowned it in blood, and to dictate its will as a victor, so that Italy may no longer represent a threat to peace in the world, or to the independence and sovereignty of my country.

However, before stating the viewpoint of my country on this question, I feel it my duty to answer the false accusations of Mr. Tsaldaris², the head of the Greek delegation, accusations and claims that he has formulated against Albania at various earlier sessions of this Conference.

Mr. Tsaldaris tries to prove that Albania is not an allied country, that Albania attacked Greece, and consequently, is in a state of war with Greece. On the other hand, Mr. Tsaldaris lays claim to South Albania, pretending that it is Greek territory and belongs by right to Greece.

On the question of whether Albania is an allied country and whether it has fully deserved this title, Mr. Tsaldaris has our reply in the words I have just spoken. The Albanian people contemptuously reject the vile accusations of the Greek delegate, who labels my country an aggressor. The Albanian people have never attacked the honest Greek people, and have never declared war on them. On the contrary, they sympathized with their cause, which was also the cause of the Albanian people, since both nations had suffered the same fate and had to deal with the same enemy.

The Albanian people demonstrated, not only during the anti-fascist war, but also during the First World War,

² Greek prime minister.

their determination to fight Italian imperialism, which had its eye on our land and resources. Between the Albanian people and the Italian fascists, a terrible and merciless war was waged. That is why Mr. Tsaldaris will not succeed in convincing anybody, even the stupid, with his "famous" arguments; Mr. Tsaldaris should demand a settlement of accounts from fascist Italy for its disgraceful attack against his country, and not from us. He should call to account the war criminal Victor Emmanuel, not the Albanian people, who were invaded by the same enemy as Greece, and who, like the Greek people, fought furiously for their independence and sovereignty.

It would be ridiculous to think that, by a paltry decree, Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, could lay the blame on the Albanian people who waged a merciless war against Italy right from the first days of the occupation, and who even made an attempt against the king's life during his only visit to Albania, in May 1941. Mr. Tsaldaris uses the declaration of war on the part of the Albanian quisling Vërlaci as an argument to defend his thesis. The Albanian people lumped the occupiers and quislings together, and made no distinction between them. The Albanian quislings, like all the other quislings of Europe, have nothing in common with our people. They were the filthiest enemies of the people and, as such, have been fought consistently. The Albanian quislings were not able to muster more than a few weak battalions against the liberation army and the allies, whereas the Albanian people rose as one man against the oppressor and the traitors. That is the difference between our people and the quislings. Would Mr. Tsaldaris like to know in addition what the Albanian people did with those quislings. Just this: they wiped them out, all of them, and thus they paid with their lives for the crimes they committed. And if he wants to know more about the fate of their associates in the war, who fled

with the German troops, he should know that these criminals may be found in the best hotels in Rome, the city from which the planes which so cravenly bombed Albanian and Greek women and children took off.

I would like to ask Mr. Tsaldaris: why does he not mention the quislings of Europe who so gravely damaged the allied cause, and in particular, those quislings who, after having committed horrible crimes, now walk freely in the streets? Why is it that Mr. Tsaldaris dare not confuse the other European quislings with their respective nations?

I would like to remind you that during the Italian-Greek War, some hundreds Albanian soldiers, forced into service by the Italians, rose against them and made common cause with the Greek people; some deserted and went over to the Greek troops, to fight alongside them, but they were treated as prisoners of war and sent to Crete, where during the German landing, they fought valiantly beside the British soldiers. Some joined the Albanian partisans, while others were disarmed by the Italians, withdrawn from the front, confined to the Shijak concentration camp, and court-martialled for "high treason".

On December 22, 1940, the Reuter news agency sent out the following item from Manastir:

"The Albanian soldiers, forcibly conscripted into the Italian army, yesterday rebelled in a sector of the Italian rear-lines, causing the enemy heavy losses before being captured. Some have taken to the hills, and are continuing to offer resistance."

On December 4, 1940, the "Anatole" news agency reported from Athens that "an Italian general taken prisoner by the Greeks has declared that the Italian army is suffering heavy losses because of the defection of the Albanians".

Mussolini himself, in a letter to Hitler on November 22, 1940, tried to justify the Italian losses in the same way. Here is what Badoglio says in his memoirs:

"The campaign has begun. The entire world knows of its progress. The Greek troops in Epirus are resisting valiantly on the Calamas river, while the Albanian bands and troops which were part of our divisions have either betrayed us, sabotaging our operations, or have gone over to the Greeks."

The newspaper "Le Figaro", in its issue No. 588 of July 4, 1946, referring to the Italian-Greek war, writes:

"The Albanian partisan detachments, for their part, attacked Italian convoys and troops on the roads leading to the front."

On October 26, 1940, the BBC broadcast:

"We are informed from Albania that Albanian partisan units, operating behind the Italian lines, are cutting and sabotaging lines of communication, sowing terror among cut-off Italian detachments.

Armed groups have succeeded in entering the capital and have posted proclamations on all the government buildings, and even on the palace of the Italian government, calling on the Italians to get out of Albania."

Likewise on January 4, 1941 the AA (BBC) broadcast:

"In military circles it is pointed out that the Albanians are giving the Greeks great aid against the Italians."

But along with his lying accusations against the Albanian people, perhaps Mr. Tsaldaris should give us here some explanation of these questions:

— Does he also consider as aggressors, as he does Albania, the various nations of Europe, whose quislings not only sent battalions but even organized entire expeditions against the heroic Red Army, which was an example of heroism and valour to all nations and, at the same

time, their surest support? It is difficult for him to answer this question.

— Does Mr. Tsaldaris perhaps consider France, from which Hitler intended to launch his offensive against England, to be an aggressor country? He will find it difficult to answer this question too.

Mr. Tsaldaris thinks that he can say what he likes against tiny Albania, but he is mistaken. His worthless arguments will not hold water.

No, the Albanian people have never been and never will be aggressors, and do not pose any threat to the Greek people, as Mr. Tsaldaris claims. The attacks on our country by the chief Greek delegate and his claims that it is we who are causing trouble remind us of one of Lafontaine's fables. We have always lived in harmony with the Greek people, with whom we fought shoulder to shoulder against the Italian and German fascist occupiers.

During our anti-fascist war, the Albanian people established links of sincere friendship with their neighbours, the Yugoslav and Greek peoples.

In the light of these facts, the Greek accusations are seen for what they really are: lies devoid of any foundation. But has Mr. Tsaldaris so quickly forgotten the fact that the Greek quislings, together with the Germans, often fought against the Albanians, and are responsible for a thousand atrocities?

Here are some facts:

On September 8, 1943, the day of Italy's capitulation, the Germans, coming from the Sajadha region and guided by a Zervas captain named Vitos, entered Konispol and burnt down more than 50 houses. During the great 1943-1944 winter offensive launched by the Germans against our National Liberation Army, the German troops, together with Zervas bands, came to Albania from Greece, and set fire to the Zagoria and Pogon regions.

Other Zervas bands, together with the Germans, fought against the Albanian partisans in January 1944, and set fire to the villages of Krane and Dermish, as well as the houses of all the partisans from the Greek minority of Dropull, while in February 1944 these bands burned down the village of Dhrovjan.

During the other large-scale offensive unleashed by the Germans in June 1944, Zervas forces again came, together with the German troops from Greece, crossing the border at Voshtina, and set fire to everything in the Zagoria region they had left the first time. Each time the Germans came from Greece to attack the forces of the National Liberation Army, their main support was the armed bands of the Greek quisling, General Napoleon Zervas.

The Greek delegation has claimed that the present Albanian government is pursuing a policy of denationalizing the Greek minority in Albania.

Gentlemen, the Greek minority in Albania, consisting of 35,000 people, fought shoulder to shoulder with all the Albanian people against the fascist and nazi occupiers, and against the Albanian and Greek quislings. Today in the People's Republic of Albania it enjoys equal rights with the Albanian population. It has 79 Greek language schools, one Greek language secondary school, has its own autonomous local administration, just like the Albanian population, and sends representatives to the People's Assembly; there are also citizens of the Greek minority in the army and the government.

On the other hand, I do not know if the honourable delegates are aware of the terror exercised against the Albanian minority in Greece. Of the 60,000 Albanians left in Greece according to the Treaty of London, from 1913 to 1923, 35,000 Albanians were forcibly transferred to Turkey as "Turkish subjects" in exchange for Greeks

from Asia Minor; contrary to the solemn pledges made by Greece, the Greek governments have always pursued a policy of exterminating the Albanian minority in Greece, and have never recognized that it had any rights. In June 1944 and March 1945, the armed bands of the quisling General Napoleon Zervas tried to wipe out the remaining Albanians: they set their villages on fire, plundered their property, and killed thousands of men and women, old people and children. More than 20,000 Albanians who managed to escape fled to Albania where, although they are assisted by the Albanian government and people, they live in great poverty.

But the real aim of all these allegations by the Greek delegate is to take two regions from Albania, those of Korça and Gjirokastra, which have always been among the most ardent centres of Albanian patriotism, both during the long Turkish occupation and during the National Liberation War against the Italian and German occupiers. These aims reflect the old policy of the protagonists of the "Megale idea"³, that is to say, Greek imperialist expansion over the entire Balkan region, an idea which has also germinated in the heads of the present Greek rulers. In fact these people, with their claims on Albania, their daily provocations on our borders, and their intrigues, like the proposal Mr. Tsaldaris made to the Yugoslav delegate that Albania be partitioned between Yugoslavia and Greece⁴, are trying to disturb the peace in the Balkans.

3 The ideological platform of the Greek chauvinist bourgeoisie which intended to create a great Greek state in the former borders of the Byzantine Empire.

4 At the Paris Peace Conference, Tsaldaris confidentially proposed to the Yugoslav delegation to partition Albania between Greece and Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav representative turned down the proposal in the hope that eventually the whole of Albania would become part of Yugoslavia.

Gentlemen, we consider it to be out of place and unacceptable for this Conference to examine the question of the territorial integrity of Albania. The Albanian people, few in number, but great in the sacrifices they made for the common cause, are not here to discuss their borders, but to express and demand their rights.

We solemnly declare that within our present borders there is not one inch of foreign soil, and that we will never permit anyone to encroach upon them, for to us they are sacred.

ALBANIA AND THE PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY

Honourable delegates, Italy is fully responsible for the losses and damage caused to the Albanian people during this war. The capitulation of September 8, 1943, put an end to the aggression and infamy of fascist Italy, but we demand, in the name of the thousands who have fallen, and because of the misfortunes inflicted on our country by Italy — that the Peace Treaty put an end, once and for all, to the aggressive and imperialist policy of Italy.

Albania has suffered much at the hands of fascist Italy, but it has also suffered at the hands of pre-fascist Italy, of so-called democratic Italy, and many signs and expressions of the present Italian government warn of the continuation of the same Italian policy towards Albania, that is to say, a policy of domination and occupation.

Present-day Italy is sheltering all the Albanian war criminals who managed to escape their just punishment by the people. There they have found an appropriate field for their propaganda and plots against new democratic Albania. The Italian war criminals, responsible for the aggression against Albania and the countless sufferings

they caused the Albanian people, are at large, and even filling important posts. In March 1946 at Bari, the Italian fascists killed an Albanian sergeant from the Albanian military mission attached to the Allied Mediterranean High Command. In speeches made during the election campaign last spring, statesmen of the present Italian government expressed greedy intentions towards Albania's independence, and even here, among the members of the Italian delegation, there are men who were Mussolini's faithful agents in imposing Italy's will on Albania, in occupying and martyring our nation.

The Albanian delegation has carefully studied the draft-peace treaty with Italy, and expresses its gratitude to the Council of Foreign Ministers which, during the elaboration of this treaty, has not passed over Albania's interests in silence. Nevertheless it takes the liberty today of making some suggestions about this treaty, reserving the right to express its views in detail before the competent commissions on specific questions whenever it sees fit.

Albania demands that the Peace Treaty give it strong guarantees avoiding any future recurrence of Italian imperialist policy of aggression towards Albania, depriving Italy of any possibility of repeating the past, both that of the period before April 7, 1939 and after, and of presenting claims of any kind against Albania.

For this reason the Albanian delegation takes the liberty of suggesting some improvements:

1. The Albanian delegation estimates that the military forces — land, sea and air — permitted to Italy allow it to threaten the peace and security of its neighbours and the Balkan countries. Albania is of the opinion that these forces should be further reduced so as to make it impossible for Italy to endanger peace, thus permitting us to live and work in security.

2. The Albanian delegation wishes to make an observation about a very important clause in this treaty, which is closely connected with the economic development of Albania. I am referring to the section on reparations for war damage. The Council of Foreign Ministers has left it to the Conference to decide on the reparation demands presented by France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania and Ethiopia. In his speech, Signor de Gasperi⁵, although somewhat hesitantly, tried to absolve his country from the just obligations it has incurred from fascism through its criminal aggression.

Gentlemen, for 54 months on end, the Italian occupiers, fully aware of their actions and pursuing well-determined aims, plundered our land and subsoil resources, our agriculture and livestock, reduced our cities and villages to ashes in order to alienate the people from their just liberation cause, and transformed our peaceful country into a battlefield, thus causing incalculable damage to our national economy. Thousands of patriots were killed, tortured, jailed or confined in concentration camps, plunging thousands of mothers, wives and children into mourning.

Italy is responsible to Albania for losses and damages amounting to a sum of 3,544,232,626 gold francs.

The Albanian delegation will present its reparation demands in detail, as well as the necessary amendments to the treaty, but as of now, it demands, as an indisputable right, that the Peace Treaty define the sum which Italy should pay to Albania as well as the conditions of payment.

3. From what has been said, it is clear that the Peace Treaty with Italy is of particular importance to Albania.

⁵ Christian-democrat politician, reactionary prime minister of Italy in 1945-1953.

There are also other important points, which I do not want to elaborate on here, such as the articles on war criminals, on the restitution of stolen property, on the property of the citizens of the allied nations in Italy, besides some details, which are, nevertheless, not unimportant, and which directly concern our country.

This treaty provided Albania with rights and obligations of great importance. They are closely connected with its independence, its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its economic and political future. Nevertheless, the Albanian delegation is forced to observe that, despite all that has been said already and despite the fact that Albania, through its contribution to the common war, has aligned itself, body and soul, with the victorious allied nations, the Peace Treaty with Italy in the draft form presented to us today does not guarantee Albania all the rights it is properly entitled to (is this not a legal paradox?), and does not permit it to sign this treaty as a contracting party, because it is not considered as an associated power.

The Albanian delegation expressed the hope that the Conference will eventually accept the following amendment, to be numbered "Article 26 a" in Part II, Section V, or added to the Foreword, which would eliminate a series of misunderstandings and a source of continuous interventions on the part of our delegation.

The amendment we suggest is as follows:

"Article 26 a"

"In the implementation of this treaty, Albania is considered as an associated power".

I want to emphasize that the Albanian delegation reserves the right to expound its views to the plenary session of the Conference, as well as to the competent commissions, whenever it sees fit to intervene on the question of the Peace Treaty with Italy.

The Albanian delegation feels duty bound to present its just demands towards Italy so that the latter ceases to pose a continuous threat to small, peace-loving Albania, pays compensation for the damage it has caused, returns everything it has taken by force, and hands over the Albanian and foreign war criminals who have found asylum in Italy and are wanted by the Albanian government.

The People's Republic of Albania will be happy to maintain normal relations with a new and genuinely democratic Italy, which honours its international obligations, keeps within its natural borders, and respects those of others, an Italy that is not a lair of neo-fascists and war criminals of all countries, or a new hot-bed of aggression, but is disposed to cooperate with other democratic countries for peace and collective security.

Albania has spared nothing for the common victory. It is also determined that, side by side with its wartime allies and with all the democratic countries, it will make its contribution to the establishment of a just peace and collective security.

The Albanian delegation will be happy if this modest contribution to the present Conference helps in carrying out this difficult task.

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**REPORT ON THE ACTIVITY
AND THE NEW TASKS OF THE FRONT, PRESENTED
TO THE 2nd MEETING OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL
OF THE DEMOCRATIC FRONT**

October 7, 1946

Comrades of the Democratic Front,

On behalf of the Secretariat of the Democratic Front and on my own behalf I greet all of you gathered here as well as all the members of the Democratic Front. Six months have passed since the last meeting of the Council of the Front in Tirana on April 7 this year, six months full of activity, full of events in which our political mass organization has played a major role. Under our people's regime, where the people are at the head of affairs, in the state institutions and the various enterprises, at the grass roots and heading the state power, where they make the law and dictate their will, direct the destiny of the country and really make the correct policy which is entirely in their interests, such meetings are not only necessary, but altogether indispensable. The leaders and the people should maintain close and constant contact. The leaders elected by the people have the duty of carrying out to the letter the tasks which have been entrusted to them, but they also have the duty to render account to the people for the work with which they have been charged, to obtain the people's approval, and profit from the great creative experience of the broad masses — the main source

of our progress. We should never forget this, for it is the foundation of our regime, and whoever violates or forgets this great principle of our democracy, is on the opposite road, on the wrong road. It is in this light that we should see the Front as the political organization of the broad masses of our people, and the policy which guides it in the performance of the tasks which face it at the various stages of the historical development of our country.

The National Liberation Front, the glorious offspring of the National Liberation War, was not merely a formal organization, nor a cover for the Communist Party of Albania, as the traitors of our country, the abject tools of the occupiers, try to present it. The call for the creation of the National Liberation Front, as well as its organization and strengthening are due to the Communist Party of Albania. This is a great historic fact, and the Albanian people will always be grateful to this outstanding organizer. The Front was set up when the country was in the greatest danger. Our country had to be defended, it had to be liberated, the people had to be saved from the occupiers and traitors and take power into their own hands to build a new life. This was imperative, for the very life of our nation was in peril. For Mehdi Bey Frashëri, Mithat Bey Frashëri or Ali Bey Këlcyra it was a small matter if the life of the people was in danger; for these beys, the danger was the people. In the critical conditions our country was passing through, it was essential for all our people to unite in brotherhood and mobilize their forces for one common aim: to fight the occupiers and their tools without mercy and liberate the country. As our Front expanded and was consolidated, the war became more fierce, our glorious National Liberation Army grew in strength and size, the power of the national liberation councils became stronger, and whole zones were liberated. What conclusions should we draw from this

great experience of our war, to serve us at every step as a lesson and a guide in our constructive work?

In the first place, the Front, as a broad political organization of the masses of the people, was born out of the circumstances of the war, and the imperative need of the masses to be liberated forever from the foreign yoke, from the yoke of the feudal landowners and other parasites. Thus, the Front did not emerge by accident, nor was it a formal organization. But for the Front, Albania would not have been in the present situation, because the Front is the people, and the policy of the Front is the policy of the people. The people fought the war, the people won the war, the people liberated Albania, and are building Albania. The brilliant victories of the war were achieved by the people, rallied around and united in the National Liberation Front, guided by the correct policy of the Front. The achievements of new people's Albania will again be made by the people, rallied around and united in the Democratic Front, and guided by its correct policy. In the deeds of the people there is continuity and consistency, just as there is grandeur and eternity.

The National Liberation Front brought the country to victory, because its policy was correct and aimed to realize the goals and aspirations of the honest working people. A political platform such as that of the Front succeeded in mobilizing and uniting the workers, peasants, and the honest and patriotic intellectuals, who had common interests. They fought for their country, and for their very existence: two inseparable things for our working people. Many people (I am not speaking here of the enemies of the people) were not able to distinguish where their true interests lay: through ignorance, or fear, or backward patriarchal traditions, these ordinary people hesitated and could not find the right road. The Front has played the main role in convincing such people. This is how the

Front expanded, and how it gathered strength at the same time. There was a place in the Front for all honest Albanians who were concerned about the fate of their country and who had made the cause of the people their own. The consciousness of the Albanian people rose, their feelings of patriotism were strengthened and found concrete expression; they understood what they were fighting for, and against whom; the people's eyes were opened to the prospects lying before them, and they proceeded with great determination towards the goals they had set themselves. This mass organization, with clear-cut aims and objectives, was precisely what ran counter to the interests of the fascists, feudal beys, rich merchants, political adventurers, money lenders and speculators. These were the perpetual enemies of our people; they sensed danger in the sound organization of our people and in their decisive struggle, so they openly united with fascism, their only hope, their sole weapon to suppress the people's revolution and preserve their privileges. Through terror and demagogy, they endeavoured to split the Front and suppress our struggle; they used every means, but their slogans smelled of Italian lire and German marks, and our people had greatly developed their sense of smell. Thus, the just policy of the Front sorted things out, separated the wheat from the chaff; but this did not mean that all the garbage had been got rid of. This calls for the people to be vigilant, to defend the homeland from the remnants of fascism, to safeguard the victories of the war, and protect their interests. Now the road is open to do this.

The Democratic Front, the successor of the National Liberation Front, will make full use of the lessons of our glorious war, and this great experience will help new Albania to develop, and to march steadily ahead with great strides. With the liberation of Albania, the Front was

faced with important and difficult tasks, which could be dealt with successfully and carried out completely through the direct and broad participation of the people. Therefore, a great mobilization and activation of the masses was needed, and the healthy energies of the people had to be guided and channelled. This was to be realized through the aid of the Front and the state power. Therefore, the main task was to strengthen the state power, to further improve the state administration, by preserving, and always scrupulously implementing, the fundamental principle: state power in the hands of the people, and their broad participation in all the activity of the country. Through the state power all the projects for the reconstruction of Albania would be realized, and great social and economic reforms brought into effect. The enemies of the people, the remnants of fascism and of the oppressive regimes of the past, would make an attempt to regroup and, adapting themselves to the new situation, would attack and damage the state power through new methods of sabotage. What was the internal situation like in general after the liberation of Albania? Many foolish people, prone to wishful thinking, believed that, with the end of the war and the liberation of Albania, things would go easily for them, that is, the old times would return and they would always occupy positions of command because, in their view, the people were great fools and could not govern themselves and manage things without their aid. When the war was being waged and people were being killed, such individuals embraced the Italians and the Germans, they enriched themselves and speculated at the people's expense, they sang the "Te Deum" for Mussolini and Hitler in their churches, and fought us with arms. When Albania was liberated, the remnants of these thieves, like Jesuits, preached "Peace and fraternity", always invoking the slogan: "Enough

blood has been shed, we are brothers". And we gave them peace, advised them to be prudent, to change their ways, their methods, and their mentality, to give tangible proof of their renunciation of their dark past. Didn't we know these people before, don't we know them now, how they think and what they do? We know them very well, but we gave them the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves. If they did not mend their ways, we were in a position to take action. But these gentlemen did not learn their lesson from the war and from the great actions of the people, they fancied that, by infiltrating here and there, in the Front and the state power organs, by singing false praise to the National Liberation War, and by speaking somewhat moderately about the reforms, which they thought were like the hundreds of reforms carried out on paper under their oppressive regime, it would be easier for them to reorganize, to gain strength and regain their former positions, and then they would know how to govern. Our people were well acquainted with these methods, because throughout their bitter history they had many times shed their blood, and when it came to reaping the harvest, found that their share was only the whip and the rope. But this time the people were able to tell them: "Forget about your good old days". The wheel of Albania's history did not turn back, the healthy forces of the people set it in motion towards definite objectives; therefore, there were only two roads open to them: either they joined forces with the entire people for the good of the collective, or they were done for.

The people triumphed and will always triumph. Did those tens of thousands of sons and daughters of our people fight and die so that the land might be left to the beys and agas, to let them collect taxes, oppress the peasants, and lead an easy life? Did they fight so that speculating big merchants might avoid being called to account,

and have a free hand to speculate on the flesh and blood of the poor people? Did they fight to enable the rich gentlemen to retain possession of the various factories which they had set up with the sweat of the people, and through which those gentlemen exploited the workers and the entire people? Of course not. Those who cherished such illusions were grossly mistaken. But even those enemies of the people who did not have such illusions were still wrong to believe that they could change this situation. Some public trials have been held in Albania. The people's courts have tried the enemies of the people. Who were these men, what did they stand for and what were their aims? These criminals, who have received the punishment they deserved, were feudal landowners, bairaktars, Catholic priests, rich merchants, intellectual adventurers, men with a hundred different flags in their pockets, traitorous officers of Zog's regime, and all the scum and hangers-on of fascism and internal reaction. Where were these people after the liberation of Albania? They were here, but they were stunned and shattered by the brilliant successes of the people's war. They were the kind of people I have mentioned, who endeavoured to mask their feelings with a smile, while behind the scenes they rubbed their hands and worked to restore themselves to power, to rally around them the people of that other category I mentioned, who fancied that, after the liberation of Albania, things would not change and the reforms would remain a dead letter. These two categories of people could not put up with this situation, because it stifled them. They could not swallow the land reform which took away their lands and their privileges; they could not bring themselves to pay the just tax on profits imposed on them, they could not tolerate the creation of the great state sector, the basis for raising the living standard of the people, they could not look favourably

upon the great development and organization of our heroic youth who won every battle they undertook; they could not be pleased to see the organization in the life of the country; they could not bear to see the working masses solidly organized in trade unions; they could not bear to see the great progress of education and culture in our country. The smoke from the chimneys of our thriving factories and work-sites suffocated them. The noise of hammers, picks and shovels repairing our bridges, opening roads, rebuilding villages and towns burned down by the war, sounded like the tolling of a funeral bell to these gentlemen. Their activity against the people depended on foreign intervention, and on the aid of international reaction. This was only natural; these people have never found and will never find support among the people; the people are their greatest enemies. The only support of these people has always been the money and bayonets of foreign imperialists. Albania and its people have been a market commodity for them. Look at these people, who are ready to sell the shirt off their backs to the foreigner; see how they act when some injustice is done to Albania and its heroic people ; they make common cause with Tsaldaris and are willing to hand over South Albania to get back the lands and the privileges they have lost; it is their very nature to become abject servants of the foreigners, to suppress the people's power. But the supporter of these criminals — international reaction — has had its claws blunted in Albania, and will never be able to stick its nose into our internal affairs. See how their vile attempts and those of their foreign bosses are being foiled one by one; see, on the other hand, how magnificent and courageous is the stand of our people, and how they are being successful in everything they undertake. The slogans of these individuals are fully in accord with the slogans of the enemies of the people abroad; they are

doing everything they can to weaken, harm and hinder us. These people are being exposed daily, and their sinister plots are being nipped in the bud. Their elimination helps to strengthen and extend the Front, to safeguard the constructive work of the people, and to consolidate our democracy and state. The policy of the Democratic Front in connection with the internal situation is a many-sided and well coordinated policy of activities in the various sectors of social and economic life in our country; it should be in a position to arouse the masses of the people and set them in motion, make them conscious, coordinate their efforts, channel their energies and educate them politically in its correct line. The question of educating and enlightening the masses is of major importance. This constitutes the main role of the Front. The Front should be active in the struggle against the anti-land reform slogans of certain clergymen, agas, and beys. The implementation of the land reform has been one of the greatest achievements of our people's power; this reform is being carried out with success. Now the Albanian peasant is the permanent master of the land he tills. To him this is the greatest reward. In implementing this reform the Front had to carry out broad activity, and mobilize the entire peasantry and the people to implement the reform rapidly and justly.

The beys and agas, as well as the Catholic clergy attempted to slow down or to impede this popular reform. These clergy and landowners, as always, coordinated their actions with the aim of harming the interests of the people. Behind the religious slogans and the name of God they hid their criminal activity, telling the peasants not to accept the land, for it was allegedly not theirs, but belonged to God and that, if they accepted it, God would curse them, and other such nonsense. This was one thing, but under cover of religious slogans and the name of God

they concocted criminal plots against the state power and the people, deceiving some simple and ignorant people. The people's courts have given these individuals the punishment they deserved. The Front has a policy towards religion which accords with the laws and articles of the Constitution of our People's Republic. We do not prevent or hinder anyone from believing in God or from going to the church or mosque to pray. The priest and the hodja are free to exercise their religious functions, but religious functions only. It is against the law to use the church or the mosque for political purposes or to misguide the faithful. The priest or the hodja, who are citizens like all citizens of Albania, are free to have their own political opinions, but like all other citizens of the Republic, are responsible for their political actions. Their religious functions and their political convictions are two separate things which should not be confused. Anyone who violates the laws of the Republic is liable to render account before the courts, be he a priest, hodja or layman. The proper punishment of a priest or hodja who has broken the law, does not mean that religious beliefs are being combatted or the church persecuted. Many Catholic priests have given this impression so as to cover up their criminal activity against the people; they and everyone else should know that we are well informed and understand their manoeuvres against the people, and have taken and will take measures if they do not take the correct road.

In today's situation, the state is faced with the problem of education and culture, as a problem of major importance for the progress of our country and the construction of new Albania. This problem becomes even greater when we take into account our cultural and educational backwardness inherited from the past, and the great and difficult tasks which confront us today for the strengthening of the state. I believe it is clear to all that this is not

merely an educational or administrative question, but a great political problem connected with our future as a nation and as a state. New Albania cannot be built with illiterate people; it needs people with knowledge, capable of directing the various branches of the economy and the entire life of the country. The whole Front should face up to this great and important problem, and help the state to solve it correctly in the shortest possible time. In general our education and culture should develop on a scientific basis and rid themselves of all reactionary ideologies which are in flagrant opposition to the great principles which emerged from the national liberation movement, which guide our Front and our People's Republic. The education of the younger generation, the cultural improvement and re-education of the masses of the people place great responsibilities before us; therefore, the government gives first priority to providing more for the education and culture of our people. Certainly, there are many difficulties here, but the Front will give great and decisive help. The people must be mobilized to open schools throughout Albania, and especially in the northern regions, and at the same time we should do all we can to convince people of the absolute necessity of improving their education, and thus encourage the desire and need for schooling. On this problem, the Front should clarify the broad masses of the people, especially those of the North, who have fewer schools, and among whom the percentage of illiteracy is very high, because they have been perpetually oppressed under the heel of the feudal lords and chieftains. In new Albania, all the young people should go to school. The question of sending girls to school should be regarded as a serious and important problem. Many clergy, particularly those in the North, and some backward people try to prevent girls from

going to school. Their aim needs no explanation. We tell them that such an act constitutes a serious crime against the progress of the people, and that those who dare continue this propaganda will soon have to regret it. The Front will play a further important role in this, in the political and ideological training of the teachers, carrying out large-scale explanatory work with them through the press, meetings, and so on, to make them worthy of the lofty mission the state has entrusted to them, for the education of the younger generation, the promising future of our country.

In the history of our country there has never been such a strong political organization as the Front, around which our people have mobilized all their energies to build the new Albania. As yesterday in the war, today, too, the Front has become the political expression of the efforts of our people to create a better and more secure future. Following the proclamation of the People's Republic of Albania and the adoption of the Constitution, new and difficult tasks faced the Front, because new roads and new horizons opened before our people, leading them towards the consolidation of the state and the building of a better life for all. Once again the Front led the masses of the people, united them and set them on the road which is the salvation of our people, the road of economic reconstruction and organization of our internal life on the basis of the Constitution of the Republic. The most remarkable feature of the Front has been its vigorous and incessant activity to mobilize the masses in carrying out the concrete tasks arising in various situations. Our country has never seen our people so enthusiastic and determined to forge ahead. The successful mobilization of the masses of town and countryside, which occurred immediately after the call of the Executive Committee of the

Front to compete¹ in the reconstruction of the country, is the most vivid expression of this enthusiasm and will power which our people have today, which has become a material force driving our country ahead and making us consider what forms and means we can best use to organize and direct the vital forces of our people, which are such a great guarantee for the secure future of our country. It is only natural that these forms and means should be such as to enable us to achieve better results in our reconstruction work, to activate the masses of town and countryside still further, and to direct our forces to all fields of activity, which in their entirety strengthen the position of democracy in our country, and consolidate the power of our state. Therefore, today, two things are required of the Front: to unite the whole people around a common political platform, and to become the initiator of the work and activity, of the new style of organization in work to carry our country forward. Today the forms and methods of organization should be adapted to this purpose, and it is our task to orientate the work in this direction. If we accept this, then I think that the greatest task in performing these functions falls on the councils at the grass roots — in the village, workplace, office, and everywhere where people work and live together, as well as on the councils of the subprefectures and prefectures. Therefore, we must consolidate the Front and make it more effective. We must strengthen its inner unity and organizational power, its councils must be strengthened because our present tasks and those which may face us at any moment call for solution, and this is expected from

1 Socialist competition is one of the organizational elements of the socialist emulation, an expression of the consciousness of the masses, of their bold self-activity, initiative and creativeness for the construction of socialism and the tempering of their revolutionary awareness.

us and from us alone. In general, we are working under difficult economic and financial conditions; this is the heritage of the war, and everyone should bear this in mind. By this I mean that sacrifices and shortages are still on the order of the day. However, I am of the opinion that the economic situation of our country in general has improved, and this is chiefly due to the tireless work of the people and of the state power; they have understood their role and done their utmost to overcome all obstacles. Seeing that things are proceeding well, I am optimistic and sure of another thing, that from now on, the situation will improve from day to day.

The program announced by our government foresaw the solution of many problems of importance for the life of the country, problems which had to be solved in difficult financial conditions. But the program also had to be based on the initiative of the masses, on their voluntary work, on their economizing at work, etc. We may say that in many matters the results are satisfactory. The land reform has almost been concluded throughout Albania, and this great reform, so much desired by the people, has yielded its results, and had the expected effect. Our peasant has greater confidence in his own work, and the agricultural problem has assumed quite a different appearance. This year more land was cultivated, and the work was done better.

Weather conditions this year have not favoured agriculture, and as a consequence, the maize harvest was poor. Nevertheless, we do not fear for the winter, because the people and the government will take all necessary measures to ensure that there is no shortage of bread on our tables. Closely connected with the agricultural problem is the problem of livestock farming. In this sector, we may say with assurance that we have made considerable progress, especially in increasing the numbers of

sheep and goats and in improving their breed. We should give special care to agriculture and livestock farming, for these are the principal sources of our country's wealth. It is not enough to till the land well and to encourage the cultivation of new crops; we must also ensure that these products are not left to the mercy of weather. By this I mean that this year, in addition to the drainage schemes, it is necessary to encourage the peasants to dig other canals themselves. Land improvement schemes will also be on our program for the future. But, while opening up new land for food crops to ensure our bread for the whole year, we should devote great care to our pasture land. Therefore, it is necessary to encourage the clearing of land for pastures and to adopt measures to improve the breed of our animals, as well as to increase our agricultural production.

Important projects are underway in our country, and we may say that there are successes, and we have kept most of our promises. Work is going on everywhere with great enthusiasm, on the road built by the youth, on draining the Maliq swamp and of the Juba canal, where the work was completed ahead of schedule. Work is going on to build the Elbasan and Vlorë canals, and is also progressing in the South, where new roads are being constructed according to our program, and about 400 planned new schools are being built, as well as many houses in villages burnt down during the war; hospitals are also being erected.

In our bitumen and copper mines and oil-fields, work is going on at a vigorous pace; the workers in these mines, and especially the oil workers in Kuçova, are being organized and becoming more aware of the great tasks the people have entrusted them with. The workers in the Kuçova oil-fields are an example for all the workers of Albania, and deserve particular praise for their high spirit

of organization, conscientious work, and steel discipline. They have understood that in this way they are serving the homeland, in this way our people will make progress and our country flourish. All should learn from their example. I must also mention the workers of the Shkodra cement factory who should be taken as an example, because of their conscientious work, as workers in the true sense of the word. Our light industry has been re-established and has achieved a satisfactory level of productivity. The oil presses, soap and tobacco factories, and various distilleries are in operation, and improving the quality of their products. Many state-owned stores have been opened in the prefectures and subprefectures, and are supplying the people with various goods. Many important and necessary measures have been adopted in the economic sector. The aim of these measures is to strengthen the state sector and improve the economic situation of the people, to stabilize the market and fight against speculators and black marketeers. The people should be mobilized to carry out these measures, because they have been taken in their interests. The people will witness many improvements because of these measures, and many difficulties will be avoided, and have been avoided. The Front should combat any manifestations of defeatism and dissatisfaction about the economic situation, by giving correct explanations and striking at the right place, leaving no room for confusion. We have overcome difficult economic situations, and we shall have future difficulties; to overcome them, we must economize and be ready for privations. The people should understand that privations and savings are necessary to bring about an improvement in the situation, which will not be long delayed.

To fulfil our program, we have had to devote our main attention to strengthening the state power, for the stronger and the more perfected it becomes, the more

easily will it solve the problems it is faced with. The state administration has made progress, but we still cannot say that we have achieved the desired results. Educating cadres, training them with the necessary technical knowledge, and instilling in them a new spirit, and a style and method of work different from that of the past, should be one of the main concerns of the Front and the state power.

There have also been shortcomings in our work. It would be a mistake to hide them, and not to criticize them and deal strongly with them wherever necessary, in order to correct them and get rid of them. We should not be afraid of sound criticism, for far from weakening us, it strengthens us. Our people's power stems from the people and belongs to the people. Therefore, the best sons and daughters of the people, the best loved and most active, should be elected to the people's councils. These councils are responsible for their work to the people who elected them. In many regions, especially in subprefectures and prefectures, this great principle has sometimes been overlooked. The Front should speak out on this matter, for it is a question of great principled importance. If this principle is not observed, if it is not applied in the most rigorous way, then we do not have a people's power, and everything will slip backwards. At broad meetings, the people and Front members must openly criticize those councils and individuals who act otherwise. There can be no leniency here, for this would become the source of many evils.

In our administrative apparatus, there is still bureaucracy, the old spirit towards work, negligence on the part of some unscrupulous people, who see their job solely as a means of getting their salary, while their work can go to the devil, the people, those in need, can wait for days or weeks on end at their office door. In our state appa-

ratus there are still some people with old ideas and with a total lack of initiative, who demand much of others, but give nothing or very little themselves; there are some who do not behave correctly towards the public; in many cases, there is lack of organization and discipline at work. All these and many others are shortcomings which the organization of the Front should systematically fight, so that people are improved, or dismissed if they are incorrigible.

But there are some — and these are enemies of the people and of the state power — whose criticism, for example, is not aimed at the mistake or shortcoming of a particular salesman in a state-owned shop, but at the setting up of a sector of state-owned shops. It matters little to these people if a salesman in a state-owned store does not treat a customer correctly (this sort of behaviour should be corrected and measures taken if it is repeated). The same might well have happened in a private shop, but what nettles these gentlemen, and what they are fighting against in every way they can, is the very existence of the state-owned shop. This is the case with many other things, too. These people opposed our great reforms and our sound achievements, using as a pretext the errors which may be made, and in fact are made, and which we must stand over to see that they are corrected. These “wise” gentlemen and sick critics accuse our people of lacking experience. This may be true, but when the will is great, when loyalty towards the people is great, and when faith in one’s own forces and in the forces of the people is unshakable, experience will be gained through work. We have only one thing to say to these gentlemen; that, even as they are, our people have greater experience than they, and there is proof of this, not merely in words. The proof is our marvellous achievements in every field of activity, which these sick critics could not have achieved in twenty

years. The experience of our people, which is growing everyday, is constructive, while theirs is destructive. They have known, and they still know, how to steal, plunder and sabotage, but the people of new Albania will most certainly never give them free scope to apply their experience.

The entire people have been participating in state affairs and in carrying out the work programs. What impels this force to go ahead with such an impetus, with such unshakable faith, on the road of progress? The answer is simple. An old woman from Kurvelesh, in baggy trousers and a black scarf, who probably lost one or two sons on the field of honour for the liberation of the country, with pick in hand, was digging a ditch along a public highway, and I heard her singing: "I am building the new Albania, I am building my home". This is the force driving our people ahead. Glory to our working people!

Look what our heroic youth are doing! They were in the front lines of the battle from the beginning to the end of the war, they died for the homeland, with their heads high and a song on their lips, and today they are energetically re-building the homeland. Their great mass action will be concluded on schedule, or even ahead of it². This action of the youth is neither the first nor the last. The gratitude of the entire people will be inscribed in gold on the banner of their victories. The Balkan Games which are taking place today in Tirana are not only a great sports event, but represent the fraternity and friendship among the Balkan peoples, and are the work of the youth. The 3rd Congress of the Youth which is to be held in Tirana next week, will not be a congress of the youth alone, but a congress of the entire Albanian people. Let us exert all

² This refers to the construction of the 64 km. long Kukës-Peshkopia road through volunteer work.

our efforts to strengthen our youth, to educate our youth, and to make life happy for our youth, because in this way we strengthen Albania.

What great strength of will the Albanian women possess; they are eager to work and avid for culture, and have put all their considerable strength into the reconstruction of the country. Who had ever seen women, who once dared not even go beyond their doorsteps, come out as volunteers and work on the roads? Our women, whose entire life was a prison, took up the gun, fought, and broke their shackles. They are a great progressive force which is marching forward. We must hold out our hand to them, and give them the greatest possible aid, for this is in the interest of the homeland.

The trade unions, which include almost all the working people of our country, are becoming one of the principal supports of our state power. They are becoming more organized and consolidated all the time, which means that the workers are becoming the major factor in the life of the country, and its happy future.

Our Democratic Front, with its clear policy and the healthy mass organizations which are part of it and constitute its stability and strength, is a solid reality. Thus the Front is not only a broad political organization of the masses, but also a sound organizer. This is the reality, and this is how the entire people should understand their great political organization; this is how everyone should understand the correct and constructive policy pursued by the Front.

In foreign policy, the Democratic Front and the government, just like the National Liberation Front during the war, have always maintained a correct, progressive and consistent stand on the road of true democracy. This policy is aimed to strengthen Albania's position abroad, to consolidate its relations of friendship with allied and

friendly nations, and to protect the interests of our country. Our foreign policy bears no resemblance to the adventurous political manoeuvres of a regime like that of Zog, or of all the reactionary and traitorous circles of our country which, in every international agreement, put the interests of the people and the country up for auction, to fill their pockets and keep the people under bondage and terror.

In their war, the Albanian people pursued a definite goal, dictated by the historical development of their life, as well as by the international situation developing in the world in which they lived as a nation and a state. Their very existence threatened by aggressive fascism, our people launched the war to liberate themselves from the yoke of the occupier and the traitors to the country, and to take power into their own hands. It was a fierce war, a life and death struggle, because the broad masses of our people, who were fighting to win freedom and independence, were confronted not only with the foreign fascist occupiers, but also with the ruling classes, the reactionary feudal cliques, the rich bourgeoisie and its adventurous politicians who had sold themselves lock stock and barrel for foreign money, and all of them relying on the fascist occupiers. In such a merciless, difficult, but decisive war, our people's qualities stood out, for they knew how to solve this vital problem, to weather the storms, to overcome the obstacles, to vanquish the internal and external enemies, and take power into their hands.

As I have said, our people lived as a nation and state in the context of international circumstances and events, and their activity in the war was closely linked with the activity of all the progressive and anti-fascist nations which had risen in armed struggle against the common enemy. Thus, it was on the stand of our people towards the fascist aggression that the fate of our country depended. Our

people took their stand from the very first days of the invasion. Their heroic war against Italian and German fascism was their first glorious step in their international policy. This was the reliable foundation for our victory and the corner-stone of the foreign policy of the national liberation movement, which our People's Republic has followed and will always follow. As a logical consequence of this great act, our people aligned themselves determinedly on the side of the allies, and the anti-fascist alliance was the foundation of the foreign policy on which we based our war and achieved our victory. We remained loyal to this alliance, and fought to the bitter end against fascism; thousands of our best men and women fell heroically fighting for their people and for the common allied cause.

The character of our liberation war, the fierceness with which it was waged throughout, regardless of sacrifices and losses in men and material, placed the Albanian people in the vanguard, among the ranks of the progressive people, who saw in the liquidation and extermination of fascism the salvation of the world and humanity, the brotherhood of nations, the establishment of a just and lasting peace, and the strengthening of democracy. The civilized world has seen what a small nation like ours can do when it is determined to live free and to be self-governing. The efforts and heroic deeds of our people have been spoken of by the representatives of the allied powers, Molotov, Hull, Eden, Churchill, and many others. The radio and press have spoken with sympathy and admiration of the superhuman efforts of the Albanians during the war. The Albanian people were active and loyal members of the anti-fascist bloc, and gave their unsparing contribution to the liquidation of fascism; they deserve the support and respect of all the states with whom they have fought shoulder to shoulder. The war, our common

suffering and efforts, have enabled us to distinguish our friends from our enemies, to strengthen our solidarity with our friends, and fight mercilessly to the end against our enemies. The horror of war had gripped all the people, and their sole desire was to see fascism crushed and the war ended as soon as possible. But the liquidation of fascism and the ending of the war depended on the firmness and intensity of the war waged by the progressive people of the world against nazi Germany. All mankind is profoundly grateful to those nations who unsparingly shed their blood, who made the supreme sacrifice, who became the torch-bearers of the liberation war, and in whom people saw their surest and most solid support in the war and in the process of establishing peace after the victory over nazi Germany. Who can deny the decisive and principal role played by the Soviet Union and its glorious army in the great anti-fascist bloc which contributed to the defeat of fascism? The Albanian people, like all other enslaved nations, understood well that the fate of the world was being decided on the plains of Russia. The victories of the Red Army brought victory for progressive mankind, and therefore love and friendship for the Soviet Union were an indispensable condition for the defeat of fascism and the establishment of a just peace. The Soviet Union became the steel pivot of the anti-fascist coalition, and the world saw in it the principal saviour of mankind from the fascist plague and from the sufferings it had caused, saw in it the champion of justice and of the small nations, the defender of the right of the nations to self-determination and to security to build a peaceful and happy life following the war. The love of our people for the Soviet Union, for the Red Army, and for their great leader Stalin was boundless. It is in the revolutionary spirit of the people of the Soviet Union, in their heroic and legendary struggle, in the determination and self-sacrifice they showed in this

cruel and bloody war, in which they carried the main burden on their backs, and in the lofty concept of justice of the Soviet man, that the enormous attraction of the great country of socialism lies. The whole world, and especially our small nation, oppressed all its life under the heel of foreign imperialists and their local tools, cannot fail to feel boundless love and deep gratitude towards it.

Such sincere friendship with the anti-fascist and progressive nations, based on sound foundations, was absolutely essential for our people. The policy of the National Liberation Front always aimed at this, for it knew that such a friendship would be a shield and support for our country, and would not violate or damage the interests of the people. The interests of the homeland were sacred, and they guided the national liberation movement. Our people's objectives during the National Liberation War concerning friendly relations with the allied and friendly nations were attained thanks to the correct policy of the National Liberation Front, which led our people to victory.

During the period of the war, our people observed many things incompatible with the line of the anti-fascist alliance on the part of the Anglo-American reactionary circles, which attempted to split the bloc and delay the end of the war. The actions of these reactionary circles also had repercussions here, where, through the press, radio, or agents, they endeavoured to save the traitors and quislings from the disaster into which they had plunged headlong, to rehabilitate these people who had sold themselves to the enemy, and thus repair the bankrupt position of Albanian internal reaction. But these attempts were futile and a failure, because our people were fully determined to prevent the revival of those who had oppressed them and brought about the great disaster of the Second World War. No one dares make the slightest criticism of us on this

point, lest he is put to shame and discredited. The Albanian people proved themselves capable of fighting fascism, of standing loyal to the end to the anti-fascist alliance; they were able to control their internal situation as seemed right and proper to them. This was their incontestable right; the people were the masters of their own fate, and would in no way allow outsiders to intervene in their internal affairs. And in this, our foreign policy conformed to the publicly declared great principles of self-determination and self-government of the peoples. All these things show the clear road followed by the Albanian people, and indicate that the Albanian people and the state power they gave their country have been and remain a factor in the victory over fascism and a sound guarantee for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in which the world ravaged in the war can be restored, and brotherhood and good relations established among the nations of the world.

Our National Liberation War not only liberated the country from the foreigners and the internal traitors, but it opened the way to friendship with the neighbouring people of the new Yugoslavia. The friendship and alliance with Yugoslavia is not the work of just two or three people, but of the Albanian and Yugoslav people, and this was hammered out in common struggle. On the battlefield we clasped hands as comrades sincerely and fraternally.

For our people the post-war period, which we are living through now, is a further period of testing which puts clearly before their eyes how correct their road was in the course of the war, and how consistent and progressive their stand towards the foreign allies and friendly world was. I shall not dwell at length here on what happened in Albania following the war, but I shall stress only the fact that the Albanian people, who liberated

themselves relying entirely on their own forces, and sent their forces beyond the borders of the Albanian state to carry the war against the Germans through to the end, established the people's regime in their country, a sound and progressive democracy, in which the people, and the people alone, have their say. Everything is in the hands of the people, who sanctioned by law and by the methods and means of the most progressive democracy all their achievements which had cost them so much suffering and bloodshed. In the same spirit in which they waged the war, our people began work to build a new life in which work occupies the first place and is an honour to all. The friends of our country, those who wished the Albanian people well, rejoiced at this rapid and just development of our country on the road of democracy. These valued friends of our country did not fail to give repeated proofs of their faith in, and friendship towards, our heroic and progressive people. The recognition of the Democratic Government of Albania by the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was a victory for us and a fully deserved satisfaction for the entire Albanian people. The Albanian people officially joined the family of the allied nations, with whom they fought side by side and sacrificed so much for the common cause. The number of states which recognize the Albanian government is increasing : Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, and Bulgaria have established diplomatic relations with us. None of them has posed conditions for the recognition of our government. And why should they? Conditions cannot be set for the recognition of the government of a heroic nation which fought against fascism from 1939 to the end of the war, a nation which made so many sacrifices and accomplished so many heroic deeds in this war, a nation which remained loyal to the allied cause, a nation whose struggle and sacrifices were officially recognized with much praise and encouragement, a nation

which established democracy and justice in its own country, a nation which strove hard and reached the desired goal: to consolidate the anti-fascist alliance and friendship with all the members of the great anti-fascist bloc. Our people know that the British and American governments have acted differently; they have posed conditions for the recognition of our government. It is only natural that we did not accept their terms. The conditions posed by the British government were not valid, because the people's regime in Albania, its laws and decisions, were made and implemented in the most democratic way. The British government announced recognition of our government, but its plenipotentiary minister appointed to Tirana never arrived. Why? I want to clarify Albanian and world public opinion on this matter, because I do not want foreign news agencies to speculate about this and distort the facts. Following the recognition of the Albanian government by the British government, the British military mission accredited to our General Staff ceased functioning and left our country, in accordance with the wishes of the Allied Mediterranean High Command and the British government; it is quite untrue that it was we who insisted on its departure. The stabilization of normal diplomatic relations meant the departure of this military mission. In reciprocal fashion, we withdrew our military mission in Bari. The postponement of the arrival of the British minister in Tirana was excused by the British government on the pretext that we had hindered the members of the military mission in their work and in their travels around Albania, and that at the same time we had ordered out of Albania a British officer making inquiries about the graves of British airmen who crashed in our territory during the war. In our view, these arguments do not constitute a sound reason for not establishing normal relations with an allied state, and in any case they are quite un-

founded. The British military mission was not only allowed to travel freely about Albania "on its business", as the members of the mission put it, but its members also went on picnics and hunting expeditions. No obstacles were ever put in their way, and they even went where they should not have gone, to places which had nothing to do with "their business". As for the officer making inquiries about the graves, the question was not as the BBC presented it for propaganda purposes. In fact, permission was again granted to this officer about six months ago. But he did not come to carry out his "mission", nor does he intend to come. This reinforces our conviction that it was not a question of the officer inquiring about the graves, or of his "mission", but that the issue was a pretext for not sending the minister. Following these untenable pretexts, they brought up others of the same nature to explain the fact that the British minister did not arrive. But even these further complaints, which were used as pretexts by the British government, were dealt with, and ironed out, and there was no obstacle whatsoever to the establishment of diplomatic relations. But whoever looks for excuses will always find one. The incident with the British warships in Saranda³ became a new obstacle. We can in no way be blamed for that regrettable incident, if the circumstances in which it happened are analysed. Greek ships, with or without the flag flying, on dozens of occasions, for months on end, have entered our waters, approached our coast, fired with artillery or machine-guns, taken Albanian citizens prisoner, plundered our boats and carried out a thousand such provocations. Precisely at such a time, two warships, without their flags flying,

3 On May 15, 1946, two British warships, with obvious provocative intentions, entered the territorial waters of Albania in the vicinity of Saranda, and struck upon mines set by the Italian and German armies during the war.

appeared in our waters heading for Saranda. Our coastal batteries fired warning shots for them to withdraw, and then fired some other shots round the ships. When they hoisted the British flag, it was too late. It was never the intention of our coastal defence command to fire on British warships; but international navigation rules require that permission be sought before entering the territorial waters of another country in order to avoid such incidents, all the more so when the Greeks were systematically carrying out naval provocations.

All the arguments I have outlined, which the British government used repeatedly as pretexts for not establishing diplomatic relations, were unsound and baseless, and our government has always been willing to explain its actions and settle matters in a spirit of sound friendship and understanding.

The condition posed by the American government for the recognition of our government was the recognition of the treaties existing prior to 1939 between Albania and the United States. As is known, Zog's government had signed a series of treaties with various foreign countries. I do not consider it necessary to enumerate here the aims of the majority of Zog's treaties, the base bargaining carried out through these treaties at the expense of the people, or the plight of our country as a result of these treaties and agreements entered into by Zog. They cost us the blood of our finest sons and daughters. At the Congress of Përmet the Albanian people were correct to adopt the decision to annul these treaties, and entitling the government to revise the treaties which were in the interest of the Albanian people.

The decisions adopted by the people at Përmet was our government's answer to the Americans. The interests of our people are paramount. This is our first right and duty, which no one can deny us, just as we do not deny

it to others. With a friendly nation, such as the American nation, we have always been ready to come to an understanding on this question. We have never lacked good will; we have asked them not to pose conditions for the recognition of our government and have told them that, after recognition, we would immediately take up and discuss the treaties in question with the American representative who would come to Tirana, and make the necessary amendments required by the circumstances of the Second World War, and the new spirit of international relations which it created. We went even further to show our government's good will on this question: we accepted the validity of all treaties of an international character existing between America and us, and as for the other two or three bilateral treaties, we were willing to take them up for immediate consideration after the recognition of our government. We took this step a long time ago, but the American government has not yet replied.

In the light of these concrete and undeniable facts, everyone can judge for himself the correctness of our stand towards the Anglo-American allies, the scope of our efforts which were lacking neither in good will nor in desire to strengthen friendly relations with the British and American peoples, and the unjustified and unfair obstacles which they raised against the establishment of diplomatic relations, and especially against our undeniable rights in all the international forums.

Through their heroic war, the Albanian people won their indisputable rights in the international field, the same rights as the other 21 nations which met in Paris to discuss the Peace Treaty with Italy and the other Axis satellites. The denial of our rights constitutes a great injustice and a flagrant violation of the rights of small nations.

For a long period the Albanian people have been witnessing this situation, and hearing with the greatest in-

dignation and deep anger the building up of a system of base slanders by the enemies of the Albanian people, the disgraceful campaigns which recall the time when fascism was at the height of its power, their systematical preparations of armed provocations along our South borders, the claims against our territory by people who have fascism in their blood, and the brazen denial of our elementary rights, in justification of which no one is able to bring forward even the slightest reasonable argument. This whole campaign is the doing of those who are trying to sabotage the peace at all costs and to throw the world into further bloody strife. But all these sinister plots are doomed to fail, because the progressive forces in the world are in a position to make all these endeavours end in ignominious failure. Today more than ever it is necessary for the progressive forces to close their ranks, and strengthen their unity and friendship — the only weapon to cope with the flamboyant manoeuvres of reaction. The Albanian people stand proudly, stronger than ever, more respected and honoured than ever, in face of these campaigns of slanders and provocations. In defending their rights and their correct road, with pride and courage, our people are indomitable fighters for democracy and peace. Our people have also seen how their rights are defended by their sincere and beloved friends and allies.

What are our rights which should be recognized and granted to us? Our people have claimed and will claim them persistently. The powerful voice of our people has often been raised demanding our participation as a full member of the United Nations Organization. The Soviet delegation rose in ardent defence of our rights in the Security Council as did the Yugoslav and Polish delegations. Our people know this. By a majority of votes we were admitted to the UNO by the Security Council, but without any sound reason, the United States and Britain used their

veto. The Albanian people and the whole world see that this is an injustice to a small nation which made such great sacrifices during the anti-fascist war; our people are even more aggrieved to see themselves ranked with Portugal, which has been and is a hotbed of supporters of fascism. But our right will be recognized, and our people will enter the UNO, because they have won this right with their blood⁴.

I shall speak briefly here about the Peace Conference and its decisions concerning Albania. Among other things, the Paris Conference was to discuss the Peace Treaty with Italy. Albania should have taken its deserved place at the summit conference, as a full member with equal rights with the other 21 victorious countries. We have very sound reasons, and only through the voting machine at the conference, supporting the vile Greek claims, were they rejected. Despite the masterly defence by the distinguished friends of the Albanian people, our just demands were rejected by votes. We were invited only to express our opinion on the Peace Treaty with Italy in the plenary session and in the various commissions where we were to present our amendments to this treaty.

Mussolini's fascist Italy, which with the greatest determination and brutality followed in the footsteps of the Italy of the Vlorë War, attacked us barbarously on April 7, 1939. The Albanian people greeted them with bullets, and did not lay down their weapons until the capitulation of Italy. The Italian atrocities in Albania, murders, arson and lootings, were all carried out on a large scale. Thus Italy must render account to us. Not only should it pay for all the damage which it has inflicted upon us, but the Peace Treaty with Italy, as far as it concerns us, should

⁴ After prolonged and persistent struggle, the PRA was admitted to the UNO in 1955.

guarantee all our moral and material rights, as well as our independence, freedom, and territorial integrity, and be a powerful barrier against a possible new Italian aggression against our country. In the Peace Treaty with Italy, this fascist aggressor country which caused us so much damage, Albania should have the right to be considered as a "puissance associée"*. This just demand of ours was once again rejected through the voting machine. In the draft Peace Treaty with Italy, the Council of Foreign Ministers had not neglected the interests of Albania. A special chapter, consisting of 6 articles which have to do with the defence of our cause, was accepted in full by the territorial and political committee for the Peace Treaty with Italy following a brilliant and consistent defence by Molotov, Vishinsky⁵ and other champions of our cause, against the ridiculous claims of the Greek delegation and its constant supporters. But despite this, the Albanian delegation to the Peace Conference presented a series of further amendments to the draft Peace Treaty with Italy. They consist of our demands for the reparations Italy owes us, for the extradition of war criminals, the return of our gold which was stolen from us and shipped to Italy, and taken from there to Germany by the Germans, the handing over of some of the armaments seized from us by the Italians at the beginning of occupation, the handing over of our ship "Illyria", and a number of other ships as compensation for those which were taken away or sunk, and for the restitution of, or compensation for, property burned or looted in our country. All these are our incontestable rights which should be recognized. What we are asking for is

* "Puissance associée" (Fr. in the original) — associated power.

⁵ A. I. Vishinsky (1883-1954), vice-foreign minister (1940-1949) and foreign minister of the Soviet Union (1949-1953).

only small in comparison with the damage and suffering caused us by fascist Italy. The Albanian delegation will insist to the end, and the Albanian people will persevere, in demanding their rights.

The Paris Conference witnessed the most disgraceful attempt by the Greek reactionaries and their supporters to partition Albania, and to rob Albania of Korça and Gjirokastra, which were the cradles of Albanian patriotism and of the national liberation movement. And this attempt was made after such a terrible war, in which millions of people fell for freedom and justice, and at a peace conference convened to put an end to aggression and fascism. And the worst of it is that this vile attempt by the Greek fascists was supported openly or indirectly by the representatives of some of the countries together with which we shed our blood.

But Albania was not alone, and its rights could not be so easily violated. Its friends were strong, they were the champions of mankind, champions of peace, champions of justice, champions of the small nations. They were the representatives of the great Soviet Union, the comrades of the great Stalin. The Albanian people will never forget Molotov's defence of our cause. They will never forget the defence of Vishinsky, who at every meeting where Albania was mentioned, rose to speak and ardently defended the rights of our small nation. Manuilsky⁶, who defended our cause with such ardour in Paris and in New York, said to me: "I love the small Albanian nation and I shall defend its people to the end, for they are courageous, they have made sacrifices, and are progres-

⁶ D. Z. Manuilsky (1883-1959), head of the delegation of the SSR of Ukraine at the San-Francisco Conference (1945), and at the Peace Conference (1946), active participant in the first four sessions of the General Assembly of the UNO.

sive." The defence of such a just cause as ours could not but have the results which were achieved: our country's just cause was recognized by the entire world, and Albania won the sympathy of all progressive people; on the other hand, the whole manoeuvre of international reaction, with the Greek reaction in the lead, ended in the most ignominious and resounding fiasco. The discussion of the southern border of Albania, which on the basis of the Greek proposal was so unjustly voted for by the plenary session of the conference, was withdrawn from the agenda, putting to shame those who had proposed and supported it. From all these events, which directly bear upon their future and the peace of mankind, the Albanian people have drawn their own conclusions. Our people will cherish deep affection for their friends, who love and defend them, and will exert all their efforts to strengthen this sincere friendship, which is a guarantee for their existence as a nation and a state and, at the same time, an invaluable factor for peace in the world. The Albanian people have never deserved the flagrant injustice done to them by the representatives of those nations, with whom they have been allies and friends; but our people are always confident that such an unjust situation will come to an end. As for the heroic and long-suffering Greek people, who are being killed and massacred by the reactionary fascist bands of the Athens government, our people feel nothing but sympathy for them. The Greek reactionaries know our opinion concerning their base claims to South Albania; they were dealt a blow and put to shame at the Peace Conference, and they should never forget that the Albanian people will never be caught off guard even for a moment, but will defend their southern border more vigilantly than ever. April 7 will never be repeated, not even from the south border. Despite the shameful failure of its attempts, the Greek reaction has never laid down its arms, but is

carrying out daily border provocations and trying to maintain a disturbed situation so as to carry out its criminal activities in Greece. The Greek reaction slanderously claims that we are helping the Greek insurgents with arms and men. Such provocations and slanders should be ended. We do not interfere in the internal affairs of the Greek people, and we do not want them to interfere in ours. In order to hide the atrocities and crimes they are committing against the Greek people, to extinguish the flames of insurrection which have spread throughout Greece, and the impact of the people's uprising which is threatening their crumbling position, the Athens politicians are trying to make out that this uprising is aided from abroad. The slanders of the Greeks are groundless; we reject them categorically. The whole world has clearly seen the aims of all the calumnies and provocations of the Greek reaction against our country; now it is high time to call a halt to the activities of these disturbers of the peace and oppressors of the democratic Greek people.

The road pursued by our people in matters of foreign policy has been most correct and progressive; we shall advance along this road with the greatest determination and conviction. We shall increasingly strengthen the close friendship which links us with the great Soviet Union; we shall strengthen our friendship and alliance with the fraternal Yugoslav people; we maintain friendly relations with the nations of the Balkans, such as Bulgaria and Rumania. We shall endeavour to strengthen and consolidate these ties of friendship, just as we shall deepen our friendship with all other progressive and democratic nations of the world. We shall fight to the end to eradicate the remnants of fascism and shall always be on the front line to defend and safeguard peace, just as we were on the front line of the war against Italian fascism and German nazism.

Comrades of the Democratic Front,

These moments which Albania is passing through are among the most important of its history, and our tasks and responsibilities are great. First of all, we are on the most correct road, because the people themselves chose it, they found it after many centuries of suffering and misery, in the course of a bloody war unprecedented in their history. The people won their freedom, independence and sovereignty, they drove out the foreign enemies, swept away the internal enemies, established the soundest and most progressive democracy, and strengthened and consolidated the prestige and position of their country abroad, ensuring strong and sincere friends and allies. These are great victories for our people. Our first duty, as members of the Front, is to safeguard these victories as the apple of our eye, and to consolidate and strengthen them.

To guard these victories means to defend the country. The defence of the country is a difficult but glorious task. You do not defend the homeland once in twenty years, and then rest on your laurels until someone else throws a rope around your neck. The country is defended every day, continually, at every step, with every word, in our daily work. Our individual life is closely bound up with the life of the entire Albanian community, and therefore we should link our personal interest with the broad general interest. From this stems and develops the idea of patriotism, sacrifice, solidarity, unity and defence. Where people work for personal gain, there is no patriotism, no vigilance, concern or discipline, and no feeling for the defence of the homeland. The external and internal enemy does not sleep, but endeavours to weaken this feeling at all costs and by every means, so that in the end it can seize us by the throat. In their daily work, the people see how

the enemy attempts to fight us, and that therefore we should wage a constant struggle against it. Here is no room for pious gentleness, for this is a life and death struggle. When the enemy had you under his boot, he did not pity you, but made you leave thousands of your best men dead and wounded on the battle-field; you had to pay with the destruction of a great part of Albania to save your life. Now it is in our hands to defend our life; this is our right, and we shall defend it and make it happy.

To consolidate the victories of the war means to make constant improvements, to build the country from every point of view. The problem of the reconstruction of the country is broad and many-sided, and requires from us concern, will-power, determination, discipline, and the highest sense of justice. To uplift the economy of the country, and thus improve the life of the people, we must think at the same time about the development of education and culture among the people from whom sound cadres will emerge, able to manage the entire economy of the country on a scientific basis; we must improve and modernize agriculture, reconstruct and modernize industry, strengthen and modernize the state apparatus. All these constitute the chief problems of our state, and we are on the way to their solution. The Front should concentrate all its efforts on mobilizing the entire people to support the many-sided work of the state power, and in the first place, the development of the country's economy. First of all, the land reform should be concluded on time. But the agrarian problem is broad and calls for special concern on the part of the state power and the Front, for large-scale land improvement schemes to improve the existing lands and gain new arable acreage. The Front's immediate task is to give greater help to the state power to quickly correct the mistakes which may have been made during the implementation of the reform, to activate the peasants

and people to dig small local or big national canals, which are part of the government plan.

Another immediate task of the Front is to launch a great campaign for the approaching sowing season, according to the plan approved by the Ministry of Agriculture. As a result of this great campaign no inch of land should be left untilled, while encouraging the cultivation of various crops in various parts of the country, as specified in this plan.

The question of mines and factories. The trade unions and the Front in general should give the greatest support possible to the great undertaking of the state in mines, factories and construction sites. Our worker should understand well that his living standards and the general well-being will improve when he works conscientiously and constantly increases production. The question of work quotas should become the concern of the workers, the trade unions and managers of the enterprises.

In the state sector in general, the Front has a huge task. We should see to it that this large sector makes a greater contribution than the other sectors. This is a question of discipline, organization, education of cadres, and development of initiative. It is necessary for the Front to encourage the initiative of the masses in everything, and not let them wait for everything from the government. In the economic field we should economize as much as possible and work with the lowest possible expenditure to realize the tasks undertaken and cover the deficit.

The Front should be active in rapidly developing and extending the cooperatives, especially the buying and selling cooperatives, and working cooperatives in the countryside. People should understand their aims, and they should rely on the initiative of the masses, for such things are not organized through bureaucratic methods. They serve to avoid speculation, increase production, and raise the living

standard of the small-scale producers, as well as to aid the consumer.

I come back once again to the question of education and culture. This is one of the most important problems for the Front and the state power. Education should be promoted at all costs, schools should be supported, every boy and girl should go to school, and all efforts should be exerted in the struggle against illiteracy, especially in the North regions. As many cultural centres and sports clubs as possible should be opened and encouraged. The press should be circulated and read throughout the country, and it should be not only informative, but especially educative, reflecting the new life and spirit.

A great task of the Front is to reinforce in the people of Albania the sense of justice, which is the highest and most sacred sentiment in our people's regime. Our judges should be selected from among the ranks of the most honest and incorruptible people, from those who have the people's cause at heart, and who will pass judgement and make decisions according to the new spirit of the times. The state prosecutors should find the greatest support among the Front members in carrying out their important duties.

The State Control Commission should also have the full support of the Front. As is known, the tasks of the State Control Commission are not to suppress initiative or to impede leadership, but on the contrary, to help through the exchange of experience and criticism of errors, and to point out these errors to enable the organs of state administration to carry out their tasks as well and effectively as possible.

Comrades of the Democratic Front,

The members of our Democratic Front have begun to understand their tasks well, and to thrash them out and solve them. At this present important meeting, we should,

therefore, put forward these problems, and exchange experience with one another, which should serve to impart new vigour to the work of construction in our country. Things are already underway, and we should work with that same impetus as we began with, for this is the way Albania is built, and this is the way it can live happy and strong.

Long live the Albanian people and their great political organization, the Democratic Front!

First published in the newspaper "Bashkimi", N° 553, October 8, 1946

Works, vol. 3.

TELEGRAM

TO THE SECRETARY—GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION IN PROTEST AGAINST THE VIOLATION OF THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE PRA IN THE CORFU CHANNEL BY WARSHIPS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND AGAINST THE ENTRY OF WARSHIPS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE PORT OF DURRËS WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PRA

November 11, 1946

TO HIS EXCELLENCY TRYGVE LIE, SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

New York

On November 10, 1946, the British government, through its embassy in Belgrade, advised our government that it had decided to clear the Corfu Channel on the 12th of November, according to the decision taken on this matter by the Central Committee for Mine Dredging.

In a note dated October 31, we notified the British government that, excluding Albanian territorial waters, the government of our Republic had no objections to the waters being cleared, but that any incursion by foreign ships into our territorial waters without the authorization of our government would be considered as an unfriendly act and would violate the sovereignty of Albania.

Through its note, the British government wanted to present Albania with an accomplished fact, and we therefore protest energetically to the United Nations Organization over this unilateral act.

We do not recognize the Central Committee for Mine Dredging which has usurped all rights and has not deigned to consult the Albanian government in undertaking the work of clearing the channel, in which Albania has incontestable rights. Only a commission emerging from the UNO, and functioning with the participation of Albania, can determine the extent of our territorial waters in the Corfu Channel.

Second, we protest energetically to the UNO over the insistence with which the American mission in Albania demands entry to the port of Durrës for two warships to take aboard this mission on its departure from Albania. We have authorized the American mission to bring a civil or merchant ship to our port, and we have given permission, if they wish, for one or two aeroplanes to land at Tirana airport to transport the personnel of this mission.

The Chairman of
the Government of the PRA

Enver Hoxha

First published in the newspaper "Bashkimi", N° 583, November 12, 1946

Works, vol. 3.

TELEGRAM
TO THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR, USA, BRITAIN AND FRANCE, REQUESTING
THAT THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA BE
INVITED, AS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT,
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE WITH GERMANY

January 12, 1947

TO THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE SOVIET
UNION, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
BRITAIN AND FRANCE

On the occasion of the coming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow¹ which will draw up the draft of the Peace Treaty with Germany, the Government of the People's Republic of Albania has the honour to set out the following for the kind consideration of the principal allied powers:

Albania is an interested party in the negotiations for the Peace Treaty with Germany, because it suffered very grave losses during the German occupation and waged a bitter battle against the nazi occupiers.

In fact Albania, one of the first victims of fascist aggression, since it was occupied on April 7, 1939, took up

¹ This refers to the 4th session of the Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Britain and France, held in Moscow from March 10 to April 24, 1947.

the fight against the Italian invaders right from the start, and kept up its struggle, defying all sacrifices, and intensified the fighting, especially during the nazi occupation. The sacrifices made by the Albanian people during the German occupation are beyond compare. The devastation and suffering caused in our country by the nazi occupiers are eloquent proof of its participation in the common struggle. In fact, the war the Albanian people waged, side by side with the allied powers, compelled the Germans to deploy from 3 to 5 divisions of their best-trained troops in Albania.

When Albania was liberated by the National Liberation Army, which carried out this difficult task on its own, our effective forces numbered 70,000 officers and men organized into a proper army. To show their loyalty to the common cause, the Albanian people did not cease fighting even after the liberation of the country; our forces pursued the Hitlerites beyond our borders and fought against them for many months on Yugoslav territory.

The balance-sheet of the sacrifices made by the Albanian people includes: 28,000 killed, 12,600 wounded, 10,000 political detainees and deported persons, and nearly 60,000 dwellings burnt down or razed to the ground.

The many people sacrificed, the material damage done, and the great military efforts made by Albania, which as a result suffered losses amounting to billions of gold francs, are sufficient reason for its claims against Germany to be respected.

On the basis of these sacrifices Albania was invited to the War Reparations Conference in Paris in November 1945, and on that occasion, signed the final act of the Conference, which allocated it a share of the reparations from Germany. Albania is a member, with equal

rights, of the Inter-allied Agency of War Reparations in Brussels².

For all these reasons, the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, interpreting the profound wishes of the Albanian people, and having confidence in the spirit of justice of the main allied powers towards the small states, claims the right to be invited to present its views to the coming meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, and when the time comes, to be invited as an active member to take part in the Peace Conference with Germany on the same footing as all the other members.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's
Republic of Albania

Colonel-General

Enver Hoxha

First published in the newspaper "Bashkimi", N° 635, January 12, 1947

Works, vol. 4.

² This agency was created in December 1945 to accept and satisfy the demands for reparations from the allied states, victims of the aggression of Hitlerite Germany, amongst which was also Albania.

**SPEECH DELIVERED TO THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY
ON THE OPENING OF THE 3rd REGULAR SESSION
OF THE 1st LEGISLATURE**

July 12, 1947

Comrade Deputies,

In the name of the government and on my own behalf I convey our greetings and heartily wish you success in the proceedings of this important parliamentary session.

As you know, in the present session of the People's Assembly, the government is presenting you with a number of important draft-laws dealing with all the economic, social and cultural activity of our country; in the first place, the draft-law on the financial budget for the current year 1947, the general state plan for 1947, and many others. Of course, these draft-laws call for the greatest attention and speedy approval by the People's Assembly.

Before the proceedings of the session begin, I wish, on my behalf and in the name of the government I have the honour to head, to explain to the representatives of the people in the Assembly our government's policy on the work of building our country in all fields of economic, social, cultural and other activity, on the achievement of this important work in the past and in the immediate future, on the clear perspective our people should have, and on the important tasks facing the organs of state power and all our people, which should be carried out as well and quickly as possible, for on this depends our

advance towards building socialism in our country, which means building a prosperous, happy life full of freedom and dignity for the working people of Albania.

Power lies firmly in the hands of the people, as a result of the heroic struggle for liberation and our great people's revolution; this is the guarantee for the building of a happy future for our people. It was for this that the broad masses of the Albanian people fought, it was for this that the workers, peasants and patriotic intellectuals of Albania fought, united as one. This firm alliance was formed in the National Liberation War, and its primary result, the seizure of power by the people, was also achieved through the National Liberation War. Preserving and consolidating daily these two results of the war, our people and their government forged ahead to realize and further develop their program, the basic principles of which were fixed by the people from the time when they took to the mountains, and fought rifle in hand against fascism and the traitors to the country. The question of the transition of power into the hands of the people is the most important question, and this will solve correctly and well all the problems of our country. The people and all our cadres should understand this well.

Here too lies the reason that the fascist aggressors provoked this great holocaust. Their aim was to establish everywhere the fascist dictatorship, the most ruthless dictatorship of capital, in order to suppress all freedom, to oppress the peoples and enslave them forever, so that the monopoly trusts would be victorious. The question of state power is also an object of concern to imperialism and world reaction. They are seeking to seize power from the hands of the people who have already succeeded in assuming power, and to replace it with a formal democratic power which would not be in the hands of the people but in the hands of a minority of individual allegedly better

qualified, and able to protect and control the interests of the people better than the people themselves. This was the objective of the Albanian traitors of the final hour, to whom I will refer later on. All their efforts were directed towards overthrowing the people's state power and, using the terms of a false and formal democracy, they sought to replace the will of the people with the hateful arbitrary power of the beys, big landowners and rich merchants, all in the service of foreign reaction. The people should never forget for a moment the question of state power, they should be on their guard and hold it firmly in their hands, improving and consolidating it.

With the establishment of our people's state power, we began immediately after the liberation of Albania to take all the necessary measures to build the country devastated by the war, to nationalize all the property that had been plundered from the people, to nationalize all the factories and mines, which served the rich in order to work the working people to death, and to compel all the speculators to give back to the people everything they had extorted from them, and we began to set up a new economy on a new basis. There is no need for me to repeat here what you all have seen and experienced yourselves, to speak of the great enthusiasm of the people for the adoption of these initial measures, their great drive, self-denial and heroism, and their all-out mobilization for the reconstruction of the country. Roads and bridges were repaired, and factories destroyed during the war were rebuilt. The Kuçova and Patos oil-fields, the copper and chromium mines were reconstructed, the houses burnt down during the war were rebuilt, and life began to take its normal course. Through these important measures we set up the state sector of the economy which became stronger all the time, and today we may say that we have a large state sector, which is the sector of socialist production. At the

same time, along with the state sector, we created a network of various cooperatives which are continually developing and exercising control and discipline over the private sector. This control and discipline do not limit production and the development of economy in general, but check speculation, anarchy and all those things that impede the general development of the economy of our country.

It is clear, and we could say that, we have been able to solve the economic problems and to strengthen our economy much better than the former regimes. We have accomplished this within a relatively short time and under very difficult situations, caused by the war. We have achieved important successes in all fields of the activity of our state.

The sectors of industry which had been destroyed have been all re-established and are operating at full capacity, producing more than before. For instance, the production of crude oil is 161,1% over 1938 production, 463.2% over 1945 production, and 217.3% over that of 1946; the production of refined bitumen is 1628% over 1938 production, 1,097% over 1945, and 155.6% over 1946; the production of leather is 900% over 1938 production, 2,600% over 1945, and 400% over 1946, that of cement is 115.5% above 1938 production, 588% over 1945, 231% over 1946; that of timber is 833%, 257%, 261%. The handicraft industry has been re-established and encouraged. All the bridges destroyed during the war, totalling a length of 5,547 meters, have been rebuilt, new bridges totalling 240 meters have been constructed, all the wharves of our seaports destroyed during the war have been rebuilt, 2,000 kilometres of the road network have been improved and 202 kilometres of new roads have been built, including the Kukës-Peshkopia road built by the youth, 7,852 houses burnt down during the war have been rebuilt,

and the State has built 530 new school buildings. Telecommunication lines have been repaired and new lines set up. All the telegraph and telephone stations have been rebuilt.

Education and culture have made great progress in our country. Suffice it for me to draw some comparisons with the pre-war state of education.

During the 1938-39 school year our country had 643 primary schools attended by 52,024 pupils, whereas today, during the 1946-47 school year, we have 1,609 primary schools attended by 134,524 pupils.

Compulsory school attendance¹ throughout Albania has been achieved 87%. Today we have 34 upper elementary and 10 secondary schools which are attended by thousands and thousands of our boys and girls. I don't intend to speak here about the number of pre-school institutions, or schools for adult education, where more than 26,000 people are taught in over a thousand classes. The campaign against illiteracy is making rapid progress. In order to wipe out illiteracy in Albania, the government, with the aid of the entire Democratic Front, will try its utmost to have about 60,000 people learn to read and write every year. Thus, within a few years illiteracy in Albania will have been wiped out.

Hundreds of students attend courses in various branches of the Teacher Training Institute which has been opened this year in Tirana, hundreds of students are attending university in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and elsewhere, and hundreds of others will be sent abroad on state scholarships to study science in various universities. The number of public libraries in our country is increasing,

¹ According to the Law on Compulsory Primary Education, which came into effect in August 1946, primary education became compulsory for all children over 7 years of age.

as well as the number of books they contain; the cinema, theater, music and sports are developing rapidly in a correct way.

One of the principal problems which our people's state power had to solve was that of land, of land reform. The peasants had to be given the land, because it belonged to them, it was their own, for they tilled it. And the land reform has been completed. The implementation of the land reform laws totally changed the ratio of ownership of land, which now appears as follows:

Land owned by the state has been reduced from 18.71% to 5.03%; land owned by religious communities has been reduced from 1.26% to 0.20%; large and medium estates have been reduced from 52.43% to 16.38%; land belonging to small owners has increased from 28.07% to 43.17%; land belonging to the rural proletariat has increased from 0% to 34.63%.

The land reform laws benefited 29,400 semi-proletarian families, 18,219 established local proletarian families, 1,902 newly-settled proletarian families, and 19,218 peasant families who already possessed some land. The peasants of Albania were liberated once and for all from the yoke of the beys, the agas and their administrators. The blood they shed in the struggle for liberation was not shed in vain: the people's state power turned their age-long dream into reality. Our peasant, bowed down by centuries of suffering, stood up, and with a song on his lips and faith in his state power, is working on his own land for his own benefit. Just what immediate effect the land reform laws had, you will understand from two figures, which I shall quote: in 1938, the area of land under cultivation in Albania was 221,030 hectares, while this year the area under cultivation is 305,000 hectares. These are the initial effects of the implementation of the land reform laws. You can see for yourselves how pro-

found are the consequences of the people's great revolution, how grand and immortal are the reforms of our people's state power.

In addition to carrying out its land reform, our state power, immediately after liberation, attached primary importance to the sector of land improvement. During these two years, excluding the Maliq lands, we have improved various lands covering an area of 6,764 hectares, by opening a total of 125 kilometres of drainage canals. During the same period, an additional 22 kilometres of irrigation canals have been opened, to irrigate 8,316 hectares of land. The completion of these projects will help to increase agricultural production.

A further success of our people's state power in the economic field is the question of cooperatives. Cooperatives did not exist in our country in the past. They came into being as a consequence of the major economic, social and political transformations that have occurred in our country thanks to the National Liberation War. Within a short period of nearly one year more than 317 cooperatives of various kinds have been set up; consumer and peasants' cooperatives, buying and selling cooperatives, handicraft cooperatives, cooperatives of working peasants and fishermen, etc. The consumer cooperatives which are functioning in our country today include 40,100 members with 180,000 dependants, representing 75% of the population of the towns where they function. Looking at these and many other tangible achievements, many may ask how these achievements and successes have been realized with such meagre financial means, with insufficient technical equipment and in a country in which the war had wrought such havoc. They have been attained thanks to the great vigour of our people, the creative efforts of the broad masses, the correct and consistent policy of our people's power, the mobilization of the entire people in building

the country, the heroic selfless struggle for reconstruction and the courage and tireless efforts of our cadres, which all made it possible to overcome obstacles and hardships and achieve these results. Is there any bastion that can resist the force of a united and heroic people such as ours? No, there is none. Only those who were opposed to the good of the people sneered from the start, vent their spleen and preached and worked to try to bring about the speedy downfall of our people's power. They posed as proficient financiers and economists and capable scientists and scholars, they claimed that they were predestined to buy hides, and engage in other trades and to make millions at the expense of our people, to speculate on the blood of the people, become spies and sell off their country to the foreigners. We do not deny them this proficiency, but under our regime the people do not allow them to take the reins of power in their hands, but send them to the rope or to prison to bring them to their senses.

All these successes achieved so far will be the basis for us to advance continually forward. New forms of organization are now being applied to meet the substantial changes in our economy. From now on, we will have a planned economy, and this road will lead us to socialism. Our whole life should be devoted to the building of socialism in our country, because this is the only way for the face of Albania to be completely transformed, for its people to see better days, and for their life to be a life of happiness and freedom. This is the only way to wipe out misery, misfortune and ignorance, to strengthen love for our families and for one another, and to raise up a new man with new concepts, who will cherish his homeland as the apple of his eye, who will be devoted to his land, his factory and the work where he sheds his sweat, who will love other nations and respect and defend their freedom like that of his own country. This is the road our people

are fully determined to build, a road at variance with that of the capitalist system where anarchy and chaos rule, where the iron heel of the trusts and monopolies dominates, hunger, misery and misfortune abound, unemployment and the exploitation of the working class and of all the working people are the law, ignorance and corruption are rife, all human freedoms are mercilessly trampled underfoot, and men prey on their fellow men, a system which spawns war.

We have all the conditions to proceed along our road; we should mobilize all the people's energies and set to work with ten times greater efforts.

The 1947 financial budget and the general state plan for 1947 will enable us to build a planned economy. We will be helped by the standardization of prices which allows us to plan state accumulation and does not leave the law of value to spontaneity, but guides the new structure and method of fixing and applying prices, and by the placing of wages and salaries on a correct basis, i.e. he who works more and better gets higher pay when everything is taken into account: ability, work productivity, difficulties of the place of work, etc. All these will enable us to build our economy according to plan.

Now we are presenting our 1947 budget and plan for nine months. As you will notice in the budget, the total sum of expenditure is 3,758,756,900 leks. This also includes the local budget in which expenditure is 550,263,085 leks. Expenditure is wholly balanced by income.

In conformity with the state budget, considerable investments are envisaged in the state plan, especially in the financing of the economy. The total sum of investments in the economic sector is over 1.5 billion leks, more than 40% of the budget. The principal investments will go to our mines, to our new and old industry, to agriculture which takes up 12.55%, to public works (12.04%), and

railways (23.6%). More than 8% of the budget will go to education and culture, and 3% to health.

As you can see for yourselves, our economy is advancing and growing stronger from year to year. With the application of the five-year plan, which the government is drawing up and will submit to the People's Assembly in the very near future², our economy will be further strengthened in a progressive way. Our industry will be improved and expanded, the development of our mines will be a source of enrichment for our country, and all its resources will be used on an ever wider scale to improve the life of our people. This year we will build the Durrës-Elbasan railway. This network will be extended during the coming years.

Significant measures will be taken to improve and develop our agriculture, and investments will be made for important land improvement schemes.

All this will raise the living standard of our people, and we are already having good results. Only a few days ago, the government decided to raise and systematize wages and salaries, as I mentioned previously. At the same time it decided to raise the bread ration for all categories of working people. These are achievements which have their basis in our people's power, in the people's correct understanding of the policy of our state power and of the Democratic Front, and in the broad participation and heroism of our people in the construction of our new economy and a better life.

² Upon orders of the CC of the CPA, the government of the PRA started to draw up a five-year plan aimed to create and develop a national economy, the electric reticulation of the country, and develop agriculture along socialist lines. It relied mainly on our own resources, and on the aid of the Soviet Union and other people's democracies. This plan did not find application due to the brutal intervention of the Yugoslav revisionists in the internal affairs of our Party and country.

The realization of our plans, and the creation of a happy and prosperous life depend on our efforts, on everyone understanding well and carrying out scrupulously all the tasks which confront us. First of all, such a huge task cannot be accomplished without the participation of all the people, both young and old, without the total mobilization of all the energies of the broad masses of the people. This should be our first concern, and the concern of the entire Democratic Front. But the people as a whole will be mobilized when they are clear about the tasks confronting them, when they are correctly led, and correctly taught how to carry out the tasks, which will have the immediate result of improving their life. They must see these improvements in practice, they must experience them and be convinced. The people will be wholly mobilized and put all their efforts into carrying out these important tasks, when they become the primary factor in realizing these achievements, when they exercise control over them and implement their great law and justice in everything. If these things are not clear, no progress can be made. All these things are done for the people and carried out with the people. Anyone who thinks and acts otherwise is wrong, and is not on the consistent road of our progressive democracy.

In order to accomplish these projects properly and carry out our plan it is necessary to put all our efforts into consolidating and modernizing our people's power, and to do away with any shortcomings that may have occurred up to now. The state power should shake off any inertia, and any excessive or restrictive bureaucracy. It should assert itself in the village and in the locality, and not have merely administrative functions. The broad masses of people should take part in it on a large scale. The countryside plays an important role in the development of our economy, and the state power there should be stronger

and have a more popular character. Our people's power should be improved all the time, so that it can carry out the great task assigned to it under the different circumstances and conditions created by the development of our country. In this, a major task falls upon our state employees, whose ability will be shown when they are able to adopt new forms, compatible with the spirit of the Constitution of the State and the rules and regulations in power, so as to carry out better the tasks that lie before them.

The exact implementation of our plan depends on a good grasp of the tasks by all the state functionaries charged with carrying out our plan, and by all the workers, peasants and intellectuals of our country. All the tasks laid down in our plan are closely linked with one another, coordinated by, and conditional on, one another. Procrastination in one work sector, or failure to carry out the plan in that sector, has repercussions in all the other work sectors. Many things are new and important, but our cadres should concentrate all their efforts on learning and understanding them well, so that they may hold the reins of our economy firmly in their hands. Our greatest concern should be to improve our cadres and increase the number of specialized cadres. Cadres will solve all our problems. In this we should proceed with the greatest courage, promoting young people, as many young people as possible, sons and daughters of the working people; we should not be afraid to place them at the head of the work, to teach and guide them untiringly and with the greatest patience, and we will certainly see the work forge ahead; only in this way will we progress. The strength of our people is inexhaustible and our people have given ample proof that they are capable and intelligent, possess energy and vitality, and can certainly carry out the tasks assigned to them. The sons of our workers, the sons of our

peasants, most of whom could neither read nor write³, led the great struggle for liberation, and led our heroic army to victory, defeating the educated generals and high-ranking officers of fascism; today they lead the detachments of our army with great proficiency, they have mastered the modern art of warfare, and are making continual progress. The sons of our workers and peasants are now in the most important leading posts in our state, and in the enterprises. Here are the cadres, and what fine cadres they are.

Today, iron discipline is required of all state cadres in carrying out their tasks. Without this discipline our work is bound to proceed slowly, and no honest man, no Albanian patriot, wants this to happen; only the enemies of the people. We need selflessness and honesty in work. Work should never tire us, but should become a matter of honour, and we should be encouraged to work even harder.

In order to accomplish these major tasks we need good organization of work from every point of view. Good organization of the work is essential in order to accomplish our tasks precisely, to achieve sound results from our work and the sound education of our cadres, and to fulfil the entire plan.

I think that all state functionaries, from the lowest to the highest rank, must face their responsibility to accomplish the tasks assigned to them by the people and the homeland. They should perform their tasks scrupulously, with honesty and self-denial. He who works, and discharges his task properly, is the most highly considered, the most respected and honoured person in new Albania, he is the finest patriot who feels for his people. The gov-

³ Before liberation over 80 per cent of the population was illiterate.

ernment will take the severest measures against those who do not work, whether simple employees or ministers, and will never allow their presence in these posts to become a canker to contaminate our constructive work.

In fully implementing the plan, we will rely on the broad mobilization of the people, we therefore appeal from this high rostrum of the People's Assembly, first and foremost, to the great patriotism of the working class of our country and say: Workers of Albania! Stand in the front ranks as you have always done, because the happy future and security of our people rely on your physical and mental force, on your great determination and energy, on your boundless loyalty to the sacred cause of our people! You are the greatest guarantee of our people's power. Exert all your efforts in carrying out the various tasks which face you in the factories and work-sites, in the state apparatus, or wherever you are employed. You should always be on the battle front, setting an example to all, showing how to work better, how to fulfil and overfulfil work norms, master technique, and train people in work, how to protect the property of the state and the people, and protect the country. You are working for your state power, for your people, for yourselves, so do your duty better than ever!

We appeal to the great patriotism of our peasants and say to them: Peasants of all Albania! You are seeing concretely how your living conditions are improving all the time! You now have your own land given to you by the land reform, by the people's power. The shackles of the beys and agas have been smashed for all time. But for this state power, which is your state power, you would never have emerged from the darkness; therefore, your lives and the lives of your children, generation after generation, are linked like flesh to bone with this state power. You should exert all your efforts to consolidate

this state power. Your task is to work your lands as well as you can, and produce as much as possible in order to have abundance for yourselves and to supply all Albania with your produce. Your alliance with the working class and working people of the cities should be continually strengthened, and you should understand it well. Our people's power grants you every favour, and will give you ever greater aid. All these measures have one objective: that your life may become better all the time, and that you, through your work, may contribute with all your forces to the general good. It would be a mistake, and to the detriment of all, including you, if the favours and aid granted to you by the state power, in order to improve your work and boost production, were to be used for egoistic purposes and degenerate into exploitation. If such tendencies appear, you should fight them mercilessly, for these are tendencies and views of the agas and rich peasants who have exploitation in their blood. Nothing will be done which will adversely affect you. On the contrary, all the measures taken and ordinances issued by the government on the question of grain are in your favour. The reduction of prices of necessary goods is in your favour. The setting up of buying and selling co-operatives in the countryside is for your benefit and will make your work lighter, and the creation of work co-operatives is in your favour. Your task therefore is to improve your work as much as possible, and supply grain and other agricultural products to the other working masses of our country, to help in accumulating grain and other articles and to apply strictly the prices set by the government. Your private economy should also proceed along the road of our planned economy. You should struggle fiercely against any tendency which tries to divert you from this course, which is the only way to ensure your prosperity.

We call on our patriotic intellectuals to muster all their energies to fulfil their tasks wherever they work. People who are truly educated and endowed with sound culture cannot stand aloof from the great cause of the people. They should place their knowledge unreservedly at the service of the country and the people.

We appeal to the profound patriotism of the women of Albania. Today we are engaged in building new Albania, and the bitter past should no longer weigh on your shoulders. You must without fail march ahead, for you are a great force, a progressive force, from which our country expects a great deal. You should take part on a wide scale in production work, and many state functions should be in your hands. You should be in the factories and cooperatives, in the fields and schools. Our plan cannot be realized without your broad participation. Our state power will help you as much as possible to forge ahead and accomplish your tasks, and I am certain that you will accomplish them with the greatest heroism.

We call on our heroic youth, the pride of the Albanian people. Our youth have always been ready and the first to go where the duty of the country and the people has called them. Their drive, their enthusiasm, their heroism and selflessness should be an example to all. Their achievements are countless, and each one is as important as the next. Everywhere, they are continually at work, and where youth work, where they learn and inspire, immortal works appear. The new life is for our youth, and they fully deserve it, for they are building it by their sweat and their brainwork, putting their heart into the job. I advise any one who wants to be reinvigorated and gain new strength, and to shake off any doubts and suspicions in his mind, to go to the railway the youth are building, to see for himself how the builders of new Albania work, learn, grow and enjoy themselves. We tell our youth that

the Albanian people are very grateful to them for what they are doing for the country, and for what they will always continue to do. Our youth are a great factor in successfully fulfilling our state plan, and will most certainly accomplish their tasks both in study and at work.

The achievements of our struggle had not only to be safeguarded, but also to be consolidated. They must serve as a sound basis on which to advance and fulfil completely the wishes and aspirations of our people. Here, of course, we were to have our first clashes with those who tried to bring to nothing the victories scored by the people during the war for liberation so that in this way these enemies of the people might better manoeuvre and conspire to re-establish their hated capitalist domination.

The great undertaking which awaited us after liberation therefore had to be, as always, the immortal work of the people, and had to reflect their continuous struggle. The people had to be mobilized to a man to carry out this task, inspired by the same ideal which guided them in their victorious war and endowed with the same courage and heroism which gave them victory over the Italian and German fascists and their lackeys. The struggle of our people had to be continued in other forms, but with the same tempo and the same determination as the first struggle. The struggle had to be waged on two fronts, for the reconstruction of the country and the building of a better and happier life, and against those who, in a thousand treacherous ways, would hinder and fight against the correct course of our people.

This was the question which faced us, to win the battle to build the new life. We had to exert all our physical and mental energies, we had to shed sweat in order to build a happy and free life, and to strike relentlessly at the enemies of every hue who would try to hamper us in our course. Whoever thinks that a livelihood can be earn-

ed without struggle, without toil and sacrifice, whoever thinks that the enemy of the people can be fought by making concessions or by patting him on the back and smiling, is linked with the enemies of the people and is an enemy of new Albania. There are and will continue to be such people, but this does not intimidate our people, and they will not be caught unawares; on the contrary, they are all the time heightening their vigilance to defend the country and their work, while the treachery of a few is doomed to failure, and will be nipped in the bud.

The situation which arose in our country during the National Liberation War had bitter consequences for the beys with large estates, the land-owners, the rich agas and the wealthy bourgeoisie who had accumulated millions by bleeding the people white. These classes launched an open struggle, rifle in hand, side by side with the occupiers, against the people, but the people were victorious. Bloody battles were fought and won with great sacrifice by the people, and that is why the revolution of our people was a total one, on a sound foundation. The myth of the nationalists who gave allegiance to a hundred flags was shattered, the bloody mask of the pseudo-democrat beys and agas was torn to shreds; they were on the other side of the barricade, in order to safeguard their privileges and the regime that allowed them to oppress the people. The Albanian quislings who crossed the sea changed their boss, and became spies for the Anglo-American reaction. Nor could they have done otherwise, for this trade is in their blood. They are ready at every moment to sell out their country to the foreigners. What can link these individuals and their class with the Albanian people? Nothing but the aim to safeguard their privileges, to the detriment of the people. But the people told them to forget the old days, and this enrages them.

However, not all those to whom the people and their state power are a thorn in the flesh, not all the class of capitalists and privileged people fled to Italy or to the Greece of the monarcho-fascists. Some stayed here and were compelled to submit to the just laws of the people, and their clear-cut decisions, and this infuriates them.

This exploiting class lost every thing it had plundered from the people, its privileges were abolished, and its lands, factories, concessions and colossal wealth were taken out of its hands and became the property of the majority, the property of the working people.

But we should not fool ourselves and think that all these things were done without struggle, and that these people became magnanimous and generous. The wolf may put on sheep's clothing, but it never becomes a lamb. It is another matter if the wolf has its fangs drawn, but if we had left it alone, it would have devoured people's revolution. This did not happen, and will never happen, because the people have the proper instrument in their hands, and know how to use it.

Nevertheless, the struggle between the capitalist and privileged class, on the one hand, and the working people and their state power, on the other, continued without interruption, passing through a number of different stages from the time of the liberation of Albania until now. This was class struggle with all its characteristics and in all its severity. Fascism, the most ruthless dictatorship of capital, was unable to suppress the freedom-loving nations or establish its law of terror and darkness, it was unable to suppress the working class of the people's democracies, but its remnants did not lay down their arms. Protected and encouraged by international reaction, especially Anglo-American reaction, they keep striving to regain ground and bring about the downfall of people's regimes, to pave the way for a third war, more ruthless

than the Second World War. This process is also taking place in our country. To deny this process and underestimate this struggle means, to put it plainly, to hand the keys over to those who have tormented and sucked the blood of the people for generations, to set fascism back on its feet and dig our own graves. Our people are in no hurry to dig their own graves, on the contrary, they are working to make Albania flourish and to improve their life, and have no hesitation about settling accounts with those who try to bring back the old days.

The important economic and social measures taken by our people's power in the early days following the liberation of Albania were only natural and correct. They transformed the face of Albania, devastated by a long and bloody war. These measures, of course, strengthened the position of our state power. However, this was not to the liking of external or internal reaction. This was where their interests coincided, and the beys, the agas, the wealthy reactionary bourgeoisie, the reactionary pseudo-patriotic intellectuals, and the beys' overseers and henchmen combined their struggle against the Albanian people, making common cause. They were joined by some of the liberal bourgeoisie whom the broad masses of the people had drawn into the war because they agreed to a certain point with the resistance against fascism; but they fought with many reservations, and joined the Front for the purpose of gaining positions in the state power and, eventually, of seizing all power themselves.

Many such people who were in the Front, seeing that they could not attain their predetermined objectives, were greatly disillusioned, severed their connections with the Front, and went over to the camp of the enemies of the people.

The former ruling classes, realizing that they had lost their economic and political dominance, had to look else-

where for support to regain their lost positions, to the detriment of the people. It goes without saying that, far from having any support among the Albanian people, they were at war with them, their only support being the foreigners, international reaction, headed by the Anglo-American reaction, which in fact supported their attempts; but they failed one after the other.

The hostile attitude maintained towards the Albanian people by the US and British governments, as well as the denial of our legitimate rights won through bloodshed and sacrifice, had one objective — to support and strengthen their official representatives in Albania, who openly and contrary to every international law, violating the sovereignty of a people and interfering in their internal affairs, tried to the last day of their stay in Albania to rally and organize the Albanian reactionaries, instigating them to sabotage actions and armed struggle against the Albanian people. The activity of these Anglo-American representatives is widely documented with facts.

Under the guidance of foreign agents, the reactionaries of our country attempted to revive the "Balli Kombëtar", "Legaliteti" and a number of other groups whose running dogs you can now find in monarcho-fascist Greece. Their common aim was to overthrow the state power by force, hoping for an Anglo-American landing in order to turn our country into a second Greece and to place it under the heel of US imperialism. This was the course followed by the remnants of the "Balli Kombëtar", "Legaliteti" and other reactionary groups, this was the course followed by the traitorous deputies⁴ who betrayed the confidence of the people, and this was the

⁴ This refers to the group of traitorous deputies who placed themselves in the service of the American and British imperialists to overthrow the people's power by force.

course that led them straight to prison. These treacherous elements did their utmost to discredit the just measures taken by the state power, sabotaged its work, and launched the most venomous and low slogans; I don't intend to list here their innumerable acts of treason, for what they do is so rotten that it makes you want to throw up. The Albanian people will soon hear these base elements testify before the court to their unparalleled crimes, baseness and treason; let the justice of the people decide what they deserve.

These elements carried out their treacherous activity at a time when all the Albanian people were hard at work rebuilding the country, when old and young were working under difficult economic conditions to build a new life. These people could not reconcile themselves with this situation. Take these individuals one by one, analyse their past, their work, their life, and you will see that they are the scum of society, speculators involved in all kinds of dishonest dealings. These people have infiltrated into the great undertaking of our people for the sole purpose of sabotaging it; we found them in the implementation of the land reform, we found them where bridges and roads were being built and land improvement schemes carried out, we found them in the state apparatus, and even in our parliament. These people complain that there is no democracy here, but terror. If by the word democracy they mean freedom for criminals, thieves, speculators, money-lenders and other such people, freedom for those who make an attack on the rights and freedom of the people, then it is true that there is not and will never be such democracy in Albania. Who are those who resort to terror — our people and their state power, or the criminals and traitors who organize sabotage activities and support the war criminals, who make attempts on the life of honest people, who seek to wreck and exploit what has

been achieved by the hard work of the people? Do these individuals imagine that the justice of the people will allow them to act at their ease, to shelter the war criminals and eat and drink with them, to sell the secrets of the state and of the people for sterling and dollars, or will leave them free to sabotage and murder the sons of the people and upholders of their state power? Why do these criminals try to commit suicide in jail, to hang themselves in prison cells with their belts, and why do they jump out of windows to put an end to their lives? Those who are not guilty do not do such things.

The correct policy of our state power has always been characterized by the greatest determination to protect the people and their achievements, and to guard the country from any external and internal threats. It is marked by its determination to forge steadily and speedily ahead to build a happy life for our people. The correct policy of our state power has always been characterized by great wisdom and level-headedness in passing judgement, in pardoning minor offenses which can be corrected and are committed with no ulterior motives, but it is severe against the enemies of the people; our state power will carry out this correct policy consistently. It has always been our concern and the duty of the Democratic Front to do as much as possible to rescue from the clutches of reaction ordinary people who have gone wrong; we should educate them, make them useful citizens of the country, and set them on the right course, the course of honour. There may be people who consider this correct and humane policy of our state power and our Democratic Front to be a sign of weakness, but we assure them that they are greatly mistaken. And if these individuals, on the basis of this erroneous judgement, try to harm the interests of the people, thinking that they will not be seen, we repeat that they are greatly mistaken. The Albanian people

work and are on their guard in order to safeguard their freedom and their achievements. Our people know very well that their enemies cannot be eliminated in one day or in one year. In all our victories, some of these individuals will come to the surface, because the efforts and ceaseless work of the people will tear off the masks of these enemies. In their great and sacred undertaking our people should always be on their guard and correctly assess every situation that is created by their progressive work. Just as we mobilized to build the country, we must also mobilize to fight a relentless campaign against our enemies, be they internal enemies or agents of foreign imperialism. There can be no compromise with our enemies, and no mercy towards them; this is the only way to consolidate the work of the people, the only way for our country to be strengthened and make progress, and for our people's democracy to be consolidated. This should be the course followed by new Albania.

It is true that Albania is a small country, but in the international arena it has its deserved place and importance. The fact that the Albanian people and their people's democracy are being unjustly and dishonestly fought by the Anglo-Americans and their lackeys, justifies the role of our democracy in safeguarding peace and world security, and at the same time justifies the correct and well-thought-out policy of the government of our Republic. All our people and all the progressive peoples of the world, including the people of the United States and Britain, are well aware that the hostile stand of the British and American governments towards our country cannot be justified by purely technical considerations, or by unreasonable arguments such as the question of the treaties, or by the absurd excuses these governments invented in order to maintain a tense situation between our state and the United States of America and Great Britain.

All the pretexts, accusations and slanders brought against our country and kept on the agenda by these governments have a premeditated aim. Their real aim is quite different from their stated purpose, namely, that they wanted to size up the situation and, in order to speed up the recognition of our government, sent the political and military representatives of the United States of America and Britain to Albania. The British and US governments are not favourably inclined towards the Albanian people, and they have given daily proof of this. The Albanian people have become masters of their own destiny, they are building their country and their free life by their own efforts and in the way they choose, and democracy in our country is growing stronger everyday and becoming a factor for the strengthening of peace and world security; these facts are not to the liking of international reaction and the British and US governments. If they do not like this, and do not like the great progressive work that is being done in Albania, that is their business; but if they interfere in the internal affairs of our country, organize the remnants of Albanian reaction within and outside Albania, and openly help them to sabotage the great undertaking of the people which is costing Albania so much blood and sweat, we are strongly opposed to this, and will not tolerate such a thing. And in this we are wholly within our rights.

Ours is almost the only government not recognized by the British and US governments, at a time when these governments have their diplomatic representatives even in the satellite countries⁵. Such a situation, however, in no way affects our constant advance and the consolidation and progress of our people's democracy. The Albanian people and their People's Republic have won the sympathy

⁵ The countries collaborating with Hitlerite Germany during the Second World War.

and great respect of all the progressive people of the world. But such a situation dishonours the British and American people. Let the people of these two countries and the whole of world public opinion judge for themselves this stand of the British and US governments towards the heroic people of a small country who shed much blood fighting against fascism, who set up their own democratic people's power, and who are determined to use their small forces to defend world peace and security as best they can. Is it because of this that our country is not recognized? Is this why our people are denied their rights in the international arena? The Albanian people are fully convinced that these are the only reasons that their rights are not recognized by the British and US governments; any other reason is groundless and does not stand up to scrutiny. If the people were not in power in Albania, if our country were ruled by the quislings and spies of fascism who, contrary to international law, are today being supported in a thousand ways by the British and US governments, then things would have been different. Albania would of course have been recognized by those governments, but our country would have become a second Greece where Zog and the terror of the beys and war criminals would reign supreme, and the people would have been subjected to the greatest misery, unparalleled in their history. It is precisely in order to establish this rule of terror in our country, and to establish the class of speculators and war criminals in Albania, that the British and US governments maintained and continue to maintain this unjust attitude towards our country. The practical activity of the official representatives of the British and US governments in Albania pursued such a political objective. Our government is in possession of astounding proofs and facts which indicate that the political and military missions of the British and US governments in

Albania did not represent the two peoples of these countries, whom our people hold in high esteem, but were an espionage agency of Anglo-American reaction which worked out plans to overthrow our people's power, and planned sabotage actions and the most shameful crimes against the sovereignty of the peace-loving and heroic people of a small country. This is not how the Albanian people interpret their friendship with the people of Britain and the United States, and they will never reconcile themselves with the "friendship" which their official representatives cultivated in Albania. But the activity of the British and US governments is not confined to the activities I have mentioned; it has a broader scope, using every means and going as far as creating international complications. In addition to the activities I have spoken of, the British and US governments have endeavoured to present Albania as a dangerous country threatening world peace and international security. "Albania is a threat to peace!" This resembles the "argument" which fascist Italy used in order to attack the Greek people, the "argument" of Daut Hoxha's murder⁶.

You have no doubt followed attentively the sequence of events related to the incident purposely provoked by the British in Saranda which they raised a hue and cry about in the Security Council and at the International Court at the Hague, with a view to convincing the world by their false and shaky arguments that Albania was endangering peace. Albania has never laid mines along its coasts; it has possessed neither mines nor the means to lay them. Official British documents prove that the British acknowledge the existence of mines

⁶ summer 1940, this man was found killed on the border with Greece. Italy used this as a pretext to attack Greece on October 1940 and to ensure the support of Albania, too.

which have remained in those waters from the time of the war; they admit that there is no certainty that the removal of the mines, which they themselves carried out, was completely effective, and that the navigation route appears unsafe. The mines could also easily have been laid by British ships or by those of their lackeys in Athens. And this raises the question: What were the English ships after in repeatedly violating the sovereignty of our territorial waters? They must surely have had some purpose. The British claim the right of passage for their "peaceful" ships through the Corfu Channel, but the route through this channel is not five hundred metres away from the seaport of Saranda, on the Himara coast, and peaceful navigation does not mean having all guns at the ready and aimed towards our ports. What about the provocations of the ships of their Athenian lackeys eight times in succession, not to mention those that happen every day — what were they after in our territorial waters, up to the very vicinity of our ports? Or did they too have "peaceful purposes" in seizing our boats with people on board and taking them to Corfu or in shelling our coastal regions and bombarding the villages of Konispol? It is not hard to understand why they did these things. Despite the votes the Anglo-Americans always rally in the Security Council to gain approval for such trumped up and aggressive acts, right is on our side and no threat or blackmail can force us to our knees in our struggle to regain our rights. And justice will always be on the side of the just. What the British and Americans brought up as an allegedly persuasive and final argument at the eleventh hour about the incident at Saranda was: "The Albanian government either laid the mines itself or knows who has laid them, because it guards its borders and coastline with the greatest jealousy". But this final argument proves nothing, or rather, it proves one thing

which we fully admit, because it is quite true that we guard our coastline and our southern borders with the greatest jealousy and determination, for they are sacred for us and fascist wolves are roaming about them.

With the all-round aid of the British and Americans, the monarcho-fascist government in Athens has become a chronic and very perilous danger not only to peace in the Balkans, but to world peace. The misfortune of the heroic Greek people cannot be described. Remember February 4 in Tirana⁷. It is always like that day in all the towns and villages of Greece. Monarcho-fascist terror has reached its peak. But Greece has become, at the same time, the centre of armed attacks and numerous provocations against our country and against all the other democratic countries of the Balkans. For years now, provocations by the Greek fascists along our borders, far from subsiding, have increased and are being carried out with greater fascist fury. The Greek fascists attack our border posts, penetrate into our territory, kill and injure peaceful citizens working in their fields, carry out air raids and kill people and livestock, rally and organize Albanian war criminals, and try to infiltrate them into our territory in order to organize murders and theft. All these crimes are part and parcel of the general plan of the Anglo-American reactionaries.

In the face of these bloody, bandit-like provocations which are aimed solely at disturbing peace in the Balkans and in the world and launching a new war, as the Truman⁸ doctrine proclaimed, the Albanian government has repeatedly appealed to the United Nations to take steps to

⁷ On February 4, 1944 the forces of the "Balli Kombëtar" and quisling gendarmerie, in collaboration with the German occupier, organized a big massacre in Tirana to frighten the people away from the National Liberation War.

⁸ Harry Truman, president of the USA (1945-1953).

put an end to these numerous provocations by the Greek monarcho-fascists. The UN Inquiry Commission which came to Greece was faced with many undeniable facts which proved the culpability of the monarcho-fascist government in Athens which, in collusion with the Anglo-Americans, bears sole responsibility for the civil war in Greece. Numerous incontestable facts were brought before the Inquiry Commission by the representative of the Albanian government, facts which proved convincingly the criminal actions of the monarcho-fascist government in Athens, its responsibility for the countless incidents it has caused along our border, the provocative piratical incursions of Greek ships into our territorial waters, the violation of the sovereignty of our country by its bands, the massacre of the Albanian population of Çamëria, of which there is incontestable documented proof, and finally, the responsibility of the monarcho-fascist government in Athens and its British supporters for the internal civil war. But in spite of that, attempts are being made to hush up the truth, to cover the sun with a sieve, as our people say, and the British, the Americans and those who usually cast their votes for them are trying to shift the responsibility for the bloody civil war which is raging furiously in Greece onto the Albanian, Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments. But this argument can fool nobody, nobody accepts it. It was not the Albanian, Yugoslav or Bulgarian governments which stirred up or armed the heroic Greek people to rise with arms in hand to gain their freedom, and the ten thousand partisans who are fighting heroically in the mountains. They were prompted to take up arms by the misery of their homeland, the wretched condition of their people, the ideal of freedom and democracy, which is being trampled underfoot by the monarcho-fascists in Athens and their supporters, they were driven to fight by the great terror of the Greek fascists. The Albanian peo-

ple and their government have never interfered in Greece's internal affairs, because these are not their affairs, and they reject any such slanders from whatever quarter they may come. The Albanian government and the Albanian people do, however, accept and will continue to accept on their territory and to show hospitality to people and democrats persecuted by the Greek fascists. This is in accordance with our Constitution and prevailing international law. The Albanian people and their government want to be left in peace to build their new life, and they want to see an end to the Greek fascist provocations. The Albanian government and the Albanian people will in no way permit the Greek monarcho-fascist bands to encroach upon their borders, and will protect their homeland, their lives and their democracy to the death. Our heroic army, which you saw parade on July 10⁹, is the most reliable defender of our achievements, of the life we are building, and of the integrity of our country.

But the tragedy of the Greek people is but one of the many features of the doctrine of Truman and Churchill. At the head of entire international reaction, US imperialism tries to engulf the whole world and to suppress the freedom of the peoples by threats, the atomic bomb, and its policy of force and the dollar. The imperialists launched a broad campaign of slanders against the Soviet Union, against that country and people who saved the world from fascism and to which mankind is forever grateful, against the Soviet Union which stands like an unconquerable fortress in defence of peace and mankind, and frustrates all the schemes of the warmongers and enslavers of the peoples of the world. But the freedom-loving people of all

⁹ July 10, 1943, the day when the General Staff of the National Liberation Army of Albania was created, entered history as the day of the founding of the People's Army of Albania.

countries have rallied all their energies to defend the peace which cost them so dearly, and to frustrate all the manoeuvres of the warmongers.

The Marshall Plan¹⁰ is another aspect of the Truman doctrine, of the policy of the dollar and of enslavement. The Albanian government and the Albanian people have attentively followed the proceedings of the Paris Conference of the three foreign ministers¹¹, for our country stands in need of aid. The Paris Conference ended inconclusively. The views of the Soviet Union were at variance with those of the governments of Britain and France as expressed in the official press of the three countries. Some days ago our government received an official invitation from the French and British governments to attend a conference organized by them in connection with the Marshall Plan.

After studying this question, our government unanimously turned down the invitation of the British and France governments to attend this conference, which will be held on July 12, because, in our government's opinion, there exists no concrete plan for US aid to Europe, and the Marshall Plan itself is very vague and imprecise. As far as the organization drafted by the French and British governments is concerned, the opinion of our government is that, far from facilitating the distribution of any US aid among the European people, it aims at working out a general economic plan for Europe under the direction of Britain and France, with the definitive approval of the

10 The plan of economic and political subjugation of the countries of Europe to the USA through economic aid, presented in 1947 by the Secretary of US State Department George Marshall, and approved by the Congress of the USA in 1948.

11 This refers to the Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Great Britain and France, which was convened in Paris in June 1947 to discuss the economic aid the US government offered to the countries of Europe.

United States. Such a plan would cause economic chaos in Europe, and by interfering in the internal affairs of the European states, by violating their will and sovereignty, would place the economy of these states under the direction and at the mercy of bigger European states and the United States of America. This plan would cause the creation of a bloc and a split in Europe. In extending an invitation to our government, the British and French governments intended to present us with an accomplished fact which we could in no way accept, because our government is convinced that only respect for the principle of sovereignty and national independence can be the basis of sincere and fruitful collaboration among nations. The Albanian government can never allow or accept the violation of the sovereignty and independence of our country. All these considerations compelled our government to turn down the invitation of the French and British governments. But there is still another great reason which heightens the suspicion and distrust of the Albanian government towards US aid and its objectives, and this is connected with the consistently hostile attitude maintained by the British and US governments towards the undeniable rights of our people. Taking into account this incorrect and quite unjustifiable stand, it is quite natural for the Albanian people and their government to suspect the sincerity of American aid and the real objective of this aid.

In these post-war times, the people of Europe, who suffered the most horrible devastations in the war and who witnessed with their own eyes and paid dearly for the barbarous attacks of the Hitlerites and their satellites, instigated by the activity and policy of the reactionary and imperialist cliques, have together with the progressive peoples of the whole world exerted all their efforts to prevent the repetition of such a catastrophe. They will all frustrate the manoeuvres of such warmongers as Chur-

chill and company. The question is to protect genuine democratic peace by every means, to protect our lives and the lives of our children, and to protect our victories which have cost us bloodshed and devastation. The people of little Albania will continue to exert all their energies to defend and consolidate such a peace in favour of the progressive peoples of the world, who are striving for the same end. To defend such a peace is just as essential as was the victory over the German nazis. Such a peace will be achieved despite the attempts of the warmongers to launch another war, it will be achieved just as the victory over Hitlerite Germany was achieved. The people of the world, and the Soviet Union under the leadership of the great Stalin, will fight for the consolidation of a just peace, of real peace. On the side of the Soviet Union, which rescued mankind from fascism, are all the progressive and freedom-loving peoples of the world, and also the people of our small country, because the Soviet Union protects our people. Young and old in our country have understood, and feel deeply in their hearts, that without the heroic war of the people of the Soviet Union, there would be no free and democratic Albania, and the Albanian people would have been massacred and oppressed without mercy. Old and young in Albania have seen with what determination the Soviet Union has championed our rights and defended our country, our independence, and the blood shed by our sons and daughters, who fell on the field of honour fighting heroically against fascism. Therefore, it is natural for the Albanian people to love the Soviet Union greatly. At a time when warmongers threaten the world with force, the atomic bomb, and the dollar, when international reaction is doing all in its power to suppress progressive democracy and revive the dark forces of fascism, the powerful voice of the Soviet Union is firmly defending peace and security, defending the people and their pro-

gressive democracy. Our people enthusiastically hail the correct and peaceful policy of the Soviet Union, because it is a living expression of the lofty and noble sentiments of the people of the entire USSR and their regime which abides by the principle of defending freedom and genuine democracy, of defending the big and small nations and genuine peace.

The relations of our people with the friendly Bulgarian people are becoming more and more cordial and friendly, and our people heartily wish Dimitrov's new Bulgaria a prosperous future. Albania will soon establish diplomatic relations with the Rumanian people, and our people wish and hope to establish such relations with other democratic nations, which is in the general interest of peace.

Comrade Deputies!

I wish to assure you that the government I have the honour to lead will exert all its efforts to implement this correct policy, which expresses the aspirations and wishes of our people, it will exert all its efforts to carry out this constructive and progressive policy, and to apply correctly and promptly the laws which the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Albania approves, and will defend with the greatest determination the interests of the people, the life of the people, and our People's Republic. Everything at all times in the service of our country and our people!

Long live the Albanian people!

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July 13, 1947*

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ALBANIA AND THE VOTE IN THE UNO SECURITY COUNCIL

(Article published in the newspaper "Bashkimi")

August 21, 1947

Albania's just request to become a member of the United Nations Organization has been turned down. The Soviet Union, the sincere and great friend of the Albanian people, strongly backed Albania's candidature, and voted in favour of the acceptance of our country into the United Nations as a worthy member state which has fought and continues to fight for the correct principles of progressive mankind. Poland, the friend of our people, of course also voted in favour of our candidature, and Albania has gained another good friend, too, namely, Syria.

On the other side of the barricade were, as usual, the USA and Britain, consistent in their hostile policy towards our people, and their permanent clients, fawning on the dollar, Belgium and Australia. France abstained, but for the Albanian people this means voting against it.

This result of the voting in the Security Council on our candidature came as no surprise to our people. It gave them the opportunity to get a better knowledge of their friends and allies, who wish them well, and on the other hand, to see through the aim of US and British imperialists, with their enslaving and anti-democratic policy towards our country and towards all the progressive peoples of the world.

It is inarguable that Albania fulfils all the conditions for membership of the United Nations, more so than many members of that organization. This fact is questioned only by the Americans, the British, the French, and all those governments which are the offspring of the Anglo-American imperialist policy. These states questioned this because the policy of their governments is opposed to genuine democracy, to world security and to just peace, opposed to the freedom of the peoples. Peace and world security are in contradiction with their enslaving and rapacious policy. Therefore, the British, the Americans, and their followers can in no way agree to admit democratic Albania and democratic Mongolia into the ranks of the UNO. However, they will welcome with open arms the admission of Italy and Portugal, and eventually, of course, of Germany and Francoist Spain, and will even insistently demand it, because without followers of this calibre their sinister plans cannot be properly realized. Anglo-American imperialism wants to isolate the genuine democracies, and to oppress those people who are now under reactionary and fascist governments, in order to pave the way for a third world conflict, and plunge mankind into another holocaust. This is how they operate, and this is the aim of their wide-ranging policy, whether it is pursued in the UNO, or is directed at an independent or colonial state.

Anglo-American policy towards the Albanian people has pursued this course. The objectives of the politicians of these countries have never favoured the democracy and independence of our country. They have always done their utmost to oppress our people, and to suppress the struggle of the Albanian people, or to turn it to their advantage. When they saw that it was impossible to bend the will of our people, or to distort their sacred aims, the Anglo-Americans and their agents tried to bring together the Albanian fascists within and outside our country, for

a crusade against the independence and self-government of our people. They organized and directed sabotage actions, and organized the bandits who had taken to the mountains, the bankrupt, and the enemies of the people. They helped them by all the means at their command, but all their plans were exposed and frustrated. They strove to create international incidents to harm our people, and to find a pretext to hamper the work of the friends of democracy and progressive people who are trying to build a genuine peace. They backed and still back the absurd demands of the Greek fascists for the partition of our country, and when they saw that this could not be done, they did their level best to hold the peace-loving people of our small country responsible for the civil war in Greece, which was their bloody work, and that of their Greek monarcho-fascist servants. Where they cannot get a footing, because the people are in power, the Anglo-American imperialists resort to all kinds of tactics to build up tension, to aggravate their relations with these peoples, to create incidents and provocations, to spread slander, and to deceive world public opinion; in this way, they try to cover their illegal and anti-democratic activities. But wherever they have extended their clutches, matters have taken a different turn. The people are being oppressed, and bled white, crime, torture and arson are on the order of the day. Everything has been placed at the service of the fascists, so as to oppress the people, and crush their freedom and their aspirations. But the people have risen, and are fighting against the approaching storm which threatens their lives. This is happening in Greece. The origin of the civil war in Greece is not to be sought among its peaceful and democratic neighbours, but in the Anglo-American intervention in the internal affairs of Greece, in their enslaving methods, in the arms and equipment they are giving the monarcho-fascists in order to oppress

the heroic Greek people and to turn Greece into a base of imperialism and fascism, from which they can threaten peace in the Balkans and in Europe. The Anglo-Americans are doing all they can to create hotbeds of aggression against the people and against peace, and they want to use Greece for this purpose.

The same thing is happening in Indonesia and in all the colonies of the British, French and US imperialists, where the people are rising up and fighting for their rights and freedom. The events in Italy are also clear. US imperialism has got its claws into the Italian people, and through its lackeys, it is trying to oppress the Italian people, to bring Mussolini's men back to power, and give full freedom of action to these outright fascists who bore responsibility for the holocaust of the Second World War. US imperialism is striving to turn Italy into a hotbed of aggression and war. Franco and his clique continue to rule and grow strong, trampling on the Spanish people; Franco's Spain and Salazar's Portugal remain lairs of fascism, threatening world peace. The Marshall Plan aims at enslaving those peoples whose governments, bought by US dollars, do their utmost to strengthen the position of reactionaries and fascists, harming the interests of their people and favouring US imperialism. Anglo-American reaction is trying hard to set nazi Germany back on its feet, and to rearm it so that it can be their watchdog, ready again to threaten the life and future of the progressive peoples.

This whole policy of Anglo-American imperialism, and its aims, are shown in every move made by the US and British representatives and their satellites in the UNO. They are trying to turn the UNO into a SDN¹, into an in-

¹ SDN (Société des nations) — the League of Nations, set up in Paris in 1919, was transformed into a tool in the hands of the imperialist powers, mainly Britain and France.

strument for their rapacious imperialist ends. They want the UNO to conceal and sanction their anti-democratic and aggressive methods and activities. They want to repeat the old and tragic history of Versailles² and the League of Nations. The questions of disarmament, of banning the atom bomb, of putting an end to aggression, of rooting out fascism, and of protecting the democratic rights and self-government of the peoples, all problems of primary importance raised and backed by the Soviet Union, are being put off endlessly, complicated and openly opposed by the British and Americans, solely to ensure that these important problems of the world might never be solved. In order to attain this, the Anglo-Americans are, of course, trying to win over as many clients to vote for them in the UNO as possible, and they want as few real champions and devoted fighters against fascism and aggression as possible. This was the intention of the vote against the candidature of Albania and Mongolia, countries in which real people's democracy has been established, and whose peoples fight with might and main for their freedom, for their well-being and for genuine peace in the world.

But this whole policy of threats, intimidation and blackmail by the US and British imperialists is doomed to failure, because on the forefront of battle, in defence of just peace, of progressive mankind and of the freedom and rights of the peoples, the great Soviet Union stands firm and invincible. All the progressive peoples of the world, whether free and independent, as in our country, or those who are today ruled by anti-popular governments, or who are suffering under the domination of colonial policy, are all united and determined to defend peace and democracy, to win freedom, to protect the freedom and

² This refers to the decisions taken by the Paris Peace Conference (Versailles) in 1919.

independence they have fought and shed their blood for. All the efforts of these peoples have been combined to give full backing to the correct and decisive policy of the great Soviet Union, which is defending the just cause of mankind. And the just cause of mankind will triumph, guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the endeavours of all the progressive peoples of the world. Our people once again hail most heartily the great Soviet Union and their friends who backed their just cause; they assure them they will never lose hope and will fight till justice triumphs against those who seek to oppress them.

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**REPORT TO THE PARTY ACTIVISTS IN TIRANA ON
THE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE 11th
PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ALBANIA**

October 4, 1948

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LETTERS OF THE BOLSHEVIK
PARTY ADDRESSED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA AND OF
THE RESOLUTION OF THE INFORMATION BUREAU

Our whole Party knows about the letters of great historic importance sent by the Bolshevik Party of the Soviet Union to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia¹. In them the Bolshevik Party draws the attention of the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to a series of grave errors of principle they have committed, and censures them for these, advises them in a correct Marxist-Leninist way and indicates how to correct these dangerous errors speedily and radically.

Our entire Party also knows about the Resolution of the Information Bureau "On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia"². This resolution has been

¹ These letters were addressed to the CC of the CPY by the CC of the CP(B) of the Soviet Union on March 27, and May 4 and 22, 1948.

² The Resolution was adopted at the meeting of the Information Bureau, held in Bucharest in June 1948.

discussed by delegates of the Central Committee throughout the Party and in all the organizations of the Democratic Front, and was unanimously approved by all the communists and working people of our country, who expressed their total solidarity with the Bolshevik Party, our great teacher Stalin, the Information Bureau and the Declaration of the Central Committee of our Party³.

Our Central Committee explained extensively to the Party and the broad masses of our people the essence of the great treason of the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, their anti-Albanian policy and the importance of the letters of the Bolshevik Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, for our Party and for the unity of the socialist camp. Our Central Committee also stressed to the Party and the broad masses of the people the historic importance of the Resolution of the Information Bureau.

The treacherous leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, headed by the nationalist clique of Tito, Kardelj, Rankovich, Gilas, and others, have adopted an anti-Marxist, anti-Soviet position, in opposition to the socialist camp. The Yugoslav leaders have revised Marxism-Leninism and are the true continuators of the opportunist and liquidationist theories of Bernstein, Volmar, Bukharin, and various Mensheviks and Trotskyites. They have taken over the theories of all these traitors to Marxism, demagogically trying to dress them up and to present them as a specific development of Marxism, in conformity with the new conditions created by the Second World War. Deviating from the Marxist-Leninist road, they

³ This refers to the communique of the CC of the CPA of July 1, 1948, which was approved at an extraordinary meeting of the plenum of the CC of the CPA, which studied the Resolution of the Information Bureau "On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia".

have slipped into a position of bourgeois nationalism and unrestrained chauvinism, abandoning and opposing the internationalist traditions of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The nationalist clique of Tito and his cronies has pursued a policy of wild slanders against the Soviet Union, the first home of socialism, the leader of the socialist camp in the world. In slandering the Soviet Union, these traitors aimed to discredit the socialist system, and thus hold back the construction of socialism. At the same time, they tried to spread their views to the other people's democracies in order to ensure support for their treacherous activity, and to increase it further.

The nationalist Trotskyite⁴ clique of Tito has pursued a base and scheming policy towards the Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Stalin, fabricating monstrous slanders in an underhand way, and proceeding from a right-wing Trotskyite position; they have used the same accusations and slanders which Trotsky used in his time, and against which Lenin and Stalin waged a determined fierce struggle.

The treacherous Belgrade clique has pursued a policy worthy of the imperialists towards the glorious Soviet Army, which played a major role in saving the world and Yugoslavia herself from the terrible slavery of German fascism, and created favourable conditions in Europe for the people's democracies to be set up and consolidated, and to develop along the road of socialist construction. The leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, blinded by their nationalism, have tried to deny the liberating role of the Soviet army and have despised its military art.

⁴ The term "Trotskyite" was used at that time to define the revisionist stand of the Yugoslav revisionist leaders, and to qualify all sort of deviations from Marxism-Leninism, and not only the ideological followers of Trotsky.

In their megalomania and arrogance they have tried to claim that the military art of the Yugoslav army was at a much higher level than that of the army of the Soviet Union, claiming that they have "added something new to Marxism-Leninism" in this field. Such an anti-Soviet line was intended to create distrust among the people of Yugoslavia, in the Yugoslav Communist Party and army, towards the Soviet Union and her glorious army. The Anglo-American imperialists and all world reaction are doing the same thing.

These anti-Marxist views have placed the treacherous leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in opposition to the unity of the world socialist camp. They have tried by every means to weaken and destroy this unity, to weaken the socialist camp itself and the anti-imperialist and democratic front of the people in the world.

The leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, with Tito at the head, have allowed their party to adopt forms of organization and methods of work which aimed at and resulted in the elimination of inner party democracy, the suppression of criticism and self-criticism, the introduction of military methods of leadership into the party, the cult of hero-worship according to the Narodnik view, the introduction of a sense of fear into the party, keeping the party in illegality, and parallel with all this, the merger of the party with the Front and its transformation into a party of the bourgeoisie and kulaks. Pursuing an opportunist policy towards the capitalist elements, they have moderated the class struggle in the countryside, according to the Bukharinite theory that in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, class struggle is not intensified, but dies down. The aim of all this treacherous activity is to make the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia degenerate into a republic of the bourgeois type, and

the Communist Party of Yugoslavia degenerate into a revisionist party.

The purpose of the letters of the Bolshevik Party addressed to the Central Committee of the CPY has been to make the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia break away from the road that led them to treason, condemn it once and for all, honestly acknowledge their very dangerous errors, and rectify them in the highest interests of their party and people, and in the interests of the socialist camp. The Belgrade Trotskyite traitors, far from acknowledging these undeniable mistakes, shamelessly rejected the criticism as slander on the part of the Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Stalin and the other parties, declaring dirty war on them, showing themselves up as avowed traitors to Marxism-Leninism and obedient lackeys of enslaving imperialism.

The treacherous leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, obstinately hostile and consistent in their work, maintain their anti-Marxist, anti-Soviet position in opposition to the socialist camp. Introducing police methods into the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, under the pressure and terror of the Ministry of State Security, they convened their 5th Congress⁵, violating the rules of a party of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist type, and exercising open terror to break the will of the party and its sound elements, legalized their treason. The Belgrade clique has launched a campaign of unprecedented terror against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, it is mobilizing the nationalist and chauvinist elements around itself, attacking the sound elements within the party, and is trying to turn the people of Yugoslavia against the people's democracies and, in the first place, against the people of the Soviet

⁵ The 5th Congress of the CPY was convened on July 21, 1948.

Union, and the Bolshevik Party. It is resorting to large-scale demagogy to deceive the sound masses of the Yugoslav Communist Party and people who have a sincere and deep love for the Soviet Union, for the Bolshevik Party with comrade Stalin at the head, and for the other fraternal parties. It cunningly tries to conceal its great treachery. Through mistaken and hasty measures it is attempting to create among the people of Yugoslavia the impression that it is correcting its mistakes and following the Marxist-Leninist road. The measures taken by these avowed anti-Marxists only increase the danger and further deepen the abyss into which they are leading the party and the people of Yugoslavia, further deepen their hostility to the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. From this nationalist position, the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will degenerate into a country dependent on the US and British imperialism.

The nationalist and anti-Marxist stand of the Yugoslav leadership represented a danger not only to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the people of Yugoslavia and their people's republic, but also to our Party and people, because very close economic and political ties were established between our two countries. The hostile activity of the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia would have been reflected here and would undoubtedly have been imposed on our Party and people if our Party and its Central Committee had not vigilantly defended the purity of the party line, if they had not fought very fiercely against the hostile, liquidationist, opportunist, anti-Marxist, anti-Soviet and anti-Albanian tendencies of the Trotskyite leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

After the liberation of the country the situation in our Party, especially in its leadership, was really very

grave and difficult. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia created an extremely unhealthy atmosphere, an atmosphere of strife and distrust, in the ranks of our Central Committee, subjecting it to economic blackmail and causing it to make serious mistakes. The Party was saved from such a situation by its determined resistance to Yugoslav intervention, and by the light shed by the letters of the Bolshevik Party of the Soviet Union on the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the activity of its leadership. The letters of the Bolshevik Party came at the most critical moment experienced by our Party. They made the grave situation existing in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia fully clear to the Central Committee of our Party, and helped it to discover the true causes of these serious errors, to see the source of the disease which was weakening the leadership of our Party and the Party itself. These historic letters will stand as an example of the principled and internationalist stand taken by the Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Stalin to help a fraternal party. They also helped our Party to take an important turning-point in its history, to save itself from the horrible abyss into which the anti-Marxist leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was trying to draw it. Our Party got rid of the dangerous plague with which the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had tried to infect it, it escaped from a nightmare and was able to breathe freely. The letters of the Bolshevik Party helped us to make this sound analysis of our work, to see our mistakes clearly and acknowledge them honestly, to correct them and learn from them, to strengthen our leadership and our Party, and to arm ourselves with a rich experience which will enable us to carry the Party always ahead, and to guard it against the internal and external foes who always try to harm it.

THE BERAT PLENUM AND ITS RESULTS

The Party and its leadership has analysed its work on a number of occasions, especially since the liberation of Albania. These analyses have been made with good intentions: to strengthen the Party and rectify certain mistakes that had been made and could have had dangerous consequences. During the time of existence of our Party, some leading comrades have committed grave errors, have tried to distort its correct line, have deviated from this correct line, and have been duly condemned.

It would be absurd and altogether unjust to say that, during the time of existence of our Party, no mistakes have been made by its leadership or by particular leaders. But the fact is that those mistakes, which were made because of the lack of experience of our men, because of the complications which arose throughout the war period, because of difficulties met in building the new Albania, because of the low ideological level of the rank-and-file party members and of some leaders, were not noticed and not corrected in the correct Marxist-Leninist way. These mistakes were used to create a difficult situation for our Party, and the representatives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia used them for definite anti-party and anti-Marxist purposes.

If we are to correctly analyse the mistakes committed in the Party, we cannot separate them from the bad influence exercised by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia; it would be wrong to separate the errors of the leadership of our Party from the hostile intervention of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. In our opinion, without the harmful influence exercised over our Party for a long period by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the leadership of our Party would not have committed

grave errors in its work. Without their intervention, our errors, whether slight errors in practice or individual shortcomings, would have been corrected, just as many of them have been corrected, and the Party would have made still greater strides forward. In order to make a truly objective analysis on a Marxist-Leninist basis, we must consider all the stages the Party has passed through, reconsider all the analyses that have been made in our Party, and put things in their proper place. We must clarify which are the real errors, and distinguish them from what were not errors, but were labelled as "serious errors" in obscure circumstances and for a specific purpose. Now it is possible for us to make this analysis from a clear and sound Marxist-Leninist position.

The situation which arose prior to the 11th Plenum has left its mark in the ranks of the Party and its cadres. Unhealthy opinions, prejudices and feelings have been created, and these should be cleared up. The analysis made at the 11th Plenum should serve to put both the Party and its cadres back on the right road. It is time for the party members and cadres to shake off all the mistaken views of the past, and time for them to return to the correct Marxist-Leninist course of our Party.

In order to analyse the different situations which arose in our Party and the errors that have occurred in them, we must first of all analyse the work done in preparation for the 2nd Plenum of the Central Committee in Berat in November 1944, and its consequences at the end of 1944 and immediately after the complete liberation of Albania. This should be the starting point of our analysis, because this is the origin of the grave illness, and of the serious errors committed by our leadership, and because the Berat Plenum marks the beginning of the open and hostile interference of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the detriment of our Party.

Was it necessary to convene a Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party on the eve of the liberation of Albania? We think that it was not only necessary, but absolutely essential, for the following reasons:

a) It had to draw up the balance sheet of the forces and achievements of our Party which had undertaken such a great struggle and had liberated the people and country from bondage, it had to consider the tasks of the new stage facing the Party. On the eve of liberation, great tasks lay before the Party, the task of the reconstruction of the war-ravaged country, and of the strengthening of the people's power and the national economy. The Party was the sole leading force of our people. It had to direct the solution of these historic tasks. So the Central Committee of the Party had the task of meeting to lay down the line the Party should follow after liberation.

b) It had to review the work of the Party over the entire period of the war, to make a Marxist analysis of the achievements and the mistakes made in the course of the work, to learn from these mistakes, to correct them in the right way and to take measures to prevent their recurrence, in such a way that the Party and its leading role would be consolidated.

The Plenum of the Central Committee, held in Berat, was in theory called for the purposes I have mentioned, but in reality its correct aims were distorted, and evil aims and dangerous and harmful backstage activities predominated. At Berat, after conspiratorial activity behind the scenes, in the form of an organized faction, unknown to the General Secretary of the Party, and unknown to the great majority of the Central Committee of the Party, an attack was prepared against the correct line implemented by the Party over the whole period of the war, and against the General Secretary of the Party. This activity, which violated all the regulations of our Party, was led

by the delegate extraordinary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and supported by Sejfulla Malëshova, a lackey of the bourgeoisie, and by comrade Nako Spiru, Koji Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and others.

What were the aims the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia wanted to achieve at the Berat Plenum?

a) To combat every correct Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and stand which aimed at safeguarding the independence of our Party.

b) To place our Party completely under the direction of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and have it implementation of the directives of its Central Committee without discussion.

c) To convince our people that the struggle of our Party and people owed much to the guidance and directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and that as a consequence, after liberation, too, our Party and people should dedicate their struggle and the results they had achieved to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its "enlightened" leadership.

d) To discredit the leadership of our Party which had led the struggle and had brought the people to victory, by accusing it of a series of mistakes allegedly made during the period of the National Liberation War, to imply that it was incapable of coping with the important tasks facing it after the liberation of Albania.

e) To create a split in the Central Committee of our Party and keep it alive by cunningly exploiting the shortcomings and concessions of the war period, by encouraging ambitious and career-seeking people, and influencing some Party leaders to cause them to slip into the erroneous position of the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and play their game. This would make it easier for the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to

impose its will and its unsound views on the Central Committee of our Party, weakened by such hostile activities.

What were the aims of those leaders of our Party who slipped into the position of the Yugoslav leadership at the Berat Plenum?

Sejfulla Malëshova, a sick and ambitious megalomaniac, aspired to emerge as the head of the Party and impose his will upon it through sheer bluff. He aimed to seize the leadership of the Party, without giving any proof that he merited it. Far from meriting to be placed at the head of the Party, he did not deserve even the post he was unjustly appointed to prior to the Berat Plenum, and particularly after the Berat Plenum. In order to achieve his aims, Sejfulla Malëshova adopted the anti-Marxist views of the Yugoslav leaders. He accused our heroic Party, our Party which had never erred in its political line, of being "a non-Marxist party, a party with a wrong political line, a party which was degenerating into a party of bandits and terrorists". Finally, he fiercely attacked the leadership of our Party, accusing it of being incompetent and unfit to lead. With his theory of the "chief of the party", Sejfulla Malëshova did his utmost to discredit the General Secretary of our Party as unworthy of the post the Party had entrusted to him, going so far as to declare behind his back, in order to convince other members of the Central Committee, that "but for the improper time, Enver Hoxha does not deserve to be Secretary of the Party". An outspoken opportunist, Sejfulla Malëshova adopted the opportunist views of the representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Velimir Stoinich, also regarding the line followed by our Party during the National Liberation War and the line it was to follow after the war. The Central Committee of the Party exposed this despicable opportunist long before the appearance of the serious illness which had infected the Communist Party

of Yugoslavia. Here it is appropriate to say that at the Berat Plenum Sejfulla Malëshova not only served the aims of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in attacking our Party, but his opportunist views completely corresponded to the anti-Marxist and liquidationist views of the Yugoslav leadership on the role of the Party and the working class; he was a lackey of the Albanian kulaks, the bourgeoisie and reaction.

What were the aims of Koçi Xoxe and Nako Spiru?

We think that the Yugoslavs fully exploited the unhealthy ambition of Koçi Xoxe and the dissatisfaction of Nako Spiru for their purposes.

Without any good reason, comrade Nako Spiru appeared as the most dissatisfied at the Berat Plenum, as if he had been deeply wronged and neglected by the other principal leaders of the Party. He was able to some extent to hide this dissatisfaction, which in reality concealed his unhealthy ambition, and to hold back his criticism of the party line at the Berat Plenum.

For his part, Koçi Xoxe spoke about non-existent errors in the line of the Party. He criticised the Party for manifestations of opportunism and organizational distortions. Koçi Xoxe accepted the anti-Marxist aims of the Yugoslav leadership, in order to express his personal dissatisfaction, and because he had mistaken notions about the allegedly opportunist stand of the Party towards the "Balli Kombëtar". In addition, he had no confidence in the General Secretary of the Party, and thus joined the representatives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in their damaging efforts to achieve their anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian ends.

In Berat these comrades did the greater and most harmful part of their work behind the scenes. Koçi Xoxe and Nako Spiru were the first to make contact with the representative of the Central Committee of the Communist

Party of Yugoslavia and, together with him, succeeded in turning the Berat Plenum from a regular meeting of the Central Committee into a meeting counter to all party rules, organized to attack the line of the Party and its General Secretary. Our opinion is that Nako Spiru united with the Yugoslav leaders because his wishes coincided with their plans to replace the General Secretary of the Party, who was "persona non grata" to them.

We think that, in fact, the shortcomings and mistakes observed in the Party over the war period were of secondary importance both to Koçi Xoxe and Nako Spiru and to the Yugoslav leadership, but they used them for particular aims which were to their advantage: to weaken the Party and split its leadership. Nako Spiru and Koçi Xoxe, two of the principal leaders of the Party, were clearly in silent opposition to the General Secretary, motivated chiefly by personal dissatisfaction. Proceeding from this personal dissatisfaction, they made the 2nd Plenum of the Central Committee in Berat serve the interests of the Yugoslav anti-Marxists, and become the starting point of the illness and the errors which were later evident in our Party. These comrades have committed a grave error under the influence of the great intrigue of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and have played its game.

At the Berat Plenum the leadership of our Party was sharply criticised for the grave mistakes it was alleged to have made. What were these mistakes? Were there political or organizational errors in its line? We say that throughout the period of the National Liberation War the political line of our Party was a correct one. Its organizational line, too, was generally correct.

Our Party has not erred politically. It was correct in its stand towards the invader, the "Balli Kombëtar", "Legaliteti", and the quislings. At that time there was a danger of opportunism and wavering in the stand of the

Party towards the so-called nationalist elements. But there was no such wavering in the line of the Central Committee. The opportunist manifestations that were evident during the period of the National Liberation War, such as the compromise with the Germans at Berat, the Mukje affair, and some temporary and sporadic opportunist stands in Gjirokastra, were not mistakes of the Party and of its Central Committee, but mistakes made by particular individuals. These mistakes have been severely condemned by the Central Committee.

The Berat compromise does not stem from our party line. This was a grave and impermissible error committed by an individual leader, but not by the Central Committee of the Party. Likewise, Mukje was the personal work of the opportunist Ymer Dishnica, who had pronounced opportunist views, and was a megalomaniac convinced of his "cleverness", a man of the upper strata of the bourgeoisie; it was not a mistake of the Central Committee of the Party. Sejfulla Malëshova tried at the Berat Plenum to attribute Ymer Dishnica's grave error to the Central Committee and to the allegedly mistaken line of our Party. This was a slanderous and hopeless effort. The Central Committee had advised Ymer Dishnica to act otherwise, and as soon as it was informed of his treason, it immediately and vehemently condemned this act.

At the Berat Plenum Nako Spiru said that "the Party and the Central Committee were caught unawares by the founding of the 'Balli Kombëtar' and did not understand that the 'Balli Kombëtar' emerged as a reaction to the National Liberation Front". This is untrue. The creation of the "Balli Kombëtar" was no surprise to our Party. Our Central Committee never for a single moment doubted the existence of the reaction in our country, a reaction made up of the quislings in the first place, the big landowners (beys), the rich bourgeoisie, the big merchants who were

linked with the invaders, and treacherous politicians. It foresaw that the reaction would inevitably rally, and therefore prepared itself for the struggle against them. So, our Central Committee was informed of the creation of the "Balli Kombëtar" organization. But it is also true that the influence of our Party was not very strong at that time. The Party had just been formed, and its work with the masses of the people was still weak. The party men did not yet have great experience, while the elements who were to head the "Balli Kombëtar" were still maintaining an equivocal stand, and had not come out into the open. They considered our Party and the national liberation movement as something sporadic, the creation of fanciful children which would soon be swept away by the forces of the invader. But facts proved the opposite. Our movement was neither accidental nor sporadic. Our Party was a sound organization which was to give determined leadership to this movement.

After the Peza conference the occupiers and the local reaction sharpened their weapons against our Party and set up a sort of organization, the "Balli Kombëtar". The "Balli Kombëtar" was a heterogeneous organization, without well-defined organizational forms, but with a demagogical program which aimed to deceive as many wavering people as possible, especially the middle and petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, or to neutralize them, if it was unable to urge them into open struggle against us. The so-called units of "Balli Kombëtar" waited to see what would happen before deciding whether to attack the occupiers or link themselves closely with them against the national liberation movement. Our tactics of detaching wavering elements from this newly formed organization and bringing the "Balli Kombëtar" units into our struggle and actions was completely correct. The question of the struggle and actions was our primary concern, and the

basis of our first discussions with the "Balli Kombëtar" organization, or rather, with its hypothetical chieftains. On no other basis did our Central Committee conduct talks with them. The problem was to expose the "Balli Kombëtar" at its weakest point, over its attitude towards the struggle against the occupiers. Right from the first discussion the "Balli Kombëtar" was asked whether or not it would fight against the occupiers. It was precisely on this question that it had to be exposed.

At the beginning an agreement was reached on the creation of commissions to co-ordinate activities, commissions which remained a dead letter, because the "Balli Kombëtar" and its bands would never be persuaded to fight against the occupiers and the quislings. The aim of the Party was to draw the "Balli Kombëtar" bands into the struggle against the occupiers. At that time, when some elements of the "Balli Kombëtar" exercised an undeserved influence over the strata of the peasantry, especially in some regions, this tactic of the Party was quite correct. The Party's call to struggle and actions exposed the demagogy of the "Balli Kombëtar", which aimed chiefly at turning the people away from the liberation struggle. So, initially, the "Balli Kombëtar" accepted in principle the idea of forming commissions to co-ordinate activities, in order to sabotage the people's struggle. Through these commissions it was to try, in the place of the real struggle and actions, to have endless talks and discussions, until the occupiers got word about the aim of an action and the place where it was to be carried out. But our Central Committee always kept this in mind and never left the outcome of the actions in the hands of these commissions. In the commissions, the representatives of our Party would propose carrying out an action, but if their proposal was not accepted by the "Balli Kombëtar", we would carry out the action by ourselves. As we said,

those commissions remained only on paper, the "Balli Kombëtar" bands never went to war, and the commissions did not even meet. This was the character and role of the commissions to co-ordinate actions, which caused up to be accused at the Berat Plenum of having slipped into an "opportunist position towards the 'Balli Kombëtar'". This accusation is unjust. There has been no opportunism in our stand towards the "Balli Kombëtar". The Party's tactics have been correct. It would have been harmful and opportunist if the creation of those commissions had inhibited the national liberation movement, but this was not and could not be the case.

The Yugoslav Vukmanovich Tempo alleged at the 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia that we adopted an "opportunist position towards the 'Balli Kombëtar' and did not expose and fight this organization". Vukmanovich Tempo also voiced these opinions during the war, at the time when he came to our General Staff. His opinions were supported by Koçi Xoxe, but they received even greater support from Sejfulla Malëshova. Sejfulla's aims are now known to one and all. As soon as he set foot in Albania, he sought everyone's support in order to manifest his opposition to the General Secretary of the Party, and to replace him. We opposed Vukmanovich's view as incorrect right from that time. We have never been against the exposure of the "Balli Kombëtar". Vukmanovich Tempo considered incorrect that the "Balli Kombëtar" was not exposed on a broad scale right from the beginning. This was an ex-cathedra judgment by a man who did not know the situation and the circumstances in Albania. On the basis of our concrete conditions, we considered that the "Balli Kombëtar" could not be exposed on a broad scale right from the beginning, but should be exposed gradually. But the fact is that our Party has never compromised with the "Balli Kombëtar", and has never

taken an opportunist stand towards it. We have always been at war with the "Balli Kombëtar". However, procrastination on our part cannot be excluded in some cases, nor was it possible in such action to define precisely the day when the exposure should take place, as Tempo wanted to do. The accusations of Vukmanovich Tempo and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as was made clear at their recent congress, had the aim of discrediting our Central Committee and the leaders of our Party as if our stand towards the "Balli Kombëtar" was an opportunist one.

Meanwhile the Yugoslav delegate at the Berat Plenum considered the convening of the Labinot Conference, which condemned the Mukje agreement, to be a sectarian action by our Party. But this delegate insisted that, although a mistake had been made at Mukje (this mistake was not ours, but Ymer Dishnica's, and our Central Committee condemned it as soon as it was informed of his treason), we should not turn down Ali Këlcyra's invitation to take part in a meeting of the "Committee for the Salvation of Albania" which was set up at Mukje, but should go there to continue the talks and expose the "Balli Kombëtar" chieftains from that platform. Our stand on this question was a correct one, while the views of the delegate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia were totally opportunist. Had we gone to that meeting, which was decided on at Mukje, we would have disorientated the Party. It would have been a concession made by the Central Committee of our Party to the "Balli Kombëtar", for it would have meant recognition of the incorrect and adverse decisions taken at Mukje. The continuation of talks on the basis of the Mukje platform would have been a grave error for the Central Committee of our Party, but it did not make this mistake. Precisely for this reason, our Central Committee was accused by the delegate of the

Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and by Sejfulla Malëshova, of having slipped into a sectarian position.

Sejfulla Malëshova, supported by the delegate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, accused the party line, the Central Committee and, above all, the General Secretary, of some practical errors committed by Liri Gega and some other comrades in the North, and blamed them for the reprisals taken against a number of "Balli Kombëtar" adherents on the eve of the liberation of Tirana. Sejfulla Malëshova labelled them as grave sectarian errors in the party line and declared that the Party was being transformed into a terrorist party. They were base accusations brought against the Party by a defender of the Ballist opposition. This was the prelude to the opportunist and hostile views and activities of Sejfulla Malëshova against the line of our Party. The delegate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia also accused us of unauthorized and extremely sectarian actions. In reality the actions undertaken in the North and during the battle of Tirana could, in some cases, be considered hasty and, to a certain degree, unwise; our comrades could have been more moderate in some cases, but at that moment such happenings could not have been completely prevented. To Sejfulla Malëshova, the denunciation and elimination of foreign agents were sectarian and condemnable actions.

These were in general the accusations brought against the party line by the Yugoslav delegate and his supporters at the Berat Plenum.

We may say that some errors occurred in the organizational line during the period of the war. The main error, in our opinion, was not the creation of the Provisional Central Committee of the Party, as they have alleged. Considering the time and the conditions in which the Party

was founded, nothing more could have been done. The solution has been proved correct. The Party was formed and consolidated, it fought against factionalists and suppressed them. Party organizations were formed in many districts.

An organizational error was committed in the method and procedure of electing the Central Committee at the 1st Conference of the Communist Party of Albania. The Conference proceeded in an orderly fashion, the delegates were properly elected in spite of the difficult circumstances, but the Central Committee was elected in an excessively conspiratorial manner, which influenced its later failure to function regularly, and the failure of some members of the Central Committee to carry out correctly and responsibly the tasks the Party had charged them with at the Conference. We know how the Central Committee and the Political Bureau were elected, how secretaries were appointed, and how the Central Committee began functioning. We have made an analysis of this, and I think that it was correct. We admitted that mistakes were made in carrying out those actions of such importance to our Party. We may blame ourselves for these mistakes, we may blame Miladin Popovich, but we think that the main culprit is Blazho Iovanovich. He came as a delegate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to help us precisely in this work. We may say openly that we lacked experience in organizing conferences and congresses, and elections to such organs as the Central Committee. But comrade Miladin Popovich also lacked such experience; he was also a young cadre, with a fairly broad experience of directing a regional party committee in conditions of illegality.

But Miladin Popovich's fault was that prior to the conference he did not have sufficient confidence in the cadres of our Party, he did not correctly estimate them,

and hesitated in decisions and judgements regarding them. At the beginning, this was justifiable, but later on, when our comrades had proved themselves and were formed as cadres, more control of party work should have been entrusted to them; but Miladin Popovich was hesitant about this. He had a sense of responsibility, and this was one of his positive features, a sound feature of an internationalist Marxist. But he should have thought more deeply and understood that the main responsibility towards the Party, the people and the Comintern fell on us.

The elections to the Central Committee should have been carried out on this basis, in such a way that every elected comrade assumed full responsibility for the direction of the affairs of the Party. In organizational questions, too, Miladin Popovich retained restricted forms of work suited to a regional committee, but not to a main, leading instance of the Party.

A narrow understanding of organizational questions, the lack of experience on our part and that of comrade Miladin, as well as the difficult circumstances of the war, allowed some mistakes to arise in matters relating to the organizing of the Party and the functioning of its organs. But it would also be wrong if we still viewed these mistakes in the distorted light of the accusations brought against us at Berat by the Yugoslav leaders, whose aims were supported by Sejfulla Malëshova and other comrades, some of whom, like Koçi Xoxe and others, continued even later to uphold the mistaken conclusions reached in Berat.

First, it is completely mistaken and altogether unjust to say that our Party was led by Miladin Popovich, as if the Central Committee and the General Secretary of the Party had stood by with folded arms. Although the Yugoslavs tried to present the matter in this way in order to discredit our Central Committee and the General Secretary of our Party, they were in personal contradictions with

Miladin Popovich. Such a thesis is hostile and directed against our Party, but the bad thing is that at Berat it was adopted; if not overtly, at least tacitly. Our Party and our National Liberation War have been directed by our Central Committee, whereas Miladin Popovich, who should be considered as a comrade of our Party, has merely given his help, just as the other comrades of the Central Committee have also helped individually.

The General Secretary of our Party has played his role as a leader and director of the Party, and has fulfilled his task. He has tried successfully to guide the Party and the movement, to orientate them in the correct way, giving them valuable organizational and political directives, relying on the experience of the Party and the great help given by other members of the Central Committee, who led the grass-roots party organizations and the National Liberation War throughout Albania. It is in place to say here that Miladin Popovich grew up together with us. Our Party raised him, just as it raised all of us. He was a truly internationalist comrade who deeply loved Albania and the Albanian people and always took a correct communist, internationalist stand in defence of the interests and correct stands of our country and Party. Miladin was a very courageous communist militant. Often, in our presence, he opposed the views of the other representatives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia such as Dushan Mugosha, Vukmanovich Tempo, Blazho Iovanovich, Velimir Stoinich, etc. For these reasons he was not well regarded by the Yugoslav leadership and on the eve of liberation, before the Berat Plenum, he was ordered out of Albania. (As is known, he was later treacherously assassinated by the OZNA⁶ agents in March 1945.)

⁶ OZNA — Yugoslav secret service.

In Berat, the intervention of the Yugoslav leadership and its representative created the impression that our Central Committee had not led the Party as it should, and that Miladin Popovich had not worked to create a genuine leadership. This is untrue. To rely on the conclusions of the Berat Plenum means to make a great mistake. Our Central Committee was strengthened and tempered and gave leadership in the struggle. The comrades of the Central Committee organized the Party throughout Albania, directed the National Liberation War, and headed the partisan units. Without the existence of the Central Committee, without the leadership of the Party, we would not have had the Party as it is today, and would not have achieved these victories. Our victories cannot be attributed to two or three individuals, and could not have been ensured by a party whose Central Committee was extremely weak or did not even exist.

It is correct to say that meetings of the Central Committee could have been held more regularly, but we should not think that during those three years, in the difficult conditions of the war, many meetings could have been convened. Nevertheless, meetings were held, if not full ones, and various comrades met with the General Secretary of the Party, discussed problems and took decisions. The Central Committee assumed a clear-cut stand on every political development, and every important event. The documents of the Party indicate this. Thus at various times, the Central Committee has held full or partial meetings, we have held discussions, defined our stand and taken decisions which have been communicated to the Party. All this was done under the difficult circumstances of the war, and not in time of peace, and thus we should acknowledge the shortcomings against the background of these conditions and difficulties.

There have also been cases of underestimation of members of the Central Committee, or their removal from responsible posts. During the activity of the Central Committee of our young Party irregular forms of work have sometimes been evident. The responsibility of the organizational secretary, for example, should have been more clearly defined. The fault here lies in the first place with Miladin Popovich, and then with me, but at the same time part of the blame lies with all the circumstances which contributed to such an incorrect situation. Neither I, nor, I am sure, Miladin, had any ulterior aims or were against Koçi's holding the post he was appointed to by the 1st National Conference. I refute what was said at Berat, that we concealed from Koçi his appointment by the conference as organizational secretary, and that we did not entrust this task to him. I had my own views about Koçi's work, which was none too good. He was vacillating and narrow-minded in his opinion on various issues and problems, he had little confidence in his own opinions and was easily swayed. But it is a fact that Koçi did not take his task as seriously as he should have.

Liri Gega also exerted her influence in this matter. With fixed aims and resorting to intrigues, she tried to hold important leading positions in the Central Committee, and to replace Koçi Xoxe. Miladin has been wrongly accused of supporting Liri Gega in these aims, but on the contrary, he spoke of her with contempt, while it was Dushan Mugosha who fostered her megalomania and arrogance. Liri Gega was intriguing to form her own rotten circle of supporters. Her work was very sectarian and individualistic. At Berat she tried to get herself appointed as "chief of cadres", and given the highest grade in the army. I have criticized some of Liri Gega's mistakes to impose her views on the question of cadres. But it cannot be denied that it was only at Berat that her errors were

severely criticized. Nako and Koçi may have seen Liri Gega in a different light, they may have detected many shortcomings in her, but it is a fact that there was no serious criticism of her, nor was the matter raised as a very important question, as was done at Berat. Liri Gega deserved sound criticism. But the Yugoslav leaders used this criticism for their own purposes.

In Berat matters were not viewed from the correct viewpoint of the Party, and in their criticism Koçi and Nako were governed by personal interest. But the worst thing was that the intentions of the Yugoslav leadership were not understood, and therefore their accusations and "advice" were accepted. Nor did our comrades look deeply into the aims of Sejfulla Malëshova and of the others involved in underhand activities. This, I think, occurred because things were not analysed in a healthy spirit of criticism and self-criticism, but in a very narrow and irregular way. This was a great shortcoming which cropped up later and which made it impossible to guard against excessive criticism in judging problems requiring solution. There was a lack of objectivity, sang-froid, and profound and all-round assessment of issues.

The main aim of the intervention of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia at the Berat Plenum, in our opinion, was not to correct our alleged mistakes, or to strengthen our Central Committee, or to settle the question of the cadres who had allegedly been underestimated. The intervention was premeditated. The representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Velimir Stoinich, had come with pre-arranged decisions in his pocket. The main aim of the Yugoslav leadership was to attack the independence of our Party. They had to make our Party and its Central Committee submit to the line and directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and make

our country orientate itself fully and exclusively towards Yugoslavia. To achieve these aims, an extremely unhealthy situation had to be created in our Party, and it was necessary to create the opinion that, without Yugoslavia, there could be no party, no struggle and no liberation. The Yugoslavs thought that the Albanian Party and people had a high regard for Yugoslavia, but that their esteem was not as great as the Yugoslavs would have liked it to be.

During the National Liberation War, Yugoslavia was a neighbour, ally and dear friend of our Party. Our whole Party felt love and sympathy for the Communist Party and people of Yugoslavia. But Yugoslavia had its place. To our Party, the first place belonged to the Soviet Union, the Bolshevik Party and Stalin. In saving the world from fascism, they had made an enormous contribution to the triumph of our people. This is pointed out by our leaflets, from the first to the most recent. It is a fact that Tito's name was unknown to our Party, but our people knew about, and correctly assessed the struggle of the people of Yugoslavia. It encouraged us and eased the burden of our struggle. But only this much. We had neither direct links with, nor direct help from, the Yugoslav National Liberation army.

Of course, our Central Committee has gained something from their experience of struggle and the experience of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, through radio "Free Yugoslavia" and through the occasional pamphlets which have reached us. These were our only links with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, apart from the visits of the Yugoslav delegates we mentioned before, who have done more harm than good, and the visit of a delegation of our youth to Tito's General Staff, a delegation which returned almost at the end of the war.

But the way in which the Berat Plenum proceeded, led to a situation which gave the impression that we owed everything to Yugoslavia and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. At Berat, instead of emphasizing the achievements of our struggle (which were evaluated in the way the delegate of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia wished), the line of our Party came under severe criticism and its leadership was attacked in an unjust and unworthy manner. The aim of the Yugoslavs was to attack and eliminate the General Secretary of the Party, for they considered him as the real obstacle to the realization of their plans.

Comrade Miladin Popovich was basely forced back to Yugoslavia, and was not even allowed to make any self-criticism or criticism, although he had something to say. He was ordered out of Albania by the Yugoslavs. I did not agree with the Yugoslav delegate on this matter. But the important thing was to remove Miladin Popovich from the scene, for he would have spoilt things for them. Otherwise, there was no reason to organize the Berat Plenum behind my back, in a surreptitious way.

When the issues were brought up, I found some of them reasonable, such as the criticism of Liri Gega and the shortcomings observed in the work. But at the Berat meeting only the gross "errors" of the principal comrades leading the work were mentioned, such as the well-known passivity of Sejfulla Malëshova, or the restricted scope of Koçi Xoxe's activity, and nothing was said about the mistakes committed by others. Why was Miladin Popovich attacked so fiercely and unjustly, to the point where the Yugoslav delegate, seeing that the criticism of him would indirectly affect the Communist Party of Yugoslavia itself and lower confidence in it, cut short the criticism of the Yugoslav comrades in the middle of the meeting? This was certainly done with ulterior motives, to attack the General

Secretary of the Party. Not a good word was spoken at Berat about the General Secretary, who had fought and carried out his task to the best of his ability, but on the contrary, he was accused of things he had not done, and errors he had not committed, and thus a climate of mistrust arose around him. It is easy to understand that after such a situation was created for the General Secretary of the Party, there could be no unity and harmony in the Political Bureau, either. All the Bureau members would try to pull in different directions, and there would be no one to harmonize their actions. The opinions voiced by the General Secretary would be viewed with suspicion, the career-seekers who had worked to bring about such a situation would try to achieve their aims, if not in law, at least in fact. Everything would degenerate into individualistic work, with intrigues, quarrels, misunderstandings, prejudices, formalism and many serious mistakes predominating, to the point where the Central Committee and the Political Bureau would be threatened. And, for a time, this was what happened. These evils were brought upon our Party by the Berat Plenum which not only encouraged the unhealthy ambitions of some of our comrades and opened the way for them to develop further, not only completely accorded with the wishes of the Yugoslav representative and the Yugoslav leadership, but also allowed opportunism to infiltrate into the line of our Party. Not only did Velimir Stoinich neither intervene nor attempt to moderate the quite misplaced criticism directed at the General Secretary of our Party, but on the contrary, he was pleased when Sejfulla Malëshova, Koçi Xoxe and Nako Spiru came out with the theory of the "chief of the party", exalted Tito and attributed to the General Secretary all the errors committed during the period of the National Liberation War.

The Yugoslav delegate was also ignorant on matters of party organization, and unable to find his bearings in political situations. He knew nothing, literally nothing, about the situation in our country. He knew our country only from the information he had been given by his Central Committee, but this was erroneous. He had been only a divisional commissar; he had a set of stock phrases in his head, and nothing more. He gave us some circulars on the organization of the Party and the state power, which could not be called the last word on the issue. Through them he tried to impose on us many distortions of our Marxist-Leninist line, which compounded the errors that began at Berat. The question of the National Liberation Front is typical. At this man's request, we brought into the Front Cen Elezi and some other bandits who, but for his suggestion, we might have hanged ten times over. A week later, on listening to radio Belgrade, he told us that the Front should have a closed membership and other such nonsense. On the other hand, as his position was an opportunist one, he tried to influence us to approach people who had never supported us and who later were to become avowed enemies of the Party, the movement and our state power.

The Berat Plenum would have been a milestone in the history of our Party, if it had discussed the problems for which it was convened, and if it had proceeded in a sound party spirit.

At Berat there was fierce criticism of the leadership, its methods of work, the lack of unity and sincerity, and the narrowly individualistic and sectarian work. All this criticism, had it been sound, should have given the good results expected, whereas the Berat Plenum had the opposite effect, and this is further proof that criticism and self-criticism were not made in a communist spirit. The aim of the Central Committee of the Communist Party

of Yugoslavia at the Berat Plenum was to attack, discredit, and if possible, eliminate the Central Committee of our Party, in order to highlight the role of the aid the CC of the CPY had allegedly given our Party during the war and which had allegedly led it to victory.

But we must not think that the criticism of shortcomings and concessions made at Berat was totally unjust. The criticism of Liri Gega, as later events showed, was wholly correct, but the Berat Plenum did our Party more harm than good. We must come to understand that the help given by the CC of the CPY and its delegate was nil, or rather extremely negative.

It is true that after the Berat Plenum, the state power was set up, the apparatus of the Central Committee was organized, etc., but we did all this work ourselves, and feel no obligation to the delegate of the CC of the CPY. The situation created after the liberation of Albania undoubtedly helped to regulate many things.

If matters had been correctly dealt with at Berat we would be in a better position, and would have advanced further. Could we have done this without the delegate Stoinich? I think we could, with shortcomings, of course, but not with the great errors of principle which occurred.

With all the ill effects of the Berat Plenum, there was one positive effect, if we can call it that ; all the proceedings of this plenum were confined to the leadership of the Party, and were not discussed by the Party as a whole. Had this happened, then the confusion would have been still greater. The Berat plague affected the Bureau and the Central Committee. After the Berat Plenum, the members of the Central Committee were not clear, they lacked conviction, and they were overwhelmed by the subsequent events. The tone of the Berat Plenum influenced the entire work of the Central Committee in various ways.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its delegate to the Berat Plenum scored a victory. They succeeded in destroying the unity of our Central Committee, attacking the leadership of the Party, shaking its self-confidence, creating distrust on the part of some comrades of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee towards the General Secretary of the Party, and wrecking the collective method of work in the Political Bureau and Central Committee. It was a success, however insufficient, for the Yugoslav leaders. Their aim was the total submission of our Central Committee to the orders of their envoy. But they hit a snag.

After the Berat Plenum, the Yugoslav delegate tried to intervene everywhere, but without success. He knocked at the General Secretary's door, but it did not open, he knocked at Nako Spiru's door, and it remained closed, too. He and several of his other Yugoslav comrades began to rally some members of our Central Committee; they held discussions with them, and complained that they were not being kept informed; at the same time they tried to influence these comrades and have them oppose the Political Bureau of the Party. The Yugoslav delegate demanded the appointment of cadres of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to our youth organization. We refused this. He demanded that the reports of the party committees to the Central Committee be handed on to him, but this too was refused. He recruited Liri Gega as his agent, and although he had agreed with her condemnation at Berat, proposed with no shame or hesitation, that we re-admit her into the Central Committee. But here, too, he met with a categorical refusal. Through his anti-Marxist activity to implement the recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Velimir Stoinich was exposed and became useless to the Yugoslavs. The CC of the CPY had to change its tactics and its men,

and therefore, sent to our country in his stead Josip Djer-dja, the OZNA-man for Albania, to "put right the matters Velimir had made a mess of".

THE SITUATION AFTER THE BERAT PLENUM AND THE
THESES OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE PARTY
FOR ITS REVISION

It is necessary to make some analysis of the situation created after the Berat Plenum and the grave consequences that ensued. In the first place, our Central Committee and its Political Bureau were not sufficiently armed, organized and united as one body to face the situation and to solve the grave problems which lay before the country following liberation. The Berat Plenum did not give either the Central Committee or the Political Bureau the necessary unity or a correct understanding of their activity as an organized general staff, qualities which they were criticized for lacking at the Berat Plenum. The members of the Central Committee did not place themselves at the head of the work as they should have done, did not clearly define the responsibility they had to undertake, and their functions were assigned at random without thorough study. This occurred because the Political Bureau itself was not in a position to make a correct division of the work.

The Berat Plenum created a privileged position for the organizational secretary of the Party, gave Koçi Xoxe the opportunity to monopolize the work, while on the other hand, it weakened all the other positions, and in the first place, the position and functions of the General Secretary of the Party. The authority of the General Secretary was attacked and shaken. Many comrades of the Political Bureau did not have due confidence in him. To claim otherwise would be wrong, for that was the reality. The

attitude and mistakes of some comrades cannot be understood otherwise. In the first place, it was the task of the General Secretary to specify, direct and check up the work of the members of the Bureau and Central Committee, and to supervise and control their activities. But this could not be done by force, especially after the situation created by the Berat Plenum. To ask, "Why did the General Secretary permit this state of affairs?" would not be at all objective.

At the Berat Plenum and after it, the personality of Nako Spiru was brought to the fore, but it was not the General Secretary who did this; on the contrary, it was done to his disadvantage. It was the duty of the other members of the Bureau to put things right if they noticed that Nako was going too far. In the first place, it was Koçi's task, but he did not carry it out. Why? At first, he kept silent because Nako's stand and activity, encouraged by the Yugoslav delegates, weakened the position of the General Secretary, which was in accordance with Koçi Xoxe's wishes and future plans. Had things been otherwise, it would have been logical for Koçi Xoxe, as the organizational secretary, after the Berat Plenum, to collaborate closely with the General Secretary and to see that Nako Spiru's activity was affecting the unity in the leadership of the Party and restricting the role of the General Secretary. But when the Yugoslavs saw that they could not manipulate Nako to their liking, they began to give support and encouragement to Koçi Xoxe, and to promote him. Then the worsening of Nako's relations with the Yugoslavs and Koçi Xoxe became apparent. At that time, Nako apparently realized his mistakes and drew closer to the General Secretary, while Koçi Xoxe, who saw this rapprochement as a threat to himself and did not consider the Party's need to strengthen its unity, encouraged by the Yugoslavs, began his struggle against Nako Spiru. The Berat Plenum had convinced Koçi Xoxe that many pro-

blems could be solved without asking the General Secretary or consulting his opinion, and had created in Koçi Xoxe an exaggerated sense of self-confidence. This contributed to the creation of the situation I have spoken about.

While comrade Nako Spiru changed his ways and drew the General Secretary into his confidence, Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo persisted in their mistaken line, lacking the necessary trust in the General Secretary, and misunderstanding and misusing the weapon of criticism and self-criticism and the struggle of contradictions within the Party, which they viewed in a personal light and as though they were engineered by Nako Spiru. This has caused them both to commit grave political and organizational errors.

I felt the need to collaborate with the comrades of the Political Bureau, and therefore saw nothing wrong in Nako's rapprochement. Personally, I had a high opinion of Nako and liked him despite all his shortcomings, although I did not approve of the stand he took at Berat. I criticized him openly for it at the time. I remained ignorant of Nako's backstage activity for a long time after the Berat Plenum. I was informed of it later by other comrades. So, there was no reason for me to suspect that his intentions were not good. No criticism had been made of Nako's work, on the contrary, he was a comrade to whom everyone listened attentively. He criticized with great courage. What harm could I see in Nako's approach to me? On the contrary, I wanted this contact, and not for personal reasons. Nako may have had certain tendencies in his work, and may have made mistakes, but the others made mistakes too.

We discussed, debated and criticized shortcomings and mistakes as far as we were able. But it is a fact that between Nako and Koçi, Nako and Sejfulla, Bedri and Koçi, Sejfulla and Koçi, these discussions and criticisms

were viewed in a personal light and carried on accordingly. The opinion of the General Secretary and his mediation did not have the desired effect on the atmosphere of tension that had been created in varying degrees among these comrades. This stemmed from the lack of unity and co-ordination in the activity of the Bureau. Some of these comrades accused the General Secretary of leniency towards Koçi Xoxe, while Koçi and Pandi Kristo had formed the idea that he was under the influence of Nako, or of one comrade or another. At no time has any factually based, serious criticism been directed at me to prove that I was adversely influenced by these comrades. I cannot be held responsible for other people's faults and mistakes.

In fact, I was never influenced by Nako's mistaken views, I criticized them, and from the time of the National Liberation War I considered the erroneous tendencies of Nako Spiru and Liri Belishova in regard to the work with the youth⁷ as a danger. Nor did I agree with some other erroneous views held by Nako, especially on the question of cadres.

Such an interpretation of matters created a rift in our Bureau, of which both Sejfulla Malëshova and the Yugoslavs took advantage in order to achieve their hostile aims, while Koçi Xoxe took the opportunity to take control of everything, neglecting the role of the General Secretary in the leadership, which encouraged the development of Nako Spiru's unhealthy ambition. In this

⁷ Despite the efforts of Nako Spiru to strengthen the organization of the youth, he could not see from a correct standpoint some of its problems, in particular the tendency of the work of the organization of the youth to develop in a somewhat independent manner from the Party, and thus he went so far as to counterpose the cadres of the youth to those of the Party, by making incorrect comparisons between the youth organization and the party organization. These tendencies were deepened by Liri Belishova.

whole situation the General Secretary had his views, which appear to have been correct. He had not lost his sense of responsibility; Berat had not subdued his courage or will-power, and he was pretty well aware of the difficult situation developing in our Political Bureau, he saw the harm caused at Berat, and the hostile activity of Velimir Stoinich. All this led the General Secretary to the conclusion that the Berat Plenum was the main disease which had caused the lack of unity in the Political Bureau, that the source of all this was the interference of Velimir Stoinich, that the line of the Party during the National Liberation War, and also the General Secretary, had been unjustly criticised, that in organizational matters there had been practical errors which needed correction, that there had been a shift of responsibilities in the leadership, that a duality of Party and state power had been created, and other grave errors.

I had become convinced of all this, and therefore decided to put before the Political Bureau the theses on the revision of the Berat Plenum and the correction of errors. The theses on the revision of the Berat Plenum were an important document in which problems were raised tactfully and mistakes criticized in accordance with the degree of danger they appeared to pose, without exaggerations or any sign of bias. But my theses and my good intentions were not correctly understood and were not accepted by either party, by Koçi and Pandi, or by Nako. Nako's errors were not alarming at the time when I presented my theses to the Political Bureau, nor were Koçi Xoxe's organizational mistakes. Sejfulla Malëshova's opportunism, which was most dangerous, was eliminated.

The main question was the Berat Plenum, the errors arising from it, the lack of unity in the Bureau, and the harm done to the work of the Party. But neither side tried to put this matter right. And the reason is clear.

Neither Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo, nor Nako Spiru showed readiness to make self-criticism about their activity at Berat, to reveal to the Party the Berat backstage plot, or to admit and condemn their errors in the spirit of Bolshevik self-criticism. On the contrary, they defended their "work" at Berat, thus again harming the Party by making their mistakes worse and deepening the split in the Bureau. Sound self-criticism on their part would have helped to expose the hostile anti-party activity of Velimir Stoinich, would have exposed the activity behind the scenes at Berat with all its harmful actions entailing negative consequences both for the political and organizational line, would have helped get rid of the existing distrust towards the party leadership and especially towards the General Secretary, and thus would have made possible the revision of the decisions of the Berat Plenum. Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo regarded the theses for the revision of the Berat Plenum as if they had originated from Nako Spiru, and I had put them forward under his influence. They thought that these theses were aimed only against Koçi as an individual. This was a grave error on their part, it was not objective and showed extremely narrow judgement. Nako Spiru took great care to avoid discussion of the main issues raised in these theses, for a basic discussion would have brought undesirable things into the open. We should mention here that on the question of Berat, silence and reservations were maintained to the end. Meanwhile Pandi Kristo tried to avoid discussion on these theses by raising the question of why I had maintained reservations since the Berat Plenum. In principle, this was true, but it was not a bad thing, on the contrary, it was to the benefit of the Party, and therefore, positive, that I brought up this question after a certain time, when many circumstances made my reservations still stronger.

I did not know what had happened behind the scenes at Berat, and I did not know the role some comrades had played. From the time of Berat I opposed their stands, though unaware of all the backstage activity, I opposed them openly, and finding Velimir Stoinich's activity mistaken, I criticized it openly and to his face. The theses on the revision of the Berat Plenum were in fact against those who carried out the backstage activities, and were to the benefit of the Party and its normal work. If Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo, on the one hand, and Nako Spiru, on the other, had viewed those theses correctly and had acknowledged their errors with sound self-criticism, matters would have been put right. But both sides kept their cards under the table.

Why did Nako Spiru, and also Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo, not view these theses correctly? I think that the sole explanation is that they did not want their errors uncovered.

My theses did not bring any improvement in the situation. The discussion was diverted into practical questions and the previous positions were maintained. Far from the unity in the Political Bureau being strengthened, the split became even deeper. I was convinced that the problem was not solved. My task, I think, was not to concentrate on the deadlock the matter had reached, but to find another solution. A good solution would have been for me to bring up the question with the Central Committee, but I did not do this, and it was a mistake. I thought the question could be solved by adding new members to enlarge the Political Bureau. This would have been a just solution.

Not only was there no unity in the Political Bureau, but all matters were dealt with by three people, Sejfulla, Nako and Koçi, who were joined by Pandi Kristo. In fact the other comrades were considered as having nothing

to do with the questions under discussion. These comrades were criticized for inactivity, lack of initiative or of definite opinions, for wavering and being easily influenced; they were criticized for sometimes taking incorrect stands, etc., but we, in our responsible positions, have forgotten to criticize ourselves for not activating them, for not keeping them informed, and for not appointing them to tasks in conformity with their responsibility. In the first place, the Berat Plenum brought about this state of affairs by creating the illusion that it had found the correct solution to the problem of the cadres of the Central Committee and its functioning, while in reality it did nothing to solve this problem. In addition, the lack of unity in the Bureau, mutual distrust, individualistic work and other shortcomings and errors in its work, prevented those comrades from taking an active and lively part in solving problems and directing affairs.

People were beginning to think that there were only three people controlling affairs in the Political Bureau, and that there was no unity among them. Therefore I thought that there should be an end to such a situation. I thought that the Political Bureau should be enlarged to include not only old comrades, but also young ones.

As far as I am concerned, both old and young comrades have always had their place. I thought, and I do not think I was mistaken, that in the Central Committee, apart from the loyal and capable older comrades, there should also be younger ones who, though not having the experience of the former, had proved through their work in the Party that they would make good leaders. Of the three comrades I proposed, one was comrade Mehmet Shehu and the two others were younger. Mehmet was our age, he had fought in Spain, he had fought and shown his ability in directing the struggle and leading our National Liberation Army, and was continuing to advance

his military knowledge. As far as the two younger ones were concerned, it is true that Nako influenced the proposal to include them, but we should not forget that, for my part, I had heard nothing bad about those two comrades, not from Nako, of course, but not from Koçi either, or from anyone else. They may have had their shortcomings, but all the comrades have shortcomings, and at that time the real or alleged shortcomings of those two comrades, which were to emerge later, were unknown and were not evident. The three comrades whom I proposed for membership of the Bureau were rejected by Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo. It should be stressed here that they did not reject them for political reasons. The reasons they put forward were that they allegedly had personal shortcomings and, being young, should continue their probation period.

Even after my theses were presented, and after the enlargement of the Bureau was proposed, we were unable to improve the situation in the leadership, and especially in our Political Bureau. But we must acknowledge that in spite of all these shortcomings, and in spite of the situation, our work had made progress. This shows that we could also have solved those problems which seemed to us insoluble, if we had only had more good will and less impetuosity, and if genuine and open Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism had existed.

In order to maintain an unhealthy situation in the Political Bureau throughout this period and after the signing of the agreement with Yugoslavia⁸, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia carried

⁸ This refers to the Treaty on the Coordination of Economic Plans, Customs Union and Financial Parity between the PR of Albania and the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed in November 27, 1946.

on intrigues to an extraordinary extent, and also used the delegates it had here for this purpose. They blatantly intervened in our internal affairs. Up to a certain point, we were also to blame for having permitted it, but this came about chiefly as a result of the trust we had placed in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav leaders attentively followed all the situations which arose in our country, and kept themselves well informed; they had detailed knowledge of our activities in the Political Bureau, of the spirit predominating there, and of the measures we were taking or thinking of taking. They were also informed of the theses on the revision of the Berat Plenum. The delegate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia apparently told Koçi Xoxe that Nako had informed them about it and had told him "the Commander⁹ thinks ill of the Yugoslavs and of the delegate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia." We cannot believe this and other such allegations, for the Yugoslavs said these things when comrade Nako was no longer among us. I think they are outright slanders. The Yugoslav Trotskyites were capable of any slander. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav leadership has been fully informed of the situation within our Party and our country. During this period they tried to strengthen their position and, on the surface, followed a "benevolent policy" towards all the members of our leadership in order to curry favour with them. They suited their word to the hearer, and incited one against the other with the aim of maintaining and fostering a tense situation, for only in this way could they later impose their views on us, and at the same time create the impression that only they were in a position to put things in order in our country and within our

⁹ Enver Hoxha.

Party. The economic relations established just at that time gave a boost to the hostile activity of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia against our Party and country.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND OUR COUNTRY

Undoubtedly, our country needed aid to reconstruct its economy destroyed by the war. We were to receive this aid from the Soviet Union and from Yugoslavia, and also from other people's democracies. In the beginning, the principal aid came from Yugoslavia. But it should be explained here that this also included the aid given by the Soviet Union. Molotov made this clear to us in Paris¹⁰, in the presence of Kardelj, Moshaj Pijade and me. He set forth the view of the Soviet leadership on the way in which the relations between our two republics should develop. When it came to economic matters, Molotov said, "the Soviet Union will unsparingly help the Albanian people to rebuild their economy, but this help will be given through Yugoslavia, purely for reasons of foreign policy." Comrade Stalin repeated this to us when we went to Moscow¹¹. Not only that, but comrade Stalin and the Soviet government met all our requests. They wholeheartedly granted us credits of great advantage to us. We do not know how the Soviet assistance that came to us through Yugoslavia was arranged, but the fact is that the Soviet Union has given Yugoslavia great economic and military assistance. The aid Yugoslavia gave us has no

10 In the course of the proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference (August 29 — October 15, 1946).

11 During the visit to the Soviet Union by a delegation of the PRA, headed by comrade Enver Hoxha in July 1947.

doubt been minimal in comparison with the aid it received from the Soviet Union. If we compare the direct economic and military aid given us by the Soviet Union when we went to Moscow, and what it is giving us this year, we can safely say that it is two or three times greater than the aid Yugoslavia gave us.

The Economic Convention¹² was a continuation of the alliance we had entered into with Yugoslavia¹³. This convention was accompanied by protocols on the co-ordination of planning, the unification of prices, parity of currency, joint companies, etc. Here it is only correct to say that we accepted and signed those protocols. But at the same time, we made several suggestions, for example, on parity of currency and the unification of prices; experience showed that our suggestions were right, but at the time they were contemptuously and menacingly turned down by the Yugoslavs, who described them as obstruction on our part. Our suggestions were confined only to practical questions, and not matters of principle. We did not discuss as we should have the true meaning of coordination of planning, parity of currency, the unification of prices, the abolition of customs barriers, and the methods of activity of joint companies, nor did we properly define the question of credits. We had full trust in them, whereas the Yugoslavs had specific aims as far as the nature and development of economic relations were concerned. The aims of the policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia towards our country were anti-Marxist, exploitative and colonialist; in short, they were to the detriment of our people.

12 The Economic Convention between the PRA and the PFRY was signed in November 1946.

13 This refers to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid between the PRA and the PFRY, signed in July 1946.

The demand for coordinated economic plans served the anti-Marxist aims of the Yugoslav leadership. Plans for particular projects could have been coordinated between our two republics in the common interest of the two countries. But the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia aimed, through the coordination of planning, to have our economy develop in the framework of the Yugoslav economy, conditioned by and dependent on it. Our economy "should not develop independently, but should be placed in dependence on the Yugoslav economy". That was the aim of the parity of currency, the unification of prices, the abolition of customs and the creation of joint companies. Yugoslavia, without making any genuine effort to help to bring these companies fully and properly into operation, claimed the exclusive right to operate them, or rather not to operate them.

In 1946 trade relations were also established between our two republics. In practice a new situation was created in which our country was isolated from the Soviet Union and the people's democracies as far as economic relations were concerned. This situation was created by the Yugoslavs, who tried to suppress any of our initiatives in this respect. We had signed a minor trade agreement with the Soviet Union, which helped us immediately after liberation, with grain and other items. As we owed the Soviet Union oil etc., the Yugoslavs tried in a thousand ways to prevent us from meeting this obligation towards the Soviet Union and to prevent the repetition of such an agreement.

In 1946 we set up the Planning Commission, headed by Nako Spiru. On our request, Soviet advisers were appointed to the Planning Commission and other departments, and right from the beginning they helped our young cadres to shoulder their tasks and to work with

confidence in the future. The Yugoslavs also brought in a number of specialists and engineers who, far from being of any great help to us, engaged in intrigues and sabotage activities. The only directive they had received was to throw a spanner into the works, to slow down as much as possible the general development of our economy, and in particular the carrying out of the plan. They insisted that we must listen to them, and that they should have the last word, arguing that it was Yugoslavia which was giving us the aid.

The 1946 plan was drawn up under these conditions and with men who were new to that work, but very active and confident in their forces. They also had the help of the Soviet advisers. The Yugoslav leaders and specialists tried at every moment to belittle our cadres and their efforts, and to hamper the work, inventing great theories on every question, proposing study after study in order to slow down the formulation of plans and later to give our side the blame, alleging that we "had not drawn up the plan in time, and had not handed it over to Belgrade in time", and that "the plan had not been studied in depth, and should have gone over with them." Their intention was to delay the delivery of goods, to postpone investments, in a word, to prevent us receiving the credit promised, as in fact happened.

During that period, besides these obstacles, the Yugoslavs also openly robbed our economy, but we tried to resist this. For example, on the question of accumulation, in spite of our opposition, the Yugoslavs arbitrarily decided against us. Thus they plundered our country of colossal sums, amounting to several million leks. Similarly, the turnover tax, which should have been a measure assisting our government to carry out its prices policy and to regulate our accumulation, was arbitrarily determined in favour of the Yugoslavs. Here, too, they have

robbed us of millions, seriously weakening our economy. All the plunder was concealed and justified with pseudo-Marxist slogans, but especially with economic blackmail and threats, with the pressure of delay in granting credit.

We witnessed many suspicious dealings by the Yugoslavs, such as the question of specifying the investments in the joint companies¹⁴, and of determining credit. We pointed this out to them in order to clarify matters and put them right. But they never wanted to clarify these questions and accused us of lacking confidence. They were on a wrong, anti-Marxist road.

The realization of a credit of two billion dinars was the main problem preoccupying us, for the fulfilment of our plan greatly depended on it. Observing the trade agreement and making investments were the most complicated problems. The Yugoslavs deliberately caused obstructions in order to be in position to exert pressure on us later. In all the sectors of plan the Yugoslavs sabotaged right and left. Not only was the total credit not forthcoming, but what consumer goods or investments that did come were never dispatched on time.

Throughout this period of our work, the Yugoslavs, in order to divert the concern and attention of our cadres from implementing the plan, and in order to justify their serious failures, did not give our cadres a moment's respite, and prevented them from setting to work and carrying out the planned tasks as they ought to. None of the proposed studies was completed, or could have been completed. Their aims, and the methods they resorted to, prevented our cadres from drawing practical benefit in order to develop and advance. But in spite of these ob-

14 The joint Albanian-Yugoslav companies were set up after the signing of the Economic Convention between the PRA and PFRY.

stacles, through the efforts of our Party and government, through the great selflessness of the working masses, and using the material available locally, much work was done to improve the living conditions of our people.

Through their activity, the Yugoslav leaders aimed at many-sided objectives: to impede the development of our economy and to place it under their complete dependence, to discredit the Party before the broad masses of the people as "a party incapable of running the country and of guiding the destiny of the people", to discredit the leadership of the Party as incapable of coping with the situations, and to fight against all those leaders who had become an obstacle to the realization of their plans. Their next aim was to shake the faith and love of our Party for the Soviet Union, and in fact to weaken our confidence in the Soviet advisers, to discredit these advisers, and to force us into demanding their departure. This would bring about the isolation of our country and Party from the Soviet Union and from the socialist camp.

The activity of the Yugoslav leadership created particular situations with a definite purpose. In order to achieve their aims, the Yugoslav leaders undertook a series of monstrous actions against our Party, our government, our economy, our plan, and our people. They came out with the thesis alleging that a second anti-Yugoslav line was becoming apparent in our Party, and made our leadership responsible to the people for such a situation. This was the first accusation they made against our Central Committee¹⁵. The Political Bureau refuted this accusation, although not all its members were convinced about

¹⁵ This accusation was brought against the CC of the CPA in June 1947 in a provocative letter sent by the CC of the CPY to the CC of the CPA.

this decision. The decision of the Bureau was a correct one, and our reply to the representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was completely correct.

In the attack on our Party and its leadership, the question of the draft five-year plan recommended by the Yugoslav government for our People's Republic was raised. In fact, the question of the draft-plan was only a bluff. All the facts prove this, as does the admission of Savo Zlatich, who revealed that in the Yugoslav budget not only was there no provision for a large credit to finance our five-year plan, but there was not even any provision for a further credit of two billion dinars which was to be granted to us for 1948. This credit was to be drawn from the supposed reserve funds of the Yugoslav budget. The Yugoslav government had told us that we would be granted a sum of 20 to 21 billion dinars for the five-year plan. The Yugoslav leaders denied saying this, just as they denied all their low-down actions, but the fact remains that this was the basis on which our draft five-year plan was drawn up. It was formulated by our comrades with the help of Soviet specialists. This draft-plan was drawn up hastily, and our cadres were exhausted by the task, because this work was beyond our capabilities, and the Yugoslavs wanted it finished in record time. They had given us the general outlines of one of their draft five-year plans, on which to rely in formulating our own, which was Yugoslav-orientated. It was claimed that Nako Spiru concealed this draft-plan. But Nako Spiru did not invent the matter of the 20 to 21 billion dinars out of his own head; the Yugoslavs officially told Kiço Ngjela¹⁶ about it. And this is the truth. We believe our

¹⁶ At that time vice-president of the State Planning Commission.

comrade Kiço Ngjela, and not the Yugoslav Trotskyites who are trying to dig our country's grave. Therefore, that plan could and did serve as guideline. Certainly the Yugoslavs used many ruses; here are the facts: one would say ten billion, and would give this as his own approximate opinion; the delegate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Savo Zlatich, mentioned the figure of 21 billion to Kiço, while the tentative draft of the Yugoslav five-year plan gave a figure of 13 to 15 billion, and this was justified with the assertion that previous estimates might have been mistaken. All these manoeuvres aimed to mislead us and showed bias and lack of seriousness.

The guidelines set down by the Yugoslavs for our five-year plan were anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian. The essence of these guidelines was to enable them to exploit our country. We were expected to produce for the Yugoslavs all the raw materials which they needed. These raw materials were to be exported to the metropolis Yugoslavia to be processed there in Yugoslav factories. The same applied to the production of cotton and other industrial crops, as well as oil, bitumen, asphalt, chrome, etc. Yugoslavia would supply its "colony", Albania, with exorbitantly priced consumer goods, including even such items as needles and thread, and would provide us with petrol and oil, as well as glass for the lamps in which we would burn the fuel extracted from our subsoil, processed in Yugoslavia, and sold to us at high prices. This is precisely the policy of the US capitalist and monopoly trusts. The aim of the Yugoslavs was, therefore, to prevent our country from developing either its industry or its working class, and to make it forever dependent on Yugoslavia. The few factories or workshops which were to be given to our country, and were anticipated in the Yugoslav draft-

plan, were not only laughable, but never eventuated. Not only that, but the Yugoslav leaders and their representatives here even dismantled what more or less efficient machinery we had, and sent it to Yugoslavia. They even robbed us of the machinery we had received as war reparations.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia described the draft five-year plan which we formulated as "autarchic", "unrealistic", etc. Such an evaluation was not correct. Our draft-plan was neither autarchic, nor unrealistic; it was based on the credit promised by the Yugoslavs themselves. Our Central Committee was not wrong in approving the draft five-year plan, nor were the General Secretary of the Party, or comrade Nako Spiru. The independent economic development of the country and the construction of socialism in Albania with the assistance of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, especially of Yugoslavia, was described as autarchic by the Yugoslav Trotskyites. This was a trick and baseless slander directed against the correct orientation of the development of our country's economy. In that draft-plan there were some inaccurate formulations and some exaggerations, but this was not the essence of the problem. We blamed Nako Spiru for these exaggerations, but this is not just, either. We too studied and approved this hastily formulated draft-plan, and if there are mistakes in it, it is the fault of all of us, and not of comrade Nako alone.

The draft-plan provided for our country to develop industrial crops, primarily cotton, at the expense of cereals and especially of maize. Here we fell into the trap set by the Yugoslav leadership, who told us, "Do not worry about bread, the Banat plain produces enough for you and for us". In view of what the Yugoslav Trotskyites had

in mind for our country, this meant that, by keeping the solution of the bread problem in their hands, they would use it like Damocles' sword over the heads of our people to deprive them of their independence and turn them into slaves.

The question of bread is one of the biggest and most difficult problems facing our country, all the more so if we take into account the great difficulties, which would face us in planning agricultural production under the conditions of the existence of small-scale private property in the countryside. This problem has been of great concern to our people, and they have quite correctly concentrated their main efforts on ensuring bread. The problem of bread is a question of principle. It is a mistake to be dependent on a foreign country for such a prime necessity, for we should be prepared to cope with the unexpected. That does not mean that our country should concentrate only on the production of maize and wheat. No. We should encourage the peasantry to cultivate and develop industrial crops as well, but this should be done after investigation, and as much new land as possible should be opened up.

As for the development of industry and the local processing of raw materials, we think that our estimate was both correct and modest.

All of us were fully confident that the draft-plan we had drawn up was correct in its general outline, and we were not at all wrong in this. That draft-plan, like all drafts, had to be discussed, corrected, and then approved. We never considered it to be final. Nor was it sent to Belgrade to be reviewed; only the principal guidelines were sent. We waited for reply, which was delayed (I will speak of this later), and when it came, it was in the form of a serious and base accusation against our Central

Committee¹⁷ by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was preparing its attack against our Party, in order to subjugate both our Party and country, it was preparing its attack against the socialist camp in the sector of Albania. The principal guidelines of our draft five-year plan were taken to Belgrade by Zlatic, not with the purpose of helping our country, but in order to have them as a springboard for the attack against our Party. As the issue of the draft-plan was not a sufficient motive for such an attack, the Yugoslav leaders concocted other base accusations to aggravate the situation still further. They used the question of the railway¹⁸, the construction of which the Party had entrusted to the youth. It was at the railway construction site that the great drive of our working youth, their heroism and their determination were best displayed. The youth were the first in work and effort, and were a great support for our Party. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia tried to attack and discourage this creative force of our people and Party. The Yugoslavs' attack on the railway construction site was at the same time a blow at our Party and government. The failure to complete the railway construction work would have been a grave economic and political setback for us. The Party had understood this well, and had thoroughly informed the youth of this, and the youth kept their word to the Party. The railway construction site was the scene of a broad confrontation be-

17 This accusation was brought against the CC of the CPA by the CC of the CPY in November 1947.

18 In the building of the railway, many Yugoslavs came to Albania allegedly to render internationalist aid; but they tried to hamper and sabotage work. Due to their activity, the Albanian youth began to look askance at them.

tween our men and the Yugoslavs. Our youth, the cadres of the Party and the youth organization who worked on the railway and directed the work there, carried out their task with heroism and great selflessness, with deep love for our Party and people. The railway was finished according to schedule only through the determination of our youth, led by the Party. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and all the men it had sent to the railway construction site — engineers, surveyors, etc. — sabotaged the railway work. To the Yugoslavs, the construction of this project was an opportunity for sabotage to create a difficult situation, and to concoct slanders against our Party. This is fully proved by all the documents held by our Party and state about this great action. The Yugoslavs working at the railway construction site, ranging from the director to the man in charge of Party matters, were nothing but anti-Marxists, OZNA-men and ustashi¹⁹, indoctrinated with exploitative and colonialist attitudes towards our country. The Yugoslavs at the railway opposed, despised and slandered our cadres, and accused them of many base actions. The Yugoslavs acted towards the Albanians at the work-site like bosses from the metropolis who set the natives to build railways in their African colonies. Our Party people and our Youth Organization never reconciled themselves to this situation. And they were right. Certainly in such an important action some small incidents did occur, but the Yugoslavs inflated them and came to the conclusion that "the Albanians have set up an anti-Yugoslav front which reached its height at the railway construction site". This was not a question of the insignificant mistakes some young person might have made, but a question

19 Members of the reactionary bands of Ante Pavelich in the so-called "Independent Croatian State" during the Second World War.

of big political issues. The Yugoslavs accused us of having viewed the question more from the practical angle, while neglecting the political angle. This is totally untrue. It is they who had neglected the political angle, or rather, had considered the question in a politically distorted, anti-Marxist, colonialist manner.

In order to further reinforce the thesis of the "anti-Yugoslav front being created within our Party and country", the Yugoslavs, from the official representatives of the government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the specialists, began to spread other slanders. They spread the rumour that the Yugoslav technicians were looked down on, that they were not given good accommodation, etc.

But their arrogance went still further. They even used the visit of a delegation of our Party and government to the Soviet Union to further their ends. This visit caused great concern to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. We signed an economic agreement with the Soviet Union, according to which it undertook to give us considerable aid to develop our economy. This aid was a serious blow to the aims of the Yugoslav leaders, who wanted to turn our country into their colony, which would work to provide the Yugoslav metropolis with raw materials. With the factories the Soviet Union was to give us, we would set up industry in our country, raw materials would be processed locally, and our people would not be forced to buy many manufactured articles abroad. With the setting up of industry, our working class, our Party and state would be strengthened. The Soviet Union granted us credits and gave us a number of threshing machines and tractors of great importance to the development of our agriculture.

Our Party informed the people of this help given us by the Soviet Union. But the Central Committee of the

Communist Party of Yugoslavia labelled this correct action as an "anti-Yugoslav policy". This was stated openly by the official representative of the Yugoslav government. To the Yugoslav Trotskyites, for us to establish political and economic relations with another socialist country was tantamount to being "anti-Yugoslav"! The Yugoslavs deeply resented our Party's efforts to strengthen our friendship with the Soviet Union. The Yugoslav officials accused those working towards this end of non-existent crimes, sometimes directly and sometimes in a roundabout way, alleging that they "were not popularizing Yugoslavia as they should", which, in other words, meant, "the Soviet Union is being popularized to an excessive degree"; at other times they accused our men and our Party of being orientated towards the West, towards France and Italy, in the commercial or cultural field. These were base slanders. Our Party has never been orientated towards the West, either in its policy, trade, or cultural relations. There is no need to explain why such an accusation was made. The Yugoslav leaders wanted us to be orientated towards their country in every field. People who did not act in this way had to be attacked and replaced. This was their intention.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia prepared the ground by slandering our Party and people high and low in order to find support for their base accusations which led to our mistaken analysis at the 8th Plenum²⁰ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania. They accused our Central Committee of following an anti-Yugoslav policy, and of allowing the creation of an anti-Yugoslav front; they claimed that the

20 At the 8th Plenum, held in February 1948, the hostile activity of the Yugoslavs and of their agency headed by Koçi Xoxe against the CPA reached its climax.

policy of our government towards Yugoslavia was diametrically opposed to the aspirations and views of our people. They claimed that the Central Committee of our Party had followed a policy of breaking away from Yugoslavia in the economic field, that the orientation of our economy was mistaken, and that this was shown by our draft-plan, which was unrealistic and autarchic, and did not in the least comply with the decisions of the central committees of our two parties. Such a mistaken orientation, they said, was also apparent in other sectors of our country's activity, such as culture, education, railways, mining, etc.

Finally, particular accusations were levelled at Nako Spiru, who held special responsibility for the economic problems of our country, as one of the authors of this situation, and he was accused of playing a suspicious role in this matter, and the Central Committee of our Party was asked to see whether there was any enemy interference to cause the relations between the two countries to reach such a low ebb. Other names were also mentioned in these accusations. They said that, before entering any agreement with another country, Albania should ask for Yugoslavia's approval. This thesis was openly directed against the economic agreement which our government had signed with the Soviet government some months earlier.

These, in a few words, were the accusations against the Central Committee of our Party. These accusations were the basis of the analysis of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee and the resolution which emerged from it. We shall speak later about the analysis and the mistakes committed there. Here we shall continue to discuss the aims of the Yugoslav charges, and the actions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia after our analysis.

The main aim of the criticism was to turn our country into the seventh republic of Yugoslavia, to make it submit to orders and directives from Belgrade, to transform our country into a Yugoslav colony with only formal independence, concealed and masked with the formulae of bourgeois pseudo-independence. The criticism aimed to separate Albania from the socialist camp, to turn it into an enemy of the Soviet Union and to divert our Party into an anti-Marxist road. To the Yugoslav Trotskyites, Albania was the small state of the socialist camp in which they would make their first experiment in implementing their treacherous line against the socialist camp. They had long worked in this direction, but the resistance of our Party was far from being extinguished. Our Party possessed great strength, and the Yugoslav leaders had to work hard to suppress that strength.

To achieve their ends, first of all, they had to subdue the will of our Central Committee and the General Secretary of our Party, in whom they saw a great obstacle. The base accusations of the Yugoslav Trotskyite leadership against the Central Committee of our Party, which were previously directed against Nako Spiru, were now levelled against the General Secretary of the Party, for he bore the principal responsibility for the "erroneous policy" of the Central Committee. They were well acquainted with the situation in the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of our Party, they were aware of the divergencies that existed among the members of the Bureau, such as those between Nako and Koçi, and of the situation which had arisen between Koçi and me. They also knew that Nako's opinions on relations with Yugoslavia, on all the points in which they were correct, accorded with mine. They knew well that Nako did nothing in this matter without asking advice and obtaining my approval. The Yugoslavs had based their calculations on

the situation that existed in our Political Bureau, a situation which was brought about, in the first place, by their base intrigues. The Yugoslav Trotskyites were also greatly helped by the gravest error committed by Nako Spiru, his suicide. The analysis of the 8th Plenum was a great triumph for the Yugoslavs. They succeeded in creating within our Party the situation they wanted.

After the analysis, the situation grew very complicated. Through pressure, blackmail and psychological warfare, they managed to ensure the approval of their first proposals. It was accepted that the plan was unrealistic and autarchic, it was accepted that "our political and economic line, as well as our military line, were mistaken and endangered our People's Republic and our Party". The draft five-year plan was buried. It was agreed that a plan for the year 1948 alone should be drawn up. The trade agreement between our two countries was abolished. A commission to co-ordinate the plans was set up along the lines the Yugoslavs wanted, and it started work. But matters did not stop there; they were to go still further. The plan was not fulfilled. The Yugoslav pledges to provide us with consumer goods, materials and investments were not carried out. All these matters were submerged under the weight of bureaucracy and endless socio-economic studies. They imposed mistaken methods on us in order to wipe out the achievements of the people's power in the implementation of land reform and other matters. The forms of organization of our enterprises were criticized and new forms were proposed with the aim of removing all obstacles in the way of the union of Albania with Yugoslavia on an anti-Marxist basis. The underestimation of our cadres reached its peak.

The Co-ordinating Commission, which was set up in order to help the fulfilment of our plans, to approach the Yugoslav government asking for faster delivery of mate-

rials and investments, and to help in the implementation of the plan, actually pursued other diametrically opposed aims. It was assuming the form of a *de facto* Yugoslav government in Albania. No action could be taken by our ministries without the approval of the Co-ordinating Commission, or better said, without the approval of the head of this commission, Kraiger. Matters reached the stage where he demanded that our ministers should come to report to him and take orders from him. That would have meant the liquidation of our government.

The Yugoslavs suggested that all the joint companies be disbanded and turned into enterprises under the direct control of the Co-ordinating Commission and Kraiger. These joint companies which should have been directed by the Albanian government, and towards which the Yugoslavs had never fulfilled their obligations, would from now on have to sever completely even those weak links they maintained with various departments of our government.

Our State Planning Commission began gradually to lose its functions and to become an appendix without any competence. The principal officials of the Planning Commission were kept busy in endless discussions with Kraiger and endless studies on the future development of our socialist economy, seen from the Yugoslav viewpoint.

A kind of control commission which came from Yugoslavia, without any right to do so, inspected the joint companies and issued a "monumental" report, one of the most shocking anti-Albanian documents, the sole document they put their signature to, in which the Albanian government and, consequently, our Central Committee were accused of many outrageous things. Grave responsibility for this falls on Pandi Kristo in particular. With unprecedented cynicism worthy only of the enemies and the USA and British imperialists, we were given the blame

for the non-delivery of materials by the Yugoslavs, and their failure to carry out investments. There was no difference between this blackmail and that of the British missions during the war. Six months had passed, and instead of about one billion eight hundred million leks of the credit which should have materialized, only about 200 million leks were forthcoming. Pressure and blackmail were exerted with specific aims in a very important sector of the country's life, that of the economy. The Yugoslavs were preparing the ground in order to eliminate the existing forms of organization, to unify our economy fully with that of Yugoslavia, to remove all obstacles in the international field, and afterwards to present the great issue of unification as a "fait accompli", carried out with the full agreement of our Party and, therefore, of our people.

In such a situation, with all the negative consequences of the analysis of the 8th Plenum, there were open disagreements between us and the Yugoslavs, and serious clashes and misunderstandings.

The Yugoslavs demanded that we request the withdrawal of the Soviet advisers. We were never convinced on the question of the departure of the Soviet advisers, but under Yugoslav pressure, we gave in on this issue, and we were mistaken. Our mistake was that we accepted the opinion of the Yugoslavs to some extent, we reached a compromise with them and asked the Soviet government to withdraw some advisers, for the alleged reason that, with the way our economy was developing, we could well do without them; but we needed the Soviet technicians. This was a rotten "modus vivendi".

The situation which arose in the economy after the 8th Plenum harmed us greatly. The cost of living rose, inflation increased, supplies were scarce, plans were not fulfilled, the procurement of maize and all other agricul-

tural products became difficult, and prices went up from day to day. The Yugoslavs shamelessly demanded that we fulfil all our obligations towards them, while not fulfilling any of their obligations towards us. This is a brief description of the economic situation which was created at that time.

In other sectors, too, an equally dangerous situation was deliberately being created by the Yugoslavs.

At this time the Yugoslav leadership asked to send a Yugoslav division into the Korça zone. The history of the sending of this division is well known. The Yugoslavs had various aims : first, they wanted to create in our country, and at the head of our Party, a phobia of imminent war and the idea that a great danger was threatening Albania from the South. The Yugoslavs presented the matter as if we were about to be attacked by the Anglo-Americans and the Greek monarcho-fascists, and alleged that they had reliable information. This was done to make our Central Committee devote serious concern to this problem and forget everything else, and to create the impression in our Party that in such a "critical situation" Yugoslavia was a vigilant ally, ready to give immediate help.

At the time when the Yugoslavs raised the question of the division, the situation in Greece was confused, the offensive of the democratic forces had begun, and there was therefore no strong reason to justify the Yugoslav alarm. To send a division at that time, and to proclaim the Korça zone a Yugoslav area, as the Yugoslavs requested, would have been an unprecedented act which might have created an international incident. It might have been used by imperialism as a threat of war on our part, for such an act would have gone beyond the bounds of self-defence, and in this case, the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid would have come into effect. If a Yugoslav division had

been sent, and Korça proclaimed a Yugoslav area, this would have had serious repercussions among our people, causing them excessive and needless alarm, and bringing about very grave political and economic consequences.

The Soviet government had no knowledge of the Yugoslav proposal. Only when we informed it of the proposal, did it learn what was being done and expressed the opinion that there was no reason why such a proposal should be accepted. The wise advice of the Soviet government strengthened our determination not to permit the sending of the division. The Yugoslav criticized us, and especially me, as I had informed the Soviet government and was not convinced about the stationing of a Yugoslav division in Korça.

The Yugoslavs intended to use the stationing of their division in Korça for other purposes. Their relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated, and they tried to foster enmity between us and the Soviet Union. General Kupreshanin, avowedly anti-Soviet, went so far as to make the monstrous statement that "the Soviet Union will sacrifice Albania to the imperialists". Kupreshanin, loyal to the Belgrade Trotskyites, identified the just policy of the Soviet Union with the policy of the men who brought about the Munich capitulation. The Trotskyite representatives of Belgrade, from Savo Zlatich and Josip Djerdja to Spiro Sergentich, spoke in the same disgraceful anti-Soviet way. The stationing of a Yugoslav division in Korça and the dispatch of other divisions, allegedly to defend the independence and integrity of our country, would have served the Yugoslav leaders as a lever to impose their opinions and to suppress by force any resistance of our Party.

After the failure of their plan to send a division, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Tito himself tried to maintain the war phobia in

Albania. The Yugoslav representative to Albania tried to convince our Central Committee and General Staff that they should take extraordinary military measures, saying that they should "change the character and organization of the army, build new bridges, and widen the existing ones to allow the passage of heavy tanks coming from Yugoslavia to cope with the situation"; they should "build many kilometres of military and strategic roads, erect new telegraph lines, mobilize a further 10,000 young men and bring in a great number of mules for the army", and many other such measures. And all this had to be completed within 2-3 months, because the threat was imminent.

As well as this, the military representative of the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shamelessly tried to argue that our army "was very weak and could hold out for only 10 days against a monarcho-fascist attack". This being the case, they claimed that "South Albania would be endangered because of the failure to station a Yugoslav division in the Korça district, for which the General Secretary of the Party was to blame". The Belgrade representative declared that "Yugoslavia would be unable to come to the aid of Albania, as it would take 15 days for its forces in Montenegro and Kosova to reach the Shkumbini river, and by then it would be all over, and the monarcho-fascists and the Anglo-Americans would have occupied South Albania". He alleged that "the issue would assume an international character, there would be intervention by special commissions of the UN, and under these conditions it would be difficult for Yugoslavia to enter the war". The Yugoslavs, in order to intimidate us, cast doubts on the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid itself. At the same time, they obstinately insisted that we ask the Soviet government to change its opinion on the stationing of a Yugoslav division in the Korça district, and demanded that "if it did not change its opi-

nion, we should insist and stubbornly demand the reasons". The aim of all this was to make us act on this important question without the approval of the Soviet government, and to set us at loggerheads with the Soviet Union. This was a base action worthy of the Trotskyites.

We disagreed with the Yugoslavs on all these questions; we judged them quite differently, with the exception of comrade Shule²¹.

For a long time Kristo Themelko transmitted the mistaken views of the Yugoslavs; he agreed with them, and his confidence in the Commander was greatly shaken. Those were very grave errors on comrade Shule's part, but it would be a mistake if we were to consider them in isolation from the accompanying circumstances. Comrade Shule honestly acknowledged his errors, made a sound, correct and open self-criticism, and severely condemned the mistaken road the Yugoslavs had led him into. There is no other way to explain Shule's mistakes, which do not comply with his class background, with his revolutionary past, and with his determined struggle for the people and the Party, other than the great influence exerted by the Yugoslavs, the deep trust he had placed in them, and the situation created in our Party. These are circumstances which mitigate Shule's errors.

Being fully under the influence of the Yugoslavs, Kristo Themelko thought completely as they did, and considered all their theses correct. We were not in agreement with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, from the time of its intervention in our military affairs to the time when they wanted to station a Yugoslav division in Korça. We thought we had taken all

21 Kristo Themelko, at that time director of the Political Department of the Army, made self-criticism and later worked according to the line of the Party.

the necessary military measures they suggested but, on their insistence, agreed to build the bridges and the roads, to install new telephone lines, etc., besides mobilizing 10,000 men and pack animals, to be done outside our plan and using special credits granted by the Yugoslav budget. Still we were fully convinced that none of these measures could be carried out.

Why did the Yugoslav leaders present the situation in such alarming terms and propose such far-reaching measures when even a child would have quite easily seen that not only was it impossible to carry out such actions within two months, but that there was no serious reason for carrying them out. The proposals of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia were presented initially through comrade Shule and later directly by Savo Zlatich. Comrade Shule, very much under Yugoslav influence, brought up two or three times in the Political Bureau the problem that all the proposed measures in the military field could not be implemented under the existing constitutional forms, and that therefore the union of our people with the people of Yugoslavia had to be carried out, and this should be done quickly. According to them, conditions were ripe, and there was no need to wait any longer. The Yugoslavs asked Shule my opinion about their proposals, but advised him that, if I did not agree with them, he should present them as his own proposals. It was apparent that their suspicion of me was deepening.

Finally, Savo Zlatich himself suggested that we should ask the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia for the union of Albania with Yugoslavia. We gave the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia a written reply on all these questions. These letters are important documents of our Party. We disagreed with the views of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which was unable to achieve what it wanted from us, that is, our approval for the union of Albania with Yugoslavia.

At that time, first through Shule and then directly through Tito's military representative in Albania, General Kupreshanin, the Yugoslavs raised the question of creating a unified command. Through Shule, when he went to Belgrade, it was first suggested and then decided that the General Staff should change its structure. There should be a deputy minister for war, who would be responsible for all the sectors of the army. The General Staff was also included within these sectors. This proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which threatened to expose their aims, was later altered, after the suggestions made to Shule. The Yugoslavs aimed to remove the General Commander from the leadership of our army command. This meant to "cross out the name of the General Commander", as Comrade Mehmet Shehu rightly told Pëllumb Dishnica²² who supported the Yugoslav proposal. After our replies in the letters mentioned previously, all these proposals were suspended.

We should stress that all these proposals and measures which the Yugoslavs wanted to implement were made with great haste. They were afraid that the exposure of their treason by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would foil their plan, so they hastily tried to lead us on to their anti-Marxist road, in order to create a bloc against the socialist camp.

We were fully aware that the actions of the Yugoslavs were not correct, but not knowing of their treason, we had to be careful and proceed very slowly. At the same

²² Former cadre of the Political Department of the Army. He was expelled from the army on account of his hostile activity.

time, under these circumstances the Yugoslavs created in our Bureau an atmosphere of doubt about whether we should ask the advice of the Soviet comrades on these matters or not, whether we should keep them informed or not. It was wrong to pose the question that way. We put our view to Savo Zlatich, saying that such a stand towards the Soviet people and the Soviet government was incorrect. He tried to justify it, saying that these were our internal affairs, and therefore we could not inform the Soviet comrades about them without first discussing them ourselves. They wanted to confront the Soviet Union with *a fait accompli* created through intrigues and anti-Marxist dealings. We put an end to this situation.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, after receiving our letters and seeing the failure of their plans, sent Savo Zlatich back to us with new suggestions. He proposed the indirect union of Albania with Yugoslavia through economic measures which would in fact mean actual union. These measures were the same as those mentioned previously which were resorted to after our last analysis²³. Then they proposed the alternative: either we maintain the existing situation, strengthening the existing links (but this meant, in their view, "to take a step backwards, which was no good"), or we sever relations. All these proposals were put forward as coming from Savo Zlatich and adopted in principle by the Central Committee of the CPY. We were to study and discuss them, while the conclusions of our discussions and our suggestions were to be presented to the Central Committee of the CPY. The aim of this was, on the one hand, to protect the Central Committee of the CPY from having to take any responsibility upon itself, letting responsibility lie

23 This refers to the 8th Plenum.

with a certain Savo Zlatich, and on the other hand, to find out our opinions, and in particular to find out whether we were aware of the conflict which existed between the Bolshevik Party of the Soviet Union and the CPY, and to ascertain our stand on this question.

A few days after these proposals were presented to us we were informed of the first letter of the Bolshevik Party to Tito and the other members of the Central Committee of the CPY. The letter of the Bolshevik Party helped us to understand correctly the hostile anti-Albanian plot of the Central Committee of the CPY. We immediately cancelled the departure of the Soviet advisers. The Yugoslavs, seeing that the departure of the Soviet advisers from Albania, an event which they were impatiently waiting for as the days went by, was not taking place, sensed that all their manoeuvres had miscarried, and immediately began spreading base slanders, and delivering open threats and ultimatums. Savo Zlatich, Josip Djerdja and General Kupreshanin left our country in a hostile and abrupt manner. Tito addressed a disgraceful letter to our Central Committee, accusing it and the General Secretary of our Party of things they had not done. He tried to sow discord in our Political Bureau and create within our Party another difficult situation like that created on the eve of the 8th Plenum, but all their shameful actions against our country, against our Party and people, were of no avail. The letters of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party had helped our Party to save itself from the clutches of the Yugoslav Trotskyites, and at the same time to save our people and country from the catastrophe these traitors wanted to lead them into.

Before considering the mistakes committed in the analysis of the 8th Plenum it is necessary also to consider our relations with the Soviet Union.

OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE
STAND OF THE YUGOSLAV LEADERSHIP
TOWARDS THEM

Our Party and Central Committee have not been wrong in the stand they have taken towards the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet Union. The heroic war of the Soviet Union against fascism was one of the main factors which accelerated the formation of our Party. The Hitlerite attack on the Soviet Union was also a blow for all the communists of the various communist groups, because they saw in the Soviet Union the glorious homeland of socialism, the great force which defended peace, defended the enslaved nations, the colonial and semi-colonial peoples, and all progressive mankind. The Soviet Union was the sole support and helper of all the progressive peoples of the world. It gave us the hope and strength to combat the slavery of the parasitical capitalists and landowners, and the Soviet Union and the Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Stalin were to the Albanian communists and all the oppressed people of Albania a shining beacon that threw light on their path. Our Party linked the struggle of our people with the struggle of the Soviet Union. From its first leaflet up till the end of the National Liberation War, our Central Committee taught the Party to love the Soviet Union, the Bolshevik Party and comrade Stalin. The Party explained to the people from the beginning of the struggle that victory would be ours, because we were linked with the Soviet Union, that fascist Germany would be smashed, while the Soviet Union was invincible. Our people understood clearly that their victory was indissolubly linked with the victories of the people of the Soviet Union. Every day our Party organizations kept our people and our army informed of the struggle waged by the Soviet Union, and of its successes, and thus the love of our people for the Soviet

Union, the Red Army, and comrade Stalin grew from day to day. And all this was due to the Party and its correct line.

During the first months after liberation, when the Party and our young state were laying the foundations of foreign policy and taking their first step towards reconstruction, the Soviet Union gave us direct help. At every international conference it defended our people. Everywhere the powerful voice of the Soviet Union rose in defence of the rights of our people and their freedom against the Anglo-Americans, in defence of the independence and territorial integrity of the country against the greed of the Anglo-Americans and their satellites, the Greek monarcho-fascists. Those were difficult moments which were surmounted through the resolute resistance of our Party and people, but this resistance also owes much to the existence and support of the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances our people linked themselves still more closely with the Soviet Union. This was due to the correct political line pursued by our Party and its Central Committee. The Soviet Union and the Bolshevik Party were unsparing in their aid to our Party. Besides their great moral support, economic assistance, too, was not lacking.

But our Party's great love for the Soviet Union, the Bolshevik Party, comrade Stalin, and the Soviet people who were in Albania, and its great confidence in them, were viewed unfavourably by the Trotskyite Yugoslav leaders. The Central Committee of the CPY considered Albania as a country which should be under its tutelage. According to the Yugoslav leaders, we were a small state, incapable of either defending ourselves or developing without the aid of Yugoslavia. According to them, the Soviet Union "was far away, and was a great powerful state which could not be directly interested in Albania". The

Yugoslavs took advantage of the fact that the economic aid of the Soviet Union came to us via Yugoslavia, and gave to understand that the CC of the CPY and Tito had agreed with the Soviet Union that Yugoslavia should look after Albania. This was the attitude they adopted towards us, while they used demagoguery in their efforts to hide what they were doing from the Soviet Union.

The stand of the Soviet Union towards other peoples was quite different to that of Yugoslavia. Stalin, at a dinner he gave in honour of the delegates of the Finnish government after the signing of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty, said among other things:

"Many people do not believe that relations of equality can exist between a great nation and a small one. But we, the Soviet people, think that such relations can and should exist. The Soviet people think that every nation, great or small, has its own individual qualities, its own specific features, which belong to it alone and distinguish it from other nations. These features make up the contribution that every nation brings to the great treasury of world culture, which it completes and enriches. In this sense all nations, great or small, occupy a position of equality, and every nation is the equal of every other nation".*

The Soviet people have viewed relations with our country in this light, as Stalin teaches us. Not for a moment did we lose the confidence we had placed in them. The Yugoslav Trotskyites attacked us with their whole arsenal to shake our Party's confidence in the Soviet Union, in the Bolshevik Party, and the Soviet people in Albania. They openly displayed their dissatisfaction. Tito himself and his closest comrades complained that the

* "Pravda", nr. 104 (10845), April 13, 1948.

Albanians received aid from the Yugoslavs, but never renounced their links with the Soviet Union.

The attack of the Yugoslav Trotskyites against the correct line of our Party was a frontal one and extended to all key sectors: the general political orientation of the Party and government, the economy and the army.

The Yugoslav Trotskyites achieved no success in changing the political orientation of the Party; in the economic field, where they could exert some pressure, they managed to shake to some extent the confidence of our Central Committee and Party about the usefulness of the presence of the Soviet advisers in our country. After the analysis of the 8th Plenum, after the pressures and blackmail applied by the Yugoslav leaders, we accepted their thesis that we had no need for Soviet advisers, but only for technicians. But the question of advisers could not be separated from that of technicians ; the Soviet advisers and technicians made up one whole. Although we accepted the thesis, we were not at all convinced that this was the right thing.

At the same time the Yugoslav Trotskyites also attacked us on the front of the army, but achieved nothing. Persistently resorting to all-out blackmail, they tried to expel the Soviet military advisers from the army. The presence of Soviet advisers in our army foiled their anti-Soviet and anti-Marxist plans. They wanted our army to accept and adopt the views of the Central Committee of the CPY on military art and organization. Attacks by the Trotskyites against our army had also been apparent before the analysis of the 8th Plenum. These attacks were made indirectly at the beginning, by criticizing and attacking the chief of our General Staff, comrade Mehmet Shehu. This stand was gradually hardening, not only against comrade Mehmet, but also against me. The attack was not yet openly directed against me, but indirectly that

was what it amounted to, for I supported comrade Mehmet's stand, it was I who recommended Mehmet for membership of the Political Bureau, and I was the General Commander of the Army.

The Yugoslavs succeeded in influencing a number of comrades of the Political Directorate of our army. The first was Pëllumb Dishnica, who put forward in concrete terms his opinion on changing the orientation of the army, and put forward theses for its reorganization. Pëllumb Dishnica's theses were in fact the theses of the Yugoslavs. Comrade Mehmet Shehu gave me a verbal report on this question, and I found his view correct. Pëllumb Dishnica's theses were wrong in principle. It was not a question of gaining experience from the Yugoslav army, but of changing the political orientation of our army, abandoning the experience of the Soviet army. I sensed this threat at once, and that was why I sent for Pëllumb Dishnica to clear things up. The directives in the army are decided upon by the Central Committee, I told Pëllumb Dishnica, they could not be played around with, and I would not permit them to be put in question. Pëllumb, after hearing my advice, said that that was clear to him, whereas at the 8th Plenum he said that in fact it was not clear. He even asked General Shule about this problem in a provocative manner, and after seeing that their opinions coincided, added: "But the Commander thinks differently from us".

The Yugoslav leaders heavily influenced our men in the Political Directorate against the correct direction of the Party in the army and, what was still more dangerous, shook their confidence in the General Commander. This was the starting-point which led the men of the Political Directorate into grave errors. Later comrade Shule and Pëllumb Dishnica, becoming mouthpieces of the Yugoslav leadership, insistently demanded the departure of the Soviet advisers from our army.

After the 8th Plenum the situation became still more aggravated. The Yugoslavs thought the moment had come to change the situation in the army. They considered our army, the army of an independent nation, as a Yugoslav army corps, and the comrades of our Political Directorate worked as if our army was but a corps among the other corps of the Yugoslav army. During a visit he paid to our Political Directorate, Vukmanovich Tempo openly criticized the leaders of our army, as if the Yugoslavs were its real commanders.

After the 8th Plenum the popularization of the Soviet Union was relegated to second place, and Yugoslavia was placed first in our propaganda. Soviet instructors were shamelessly despised and made a laughing stock by the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslavs resorted to the basest anti-Soviet slanders. They considered the Soviet advisers as an obstacle in their work, and this was in fact the case. They openly expressed their view that "the work in the army could not go well as long as the Soviet advisers were retained, because it was impossible to work with two sorts of advisers". They underestimated the Soviet advisers, and in their arrogance and conceit, did all they could to make them a target of scorn. They tried to spread this spirit among our people. They tried to convince us that we were not capable of utilizing the Soviet experience, that the Soviet experience had been taken by the Yugoslavs, who had worked on it in detail and adapted it to the conditions of our countries and armies. Therefore, they claimed, there was nothing left for us, but to adopt the Yugoslav military art and apply it, for it was better suited to our army. But our Central Committee did not waver, and the efforts of the Yugoslavs failed. The Yugoslavs waited impatiently for the departure of the Soviets, and when they saw that none of the Soviet advisers were leaving, they started a disgraceful campaign

against us. The rage of the Titoite clique and the Yugoslav delegates in Albania reached its peak. On a false pretext, they severed the relations that existed between our two armies.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE 8th PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
ALBANIA AND OUR GRAVE ERRORS

The analysis at the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee, which we may call the gravest error our Central Committee has committed during its whole existence, was made under the direct instigation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. It was based on the groundless, anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian accusations of the Trotskyite Yugoslav leadership, and on the difficult situation that existed in our Political Bureau and in our leadership in general. The intention of the Yugoslav Trotskyites was to liquidate the sound leadership of the Party and, in the first place, its General Secretary, followed by comrades Nako Spiru and Mehmet Shehu, as people considered undesirable by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. They hoped through such a blow to suppress any serious resistance which might prevent them from achieving their aims. The main points of the Yugoslav criticism, which gave rise to the analysis made at the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania, were:

1. — An anti-Yugoslav front had been created in Albania.
2. — The draft five-year plan compiled by the Albanians was autarchic and unrealistic.
3. — Albania should not enter any agreement with other states without the permission of Yugoslavia.

4. — The policy of the Albanian government was in flagrant opposition to the aspirations of the Albanian people, and was to blame for the fact that the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia had sunk to an all time low.

5. — In all this hostile activity Nako Spiru had played a mysterious role. Other comrades, too, were in the same position.

6. — The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania should investigate carefully to see whether the enemy were involved in this situation.

These principal points, which were the basis of the Yugoslav criticism, should be analysed carefully, because they were the essence of all the anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian intentions of the Yugoslav leadership.

The accusation that our country had "broken away" from Yugoslavia, as we understand it, that is to say, that it had abandoned collaboration, is completely groundless and slanderous. There has been no action by the Central Committee of our Party in this direction, and no isolated action by any individual Party member. Our Central Committee has always correctly assessed the question of collaboration with Yugoslavia, while the Yugoslavs developed these relations in a distorted way, with definite anti-Albanian and anti-Marxist aims. Had we wanted to "break away" from Yugoslavia and proceed in a distorted way, we would have renounced Yugoslav assistance and orientated ourselves towards the West, or the Marshall Plan. Neither our Party, nor its Central Committee, nor any member of our Party have worked towards this end.

Then what was the basis of their accusations against us? The Yugoslavs were worried by the correct policy of our Party in the economic development of the country, relying not only on Yugoslavia, but also on the Soviet Union. They considered this policy as a break-away from

Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs knew fairly well what a favourable and enthusiastic attitude our Party had created among the Albanian popular masses towards the new Yugoslavia, but that was not enough for them, they wanted Albania's total subjugation to Yugoslavia. As an argument to prove their thesis they used the question of the draft five-year plan. But this argument could not be borne out. Let us imagine for a moment that our draft five-year plan was autarchic, unrealistic, inflated, etc., etc. Where would such an inflated, etc., etc., plan lead Albania? If that plan was unrealistic and caused Albania to break away from Yugoslavia, then it must lead it elsewhere, and link it with another country. There was no evidence that our Party was trying to link our country with the Western states, for such a view had never existed in our Party. There remained only the link with the Soviet Union. But how was this to be interpreted, when the Soviet Union and Stalin had advised us on how we should conduct our relations with the Yugoslavs, and the Yugoslavs with us? If our great wish to have economic relations with the Soviet Union, too, had been excessive, then the Soviet Union and comrade Stalin would have advised us, as they gave us wise advice on how to conduct our relations with Yugoslavia. And we listened to comrade Stalin's advice, and carried it out with the greatest determination. Therefore it was not wrong to have relations with the Soviet Union. But even if our five-year plan had been autarchic or unrealistic, as the Yugoslavs said, this would give no reason to suspect that we wanted to develop our relations with the Soviet Union to the detriment of Yugoslavia. Only the Yugoslavs could say such a ridiculous and monstrous thing. They were cunning slanders. If our draft-plan was mistaken, it should have been corrected, and nothing more.

Why was this draft-plan linked with political issues, and used to attack our line and call it mistaken? We think that a state, provided it has time and qualified people, can draw up as many as five plans, reject four of them and retain only the best one. We were not given the possibility of studying even the one we had, to see whether it was good or bad, and to correct what was not good in it. But the problem was not the plan. The pretext of the draft-plan was used to attack the line of our Party, the Central Committee and its leaders, and worse still, the Soviet Union, the Soviet advisers, and their correct orientation. For this purpose — why go on further about this — the Yugoslavs had not anticipated even the smallest credit for our country in the budget of their five-year plan. They thought, if they achieved their aims, and united Albania with Yugoslavia by their methods, then the problems of the five-year plan could easily be dealt with; if their plans failed, then there was no reason why Yugoslavia should bother about helping Albania, for the situation which now exists was bound to be created.

I explained earlier that, to us, our plan was neither unrealistic nor autarchic, and even if there were some excesses, they could have been put right, for they were not particularly grave. Nako was accused of these exaggerations as if he had committed a grave crime. This was not right. First, if there were such excesses, it was not only Nako's fault, but the fault of the whole Central Committee, which did not correct them. But even if we let Nako be blamed for those exaggerations, they were not dangerous errors in our line. Who can claim that no mistakes are made in the process of work? Many others have committed still graver errors, and the Party has corrected them, quite apart from those unimportant errors. I want to say here that, as far as the five-year plan was concerned, our proposals were quite correct, not only in the political

and economic fields, but also in the cultural and social ones. We proposed that our country, as an independent republic of the democratic camp, would build socialism with the help of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and the other people's democracies, mobilizing all the vital forces of its people under the leadership of its Communist Party. Our plan opposed any spirit of exploitation and imperialist colonization, and its aim was to build industry and supply electric power to the country, to increase and consolidate the working class of Albania, to develop and modernize our agriculture on the correct road of socialism. The Yugoslavs advocated the opposite. According to them, Albania should not develop its industry, but its raw materials should go to Yugoslavia for processing. Agriculture, according to them, should develop in such a way that Albania would become a huge estate of Yugoslavia, and our peasants should provide Yugoslavia with raw materials to be processed there. Albania would receive all manufactured goods from Yugoslavia, even its bread. This would have meant complete dependence in the colonialist and imperialist manner.

The idea that we should draw up a five-year plan was raised by the Yugoslavs in order to strike a blow at us and at the Soviet planning specialists who helped us to draw up this correct draft-plan. In attacking this draft-plan, the Yugoslavs were not concerned about one or two factories too many, but had political aims. It was not their intention for a five-year plan to be worked out for Albania, but they wanted to further the ends already mentioned. If the Yugoslavs had confined themselves only to accusations and slanders concerning our five-year plan, their criticism would have been weak and lacking in substance. But they used slanders to bolster their case.

The Yugoslavs criticized us and warned us that, before entering any agreement with any other state, we

should obtain the approval of the Yugoslav government. This clearly shows how Yugoslavia regarded our country. But we had not entered an agreement with any state, with the exception of a credit agreement with the Soviet Union. Was that an error? Was the credit the Soviet Union granted us to the detriment of our country and of our relations with Yugoslavia? We need not even answer this question. But it is a fact that the Yugoslavs did not like this at all, for it foiled their anti-Marxist plans. They wanted to keep our country completely isolated and do what they wanted with it. Our people were rightly grateful to the Soviet Union for the great help it was giving them, but the Yugoslav leaders did not like this. You know about the shocking actions of the Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow, who exerted hostile pressure on our minister, demanding to be told what economic agreements Nako Spiru had signed when he went to Moscow. Far from signing any agreement, comrade Nako Spiru did not meet any Soviet official except the VOKS²⁴ people.

The strengthening of our country's ties with the Soviet Union greatly preoccupied the Yugoslav Trotskyite leaders. After the return of our government delegation from Moscow, Kosmerl²⁵ officially stated to comrade Hysni Kapo that "after General Hoxha's return from Moscow the policy of the Albanian government towards Yugoslavia has changed." These are openly hostile, anti-Albanian and anti-Soviet actions which do not need lengthy explanations to make them clear. According to them, our government, headed by the General Secretary of the Party and the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Alba-

24 VOKS (Vsesoyuznoe Obshchestvo Kulturnoi Sviasi s Zagranicej — the Soviet Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries).

25 Adviser at the Yugoslav Legation in Tirana.

nia, was conducting an anti-Yugoslav policy. They also said this in their later accusations.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its stooge Savo Zlatich supported their criticism about the creation of an "anti-Yugoslav front in Albania" with slanders against our people at the railway construction site. The Central Committee of the CPY had raised this question previously, but we rejected their slanders. We found all of them groundless, and we demonstrated this. The Party is in possession of the report of the Control Commission, and the reports of the party organizations at the railway construction site, which demonstrate that the Yugoslav charges were false, and prove the very real and important fact that the Yugoslavs were saboteurs, provocateurs, and enemies of our state power, our youth and our Party. The party comrades and those of the Youth Organization at the railway construction site have shown themselves to be very loyal and vigilant in defending the work and achievements of our people and Party, have shown maturity despite their youth.

In raising issues like this one, the Yugoslavs had many aims. They wanted to dampen the drive of our youth and its leaders, to connect people like Nako Spiru, and indirectly the Prime Minister²⁶ with this issue, and to discredit the government in this great undertaking. They claimed that at the railway construction site we and the youth had neglected a politically important question, the alliance with Yugoslavia. If there was anyone who correctly assessed this question, it was we and the people of the Youth Organization at the railway construction site, whereas the Yugoslavs did all they could to foster animosities among our youth, to suppress their initiative, their

²⁶ On top of the task as General Secretary of the Party, comrade Enver Hoxha was also Prime Minister of the Government of the PRA.

drive, enthusiasm and abilities. Admittedly trifling misunderstandings may occur in such a great action. But the Yugoslavs did not admit a single mistake, while their sabotage activity was blatant. The Yugoslavs did not have a serious attitude towards the projects which were being built in our country. This quite understandably irritated our people, but they never lost their patience and their sense of proportion. Our people defended the alliance with Yugoslavia, so they too made concessions which cannot be considered as opportunist but as an expression of good faith, or rather of excessive faith.

The Yugoslavs would never have completely achieved their aims through the slanders they spread to "prove" that an "anti-Yugoslav front" had been created in Albania. Their main aim was to attack the leadership of the Party and government in the person of Enver Hoxha, who was responsible to the Party for the correct implementation of its line, for the coordination of work and the supervision of the comrades in their work. And this is what the Yugoslavs did.

The policy of the Albanian government, the Yugoslavs claimed, was diametrically opposed to the sentiments of the people. In plain words, this meant that the government was anti-popular, and some responsible persons should be condemned for this, the main culprits being, clearly, the Prime Minister, then Nako Spiru, Mehmet Shehu and "the entire clique" which, on the basis of these "accusations", was condemned at the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania. In his latest letter Tito directly accuses the General Secretary of the Party of this. But at that time a direct attack against the General Secretary of our Party would have been very difficult for the Yugoslavs, because they had no support for such a move. They had to attack him indirectly in order to succeed. Nako Spiru was more open to

attack, not because he had erred in his stand towards the Yugoslavs, but because there was discord in the Bureau, there was hostility towards Nako Spiru and, indirectly, towards the Commander. The split in our Political Bureau, which they not only knew about but had themselves caused and continued to keep alive, created a possibility of success of the Yugoslav manoeuvre. But even this was not enough to achieve success, they had to accuse Nako and other comrades and, indirectly, the Commander himself with the basest slanders and threats, such as the allegation of "enemy activity" within our Party. This implied just what Pandi Kristo said with conviction at a Central Committee meeting, that Nako Spiru was a spy. Thus it is clear what kind of a situation was created, and what was the target of this manoeuvring. After comrade Nako's suicide, Zlatich advised our comrades to take care, for such things had also happened in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and its General Secretary Gorkich had been exposed as a traitor and a spy. Against whom were these accusations directed? Certainly, against the General Secretary of our Party. Comrade Mehmet Shehu was placed in the same position. This difficult situation was created by the Yugoslavs with ulterior motives, and was directed against the line of our Party and against particular people. They attacked the correct line and principles which inspired and guided our Party.

As I mentioned earlier, the Yugoslav leaders made another criticism against the Central Committee of our Party, claiming that two lines were emerging distinctly within our Party, one of them mistaken. The blame for this second mistaken line, according to the Yugoslavs, lay with our entire Central Committee. We rejected this first criticism. In the Political Bureau we were of one mind, at least formally, for afterwards it was said that some comrades of the Political Bureau in reality disagreed with

the decision that was taken. The document I compiled as an answer to Zlatich was later severely criticized by some people as expressing distrust towards the Yugoslavs and embodying a wrong stand, but it was extremely correct. We have correctly assessed the situation, pointing out both our mistakes and those of the Yugoslavs in a correct Marxist-Leninist way, and quite correctly underlining the omissions and delays of the Yugoslavs in delivering materials which were vital for the fulfilment of our plan and many other things.

After this first criticism by the Yugoslavs, why did our Central Committee and its Political Bureau not react instantly, and why did matters not develop as they did after the second accusation? We must analyse this situation, because it is very important. The first criticism by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was, so to say, a trial run to study its effect and the strength of our forces, and to see how far their arguments, although baseless, would succeed. This criticism was unsuccessful. Our Political Bureau rejected the accusations as groundless. They were unable through such charges to create the situation they wanted in the Political Bureau, even though it lacked unity. It is a fact that, in face of such accusations, despite the waverings of some members, we came out with a unanimous decision. And this was not to the liking of the Yugoslavs.

Therefore, in their second accusation, the Yugoslavs added new charges to their first accusation, this time mentioning names as well. This would, and did, arouse a reaction in our Political Bureau. The Yugoslavs used the divergencies within the Bureau as their main weapon to help them mount a successful offensive against the line of our Party. The Yugoslavs now resorted to the tactic of suggesting to Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo that "your struggle against Nako Spiru and the Commander is justi-

fied: the enemy is involved here, Nako Spiru is playing a suspicious role, and Enver Hoxha is backing him up one hundred per cent; the way is open for you, strike now!" The implication of the Yugoslavs was evident: they brought serious accusations against some of the comrades of the Political Bureau, and at the same time encouraged others to take up the struggle against them. Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo were predisposed and ready to enter the impasse into which the Yugoslavs had led them. They had come to the conclusion that "the situation was so tense that before long there would be fighting in the Political Bureau", and were waiting for "a heavy blow to fall from outside". The blow fell, and they had to act. And they acted in the way the Yugoslavs wanted, in a most mistaken way.

Here the responsibilities of each individual should be singled out, for this was the crossroad where tempers, prejudices, animosities, and errors clashed, and the principal Party cadres were, rightly or wrongly, attacked, and accused of things they had and had not done. And what is more important, the Party line was attacked and shaken, unity in the Bureau was undermined, the General Secretary of the Party was attacked for things he had not done, and not only that, but he was attacked on matters in which he had been correct. The fact is that Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo set the tone of the analysis of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee. Some followed suit and others were influenced by them in varying degrees. Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo came out before all the comrades as though they alone had correctly assessed all the issues raised. Under the strong influence of the mistaken policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, they seriously erred. Both of them considered the matter mainly in relation to individuals, and

in doing so, they saw things in a false light, and not objectively.

The criticism by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia shocked us all, especially me. But the truth is that, when Savo Zlatich expounded his views, I was fully convinced that they were incorrect. I disagreed with them, I even intervened in the middle of Zlatich's report to ask him: "Is what you are saying to us the opinion of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and does the Central Committee of the CPY rely on these arguments?" Savo Zlatich retorted: "Not only are all these the views of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, but they have also been studied and approved by Tito." At the end of his report I asked him to give these views in written form, but he in fact refused.

After Zlatich's report my view was that we too should assemble our arguments in reply to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs' assessment of Nako seemed to me very strange, and I said to Koçi: "This is serious accusation". I said this to Koçi because, logically, the attack would have made far less impression on him than on me, because his opinion on Nako was quite different from mine. Therefore, my view right from the start was that the matter should be brought up in the Bureau, after we too had assembled this opinion, and that is what we did. We informed the comrades individually of the criticism by the Yugoslav leadership, and also informed Nako Spiru, without telling him of the serious direct accusation brought against him by the Yugoslavs. It seems to me that this stand towards comrade Nako was not correct on our part. We should have told Nako everything. I have always been of the opinion that internal matters of the Bureau should be solved correctly. The conflicts between Koçi and Pandi, on the one hand,

and Nako, on the other, were an old illness which had been greatly aggravated (as I have already said) to the point where the two considered every action of mine to be dictated and influenced by Nako. This was not a correct judgement.

It is true that at the meeting of the Political Bureau we put as the first item on the agenda the question of the criticism in the economic field. But many mistakes were made in holding this meeting of the Bureau on such an important problem. Some members and candidate members were not called to that meeting, including some comrades who had been unjustly accused, and would be criticized at the meeting. The way the question of Nako was taken up in the Bureau and put on the agenda of the meeting was not as had been intended. We considered this procedure correct, while we disagreed with Nako's request, on learning of the grave accusation made against him, for some time to prepare an answer; this request seemed to us to have sinister implications.

But let us assess that situation in the light of the present. The Yugoslavs accused Nako of having links with the enemy. Could this be considered as a minor matter? We gave Nako one day to think it over and prepare his reply. This was quite wrong, because it was not a simple matter. We have been working on this analysis for six months, and only now are we able to raise these important matters in the Party. We did not give Nako even five days to think things over, to prepare, or to explain himself. Even a criminal is granted time to think things over, let alone a comrade like Nako Spiru. As soon as Nako asked for time for his answer, some comrades of the Political Bureau, such as Koçi, Pandi, etc., rose against him in a savage and hostile manner. At that moment we ought to have realized our mistake, that the discussion was not centred on economic questions on which the Yu-

goslav criticism apparently relied. This was totally forgotten, and the struggle against Nako predominated. The problem was shifted to where the Yugoslavs wanted, and as Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo wished. Comrade Nako Spiru, undoubtedly thinking that he had no other way out of that situation, shot himself. This was the gravest error Nako committed in his revolutionary life, but responsibility also lies with the Political Bureau. Nako Spiru did not think as a strong-willed communist ought to, although his situation was very grave. However grave the situation may be for a communist, he should never commit suicide, but face the situation, accept criticism, and condemnation if he is guilty, and always trust in the justice of the Party.

Nako's suicide helped to bring about the total acceptance of the base accusation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The atmosphere created after Nako's suicide was such that things could only develop the way they did. The criticism by the Yugoslavs was accepted without any discussion. Not only that but the correct efforts and opinions of myself, Nako, and other comrades were all turned against us and used to underline our distrust of the "correct line of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia". The theses on the revision of the Berat Plenum and my answer to Savo Zlatich over his first criticism were all studied and used to demonstrate that both Nako and I had long distrusted Yugoslavia. The actions of the youth at the railway building site were condemned as hostile actions against the Yugoslavs and against the line of our Party, and were mainly blamed on Nako. All the reports of the Control Commission and of the party comrades at the railway building site were rejected as if they were mere trifles. The very things that today prove the accuracy of the correct opinions of our people at the railway building

site were at that time collected in detail to prove the opposite, in the way the Yugoslavs wished. Nako was classified as a spy and a traitor to the Party. His case was closed once and for all.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu was likewise accused "of having carried out a typically individualistic policy, leading the army towards a break with Yugoslavia and seeking to develop it in an independent way"; it was alleged that "Mehmet Shehu's plans for the army were exceedingly inflated, and corresponded with Nako's five-year plan; Mehmet Shehu was against the Yugoslavs; and therefore Mehmet Shehu was in league with Nako", so he, too, was included in the list of the "enemies".

But what about the question of the Soviet advisers amidst all this? They were never openly attacked, but this whole campaign was at the same time directed against the Soviets. The Yugoslavs said that "the Soviets were mistaken and wrongly orientated, deceived by Nako and the others. The Soviets wore their hearts on their sleeves, they were very sincere and acted accordingly, and enemies like Nako took advantage of this quality of the Soviets." Wittingly or unwittingly, these things were tantamount to an attack against the Soviets. Such opinions prevailed throughout the entire analysis. Matters reached the point where the correct pro-Soviet views of Nako, Mehmet and others, and the great and correct work done in this matter, were presented in a completely distorted and unobjective light.

But how was the question of the General Secretary of the Party raised? It is common knowledge in what an unjust and unfavourable position he was placed. The General Secretary was fiercely attacked, in the first place, by Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo. Of course, he could not be labelled like Nako and the others, but it was he who emerged as the main culprit, for all those condemned

acted under his protection, and rightly or wrongly, used his authority. Nako emerged from the analysis as the main person responsible for the discord existing in the Bureau, but the Commander, allegedly "being under his influence, was also greatly at fault, and the one who caused such a situation." This was the aim the Yugoslavs wanted to achieve, and they succeeded in achieving it.

Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo went from one mistake to another. Koçi raised the question of the existence of a dangerous grouping, with all the features of a faction, at the head of the Party. The analysis of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee gave all the comrades the impression that the Party had been saved from this dangerous faction by Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo, who had "correctly" assessed all these questions right from the beginning, while the others, with the Commander at their head, had grossly erred. After the 8th Plenum a resolution was passed and the matters were taken up in the Party, in the same way as they were raised in the Central Committee of the Party, with a small exception, namely, that the General Secretary was not mentioned. But, whether consciously or not, the effect of all this was to achieve the aim of the Yugoslavs. To the Yugoslav Trotskyites, this was a most desirable solution, while to our Party it was a most distorted and dangerous solution. Therefore, it is urgent for us to correct these grave mistakes, to put things right with the true sense of justice that characterizes our Party, to appear before the Party without fear or hesitation, to make a sound Bolshevik self-criticism and learn many things from these mistakes, and to help the Party to learn from the mistakes of its leadership, to avoid errors in the future.

What conclusions should be drawn from our new assessment of the former analysis made at the 8th Plenum and of its resolution?

The analysis of the 8th Plenum, motivated by the Yugoslavs to further their hostile, anti-party, anti-Albanian, anti-Marxist, and anti-Soviet aims, could not be a correct Marxist-Leninist analysis. It was mistaken, and thus the resolution which resulted from it could not be otherwise. The analysis and the resolution of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee led our Party into an anti-Marxist position and into a position of solidarity with Tito's Trotskyite group. The work which went on at this Plenum and the decisions taken there have gravely harmed our Party, because they attacked its correct line, attacked the unity of our leadership, attacked, condemned and discredited leading comrades for mistakes which they did not commit, groundlessly attacked the General Secretary of the Party, and shook his position in the eyes of the members of the Central Committee of the Party. This has seriously affected the unity of the leadership, and its authority.

The analysis and resolution of the 8th Plenum attacked democratic centralism and inner-party democracy, stifled criticism and self-criticism, introduced military methods into the leadership, violated the organizational principles of the Party, intensified the control of the State Security organs over the Party, and were pushing us in the direction of a police state.

The analysis and resolution of the 8th Plenum created within the Party an un-Marxist bias against the communist intellectuals who were regarded with suspicion, which caused the Party to pursue a wrong policy in the sector of cadres.

The analysis and resolution of the 8th Plenum were a triumph for the Yugoslav Trotskyites, because they made our Central Committee slip into an erroneous position and adopt forms of economic organization which would lead

to the liquidation of our government, and our country's increasing colonization by the Yugoslav Trotskyites.

The line of our Party has been correct, and its orientation has been correct. At no time have we erred with regard to our friendship and alliance with Yugoslavia. We viewed our economic relations with Yugoslavia correctly, and we had great, even excessive, confidence in the Yugoslavs. Our criticism of the activity of the Yugoslavs in Albania was correct and to the point. Here I am referring to the accusations the Yugoslavs brought against us, because the mistake of some young man at the railway construction site can in no way prove that our Central Committee had an incorrect line.

All the accusations by the Yugoslavs do not stand up; they are nothing but slanders fabricated for particular aims, which we have already explained. The charges against Nako Spiru, Mehmet Shehu and other comrades, accusing them of damaging the Party line in regard to Yugoslavia, do not hold water. These comrades did not deviate from the party line, they have followed the correct line and fought to have it implemented.

The question of comrade Nako Spiru. Comrade Nako Spiru was neither a spy nor a traitor to the Party; there is absolutely no proof of this. The case against him was a base slander by the Yugoslavs. Comrade Nako had his positive and negative sides, as a revolutionary, a party member and a leader of the Party. Nako fought for the Party and people from the creation of the Party to the day he killed himself, and never wavered in the struggle. But in his work he also made mistakes, which must be gone into. Nako Spiru was a man of immoderate ambition, and naturally such a shortcoming in a leader greatly affects his work. Could such a dangerous shortcoming have been rectified? We think it could. Our Party moves mountains, not to speak of correcting people's shortcom-

ings and errors. But was the necessary effort made to help comrade Nako correct this shortcoming which was to influence his mistakes? We think not, on the contrary, this shortcoming was encouraged and reinforced by the whole situation which was created. Nako carried out his activity in difficult circumstances, and these circumstances should be taken into account in judging his shortcomings and errors. The Yugoslavs encouraged Nako's unhealthy ambition for their own ends, and it was fostered by the Berat Plenum and the activity which followed that Plenum and by his exaggerated confidence in his own ability. He was wrong in this, but others, too, made the same mistake.

The General Secretary of the Party at no time allowed Nako to use his ambition to the detriment of the Party and his comrades. When Nako spoke of the cadres, he had his own opinion on this question, and indirectly hinted that this problem could not be solved through the stand Koçi was taking. I fought against his mistaken views and said to him: "I will never permit a repetition of what happened at Berat. The question of cadres should be solved in a Marxist way, through sound criticism and self-criticism". I think the other comrades of the Political Bureau were not sufficiently objective towards Nako Spiru. He was not satisfied with the post he held. The comrades who had noticed this tendency in Nako, especially at the Berat Plenum and after it, did not criticize his unhealthy ambition.

Later some comrades accused him of getting closer to me in order to take the place of Koçi Xoxe. He may have had such an intention, but I did not encourage it; on the contrary, I fought every tendency on his part to underestimate other comrades. I think the other comrades did not act with equal objectivity in this case.

Nako was a very pessimistic and highly-strung comrade, two weaknesses of character which are dangerous in a leader. But, worse still, Nako was even more pessimistic about the work of others. In this way he aggravated the errors of his comrades. As we said, Nako Spiru had enormous confidence in himself and his work, and his own abilities, which often led him to underestimate others. He did his best to draw attention to his ability and his personal activity. Without denying his ability and qualities, for Nako did have qualities, his attitude was an unhealthy one. And all this was closely connected with his ambition.

Another grave mistake of Nako's was his incorrect assessment of the question of the youth. Nako Spiru worked to consolidate the Youth Organization, but right from the start he had the tendency to carry out the work with the youth somewhat independently of the Party. Since the time of the war, I have often attacked this tendency. After the Berat Plenum this tendency became more pronounced in him, and it was carried on by Liri Belishova and some other comrades in the leadership of the Youth Organization. Even after he left the Youth Organization, Nako continued to consider the work with the youth as his own sector of activity. All the leaders should concern themselves with the youth, no one can deny that, but Nako was not on the right road so far as this question was concerned. We know what the youth are to our Party, but Nako Spiru did not consider this question from the position of the Party, but from a personal position, often going so far as to put the cadres of the Youth Organization in opposition to those of the Party, and to make quite improper comparisons between the Youth Organization and the Party. Nako did not look at the question of the cadres of the Youth Organization correctly, from the position of the Party. He considered the Youth Organiza-

tion as his own army, in the sense that he had a strong position there and could speak from that platform. This was an erroneous view held by Nako Spiru.

It would be wrong to take the old stand and say that Nako Spiru was against the working class. Comrade Nako was not against the working class. He made some mistakes in his instructions on the question of cadres. Nako had a preference for intellectuals, for educated people, to whom he gave greater support. But he never supported intellectual saboteurs, as the Yugoslavs accused him of doing, and as was the general opinion at the time of the analysis of the 8th Plenum. It's not right to say this. There may have been cases where Nako underestimated worker comrades, and conclusions may be drawn from such a stand, but at the time of the analysis at the 8th Plenum of the CC, the speakers pieced together many unconnected things, and reached the erroneous conclusion that Nako Spiru was an enemy of the working class. Whoever is an enemy of the working class, is also an enemy of our Party, of our people and of Marxism-Leninism.

Our Political Bureau held countless meetings on the question of cadres, there were thorough discussions about people, comrades were criticized, but it never entered anyone's mind to accuse Nako Spiru of being against the working class, or to criticize him fiercely for this deviation. This did not occur. It is a fact that at the meetings of the Bureau, Nako Spiru and Koçi Xoxe did not mince their words. The conclusion that Nako Spiru was against the working class was reached only in the analysis made at the 8th Plenum. And such a conclusion was not just.

After the Berat Plenum Nako made mistakes in his leading work, which was detrimental to the unity of the Bureau. But again we must consider Nako's mistaken and harmful work in the context of an unhealthy situa-

tion, and of the other errors committed in our Party after the Berat Plenum, and we must take into account the errors made by other comrades, their attitude, and the intrigues and wide-scale hostile activity of the Yugoslavs. If we were to consider Nako's errors in isolation from these things, we would condemn him unjustly.

Comrade Nako Spiru loved the Soviet Union and had great confidence in it. The claims of some comrades that he had said that in the Soviet Union he had seen people walking about barefooted, or that the Soviets had got them blind drunk in a kolkhoz so as they might not be able to see anything, etc., may well be true. If they are, it was improper of him to speak like this, but it does not prove that Nako was anti-Soviet. There are other more important activities which demonstrate that Nako was a friend of the Soviet Union.

Nako's animosity towards Koçi Xoxe and his activity was exaggerated and harmful. But the same can be said of Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo towards Nako. Both sides were in the wrong. Neither made any concession to the other, and this was harmful to the Party. The matter should have been cleared up through a sound criticism and bolshevik self-criticism by both sides. But this was not done. Because of this Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo have accused me of serious faults. But what did Nako's mistaken influence on me amount to, and where are my great mistakes? This question deserves a brief clarification.

My views on the question of cadres were not wrong, and I have never been influenced by Nako's errors. Nor were my views on the Youth Organization wrong, and I was never influenced by Nako's errors in this field. I never encouraged Nako's ambition, on the contrary, I always criticized it, and criticized his individualistic style of work, his arrogance and his and other comrades' laxity

whenever I was informed of these shortcomings. I valued Nako and helped him in his work, just as I helped the others. Nako often came to me, and I saw no harm in this, on the contrary, he kept me informed on all questions, he asked me questions and sought my advice. But I was very concerned about Nako's pessimism and his view of the question of cadres. I had my own opinions on that question, and I do not think they were mistaken. Nako did not accept in the right way my views on the proposals for the solution of the question of cadres and the overcoming of his errors. There was bias on his part, but for my part I have neither been unduly influenced nor committed great errors, although of course some small mistakes were inevitable.

Koçi Xoxe is chiefly responsible for the organizational errors that have occurred in our Party. As a result of the way he acted, the suspicions he held, the animosities which existed among the members of the Bureau, and the underestimation of the role of the General Secretary of the Party, the great organizational questions of the Party were left outside the control and help of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee. The reports occasionally submitted by Koçi Xoxe were purely formal and superficial. The monopolization of the work in the hands of the organizational secretary and the elimination of the true role of the General Secretary greatly harmed the Party, and were great mistakes on the part of Koçi Xoxe. A mistaken and dangerous opinion arose within the Party, the idea that the Party had two leaders, Enver Hoxha and Koçi Xoxe, and that the first led the state, and the second led the Party. This was a totally wrong concept which has nothing to do with building our Party. These viewpoints later gave rise to many errors, such as the failure to render account, which means violation of democratic centralism, violation of inner-party democracy, and viola-

tion and stifling of criticism and self-criticism. This led to the violation of the principle of collective leadership, which is established only through criticism and self-criticism and the struggle of contradictions. Stalin teaches us:

*"To think that these contradictions can be avoided is self-deception. Engels was right when he said that in the long run it is impossible to slur over contradictions within the party, that they must be fought out."**

Stalin also says:

". . . the source of the contradictions within the proletarian parties lies in two circumstances. . .

They are, firstly, the pressure exerted by the bourgeoisie and bourgeois ideology. . .

*They are, secondly, the heterogeneity of the working class. . ."***

Koçi Xoxe did not abide by this great principle and erred in this respect. He considered the contradictions and clashes of opinions in the leadership on a personal plane, as criticism directed against his person and activity, while he regarded himself as faultless and beyond criticism. And here Koçi Xoxe suffered from egoism and conceit.

If we judge matters in this light, did Nako Spiru deserve our condemnation? He condemned himself through his suicide, and this harmed our Party. If it were not for the base anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian intervention of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and if our activity had been submitted to a serious and bolshevik criticism and self-criticism, we would have been healed of the plague that afflicted us, and Nako Spiru would still be among us. Today, seeing and analys-

* J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 9, p. 12 (Alb. ed.).

** J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 9, p. 9-10 (Alb. ed.).

ing the situation in this way, clearly and in an unbiased way, we must consider Nako Spiru as a victim of the base intrigues resorted to by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the detriment of our Party, we must consider him as a victim who condemned himself to suicide, overwhelmed by the hostile aims of Tito's Trotskyite clique. And this, I think, is a just judgement on Nako Spiru.

The question of Comrade Mehmet Shehu appears to me to be simpler than that of Nako Spiru. He was accused of wrong views on army matters, of inflated plans, of moving away from Yugoslavia and, hence, of collaborating with Nako Spiru to attack and distort the party line, etc. These accusations do not bear scrutiny. The accusations against him implied total acceptance of the Yugoslav anti-Marxist theses which were directed against our army, the Soviet army, and the Soviet advisers in Albania. They aimed to attack the correct line of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania in military affairs, and to unify our army with that of Yugoslavia. Mehmet Shehu gave the Yugoslavs no guarantee that their line would be implemented, and therefore they had long been preparing the ground for an attack on him. The matter of his disagreements with the Political Directorate, etc., is a consequence of the hostile policy of the Yugoslavs. Possible shortcomings cannot be ruled out, but the most dangerous thing was that the Political Directorate, with Kristo Themelko and Pëllumb Dishnica at its head, was under the direct influence of the Yugoslavs.

We cannot rule out the possibility that the work of some comrades of the General Staff, and their attitude to Mehmet, were influenced by the views of the Political Directorate. Mehmet has been accused of lack of cooperation with the General Staff, of monopolizing the work, etc. Under the conditions that existed, we cannot exclude the

possibility of some manifestation of this kind, but not to the extent suggested in the analysis of the 8th Plenum, or in the spirit implied in that analysis. Comrade Mehmet Shehu deserved neither the accusations brought against him nor the condemnation he received. They were out of place. Comrade Mehmet Shehu is an exacting comrade, and the prattlers and intriguers called this a monopolization of the work. Mehmet Shehu is a comrade who has fought well. We say this, for in the analysis of the 8th Plenum efforts were made to obscure this very positive aspect of his. Mehmet has military ability, and has made a valuable contribution to the struggle, and to the organization and modernizing of our army. Comrade Mehmet Shehu has defended both the general line of the Party and our correct line in the army with determination worthy of a member of the Central Committee. I want us to act correctly, to acknowledge the positive aspects of comrade Mehmet's activity, and to correctly assess his shortcomings in his work without detaching them from their circumstances and from the errors of other comrades. To act otherwise would not be objective, and would lead to wrong conclusions.

The question of the other lower ranking cadres who were attacked in the analysis of the 8th Plenum should also be viewed from this correct standpoint, so that we can rectify the measures taken against them, rehabilitate them, and appoint them to appropriate posts.

THE QUESTION OF THE "FACTION AT THE HEAD OF THE PARTY"

There has not been a faction at the head of the Party. This totally wrong definition was made by Koçi Xoxe. Our present analysis refutes this erroneous thesis. Practice in

no way corresponds to the theoretical definition of a faction. A faction is something organized, with definite anti-party political and organizational aims, against the political and organizational line laid down by the Congress of the Party and the Central Committee. A faction organized within the Party would mean the organization of an ideological struggle, backed up by actions, against the Marxist-Leninist principles which constitute the foundations of our Party and by which it is guided. Neither such an organization nor such purposes have existed.

It is correct to say that Nako Spiru committed errors in his work, but these errors could degenerate into anti-party and factionalist activity only if we had let them become worse. This can occur when the Party fails to see the errors committed by one person or another, or if it conceals them and does not correct them. But if we label these errors as a faction at the head of the Party, what name should we use for the gross errors committed in the analysis of the 8th Plenum, which would have led to the most dangerous faction our Party had ever seen, and would have led our Party and people into an abyss, as Tito, Gilas, Kardelj, Rankovich and others are doing with Yugoslavia? In the analysis of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee there were errors of principle, and there were attacks on the unity of the Party, the correct line and orientation of the Party, the unity of the socialist camp, and the Soviet Union. And these attacks were extremely well organized, and were actually under the direct supervision of the Belgrade Trotskyite clique. The Party cannot help comparing these two situations, and the Central Committee should make this comparison, for it is very important, and the people who organized the 8th Plenum bear great responsibility.

We think that if we understand this situation properly, if we are deeply aware of these errors and conscien-

tiously acknowledge them, then our Party will be greatly strengthened and safeguarded from future dangers. If these matters are not correctly understood, then the Party will suffer in the future, and will be in a dangerous situation. These important party matters should be considered from the position of the Party, and not from a personal position. The prestige of an individual, whoever he may be, whether the General Secretary or a rank-and-file party member, can in no way be placed above the prestige of the Party. If we do not have the courage to bring up matters before the Party in a correct way, if we do not have the courage to speak openly before the Party about the errors we have committed and make a deep and not a superficial analysis of these bitter mistakes, then we will have gravely harmed our Party.

Through the resolution of the 8th Plenum the Party has been told many incorrect things, it has been said that there were deviations, that there was a faction at the head of the Party, that Nako Spiru was a spy, etc. In a speech he delivered last December on the occasion of the opening of the Party School, Koçi Xoxe, speaking about relations with Yugoslavia, said among other things, "These relations are our main support in building our society and safeguarding our existence; they were born and have been strengthened in common struggle, and today more than ever it is in the interests of our people for them to become still stronger and sounder, but they (Here he meant those who were to be condemned by the analysis, such as Nako Spiru, etc.) want to present them in a different light, painting them with the black hues of imperialist relations. To deny those correct relations and to consider them on the same level as imperialist relations, or to sow doubts and suspicions about them, means to be totally disorientated, detached from the party line and from Marxism-Leninism, or otherwise, to encourage the dark aims of the enemy."

Now we must acknowledge how wrong these views of Koçi Xoxe were, and what difficulties they were leading our Party into. Koçi Xoxe's speech prepared the ground for an erroneous anti-Albanian and anti-Marxist line. The situation was not as he presented it, he was preparing the ground for the 8th Plenum.

In this speech, pointing out the danger that allegedly threatened the Party from such people as Nako Spiru, Koçi Xoxe said: ". . . these people play down the role of Federal Yugoslavia in the Balkans and in international politics . . ." Such a view led to very wrong and dangerous anti-Marxist and anti-Soviet orientations. We must admit that it was the great trust we had placed in Yugoslavia which led us to commit these errors. This is the truth, and now, in the light of this new analysis, it is evident how gravely we were mistaken. The Yugoslavs had pronounced chauvinistic and great-power tendencies. They wanted all the people's democracies in the Balkans, as well as the other people's democracies elsewhere, to align themselves with Yugoslavia, so that Yugoslavia would become "the epicentre and head" of the socialist camp. This meant to attack the Soviet Union and to uncrown the first homeland of socialism.

The purpose of our analysis is not to tell the Party that Nako Spiru or anyone else has not erred, or that they have erred only in minor matters; this should be emphasized. The most important thing for our Party is to draw correct conclusions from the whole analysis of our work, in order to arm the Party, to enable it to combat erroneous manifestations in the future.

The Party does not for a moment forget the leading role of the Soviet Union in the socialist camp. All the Yugoslav Trotskyites and the other rightwing nationalist deviationists have tried not only to obscure this reality, but also to oppose and attack the Soviet Union. The aim

of these enemies of socialism was the same as that of imperialism. They wanted to find a hold for their opportunist and revisionist viewpoints in their parties, to liquidate their communist parties and to make the people's democracies degenerate into bourgeois democracies. This means creating favourable ground for capitalism in the new people's democracies, and setting up blocs hostile to socialism within the democratic and anti-imperialist camp. So our Party should be very vigilant; it should defend Marxism-Leninism, the genuine ideology of our Party, mercilessly fight against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois views within the Party, and persevere in its defence of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp.

Now let us go back and tell the Party the truth, that we emerge from this analysis convinced of the serious mistakes we have made, for otherwise, if we are not convinced ourselves, we cannot convince anyone in the Party. To act otherwise would mean grave danger, we would remain in the old mistaken position, we would cover our mistakes lightly, the Party would be disorientated and the ground would be prepared for future dangers, because the struggle of our Party cannot end there. It is necessary to hate the enemy in order to fight him properly, and it is essential to know errors well in order to be able to fight and overcome them correctly. We must be vigilant towards the errors of the others, but at the same time we must keep a watch on ourselves, observe our mistakes and correct them. Mistakes in the leadership are the most dangerous, because the Party develops through the example of its leadership, and the leadership develops through the work of the Party. These two things are inseparable and identical.

The question of class struggle. Our Party has not been influenced by the great deviation of the Yugoslav Party on the question of class struggle. We have not made this

mistake, but the letters of the Bolshevik Party to the Central Committee of the CPY are a great lesson to us, and a formidable weapon to guard our Party against these dangers. The letter of the Bolshevik Party addressed to Tito and company says: "In the Communist Party of Yugoslavia the spirit of class struggle is lacking. There is a rapid growth of the capitalist elements in the countryside and in the towns, while the leadership of the party is taking no measures to restrain the capitalist elements. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia is being lulled to sleep with the rotten opportunist theory of the peaceful integration of capitalist elements into socialism, borrowed from Bernstein, Volmar and Bukharin". Our Party has made no concessions of this kind; on the contrary, it has intensified the class struggle in town and countryside from day to day, it has struck mercilessly at the kulaks, the big landowners, the big merchants, speculators, money-lenders and other such people; the Party has disarmed them, not permitting them to raise their head in town or countryside. But if the Party slackens the class struggle, the danger of their revival always exists, for as the letters of the Bolshevik Party teach us, we must not draw the conclusion that there is no longer a danger of the capitalist elements becoming stronger. In 1920 Lenin said:

*"While we live in a small peasant country, there is a firmer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. . . ."**

*". . . and small-scale production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale."***

Our Party should never become drunk with success, it should not be carried away by the far-reaching social

* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 31, p. 516.

** V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 31, p. 24.

reforms it has carried out in our country, or by its achievements; it must not neglect or slacken the class struggle. Our Party must always keep in mind the lessons of the letter of the Bolshevik Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which says:

"Nobody can deny the depth and the radical character of the social transformations carried out in the Soviet Union as a result of the October Socialist Revolution. But the CPSU(B) has never let this fact lead it to the conclusion that class struggle in our country is weakening, or that there is no danger of the capitalist elements gaining strength ... It is common knowledge that for 15 years after the October Revolution the question, first, of measures to restrict the capitalist elements in the countryside, and then, of the liquidation of the kulaks as the last capitalist class, was never taken off the agenda. The underestimation of this experience of the CPSU(B) on the question of ensuring the fundamental conditions for the construction of socialism in Yugoslavia, is fraught with grave political dangers and is impermissible for Marxists, because socialism cannot be built only in the cities, or only in industry, but must also be built in the countryside, in agriculture".

Grave dangers may threaten us, Albanian communists, if we do not always keep in mind these great principles of Leninism, because Albania is an agricultural country where small private peasant property predominates, the peasant is at a very low level of development, and the old mentality, ignorance, and fanaticism exist. We must beware of the danger which might lead us to the mistaken opinion that, having reduced the kulaks of our villages to the same level as the poor or middle peasants as far as their land and economic situation is concerned, we have eliminated them as kulaks, as the last capitalist class, and can in future forget about class differentiation in the

countryside, regard the peasantry as one whole, and neglect the mobilization of the Party in order to overcome the difficulties arising from the growth of the exploiting elements in the countryside. The kulaks are engaged in large-scale activities in our villages, sabotaging our work in all aspects of agricultural economy, and in political matters as well. The kulaks try to sow discontent in the countryside, and to get into the state organs, from which they can manage affairs to their liking; they try to carry out sabotage actions, and to worm their way into the mass organizations in the countryside and even in the agricultural cooperatives.

We should make a thorough survey of the agricultural work cooperatives, for errors of principle were committed in the way they were set up and organized, and thus their general purpose has been distorted. Through the various laws and regulations they have imposed on us, the Yugoslavs have tried to misdirect us on the question of the countryside. There is no doubt that the economic situation of our peasantry has greatly improved. But while we implemented the land reform, which was a historic achievement of our Party, and expropriated the big plots of land of the kulaks, at the same time, the tax laws allowed the kulaks and part of the middle peasantry with a petty capitalist mentality to enrich themselves, while they had no obligation towards the state and made no contribution to the construction of the joint popular economy. In our law on agricultural taxation the tariff itself, although based on progressive principles, i.e. on taxation according to income, favours the rich peasants and is to the disadvantage of the poorer strata of the peasant population. According to this law, a peasant household with an income of 90,000 to 100,000 leks a year would be taxed with 15,000 leks plus 43 per cent, while another peasant household with an income of over 100,000

leks would be taxed at the rate of 20 per cent. This law is from every point of view a law along the correct lines, but the Yugoslavs have imposed on us through the rate an anti-Marxist error which favours the enrichment of the kulaks, which is a feature of the anti-Marxist view of the Yugoslav leadership. This and the other erroneous forms we have mentioned are the source of our country's economic difficulties, and what is even more dangerous, of slackening of the class struggle in the countryside, which could harm us immeasurably. We should not hesitate to fight against these shortcomings, but should set our agricultural work cooperatives on a correct basis, create as many producer and consumer cooperatives as possible, teach the peasant to bring his produce to them, turn him away from speculation and the black market, strike at the speculators in the countryside, and place the agricultural cooperatives on a correct basis, giving them greater help to enable them to become models for the peasants of the surrounding area.

We should always keep in mind Lenin's teachings on the agricultural cooperatives. He says:

*"It would be absolutely absurd to attempt to reshape these farms in any rapid way, by issuing an order or bringing pressure to bear from without."**

Lenin says:

*". . . the peasants are far too practical and cling far too tenaciously to the old methods of farming to consent to any serious change merely on the basis of advice and book instructions."***

Lenin teaches us that the agricultural work cooperative should help the peasants of the surrounding villages.

*V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 30, p. 196.

** Ibid.

On no account should the agricultural cooperative set itself apart from the peasant population, but it should attract it by giving concrete help and showing by example that life in the cooperative is improved through collective work itself, even without state financial help. The communists should not forget Lenin's teachings, for in our work with the cooperatives we have committed some of the mistakes he mentions; we must be careful. Our state should use agricultural credits correctly to help the agricultural work cooperatives, the poor peasants and then the middle peasants. But Lenin says that we should ensure that the peasant correctly understands state assistance, because:

*"He has been accustomed for centuries to expect only oppression from the state, and he is therefore in the habit of regarding everything that comes from the state with suspicion."**

When we carried out the land reform, we did not state explicitly that the land was nationalized, but the law on land reform states that nobody has the right to buy or sell land. This is a question of principle, and will be the basis of the future collectivization of agriculture. We must act correctly and not be misled by the view that our peasants, in the "specific" conditions of their backwardness, would consider this as something harmful.

Lenin also teaches us that:

*". . . private property in land must be abolished altogether i.e., all the land shall belong to the nation as a whole, and its disposal shall be placed in the hands of the local democratic institutions"**.*

* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 30, p. 197.

** V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 24, p. 483.

On the question of the peasantry, we must proceed with the greatest care, as comrade Stalin advised us during our stay in Moscow, and we should not overwhelm them with the maximum program of our Party. In correctly following comrade Stalin's invaluable advice on this question, we must proceed with sure and measured steps in our relations with the peasantry, we should be well acquainted with the conditions of our peasants and their mentality, and the line of our Party should not waver for a moment from the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Work in the countryside is very difficult for our Party; it should make us stronger and able to overcome all difficulties. The letter of the Bolshevik Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia says:

"In the conditions of Yugoslavia where the nationalization of land has not been carried out, where the private ownership, sale and purchase of land still exist, where large tracts of land are accumulated in the hands of the kulaks, where hired labour is still used, etc., the party cannot be educated with the belief that class struggle is dying out and that class contradictions are being reconciled, without thereby being disarmed in the face of the main difficulties involved in the construction of socialism".

We must draw a lesson from these important remarks of the letter of the Bolshevik Party, to enable us to fight still more fiercely against any laxity or errors that may occur. Our country is an agricultural country, and the peasantry makes up the majority of the population, therefore we must take great care to remain clear about the question of the leading role of the working class. The letters of the Bolshevik Party teach us:

"Marxism-Leninism considers that in Europe, including the people's democracies, the working class, and not the peasantry, is the vanguard class which remains

revolutionary to the end. As for the peasantry, the majority, that is the poor and middle peasantry, can be or actually are in alliance with the working class, while the leading role in this alliance belongs to the working class”.

This is where the Yugoslav leaders have deviated. The poor and middle peasants of our country have the greatest confidence in our Party, for it was the Party that gave them land, and under its correct leadership their economic situation has improved beyond measure. Our peasantry loves the Party and acknowledges its leading role. This means that the poor and middle peasantry have embraced the alliance with the working class and acknowledged its leading role in this alliance. But our Party is faced with the great task of consolidating this alliance. It will achieve this by implementing the lofty principles of Marxism-Leninism wisely and with determination, by fiercely combating the rotten opportunist theories of the peaceful integration of capitalist elements into socialism, by not considering the construction of socialism in the cities in isolation from the construction of socialism in the countryside.

The Party and the Front organization. Our Party had adopted many organizational forms from the Yugoslav Front, but the Party, and not the Front, has been considered as the main force leading the struggle and all aspects of the life of the country. The Yugoslav Trotskyites deviated completely on this very important matter. The Yugoslav leaders considered the Popular Front as the main leading force, and tried to merge the Party with the Front, because Tito and company claimed that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia could not have a program separate from that of the Popular Front.

In our country the Front has been and is an organization of the broad masses of the people led by the Party. In our statements we have always emphasized that the

Party is at the head of the Front, that the Party is the backbone of the Front. The broad masses of our people often did not mention the name of the Front, but spoke of the Party. They said: "The Party has ordered this", "When the Party came to power", and similar things. We can say that in this respect the role of the Front has been neglected and it has not been soundly organized. In our Front there has been no other party but ours and there has been some control over membership; we can even say that we have been somewhat sectarian in this respect. In our Front there was a continual process of differentiation, and in every period the representatives of the reaction have been exposed and expelled. At one time, precisely at the time of the Berat Plenum, on the insistence of the Yugoslav delegate, we admitted to the Front some enemies who had no place in this organization. Sejfulla Malëshova's opportunist policy and our concessions over a short period enabled some disguised elements to remain in the Front and hold leading posts in it during the war. They were detected, exposed and eliminated.

Our great mistake was that, apart from the organizational forms borrowed from the Yugoslavs, we kept our Party in semi-illegality, following their mistaken example. Since the liberation of Albania, our Party has been in power, but we have not yet legalized this fact. During this period, willingly or unwillingly, we have hidden the flag of our Party under the mask of the Front. If we fully and correctly understood the leading role of the Party, why did we make this great mistake? Doubtlessly, Yugoslav influence has caused us to make mistakes, but our Party recognizes and appreciates the gravity of this error, which is illustrated by the letters of the Bolshevik Party, which say:

"Lenin says that the Party is the most important weapon in the hands of the working class. The task of the

leaders is to keep this weapon on military alert. But as long as the Yugoslav comrades hide the flag of the party and refuse to make the leading role of the party clear to the people, they weaken this weapon of the working class, detract from the role of the party, and disarm the working class. It is ridiculous to think that, because of a petty subterfuge by the Yugoslav comrades, the enemy would renounce the struggle. This is precisely why the Party should be kept on military alert for the struggle against the enemy, and not fall asleep, its flag should not be hidden, and it should not be lulled into inactivity with the thought that the enemy, if he is not provoked, will cease the struggle, and stop the legal or illegal organization of his forces".

We can illustrate the great truth of the words of the Bolshevik Party with many actions from the life of our Party and our Front, which show how they understood their mutual relations. We were always afraid that, in correctly stating the role of the Party in the Front, we would frighten away the camouflaged reactionary elements. Not only did we conceal our party membership, but we considered it correct that some ministers who were party members, but not known as such by the broad masses of the Front, continued to keep the secret of their party membership. This was done in order to avoid giving our government or the People's Assembly its true face as a communist government or a People's Assembly in which the communists predominated. This was a mistake on our part. We did this allegedly to make the camouflaged enemy elements think that there was no need for them to organize, either legally or illegally, because people who were not communists were taking part in the government and other organs. But these methods did not prevent the reactionary elements from organizing within and outside the Front. This was demonstrated by the hostile activity

of some deputies and other enemies who had wormed their way into the Front.

We hid all the party functions behind those of the Front, and the party member hid his party membership, which is a source of pride and great honour to him, under the guise of the front membership.

The Bolshevik Party's censure of the errors of the Yugoslav leadership applied equally to us. The letter of the Bolshevik Party says:

" . . . the Communist Party in Yugoslavia has remained in a semi-legal position, without taking account of the fact that it came to power three and a half years ago; within the party there is no democracy, no elections, no criticism and self-criticism, and the CC of the CPY has a majority not of elected members, but of co-opted ones."

If we study the question of the functioning of our Central Committee, we will observe the same errors that have occurred in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Not only were there many shortcomings in the way the elections to the Central Committee were held at the 1st National Conference of the CP of Albania, but we continued to co-opt a series of people outside the party regulations. These people were co-opted right after our incorrect analyses at the 2nd Plenum in Berat and at the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party. They were not co-opted by the conferences, but by the Central Committee. We now have a Central Committee consisting of 25 people, of whom 16 are members and 9 alternate members. Only 8 of them were elected by the 1st National Conference of the CPA, while all the others, both members and alternate members, 17 in all, were co-opted. This is neither regular nor correct. The members of the local party committees and all the secretaries were nominated by the higher instances. No elections were carried out either in

the higher or lower instances of the Party. All the party meetings and conferences were held in secret, just as in the time of greatest illegality. The decisions of the Party were not made public, and the masses of the people were informed about them only indirectly, through the Front and in the name of the Front. A year ago, Stalin told us, and I quote: "It is incomprehensible that a party which is in power should not be made legal". We have not yet made our Party legal or convened a party congress. This is an error of principle which should be quickly put right, for this is the source of many other mistakes.

From what we have just mentioned, it appears that our Party suffers from a lack of genuine internal democracy, and lacks sound Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism, from the leadership down to the cells. Party members are afraid to speak out of fear that this will be taken the wrong way.

"It is fully understandable," says the letter of the Bolshevik Party to the CPY, "that while such conditions prevail in the party, while there are no elections for the leading organs, but only appointments from above, it is not possible to speak of inner party democracy . . . the party members are afraid of expressing their opinions, and afraid to criticize the party regulations; they prefer to keep quiet to avoid being subjected to repression."

There are many typical examples of these unhealthy manifestations in our Party. The analysis we have been making bears out fully the just criticism of the Bolshevik Party. There are examples of secretaries of party cells and party committees who, in order to safeguard their personal prestige and to cover up their mistakes with the authority of the Party, have used their authority to stifle criticism and self-criticism in those forums, even going to the extent of expelling from the cell the party member who dared

oppose their views. This has happened at the grass root level, but is also a reflection of the work at the centre.

Whether a rank-and-file party member or a Central Committee member, everyone has his place, all of us are party members, charged with particular functions and responsibilities and should serve only the Party, not individuals. All of us have the right to criticize and be criticized, without any exception. Of course, criticism must be sound, and it has its proper place. Every party member knows where he should criticize, and he should criticize forcefully and without fear. Nobody should react resentfully if he is the subject of sound criticism; on the contrary, he should be glad, for it has an educative aim. Likewise, if he makes a mistake, the party member should make an open Bolshevik self-criticism, fearlessly and without thinking that his dignity is lowered by it. On the contrary, whoever uses criticism and self-criticism properly, as Lenin and Stalin teach us, will recover and gain fresh energies and advance with new determination on the correct road of our Party.

The lack of criticism and self-criticism in the leadership and in the Party as a whole has caused the great harm which we have spoken of in this report. It has damaged the unity of the leadership, which is of vital importance to our Party. These errors have resulted in the first dangerous manifestations of odious military methods in our Party. The activity of the Berat Plenum, the tendencies noticed at the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania, the erroneous attitude adopted towards Nako Spiru, and the failure to call to meetings of the Political Bureau or Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania, those members or alternate members of these organs who were to be criticized, in order to give them the opportunity to have their say, to criticize and be criticized ; all these and

other things show that we did not make a proper and correct use of a sound weapon of the Party, criticism and self-criticism. These were odious manifestations of arbitrariness in our Party, showing that we had allowed the introduction of military methods, and distorted forms of party organization borrowed from the Yugoslav Trotskyites.

Our actions in the analysis of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania may be compared with the erroneous views of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. In the way of acting and judging, and in the condemnation of Nako Spiru, Mehmet Shehu and other comrades, we find analogies with the actions and decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia towards comrade Zhuyovich and Hebrang. In the analysis of the 8th Plenum, which was instigated by the Yugoslav Trotskyites, we cannot but find the reflection of the anti-Marxist and anti-Soviet views of the Yugoslavs, and their opposition to our Party. The letter of the Bolshevik Party says:

"It was sufficient for Comrade Zhuyovich at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to express his disapproval of the draft answer of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union(B), to be immediately expelled from the Central Committee. Apparently the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia does not consider the party as an organism which can act on its own initiative and has the right to express its opinions, but as a partisan detachment, whose members have no right to discuss various questions, but are obliged to carry out without discussion all the desires of their "chief". This

is what we call the cultivation of military methods in the party, something which is totally irreconcilable with the principles of inner party democracy in a Marxist party. Trotsky too once attempted to implant military methods of leadership in the Bolshevik Party, but he was exposed and condemned by the party, with Lenin at its head, the military methods were done away with and inner party democracy was preserved as the most important principle of party building."

Another danger which existed in the Party was the fact that the cadre secretary of the Central Committee was at the same time minister of internal affairs. In this connection the letter of the Bolshevik Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia says:

"It should be noted that the cadre secretary of the Central Committee of the party is at the same time minister of State Security. In other words, the party cadres are in fact put under the supervision of the minister of State Security. According to Marxist theory, the party should control all the state organs of the country, including the ministry of State Security, whereas in Yugoslavia things are the other way round, and the party is in fact controlled by the ministry of State Security. This explains why the initiative of the masses of the party members in Yugoslavia is not as great as it should be.

Clearly this way of organizing a communist party cannot be considered as Marxist-Leninist and Bolshevik."

The adoption of such an organizational form has done great harm to our Party. Without going into details and giving examples, of which there are many, it should be accepted that all the errors of which I spoke in my report are dialectically linked with the fact that the organizational secretary is also minister of internal affairs. This grave mistake should be fully acknowledged, because much harm stemmed from it, such as the suppression of criticism and

self-criticism, the lack of inner party democracy, the introduction of military methods, and other evils. We should acknowledge this and understand it correctly, for otherwise the same danger may threaten us in the future. We can give plenty of examples to illustrate the errors committed in this regard. For instance, it has been alleged that the party members who work in the State Security organs are the most loyal to the Party. But it is quite wrong to put the matter in this way. Why was it raised in such a way? I think that this originates in the organizational mistake we have spoken of. Undoubtedly, the comrades who work in the State Security organs are loyal to the Party, and they must carry out their task faithfully, but this does not mean in the least that other party members who work in other sectors are any less loyal. The State Security is a very important sector of our Party, but this does not mean that since people loyal to the Party are appointed to work in this sector, they should oversee the Party and other people who are as loyal to the Party as they are. It is the Party alone which controls them all. This is how everyone should understand the question; there is no other way.

At a meeting of the Bureau, comrade Nesti Kerenxhi said that the Ministry of Internal Affairs had issued a circular recommending to all the organs of the State Security that they supervise all the activity of Party members, and their private life, their connections, the quarrels among them or within their families, their economic situation, whether their wages were sufficient or not, whether financial necessity drove them to take money from the reactionaries and become tools of the enemy, etc. Such a very wrong directive, for which Koçi Xoxe bears a great responsibility, in fact placed the party members under the supervision and control of the Ministry of

Internal Affairs. These examples are sufficient to demonstrate the incorrect line in this respect.

But there are also many other activities which Koçi Xoxe, in his capacity as cadre secretary of the Party, has allowed to go on in this very mistaken way. The meetings of the party cell in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is a cell just like those of all the other ministries, could be attended only by someone appointed by the Party Committee for the Ministries, someone whose function was connected with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. As the Party Committee for the Ministries could not supervise the activity of the party cell in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it is clear that the Party was not able to control its activity in this ministry. Why did this happen? It happened because the meeting of the party cell of this department was not a meeting where the party problems of the department were taken up. The meetings of the party cell in the Ministry of Internal Affairs dealt only with security matters. The reports it sent to the Party Committee for the Ministries, or the Central Committee, were not party reports in which the work of the Party in this particular department was reflected, but reports on individuals. In a case where a party district committee member was not in a sound party position, but had taken the stand of the enemy, in reply to the persistent demands of the Cadre Section of the Central Committee to investigate the matter more closely, the Ministry of Internal Affairs replied that that section of the Central Committee needed not concern itself with these problems, as the security department had undertaken to deal with them. How could such a thing be permitted, that the Party, or more exactly, the Central Committee, should not be concerned about a district committee in which things were going badly, in which there were irregularities, abuses, or even hostile activity? The Party should do its work thoroughly, just

as the State Security organs do the work the Party has entrusted them with in a thorough way. Both these activities should be co-ordinated and meet at the same point, in the Central Committee of the Party. It is the Party which should give the State Security its directions, supervise it; it should not be the State Security which imposes its will and views on the Party. It is impermissible for the State Security to investigate the question of an enemy element who has infiltrated into the Party, while the Party continues to consider him as one of its sound members. If circumstances demand that secrecy be maintained for a time in order to broaden the investigations and discover the broader circles of this enemy infiltrated into the Party, the State Security cannot act without informing the party leadership, which should take all the measures it considers reasonable to co-ordinate the activities in this respect. The State Security can never act in isolation from the Party and its sure leadership.

Typical cases are those which have occurred in Shkodra and Berat, where the security chiefs went to control the offices of the party committees to see what state they were in, and how the party records were kept. Also typical are the reports which came to the State Security from the security chiefs of the districts, dealing with the activity of the party committee members of these districts.

We can easily imagine what kind of criticism and self-criticism and what internal democracy could exist in our Party when such a grave situation existed within the Party, created by these impermissible and anti-Marxist acts. We must have no illusions about this, or be defensive and hide something that cannot be hidden. In our Party people have been afraid to speak openly, to criticize fearlessly, or to make correct self-criticism, for often self-criticism, instead of leading to the rehabilitation of the erring comrade, caused him to be even more strongly condemned,

because it was turned into a weapon to strike arbitrarily at the one who made self-criticism. So people kept quiet, mistakes were covered up, suspicion was created towards the comrades and even towards the justice of the Party. Old communist comrades, with tears in their eyes, asked to be relieved of the posts assigned to them by the state, because they saw that unjust acts were being committed. They addressed themselves to the highest organs of the Party, but even there they were not attentively listened to. This is an alarming situation which should make us wake up and sound the alarm in the Party in order to combat these anti-Marxist tendencies. And we must fight them by putting in the hands of the Party the sure weapon of sound criticism and self-criticism, as great Stalin teaches us.

Some comrades confuse the role of the Party with that of security, and see nothing wrong in actions which are nothing but police activities. The Party must be vigilant and check on the activity of all its members in order to defend its ranks, but its great educative role must never be forgotten. We know that there are good party members, but there are also weak ones who may swerve from the party line. It is the task of the Party to carry out intensive educational work, showing particular care for the progress of the cadres, as Stalin teaches us ; we should look after the cadres like a good gardener who lovingly tends the plants : waters, prunes and rears them ; we should make every effort to reform those party members, and exclude them from the Party only when they are beyond remedy and are of absolutely no use to the Party.

In our Party, as in all the other parties, there are party members who have been condemned for committing serious errors, but who have not been given the maximum penalty of expulsion from the Party. Those members are like people who have survived a serious illness, and the doctor's task is to do the utmost to help them recover, to

restore their health and energy. This is how the Party should act with those people, it should help them to recover, and not kick them out. The Party, as long as it has not expelled them from its ranks, always has hopes for them. Stalin teaches us that people can be corrected, and we see this in the history of political parties. But we have not acted in this way, according to the correct party line. People who have been condemned for errors have been despised and isolated, and orders have even been given that they should be closely watched, to see what they do and whom they meet. Those are out-and-out police methods, which have nothing to do with the educational role and sound vigilance of the Party. If we do not understand this question correctly, then the party committees and cells will be transformed purely and simply into police and security offices.

We must be well aware that the introduction of such methods into the Party leads to an open attack on the Marxist-Leninist principles of party building. But we must also be well aware of the role and the tasks of the State Security organs. These organs are directed by the Party, just like any other state organ; they are organs charged with the important task of defending the achievements of our struggle, defending our People's Republic, and defending the People's Power against internal and external enemies. They should be seen and appreciated in this light and assisted in their activity to deprive the enemy of any opportunity to harm us. This is everybody's task. The arm of State Security is a very valuable and beloved arm of our Party, and its achievements in carrying out the tasks entrusted to it since its founding should be assessed correctly. That is how the entire Party must understand this problem.

The letters of the Bolshevik Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia are impor-

tant documents which our Party and all its members from the leadership to the rank-and-file members, should read and study, and draw conclusions related to our past and future activity. Our party members, armed with the great teachings of Marxism-Leninism, should examine their work and defend the party line, correcting their mistakes and preventing future mistakes. We must properly implement the teachings of great Lenin and Stalin, for it is only in this way that our Party will advance with certainty, and the Party and its members will become bolshevized. Lenin says:

*"A political party's attitude towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest ways of judging how earnest the party is and how it fulfils in practice its obligations towards its class and the working people. Frankly acknowledging a mistake, ascertaining the reasons for it, analysing the conditions that have led up to it, and thrashing out the means of rectification — that is the hallmark of a serious party; that is how it should perform its duties, and how it should educate its class, and then the masses."**

We should never forget Lenin's golden words:

*"All the revolutionary parties that have perished so far, perished because they became conceited, because they failed to see the source of their strength and feared to discuss their weaknesses. We, however, shall not perish, because we are not afraid to discuss our weaknesses and will learn to overcome them."***

Our Party, its leaders and all its members should faithfully follow the invaluable teachings of the glorious

* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 31, p. 57.

**V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 311.

teachers of our Party, Lenin and Stalin. Our Party and its leadership will not be afraid to face their mistakes, to acknowledge them honestly and mercilessly fight them, making their repetition impossible, for the good of our Party and people.

Comrades,

Our analysis of the activity of our Party is based on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, and draws on the insight of the historic letters of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

On the basis of this broad and exhaustive analysis of the activity of the Party, the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee has taken decisions which are of very great importance to our Party. The Plenum found it necessary to lay particular stress on the need to mobilize all the forces of the Party to correctly implement its decisions as soon as possible. The letters of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should be studied in all the party organizations and should help to improve the way in which the decisions of the 11th Plenum are implemented.

The whole Party should be mobilized to explain to the working masses and to all our people the truly great role of the Soviet Union, of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) and of great comrade Stalin, both like yesterday in the war and today in peace. The whole Party should learn from the teachings of the Bolshevik Communist Party and of comrade Stalin, the beloved friend of our people, and should profit in all ways from the invaluable experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) and put this experience into practice, in accordance with our conditions, in the construction of socialism.

Confronting the democratic and anti-imperialist camp which is fighting for peace and genuine democracy, with

the Soviet Union at its head, stands the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, led by the United States and the other imperialist powers, which follows an aggressive policy against the people's democracies, against peace and freedom, with the intention of establishing its hegemony over the entire world, and enslaving and plundering the nations. The imperialists make aggressive plans, they press for war against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, they are preparing a new butchery, like Hitler yesterday, in order to enslave the nations. Against this camp, at the head of the democratic forces, fights the Soviet Union, the land of socialism.

Therefore, all the party members and organizations should always be prepared to explain the development of international events to the working masses, to increase their hatred towards the enemy of mankind, the great enemy of our country, US and British imperialism, Hitler's faithful successors, who are attempting to enslave the world.

Tito's Trotskyite group deviated from Marxism-Leninism, and, in a hostile manner, refused the help and advice of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) and of the other fraternal parties; it betrayed the cause of socialism, and proletarian internationalism, and threw itself into the arms of the imperialists, and rose in shameful and dirty opposition to the Soviet Union, the glorious Bolshevik Party, and the entire socialist camp.

The Yugoslav Trotskyites have also tried to draw our Party onto their anti-Marxist road. Through their diabolical and disgraceful activity they have tried to impose their will on our Party and country, to abolish the independence of the Party and Albanian people, and turn our country into their colony. But all their efforts have met with the firm resistance of the Central Committee of our Party which, with the help of the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union (B), definitively thwarted these ignoble efforts and escaped from the clutches of Tito's renegade group.

Our whole Party must be mobilized and must gain a clear understanding of the great treachery of Tito's Trotskyite group to the cause of proletarian internationalism and to the cause of the socialist camp, so that the Party can explain this clearly to our working masses; it must understand the great help given us by the Bolshevik Party and great Stalin to save our country and Party from the abyss which Tito's treacherous group was leading us towards, and to enable us to find the road of Marxism-Leninism.

In view of the low ideological level of the masses of our party members, we must take immediate appropriate measures, doing organized and systematic work to consolidate the Marxist-Leninist education of the party cadres, and to raise their ideological level. We must always keep in mind the great and meaningful definition of Lenin in all its magnificence that :

"The role of vanguard fighter can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the most advanced theory".*

and we should take all necessary measures to solve this important problem.

The truth is that the concrete tasks of the post-liberation years, and the tendency towards practical work, have caused us to neglect our work to raise the ideological level of the cadres. The failure to do systematic and continuous work has grave consequences for our party. Comrade Stalin, emphasizing the danger of such a situation, says:

". . . if our party propaganda begins to flag, if the work for the Marxist-Leninist education of our cadres

* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 5, p. 370.

*starts to slacken, if our work to raise the political and theoretical level of these cadres weakens and, as a result, the cadres themselves are no longer interested in our prospects and our progress, no longer appreciate the justice of our cause, and turn into practitioners without a sense of perspective. . . then the whole activity of the state and the party will inevitably be weakened. It must be admitted as an axiom that, the higher the political level and the Marxist-Leninist awareness of the cadres of every sector of state and party work, the better and more effective are the results of work, the better and more fruitful work is, and vice-versa, the lower the political level and the Marxist-Leninist awareness of the cadres, the greater the likelihood of errors and failures in work. . ."**

Our Party is greatly affected by this shortcoming and has a great and urgent need to improve the work to raise the ideological level of cadres, and to develop this work to a higher stage.

Comrade Stalin has continually emphasized the urgent need for cadres to assimilate Marxist-Leninist science and study Marxist-Leninist theory. At the 18th Congress of the Bolshevik Communist Party, he states:

*". . . if we were able to carry out the ideological training and political tempering of the cadres in every sector in such a way that they were fully conversant with the internal and international situation, if we could succeed in turning them into fully mature Marxist-Leninists capable of solving the problems of running the country without serious mistakes, then we would be fully entitled to say that nine-tenths of all our problems were solved."***

* J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 14, pp. 246-247 (Alb. ed.).

** J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 14, p. 247 (Alb. ed.).

This shows even more forcefully how urgent it is for our Party to understand fully the great importance of the study of Marxist-Leninist theory, which is the main weapon of a revolutionary party.

We should take measures to strengthen the Party School and to create courses in other centres which the party members can attend in order to arm themselves with the Marxist-Leninist science. It should be set as a main task of party members, and they should be encouraged and helped, to study the Marxist-Leninist science individually, in the first place the History of the CPSU (B), the foundations of Marxism-Leninism, the Constitution and Program of the Party, and the fundamental laws of the transition from capitalism to socialism in our country.

All party members have an obligation to study in order to broaden their general knowledge, to develop their minds, and alongside the work they are assigned to, they should attend school as well.

The Party should also publish as many theoretical Marxist-Leninist books as possible, and put these in the hands of its members.

The main task of our Party is to assimilate the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, for without such preparation, the activity of the Party would be hindered, and its road obscured, which would lead to grave mistakes that would cost the Party and the country dear. So we must put all our energies into studying the Marxist-Leninist theory which illuminates the road of our Party, and spread it as widely as possible among the masses of party members, using every available means.

The party publications are very important here, and should play a major role in providing the masses of party members with the necessary theoretical material, and in spreading the propaganda more widely among the ranks of the communists.

"Zëri i Popullit", which will recommence daily publication in accordance with a decision of the Central Committee, should be turned into a sound and powerful weapon in the hands of the Party, helping to bring the party line to the masses, to strengthen the party organizations, and to equip the Party with the necessary experience to carry out successfully the great tasks which lie before it, as well as helping to raise the political level of the party members.

Based on the party line, on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, the struggle against bourgeois and anti-Marxist views should be broadened and intensified everywhere in our country, particularly in the schools. Our schools, under the guidance of our people's power, and under the leadership of the Party, should become in every way centres for the formation of the future cadres, educated on the sound basis of Marxist-Leninist theory. Such cadres are what our country greatly needs. So we must struggle to eliminate everything which hampers the progress of our schools towards this goal. We should take steps to get rid of obsolete text-books and replace them with new ones, on the basis of the experience of the Soviet Union, adapted to our conditions.

The development of our party propaganda to the necessary level, and the work to raise the ideological level of the party cadres, are the greatest and the most important tasks of the Party.

Alongside these tasks, the Party must solve one of its most important problems: it must make a study of the current situation of the country on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, and sum up the necessary experience for its further development on the road of socialist construction.

We must also further strengthen our propaganda work and agitation among the masses. Our working masses and the people as a whole should be informed about the prob-

lems of the country and about international problems; they should understand the situation, know what work has to be done, and mobilize themselves to carry it out. It is the task of the party organizations and of every party member to transmit the party line to the broad masses of the people, to enhance their consciousness and mobilize them to implement the party line.

All the party organizations should carry out broad and systematic propaganda and agitational activity, explaining to the masses the importance of the decisions of the government, and in the first place, the importance of the state plan, mobilizing them to fulfil and overfulfil it. The party members should set an example in all this great activity, and be better at organizing the work to carry out and overfulfil the state plan.

Our Party should immediately be made legal as the party which leads and directs all the affairs of the country at the head of the working masses, and at the head of all the mass organizations, in the construction of socialism. Up till now, the Party has remained in a state of semi-illegality, this harmed it, weakened its influence, and hindered its further development and the strengthening of its authority and its links with the masses. It is clear that in a situation where the political role of the Party is reduced, as happened here, through its being hidden behind the Democratic Front, although the Party is in power, favourable conditions are created for the emergence of anti-party tendencies which gravely harm the Party.

It is vitally urgent for the very existence and consolidation of the Party that we immediately eliminate all the alien, anti-Marxist and anti-party views which have penetrated into our Party. With regard to the building of inner party democracy, the Marxist-Leninist principles of party building and inner party democracy should be re-

established. To achieve this, the Central Committee has in the first place taken the decision to convoke the 1st Congress of the Party, at which we will analyse its whole activity, approve its Constitution and Program, and democratically elect the Central Committee, then democratic elections will be held in all the party organizations.

The Central Committee has taken measures to end a situation in which the organizational secretary of the Party was also minister of internal affairs, for this is totally alien to our principles and has gravely harmed the Party. It must be made quite clear that the function of minister of internal affairs should be considered as a state function which, like all other functions, is under the direction and control of the Party, and should never be permitted to control the Party, as happened in our country.

Organizationally, the Party should be strengthened on the basis of the Leninist principles of party building.

The main principle, on which a revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist party is built, is the principle of democratic centralism. Democratic centralism means:

1. — All the leading organs of the Party should be elected democratically, from below up, and they should not be appointed or co-opted.
2. — It is the duty of the leading organs to render account periodically on their activity to the members who have elected them, and create all the possibilities for them to participate freely in discussions and decision-making.
3. — Steel-like but conscious discipline, with the minority submitting to the majority, is absolutely essential for democratic centralism. Steel-like discipline calls for discussions, and the struggle of opinions.

"But after a conflict of opinion has been closed",
comrade Stalin says, *"after criticism has been ex-*

*hausted and a decision arrived at, unity of will and unity of action of all party members are the necessary conditions without which neither party unity nor iron discipline in the party is conceivable.”**

4. — The decisions of the higher party organs are binding on the lower organs.

We must particularly emphasize the need to take measures to eliminate all the anti-democratic, military and police methods, and the anti-Marxist and anti-party views, which have penetrated into our Party, and inner party democracy should be established, as Lenin and Stalin teach us.

Inner party democracy is a necessary condition for the existence and consolidation of the Party. It strengthens party discipline, but is opposed to military and police methods.

The party member should feel at home in the Party, and all his rights should be respected.

All problems in the Party should be solved on the basis of criticism and self-criticism. The party member has the right to have his say, to criticize anyone, and on no account should moral reprisals be taken against him for his just criticism. The lively participation of the party members, the confrontation of opinions, free discussion, and the implementation of the decisions taken; this is the essence of the inner-party democracy.

Comrade Stalin, explaining the essence of inner-party democracy, says:

"Genuine democracy means that the party masses are active in the party organizations, the party masses solve both questions of the party and questions of general practical significance, and the party masses

* J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 6, p. 186 (Alb. ed.).

*take decisions and set the party organizations the task of implementing them.”**

Inner party democracy strengthens the unity of the Party, its ideological unity, its conscious discipline and centralism.

The principle of inner party democracy calls for sound Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism. Without criticism and self-criticism, the Leninist-Stalinist organizational principles of party building cannot be implemented. Self-criticism is a law of development of a Marxist-Leninist party. It is a sound weapon in the hands of the party, which strengthens and enables it to overcome difficulties and forge ahead.

Comrade Stalin says:

*"Only parties which are departing into the past and whose doom is sealed can fear the light and fear criticism. We fear neither the one nor the other, we do not fear them because we are a party that is in the ascendent, that is marching to victory. That is why self-criticism. . . is a sign of our party's immense strength, and not of its weakness, it is a means of consolidating and not of disintegrating the party"****

Our whole Party, and all the party members should be educated in this method, which is the method of educating the cadres in a revolutionary spirit. Any other stand towards criticism and self-criticism is anti-Marxist and unworthy of a communist. Not to accept criticism and not to make self-criticism means to be afraid, to be on one's guard against the Party, or to be unwilling to acknowledge

* Questions of the Building of the Party (Book One), Tirana, 1948, p. 57 (Alb. ed.).

** J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 7, p. 124 (Alb. ed.).

mistakes. In either case, this is a stand harmful to the Party. Our Party should be educated in a revolutionary spirit, as Lenin and Stalin teach us.

Without broadly developing criticism and self-criticism in the party organizations, it is impossible to judge matters correctly, it is impossible to make progress, or to strengthen the Party. If criticism and self-criticism are lacking, the way is opened for the penetration of alien and anti-Marxist methods into the Party, which weaken and erode it from within.

There should be an end to all the non-Marxist methods of work in the Party on the matter of the assessment of cadres. The party cadres should be evaluated and judged according to their work, according to the results of their work, and the way they defend the party line, and not according to personal opinions derived from backward and petty-bourgeois prejudices.

We must stress the necessity for our Party to establish unity and the method of collective work in all its organizations, from the highest to the lowest. We cannot allow a situation where party problems are not raised or are raised only superficially for the sake of supplying some information, and solved in an individualistic and unconnected way.

Party questions should be dealt with on the basis of the party norms, on the basis of the great principle of democratic centralism. It is only on this basis that party questions can be correctly solved, otherwise room is left for grave errors to occur in the Party, as a consequence of individual work isolated from the Party, viewed and assessed not according to the line and interests of the Party, but according to personal prejudices and ulterior motives.

Assessing questions in a personal light is a primitive method of work for our Party, and does not at all comply with the principles of a Marxist-Leninist party; it is often

the result of the great conceit that stems from the over-estimation of oneself, and from the flagrant violation of democratic centralism. This method eliminates the participation of the Party in broad and free discussion of problems, and does away with the struggle of opinions, criticism and self-criticism, which should be the method of work of a revolutionary party. Such individualistic work, for removed from the fundamental principles of a Marxist-Leninist party, based on personal opinion, petty-bourgeois prejudices and narrowly personal and egoistic motives, cannot be allowed in our Party, for such a method is anti-Marxist and spells death to the Party.

The elimination of such a method of work and the establishment of collective work in the party organs will safeguard and strengthen the unity of the leading organs of the Party and of all its organizations.

We must also understand more clearly and consider in a more profound way the question of the personal responsibility which each party member, and especially each leader, should feel towards the tasks entrusted to him. Collective work and the observance of Marxist-Leninist principles in the work of the Party should lead every party cadre to be more aware of his responsibility, and carry out his tasks better on the basis of the decisions and line of the Party.

Revolutionary vigilance in the Party should be heightened in order to safeguard the party line, to guard the Party against distortions of its line, and to defend the Party against the attacks of internal and external enemies. The Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Stalin has given a brilliant example of the way the unity and the line of the Party should be defended at any time against the avowed enemies of the Party and the proletariat. We must follow the example of the Bolshevik Party, and strengthen revolutionary vigilance in our Party.

We should eliminate as soon as possible police methods of supervision which limit vigilance and in fact cannot properly defend the Party. Information within the Party should also be understood in this way, that is, it should not be information of a police nature, but information which gives the Party every opportunity to have a clear understanding of how to implement its line, to uncover distortions and mistakes, and to take the necessary measures in time. To be vigilant means to detect distortions in the party line, to detect hostile and anti-party activity. The Party should teach every one of its members that the Party is defended by preserving the purity of its Marxist-Leninist line.

The links of the Party with the masses should be strengthened. This is one of the main tasks of the Party, and an indispensable condition for its very existence. This means, primarily that the party members should not only be among the working masses, teaching and guiding them, but should always be ready to listen to what they say, to their suggestions, and their opinions, should know how to learn from them, understand their needs, and respond to them appropriately.

In the period of the socialist construction of our country, particular importance should be attached to the question of developing criticism and self-criticism on a large scale among the working masses, to the question of control from below, to the question of teaching them to discover shortcomings and mistakes in work, and to take an active part in rectifying them. The party members should have a good grasp of this very important task, otherwise there can be no progress in socialist construction.

In order to strengthen the links of the Party with the masses, all the party members should educate the masses politically and mobilize them to implement the party line. They should take the party line to the working masses.

In the first place, the party organizations should be firmer and more unhesitating in waging class struggle, struggle against the enemies of our course. It must be clear that in this period of socialist construction, in this period of transition from capitalism to socialism, class struggle does not slacken. The enemies of socialism, the privileged classes of the past, which have been affected and are continually being affected by our reforms, will never for a moment give up their struggle against our line, against socialist construction. The internal and external enemies are still further stepping up their struggle and efforts to block our road to socialism, to attack and overthrow our people's power, and to re-establish their hated capitalist regime.

The party members should be among the working masses, as outstanding fighters against the enemies of the working class, against the enemies of socialism, and should teach and lead the masses in the struggle to build socialism.

The party members should gain the sympathy of the masses, and win their confidence. But in order to do this, the party members must divest themselves of all petty-bourgeois vestiges, of all the shortcomings they may have, such as ambition, egotism and conceit, and should become an example of simplicity. If you act conceitedly with the masses, if you put your nose in the air and look down on them, you cannot become their leader, you cannot lead the masses along the party line, you cannot teach them, and even less can you learn from them. In this way the links of the Party with the masses are severed, and the Party heads towards its liquidation, its annihilation.

The party organizations should strengthen their activity to unite the broad working masses, the workers, the poor and middle peasants and the patriotic intellectuals around the Democratic Front, and take particular care to see that the alliance of the working class with the poor

and middle peasantry, under the leadership of the working class, is continuously strengthened in the struggle to implement the party line and to make the transition to socialism.

We must strengthen and increase the deep love and respect which the popular masses should feel for our army, the defender and guarantor of our borders, and of the independence of the country, the loyal guard of the socialist achievements and the interests of our people.

The Central Committee of the Party, as a result of the whole analysis made at the 11th Plenum, has taken many important decisions which refute all the unjust decisions and measures taken under unhealthy circumstances; these new decisions aim at strengthening the leadership of the Party, at healing the Party, at enlivening its activity and at setting its work on a correct Marxist-Leninist basis.

It is the duty of all the party organizations and of all the party members to exert all their efforts and in the spirit of this analysis, to carry out these decisions as soon as possible and as well as possible.

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