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# THE FDR-CHURCHILL TALKS

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## Lewis Still Waits

**PERHAPS** the most significant thing one may say about the AFL Executive Council meeting last week is that John L. Lewis is not in. Not yet. And perhaps he may never be. This fact dominated the sessions; it jolted Big Bill Hutcheson and Matthew Woll, Herbert Hoover's men of labor. Not to mention David Dubinsky, godfather of the move to bring Lewis back into the AFL tent where he could do his damnedest to swing labor away from President Roosevelt.

It worked—the energetic pressure of wide circles within the Federation, as well as public opinion generally. For the mass of people didn't cotton to the notion that the nation's good would be served by Lewis' return— and there were plenty of evidences of active popular disfavor. By unanimous vote the Council agreed to submit the Lewis issue "without recommendation" to the Boston convention in early October.

The decision to delay UMW reentry, according to William Green, resulted from "technicalities"—which means (1) the jurisdictional issues arising from Lewis' District 50, that polyglot setup busily engaged in poaching on other unions' preserves, and (2) the question of the Progressive Mine Workers, which received a charter from the AFL after the UMW left the Federation. The PMW, which claims 35,000 members, contends that it has jurisdiction over all coal miners in the country and insists that Lewis' union can return to the AFL only through its doorway. Naturally that created some big headaches, but, most observers think, not big enough to be the real reason for denying Lewis at this point. After all the Progressive Miners are but 35,000 compared to the UMW's 500,000. The practiced parliamentarians in AFL top circles would have found means to bypass the technicalities had they so desired. Obviously, they did not-not at this time anyway. It was the better part of judgment, observers say, for the AFL leaders to play a waiting game to see how the winds blow around October. And it is felt that Lewis' reentry will depend upon the war issues and John L.'s defeatist role the next few months. If public and labor pressure is not relaxed, but increased, Lewis most likely will fail to have his way. Which is a triumph for America. Another positive result of the meeting was the declaration that the AFL would not be bamboozled by the SmithConnally act into repudiating its no-strike pledge. In view of the fact that Lewis' District 50 is busily engaged in promoting strikes under the act's aegis, the Council's position is all the more significant. It constitutes a direct rebuff to the Lewis position on strikes. The Council, furthermore, endorsed wage and price stabilization, subsidies, and the roll-back. This, too, ran counter to John L.'s liking. When you consider all these factors you may conclude that the Council was, in these actions, reflecting the win-the-war spirit of its 5,000,-000 members, a spirit most of the top AFL leaders share in varying degrees. But unfortunately old habits of thinking persist.

They persisted in the rejection of Sidney Hillman's proposal, on behalf of the CIO Political Action Committee, for cooperation. Green reaffirmed the Council's traditional policy "to oppose our enemies and support our friends, regardless of political affiliation." But he feared "entanglement" with other committees, "appointed by other organizations." It might "jeopardize the success of our nonpartisan policies." Obviously Hutcheson and Woll, stumping for defeatist politicians, don't want "entanglements" with the other great wing of labor which seeks to strengthen FDR's position. Green did indicate that the CIO and AFL committee would frequently follow the same course of action in the case of specific candidates. Undoubtedly political cooperation on a local and state scale already exists in many areas. And no doubt it will be strengthened as the 1944 political campaign swings into action, speeded by the war's exigencies.

S HOCKING, however, was the Council's stand on repeal or modification of the insulting Chinese Exclusion Act. Most Americans feel that this act runs counter to United Nations spirit and that it violates our growing friendship for our allies. But the Council felt otherwise. It reiterated its traditional position against repeal or modification. Green's comment, "A China-man is always a Chinaman," not only shocked Americans, but will certainly win no friends for us in that great country which is holding out against our common enemy in the Pacific. Old prejudices die hard, evidently, with AFL leaders; this one should certainly draw the fire from millions of AFL rank and file. They haven't reflected this chauvinistic attitude in their passionate desire to see the United Nations win. And in their admiration for the heroism of our Chinese allies.

#### Moral of the ALP Primaries



LIBERALS who threw their weight behind the Dubinsky - controlled slate of the American Labor Party should do some straight

thinking now that the official returns of the New York primaries are in. The majority of ALP enrolled members repudiated the right wing slate. Dubinsky has lost in Brooklyn, the most hotly contested county of the balloting. He lost in Manhattan, of course, where the progressives strengthened their leadership by receiving more than seventy-five percent of the votes cast; this compares with sixty percent in the elections two years ago. Even in the Bronx, the Dubinsky stronghold, the "right wing" carried only by a small majority. The contest for county committees centered about these three areas; the Progressives have won a resounding victory. And they did so after the Dubinsky-Social Democratic group, which controlled the ALP state committee, had waged a furious campaign, had enlisted every commercial newspaper in the city. Even the Nation and New Republic carried heated pro-Dubinsky editorials. *PM* and the New York *Post* ran Red-baiting "news stories" that at times crowded the war cables off the page. Dubinsky's men poured hundreds of thousands of dollars into the campaign, took to the airwaves practically every day the week before the primaries. They even tried coercion against unionists. Yet Dubinsky lost. Why?

Herein lies the moral. The red herring has lost its savor. The Dubinsky crowd had only one plank in the campaign—the issue of "Communist control." The voters rejected that issue. They would not believe that the Communists plotted to control the ALP but they did believe that the Progressives wanted to extend the ALP base to include all trade unions. The voters drew some canny conclusions when they observed Progressive endorsement of the Sidney Hillman proposal to restore the ALP to organized labor; that didn't sound like "Communist control" to them. And the voters took sufficient cognizance of Dubinsky's clamorous silence at Mr. Hillman's proposals. The voters rejected the high pressure Red-baiting campaign, figured the truth out for themselves. This they believed to be the real issue: unity of the party behind the President's win-the-war program.



The majority of the voters couldn't swallow the right wing contention that Dubinsky endorsed the administration's policies when they knew that he backed Lewis' reentry into the AFL; they rejected right wing protestations of friendship for the Soviet Union when they saw Eugene Lyons and Nathan Chanin on the Dubinsky slate. They were shocked at fascist Gerald L. K. Smith's endorsement of Lyons; they remembered Chanin's "last shot" remark-that "it would come from the USA" to destroy the "Stalin regime." They added up the score when the Hearst press urged its readers to vote the Dubinsky slate. The result: not only were Lyons and Chanin beaten as candidates for the county committee; so was Dean Alfange, ALP candidate for governor in 1942, who fronted for his dubious colleagues; so was Algernon Lee, state chairman of the Social-Democratic Federation and alleged brain-trust for Dubinsky; so was Dubinsky himself. Telling evidence of the way labor in New York was thinking.

**IN OTHER words the majority of the** ALP-controlled voters of all wings and groups earnestly seek a united party based on the trade unions and committed to support of the national administration-in short, Sidney Hillman's proposals. This is the moral of the primaries. If this is understood, then all genuine patriots, representing all groups, will swing behind the progressive slate to labor loyally for that unity. The Dubinsky Social-Democrats may continue their efforts to finagle and befuddle the results; this must be finally rejected by all New Yorkers who want a victory over Hitlerism and its methods, whether on the Continent or in the state of New York.

## ". . . I Reach for My Gun"

IN ALL truth, John Bovingdon had been guilty of dancing. It was Martin 🛌 Dies' privilege to unearth this particular scandal against a gov-



ernment agency, to accuse the Office of Economic Warfare of betraying America by retaining Bovingdon as economic analyst. When Dies discovered the dread truth about Bovingdon, who had also dared visit the Soviet Union-well, what would any red-blooded America Firster conclude? Certainly, Bovingdon must be "subversive." Leo Crowley, OEW chief, fired him forthwith without investigation, in the interests of "efficiency," although Bovingdon's ability as an economist was unquestioned. His record showed that he was exceptionally fitted for the job.

All of this, one might say, concerns only one man. The war can be won without

Bovingdon, who had two sons in the service, one of whom was killed. But it is worth considering what it means to the nation when a man who likes to danceor to write poetry, or teach economics, or in fact follow any of the cultural pursuits Dies considers "sissy"-when such a man is therefore hounded as "un-American." And it is worth very serious thought that the head of a government agency has summarily fired, without trial, an employe who happens to evoke the displeasure of a Dies. Hitler burned the books and tortured the intellectuals. Martin Dies hates and punishes them to the limit of his power. There is one ugly word for all this and the word is fascist.

But America has an opposite for that word-which is, of course, democracy. Federal workers in Washington, among others, made it ring clear when they protested both Dies' and Crowley's actions. Hundreds of these Washington workers turned out in a rally to hear Bovingdon state the facts which his enemies had preferred to ignore-and to cheer him when he urged a national mobilization looking toward a "people's Congress" minus Martin Dies.

## **One More Cabinet**

 $\mathbf{W}^{\mathtt{e}}$  venture the forecast that the newly organized Yugoslav government-in-exile will last no longer than its lame predecessor. The

Trifunovitch cabinet toppled after six weeks; to its credit is the great diplomatic triumph of having blessed the engagement of King Peter to a Greek princess. But all is not moonlight and romance in Yugoslav affairs and it was inevitable that failure to solve key issues would result in another fiasco. The source of conflict rises from those reactionary Serbian elements who will not tolerate any equality with the Croats and Slovenes. And it is these Serbian chauvinists who demand the retention of the discredited Mikhailovich as Minister of War. The immediate breakdown came when the Croats called for a declaration of policy to clarify relations among the national groups before the government left London for its new seat at Cairo. The Serbs rejected the proposal and the cabinet fell. The new cabinet is even more of a shyster combination than the old. It consists almost wholly of Serb bureaucrats and third-rate personalities headed by Prime Minister Bozidar Pouritch, whose record is not one to inspire confidence. If it does anything at all, it will again be along the lines of stealing Partisan Army victories and attributing them to Mikhailovich. At a time when the British high command has acknowledged the operations of the Partisans, the Yugoslav government still insists on supporting the Mikhailovich military myth. But myths do not win battles or forge anti-fascist unity such as the Partisans have been able to achieve, and it is only a matter of weeks before the new makeshift cabinet is as dead as a dodo.

Yugoslavs in this country, however, are working hard to undo the damage caused by the government-in-exile. They have now become part of the recently organized United Committee of South-Slavic Americans whose president is Louis Adamic. A ten-point program has been formulated whose central aims are full support for the United Nations in prosecuting the war, to inform Americans about Balkan problems, and to suggest that the Allies aid the Partisan Army and its Liberation Council. Here is the dynamic unity of all Slav forces-a unity so utterly strange to the decadent pensioners who dominate the government in London.

## Let's Look at India

FTER reading the A<sup>FIER</sup> newspapers, it would seem that the sole justification which British tories offer for the continued imprisonment of Gandhi



and Nehru is that they are being well cared for. The Viceroy's office will at the drop of a hat tell any inquirer that there is no cause for anxiety because Gandhi is "interned in the luxurious villa of the Aga Khan." What the splendor of Gandhi's prison accommodations has to do with solving the Indian political deadlock is perhaps clear only to those imperturbable minds in Britain who direct Indian policy. But to a simple anti-fascist intelligence the impasse is a source of deepest dismay; that one year after the wholesale arrests of India's leaders, Downing Street has not budged a hairs-breadth from its tragic stand. To be sure, Japan is on the defensive in the Pacific and Allied military positions there are somewhat more secure. Nevertheless Japan still occupies Burma and so long as India's masses are not mobilized and given their rightful place in the war, victory in Asia will be impeded and any large scale offensive made immeasurably more difficult than it need be.

There is too much silence in this country on the whole Indian issue. Labor has spoken up before but in the last few months seems to have lost its tongue. Here is a paramount matter involving democratic war policy, involving both the outcome of the war and the peace. Yet few voices have been recently heard in protest. If there were enough pressure British bureaucracy

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would not have dared to refuse permission to the President's special envoy, William Phillips, to visit Gandhi and Nehru. The administration itself might be a little more concerned than it has been. And such pressure might even develop some backbone in the British Labor Party which closed its last conference without a decision or declaration of policy on India. Ours is an obligation to give muscle to the Atlantic Charter instead of letting tory intransigeants denude that document of any meaning for 400,000,000 people.

## Struggle in Argentina

Conditions in Argentina have steadily worsened since General Ramirez seized power early last June from the pro-Nazi but weak Castillo junta. The promise of a change in foreign policy to unite Argentina more firmly with her sister nations of the Western Hemisphere, and to bring that country into line with the United Nations, has proved to be double talk.

The same is true of Ramirez' promise of internal reform. Corruption has not been eliminated, prices have not been brought under control; election of a new president, instead of being guaranteed, has been postponed; constitutional rights have been withdrawn. Leading progressives of all sorts have been jailed-among them distinguished medical men, educators, labor



leaders, and an alarming number of prominent Jews. The most noted of Argentina's political prisoners, Victorio Codovilla, to whom the government of Uruguay has

offered asylum, is subjected to such brutal treatment that it is reported to be seriously endangering his life.

Little information now reaches this country from Argentina and that little sifts through the double obstacle of censorship and, for the most part, incompetent reporting. We nevertheless have ample evidence of the Argentinians' overwhelming prodemocratic sentiment. In spite of the fascist terror to which they are increasingly subjected they are putting up a magnificent fight. First hand information on their struggle was recently brought to other labor leaders of the Hemisphere by Jose Maria Argana, a leader in the bona fide trade union movement of Argentina, and Enrique Rodriquez, secretary-general of the Confederation of Workers of the neighboring nation of Uruguay. Their most urgent message to progressive forces outside Argentina dealt with the importance and effectiveness of foreign pressure. Certain American trade unionists already know of the success that has attended previous pro-(Continued on page 7)

The Real Facts in Detroit

ALMOST two months have sped by since the Detroit insurrection; practically a month since the outbreak in Harlem. America stands breathless at the possible recurrence of similar tragedies in those great communities and elsewhere. Our people want to hear that the authorities have gotten down to brass tacks and that a remedial course of action has been adopted. We can, at this writing, report the following: first, evidence is at hand that the Army has begun some measures—albeit haltingly—to improve the status of the Negro soldier; second, that the general approach adopted by the New York authorities has won the approval of all patriots who now wait for the word to become deed; third, that the situation in Detroit is, if anything, worse; and finally, that Attorney General Biddle has evidenced no sincere concern over abolition of the evil.

Let us consider the Detroit question first, since little official progress has been made there. The police authorities who failed the community, and the nation, those tragic days of June 20-21, have failed America again. Governor Kelly's Fact Finding Committee, composed mainly of police authorities, came to veritable Kluxist conclusions in their report last week. They blamed the Negro, whitewashed the pro-fascist groups whose record of disruption is no secret. Not only are progressives, labor and Negro leaders dismayed, but even such a conservative Republican organ as the Philadelphia "Inquirer" abhors the calcimine. The "Inquirer" said: "The very makeup of this committee was enough to make its findings suspect from the start." It consisted of the state attorney general, the county prosecutor, the police commissioner, and the head of the state police, all of them officials charged with law enforcement. "To ask them," says the "Inquirer," "to sift the causes of an outbreak that got beyond police control was absurd on the face of it." Plenty of Detroiters felt likewise, including Councilman Edwards, who announced: "I still think we need a Grand Jury to investigate these foul murders and restore public confidence." Sheldon Tappes, leader of the Ford local of the United Automobile Workers, likewise urged federal grand jury investigation.

As a result, many throughout the nation wonder today whether the fact finders are really clear of ties with the Klan and other pro-fascist gentry they so generously vindicated. Small wonder: the callous attitude displayed toward the daily injustice suffered by the Negro people of Detroit, injustice arising from the medieval institution of Jim Crow, can only provoke such suspicion. So long as fundamental issues like job discrimination, wretched housing, meager educational facilities are skirted by officials, their sincerity will be questioned.

For these reasons people are eyeing Attorney General Biddle's actions with concern. Such an outcry arose last week over his reported proposals to curb Negro migration as a solution to racial tension that he was constrained to deny knowledge of any such "present plan." The wording of his denial, however, left doubts of his genuine intention. Moreover, he is under fire for having taken no measures against the fifth columnists running rife throughout Detroit and elsewhere. Nor is this all. It is common knowledge that the War Department has urged action in a number of cases involving murder of Negro soldiers, but the Justice Department has failed to move. And shows no intention of doing so. Unfortunately the War Department has itself not taken the initiative in publicly condemning these outrages. However, it is considered most significant that Secretary of War Stimson conferred recently in Tunis with Lieut. Col. Benjamin O. Davis, Negro commander of the 99th Negro fighter squadron in Sicily. Observers interpreted this as a step in Secretary Stimson's desire to study the whole problem of our Negro troops with an eye toward improvement. It is hoped that Mr. Stimson will be moved to more aggressive action regarding the rights of Negro soldiers here at home. And that the War Department will realize the sinister role of pro-fascist organizations and will demand action against them.

In fact, leading civil rights organizations have begun a drive for 2,000,000 signatures to a petition to President Roosevelt urging him to instruct the Attorney General to eliminate the Klan, the America First Party, and other fascist-thinking groups whose avowed programs labor toward furthering dissensions between Negro and white. How many times need this be repeated: that the Axis' final hope of averting catastrophe lies through disruption of our nation's unity? It is clear enough to the average intelligent citizen: what prevents Attorney General Biddle from seeing it?

## MAKE IT A SHORT WAR

T is reasonable to surmise that a large chunk of the conversations between the President and Mr. Churchill is in the nature of an inventory of the war. Beyond that, and until there is an official pronouncement, no one can foretell what their conclusions will be. In the intervening months since they met last May, a European dictator has crashed back into the gutter, a large island outpost of the Axis empire is cleansed, and on the raging front in the East vast masses of the Wehrmacht are either in flight or under relentless Red Army pressure. Some of this picture was anticipated but many of its largest facets were not. And after all the details are added and subtracted, divided and multiplied, the total that emerges is that we are indeed on the threshold of great events.

This perhaps is only a hope. But it is an ascending hope that can reach fulfillment in victory in the remaining months of 1943. If that is the focus of all political perspectives and military planning, we can be rid of the fears that the fuglemen of pessimism and disruption have been heralding in the past two weeks. Theirs has been a furious outburst against the Soviet Union, designed very obviously to influence the consultations in Canada. It ranges from the ancient Hearst cry that we dismiss Europe for action in the Pacific, to the pinpricks epitomized in a sentence by David Lawrence in his syndicated Washington column of August 12: "Russia is constantly demanding things from the United Nations and giving little in return."

If one were michievous and wanted to reverse the sentence to read "The United Nations are constantly demanding things from the Russians and giving little in return," then he might have a more objective view of the real state of affairs of the past two years. But that is hardly what the Russians claim if one is to make any intelligent judgment of their most recent statements on the urgency of a second front. They demand nothing from us that we ourselves do not already recognize to be in our own national interest and what the opportunities of the hour dictate---triumph this year. This thought seems uppermost in their calculations and is expressed in the scope of their operations on the Eastern Front. They do not relish the role of military Santa Claus. They have given credit publicly to our offensive in the Mediterranean and our air bombardments over Europe and whether Mr. Lawrence is picayune in returning the compliment is of no account in determining the course of the war.

## By John Stuart

What the Russians seem to resent, as we would too if our positions were reversed, are the implied and explicit accusations in many American newspapers that their absence from Canada was deliberate, that they are hindering the unfolding of Allied plans. It now turns out, according to a statement by the Soviet news agency, Tass, that "the Soviet government received no invitation to the meeting, since the nature of the conference in Quebec does not call nor will it call for the presence of a representative of the Soviet government." Here it is in very brief and very simple prose. They are absent because they were not asked and the character of the meeting does not call for their participation. In essence then the reason is no different from that which kept a Russian delegate from attending the deliberations at Casablanca. The delicate balance of Soviet-Japanese relations is such that Tokyo might consider Soviet collaboration in a conference in any degree concerning the Pacific an act of war. Every sane commentator and military strategist has acknowledged that such a Far Eastern conflict would be exactly what Hitler now needs to save him from doom. Obviously the coalition as a whole would suffer immeasurably and lose a great part of the initiative which Soviet arms and valor have largely created.

Neither is there any mystery as to what a Soviet representative would say could he be present at the Canadian sessions. That would be amply clear from an editorial republished in Pravda from the Soviet labor periodical The War and the Working Class. It leaves no doubt as to what is paramount in Russian thinking. Both London and Washington had committed themselves to a second front last year. But that failed of achievement. Then Mr. Churchill in February 1943 said that in the next nine months an offensive would be undertaken. That leaves Mr. Churchill only a few more weeks before the nine months expire. It would seem to us then that the Pravda editorial is a pointed reminder that Mr. Churchill's second promissory note must soon be honored. That, one can easily gather, is the gist of the Soviet position as recorded in its press. From another angle it also is apparently the attitude of many people in London who, according to Claude Cockburn (see his dispatch on page 7), are more concerned about the outcome of the Quebec meeting than in the attending personnel. If, writes our London correspondent, the Prime Minister and the President have made up their minds to attack from the West, then Stalin's presence is unnecessary and, if they have not, Stalin's presence is useless.

What worries our Soviet ally, and a reading of the Pravda editorial shows it, is protracted warfare, and they call therefore for a strategy of "contracted" warfare. Mr. Churchill is equally aware, recalling his speech in Congress in May, of the risks of a long war which would exhaust the Allies and set the stage for a compromise peace. A prolonged war is therefore the greatest peril that confronts the coalition. And moving a step further, it would be the blindest folly if our High Command failed to grasp the apparent advantages which now exist for shortening the war. The Allies are at the peak of their strength while the enemy is disintegrating. If the opportunity-the rich and unprecedented opportunity-for a second front in the immediate weeks is permitted to slip by, then what is to be greatly feared is a disintegration of the Allies and a strengthening of the Axis. What good, for example, is Allied superiority if it is not brought to maximum use? Of what value is the fact that the Red Army is consuming Nazi reserves when in the West there is no strategic force of sufficient weight to keep the Germans from sending more reserves to the Eastern Front? Soviet arms are now engaged in a battle of decision. Nothing less. They seek victory this year -which means that all of us can have victory this year if we obey the imperatives of the military scene. This, it seems, is the meaning of the Soviet request that sixty Nazi divisions be drawn away from the East by an Allied invasion in the West. In short order the Wehrmacht would collapse both on Soviet soil and in France and the rest would be a victory parade to Berlin.

 $\mathbf{W}_{ ext{victory; we cannot pursue, if any}}^{ ext{ E}}$ such thought exists among military men, a "pushover" theory of warfare in which the Americans and the British enter upon the decisive scene of battle at their leisure. It would stigmatize us among the peoples of Europe as careless with the lives of a great ally; that a British Tommy or a doughboy is worth the lives of six or ten Russians. Such conceptions are immoral and unjust and history would so judge them. But more than that it leads to delays and gives fresh opportunities to the appeasers to sell the country down the river, to undermine the administration and defeat the pro-war forces in the coming critical elections. The pacifists, the defeatists, the isolationists of

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#### (Continued from page 5)

tests of theirs regarding political prisoners. Today their efforts, and those of all Americans, should be redoubled to give strength to the democratic forces bearing the brunt of the burden in Argentina.

## **Justice Scores a Point**

**I** T is exceedingly good news that an order staying the execution of the sentence against Morris U. Schappes has been signed by Associate Judge Loughran of the New York Court of Appeals. It will be even better news when the US Supreme Court agrees to review Schappes' conviction for "perjury." The application for such review, as Judge Loughran notes, "raises questions of law affecting the rights of the defendant under the Constitution of the United States." These questions relate to the withholding of prior contradictory sworn testimony which raises doubts as the credibility of William M. Canning, chief witness against Schappes. The Rapp-Coudert committee refused to submit to the court the record of prior hearings at which Canning had given this contradictory testimony.

**I** N arguing before the Court of Appeals for a reversal of the conviction, Henry Epstein, former Solicitor General of New York, described the original trial as "a travesty on justice" and the record of the proceedings as a "judicial lynching." We trust that the Supreme Court will agree not only to review but to reverse the conviction of the lower court.



London (by wireless).

THE public movement in Britain reported in my last dispatch developed on a somewhat sensational scale in the course of the week. More resolutions and telegrams than ever before come in from the factories pledging support of the government for the immediate opening of a second front adequate to withdraw at least sixty German divisions. Among the most recent telegrams was that sent from one of the most important Metro-Vickers factories to Churchill in Canada, asking for the immediate launching of a European offensive and expressing enthusiasm over the possible results of the Churchill trip and the Sicilian campaign.

Simultaneously workers at the great Handleypage Aircraft factory called on the government to "Make full use of this situation for an immediate mass invasion in Europe." This resolution was accompanied by a pledge of utmost support from all the Handleypage workers. The latest list of resolutions includes the shop stewards of the English Steel Corp., Blackburn Aircraft factory, and the Sheffield District Committee of the Amalgamated Engineering Union. These are only a small number of the total of similar expressions of opinion.

In fact, since last week we have witnessed an extraordinary awakening of British opinion to the realities of the situation and a corresponding slump in the wishful thinking which swept the country immediately following the fall of Mussolini. It is a fact that the Duce's fall was widely though mistakenly viewed as the collapse of a Humpty-Dumpty following a brief and costly jolt in Sicily. Only now, when the character of the succeeding regime in Italy is seen more clearly, the public is in a better position to appreciate the fact that Mussolini's tumble was due primarily to the failure of the German Eastern Front offensive.

While there has been some natural disquiet here aroused by the storm of rumors regarding Soviet non-participation in the Roosevelt-Churchill talks, most people are considerably less interested in that than in the question of the concrete decisions to be taken by the Western Allied chiefs. It is sensibly pointed out that Stalin has already made perfectly clear his view of the necessity for a Western offensive to withdraw sixty divisions. It is, in fact, more than a year since America and Britain publicly and officially recognized the urgency of establishing a second front. And it is argued here that if President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill are going to adjust Casablanca strategy to the new situation, it is unnecessary for Stalin to participate in the conference-it is only essential that there be subsequent military coordination. If, on the other hand, they are not proposing to adjust strategy in this sense, then it is clearly worse than useless for Stalin to sit in on such a conference.

**I** Is also noted that Axis propagandists and dupes in neutral and Allied countries are particularly active in efforts to suggest that Stalin's absence is a sign of a rift in the United Nations. The feeling here is that this type of propaganda is only wishful thinking. However, there is increasing anxiety for improvement in the general relations between the Western allies and the Soviet Union. And it is pointed out that those who seem to gravely underestimate the urgency of such improvement have been having something of a field day.

The latest example is a mysterious mixup regarding Benes' proposed visit to Moscow, which, according to *Pravda*, has been postponed because certain British circles are unwilling for Benes to go to Moscow to sign a mutual assistance treaty between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Those people here in a position to understand the enormous value such a treaty could have as a cornerstone in the constructive settlement of East European postwar problems are frankly dismayed at the news. The encouraging feature of this disagreeable affair is that there has been a really astonishing demonstration of unity on the question of Czechoslovak-USSR relations by all Czech and Slovakian political opinion in London. Persons ranging from the Communists to the Slovak agrarians have expressed unanimity on the necessity for the earliest possible signing of the treaty.

This fact has bearing beyond the immediate issue; it is considered an enormously encouraging sign by many people in touch with the opinion of the exiled governments and the many resistance movements in Europe. This is especially so because of the mutual agreement of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia as to the right of the peoples in the Nazi-occupied nations to determine their own system of government after liberation. For that agreement offsets doubts and suspicions regarding certain other aspects of United Nations policy, doubts fostered partly by recollections of North African events and partly by the uncertainties of organizations like Amgot.

It must be emphasized that while questions concerning the character of Amgot and the general policy of the Anglo-Americans in Italy occupy considerable space in the British press, the general trend of opinion that evolved very rapidly this past week is toward regarding these questions as entirely subordinate to the real, dominant question. And that question is: how far, on a military plane, the British and Americans are able and willing to undertake those drastice reshapings of policy which are increasingly essential if apparent advantages are to be exploited to a point where victory is achievable this year.

NM SPOT LIGHT

## FRONT LINES by COLONEL T. FROM SICILY TO POLTAVA

ORE than a month ago I wrote an article for these pages which was entitled "Sicily to Orel." Only the latter part of the title has to be changed today-"Sicily to Bryansk and Poltava." That (n + 1)'st front is still in Sicily, while the strategic situation on the Eastern Front has been completely reversed. In order to understand how completely, just get your copy of New Masses for July 20 and look at the map which accompanied my article. Now, if you could cut out the big fat arrows, turn them around 180 degrees (i.e. make them about-face), and push them somewhat toward the rear of the enemy, you would have a picture of the situation today.

The fact that these arrows have been reversed is a graphic illustration of the phenomenon which has taken place on the Eastern Front. In its essence, the phenomenon boils down to this: the German Army cannot advance any more even in the summer, while the Red Army can advance in both winter and summer. Thus an entirely new balance of forces has emerged from under the hammerblows of war.

The following table gives a clear picture of what has happened in these two years:

•	German penetration (Miles)	Front of offensive (Miles)	Duration of offensive
Summer, 1941	<b>6</b> 00-700	1,000	5 months
Summer, 1942	300-400	500	$4\frac{1}{2}$ months
Summer, 1943	18	50	7 days

There is the essence of the whole story of the armed contest between two diametrically opposite social systems.

German armor, with the new Tiger tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns, has done no better than penetrate the worward zone of the Soviet defenses at Belgorod and Maloarchangelsk to a depth of less than twenty miles, and has been able to keep up the effort for exactly seven days.

The Luftwaffe has lost the initiative on the Eastern Front and is now busy fighting off the Soviet Air Force instead of attacking the Soviet troop concentrations and communication centers. Right now it is strategically passive and tactically on the defensive while the Soviet Air Force, which is using a number of new type planes, is tactically and strategically on the offensive.

In this connection it is worthwhile pointing out to those who express disappointment at the comparative absence of long-range Soviet air raids against German objectives, that the Red Air Force has a great battle on its hands and naturally must concentrate on the enemy operational rear



(say between the front and the line of the Dvina and Dneiper) instead of going out to bomb Ploesti, Silesia, and East Prussia. The Soviet Air Command obviously figures that 240 enemy divisions packed in a zone 1,000 miles long and 200 miles wide are more important than the objectives that feed those divisions. In other words they consider that breaking the enemy's "gunhand" is more important than slowly ruining his "stomach."

THE German infantry and artillery have never been able to develop the teamwork which their Soviet counterparts have achieved. One example will illustrate the latter. Just before an attack on a German stronghold the Soviet artillery lays down a short, powerful barrage which drives the German defenders into their dugouts. While the barrage is still on, the Soviet infantry advances to the forward zone of the German defenses. Up to here everything has been happening 'according to standard rules. However, at this point things become "original." Instead of laying low and waiting for the barrage to be lifted and moved back to the enemy tactical rear (which would give the enemy at least several minutes to re-man his guns and machine guns) the Soviet infantry moves right into the barrage, between shellbursts so that when it is lifted, the German gunners rushing to their stations are confronted with the cold steel of Russian bayonets. Of course, the Soviet infantry suffers losses from its own barrage; however, it has been calculated that such losses are always much lighter than would occur if the enemy could man his guns.

Such tactics are possible only when the following conditions have been fulfilled: (1) the training of the troops in split-second maneuver; (2) both arms—infantry and artillery—have been virtually brought up together, like brothers, and (3) the infantry troops are of the highest caliber in training, morale, and discipline. Marching into your own barrage without flinching is probably one of the greatest military feats. Mass performance of such a feat is something almost unique in military tactics.

Taking the Soviet artillery alone, we must recognize that it is far superior to its German counterpart, both qualitatively and quantitatively. For instance, it has just been reported that on the Bryansk Front the Soviet High Command concentrated fire-power at the rate of 3,000 gun-barrels per kilometer. (I use the expression "gun-barrels" because it seems that the barrels of multiple guns are being counted singly; so that a six-barrel mortar would count as six "barrels.") This is several times more than was seen on the Western Front during the first world war, including Verdun and the Allied offensive in the summer of 1918.

Such artillery and infantry-artillery tactics were responsible, among other things, for the comparatively rapid reduction of the Orel defense complex which the Germans had been building for almost two years and were defending with at least a score of the best divisions.

So far it is known that the Germans, in their offensive-defensive fighting between July 5 and August 5, lost 120,000 officers and men killed and more than 12,000 captured; over 5,000 tanks destroyed and captured; 1,700 guns destroyed and captured; and 2,500 planes brought down. Now, these losses, together with the wounded Germans-calculated at the rate of 2:1 to those killed-represent the elimination of about 400,000 men. or more than half the number Moscow has been asking the Allies to draw off from the Eastern Front. Just imagine what would be happening in Germany today if that 750,000 German troops were missing today from the front between Leningrad ond Novorossisk. There is little doubt that Allied armies would be battling within the bastions of the inner Fortress Europa.

IN SICILY the Allies have all but closed a ring around the Mt. Etna massif and to all practical intents and purposes the front now (August 15) stretches from Patti on the north coast to Taormina on the east coast. It is clear that the Axis is giving up Sicily, and the only question now is, how many Germans will succeed in escaping to the mainland? Probably a good portion. Determined small rearguards fighting on the two coastal roads can give the others a good chance to flee across the narrow Straits of Messina at night. All in all, the Axis by defending Sicily will have paid with some ten unreliable Italian divisions and not much more than one German division for a delay of six weeks in the invasion of Europe-that is, if the invasion of Europe should follow the close of the Sicilian campaign immediately. A reasonable price indeed. We achieved a logistical wonder and tactically a good job, but strategically we are still "in the sticks." Or on the rim, if you prefer.

Three weeks have passed since the exit of Mussolini provided us with an opportunity to support the popular risings in Italy and help overthrow Badoglio and the King —the position now taken by the five party Italian coalition. This would have made the positions of the then few German troops in Italy extremely difficult and uncertain. Now it is quite clear that the defense line of the Northern Appennines and the Po has been manned by the Germans and, considering the time it took us to conquer Sicily, it is a fair guess that we could not reach the Brenner before winter.

To put it bluntly, a new strategic di-

rection for decisive action will have to be found. It still lies between the mouths of the Seine and the Schelde.

**I**N THE air we have been doing rather grandly, even reaching out to the suburbs of Vienna from Egypt with a mighty air blow at the Messerschmitt works in Weiner-Neustadt. By the way, that spot on the map is a rather interesting one: it is equidistant from central England, Bizerte, and Velikie Luki. And, strangely enough, it was not raided from either one of these spots, but from a base which is time-and-one-half farther away (the distance between Weiner-Neustadt and Istanbul is also equal to the other three).

Nothing of importance has happened in the Pacific since the capture of Munda which occurred one year after our first landing on Guadalcanal.

As to the action in the Atlantic, it was disclosed that we had sunk an average of one German submarine per day through May, June, and July; which is far from being bad.

Thus we are doing things in the air and on the sea, but on land we are still in the homeopathic stage of military action.



Washington.

ISSY PATTERSON'S hate sheet, the Washington Times-Herald, last week reprinted a series of articles originally prepared for Colonel McCormick's Chicago Tribune. There is nothing unusual in this procedure. The Tribune, the Times-Herald, along with the New York News-and rivaled only by the Hearst chain-have always interchanged features, and never overlook the chance to give added circulation to any new voice of disruption and appeasement. As the American and British armies advance, as the Red Army's powerful offensive gains momentum, the enemies of American security grow increasingly frenzied in their last-minute efforts to stop the war and to prevent a democratic victory. I want to call attention to four articles (there may be more coming) written by Col. Conrad L. Lanza, retired field-artillery officer whose "authoritative views" are the most recent offering by the defeatist press to the cause of destroying the war effort. I want to call attention to the spectacle of the Chicago Tribune and its satellites buying the services of a retired American army officer-one of a handful routed out of obscure retirement-to provide an aura of "official" sanction to the campaign of calumny.

Colonel Lanza is introduced to the readers of the McCormick-Patterson press as a "regular contributor to the *Field Artillery Journal* and recognized as an authority on military matters." Because of his status (the *Times-Herald* took pains to obscure Colonel Lanza's retirement and to intimate that he is still an active officer) every line, every word written by the colonel must be approved before publication by the War Department. In consequence, Colonel Lanza's remarks carry the sanction of his superiors; the illusion is created that Colonel Lanza expresses the official thinking of the War Department. This is not true, as will be shown later.

In the first article, headlined "Russians Seeking Pact with Reich, Lanza Declares," the Colonel offers the following "authoritative" facts:

"If the war goes on, and Germany is overthrown by the Americans and British, their announced intention is to disarm Germany and probably, break it up into a number of small states. If this occurs, the Americans and British will dominate Europe, and be in a position to curb certain dearly desired Russian ambitions. Russia would not have a single ally to help her."

Aside from threatening the Soviet Union, Colonel Lanza states as an accepted fact that Anglo-American policy is to create a *cordon sanitaire* in eastern Europe. No doubt certain reactionaries are flirting with the possibilities of creating a group of hostile nations to hem in the USSR. But the State Department felt it necessary to deny these rumors officially in so many words as utterly false. Colonel Lanza does not mention these denials. Instead, he presumes on his rank and prestige as a member of the American army to misrepresent American policy.

He continues: "A separate peace between Germany and Russia is a distinct possibility." Premier Stalin specifically denied this libel, and repetition has no other purpose than to disrupt the amity of the United Nations.

"In 1942," writes Lanza, "Russia was preparing for war with Germany with a view of marching through the Balkans and seizing Istanbul, Turkey. At a conference between Hitler and Foreign Commissar Molotov in Berlin in November,

## 1940, Hitler had refused to agree that Russia should have Istanbul.

"This started the Russo-German war. Undoubtedly Russia still wants Istanbul. Germany might now agree, but the British would not. As far as Russia and Germany are concerned, they are not in a position to make an agreement on Istanbul."

The above sentences, aside from the historical fiction that the Soviet Union precipitated the war with Germany, and aside from Colonel Lanza's secret information on what Molotov said to Hitler in 1940a neat trick to overhear a carefully guarded conversation from a distance of well over 3,000 miles-the above statements are attributed to "reliable sources." Colonel Lanza does not reveal his sources in the Tribune articles. But writing for the Field Artillery Journal where he repeatedly stresses the Soviet Union's alleged desire to annex Istanbul, Colonel Lanza names the New York Times of July 21, 1940, as his authority. A close examination of the Times for that date (a Sunday), produced the following stupid sentence from an article entitled "Strategic Gateway to War or Peace" appearing in the magazine section and written by J. W. Kernick, evidently the Times' Istanbul correspondent: "The Dardanelles, of course, have always been a goal of Russian imperialism." That is all. The rest of the article is devoted to a routine and superficial 'review of Turkey's turbulent history.

Not satisfied with this "source," I looked through the *Times* for the following day and found a dispatch from London dated July 21 and signed by Augur (well known White Russian). This typical dope story, which seems likely to



have impressed Colonel Lanza as the final revelation, contained the sentences: "Stalin's burning wish is to carry out the testamentary will of Peter the Great by obtaining control of the Straits between the Black and the Mediterranean seas. What successive czars failed to accomplish, Joseph Stalin wants to achieve. Characteristic of Russian methods, Mr. Stalin has now expressed his desire to see Russian control established in the Bosporus and the Dardanelles simultaneously to Berlin and London."

On this intuitive reading of Stalin's innermost mind by a professional Soviet baiter, Colonel Lanza rests his case. All other "evidence" of the Soviet Union's reputed territorial ambitions, Colonel Lanza would have to glean from inspired releases out of Berlin.

"In 1938," Lanza goes on, "the French diplomatic service reported that Russia desired a port in the northern part of Norway—preferably Tromsoe."

Here is another hearsay "fact." The French diplomatic service in 1938 was dominated by anti-Soviet intriguers assiduously preparing to betray their own country to the Nazis. The above tidbit brings back memories of Bonnet.

So the argument proceeds. In the second article, Lanza offers no proof for assertions passed off as demonstrable truth. "If the war works out as the Americans and British have planned it, with the complete extermination of the Axis in Europe and Japan in Asia as military powers, it will leave Russia surrounded by the Anglo-Saxon forces. With a Russia exhausted by unprofitable war with Germany, some Soviet leaders think their country may be forced to evacuate Mongolia to China, the Baltic states to their own people, and so on. Therefore, some Russians contend it is not to the interest of Russia that the British and Americans win an overwhelming victory. They would prefer to retain Japan in the Pacific and Germany in Europe, to offset possible complications later with the Americans and British. . . . It is possible that Russia might try to seize Istanbul. If this can be postponed until after the Axis is beaten, Turkey will get help from the British, certainly, and then from the Americans, probably, to save Istanbul for her."

The prospect of war between the Soviet Union and its Anglo-American allies is baldly threatened. Evidence bearing out this mish-mash of hate is lacking. Colonel Lanza's knowledge of what "some Soviet leaders" are thinking is, to say the least, startling.

In the fourth article, Colonel Lanza brings his discussion up to date. "If the figures are correct [of German losses during the first month of the present battle] they indicate that the Russian losses are high, and the Germans may, if they can



keep the battle going, ultimately wear the Russians out. . . Due to the importance of Japan keeping Germany in the war, concessions might be made by her to Russia to induce her to accept a separate peace. . . . Germany will not hesitate to change its form of government if it would thereby obtain some benefit. A start seems to have been made in the report that Field Marshal Keitel, Grand Admiral Doenitz and Reich Marshal Goering have been appointed as some sort of executive triumvirate to supervise military and foreign affairs, possibly with full powers to negotiate."

The above is typical of Lanza's "method." He construes the immense Soviet victories to the disadvantage of the Red Army. He again repeats the lie about the USSR concluding a separate peace (in a former article, Lanza informs us without any evidence that a separate peace "is being discussed") and he does his bit to reinforce the Tribune's insistence that Japan and the USSR are "allies." Most interesting is Colonel Lanza's trick of taking at face value Madrid rumors inspired by the Axis to the effect that Hitler has been ousted, and interpreting these rumors to bolster his separate peace remarks. President Roosevelt told a press conference that he and the State Department knew nothing about a German shift; Colonel Lanza, however, presents the rumor as fact and goes on from there to build an elaborate argument.

THE point is, Colonel Lanza's evil drivel was read and approved by the review board of the War Department's Bureau of Public Relations. If similar material, written by either a British or Red Army officer and passed by an official board of review appeared in the London or Moscow press, the effect would not, to put it mildly, be likely to improve American relations to the United Nations. Colonel Lanza's ravings are dangerous, approaching the border-line of treason to the United Nations. Certainly they are not calculated to improve morale, to push the prosecution of the war, or to cement unity with our allies.

Colonel Lanza himself is relatively unimportant. He has long woven his anti-Soviet prejudices into his columns in the Field Artillery Journal. His editor, Colonel John E. Coleman, could see nothing wrong with the Tribune articles, but also insisted that he had no control over Colonel Lanza's writings other than those appearing in the Journal, and he flatly dissociated himself and his magazine from Lanza's recent excursion in the commercial press. Colonel Coleman pointed to the Journal's legend: "No articles are official unless specifically so described." On the other hand, Colonel Coleman offered the opinion that Colonel Lanza's ideas were perfectly sound, and went on to remark that the Soviet Union is about to make a separate peace. On being reminded that this view has been denied by his Commander-in-Chief, President Roosevelt, Colonel Coleman shrugged his shoulders and changed the subject.

I suppose that as a military commentator Colonel Lanza is as competent as most self-ordained "experts." At present he writes from his home in New Hampshire, where he is a great one for maps and studies of terrain. But Colonel Lanza's military judgments already tested by history prove lamentably feeble. For the first year of the Nazi-Soviet war, he swallowed most of the German communiques, apparently without a doubt of their veracity. He reported the successive destruction of Soviet army after army. He adopted an ironical ."tut-tut" tone toward any mention of the need for a second front. He was highly contemptuous of Soviet strategy, and dismissed the Red Army's winter campaign of 1941-42 as a total "failure." He asserted blandly that the Soviet command had no war plan-the failure of the Nazis to take Leningrad and Moscow he attributed to the desire of the Nazi generals to capture these objectives at a more opportune moment. He interpreted the evacuation of Odessa as an instance of the Russians' capitulation without cause. He doubted Stalin's declaration that the German army would be weaker in 1942 than in '41.

On the other hand, Colonel Lanza is capable of recognizing the obvious. After the German debacle at Stalingrad, and after the 1942-43 winter campaign, the colonel graciously complimented the Soviet staff and actually lambasted the Nazi leaders. I was gratified to find such a prejudiced and stiff-necked brass hat admit that the events subsequent to the Red Army's defense of Stalingrad constituted a staggering blow to the Nazis, though Colonel Lanza was still not sure the Germans couldn't stage a decisive comeback. To expect Colonel Lanza to display as much perception to reality as Colonel Kernan, Max Werner, or our own Colonel T, is asking too much.

I MMEDIATELY after my inquiries at the office of the Field Artillery Journal, Walter Trohan of the Chicago Tribune telephoned me to ask what sort of "protest" over the articles I was lodging with the War and State Departments. I do not know how Mr. Trohan learned of my interest in these articles, since I had discussed them with no one except Colonel Coleman a few hours before. Mr. Trohan, however, was upset over what he considered a threat to freedom of the press in my inquiries. He also pointed out that if I persisted in discussing the matter with the War Department, my professional ethics would be cast under a cloud since my curiosity might possibly harm a fellow journalist-Colonel Lanza-who is an old man of sixty-five trying to make a living pounding a typewriter even as he and I.

Despite Mr. Trohan's warning and even with the knowledge that New MASSES' views on Colonel Lanza's journalistic outpourings will be subject to review by the McCormick-Patterson press, I called on Col. John T. Winterich, head of the War Department board that passes on articles submitted for publication by army officers.

Colonel Winterich did not consider the Lanza articles controversial, though he intimated that some people might logically feel they went too far. His office is primarily concerned with guarding military security and with preventing information of benefit to the enemy from leaking into the press. He felt that my inquiries might involve freedom of the press, though he acknowledged that there is such a thing as abusing this privilege and transcending the bounds of license. The War Department grants greater liberty of "speculation" to its re-tired personnel. The Department, the colonel told me, would be very glad to take under advisement any protest that challenged the Lanza articles. "Go ahead and write your article," Colonel Winterich advised, "send us a copy, and we will take it under consideration."

The McCormick-Patterson press has

made a practice of using the prestige and authority of army officers to dress up disruptive propaganda. If any doubt lingers as to the thinking of the men running these newspapers, I submit a selection from the writings of Frank C. Waldrop, editor of the Times-Herald, appearing on August 7: "Stalin always has been a tough baby," Waldrop declares in extra heavy type. "One observer has summed it up pretty well-that the Germans and Italians and other Europeans seeking to work diplomatic confidence games made fools of themselves trying to imitate the English, but that Stalin gets ahead by just being a 'dirty, old Oriental who sleeps in his underwear and doesn't care who knows it."

I don't know exactly what Mr. Waldrop is trying to prove. But certainly he is straining every energy to whip up a frenzy of hate against our powerful ally, the USSR. Certainly, by so doing, he and his employers are sowing suspicion that hampers the prosecution of the present war and that lays the basis of a future war which can well be disastrous to the best interests of the United States. Certainly Mr. Waldrop makes no bones about repeating propaganda initiated by Goebbels.

The War Department, by posing as a

"neutral" when it approves the writings of officers like Colonel Lanza, is open to the charge of failing to exercise proper vigilance in wartime. The Department cannot remain oblivious to interpretations bound to be made at home and abroad as a result of articles authored by army officers and approved by the War Department. Colonel Winterich intimated that he will be interested in any reaction he receives to Colonel Lanza's views.

As Colonel Lanza himself has warned in the Field Artillery Journal, "Nothing is more injurious in war than plans which do not rest on a broad basis of fact." I do not think Colonel Lanza could deny that his aphorism is just as true when amended to read: "Nothing is more injurious to the country at war than misrepresentations of and attacks against our nation's allies which do not rest on the broad basis of fact." Colonel Lanza in the service of the McCormick-Patterson axis has been guilty of rumor-mongering, distortion, provocation, and evil-intentioned gossiping. He forgets his obligations as a retired army officer to lend all support to the fight to preserve the United States from its mortal foes, and to eschew everything that provides aid and comfort to the enemy.



THE internal situation in China has reached a dangerously critical stage. The crisis expresses itself not only in the possibility of civil war provoked by the appeaser elements in the Kuomintang, but also in the near collapse of National China's war economy and the consequent weakening of the military effort.

China has been heading toward this crisis for many months; persons in a position to follow Chinese developments-and these include the military and civilian leaders of our war program-have not been caught unawares. Whether they have been caught unprepared to take whatever remedial action is open to a friendly ally is another matter. But without doubt it is generally realized throughout the world that the cornerstone of the Chinese people's magnificent resistance to the Japanese invasion has been a growing national unity among the people themselves, occasionally given impetus, though not so consistently as might have been desired, by leaders of the National Government and particularly by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The symbol of this unity was the working arrangement forged between the Kuomintang and Communist Parties in 1937, which reached

its high point in 1938 but since has been violated several times by defeatists in Chungking. Today that working arrangement has reached its lowest point, if indeed it can be said to exist at all any more. The most heroic phases of China's military effort have occurred as a result of the partial acceptance by pro-war elements in the Kuomintang of the principle of a people's war. In the fall of 1938 Chiang Kai-shek revived world hopes of China's ultimate. victory when he called for a reorganization of the armed forces, including the development of a gigantic guerrilla movement as well as preparations for a later counteroffensive by training a new army of many million men, with the most modern war equipment. Had this program been carried out in all its ramifications on the economic and political side a nation of irresistible force could have been welded and all partisan differences would have disappeared in the fight to drive the foe into the sea.

That the program was not carried out cannot be blamed entirely on China's Kuomintang leaders. Two of China's natural allies, the United States and Great Britain, failed her miserably at that time and, indeed, gave comfort and support to the Japanese enemy. When they finally altered their Far Eastern policies and adopted an anti-fascist line it was too late to do China any immediate good. The military events after Pearl Harbor placed China in an even more difficult position than before, for the Japanese seizure of the entire Malayan Peninsula and her completion of the coastal blockade closed all avenues of American and British approach. This situation still prevails and will continue until a major campaign is launched to recapture Burma and Indo-China.

**B** UT in the recent period there have been more than military factors to harm China's internal situation. One need only list a few to appreciate the effect they have inevitably had in strengthening the influence of Chungking reactionaries and appeasers. Britain's failure to mobilize the Indian people for the war and to grant a provisional government to that nation; Churchill's conditions to the Atlantic Charter declaration, the refustl to see the empire liquidated; our own failure to apply the Atlantic Charter to Puerto Rico; Darlanism in North Africa; our continued dealing with the fascist Franco; Jim Crow



and race riots in the United States; the anti-Soviet plot of the American Social Democrats; the AFL's recent kick in the face at China over the immigration question; the continuance of Red-baiting; the long delay in opening a second front on the European continent; our refusal to grant China full equality in determining the strategy of the war. And the list could be made much longer. It is true that these are not the dominant policies of war-minded Great Britain and the United States; they represent the lags, the exceptions in our determination to pit our entire strength against fascism. But the point is that in relation to China's internal situation every one of them can be and is used by disruptive elements whether they are appeasers who want a negotiated peace, fascists who fear their own people more than they do the enemy, or reactionaries who see the war only as an opportunity to profiteer.

While China's allies must share the blame for the present dangerous crisis, it is evident that the most responsible foreign observers are now taking a very serious view of the influence of defeatist elements within China. During the last few weeks a number of articles have suddenly appeared that completely lift a veil which had been carefully drawn out of deep respect for a valiant ally and from a hope that China would soon clean its own house. Pearl Buck has written "A Warning About China" in Life magazine. An American missionary, Creighton Lacy, has posed the questions in his book Is China a Democracy? The well known Far Eastern expert, T. A. Bisson has stated the issues sharply in the Far Eastern Survey published by the research organization the Institute of Pacific Relations. Bisson's charges have been thoroughly documented by Y. Y. Hsu in the summer quarterly issue of Amerasia. And the Foreign Policy Association Far Eastern expert, Lawrence K. Rosinger, has published the first of a series of articles on the subject in that organization's weekly Bulletin. Of signal importance, because its publication indicates the seriousness with which the Soviet Union views the situation, is the appearance of a timely article by Vladimir Rogov in the Soviet trade union periodical, The War and the Workingclass, warning of the danger of appeaser forces in China. Excerpts from this article have appeared in leading American newspapers; the full text may be found in the August 12 issue of the Daily Worker.

**POINTING** out that the Japanese have renewed their efforts to capitalize on the divisions within China, Rogov writes: "These Japanese plans profit from the maneuvers of the Chinese 'appeasers,' who provoke conflicts and incidents up to armed clashes, do their utmost to undermine the military collaboration of Kuomintang circles with the Communist Party, and incite the persecution and rout of the Eighth and Fourth Armies, which as units of China's united national army have inscribed many heroic pages in the history of the resistance of the Chinese people to the Japanese invaders." He further points out that China has failed to undertake large economic construction for the war because "the industrial and financial circles prefer to engage in profiteering rather than invest their capital in the armaments industry."

Speaking of the deterioration in national unity since the high point of 1938, Bisson writes: "A year or more before Pearl Harbor . . . two Chinas had definitely emerged. Each had its own government, its own military forces, its own territories. More significant, each had its own characteristic set of political and economic institutions. One is now generally called Kuomintang China; the other is called Communist China. However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might be called feudal China; the other, democratic China. These terms express the actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between the two Chinas." Y. Y. Hsu's contribution, in the Amerasia article, is to subject the war accomplishment of these two parts of China to close scrutiny based upon original Chinese sources not previously known to the American public.

The alarming stage of the Chinese situation is evident not solely from the fact that a large number of responsible experts now find it necessary to make public these extremely serious charges against our ally. The most recent events fully substantiate the wisdom of bringing the situation out into the open. It is known, for instance, that new Kuomintang divisions, probably as many as five, equipped with the best war material available to Chinese troops, have

been dispatched to reinforce the already heavily manned blockade of the Border Region from which the Communist forces operate. No doubt if the appeasers have their way these troops will do more than strengthen the already notorious blockade, they will undertake military action against the Eighth and Fourth Armies. Chiang Kai-shek, moreover, is reliably reported to have issued an ultimatum to the Communist representatives in Chungking demanding a virtual dissolution of the Communistled armies and a further territorial reduction of the Border Region. Acceptance of such demands would be tantamount to surrendering China's war effort, lock, stock and barrel, to the appeasers. Needless to say the ultimatum has been rejected.

 $\mathbf{W}^{\mathrm{ITH}}$  the information at hand one cannot predict what will happen. It is clear that the danger of civil war is greatnothing else explains the outspoken character of the Rogov articles and the wide publicity given it. It is also clear that the analysis of China's internal crisis made simultaneously in the Soviet Union and by so many outstanding authorities in the United States itself serves as a deterrent. The most hopeful factor in the Chinese scene, however, is the unquestioned strength of the Chinese people's desire for unity, for unconditional victory over the enemy, and for the avoidance of civil strife at home. That has been the factor which has accounted for China's heroic resistance thus far. It is the factor which today must be given every conceivable assistance so that again it may overcome the treacherous elements which so tragically remain in positions of authority.

F. V. F.



## WORKERS OF ALL THE AMERICAS

A firsthand report on the CTAL convention, by Frederick V. Field. What Latin America's trade unionists want. Their stand in the fight to obliterate fascism. The role of the United States.

#### Havana.

THE episode of the box of cigars symbolized the recent Havana meeting of the Council of the Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL) so I shall tell you about that first. It occurred at the closing session, held in the historic former legislative hall now occupied by the Ministry of Education. In the center of the rostrum sat the Prime Minister of Cuba, Ramon Zaydin, who presided. At his right sat the Minister of Labor, Suarez Rivas, and Lazaro Pena, secretary-general of the Cuban Confederation of Workers, the great Cuban leader to whom our State Department in their incredible shortsightedness had recently refused to grant a visa to attend the annual convention of the National Maritime Union. On the Prime Minister's left sat Vicente Lombardo Toledano, president of the CTAL and an outstanding leader of the Latin American people.

The hall, not nearly large enough, was jammed with cheering spectators. On the floor of the chamber directly before the rostrum sat the CTAL delegates. I was there as a fraternal delegate representing the Council for Pan-American Democracy and I found myself sitting next to Alberto Sanchez, one of the vigorous leaders of the Puerto Rican trade union movement. Just beyond him, wearing mourning because of the recent death of her heroic mother, sat Lygia Prestes, sister of Luis Carlos Prestes, and just behind her was Prestes' little daughter whom he has never seen. Opposite us were Jacob Potofsky, chairman of the CIO Latin American Committee, and the delegates from Uruguay and Argentina.

A Cuban labor leader opened the meeting by reminding us that the work of the CTAL Council had enjoyed the fortunate setting of a strong, united labor movement working closely with President Batista's progressive unity government. Then a representative of each of the nations present addressed the session. Mr. Potofsky was the first. As he stepped back from the microphone (the entire four-and-a-half hour meeting was broadcast locally and shortwaved to the rest of Latin America) the announcer stepped up to say: "In the name of the working people of Cuba the Prime Minister is now handing to Mr. Potofsky, the delegate from the CIO, a carved box of cigars which is being presented through him to President Franklin D. Roosevelt." An ovation followed. It was an ovation for the CIO and its representative at the Havana meeting, it was a vote of confidence in the Good Neighbor Policy, more than all else it was a demonstration in honor of President Roosevelt's progressive leadership among the United Nations fighting to exterminate the Axis.

Fidel Velazquez, the secretary-general of the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), followed and he too was presented with a box of cigars for President Avila Camacho, the leader of another great democracy. Then came Guillermo Rodrigiez of the Confederation of Workers of Colombia, and the Prime Minister handed him a box of cigars for President Lopez. The dramatic moment came when Jose Maria Argana, the delegate from the General Confederation of Workers of Argentina, stepped to the platform.

A RGANA represented the authentic trade union movement of Argentina, which only a few days before had been outlawed by the fascist clique of General Ramirez. He came from the nation which under the guise of a "neutrality" policy had given aid and comfort to the fascist powers throughout the war. Argentina was the only country in the Western Hemisphere which had failed to throw its weight behind the United Nations, a nation ruled by a dictatorship which thwarted the democratic will of the vast majority of its people through a brutal fascist repression. Argana said: "Even though there may be in the Western Hemisphere a government which is neutral, there are no neutral people. The workers do not want to be neutral because we are democratic. . . ." As he stepped back from the microphone his statement was greeted with applause. A silence fell on the assembly. All eyes turned to the Prime Minister. Was there to be a box of cigars for Ramirez? Argana quickly sensed the situation. He came back to the mike and, as every person in the hall, realizing what was to happen, rose to cheer a courageous anti-fascist, Argana told us: "I know I am not going to receive a box of cigars for the President of Argentina, and I am aware of the reason. I want to assure you, companeros, that the people of Argentina are not defeated, they are not slaves, and they never will be slaves. They are overwhelmingly anti-Nazi and anti-fascist!"

This was the great international confederation of Latin American trade unions giving direct expression to the democratic convictions of the people of the Americas. And here was a thoroughly sympathetic government completely identifying itself with the workers' convictions through their Prime Minister. It was not only the Presidents of the United States and Mexico and

Colombia that were honored as peoples' leaders in the war against fascism. Bernado Ibanez received a box of cigars for President Rios of Chile, Enrique Rodriquez for President Amezaga of Uruguay, Victor Cordero for President Calderon Guardia of Costa Rica, and, most fittingly, Lazaro Pena for President Batista of Cuba. There were other delegates, however, who left the rostrum empty-handed. One of these was Jose Arze, the fighter for democracy and trade union rights, of Bolivia; another was the stooge which the dictator Trujillo had sent over as an observer for San Domingo. Paraguay and Ecuador could not be directly represented because of internal reaction in those countries; it was obvious that their Presidents did not rate cigars. And Brazil was not there because, despite Vargas' cooperation in the war, he still refuses to permit a genuine Brazilian trade union movement. My companion, Alberto Sanchez of Puerto Rico, did not get a box of cigars either, but for another reason -that Puerto Rico had not yet been granted the right of self-determination. Some one said to me as we were leaving the hall, "Let us hope that when we come together again next year our friend from Puerto Rico will be entitled to a box of cigars for the President of the Puerto Rican nation!"

THE session I have just described came at the close of a week of meetings at which delegates from a dozen Latin American nations had focused their attention on the all-important question of smashing fascism. The meetings had been inaugurated by a great gathering at the Cuban Confederation's newly acquired Labor Palace. This large building, purchased and out-fitted with \$200,000 which had been raised among the people of Cuba, housed not only the office headquarters of the Confederation but one of the largest auditoriums in Havana. The auditorium was literally jammed to the rafters that night. A normal capacity of 6,000 or 7,000 had been stretched to nearly 10,000. Hundreds stood in the aisles and at the entrances from eight-thirty in the evening when the meeting started, until half-past one the next morning. The CTAL delegates sat on the speakers' stand. Our party-I had come with Lombardo Toledano, the president of the CTAL-arrived around ten o'clock. (To be late, I discovered, was practically a Cuban custom.)

Lombardo received a deafening ovation. An hour later another ovation greeted President Batista of Cuba, who came with members of his cabinet and the highest officers of Cuba's armed forces. As he walked up to the platform you immediately realized that the Batista government and the working people had formed a close alliance for the successful prosecution of the war. Batista came to that meeting as the leader of the Cuban people. He spoke to the great audience and to the representatives of other countries as a man who had identified himself and his policies completely with the democratic aspirations of the trade union movement. It was at once evident that this was no show put on for our benefit. We had come to a genuinely progressive nation in which all except defeatists, Falangists, and Trotskyites were united against the Axis. And there was no question but that they were united under the leadership of President Batista.

As he came on the platform the first person the President greeted happened to be Blas Roca, the general secretary of the Cuban Communist Party and member of the Chamber of Deputies. Batista then shook hands with Anibel Escalante, the editor of the progressive newspaper *Hoy*. As he greeted Lombardo Toledano with the typical Latin embrace, the crowd cheered wildly. But their greatest enthusiasm was reserved until a little later when Lygia Prestes, who had only recently come to Havana from Mexico City, was presented and the President of Cuba asked to be introduced to her.

T WAS in this stirring atmosphere that the perspectives of Latin America's workers were first drawn for us, principally in the three great speeches by Lazaro Pena, leader of the Cuban workers; Lombardo Toledano, and President Batista. The picture that emerged was somewhat as follows: The war has reached a final stage. The Soviet Union has stopped Hitler's armies in their tracks. Its counter-blows have destroyed vast quantities of German supplies and men. A great Soviet offensive is now under way. British and American forces, sweeping through Sicily, are about to take Italy out of the war. The stage is set for the final crushing of Hitler between the might of the Red Army and an Anglo-American invasion of the continent. But even though the final stage of war was at hand there was no over-optimism exhibited in the Cuban Labor Palace that night. On the contrary, the point was made over and again that the war was by no means won. Much remained to be done and it had to be done quickly.

The urgency of getting on with the war speedily was emphasized throughout the CTAL meeting. The longer a second front is delayed the more uncertain and the more costly will be the victory. The longer the war takes the more critical will become the economic crisis of the Latin American nations, and the sharper that crisis becomes the more difficult it will be for the democratic, progressive forces to combat



Vicente Lombardo Toledano

the divisive, defeatist influence of reactionaries and fifth columnists. For Latin America is part, and an important part, of the war's home front; and as President Roosevelt has said, the home front cannot be distinguished from the battle front.

 ${f M}^{
m ost}$  of these Latin American nations are just as truly in the war as they would be if it were possible for them to equip and dispatch large forces overseas. They are supplying at an ever increasing rate industrial and agricultural raw materials to the United States war effort. Workers and progressive governments and other pro-war elements have seen to it that production has increased and that the flow of materials to North American factories constantly grows. Money has flowed back in payment for these exports, but in the failure throughout the Western Hemisphere to convert from peacetime to genuine war economy this inflow of capital has had an increasingly inflationary effect. The normal solution, the purchase of machinery and other capital equipment from the United States for industrialization, has been denied because of our own war exigencies. The resulting increase in the cost of living, accentuated in many instances by hoarding, profiteering, and corruption, has placed a heavy burden upon the working people. As the CTAL delegates pointed out, this is where the war is being most severely felt in Latin America. It is this factor of growing economic crisis-the exorbitant prices of the essentials of life and widespread poverty and misery-that more than any other factor provides a playground for the insidious games of the fifth columnists. And it is toward this economicpolitical sector that the brains and the strength of the trade union movement are being directed.

In the interests of the war, increased production, and national unity, the CTAL and its constituent unions have taken the no-strike pledge. They are committed to labor-management cooperation. At the same time they know, just as do the unions in the United States, that the worst enemy of production is poverty. The problem is the same in Latin America as it is with us. The necessities of war require that prices be controlled. But if, because of the refusal of conservative elements to convert to a thoroughgoing war economy and through the action of defeatists, hoarders, and speculators prices are not controlled, then wages, too, must be permitted to rise. Labor's win-the-war policy prefers pricecontrol to wage increases but if the former fails, the latter must be demanded. This position was made clear by Lombardo Toledano and by each of the national trade union leaders.

Unfortunately even the more progressive, democratic countries of Latin America have not prevented a terrific rise in the cost of living. In Cuba, for example, the cost of food has risen sixty-four percent since September 1939. Wages, on the other hand, have not increased more than twenty percent on the average. The pinch on the common people is becoming unbearable. From this special factor-and remember that it dominates Latin America in the war-as well as from the hope for speedy victory shared by anti-fascists the world over, arises the feeling of desperate urgency about hurrying up with the war, the feeling that was so conspicuous at that opening CTAL meeting. The economic situation of the masses of Latin Americans and the political problems arising from it are too serious to permit a moment's delay in the final blow to crush Hitlerism. The cry "Open the Second Front!" which rang through the Cuban Labor Palace that night was based on the hard realities of the cost of food, shelter, and medicine.

HERE was a second point emphasized by Lazaro Pena, Lombardo Toledano, and President Batista that night: the meaning of unconditional surrender. The complete wiping out of fascism throughout the world is something concrete and specific to a Latin American worker in a sense somewhat different from our own experience. Consider what fascism symbolizes to the tin miner in Bolivia, the streetcar conductor in Paraguay, or the metal worker in Argentina. It means the virtual slavery imposed on tens of thousands of families by the Patino Hochschild-Arramayo tin monopolies; it means the brutal jails of Paraguay where virtually all the democratic leaders are incarcerated; it means the suppression of constitutional rights by the Ramirez clique in Argentina; it means the

imprisonment of Luis Carlos Prestes in Brazil; it means the Sinarquists in Mexico, the Falangists in Cuba. It means the Yankee imperialism which President Roosevelt and Vice-President Wallace have pronounced dead but which so often lives on in the activities of private American monopolists. Yankee imperialism is the nightmare which may again become a reality if the win-the-war forces are defeated in the United States and replaced by the coalition of hideous forces which are now trying to capture the Republican Party from the Willkie progressives. It was evident that this specter was constantly in the minds of delegates at Havana.

These are the immediate expressions of fascism in Latin America. And when we speak of carrying the war on to unconditional surrender, when we speak of complete victory over the forces of fascism, our brothers in Latin America think not only of Hitler and Mussolini and Horohito. At the CTAL meeting they were thinking, too, of all the elements and forces and institutions operating to hold back the unfolding of their democratic aspirations, the final completion of the Latin American revolutions for national independence.

I do not mean to give the impression that the delegates at the CTAL meeting took the view that the winning of the war would bring the millennium. Far from it. I do intend to emphasize that they were acutely conscious of the existence of appeaser, defeatist and anti-democratic forces in our midst which unless smashed to unconditional surrender would nourish the kernel of fascism even after the military defeat of the Axis. There can be no doubt that Darlanism had been a profound shock to Latin American workers. The delay in opening the second front greatly disturbs them. They find it difficult to correlate our hasty recognition of the Ramirez gangsters and our cordial treatment of the Latin American dictators or our treatment of Puerto Rico with the declaration of the Atlantic Charter and the Good Neighbor Policy as expounded by President Roosevelt and Vice-President Wallace. The "zoot-suit" riots in Los Angeles, the race riots in Detroit, Beaumont, and elsewhere, the markedly anti-democratic attitude of the FBI, the deliberate efforts of influential American elements to sabotage the CTAL furnished grounds for extreme anxiety and pointed to the paramount importance of unity among all the democratic forces of the homisphere against these black spots in our war effort. Victory over fascism, in other words, must be won not only in a military sense but in a political sense as well.

The battle cry issued by the CTAL was Win the War Speedily and Win It Unconditionally! Our contribution as Latin American workers, they said, is to step up the production of strategic materials to

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the maximum, to give unstinted cooperation in the economic field, and in the political field to work hand in hand with the leaders of the United Nations and with the progressive people's organizations throughout the world to exterminate the last vestiges of fascism.

THE effectiveness of Latin America's participation in the war depends largely upon the strength of democratic forces within each of the Latin American nations. Foremost among these forces, in terms of actual organizational strength, accomplishment, and political leadership, is the CTAL. But, as Lombardo Toledano repeatedly emphasized, no matter how strong the CTAL and other democratic elements in Latin America may be, or may become, they will not succeed in their historic task without the active cooperation of similar progressive forces in other parts of the world and particularly in the United States. For Latin America must still be viewed primarily as an economic empire of the United States. Neither Cuba, nor Mexico, nor for that matter even Brazil or any other of the Latin nations, is sufficiently strong to stand against North American reaction, should that return to the saddle. The democratic forces of the United States and of the nations to the south must not only win and hold the fort of anti-fascism in each of their respective countries, but to do so they must work hand in hand with each other. To win the war quickly and completely and to win the peace the United States needs the cooperation of the people of Latin America. And just as certainly, to win and maintain their own freedom the people of Latin America must have the support of their fellow progressives in our country.

For this reason the participation in the CTAL Executive Council meeting of Jacob Potofsky of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, representing the CIO as chairman of its Latin American Committee, was of the utmost importance. It is true that unlike the situation in many Latin American nations, where under the influence of the CTAL complete labor unity has been achieved, the labor movement in the United States is split. Neither the AFL nor the Railroad Brotherhoods accepted the invitation to attend the Havana meeting. Nevertheless the most dynamic and progressive section of American labor was represented and on the part of both Mr. Potofsky and the CTAL the doors of welcome were left wide open to all other branches of US labor.

Mr. Potofsky was able to report a growing interest on the part of the CIO in the welfare of their Latin American brothers. As a token of this concern he announced the gift of a generous fund to the Bolivian workers for the relief of the families of the victims of the outrageous Catavi massacre of last winter. There can be no doubt that this interest, and particularly the development of closer working relations with the CTAL and with its constituent unions, will be intensified. The two movements have much to contribute to each other.

It is my personal impression that American labor can be of the utmost help to Latin American labor in the strengthening of the latter's trade union machinery and in furnishing the moral and political support of a powerful and friendly neighbor. It is likewise my impression that American labor has much to learn from our Latin American brothers in the sphere of political leadership and participation in national affairs.

IN HIS closing speech, Vicente Lombardo Toledano turned directly to the North American delegate and said, "Companero Potofsky, tell our brothers of the CIO, of the AFL; of the Railroad Brotherhoods, tell all your people what our program is. Tell them that we want a new Latin America, a new America, and a new world. Tell them that we no longer want to feel the indifference of those who would be our step-fathers, that all men and women of the Americas, putting aside any and all inferiority complexes, being proud to be Americans, dedicate themselves to the realization of a new world."

The achievement of unity and cooperation is the essence of the Good Neighbor Policy. It means the welding of a vast coalition of nations in different stages of development throughout the hemisphere for the single purpose of conquering the Axis. It presents problems of the utmost complexity which can be solved only by the joint efforts of all concerned, the governments, the employers, and the workers. It is the CTAL and its component national trade union movements which of all these groups has most realistically and constructively tackled the question of gearing Latin America to the anti-fascist war. If our State Department only knew it the best friend of our war effort in Latin America is the trade unions. And this is natural, for no other sector of the population realizes so clearly the urgency of smashing every vestige of fascism abroad and on the home front. The trade union movement is Latin American democracy. Where the unions are strong, as in Cuba, Mexico, Uruguay, Chile, and Colombia, there you have the greatest degree of democratic development, the most substantial contribution to the war. Where the unions have been suppressed and the workers' leaders persecuted, as in Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador, and Argentina, fascism retains strong footholds. It is our war job to extend our fullest support to the CTAL and to its leader, Vicente Lombardo Toledano.

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

## A TALK WITH GOV. SALTONSTALL

"We must be friends with all peoples," says this Republican leader, the highest official of the Bay State. Joseph North interviews the governor, and reports on Massachusetts.

**X** You cannot jam a journey to Massachusetts, an interview with a governor, and a ride on virtually a troop-train into one page-so my column this week grew into an article. The visit to Boston proved more than rewarding: much exhilarating talk with tanned veterans of twenty-one or so on the New York, New Haven and Hartford train chuck-full of warriors, and an hour's talk with Gov. Leverett Saltonstall. A solid day. Your columnist has said to himself recently that a man must get around. For one reason or another he hasn't lately. The battlefronts beckoned-North Africa, Sicily, Britain, Russia-but there were obstacles. Perhaps there won't be tomorrow. Meanwhile your correspondent decided to see more of the home front. Let's start with a journey to Boston.

You cannot write about America today without noting the trains sliding across America. They're virtually troop-trains, and it does you good to see the stock America has produced. I like too the camaraderie I have seen between civilians and soldiers. Here is the citizens' army; the warriors are the flesh-and-blood of the civilians about them. A warm courtesy earmarks relations, and the boys in uniform act easily, as though Main Street is every part of the country, and they are in the bosom of the family. This I learned on the train: the men on furlough cannot wait to get up the front porch into the door. The family ties are close, the burdens of war have drawn everybody nearer. More often than not the boys I talked with said they are coming home "unbeknownst to Mom." The chunky lad with the service stripes said he wanted to see the look on her face when he walks in. Returned from three continents, the sailor eyed the sunlit beaches of Stamford avidly. "I used to go swimming there, right there where the skiff is." Son of an immigrant Portuguese fisherman, this native-born Yankee pointed out the places where the smelts ran. "Out there, right out there," he said excitedly, "I caught many a fish." You could feel the nostalgic past well up on him. There is nothing like homecoming from battle. Home is sweet even though our warriors cotton to the folk they meet in other parts. I was struck by their warm references to the peoples they had met-the black in Africa, the brown in the Pacific, the white in Britain. The Yank abroad, I thought, sloughs off his provincialism as a halfback rushing onto the gridiron sheds his sweat-shirt.

Governor Saltonstall picked up where the soldiers left off. Father of two sons and a daughter in the service, he told me, he is waiting for word from his boy somewhere in the Pacific, veteran of Guadalcanal. (He waits for a letter and a Connec-. ticut fisherman waits for a letter. War makes all fathers kin.) You felt you talked with a man to whom the words "my native land" mean a lot. National unity is more than two words in an editorial. Patriot, I felt, there in the governor's office decorated with ancient banners, is a big word, big enough to encompass the six-foot blueblood whose forefathers came sailing up the James River several hundred years ago, and that fisherman's son whose father got here from a suburb of Lisbon a decade or two back to supply New England with many a ton of smelts, and a strapping boy who fought for his native land on three continents of the world.

 $\mathbf{A}_{ ext{tiny stretch of the map along the At-}}^{ ext{ltmough this trip of mine went up a}}$ lantic seaboard, it underscored the sense I feel of a deep, underlying internationalism among our people which belies the hullabaloo in most of the press. I believe it will be hard to sell our folk an isolationist bill of goods. What these soldiers and sailors feel, what others I have talked to feel, indicate to me that Wendell Willkie was not talking for himself in One World. He has his ear to the ground. And Governor Saltonstall, too, is listening. "We must all of us, Great Britain, United States, Russia, and China, pull together to win. And we must pull together in the postwar world," Mr. Saltonstall told me. The soldiers and sailors didn't put it in those words. But the sense of it was that. A time like today requiring the utmost patriotism, love of country, brings with it regard for other men's



Gov. Leverett Saltonstall

countries. "The people in my state and from what I see of the Gallup polls nationally," the governor said, "indicate a trend away from isolationism. People are coming to understand that we are part of an inter-related world, and that we cannot stand aloof. And that feeling will intensify after the war is over." I mentioned my talks on the train and the governor nodded. "Eleven, twelve million young men and women will come back from every corner of the world knowing that: that we must be friends with all peoples and that our government, therefore, has a greater world obligation than ever before."

Looking ahead into the postwar world, he was eager for anything that would forestall widespread economic debacle. A well thought out public works program would help greatly; he believed that social insurance policies would be beneficial. He had talked with Sir William Beveridge, and felt there was a lot of good in the Britisher's ideas. Unlike some Republicans in Congress who shudder at the mystic, possibly subversive, symbols of Phi Beta Kappa, Mr. Saltonstall felt that "professors in the colleges" - economic authorities - should be working on the question all the time. When I mentioned labor, too, in this respect, he told me he had set up a state committee shortly after Pearl Harbor to ponder these economic postwar issues and he was certain his state would be able to surmount any possible crisis without "injury" to the working people.

M<sup>Y</sup> impression of this six-foot, gangly, low-spoken governor was that of a patriotic conservative; a man who wants a strong America, sovereign, and, in this fight to keep it so, is learning that you cannot succeed without a lot of help. From that Portuguese fisherman's son, for instance. From the riveter, the baker, the brakeman, the stenographer, the schoolteacher. That's a lot to learn in one lifetime for a Republican blue-blood whose early political days lacked understanding of the man at the bench. He seemed to have come a long way. "I've learned a lot," he said. I like to hear a governor say that, particularly a Saltonstall (R., Mass.). A decade or so ago he was generally recognized as a State Street man, a spokesman for the Commonwealth's most affluent bankers. He himself is said to be a millionaire many times over and these facts weighed heavy against him when he began his political career. Massachusetts labor cocked a wary eye at him. But his reelection to the governor's chair last year came with labor's support generally.

"I've learned a lot these past six years," he repeated several times when we touched on the question of labor. "The unions have cooperated loyally with the government in this state": he expressed pride that Massachusetts stands second throughout the country in the number of Army and Navy E awards; that its strike record ranks among the lowest in the nation, perhaps second. He attributed that to the loyal desire of labor and management to submerge their differences for the common goal-victory. He had early appointed CIO and AFL representatives to a victory cabinet, and he has spent a good deal of time trying to convince the unionists that he is their friend, and not a blue-blooded enemy.

He had gained the confidence of working men because he loyally supported the President's program; in fact, was considered one of FDR's staunchest advocates since 1940. "My record shows that," and he indicated that he wanted to see all Americans behind the President and his war program.

All to the good, I thought during the interview. Here was a forward-looking executive, a man "who had learned a lot," and evidenced eagerness to continue learning so that his nation will stay sovereign. This was a Willkie Republican in the flesh: a man whose war record attested to the fact that there are Republicans who don't mean the same thing Herbert Hoover means; a man who talks a different language from Sen. Robert Taft, and the whole caboodle of GOP defeatists in Congress. Yes, he had learned a lot.

 $B_{\rm never-ending}^{\rm ut}$  education is an evolving process, a never-ending one. And the governor who is learning and recognizes that, may still have some things to unlearn. Some aspects of the picture left me disturbed. I don't know how much Politics-with a capital P-was involved when we discussed the issue of the fifth column, indigenous as well as imported. Detroit, for instance. He said he could not answer for the rest of the country but so far as Massachusetts is concerned, he did not believe there would be any similar trouble there. "Knock wood," he muttered grimly, tapping the beautiful mahogany desk. "We have only a small Negro population and there is no Klan. There was one in 1923 but it has died out. As far as anti-Semitism is concerned, I don't think we have much of a problem there. Jews and Catholics and Protestants are working together very well for the war." What bothered me was that I was apprised of strong Christian Frontist influence in Boston, and I wondered why the governor skirted the issue. He did say that Time magazine had run an item about ill-feeling between Jews and Catholics and that he had had the matter investigated, but found little, if anything, to warrant the Time statement. Undoubtedly, the majority of Massachusetts-Protestant, Jew



Catholic—were hauling together, but a sinister minority of Coughlinites can wreak a lot of damage. And there's no good in blinking the danger.

Another disturbing fact: I learned later that Governor Saltonstall's speech at the Governor's Conference in Ohio recently did not jibe exactly with his unquestionably fine record of cooperation with the administration. He was never given to baiting the President's domestic program, but at Columbus that crept into his speech. I pondered over it and later queried some political observers in Boston. One explained it in these terms: Saltonstall, he said, has a fine war record. But there is pressure on him to run as a dark horse in case Wendell Willkie doesn't get the Republican nomination. Some of Saltonstall's associates are trying to influence him toward "a safe middle course," to ride high on the popu-larity of Willkie internationalism, but to show the Hoover crowd that he isn't too far away from them on domestic issues. Thus, perhaps, both sections of the GOP can agree on the governor as candidate.

I don't know if this is true, of course. I hope not. But those words at Columbus are disturbing. Indeed it would be a pity if the hitherto far-sighted governor reversed the track and moved back from the vantage point he has won. For he has a big job in his important state. He has, it is obvious, entrenched himself with the rank and file. No breath of scandal hovers over his administration as it did in previous governors' times. He seems too to have torn himself away from his labor-baiting past; he has always had a good civil liberties record. For all these reasons he is in a strong position to throw his weight around in Massachusetts and influence those among his Republican colleagues who have been voting bad in Congress. And most of the state delegation has done scandalously on the President's domestic program. The governor's friends in labor cite the fact that Allen T. Treadway, Pehr G. Holmes, Charles L. Gifford, all GOP congressmen, as well as Joe Martin, Republican minority leader in the House, refused to sign the discharge petition for the anti-poll tax bill. (And I might add here that talk persists of a movement in some Republican circles to groom Martin as a presidential possibility.)

Labor here, as elsewhere, is in no mood to temporize with dalliers or obstructors along the road to victory. They like the governor because he is a win-the-war man. They don't like what too many other politicians in the state are up to. So union delegations are making themselves at home in the offices of congressmen. George L. Bates, of Salem, for instance, who flatfootedly opposed every point in Roosevelt's seven-point program, got an earful from a labor delegation. Others are being seen as this is written. There is much censure of the Commonwealth's GOP delegation in Washington for its opposition to the President's domestic program. The three Democrats, McCormick, Curley, and Lane, have generally voted otherwise.

The picture differs somewhat in the state administration, which holds a number of Willkie Republicans. Attorney General Bushnell minced no words during the last elections when he condemned Senator Lodge's isolationism and generally defeatist cussedness. Unfortunately, however, the state legislature is burdened by a strong group of Farley Democrats who oppose FDR's foreign as well as domestic policy. The voice of the Christian Front was heard more than once in the recent session of the legislature. The state is rife with defeatist Democrats-remember, this is the home ground of such worthies as Sen. David Walsh who is quietly up to no good in Boston, lining up as much opposition as he can to the administration's policies. Even the governor's close friend, Christian Herter, the only Massachusetts congressman who voted against Dies, has consistently opposed FDR's economic program.

GOVERNOR SALTONSTALL can be a powerful force counterposed to the enemies of victory; his supporters ask if he has done all he can. His newly won friends in labor and throughout the state generally look to him for leadership. They indicate that he will not retain their loyalties if he seeks to curry favor with the Hoover Republicans and treads softly on vital domestic issues and upon the paramount imperative of this time: national unity for victory. Doubtless there are strong temptations: the presidential bee has done many strange things to strong men. But if Governor Saltonstall is to keep faith with the fisherman's son and his own boy in the Pacific he will march steadfastly along the road he has taken since 1940. "I have learned a lot these past years," he said. His friends hope he will draw the full implications of his lessons: the path toward Hoover is the path toward defeat. JOSEPH NORTH.

## WHEN HOOVER BEGINS TO COO

Morris U. Schappes looks at the "lasting peace" proposed by the defeatist Old Guard of the GOP—and finds neither peace nor honor. The meaning of their anti-Sovieteering.

NE of the most curious phenomena of recent years is the success with which Herbert Hoover, who left the Presidency so ignominiously ten years ago, has reestablished himself as an elder statesman, seer, and eminent patriot. One would have thought that his active and open defeatism prior to Pearl Harbor would have been sufficient to discredit him permanently. Yet the fact is that his dangerous book The Problems of Lasting Peace, written in collaboration with Hugh Gibson, was hailed as an important contribution to American thought-and not only by reactionaries, but even in winthe-war circles, including certain liberal quarters. The Book-of-the-Month Club has issued a volume containing the full text of that book side by side with Wendell Willkie's One World and the speeches of Vice-President Wallace and Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles. And a conference at which outstanding public figures are represented, the Emergency Conference to Save the Jews of Europe, includes Hoover (together with Hearst!) among its honorary chairmen, though the policies of the ex-President, had they been adopted by our government, would have led to the destruction of the Jews not only in Europe, but in America and throughout the world by the Nazi murder gangs.

No one who objectively examines Hoover's recent proposals on such questions can fail to observe a consistent pattern of obstructionism. For an appreciation of the full meaning of this as in essence a pattern of defeatism it is necessary, however, to examine his most recently published views on foreign affairs.

Thus early in January, while President Roosevelt was in Casablanca planning offensive coalition action, Hoover issued widely syndicated newspaper articles cautioning us against invading Europe in 1943, warning us against attempting to do "too much too soon." Hitler needed time to rebuild an industrial and military strength that was being drained on the Eastern Front; Hoover was proposing to give it to him.

This past spring the thinking of our nation on the global character and aims of this war of national liberation was vitalized by the publication of Wendell Willkie's One World and the speedy sale of more than 1,000,000 copies. Willkie articulated the conclusions that millions in this and other countries had already drawn —that not only is peace indivisible but so is freedom. He added the equally important thought that standards of living are indivisible, that extreme poverty in any country affects the wealth of all nations, now linked as they are by the world market. The nations united in war against the Axis must be united in battle, in victory, and in peace. And the key to this unity, Willkie emphasized, was our relations with the Soviet Union and the new China.

Almost as if in direct reply, Hoover and Gibson published in *Collier's* a series of four articles entitled "New Approaches to Lasting Peace," which restate and develop the fundamental line of their book. Streaked with the camouflage of platitude, these articles contain within them, in subtle and cautious formulation, the spreading roots of little less than defeatism. If the authors avoid being explicit, their obfuscation makes it even more imperative that critics thinking seriously about the war cut through the fog to the implacable hostility to the war that is at the heart of Hoover's and Gibson's counsel.

FIRST, it must be noted that they do not in any way regard this war as a struggle for the very survival of our country as an independent nation. In their eyes, we are not at war because we were compelled to resist the political, economic, and final military aggression of a Hitler-dominated Axis bent on world conquest. They reject the mountainous evidence of the past decade that no country has been able to do business with Hitler without speedily losing its national independence, its territory, its peace, its institutions, its economy, its religious freedom, its labor supply, and the very lives of millions of its citizens. They still insist that we are in this war needlessly because we are international busybodies who refused to allow Hitler to have his way. They put it this way: "If we had been prepared to sacrifice China and had not concerned ourselves to save Europe from military aggression we would not have been attacked at Pearl Harbor. ... Sometimes one could wish all this were remembered when we are castigated for not doing enough for this nation or that." Is it only an accidental echo of Hitler's line, this charge by an ex-President and an ex-ambassador that our government is responsible for this war? Hoover and Gibson would have us forget what the experience of the nation and in fact of the whole world has taught it: that "sacrificing" China and Europe would not have meant peace for the United States-it would have meant subjugation to Hitler's economic control, and the rule of our country by Americans acceptable to Hitler's

ways and ends. In France Hitler found the Lavals; in the United States he would have the Hoovers.

Once collective security as proposed by the Soviet Union was rejected, and Hoover's steadfast hostility contributed much to this rejection, our nation really never had a choice between peace or war. The real choice became one between enslavement by the Axis or resistance to it-political, diplomatic, and (when attacked) military resistance. In the political and diplomatic field, our pre-war resistance to the Axis was terribly weak. Suspicion and distrust of the Soviet Union, furthered by masses of misinformation about it, led to the estrangement of our country from this most powerful of allies. During the Soviet Union's war with Finland—an obviously just war as seen in retrospect-Hoover led those American forces that tended to break completely with the USSR. Hoover headed the aid-Finland movement that sent money, food, supplies, and even recruits enlisted to fight in this anti-Soviet crusade. He who rebukes us coldly for not "sacrificing" China and all of Europe to the Axis, and who is cold to the aid we render nations whose self-defense against our common enemy is in our own national interest, also found it intolerable to conceive that one hair of Mannerheim's head might be "sacrificed" to the main bulwark of the United Nations. If we did not go to war with the Soviet Union to "save Finland" it is certainly not because of anything Hoover left undone or unsaid. As it was, despite everything Hoover did, it was Hitler's aggression against the Soviet Union and then against us at Pearl Harbor that jolted our country into recognizing what should have been clear long ago: that we could have neither victory, peace, nor security without alliance with the Soviets.

BUT there is another aspect to this matter of whether we could have done business with Hitler and thereby preserved peace. If the war is our own fault, shouldn't we get out of it at once, by some "negotiated peace"? Certainly an unjust war that is really none of our business is not worth prosecuting. Perhaps before we completely get into the fighting, we should reconsider the cost? How much responsibility is Hoover's for the fact that his admirer, Gerald L. K. Smith, who repeatedly praises Hoover in his fascist magazine, The Cross and the Flag, has organized "We, the Mothers of America" to help pull us out of the war long before the national goal of unconditional surrender is achieved? Does not Hoover's advice, given in January, that we not invade the continent in 1943 provide a little more time for the maturing of such "peace" maneuvers? It is worth remembering that on Oct. 26, 1942, Mr. Gibson, lecturing at Columbia University, declared that the officers of the German army "are Germans first and Nazis afterwards. They did not want war, fearing that the whole world would go up in arms against Germany. When victory becomes sufficiently remote the army leaders will take Hitler into protective custody." (New York Times, Oct. 27, 1942.) Without stopping to ask what evidence there is that the Junker Reichswehr leaders opposed the war, it is pertinent to ask this: "Suppose these army leaders should now, as they are about to face a two-front war, decide to sacrifice Hitler as a pawn in a 'negotiated peace,' would Mr. Gibson support such a move and propose that we do business with a Hitler-less Nazi Germany?" Certainly, it seems to me that the Hoover and Gibson articles, as well as their book, try to incline the country toward such maneuvers, which would rob us of an unconditional victory and the very possibility of lasting peace.

But Hoover and Gibson do more than mat. Startling as it may seem in view of the fact that they speak in the dazzling name of "lasting peace," they still reject outright the concept of collective security. One of the "lessons" they choose to draw from the League of Nations' failure to prevent this war is that economic sanctions cannot work: "This idea [economic sanctions] has been revived under the term of 'quarantine' and seems to haunt many thinkers. The word itself adds stigma to injury. . . . It can be concluded that quarantine, blockade, or economic sanctions applied to great nations mean war and that any other belief is fooling." The following implications are noteworthy: first, that President Roosevelt, the author of the phrase "quarantine the aggressor," is chided for stigmatizing Hitlerism as aggressive and malignant; second, that we are in this war because of the Roosevelt policy of "quarantining," when in point of fact the policy, although announced as an objective, was never carried out because of the hostility to it on the part of Hoover and his followers; and third, and most important, that the policy of quarantining be avoided in the future lest it bring new wars.

Now it has consistently been the argument of the aggressor nations that those who in any way resist them are in fact the cause of the war. While there is no more sense in that theory than in the idea that a man robbed is the cause of the robbery, it nevertheless was useful in paralyzing such nations as France to the extent that they collapsed without any resistance. But to argue now, as Hoover and Gibson do,

that non-resistance to aggression is the price of peace after this war, is to put a premium on aggression and a "stigma" on resistance. It cannot be assumed that they expect the postwar period to be so harmonious as to rule out even the *possibility* that some nation might resort to aggression or to threats of aggression. Then how are such threats or such acts to be dealt with first if not by some collective peaceful action? A "quarantine" might not succeed, in which case sterner and sterner measures might be necessary up to the point of using international military sanctions against the aggressor. But that is far different from the Hoover and Gibson thesis that any collective action must lead to war. Have we forgotten that Hitler, and in the democracies those who. abetted Hitler, constantly asserted that "sanctions will mean war," that they succeeded in preventing the application of sanctions and that the inevitable result was the war we are now fighting?

The specific "new" proposals Hoover and Gibson make in *Collier's* are no more reassuring as to their intentions and outlook. First, they would postpone the attempt to build a world institution until about ten years after the end of the war. Against the concept of a United Nations postwar organization, they pit the concept of the "regional council." They seek to gain support for their idea by maintaining that it coincides with that put forward by Churchill in his address of March 21, 1943. But this claim is quite untenable, for Churchill made it clear that he put the organization of a world institution first: "One can imagine that under a world institution embodying or representing the United Nations, and some day all nations, there should come into being a Council of Europe and a Council of Asia." Churchill, clearly, looks forward to the organization of collective, world security with a world institution as the instrumentality for maintaining it. But Hoover and Gibson, operating on the premise that the United States and its hemispheric region could have kept out of the war by accepting a Hitler-Japanese regional revision of the world, would delay even consideration of a world institution and seek to substitute the idea of regional security for world security.

For "global planning" they express open contempt. Referring to Willkie's circumnavigation of the social and political globe, Hoover and Gibson seek to mock his conclusions by this triumphant *reductio ad absurdum*: "Are we prepared to adopt Oriental philosophy, religion, economic standards or ways of life because we can more easily know their views and their way of



## The Conqueror

The gray marchers came like a fog in the season of death. The fog and the people do not live together. No one is here but the gray marchers.

They walk the wet streets, they witness the echo.

They visit monuments, their Baedeker knows everything but life.

They finger the shops: wool, silk, paintings, food, the figures of glass.

No one speaks . . . this conquest is wrapped like a bale.

The war plan was flawless, the general staff received the compliments of the leader.

But how to swallow a nation? The door they broke down is oddly closed,

The shade drawn on the dusty window, the house grave as a winter's sleep.

No one is home.

The family is in the hills with the fighting men.

The great migration rolled out as the fog came over;

No one was on the roads, the spirit went shoeless to another place.

A land may be taken; but how to possess a people?

How to follow a military compass in the lonely substance of a dream;

How to occupy a cloud, the lightning in the mountains of the sky. Don Gordon.

living?" They would have us believe that Willkie and other exponents of world unity rest their case naively on the mere technological possibilities of transportation when in fact Willkie was dramatically pointing up the necessity of achieving world unity if we are to avoid endless world chaos and world destruction. There is no question here of our adopting other philosophies or religions, or of reducing our standards of living; the issues are whether we shall participate with the remainder of the world in the work of upgrading standards of living whose very lowness is a threat to our security and whether we shall make it impossible for "philosophies" of aggression to make headway.

Second, Hoover and Gibson propose that there be a five-to-ten year period of "conditional peace," the terms of which should be agreed on before the war ends. However, among the immediate problems to be decided as a minimum for conditional peace is "the designation of provisional boundaries of all liberated and enemy states, with some areas to be occupied and governed by the 'Trustees' pending settlement." This suggestion is remarkable for its explosive and disruptive possibilities. Is it accidental that while the British, Soviet, Czechoslovakian, and United States governments are willing and eager to have the solution to such problems postponed until after the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers, it is the increasingly discredited Polish government-in-exile and

persons like Hoover and Hearst in our own country that press, it would seem, not so much for immediate solution as for the discord that would arise from the attempts at solution? It is particularly strange that Hoover and Gibson should regard boundary questions as matters to be decided during the war, while "the punishment of Axis leaders and officials for criminal actions" they consider a "long view problem" to be handled by a regional council or special commission *after* the conditional peace of about a decade. Disruptive haste on the one hand blends with a slowness on the other hand that must be comforting to the Axis criminals involved.

Furthermore, Hoover and Gibson want "no general peace conference" but "negotiations of long view questions by separate regional councils or special commissions." Opposition even to a general peace *conference* reveals the depth of their hostility to collective planning, action, and security; for then their commissions and councils would not be committees responsible to a conference of at least all the United Nations but independent bodies that might well become the sources of new and needless frictions.

The authors proceed to another novel recommendation: that "a few of the leading United Nations at some time before the end of the war should, by definite agreement of the whole United Nations, be constituted 'Trustees of Peace,' or 'Regents of Peace,' or 'Leaders of Peace,' to guide the world through the transitional stage from war to peace" and that "such a Trusteeship could well be limited to a term of five or ten years after the conditional peace and subject to renewal." Is this not another seed of discord? With the still unsolved problems of winning the war confronting the United Nations, are they now to turn to the selection of "Trustees" for the peace, to serve for about twenty years after the war? Unanimity on the selection, even if it were thought desirable to have these "Trustees," might be very difficult to achieve, and to act now against the wishes of any minority would certainly not bring the closer unity needed for victory.

FINALLY, Hoover and Gibson are suspiciously silent as to what countries they regard as worthy of this "Trusteeship." ' The decisive four powers among the United Nations are obviously the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and China. There has been much public discussion of how these four unmistakably leading nations could develop a leadership that would not, however, involve the delegation of powers to them by the other United Nations, as does the Hoover-Gibson proposal. Some have pointed to the British-Soviet Twenty-Year Treaty as a model we might well imitate. Walter Lippmann has advanced the idea of a "nuclear alliance" of our country with the Soviet Union and Britain. But Hoover and Gibson, although they mention none of these powers, do reveal deep-rooted attitudes.

Most significant is the implicit rejection of the Soviet Union as a possible "Trustee," They regard the USSR as a source of grave "frontier questions" because of its government's stand on the matter of frontiers with Finland, Poland, Rumania, and the Baltic states. They propose that the "Trustees" might have to occupy some of the disputed territory. So evidently Hoover and Gibson do not envision the Soviet Union in the role of "Trustee." Moreover, they consider the Soviet Union a "dictatorship" constantly tending to disturb the peace. The first among their list of destructive forces that led to this war is this: "It was recognized at Versailles that representative government afforded the best hope of preserving peace. It is the only form of government that is not at war with the rights of man. . . . Out of the first world war and its settlements, representative governments sprang up in all Europe outside of Russia." (My italics.) In another context it might very well be worth discussing whether the monarchy of Spain, the Finland of Mannerheim, or the Hungary of Horthy could be regarded in any sense as representative governments. But more important is the definite implication in the Hoover and Gibson statement that the Soviet Union is the original

cause of the present war, since it must have been "at war with the rights of man" and a disturber of the peace. By this time perhaps we should not be surprised to find that again Hoover and Gibson are echoing Hitler's propaganda and reaffirming the policy of the Chamberlains. How quick to put a stigma on the Soviet Union are those who protect Hitlerite aggression from being stigmatized by President Roosevelt!

But since the Soviet government will continue to represent its population in its own, socialist way, there is more involved than a mere difference of opinion. For Hoover's and Gibson's views signify that after this war too they will regard the Soviet Union as "at war with the rights of man" and a threat to peace. Surely then they would not give it a "Trusteeship." Furthermore, there is no possibility of "lasting peace" unless the Soviet Union as a socialist nation is accepted as one of the foundations of peace. If Hoover and Gibson are planning a "peace" without the Soviet Union, it would tend to be transformed into a "peace" against the Soviet Union, that is, another war. Can anyone today still wish to isolate the Soviet Union without being at once suspected of opposing victory in this war and of preparing for war against the Soviet Union? Are there more apt words for such a policy than defeatism and treason to American national interests?

Finally, there is the postwar economic program that Hoover and Gibson propound. First, "there must be assurance that international trade will be conducted by private enterprise." They oppose "trading by governments, or government subsidy of trade." Two considerations arise: first, insistence on this principle would exclude the Soviet Union from world trade because its government conducts all foreign trade; second, it would prevent our own government from adopting, for instance, the recommendations of the United Nations Conference on food and agriculture. For if there is any kind of postwar aid to be given devastated and economically backward countries, some of it will certainly have to be in terms of partially subsidized trade. To proclaim now that we are opposed to such trade is not to help unify the United Nations. Our authors further declare: "Tariffs should be reduced to a competitive basis founded upon differences in living standards." Is it not remarkable, when it has been demonstrated that extreme differences in living standards are one of the causes of modern war and should therefore be reduced by planned and cooperative raising of the lowest standards, that Hoover and Gibson should advocate perpetuating and therefore intensifying these differences? Such a policy moves in the directon of new wars rather than lasting peace.

Into this problem of organizing world

trade, however, Hoover and Gibson inject another issue: "Our farmers and workmen are not going to allow free imports or free immigration from Asiatic or other low-standard-of-living countries." Now it seems to me that the people of China, India, and other undeveloped countries will prefer to stay in their own lands, to take part in the building up of their own countries. When Pegler and Hearst and Colonel McCormick, and now Hoover and Gibson, again raise the bogey of Asiatic immigration, they are not doing so to warn us against a real problem. Rather they seem to be making additional attempts to blow holes into that "reservoir of goodwill" toward our country that Willkie found throughout the Near and Far East. While generally Hoover and Gibson echo the Hitler end of the Axis, this time they are echoing the Japanese propaganda of Asia-for-the-Asiatics.

One sign of political immaturity in many circles is the belief that the fifth column in the United States is to be sought for only among "aliens," naturalized citizens of German or Japanese birth, or paid agents of the Axis. Thus when Patterson of the New York *Daily News* is charged in Congress with being a fifth columnist, he thinks it an adequate defense to point out that his grandparents were born in the United States. As a nation, however, we must quickly learn that the most effective treason is always native. Laval was a Frenchman, Quisling a Norwegian, Franco a Spaniard. Who else could have been so effective in betraval? As a nation we must become more penetrating, distinguishing between constructive criticism and a policy of defeatism. Hoover and Gibson give ideological leadership to the camp of the defeatists, whose immediate tactic is the preparation for a "negotiated peace." Consider this in closing: on June 9, 1943, addressing the Farm Bureau Federation, Hoover speculated on what would happen "if the war in Europe should come to an end within the next twelve months." In January he warned us not to attack Germany in mass before 1944. The present delay is prolonging the war. Yet in June of this year Hoover wonders what might develop if the war ends before June 1944. Is this not another teasing bid for a "negotiated peace" far short of the only thing that would be victory: unconditional sur-Morris U. Schappes. render?



## THE FUTURE OF GERMANY-II

The potentials for a democratic revolution after the destruction of the Nazi state. Differences between that state and the German people . . . An anti-fascist German's viewpoint. By Michel Anders.

In last week's "New Masses," Mr. Anders expressed his opinion on the futility of plans for a postwar Germany that did not strike at the heart of German imperialism or did not give the German people the right to self-determination. In his view, dividing Prussia from the Reich, a plan advocated by Emil Ludwig and others, solves nothing because German monopolists will still dominate their country's economy and eventually break out of bounds to start another war.—The Editors.

B<sup>Y</sup> SEPARATING Prussia from the Reich, it should be clear, the vital nerve centers of German imperialism will not be affected. I return therefore to my central point that only a basic change in Germany's economic structure can prevent the regeneration of German imperialism after it is defeated.

In what form and at what tempo such a change in the economic structure will take place cannot be foreseen. But take place it must in order to counteract the tendency of German economy toward dictatorship-toward a Nazi hegemony such as arose within the country in the past ten years. All postwar planning, therefore, which prevents alteration of German economy paves the way for another form of reactionary dictatorial rule. Of course it is quite possible that the lords of German monopoly may accept temporarily some foreign domination in order to protect their historically outworn position. And there are some circles outside of Germany who have this as part of their perspective for a future Germany. But the effects of such plans would be to heighten the national and social tensions within Germany and in the long run require strong measures to subdue them. Only when the anti-imperialist economic tendencies and democratic social forces in Germany are encouraged and permitted to prevail-only then will Germany no longer be a menace to world peace.

It is important for all of us to understand, at this critical moment, that the development of European economic and social conditions is on a different level from that of the American continent and that between the two there are also different traditions and therefore different perspectives. A change in the economic structure of Germany which kills all imperialist aspirations for power is no menace to any other country.

A Germany minus an imperialistic economy offers possibilities for good commercial relations with the United States without becoming a source of imperialistic danger. The cooperation of nations with different economic structures is not only possible, it is necessary. The best proof that it is possible and fruitful is in the alliance of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China.

It seems to me, then, that the progressive or reactionary character of postwar plans is determined by whether the antiimperialist forces in Germany are supported or suppressed and whether the initiative of the German people to destroy Hitler is encouraged or hindered. And it is from this point of view that we must examine the plans for a postwar Germany.

 $E_{\rm to\ the\ German\ people\ to\ overthrow}^{\rm LMER\ Davis\ is\ right\ when\ he\ appeals}$ Hitler. But I believe the German people will also want to know what they may expect afterward. We always have to keep in mind Goebbels' exploitation of the fact that Wilson's promises after the last war were not kept. Goebbels applies the same propaganda approach to current Allied postwar plans. He says they are mere promises which will not be converted into deeds. And in addition the slogan "democracy," which was so new and forceful in its appeal to Germans in the first world war, was abused and distorted in the years of the Weimar Republic and by the Nazi propagandists.

The recent events in Italy confirm anew that all plans from the outside cannot replace the initiative of the people; nor dan they be strangled whether this is wanted or not by any group or individual. In Italy forces that were driven into illegality more than twenty years ago now openly emerge and act. The same will happen in Germany after ten years of Hitler dictatorship. And one may ignore a nation's development or disregard the people's forces, but the key fact to remember is that the people will always find their way.

**I** N A RECENT article in the American Mercury (April 1943) Kingsbury Smith attempted to set forth "Our Government's Plan for a Postwar Germany." Because of limited space I can only summarize Mr. Smith's article.

The purported government plan involves total disarmament of the German nation; swift, merciless punishment of war criminals; drastic decentralization of the country and the temporary restriction of its economic life to the minimum required for self-subsistence. The plan intends to draw the difference between Germany as a state and Germany as a people. The first step following occupation is the establishment of a military government by the commander of the United Nations forces. The American planners consider it absolutely essential that an understanding be reached in advance among the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union concerning the joint policy to be followed in connection with the establishment of this military government.

According to Smith's version of the American plan, unless there is prompt punishment of Nazi war criminals through an orderly process of justice it is feared that widespread civil war will develop in Europe. To forestall this German civilian personnel and police forces will be retained as long as they can be relied upon to do their work under strict control. Germany will also be deprived of all armaments except the small arms required by the police to maintain civil order. Since the soldiers of a defeated nation are considered ripe for revolution and since the American planners feel that this must be avoided at all cost, the German army will be completely demobilized. And as part of the plan of preventing revolution and chaos not only in Germany but also in all of Europe, famine and disease must also be prevented.

In addition to disarmament, reparations, economic and political decentralization, Germany's cartels will be broken up and the industries left intact will be placed under Allied control. Later as the German people give evidence of good faith in helping in the peaceful reconstruction of Europe, benefits will be increased until full equality of commercial opportunity is achieved by Germany. In addition a great educational plan will have to be undertaken in Germany to erase the stamp of Hitlerism.

The above is more or less a brief abstract of Mr. Smith's article.

Its central shortcoming is that it is a plan to be imposed on the German people and not a base from which the German people can fulfill their rights to self-determination. Because these American planners would prevent a democratic revolution in Germany, then German initiative to destroy the Nazi gang and their imperialist supporters is not promoted. On the contrary the planners envision the retention of German police forces to maintain order. But who comprises the German police force? Without exception it is and has been the tool of the hangman Himmler.

The planners also shower Germans with the threat that they will be made to pay most severely for following "Hitler in his mad movement of world conquest." The German people, as we shall see in time, will consider it their obligation to indemnify and repay for the indescribable damage that has been done to other peoples. But to burden them with such punishment as will crush them and obstruct their desire to cleanse Germany of its gangsters and war criminals is the height of folly. The Germans will naturally ask why not also impose such punishment on the men outside Germany who helped Hitler to power, nourished him, and let him take Austria, Czechoslovakia, etc. Whoever fears a German democratic revolution inadvertently admits that the German people are eager to make amends and set their house in order.

And in this connection I should like to say a word about the reeducation of Germany for democracy. There is no greater democratic education than is to be gotten from a democratic revolution. The American people matured and made themselves ready for democratic government and life by waging a democratic revolution. In the American revolution the country achieved its independence and national integrity. In this struggle the American people had the support of many good Europeans, and even Germans. The English and the French learned the principles of democracy through their own revolutions. Why not let the German people have the same schooling? Let the German people dethrone their monopolists and junkers and they will destroy forever the devil that is German imperialism. For this the German people need no "gauleiters" but weapons and help through active propaganda. Whoever stands in the way of this natural development will for a time perhaps succeed in making a colony of Germany but he will not succeed in bringing everlasting peace.

I T IS worth examining the plans of the Free German National Committee in Moscow. Inasmuch as the Soviet press has widely publicized the recent manifesto of this Committee, the Soviet government seems to be in agreement with these Germans' desire to reinforce the initiative of the German people to purge themselves of Nazi tyranny and the right of the Germans to self-determination when the war is won.

In all their statements the Soviet leaders have left no doubt of their determination to destroy Nazism forever and to punish mercilessly the Nazi war criminals. But Stalin has at the same time also declared that ". . . it would be ridiculous to identify Hitler's clique with the German people and the German state. History shows that Hitlers come and go, but the German people and the German state remain. Lastly, the strength of the Red Army lies in the fact that it does not and cannot entertain racial hatred for other peoples, including the German people, that

it has been brought up in the spirit of the equality of all peoples and races, in the spirit of respect for the rights of other peoples. . . ." (Feb. 23, 1942). On Nov. 6, 1942, Stalin asserted "It is not our aim to destroy Germany, for it is impossible to destroy Germany, just as it is impossible to destroy Russia. But the Hitlerite state can and should be destroyed. And our first task in fact is to destroy the Hitlerite state and its inspirers. . . . It is not our aim to destroy all organized military force in Germany, for every literate person will understand that that is not only impossible in regard to Germany, as it is in regard to Russia, but also inadvisable from the point of view of the victor. But Hitler's army can and should be destroyed. Our second task, in fact, is to destroy Hitler's army and its leaders."

In the same speech Stalin makes it clear that the Nazi war criminals will not escape punishment. "They have converted Europe into a prison of nations. And this they call 'the new order in Europe.' We know who are the men guilty of these outrages, the builders of 'the new order in Europe,' all those newly baked governor generals or just ordinary governors, commandants and sub-commandants. . . . Let these butchers know that they will not escape the responsibility for their crimes or elude the avenging hand of the tormented nations."

These quotations, it seems to me, accord the German people the right to self-determination and are in agreement with the manifesto of the Free Germans in the Soviet Union. It is these Germans who show how to reeducate Germany by letting the German anti-fascists prove their ability to make Germany a democratic state.

Their manifesto speaks clearly and firmly to the German people. Its psychological effect on the German people is and will be profound since it comes from Germans also. It tells Germans that the war is lost and that they must act now to overthrow Hitler. Since no one will conclude peace with Germany, the manifesto asks for the formation of a genuinely democratic German government. This "government will support itself on the fighting groups that will unite to overthrow Hitler. There are forces in the army that are loyal to the country, and the people must play a decisive role. This government will immediately cease military operations, will recall the German troops to the Reich's frontiers and embark on peace negotiations, renouncing all conquests."

This government should be a strong democratic power and not a helpless Weimar regime. It will annul all laws based on national and racial hatred. It is a government which will protect lawfully acquired property and restore property to their lawful owners and confiscate the property of those responsible for the war and of the war profiteers. It will give amnesty to all Hitler adherents who in good time renounce him and join the movement for a free Germany. It will provide for freedom of the press, speech, assembly, and religious beliefs.

In this Free German Manifesto, it seems to me, is an excellent model on which Allied plans for Germany should base themselves. It recognizes that the German people can determine their own destiny, that they will acquire democracy by fighting for it. It points to the creation of a Germany that will live in peace with the United States and all the United Nations. It points to the ending of German imperialism by rooting it out at its source. And who will deny that the destruction of German imperialist aggression is in America's national interests. All plans that fall short of that goal can only lead to another conflagration in the future.

MICHEL ANDERS.



"... so then she had to let her chauffeur go and now she can't BEAR to look at a uniform."



## BOOKS and PEOPLE by SAMUEL SILLEN

## **IRA WOLFERT'S PEOPLE**

A discussion of the Pulitzer Prize winner's two books on the Pacific War and a novel of the depression period. An author who both writes and fights.

CAN'T think of an American writer who has piled up a more impressive record than Ira Wolfert in this war. Few readers knew his name before Pearl Harbor, even though his fine short stories were included in the prize collections of the late Edward J. O'Brien. Today his frontline reports are syndicated by the North American Newspaper Alliance to approximately 150 papers. A graduate of the Columbia University School of Journalism, this former taxi driver, streetcar motorman, and sports writer scooped the world with his account of the Free French capture of St. Pierre and Miquelon. Last October and November he was at Guadalcanal in the thick of the "git or git-got" fighting. For the brilliant dispatches from that front he was awarded a Pulitzer Prize. In the first half of 1943 he published no fewer than three volumes: two stories of the Pacific fighting, Battle for the Solomons and Torpedo 8 (both Houghton, Mifflin, \$2), and a novel, Tucker's People (L. B. Fischer, \$3). Wolfert is back in the Pacific now, watching our men slug the Japanese, taking a hand himself on occasion, filling his notebooks with stormy scenes and American talk that may add up to another exciting book before the year is out.

Wolfert's excellent work illuminates the kind of fighting-writing integration some of us have been talking about. He is not only a reporter but a novelist. He has the reporter's eye for the exact detail and the novelist's ability to give that detail the right shade, the bold image, the dramatic connotation. He avoids two opposite difficulties of so many of the eve-witness war books which have recently appeared. His is neither a literal diary-report that fails to build a structure of suspense and climax because it is loaded down with unrelated data; and neither is it a romantic adventure story that uses a few real incidents as the occasion for another piece of pulp fiction. Most of the time you can reduce the difference to this: a feeling for the right words at the right time. Wolfert's language has muscle, and the only way you can explain that is to say he is in there fighting and thinking every minute of the way. He reminds you a little of Lieutenant Larsen of Torpedo 8, who wanted to get the war over with: "That was his idea, get into the war and get it over with, and

do your fooling around when it would be fun, when you would have nothing hanging over your head to make you think that maybe today's fun was not going to have any tomorrow."

THE first paragraph of Battle for the  $S_{2}$ Solomons means business, setting the language tension high: "At about eleven o'clock in the morning, ship's time, one of the escort vessels smelled something and went to find it. It had been mousing along up ahead of the convoy, whiskers twitching, as they say to indicate that its mechanical feelers were spreading restlessly and combing out the water for the dynamite. Now it gave up fooling and went. The bow threw up white water in a snarl, a whole snootful of it, and made the ship look as if it were lunging with teeth bared." It doesn't take long to describe the essence of a military problem: "The enemy has got one of his big teeth stuck deep into us there, and what we were doing was skirting the edge of that tooth to get where we could do some drilling on it. That's a real old-time bucket of blood that we are heading for in the Solomons." The battle-torn landscape is not lovely: "Huge trees which were felled or severed by shells are stick-



Ira Wolfert

ing up like gaunt, amputated limbs, like the wounded of the last war in Vienna who had turned beggars and used mutely to hold up unbandaged stumps to passersby."

The following passage is neither maudlin nor excessively tight-lipped; it's just what it should be, and you don't forget the picture: "Our fellows have elected to die here, too. Along the road pounded through by our trucks lie several graves, one of a private. His friends have trimmed its mound pathetically with coconuts and fashioned a rude wooden cross for a headstone. A helmet with three holes in it, the holes as blank as dead eyes, tops the cross and on it is penciled, 'A Real Guy.' Against the cross stands a photograph of a very pretty girl, staring silently. The sunlight is very bright here and you can see the brown color of the eyes in the photograph and seem to be able to look deep into them down past the look she gave the Dodge City, Kansas, photographer and his camera. Her dead man must have loved her truly, for he carried her picture into battle."

Wolfert has a real feeling for those American boys and men who are doing a job that you can't appreciate by reading the cold communiques. He likes the grim humor of the soldiers washing their clothes in a river and complaining that this would be a real washing machine if only the Japs would open up with three more batteries. He finds most of the men practical, realistic, hard-headed, ready to swap their lives for something they feel is worth the price. If we have many heroes, it is the "ordinary run-of-the-mill guy" who has to be relied on for victory in the long run, like the transport pilot who would like to be in a bomber instead of a "flying truck," but who keeps driving the truck all the same. Wolfert gets sore when he recalls that "Most of the fellows now doing the fighting have taken a lot of abuse in the recent past from the newspapers, and orators, and mostly the Republican politicians against the New Deal 'pampering,' and other worriers who were trying to scold and abuse and insult them into being tough about the depression, or food rationing, or soldiering, or what-the hell."

In describing how Swede Larsen's bomber squadron avenged their buddies

who were smashed like eggs in an electric fan at Midway, Wolfert emphasizes that the heroism of this war is not a case of "rushing heedlessly to die for a dear old Rutgers." When our men are asked to volunteer for some especially dangerous mission, they take a cool look at all the ins and outs of the situation: "Our men volunteer for suicidal missions, not to seem brave, not to win medals or promotion, but only when, independently of their officers, they decide the possible gain is worth the probable loss. They decline to volunteer only when their private arithmetic does not add up that way. They do things that seem crazy, but never for crazy rea-sons. . . ." Wolfert tells an interesting story of a desk officer who accepts the verdict and reasons of men who refused to volunteer for an action not because they were chickening on the command, but because, knowing the setup at first hand, they understood that the order was foolish. And he contrasts this habit of mind with the wasteful robot-like action of fascist-trained troops who are tough but not extravagantly intelligent.

THERE is a wide gulf between Wolfert's two Pacific books and his novel, *Tucker's People*. It is as if we were reading about two different Americas, two different historic epochs. I would judge that *Tucker's People*, which deals with the depression years, was written some time before the war. Its simultaneous appearance with the war books provides an interesting basis for a study of a writer's development in this period.

The novel deals with people involved in a gambling racket, the "policy" or "numbers" game. This racket was technically "illegal," but Wolfert stresses that in every respect, in its violence, dog-eat-dog credo, and spectacular cunning, it merely repeated the pattern of allegedly respectable business enterprise. Profit was its aim, exploitation of the poor and innocent its basic technique. The novel is a portrait of corruption, greed, insecurity. It is a study of an America advancing "towards the time of Hitler, when big business and its creatures, when trusts and monopolies and their methods, having grown powerful and hungry in the hunt, were foraging even among the rabbit holes."

This image dominates the novel. The characters are terribly scarred victims of insecurity, frustration, and jungle morality; they scurry frantically for rabbit holes that are too dark for seeing and too close for healthy breathing. They become hysterical. They end up dead, without even the privilege of putting up a good fight. Leo Minch, unsuccessful small businessman, had the misfortunate to be born "in the time of Rockefeller" and he had "run from place to place, looking for one place where he could hole up and be overlooked and at peace in a world of expanding big

business." His brother Joe, strong arm man for Tucker, boss of a racket, complains in a frenzy: "Am I a rat to be chased and chased and chased, I got to bite back and chase me again and bite back and chase me again and chase and chase until they get me in a corner and I bite back and chase and chase. Is that my life, in the corner, out of the corner, bite, chase? Is that what life is?" And Bauer, whom poverty and oppressive insecurity have driven into the racket as a white-collar employe, a bookkeeper, exclaims: "I'm just a stone in the street, step on, push here, do this, stay there, without my asking, knowing, telling me, nothing, just push around." Henry Wheelock, attorney for the racket, "was a man whose mind had been made blind and sick, also, by what business had done to his family and to him"; he had decided to hunt with the hunters, and the harder he tried for money the more he degraded himself. The same with the politicians, the police, the anonymous ones who put a nickel on a number waiting for the great stroke of fortune that will turn the nickel into dollars. And the same with Tucker himself, who scurries for a hole when still more powerful racketeers come along.

Wolfert has portrayed these types with devastating insight. He combines psychological subtlety with the terror and violent impact of a first rate gangster story. There is not the slightest doubt that this novel marks the appearance of a major fictional talent. *Tucker's People* is a mature, absorbing, and convincingly authentic account of an ugly phase of American life.

But it has a serious flaw which becomes all the more apparent after we have read the two war books. The people run around in a maze without exits, like those experimental contraptions that psychologists use to watch animals developing neuroses. And the novelist is constantly suggesting that this is the basic pattern of American life "in the time of Rockefeller." This is a story, Wolfert says in a prologue, of our own modern world and of what the world does to its people. It is a story of social failure and human defeat, a kind of allegory of the great depression.

Yet the paramount fact that emerges in his war books is the vigor of the American people as represented in their fighting men. It can scarcely be that so fundamental a revolution could have taken place in so short a time. One feels rather that Wolfert's mood has changed because his experience has brought him closer to what he calls the "ordinary run-of-the-mill guy." The closer he gets to that guy the more affirmative he becomes. It is no longer possible to summarize the epoch as "the time of Rockefeller." The caustically bitter mood of the novel turns into a proud sense of discovery in the war books. Somewhere along the line a profound shift in the writer's consciousness has taken place. America has begun to look different. It is not a country that, as you might be led to expect from *Tucker's People*, is going to be consumed by an inner disease. The marrow is sound.

This is not to argue that a writer should ignore the sore spots or overlook the contradictions of American life. The realists of the depression years did a necessary and valuable job. But by and large. I think, they were so concerned with portraying insecurity and defeat that they inadequately understood the vitality of our people and our country, their capacity for growth, their endurance and determination. Such qualities emerge strikingly in Battle for the Solomons and Torpedo 8; they are very conspicuously, almost selfconsciously missing in Tucker's People. The war experience has made a terrific difference in Wolfert's consciousness. He is not alone.

## The Bloc That Blocks

THE FARM BLOC, by Wesley McCune. Doubleday Doran. \$2.

IN HIS preface to The Farm Bloc, Walter McCune of Newswaek disclaims any intention to do more than present "a reporter's account" of the congressional coalition and the lobbies behind it which claim to speak for the farmers. Mr. Mc-Cune has collected a great many interesting and relevant facts, and has written about them with admirable care and objectivity. He has not been taken in by the farm bloc's claims or pretensions. He has produced a straightforward and useful book.

The Farm Bloc sets out to tell the story of the strange coalition in Congress which kowtows to powerful organizations able to exercise enormous political influence. The farm bloc is without doubt the most deceptive of the many amorphous groupings in this or the preceding Congress: it has become a reactionary force, while posing as the protagonist of the dirt farmers, whose real interests the bloc ignores or violates without compunction. The bloc plays a major part in most congressional debates; it invariably puts the selfish interests of a few above the need for victory over the Axis. It has opposed every attempt to improve the lot of the average farmer-for example, the bloc led the fight to reduce the Farm Security Administration to impotence. It has impeded, to say the least, the Food for Victory program. It has berated the President, it has attacked labor, it has resisted equitable taxes, it has sought to legalize super-profits for its more powerful backers, it has joined the National Association of Manufacturers in undermining the unity of the nation at war, it has been the most eager advocate of ruinous inflation. In fact, the "farm" bloc has little to do with its label—it functions with zest to prevent the conversion of agricultural production to war, but it also goes



along with non-agrarian reactionaries to bait labor, to slander the nation's allies, to resist the anti-poll tax bill, to Red-bait, to support Martin Dies. In other words, it shifts ground continually, and by no means limits its activities to farm problems alone; it provides a solid base with only an occasional defection on particular issues, for the most rabid administration-haters, for the political alliance of the Hoover-Taft Republicans and the poll tax Democrats.

That is its strength-and weakness. On issues directly related to agriculture the bloc is able to mislead most of the spokesmen of the farm districts; on other matters the bloc, reduced to its considerable reactionary core, forms the rallying point for business-as-usual and the defeatists in Congress. The bloc packs a terrific punch -mostly because it is seldom challenged with any consistency or power. The winthe-war forces in Congress-and they are larger than most casual observers realizehave shown a tragic disunity and weakness of leadership, and have often failed to receive the support they merit from the administration. At least farm bloc leaders know what they want and make no bones about getting it. They take the initiative, along with the appeasers and reactionaries. The win-the-war groups still hesitate; and by failing to provide dynamic leadership, they abandon the large majority of congressmen with no fixed convictions to the pressure of the aggressive reaction gathered for convenience and greater efficiency in or around the farm bloc.

The defeat of the bloc therefore requires two first steps-the organization politically of the farmers themselves, in alliance with labor and all other progressive forces; and the vigorous expression within Congress of win-the-war initiative. The present CIO campaign to mobilize workers, farmers, and all people's groups, and to bring home to individual congressmen the demands of the majority back home, along with the formation of the bloc of forty members in the House to implement the President's anti-inflation program, are forward steps in the campaign to defeat the farm bloc and to loosen its hold on the national legislature.

Mr. McCune does not discuss at any length the political implications of the farm bloc conspiracy. He is content to give objective facts of the bloc's composition, backing, and record. As a result his conclusions are at times over-pessimistic. On the other hand, by exposing the venality of the most conspicuous farm bloc leaders, by providing an excellent description of the heads of the farm lobbies and how they work, he has made a real contribution. His explanations of parity, the failure of the cooperatives, the special thinking of the commodity groups, are clear and revealing. He has sketched in the role of the National Farmers Union-though he has underestimated the importance of certain groups within the Farm Bureau and the Grange that fight the domination of the large landlord-banker cliques. It is to be regretted that Mr. McCune did not trace the evolution of the present farm bloc from the earlier coalitions that appeared in Congress before the first world war and during the early twenties. But for those who want a quick review of the main facts about the present farm bloc in order to follow the news as it is reported in the press from day to day, Mr. McCune's *The Farm Bloc* is warmly recommended.

BRUCE MINTON.

## A Doctor at War

BURMA SURGEON, by Lieut. Col. G. S. Seagrave. Norton. \$3.

IN A narrow sense this is the diary of a medical missionary's odyssey through the luxuriant jungles of Burma, India, and China in the great retreat with General Stilwell. In a broader sense it contains many examples of Wendell Willkie's formulation of "one world" built around the "reservoirs of good will." For there is deep and genuine affection for America in the hearts of millions of common men and women all over the face of the globe. Great credit for this respect and warmth for our country must go to the many hospitals, missions, and colleges founded by American doctors and teachers in the far corners of the earth.

These are largely personal memoirs notes and thoughts—that one American doctor recorded in his effort to help his fellow-man. Dr. Seagrave, son of missionaries, was determined to let no racial, color, or political consideration keep him from treating the native population of these malaria-infested countries. He writes, "Some people feel no desire to be killed defending Burma, or India, or China. Somehow I can't see any difference. . . . I keep feeling that everything that we are doing here is being done for America and for the whole world." And he piles on evidence to support this thesis.

Dr. Seagrave took girls who were steeped in witchcraft and the medicine man from many different races that were supposed to be at swords' points-the Kachin, the Shan, the Karen, and a half dozen others-and made them into nurses who became the pride of the Chinese and British armies. This white doctor treated them with respect. He earned their loyalty, devotion, and stimulated an eagerness for study. They were taught to give hypodermic injections, handle minor surgery, drive jeeps, cook, wash, sterilize, in an atmosphere of mud, malaria, and incessant rain. Their daily dozen consisted of wrestling with the problems of malaria, goiter, amebic dysentery, gonorrhea, and syphilis. They were able to cure a high percentage



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of bone injuries by the "Spanish treatment." (This technique of immobilizing fractures was developed by Spanish republican doctors.) Many of "Seagrave's Burmese nurses" were left in hospital outposts and performed major and minor medical miracles for the people dwelling along the Burma Road. One of them propped up her obstetrics book on the floor beside the patient and delivered a live baby.

But our "good-will reservoir" also leaks. There are far too many Colonel Blimps running around loose. The civil surgeon of Lashio tried to prevent compulsory vaccination against bubonic plague because "compulsory vaccination was a variety of fascism." He threatened to prosecute the nurses who had given the injections because they had not received the three-month government course in nursing. And this despite the fact that these nurses had three years of practical training under Dr. Seagrave. This attitude of "Let them die if they don't want to be helped" is contrasted to the courage and perseverance of the thousands of lame, blind, and disease-ridden natives that built their road to freedom, the Burma Road, stone by stone, while under constant Japanese strafing.

Contributions to the various United Nations War Relief societies become doubly important when you read this book. Operations on amebic abscesses of the liver, amputations of the leg and arm, sarcoma of the eye orbit, removing of goiters the size of hams, fractures of all sorts, are performed with pitifully few surgical instruments and medicines. Many soldiers of the United Nations die en route to the hospital because of the lack of bandages, sulfa drugs, and first aid equipment.

There is great need to hold our reservoir together. The doctor laid the foundation, the nurses have kept the water clean. It is up to us to supply them with the essentials for maintenance and repair.

JAMES KNIGHT.



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## **Demi-Tasse Formula**

SPEARHEAD, by John Brophy. Harper. \$2.50.

**I** F YOU are interested in the organization, training, and work of the Commandos, John Brophy's novel will give you a fairly detailed picture of this corps of the British Army. If you are interested in why the English novelist seems to be frozen in his prewar tracks, the same book will add to the already abundant evidence on this point. Either the people who are writing novels in England today are not in and of the life of their country and cannot give it expression or they are deliberately maintaining themselves in print just as they were in the 1930's or earlier. But in either case, why?

Mr. Brophy has gone to a conscientious amount of trouble to show how the picked men of the Commando regiments function in maneuvers and action. This, the purely expository part of his book, is interesting because the technique of modern warfare is interesting in all its departments. The Commandos have the special glamour of a more adventurous role and stiffer requirements than the ordinary, and they naturally make good copy. It is too bad that Mr. Brophy was not content to use this copy as non-fiction and give us a straight account of this subject. For when we are pulled (all too soon) into the "story," we are trapped in a romance serenely cut from the best prewar cardboard.

The war is going on every second in this book. The hero goes through two actions. Comrades are wounded and killed. The heroine wears a uniform, endures the bombardment of London, and defies the traditions of her class in favor of the hero, who is not of her class. And everything is done in the spirit of the following chapter titles, which so aptly indicate the author's attitude that they must be quoted: "Enigmas after Dinner"; "Moonlight Madness"; "Conversation over Coffee"; "No Answers in the Mirror." Chapter I, describing a training maneuver of the Commandos, is called "Masculine Society."

The war is a dirty job; it must be done; the English are a good team; they can do it. That's all. What is being fought for and why and even who are fighting are matters beyond the thought ranges of Mr. Brophy's characters. You would scarcely guess from this book that England is one of several United Nations. You would never guess that anything but the most limited and leisurely after-dinner thinking was being done by the people of England. So valiantly does the author carry on the cricket-field view of life and the writing approach of the nineteenth century novel of manners that if a total Axis victory were to occur overnight, I



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I don't know how seriously Mr. Brophy takes the work of a novelist in wartime. But since he is apparently prolific and likely to write another book, he might seriously ask himself: just *how* is the war effort served by making an escape novel of material that is not escapable? Or does he really think that we can escape the complex claims of this period by hanging on for dear life to the demi-tasse formula of a gentler time?

HELEN CLARE NELSON. .

#### **Pilots in Action**

WILDCATS OVER CASABLANCA, by Lt. M. T. Wordell and Lt. E. N. Seiler, as told to Keith Ayling. Little, Brown. \$2.50.

THE "Wildcats," of course, are the famous carrier-based fighter planes made by Grumman and known (to the trade) as F4F-3. And this narrative of aerial combat over Casablanca. during our invasion of French North Africa is concerned largely with the activities of the "Red Ripper" squadron of Wildcats, based on the American carrier USS —......

As told by two fighter pilots to Mr. Ayling, the narrative roars with action over the ancient city where the Vichy French put up the greatest opposition to our landing forces. Navy planes prepared and covered this action, knocking out shore installations with dive-bombing attacks before General Doolittle's army planes shuttled across from Gibraltar and took over the inland airports.

Strictly as narrative Mr. Ayling's transcription of the action leaves much to be desired. It is endlessly repetitious—as any narrative of individual combat is likely to be—and it rises to few climaxes. And its greatest interest, strangely, is to be found in its revelation of what was going on on land. Several of our pilots were shot down and made safe landings in Africa, and their narratives are far more interesting from that point on.

For it seems to have been their common experience to discover that the rank and file of the French Army, Navy, and Air Force definitely did not want to fight against America. Universally they hated the Germans and universally they resented having to take orders from Vichyite officers. They took those orders, however, and made considerably more than a token resistance. But there were many instances of Vichy pilots avoiding combat, not pressing their advantage—when they had it having their commissions revoked for refusing to fight, and expressing their delight at the hasty end of hostilities.

DONALD LARSEN.

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## **Romanticized Years**

WORLD OF YESTERDAY, by Stefan Zweig. Viking. \$2.75.

 $\mathbf{F}$  or everyone who knows the work of Stefan Zweig, his posthumously published autobiography does not reveal anything new about his ideas and conception of the world and the arts. Still, in reading the *World of Yesterday*, I was shocked time and again by the bluntness of its admission that a man of great literary fame lived in our time of world wars and revolutions and general upheaval and yet confined himself to an existence in a neatly arranged Japanese flower garden of purely literary and esthetic interests.

Theater performances, strolls through Paris streets, literary societies, fashionable cruises to India and America, witty conversations, meetings with great artists this, and almost nothing else, is described in Zweig's autobiography. The odd thing is that the reader has the impression of seeing gay flat water colors glide swiftly by while he sits in an easy chair and looks at them. When there is a somewhat broader picture of a period, a city, a society (for instance, the old Austrian upper middle class in the years before 1914) it is a safe bet that everything is romanticized.

In his autobiography, as in his fiction, Stefan Zweig appears as a bearer of enlightened entertainment, as a spiritual causeur. One can easily understand why this man, who did not endure any material hardships from his exile, committed suicide: he simply could not survive the death of his cherished illusions and the downfall of the society in which he had lived and flowered. For him, when fascist barbarism took over his native country and a great part of Europe, it was a world's end-for he did not know, he did not see the power of popular forces. In this respect the chapter about his first visit to the United States before World War I is most revealing; almost the only thing which delighted him was the "freedom" to get a job "without unions."

Still, as always in Zweig's books, there are parts, such as a little scene in a Paris courtroom, which one does not easily forget. O. T. RING.

## **Brief Review**

BENEATH ANOTHER SUN, by Ernst Lothar. Doubleday Doran. \$2.75.

**I** N A FOREWORD to Beneath Another Sun, the author says, "No novelist's imagination can even approach the unthinkable course of history since the rise of Hitler." On the book's jacket there is the simple subtitle "The Story of a Transplanted People."

It is where he acts almost entirely as the chronicler of what Hitler did to one peo-



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ple in Europe—attempting to transplant them from a proud folk, rich in tradition, into a scattered tribe of slaves—that Ernst Lothar succeeds in producing a truly moving and vital tale of what has happened to the descendants of Andreas Hofer. When he becomes the novelist—though motivated by sincerest anti-fascist wishful thinking—his book doesn't quite measure up.

Dealing with the tragedy of the people of the South Tyrol, sacrificed to Axis strategy and betrayed by their quislings, he adds a magnificent chapter to the literature of World War II. The story of these people illustrates grimly a side of fascist terror which is not so well known as the variety that is exterminating the Jews of Europe. Hitler's plans for the Brenner Pass did not include the national aspirations of the people of the South Tyrol. But he made murderous use of them to confuse the kindly South Tyroleans smarting under Mussolini's brand of fascist aggression.

Beneath Another Sun tells their story lovingly—as they love their soil and its monuments. The characters are hewn from granite. And their strength fills the reader with the certainty that it is fascism, and not its victims, which is doomed.

## Make It a Short War

(Continued from page 6)

every stripe are now acting in full concert. Why lose more lives, they say, when we can have peace with the Axis now? This is the talk of Hitler's collaborators and it is only an immediate victory that can keep them from rising and in time dominating American political affairs.

Our allies abroad, the Russians among them, view the defeatist threat not only as a menace to the progress of the war but to America's participation in the war. The Russians do not ask for favors or relief or charity when they call for a second front. Along with honest Americans they simply say that every moment of delay will cost all of us more lives and needless expenditures of wealth. We must get it clearly in our minds, then, that we cannot win this war without fighting on the largest scale; that we cannot peck at the periphery of Europe and say, as some do, that this pecking is a second front. Unconditional surrender will only be the fruit of unconditional warfare.

Americans have shown a thousand times over that they have the will to win. They are not complacent, nor are they the victims of a heady optimism. Under the President's orders, they are prepared to end the menace to their lives and their country. They ask that the President feel secure in their unflagging support and that he issue at once the command for the invasion that will send the madman's castle toppling into oblivion.



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