Answer To Tobruk: A Second Front See Pages 12 and 18



June 30, 1942 15c in Canada 20c JUN 271942 JUN COLLEGE LIDAMAN ANNAPOLIS, MD.



"Our officers are cultured people. They read and write and some of them, as you can see, have even been abroad."

WHAT ABOUT Postwar planning?

By A. B. Magil

KEY TO British Politics

By R. Palme Dutt



By Bruce Minton

Answer To Tobruk: A Second Front See Pages 12 and 18



JUN 271942 15c in Canada 20c JUN 271942 JUN 271942 ANNAPOLIS, MD.



"Our officers are cultured people. They read and write and some of them, as you can see, have even been abroad."

WHAT ABOUT Postwar planning?

By A. B. Magil

KEY TO British Politics

By R. Palme Dutt

BLOCS THAT BLOCK CONGRESS

By Bruce Minton

Now

Dear Reader:

We know what you thought of our special issue on our Soviet ally. You thought it was fine. You told us so in many letters. We would have liked to print some of these letters. But there wasn't space. For you asked for <u>more</u> "special issues"—and we cannot meet that demand unless our budget permits. So we are taking these columns to appeal to you again.

Here is the story: during the past week, a little more than \$1,000 came in. This brings the total to \$26,000, or within \$14,000 of our goal—the necessary minimum of \$40,000. Last week, remember, we said that if we could reach \$30,000 in a fortnight we would omit further appeals from the magazine and raise the remaining ten thousand by personal contacts, parties, etc. Well, we are still \$4,000 short of that goal.

Can we count on you for \$4,000 within the next seven days? We think we can. You, surely as much as we, want to see the whole magazine devoted to its winthe-war purpose. You want special issues —like the Western Front one, the one last week, others in the past few years. Help us make them possible. Every dollar—and every hour—counts. Won't you make that extra effort—make it <u>now?</u>

The Editors

Between Ourselves

 $\mathbf{W}^{ extsf{hen}}$ we put last week's special issue on "Our Soviet Ally" to press, we had a pretty satisfied feeling about it. Even so, we received a very agreeable jolt when the issue got into circulation and we began to hear about it. It seems to be generally regarded as definitely more than satisfactory-as one of our best efforts, in fact. To be told that the results measured up to the subject was particularly gratifying. For the tributes we received practically all contained an intense, glowing appreciation that the issue had been devoted to our Soviet ally-an intense appreciation of that ally itself and gratitude for more information concerning it. There was particular praise for the selection of material from the vast field offered by the theme. And many of our readers were impressed by the evidence of national unity shown in the variety of contributors. Of course it would take far more than thirty-two pages or several special issues to cover the subject of that June 22 anniversary

celebration. But we hardly need to tell you that you will hear more about it in these pages—as you have heard in the past.

A hearty welcome for a new antifascist publication in this country the German American, published by the German American Emergency Conference, under the slogan "Smash the Axis." Edited by Rudolf Kohler, this monthly periodical publishes articles in both German and English. Its contributors include Americans of German descent and such famous German anti-Nazis as Heinrich Mann. The periodical is published at 305 Broadway, Room 409, N. Y. C.

Readers who saw the paintings of Soviet life by Frank Horowitz which were reproduced in our June 9 issue, will be glad to hear that these and other paintings by the artist are being exhibited until July 27 at the Educational Alliance, 197 East Broadway, NYC. After that date they will go on tour in a traveling exhibit of the American Federation of Art.

THIS WEEK

NEW MASSES, VOL. XLIII, NO. 13

June 30, 1942

Now and Tomorrow by A. B. Magil	3
The Key to British Politics by R. Palme Dutt	
A Second Front Will Beat Japan by Frederick V. Field	
The Meaning of Sevastopol by Colonel T 1	
Trouble with Tikhonov by Vadim Kozhevnikov 1	13
The Blocs that Block Congress by Bruce Minton 1	14
Press Parade	17
Editorial Comment	18
Readers' Forum	21
REVIEW AND COMMENT	
Russia's Fighting Forces by Samuel Sillen	22
Severance from Life by Marian Andrews 2	24

Severance from Life by Marian Andrews			•	•	•	24
A Mexican Novel by H. R. Hays		•	•			25
Haldane on Genetics by David Cosgrove	•	•	•	•	•	26

SIGHTS AND SOUNDS

Actors with Half a Chance by Alvah Bessie . . . 27 Washington Talks to Hollywood by Jack Young . . 28 Under the Bombs by Joy Davidman 29

Two weeks' notice is required for change of address. Notification sent to NEW MASSES rather than to the post office will give the best results.

Published weekly by WEEKLY MASSES Co., INC. at 461 Fourth Ave., New York City. Copyright 1942, WEEKLY MASSES Co., INC. Reg. U. S. Patent Office. Washington Office, 945 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Drawings and text may not be reprinted without permission. Entered as second-class matter, June 24, 1926, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1879. Single copies 15 cents. Subscriptions \$5.00 a year; in U. 8. and Colonies and Mexico. Six months \$2.75; three months \$1.50; Foreign \$6.00 a year; six months \$3.25; three months \$1.75. In Canada, \$5.50 a year, \$3.00 for six months. New MASSES welcomes the work of new writers and artists. Manuscripts and drawings must be accompanied by stamped, addressed envelopes. New MASSES does not pay for contributions.



AUSTRALIA

BELGIUM

CANADA

COSTA RICA

CUBA

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

EL SALVADOR

GREECE

MEXICO

(jh)

Ð







CHIÑA







The approach to postwar problems which will strengthen the unity between ourselves and our allies. What the present demands. Last of two articles by A. B. Maail.

HE new American and British agreements with the Soviet Union have thrust a great finger of light through the fog of conflicting plans and projects for the postwar world. These agreements help orient us for the present and the future; by binding together more closely for war and for peace the three major anti-Axis powers they help lay the cornerstone of a world system of security.

Attempts to blueprint ideal world orders are nothing new and have been particularly stimulated by the Napoleonic Wars, by the first world war, and by the present one. In all such efforts there is a positive core: the instinctive realization of millions that wars and depressions are unnecessary, that all the material possibilities exist for creating lasting peace and prosperity and justice. This positive element may express itself in a constructive fashion or it may be diverted into utopian or reactionary channels and find an outlet in ways that at best are ineffectual, at worst harmful to the very objective which it seeks. There are two tests, it seems to me, which ought to be applied to any speculations or proposals regarding the postwar period: first, since we are engaged in a war which must be won if there is to be any basis for building a decent world, and since this war, more than any in the past, requires maximum unity and the mobilization of the energies of the entire people, do these speculations or proposals tend to strengthen or weaken the fight for victory? And second, are they mere day-dreams or are they made of the stuff of the real world, a world threatened by fascism and waging bitter war against it?

In my first article last week I argued against all attempts to blueprint the future at this time, largely on the ground that while there was agreement among all sections of our population and among the United Nations on broad general objectivessuch as are expressed with progressively greater concreteness in President Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, the recent speeches of Vice-President Wallace and Undersecretary of State Welles, and the new Washington-London-Moscow agreements-there was sharp divergence in regard to both the detailed elaboration of these objectives and the precise methods of achieving them. The ardent advocacy of particular schemes can therefore become a source of disunity within our country and between us and our allies. Moreover, this kind of activity drains precious energy away from the immediate task of winning the war. Let us take a look at some of the general (Continued on page 4)

INDIA

LUXEMBOURG

NETHERLAND S

È

NICARAGUA

characteristics of this type of "planning" and some of the dangers involved.

Conflict Among Planners.—It is a paradox not wholly devoid of pathos that those who are most preoccupied with designing on paper a world or at least part of a world in which nations will live in peace and harmony are unable to agree among themselves about the exact details of this world. The American Clarence Streit, in *Union Now* proposes that the American Constitution and the structure of the American government be the model for a federation of nations. The Englishman Julian Huxley suggests in his recently published pamphlet, *Reconstruction and Peace*, that future international organization be along the lines of the British Commonwealth of Nations and warns against the adoption of a constitution. The Austrian Count R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, founder of the Pan-Europe movement, who has spent many years in Switzerland, insists that that tiny republic be the model.

There is no greater unanimity regarding other matters. Streit's Federal Union movement wants to limit its federation to those countries it designates democracies. Count Coudehove-Kalergi, on the other hand, bases his scheme not on social or political considerations, but on geography and culture, and therefore restricts his federation to Europe. Milan Hodza, the last prime minister of Czechoslovakia, wants to start more modestly and urges a Central European regional federation as "the indispensable prerequisite of any larger federation" (Nation, May 16, 1942), while Graeme K. Howard, in his book America and a New World Order, extends this idea and calls for "internationally balanced economic and political regional blocs." In contrast, Albert Guerard, in The France of Tomorrow, proposes the complete obliteration of national identity and the atomization of Europe into purely administrative regions. And so on. Amidst this Babel of plans, which is Joe Smith, American, to choose?

Ignoring the Reality of World Relations .--- History has a way of canceling out so many of these neat projects that it is clear they are derived not from the world as it is, but from the wishful world that exists in the minds of isolated individuals and groups. Some of them too have an old familiar look and a mothball smell; not only have they no organic relation to the war (for which perfunctory acknowledgement of the war is no substitute), but they seem to have been dragged out of the closet of the twenties. Isn't Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europe the same dish he served up to us twenty years ago? And when in his book Europe Must Unite, published shortly after the outbreak of World War II, he writes without intentional irony that Hjalmar Schacht was "the principal speaker at the first demonstration of the Pan-European Union in the German Reichstag" and that the man who established the fascist dictatorship in Austria, Dollfuss, "took over the honorary presidency of the Austrian Paneuropa group," isn't Count Coudenhove-Kalergi writing the epitaph on all his futile thinking?

Incidentally, Coudenhove-Kalergi, who is now in this country, is a thoroughgoing reactionary. He is not only fanatically anti-Soviet, but anti-American. In *Europe Must Unite* he urges European federation and the organization of the European market "against the intolerable competition of America's spacious grain factories" and "against cheap imports from Asiatic and American industrial centers." In an article in the October 1941 issue of *Common Sense* he proposes replacing the Nazis in civilian garb with those in uniform—a negotiated peace with Hitler's generals. Under the slogan of Pan-Europe Coudenhove-Kalergi is actually seeking to establish his own type of fascist "new order" directed at Russia, the United States and Asia. This is the realistic kernel inside the utopian shell.

The Federal Union idea is also old stuff. That by itself would be no argument against it did its specific manifestation in the Union Now program express the living realities of our time. The contrary is true. What appears to be the chief strength of Streit's Federal Union proposal, its completeness of detail, is, in fact, the principal source of its weakness. For events continue to ignore the Union Now scheme and to stultify its original dogmas. Streit's book Union Now was first published in 1939 six months before the beginning of the war and its principal thesis has not been altered. It rests on the assumption that the American Constitution and the American governmental structure, products of specific American conditions of one hundred and fifty years ago, can serve as models for a union of many different nations with diverse traditions and culture. If at first this plan, which is the antithesis of true internationalism, was a harmless fantasy; if later, despite the sincerity of its author, it lent itself to the uses of the imperialist propagandists of an "American century" and an Anglo-Saxondominated world, today, when this country is actually in the war and united with so many nations in the common struggle, a plan that asks other peoples to accept the governmental form of the United States can do nothing but mischief.

I N OTHER respects, too, history has repudiated Union Now. Originally the Federal Union was to consist of fifteen democracies, with the rest of the nations to be admitted later as soon as they were regarded as fit. The criterion of democracy embodied in this undemocratic scheme was vague and broad enough to include Mannerheim Finland, but not the Soviet Union, China, India, or any of the Latin American republics. When Nazi conquest swept over Europe, the Union Now movement decided to become more exclusive, limiting the Federal Union to the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations (England, Eire, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa). In other words, as the struggle against Hitlerism broadened, Union Now grew narrower, moving into its own kind of isolationism.

More recently, on May 1, 1942, Federal Union, Inc., issued a policy statement which while limiting admission into the proposed Federal Union to "those peoples with whom we have compelling natural ties," also endorses "an all-inclusive inter-



Vice-President Wallace, whose recent speech before the Free World Association defined the people's character of the war.

national organization in which the United States, the British Commonwealth, China, Russia, India, and other powers known as the United Nations should take the lead," adding that this international organization "should contain such elements of federalism as are found to be practicable." But this is the very negation of the exclusive, tight little scheme known as Federal Union. In other words, another epitaph on the past.

The failure of the postwar planners to base their thinking on the reality of world relations is evident in another important respect: the attitude of most of them toward Russia. One would, of course, suppose that those who concern themselves with plans for a potential federation of nations might find it instructive to learn from the experience of an actual federation, particularly since it happens to be the only successful federation of equal nations the world has known: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Most of the postwar planners, however, are completely allergic to the Soviet achievement in this sphere. But apart from this consideration, there is the question of the postwar world. Here the thinking of the planners is still dominated by the prejudices of 1939-40.

I have already mentioned the attitude of Clarence Streit and Count Coudenhove-Kalergi. Dr. Frederick L. Schuman, who at one time helped promote closer Soviet-American relations, has not yet entirely recovered his balance since he went overboard on the Soviet-Finnish war. A convert to Union Now, his latest book, Design for Power: The Struggle for the World, calls for "a vast federation of the Atlantic civilizations," from which Russia and the peoples of Asia-those who are sacrificing most to make possible a civilized world-would be excluded. But they are not to be cast into utter darkness. Dr. Schuman generously concedes that "such a Federation of the Free could and should make the Covenant of the League of Nations [a dead horse!] the basis of its relationship with the Soviet Union and China, with an emancipated India, with the peoples of Africa and Oceania. . . .". Similarly Julian Huxley in his elaborate proposals for postwar reconstruction excludes the USSR, but then condescends to add that "assuredly its full cooperation



"The age of imperialism is ended," said Undersecretary of State Welles (right) in a Memorial Day address. Here he is talking with Foreign Minister Perez of Venezuela.

in the business of reconstruction is desirable. But how far it would be willing to participate remains to be seen, and just how it should be represented on the Reconstruction Commission remains to be worked out." As if there were anything uncertain or inscrutable about the policy of the country which fought for collective security when most other governments sabotaged and betrayed it.

In contrast, what a healthy sense of world reality there is in the new American and British agreements with the Soviet Union. The White House statement after the Molotov visit said there had been discussed "the fundamental problems of cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States in safeguarding peace and security to the freedom-loving peoples after the war." The lend-lease agreement between the two countries is concerned not only with the war, but as Sumner Welles pointed out in his speech on June 17, "also looks forward to the peace." And the Anglo-Soviet treaty creates a formal alliance to continue beyond the war until superseded by a broader system based on common action with other countries. Here is no pat scheme and no exclusive club, but the solid basis for the future organization of collective security and collective peace.

Ignoring the Reality of Social Relations.—Practically all of the postwar blueprints fail to consider the social forces operating in the world and show no awareness of the fact that the conduct of the war and the shape of the peace are being largely determined by the relations among the various classes of our society. The planners are like a man trying to drive a car by ignoring the fact that someone else happens to be at the wheel. To take one example, I don't know of a single one of these previews of the future that takes cognizance of labor's increased role in the war effort and its implications for the postwar era. It has remained for a realistic, even though conservative, political leader, Wendell Willkie, to assert that labor's inclusion in our government "must ultimately be done for the effective conduct of the war and for the peace to follow." (Look, April 7.)

A Positive Approach to the Problems of the Peace.— The working out of exact formulae for future salvation, however interesting as academic exercises, can shed no light on the problems before us since the materials with which we will actually have to work are still unknown. This is not planning, but only the appearance of planning. It substitutes conjecture for knowledge, wish for fact. Of more serious importance, it tends to divide where unity is the first essential, and by ignoring the reality of world and social relations, it sets up impediments to progress. How then, shall we go about *constructively* planning for the peace?

This, it seems to me, cannot be done in isolation from the process of the war, but only as an organic part of it. The war is the crucible of the peace. Winning it and doing certain things or failing to do certain things in the conduct of the war are the primary factors in determining the shape of the postwar world. This implies certain simple things-so simple and obvious that they are as a rule ignored by the postwar planners. For example, nothing in the immediate future could so effectively determine the character of the peace as the opening of a western front in Europe within the next weeks and months. Why? Because without it there is no guarantee of victory, and without victory there can be only the peace of death. And even should we escape defeat, failure to open a Western Front soon would unnecessarily prolong the conflict so that the peace might find all nations completely exhausted and the conquered peoples prostrate, enormously complicating the problems of reconstruction. That is why the official statement issued in Washington and London after the Molotov visit that "full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942" is a most important contribution not only to winning the war, but winning the peace. The sooner this pledge is implemented, the more decisive will this contribution be.

Second, cooperation among the nations of the world in the

peace can best be built on the basis of the closest cooperation in the war. Through joint efforts on the field of battle, through diplomatic and political agreements like the Atlantic Charter, the pact of the United Nations, and the Anglo-Soviet mutual assistance treaty, and through economic agreements like the lend-lease pacts the pattern of the peace is being woven. Sumner Welles was therefore entirely realistic when in his Memorial Day address he put forward the idea that "the United Nations become the nucleus of a world organization of the future."

In developing close cooperation among all the United Nations there are two areas of special problems: one comprises the relations between the capitalist world and the Socialist world of the Soviet Union, the other, the relations between the capitalist world and the colonial and semi-colonial world in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Collaboration between the capitalist and socialist worlds in war is a fact. Can it not also be a fact, an indispensable fact in peace? As Walter Lippmann wrote recently: "Russia is the greatest land power of the Eurasian continent, and no international order can be imagined without Russia as one of its great supports." (New York Herald Tribune, June 6, 1942.) He also pointed out that "Russiabe it czarist or Soviet—is and always has been the natural ally of the United States." The future is the child of the present; to the degree that we strengthen relations with our great Soviet ally today, we will assure close and warm relations in the difficult trials of the postwar period. In this sense the historic significance of the Washington-London-Moscow agreements is incalculable.

B^{UT} much still remains to be done. The New York *Times* calls for the inclusion of Russia in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee at Washington. Lester Velie, business editor of the Journal of Commerce, urges the signing of a formal mutual assistance treaty with the USSR. And in the press and on the air there are still too many vestiges of old prejudice and malice, too little understanding of what Professor Allan Nevins has called "the thirst for equity and progress that has somehow rendered Russia a vast brotherhood." We need not only to appreciate the military achievements of the Soviet people, but their social strivings as well, to recognize that despite differences in economic and social systems, they share with us the great faith in "the century of the common man."

In the relations between the capitalist world and the colonial



Heavy Lies the Usurper's Head

and semi-colonial world many changes are taking place and there can be no return to the past. In the words of Mr. Welles: "If this war is in fact a war for the liberation of peoples, it must assure the sovereign equality of peoples throughout the world, as well as in the world of the Americas. Our victory must bring in its train the liberation of all peoples. Discrimination between peoples because of their race, creed, or color must be abolished. The age of imperialism is ended." But words and good intentions alone will not end the age of imperialism. The necessities of both the war and the peace require immediate deeds. Britain and all the United Nations are today paying a heavy price in the Far East for the imperialist policies of the past-and the present. The British offer to India was not too late, but certainly far too little. This is not to condone the narrow, one-sided attitude of certain Indian leaders, but the primary blame falls on the British government. A national government for India and equal partnership in the war effort would unleash powerful forces against the Axis and help underwrite a free future for all peoples. And our own relations with China-against whose people we discriminate shamefully-and our relations with the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the republics of Latin America still lack that full equality which the war and the peace require.

Third, within our own country the present is shaping the future. Let us not be blind to our own India: the Negro people. The two situations are not entirely identical, but it is a question whether the differences are in our favor. Though there has been improvement, can it be maintained that the treatment still accorded our 13,000,000 black fellow-Americans doesn't hurt both the war and the peace? Suppose our government were to announce that it was going to do a very simple thing: immediately abolish all discrimination in the armed forces and have Negroes and whites serve side by side with equal opportunities for both. What a guarantee for the postwar world. What a great moral force that would be in India, Burma, among the enslaved peoples of Europe. It would be the very flesh of the future, warm and glowing in the present.

HERE are many other approaches within our own country L to the problems of the postwar period. A role for labor in the directing agencies of the war program and in the government that is more nearly commensurate with labor's role in production and in society would help assure the democratic development of our nation and its continued collaboration with likeminded countries after victory is won. President Roosevelt's seven-point economic program, which seeks to establish the principle of equality of sacrifice, would help build one kind of postwar world; the tax program of the House Ways and Means Committee, based on the principle of favoring the rich and overburdening the poor, would help build another. Similarly, the release of Earl Browder and the deportation order against Harry Bridges not only affect the immediate war effort in opposite ways, but represent contrary forces in the molding of the postwar era. And the millions who spoke up for Browder and the millions who are speaking up against Bridges' deportation are doing the most practical kind of postwar planning.

This brings me to my final point. The future will not be fashioned by a few individuals, no matter how gifted, sitting down and cutting ingenious patterns, nor even by the efforts of governments alone. It is being fashioned by the action of the peoples of all countries, by their blood and sweat-yes, and by their vision too. The middle-class men and women of America have every reason not to permit themselves to be diverted away from this historic mainstream by illusory schemes and plans that have no roots in life; on the contrary, every consideration of the present and future should impel them to join fully with their brothers and sisters of other classes, particularly of the working class, in the great liberating war that alone can bring a great liberating peace.

A. B. MAGIL.

THE KEY TO BRITISH POLITICS

R. Palme Dutt discusses the pivotal issues in London. The forces that are trying to obstruct the immediate opening of a second front. The Labor Party Conference.

R. Palme Dutt is among the foremost Marxists in the English-speaking world. Since 1921 he has been the editor of the British "Labour Monthly." His three books "Fascism and Social Revolution," "World Politics: 1918-1936," and "India Today" have won world renown. Dutt was educated at Cambridge University, has been identified with the British Commu-



nist Party for over twenty years, and is today recognized as one of its leading figures.

Mr. Dutt's cable, delayed in transmission, was written before the announcement of the Anglo-Soviet Pact.—The Editors.

London (by cable)

WELVE months have passed since British-Soviet unity against Hitler has been established. We can now estimate where we stand and the perspective. Great positive gains have been achieved. The world alliance of the United Nations has been drawn close and strengthened despite temporary losses to the Axis in the Far East and through Nazi occupation of Soviet territories. The superior power of the United Nations grows daily. The strength of the Soviet resistance and counter-offensive has already inflicted crippling losses on the Nazi power, and even though severe battles are still in front, it has turned the Nazi monster from an apparently invincible conqueror to a beast at bay. The war production of the anti-Axis coalition now exceeds the Axis. New hope and confidence spreads among the peoples of the world, especially demonstrated in the rising struggle of the European peoples. The beginnings of offensive action by the western powers have been heralded by mass air raids. But we cannot underestimate the formidable character of the battle now opening this summer after twelve months. The two-front war which can alone ensure the speedy defeat of Hitler and thereby of all the Axis, is still not established. Therefore, Hitler can still concentrate over nine-tenths of his forces and satellites against the Red Army, while millions of the Anglo-American forces are still inactive.

The refusal of the British Cabinet to establish an Indian national government hampers the mobilization of hundreds of millions of the Indian people in the common struggle. There is still a lack of coordination of Allied strategy and a dangerous divergence between two perspectives: victory in 1942 by a maximum united offensive, a perspective proclaimed by the Soviet leaders and corresponding to the wishes of the peoples of all countries, and the official Anglo-American perspective of a long war of attrition with the decision in 1943, 1944, or 1945. Britain holds the pivotal responsibility in this situation of strengthening the coordinated strategy of the Soviet Union and the western powers, establishing a second front in western Europe this summer, winning the free cooperation of the Indian people, and mobilizing for victory in 1942.

W^{ITHIN} Britain there is an overwhelming national unity of a kind and extent never before known, behind the British-Soviet alliance for victory of the United Nations and behind the Churchill government as the representative of this unity for victory. The last Gallup poll shows that Churchill has eighty-seven percent of the popular support or a five percent rise over the April poll, and the government as a whole has the support of sixty-three percent of the voters.

But we cannot close our eyes to the dangerous forces working to break this unity. Munichites, Clivedenites, and reactionaries are increasingly active in face of the prospects of a Soviet victorious offensive and the defeat of fascism. Major Cazalet, Tory MP, has circulated a privately published anti-Soviet book. Harold Nicholson, former parliamentary secretary of the Ministry of Information, writes in the London Spectator, deploring the "uncalculating enthusiasm" of the British people for the Soviet Union and suggesting the possibility of Hitler offering Stalin peace. James Walker, chairman of the recent Labor Party Conference, spreads similar slander "if things change in the East" as a reason for maintaining the ban on the Daily Worker. The chairman of the Imperial Policy group, Lord Phillmore, former supporter of Franco and patron of the Finland Fund, publishes a journal, Review of World Affairs, which decries the Soviet war effort and states: "Great efforts have been made to induce the British public to believe that if Russia falls, all will be lost. Happily for the world, Britain and America can in fact still look upon the continental military scene with some measure of detachment." The Astorowned Times and Sunday Observer work to weaken Churchill's position by demanding the conduct of the war be taken out of his hands and by playing up Cripps. The powerful reactionary Kemsley press denounces the agitation for a second front and pushes the Vansittart line of a war of extermination against the German people. The strength of the reactionary monopolist interests was shown in the power of the lobby over the coal situation when the 1922 Committee (a reactionary group within the Conservative Party, formed after the dissolution of the Lloyd George coalition) compelled the government to retreat from the fuel rationing plan.

These reactionary forces would be powerless to win direct mass support, but they build their hopes on disintegration from the left, exploiting the wide popular dissatisfaction with many aspects of the government policy of passive strategy, inequality of sacrifice, etc. The confusion created in the labor movement through lack of leadership, the official opposition to unity, and the general passivity and stagnation is reflected in the halving of the individual membership of the Labor Party in the past four years from 447,000 in 1937 to 226,000 in 1941, a situation which plays into the hands of these dangerous forces. Individual adventurers, posing as non-Party independents in by-elections, exploit the popular issues in order to disrupt national unity.

N THIS situation the Communist Party National Conference, held May 23-24, played a most constructive role. The Party is now 53,000 strong. In a three months' campaign at the beginning of the year, it asked for 15,000 new members and won 25,000. There were 1,300 delegates at the conference. young, keen, eager, competent, from all war industries, including 500 engineers from the arms factories. The Communist Party conference put forward the following program for victory in 1942: (1) a second front in western Europe as the main task before the British people today; (2) national unity as an indispensable basis for a second front and victory in 1942; the political fight to be only against the Munichites and friends of fascism; (3) strengthening of the Anglo-Soviet alliance; (4) reopening of negotiations with the Indian National Congress for free cooperation of the Indian people under a national government; (5) intensified war production, opposition to

7

strikes, enforcement of the Communist production program for unified control and strengthened production, overriding the vested interests; (6) equality of sacrifice, improvement of conditions of service men and dependents, women workers, and low-paid workers, the leveling up of social service benefits, drastic restriction of luxury expenditure, and more equal distribution of food and necessities of life; (7) raising the ban on the Daily Worker; (8) unity in action of the Labor movement by raising existing bans on cooperation.

A giant demonstration of 50,000 Londoners in Trafalgar Square received the report of the Communist Party conference and acclaimed the aims of a second front, national unity, freedom for India, and increased prtoduction for victory in 1942. The previous Trafalgar Square demonstration for a second front, organized by the Communist Party at the end of March, had surpassed all records, with an attendance of 35,000. Veteran Ben Tillett, with sixty years of memories in the labor movement, declared that there was nothing like it known in Trafalgar Square even in the historic gatherings of the 1880's. Now, with 50,000, every square foot was covered with the massed crowds, even beyond the square to the National Gallery, St. Martin's Lane, Strand, and Whitehall. What impressed the present writer in addressing this vast concourse was the number in the uniforms of all the services, including many senior officers. On the Communist platform were William Gallacher, member of Parliament, Harry Pollitt, Joe Scott, an engineer, and a woman war worker. A resolution embodying the Communist Conference policy was carried unanimously. Recruiting into the Party took place after the meeting at open tables with queues. There were 500 recruits. It was an impressive demonstration of the strengthened political role the Communist Party is now able to play, though only a beginning of what must be achieved this year.

HE Labor Party Conference was of a different character. It revealed the growing mass feeling for a more active policy, but also the dangerous divisions of policy and leadership. For the first time in twenty years or more a victory for unity on a major issue was carried despite the opposition of the executive by the adoption of a resolution for raising the ban on the Daily Worker. But at the same time confusion was shown in that there was also nearly a majority against the executive



People We Could Do Without

on the issue of continuing the political truce with the Conservatives. And in the whole conference proceedings no voice was raised for a second front.

However, strengthened support for a second front is now undoubtedly shown in the change of official expression in relation to it. Last autumn when the Communist Party first raised the issue, the proposal was denounced as a scheme of armchair strategists and the demand of an ignorant rabble. Today all official expression is friendly in principle to a second front in the West, but only seeks to defer the date of action. The Prime Minister's broadcast of May 10 referred specifically to the Trafalgar Square demonstration organized by the Communist Party for a second front as a demonstration of the national will. Cripps' Bristol speech of May 17 said with regard to "a second front in Western Europe" that "the government is as keenly anxious for this to materialize as you are."

But a change of expression is not yet the same as a change of policy. It is well understood that even if a definite decision has been reached, the government cannot indicate its specific action beforehand. But it must be noted that there is no evidence yet of any decisive change of the present policy by the government. All declarations have been only declarations of general principle without reference to the present urgent moment. The most specific declaration, that of Cripps on May 20, stated that the strategy of an air offensive against Germany will continue "until such time as we are able to make a carefully planned attack upon the continent of Europe." And in the same debate the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, described the present moment as "a pause before the full summer campaign breaks upon us." -----

WE CANNOT afford to delay. The strategic time is now when the Soviet forces are already in full action, when the issue is in the balance, when opportunity is highest, when the European peoples are looking for our action, when our intervention can play a crucial part in joint victory. We cannot allow the serious demand for the immediate establishment of a second front in the West to be put off with complimentary reference to its value for morale, as if the problem were how to maintain the morale of the people instead of how to deliver the most decisive blows against the enemy with full confidence that action is the best stimulus to morale. After all the complimentary references have been made and after all the mounting promises of future action have been made, the fact remains that a second front in the West does not yet exist when the need is most urgent. All promises are undated drafts on the future and the present visible policy is still merely that of an air bombing offensive and intensified Commando raids.

The nation will give full support to the government in the establishment of a second front, but until a second front is established, agitation must and will continue and be increased. We do not wish to be condemned again to being passive spectators of a battle in which the fate of the people of this country and of mankind is being determined. We do not wish to see our rulers watching for fortunes of battle in the East before determining their action so that their intervention either arrives after the most favorable moment has passed or arrives only after the Soviet forces have already done the brunt of the work of breaking the enemy, so that intervention takes on only the character of a hasty attempt to participate in a settlement on the basis of a victory won by others, instead of a worthy equal participation in winning the victory. Therefore, it is necessary now more than ever to intensify the struggle for a second front. This is today the decisive issue of the political situation here in Britain. The fight for the second front requires the widest political mobilization of the people and the effective unity of the labor movement within the broad framework of national unity. The future perspective for the peoples of Britain and the United States depends, above all, on our success in this fight.

R. PALME DUTT.



Bombay youngsters: Self-government for India will immeasurably strengthen the Allied defenses against the Mikado.

A SECOND FRONT WILL BEAT JAPAN

An expert on the Far East tells what must be done in the Pacific while a Western Front in Europe is being launched. How to hold Tokyo preparatory to a smashing offensive.

Frederick V. Field has lived and traveled in China, Japan, and the Philippines. After graduating from Harvard in 1927 he studied at the London School of Economics. For several years he was on the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations and executive secretary of its United States branch. He is the author of a book on American financial operations in China up to 1930, and of the "Eco-



nomic Handbook of the Pacific Area." He has written articles on the Far East for many publications and is at present chairman of the editorial board of "Amerasia."

ILLIONS in the United States and Great Britain are now pressing their governments for the immediate opening of a second land offensive against Hitler so that this year he and his Nazi hordes may be crushed between the anvil of this new front and the hammer blows of the Red Armies. New MASSES, in its special "How to Win the War" issue (May 26), has analyzed the case for the Western Front and we have found it to be convincing beyond question.

Our demand for the Western Front does not ignore the relationship between an all-out offensive against Hitler and the necessity of preparing the way for a later offensive against Japan. Certain points underlying the relationship between the two fronts, the second front in Europe and the Far Eastern front, have been brought out. One of these is the basic consideration that the principal strength of the Axis lies in Germany and in the resources of the countries now occupied by Nazi troops. Isolated from the German war effort, Japan could hardly be considered a major challenge to the aroused might of the United Nations. (Mussolini, of course, has descended almost to the low level of eminence caricatured by Wang Ching-wei and by that distinguished Emperor of Manchoukuo, Kang Teh.)

Advocacy of an immediate second front in Europe is, then, premised on the sound notion that while the elimination of Japan from the war would not necessarily mean the easy defeat of Hitler, the smashing of Hitler would quickly release the energies of the United Nations required for a speedy defeat of Japan. At this point, however, we must add this consideration. With each victory Japan becomes a more formidable opponent. The Japan we are fighting today is a very different military-strategic factor from the Japan which attacked us last December. And, to go back further, the Japan of 1931 was a far weaker enemy than the country which emerged, on the eve of Pearl Harbor, nurtured for ten years by appeasement. Projecting this point forward in time, instead of backward, we must recognize that Japan cannot be permitted further gains while we are concentrating our major energies on smashing Hitler. Consider in this connection the problem the United Nations would face if, while they were engaged in crushing the Nazis in Europe, Japan were permitted to smash China's heroic armies, or to occupy Australia and cut off the American south Pacific supply route, or to possess India, or to launch a full-strength attack on the Soviet Union, or to do further damage to our outlying bases in the Pacific.

The premise inherent in the demand for a Western Front in Europe, therefore, must explicitly include, at the very least, the prevention of any further Japanese gains. At the same time we must be vigilant against the appeasers within our own country, those who, led by the Hearsts, McCormicks, Pattersons, and Howards, would have us divert all our military energies to the Pacific.

Another assumption in the demand for an immediate second front against Hitler is that our all-out 1942 effort in Europe and the tasks that must simultaneously be carried out in the western Pacific are complementary, not competing. Here it must be recognized that vast quantities of war materials must be made available to the Red Armies, to Great Britain, and to our own overseas forces if the hammer and anvil strategy against Hitler is to be successful. Transportation and protection for that transportation must be provided and maintained. At the same time our minimum objectives in the Far East require personnel and materials of war to the widely scattered and various Far Eastern fronts. Australia and the south Pacific shipping route must be held, India must be held. China must be supplied, we must be ever vigilant for a Japanese attack on Siberia, we must constantly destroy the enemy's sinews of war to prevent new offensives and to prepare for our own final smashing blows.

Even though we put our major emphasis on the European front—and this we must do—we must simultaneously send adequate supplies of men and materials across the Pacific and through the Indian Ocean. Unless we do so, the two sectors of the war will compete against each other and our gains in Europe may be partly offset by our further losses in Asia and the south Pacific. Only by supplying both sectors at the same time, the European front for the knock-out blow against Hitler, the Far Eastern front to make ready for a later all-out offensive, can the two efforts be made genuinely complementary.

T HE clue to the successful maintenance of these complementary efforts is to be found primarily at home. It will be on the production lines that the problem of supplying all sectors of the war with the necessary materials will be determined; it will be in our unremitting fight against fascists, appeasers, and isolationists within our own midst that the problem of releasing our entire united energy to win the war speedily will be decided; it will be through our persistent, democratic raising of the grand politico-military strategy of the conduct of the war that we will succeed in establishing a Western Front in Europe now and prepare for the end of fascist Japan.

We are engaged in a people's war, victory in which can be won only by the people themselves. The grand strategy of fighting the Axis powers is a technical military problem for trained military experts in a narrow sense only. Broadly it involves far more than the contribution that can be made by military technicians. Their indispensable role would avail nothing if they were not supported, and indeed given leadership, by the people of an aroused democracy. It is not only the right of the millions of military laymen, the workers in the factories, the farmers, the masses of people in their various occupations and organizations, to raise the cry for opening a second land front in Europe, but that front will be opened because the masses of people have demanded it. For the possibility of that final blow against Hitler depends in the last analysis on the people's eagerness and capacity for carrying it through to victory.

For this reason we must examine in more detail the relation of the Far Eastern front to our demand for the immediate opening of a second front against Hitler.

We are agreed that the immediate issue, the greatest facing the peoples of the United Nations today, is the urgent necessity of opening up a second anti-Hitler front in Western Europe. We insist that Hitler can and must be defeated in 1942. We have put forward the irrefutable argument that now, today, when the brave and mighty Russian armies and Russian people are destroying Hitler's eastern flank, engaging ninety percent of the Nazi military strength, when the production of the United States and Great Britain has reached an unprecedented peak, when the armies of both countries are ready to take the field, and when the inner front, the aroused people of the occupied countries, are everywhere telling us that they are prepared to strike from within-today we must invade Hitler's Nazi fortress from the West. Today we can spare no energy from giving full support to the historic Roosevelt-Churchill-Molotov agreements.

But to make it completely victorious, to guarantee that in our preoccupation with one sector of the war we do not fall into the error of forgetting another sector, we should examine what must be done simultaneously in the Far East.

During the remainder of the year, while the second front against Hitler is being launched and driven to its irresist-



Gen. MacArthur and his right hand man, Lt. Gen. Brett, who heads the United Nations air forces in the southwest Pacific.

ible conclusion, here are some of the objectives that must be achieved in the western Pacific. Japan must be permitted no further victories. Territorially and strategically she has to be stopped in her tracks. In every respect the way must be prepared for a later smashing offensive.

(1): It is generally accepted that Australia must be held. But in that region there is more to it than simply holding that vast continent. The approaches to it, now held by Japan, the bases for an offensive on Australia located in the Netherlands Indies in New Guinea and in New Britain, must be continuously bombed. Other nearby bases, conspicuously New Caledonia, now held by US troops in cooperation with the Free French, and the Fiji Islands, cannot be sacrificed to the Japanese. For these points command not only the likelihood of easy bombing raids, and perhaps invasion of Australia's eastern coast on which nearly all her industries are concentrated, but also the invasion route to New Zealand and the aerial control of the south Pacific shipping route from the United States.

(2): With the easy capture of Burma by relatively small Japanese forces and the appearance of Japanese naval craft in some strength in the Bay of Bengal, India has suddenly become a vital front for the United Nations. At all costs the sea approaches to India as well as those just behind India to the Middle East must be kept open to our supply convoys and navies. India itself must be defended to prevent the enemy from grasping her vast resources, to prevent the final demoralization of the entire remaining colonial world, and to retain the potentiality of the 400,000,000 Indian people as positive assets in the cause of world freedom from fascist domination.

(3): China is now surrounded on virtually three sides by the Japanese invader. From the northern reaches of Manchuria down through the great string of strategic islands off the China coast, and including much of that coast itself, westward through Indo-China and crawling up China's back in Burma, Japanese troops and ships—to say nothing of Japanese "special agents" working with foreign fifth columnists—have placed China in a dangerously vulnerable position. China's vast armies, high morale, and potential striking power are the vital factors in the whole Far Eastern phase of the war. For when Japan is finally defeated it will have been China's courageous per-



Adm. Nimitz greets a navy plane crew which rescued nine army fliers forced down at sea.

severance and final offensive that have done the job. The efforts of other members of the United Nations will inevitably be ancillary to China's. Therefore, a cardinal objective of the immediate future is to give China all the aid she requires not simply to continue her heroic defense, but more important to help her prepare for the great offensive.

At this point we must recognize that more than the materiel of war is needed for the liberation of Asia from the fascist aggressor. Every political and diplomatic device possible must be employed to enable these millions to defend their homes and to thrust back the invader. The futures of the people of India and China are inextricably linked. The United Nations must open the way to their freedom through total mobilization. Selfgovernment for India will immeasurably strengthen the defense of China; our recognition of China as a leading and equal partner among the United Nations will provide incentive to the masses of India.

(4): None of us will be surprised to hear suddenly announced on our radio or to read in the streaming headlines of the newspapers that the Japanese aggressors have launched an attack on the Soviet Union. Nor would the Soviet Union be surprised at a treacherous attack and we know that her Far Eastern armies, air force, and Red Fleet are prepared for it. But we also know that until Hitler's armies have been smashed on the Soviet Union's western flank, she wants to avoid opening her own "second front." Having to fight in the East cannot but divert the Soviet's energies from the all important task of engaging the Nazi forces on the West to the finish. This is our interest as well as that of the Soviet Union. We cannot afford to see a single ounce of our great ally's offensive against Hitler diverted. We have, therefore, still another front to watch in the Far East, that is, another front into which we must at any moment be prepared to throw all the help we can.

(5): There is another front against Japan in the Far Eastern sector of this war and it defines another of the objectives we must carry out at the same time we are opening our second front against Hitler. It is the front maintained principally by the United States. It reaches to every point where a Japanese military or industrial objective can be found. It is a front that is indispensable in preparation for the final attack that will put an end to Japanese fascism. At present, while we concentrate on the elimination of Hitler, we have to raid and destroy, whether by air, by submarine, by surface craft, or by land forces, as much of Japan's equipment as possible. The United Nations have so far put out of commission an estimated third of Japan's cruiser strength. Japan cannot replace it. We have probably destroyed slightly more than the current output of airplanes. Enough of Japan's tankers and merchantmen have been sunk so that it is likely that if the rate of sinkings can at least be maintained she will soon be hard-pressed to maintain contact with her newly acquired overseas empire. These remarks are not made in a mood of optimism, for there is yet no ground for it in the Far East, but as an indication that it has been possible to do a good deal of damage even during the discouraging early months after Pearl Harbor. More must be done each week.

The American front against Japan is based primarily on Hawaii and the Aleutians stretching westward from Alaska. It goes without saying that our immediate strategy of war must not only protect these from Japanese raids but must constantly build them up as offensive bases for our own raiding operations.

(6): There is, finally, the most intangible but at the same time one of the most potentially decisive fronts of the warthe inner front. It must be made to play as active and significant a role in the Pacific as it is in France, in Yugoslavia, in Norway, in Czechoslovakia. In the western Pacific such a front exists and has existed for five years. It is the guerrilla, or partisan, front in China which has unremittingly harassed the invader in the so-called occupied regions. Nothing in the annals of war, unless it be the similar tactic in the Soviet Union, has brought forward such heroism, such leadership, personal initiative; few things have proved so effective against the enemy. I believe that no aspect of the war has so perfectly exemplified the democracy for the further development of which we are fighting the fascist Axis.

Would that it were today possible to speak realistically of the "so-called" occupied areas of the Netherlands Indies, of Indo-China, of Malaya, of Burma. Unfortunately we have no evidence at hand to indicate that the peoples of these nations—over 100,000,000 of them—were previous to the invasion permitted sufficient democracy to have developed the will and resourcefulness for an active internal front. Nor is there evidence that the United Nations have yet sufficiently recognized the importance—no, the necessity of giving these colonial people the political incentives which might today arouse them to take positive steps against the fascists.

In this matter our choice is simple: either we command the respect and cooperation of the colonial peoples of these occupied regions, or the Japanese will put them to work on their side. That the leaders of the United Nations are aware of this problem is now becoming apparent. The generalities of the Atlantic Charter have been made more specific, more concrete, more applicable to the people of the southwestern Pacific by the recent historic speeches of Vice-President Wallace and Undersecretary of State Welles. More remains to be done to make our intentions convincing. The extent of our aid to the Soviet Union, the immediate opening of a Western Front in Europe, the degree of our cooperation with the people of China, and perhaps most of all the fate of the Indian people will all be effective in reaching the colonial populations now overrun by the enemy. The Japanese could not have taken these areas so easily without the active aid of fifth column elements among the local population. We shall not be able to retake them without the assistance of the vast anti-fascist majority of those former colonies.

The foregoing are some of the objectives toward which we must drive in the Pacific sector of the war while we are placing our major emphasis on the Western Front in Europe. They are, singly and collectively, stupendous. Nevertheless their achievement is indispensable to the success of our main drive against Hitler. FREDERICK V. FIELD.



FRONT LINES by COLONEL T.

THE MEANING OF SEVASTOPOL

A perimeter of ten miles pounded daily by two thousand planes and assaulted by ten divisions of Nazi infantry. The "miracle" of its defense. A lesson to inspire the world.

The city, naval base, and port of Sevastopol is flanked from the north and from the south by two landmarks of a symbolic character. About two miles north, between the bay and the Belbek River, lies the Russian Cemetery. About three miles south of the southern outskirts of the fortress city lies the French Cemetery. These landmarks are historic reminders of the terrible struggle which raged here during the last three months of 1854 and the first eight months of 1855 when the French, British, Turkish, and Sardinian troops stormed against the bastions of Sevastopol.

The main defenses of Sevastopol, now as then, run along the Belbek River, where a series of modern forts have now taken the place of the famous northern fortification (near the Russian Cemetery), to the south from Kamichli across the Chernaya River and the Upper Bay, and along the rugged slopes of Mount Sapoun to Kadikyoi and Balaklava. The eastern approaches of Sevastopol during the Crimean War were covered by the fort of Malakhov Kurgan. Paris named its Avenue Malakov after that tough nut which was finally cracked by the Allies on Aug. 27, 1855.

The main difference between the two campaigns is that then the Allies had to bring their reinforcements by ship from far away Europe and Turkey, while the Russian Field Army had open land communications with the interior and could have played a decisive role if it had not been headed by such nonentities as Dannenberg and Menshikov. The Allies had such freedom of action despite the presence of the Russian Field Army in their rear, that they marched from the vicinity of Eupatoria where they landed in early September, southward past Inkerman to Balaklava, and forced their way into the peninsula which juts out into the sea southwest of Sevastopol. Thus the Allies completed the surrounding of Sevastopol by a flank march of some sixty miles.

TODAY the Germans have command of all land communications around Sevastopol and can reinforce their siege army *ad infinitum*. For instance, they can double their attacking forces by simply borrowing ten divisions from von Bock's army group. Today Sevastopol is under a real siege and the besiegers are not besieged as they actually were during the Crimean War. On the other hand, the Red Fleet has full command of the Black Sea. However, it must be admitted that as far as the military situation at Sevastopol itself is concerned, the German land advantages are heavily outweighing the Soviet sea advantages. And heroic as the defense of Sevastopol was eighty-seven years ago, the struggle which is reaching its climax at this writing is incomparably more grandiose and epic.

The nearest Red Army unit outside the Fortress is no less than 180 miles away on the Taman Peninsula in the Caucasus. Now as then, the enemy is pressing from both north and south. The future "German Cemetery" which will be added to the environs of Sevastopol is growing. Probably some 50,000 Germans have already perished here during the seven and onehalf months of the siege. There is little doubt that the tremendous superiority of the Germans in numbers has enabled them to dent the defenses on the Belbek and around Mount Sapoun. The small *place d'armes* of Sevastopol lacks airfield space. The Soviet fighter planes must come almost 200 miles to the rescue. The Luftwaffe sends up to 2,000 planes (by this I mean plane *sorties*, or starts) daily over the beleaguered stronghold. (Compare this with 1,200 British planes over Germany and France!) It is a real miracle that Sevastopol stands.

True, Red Army engineers have built the fortifications in such a way as to enable them to cover both land and sea approaches which was a feat in itself, the batteries being embedded in solid rock. But how long can men stand a daily pounding of 2,000 planes over an area of fifteen square miles, to say nothing of ten divisions of infantry with powerful tank support charging day and night along a perimeter of ten miles?

N OBODY can foretell what the fate of Sevastopol will be when these lines reach the reader. It is, therefore, of the most practical importance to every American to consider the



A church destroyed by German artillery in Sevastopol.

worst possible outcome and evaluate its consequences. Let us assume for a moment that sheer weight of men and metal has finally crushed the comparative handful of defenders of the fortress. Some people are inclined to think that the fall of Sevastopol would *ipso facto* open the way for the Germans to the Caucasus. This is not so.

As far as the fighting on land is concerned, the removal of a threat to the German Army by the handful of men who are defending Sevastopol is not a factor of great importance. There are probably about three our four Soviet divisions within the perimeter of Sevastopol and such a force cannot constitute a serious threat to von Bock's rear on the Kharkov-Rostov front, where the German commander has certainly no less than seventy-five divisions. No *sortie* of the Sevastopol garrison could seriously affect the conduct of operations of the enormous forces facing each other 300 miles and more to the east. Such a threat could have existed only if the Kerch Peninsula were still in Soviet hands and a possible junction of Soviet forces in the Crimea could have been effected with the object of making a *sortie* in force via Perekop and Ghenichesk in the direction of the lower reaches of the Dneiper River.

With the Crimean mountains seething with guerrillas, the

Germans will be hardly able to withdraw many of General von Mannstein's divisions for use on the main front. No more than half a dozen such divisions could be moved from the Crimea to the Rostov front, and that would be a drop in the bucket. On the other hand, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, freed of its tasks in connection with the defense of Sevastopol, would fall back upon Novorossisk, barring the way to the German Army across the Straits of Kerch, should an amphibious operation be attempted against the Taman Peninsula, which is the real doormat of the Caucasus.

If worst came to worst, there would be nothing left in Sevastopol for the Germans to use except the water of the harbor which would be blocked, to boot, by sunken carcasses of ships. Furthermore, the Germans have no navy to speak of to use in the Black Sea and the command of the latter would remain in Soviet hands, although the operational lines of the Black Sea Fleet would be doubled in length. The entire length of the Black Sea is only 700 miles.

Finally, the capture of Sevastopol would have cost the Germans more than 100,000 killed and maimed and a stupendous amount of materiel. Win or lose—Sevastopol has already given the Germans and the world a sample of Red Army fighting.

TROUBLE WITH TIKHONOV

The scout couldn't succeed in his assignment. "Comrade commander," he said, "I am not the man to bring you a live prisoner. . . ." A short short story from the battlefield.

Moscow (by mail).

Ay was breaking as the scout Tikhonov, returning from an assignment, walked into his commanding officer's blindage.

Broad-shouldered, slightly stooped, his face drawn with fatigue, his blue eyes gentle, Tikhonov apologetically tugged at his wet and dirty quilted jacket, as he spoke in a hoarse voice:

"Somehow it doesn't seem to work out, comrade commander! Lost my touch. You know, I even covered the butt of my rifle with my jacket here to make the blow a bit softer. But when I bent down to look at him, I saw that his helmet along with his head had been driven into his shoulders. My hand was too heavy. Whenever I think of the little girl I lose control of myself, and my heart goes to pieces. So I had to discard him, as he was useless."

And Tikhonov contritely spread his hands.

"Just a minute now," the commanding officer angrily interrupted. "You were given the task of bringing in a prisoner so that we could question him, and you are talking about some girl...."

Tikhonov awkwardly shuffled his feet and hoarsely explained:

"I was trying to tell you. She was just a child, but they raped her to death. She was still breathing when I entered the barn."

Tikhonov straightened up suddenly and continued in a determined voice:

"See here, comrade commander, I am not the man to bring you a live prisoner. I am ruined for that. When I capture one I try to take myself in hand, be more careful. But it's no use. I just can't make it. I ran across one of the fascists at dawn the other day . . . a juicy fat guy who looked like a non-com. I caught him quietly and held him just long enough to stop his outcries. And then after I looked around to see if I had aroused anyone, I let him drop. Well, when I looked back at him he was already no good to anyone."

"So you did not fulfill your task?"

Tikhonov drew himself up as much as the low-ceilinged blindage would permit, sighed, and mournfully answered: "Comrade commander, please try to understand my predicament. What could I have done? I bent over her, just a mere child. Thought that I'd carry her away and maybe she would live through it. And she, the poor kid, must have thought that I, too . . . she sank her little teeth into my hand and passed on like that, just as I was carrying her."

He choked and could not continue.

Water dripped from the walls of the blindage.

"You may go," said the commanding officer quietly. Tikhonov hesitated, then turning around awkwardly in the narrow passage, he went out. He returned almost immediately.

"Comrade commander," he began apologetically, "I forgot to tell you that I did bring one in, however."

"Where is he? Bring him in here." The commanding officer's pleasure showed in his voice.

Downcast, Tikhonov hesitated for a second, and said:

"I took him directly to the doctor. If he comes to, he will do very nicely."

The commanding officer sat down and looking hard at the scout, asked:

"Well, what do you want me to do with you, Comrade Tikhonov? I guess I'll have to send you back to the sniper squad."

Tikhonov's face broadened into a good-natured grin. Edging toward the officer, he said enthusiastically:

"You've made a correct decision, comrade commander. There I'll be able to relax a bit," and added quietly, "and, if I happen to kill off an extra snake or two, no one will blame me for it. There a fellow doesn't have to hold himself in. Later, if you order me back to scouting I'll gladly return. But now—well, I keep thinking of the little girl—my heart burns with anger and pain. I just can't do it, my heart won't be in my work."

Tikhonov tugged at his jacket with which he had so carefully covered his rifle butt to make the blow softer.

"May I go?"

"Go ahead," answered the commanding officer, and picking up the phone called the medical center, hoping that the prisoner whom Tikhonov had brought in would still be of some use. VADIM KOZHEVNIKOV.

THE BLOCS THAT BLOCK CONGRESS

The defeatist groupings that operate in the House and Senate. Bruce Minton probes the so-called "farm bloc." Third in the series "Wanted: A Victory Congress."

Washington.

S INCE December 7 one criterion alone can justly be applied to Congress: to what degree has Congress—and more specifically, to what degree have individual members of Congress—responded to the demands of total war? Party labels of "Republican" or "Democrat" lack validity these days; financial and business ties turn out to be inadequate measures. What counts now is the extent to which the members of the national legislature have pushed the war against the Axis powers.

To start with, a small group within Congress must be singled out as dangerous to the nation's security. The appeasers would deliver America to fascism, either because they fear the implications of a United Nations' victory, or because they admire the Nazi way of life, or because they hate Roosevelt far worse than Hitler. Against this handful of betrayers charges can be leveled similar to that hurled against the publisher of the Chicago Tribune by Representative McKeough: "I challenge Colonel McCormick's patriotism and I say that his language at this time makes him subject, at least to thinking people, to the charge of being guilty of treason, and I so charge him." Certainly strong judgments can be justified against such men as Senator Reynolds (founder of the anti-Semitic American Vindicator, admirer of Hitler and Mussolini, endorsed by Gerald L. K. Smith, praised by Fritz Kuhn); or Senator Wheeler (leading America First speaker, reviler of the Presdent, isolationist disrupter); or Representative Ham Fish (American Firster, friend of the convicted Nazi agent George Sylvester Viereck). Nor can any excuse lessen the guilt of those who lent their franking privileges to Viereck-among them Senators Nye, Brooks, Clark of Idaho, Johnson of Colo-

The so-called farm bloc doesn't give a hoot about them: a southern sharecropper's wife and her two ragged children.



rado; Representatives Knutson, Vorys, Stratton, Hoffman, and Tinkham.

Around these ominous figures hover the more virulent reactionaries. Not all these men are outright appeasers. Yet they have gone along with the appeasers more than once—or perhaps their actions persuaded the appeasers to consider them as allies. The result is the same—damaging to America at war. More accurately, the members of this group can be called "diversionists"; they distract attention from the main enemy into by-ways dangerous to morale and comforting to the Axis.

The diversionists are not so simple as to announce their intention of impeding the war effort. In fact, each would individually protest his passion to beat Hitler and Japan. With the single exception of the pacifist Jeanette Rankin, every member of the House and Senate voted for the declarations of war against the Axis. But the acts of the diversionists since then reveal them as chiefly occupied with undermining national unity and impeding the fight for victory.

To the worst of the die-hards, the war against the Axis remains secondary to their private war against the New Deal, against labor, against President Roosevelt, and against Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The formal record of Congress since Pearl Harbor (discussed in a preceding article, NEW MASSES, June 16) reflects the successes of this diversionist minority in dominating debate and blocking legislation of immediate concern to the nation. Reaction, organized loosely into more or less effective groupings, misled the public and a good section of Congress. Presumably each grouping or "bloc" is dedicated to a high purpose—the so-called "farm bloc" flaunts its devotion to the American farmer; the "economy bloc" boasts of its watchdog vigilance in protecting the taxpayer. Yet observe these groupings in action; do they fulfill any of the claims they so glibly ascribe to themselves?

HE House and Senate are physically divided according to party. On the one side sit the Republicans, and opposite, with the aisle as demarcation, the Democrats. Neither delegation can boast of unity. Among the Republicans, ostensibly the loval opposition, the realities of war more and more cut through old patterns; most of them speak these days for communities committed whole-heartedly to the fight against the Axis. The Republican ranks include some out-and-out oppositionists-Hoffman, Day, Fish in the House, Brooks, Capper, Lodge in the Senate, for example-but these are a handful. Most of the delegation recognize the need for national unity; they willingly vote for war appropriations, but having done so, they are inclined to think they have discharged their obligation. The lack of purposeful leadership has influenced most Republicans to continue politics-as-usual, which means that in relation to the demands of the day, they seem suspended in mid-air. Yet, as will be seen in later articles, the minority party can be surely drawn into the war effort to a far greater degree than has been true up to now.

Nor have the Democrats achieved sufficient unity. They too have their appeasers and professional administration baiters in the House, Cox, Dies, Barry, Sweeney are instances; in the Senate, Walsh, Byrd, Tydings, Bilbo. The poll taxers, with a formal record of approving war measures, have done so only after deliberate attempts to delay, to water down. They have tried to extort as the price of support to the administration the dumping of all social legislation. Furthermore, among the Democrats, as among the Republicans, sit a large number of "neutrals," willing if pressure is strong enough, to go along with the administration and at times with that small group whose position on the war and on domestic questions is most consistently progressive. But these "neutrals" if given no guidance, are just as likely to take their place with the aggressive diversionists.

On both sides of the aisle are the pro-war forces. The most able and far-seeing of these—progressives like Kopplemann, Eliot, Marcantonio, Scanlon, Hook, Sabath, Thomas Ford, John Coffee, Bradley, Sacks, Casey, and about a score others are purposeful men who have still not welded themselves into a solid phalanx, and are still not masters of the art of unified action. Of these men, whose presence in Congress promises so much for the fulfillment of the people's aspirations, much more will be said in the subsequent articles.

Within Congress, cutting across party labels, also exists a reactionary coalition with a semblance of stability. The coalition seems to break up into specialized groups—but these groups merely express the wishes of the reactionaries as a whole. Whether they pose as fighters for "economy," or against "regimentation," or in opposition to "executive dictatorship," they are after the same ends—to fight the government wherever possible. The result is the delay—if nothing worse—of many measures essential to the war effort.

O F ALL these groupings, the so-called "farm bloc" is the most deceptive. I give it detailed consideration, because once it stands revealed in its true colors, the whole sham of the reactionary coalition's other battle-cries—economy, anti-dictatorship, etc.—becomes clear. The "farm bloc," moreover, has garnered most publicity; it is often considered a genuine group interested in the fate of the farmers. But this claim has no basis in fact.

Since the outbreak of war, the "farm bloc" has come forward as a major force in most debates, even when the farmers are not directly involved. Throughout the fight over price control, the bloc protested vehemently against ceilings on agricultural products. Since the passage of the inadequate legislation misnamed "price control," hardly a week has passed during which the farm bloc has not been embroiled in controversy—whether over the Farm Security Administration, the disposal of surplus wheat and corn owned by the government, or anti-labor and economy legislation. One thing must be acknowledged—the bloc is by no means reticent.

Supposedly the bloc's animosity to price control stemmed from a desire to obtain higher prices for producers and protection against unfair restrictions. Both in the Senate and the House the bloc claimed as its supporters those coming from agricultural localities hard hit by crisis during the last two decades, the crisis which affected agriculture long before it overwhelmed industrial centers. The bloc, therefore, posed as an alliance between spokesmen of the southern states and the midwest farm areas. True enough, in the early twenties such an alliance did exist in Congress; for all the differences in objectives separating those who talked for cotton and those interested in wheat, corn, and livestock, this uneasy collaboration did manage now and then to thwart the Old Guard Republicans who had elected Harding. But the farm bloc of 1942 is another breed of puppy. Today the bloc devotes itself to destroying progressive legislation—even that legislation beneficial to the average farmer.

N CONGRESS Senators McNary and O'Mahoney, Nye and Reed stick a hayseed in their hair, while Senators "Cotton Ed" Smith, Thomas of Oklahoma, Capper, Russell, Byrd, Bilbo, George, and Bankhead adorn their brows with crowns of cotton. But they show a startling indifference to legislation protecting the farmers' future. They exhibit a mighty unconcern over guarantees of minimum prices or safeguards against sharp market drops that may ruin the farmer in the next two or three years. Instead they smile benignly on speculators and profiteers. They reject the Presidential suggestion that abundant production be rewarded. They gabble only of 110 and 120 percent parity. And this refrain is sheer demagogy. Prices can only rise to inflated levels if farm production is restricted, if producers are restrained from planting and harvesting. For this purpose the bloc launched an all-out attack on the Farm Security Administration and against every other government agency offering farm aid. Yet the small producers, so vital to the Food for Victory program, cannot increase (or even maintain) crops without loans for seeds and tools, without help to meet debts, without cooperatives, without assistance that allows them to improve the fertility of their land. Exactly at this point, however, the farm bloc balks.

To understand the bloc, it is necessary to examine those organizations to which it expresses allegiance and which in turn dictate bloc policies:

1. The National Council of Farm Cooperatives, dominated by the big milk trusts, Borden and Sheffield.

2. The National Grange. Louis Taber, recently resigned master of the Grange, was a member of America First, and the new master, Albert Goss, while not a member, is very close to Taber and is guided by Taber's policies. The Grange is controlled by wealthy farmers—at least it is so organized that the biggest landholders dictate to Taber and Goss. It is primarily concerned these days not with farm problems but with fighting labor.

A group of CCC boys training for the merchant marine on a ship at St. Petersburg, Fla.



3. The Associated Farmers receives ten percent of its funds from farmer members, ninety percent from big business, among which it counts the Pacific Gas and Electric Co., Standard Oil of California, California Packing Corp., American Can Co., Southern Pacific Railroad, San Francisco Industrial Association, Sun Oil Co., and various banks. Organized in 1934, the Associated Farmers concentrated on breaking strikes on the West Coast; more recently it expanded into fifteen states. In California it has been called the front for two percent of the owners who possess a quarter of farm acreage in the state and receive a third of the total crop value.

4. The American Farm Bureau Federation, the largest and most influential of all the farm lobbies, includes a proportion of dirt farmers in its membership. In Ohio and Vermont these farmers have gained control of the local Bureaus and have violently protested policies of the national Bureau. But Edward O'Neal, president of the Bureau, wealthy Alabama landowner, is a determined man, and on the whole the big farmers retain their grip on the Bureau apparatus. According to Representative Dingell: "Mr. O'Neal, together with certain of his associates, represents the large plantation type of operation in the cotton South and the large-scale commercialized farming operations in the grain, vegetable, and fruit sections of the country. . . . The policy of Mr. O'Neal appears to be a kind of modern feudalism in concept, believing in the concentration of land ownership in a comparatively small proportion of the agricultural population." Mr. O'Neal told the Byrd economy committee: "I tell farmers if they can't join any of the farm organizations, they should join the Ku Klux Klan."

The leaders of these four organizations are the inspiration and the guiding force of the congressional farm bloc. The big four have lately been joined by the Free Farmers, Inc., set up by the Grange and the Farm Bureau. It ostensibly resists John L. Lewis' phony union among dairy farmers. But this formal resistance is used as an excuse to drum up hysteria against organized labor. The big four with the Free Farmers, Inc., have little to do with dirt farmers or the rank and file of dairy farmers. They speak for industrialized agriculture, for the huge landowners. And so, not surprisingly, does the so-called farm bloc.

T IS only necessary to look at the record:

1. The block attacked FSA, migrant camps for farm labor, loans to little farmers, all aid to small landholders. Applause and encouragement came from Edward O'Neal of the Bureau and from the Associated Farmers.

2. The Bankhead amendment to the price control bill, sup-

The farm bloc's against this too: a WPA nursery.



ported by the bloc, was presumably written by the Farm Bureau. The anxiety to transfer authority over farm prices from Leon Henderson of the Price Control Administration to Claude Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture, expressed the Farm Bureau's feeling that the Department of Agriculture would prove more tractable to pressure than the OPA—a hope not fulfilled, to the bloc's dismay. The Farm Bureau has long boasted of how it "ran" AAA, and certainly the Bureau still wields enormous influence in the department.

3. The farm bloc opposed legislation allowing the government to sell surplus corn, wheat, and cotton below parity. Friends of the Farm Bureau (and members) own elevators and granaries; they do not want to lose rent on stored products. Moreover, the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, speaking for the industrial alcohol interests, fears use of government owned farm surpluses for the manufacture of industrial alcohol and synthetic rubber, badly needed in the war effort. More money can be made by the trust if alcohol is manufactured from petroleum and sugar. So Senators Russell, Bankhead, Gillette, and Thomas of Oklahoma sponsored legislation forbidding sale of agricultural surpluses below parity. This legislation encouraged speculation, dreaded by farmers. But the bloc had its orders. . .

4. The bloc conducted an enthusiastic campaign against organized labor. The Bureau's Mr. O'Neal protested the fortyhour week, high wages, and non-existent strikes which he said caused inflation. The Associated Farmers clamored for an antilabor rather than a price control bill.

The record shows that the congressional grouping disguising itself as a "farm bloc" is misnamed. It has nothing in common with the majority of farmers; it does not express their needs. Moreover, the "bloc" itself proves to be a fake. It is no more than a sub-division of a much larger reactionary coalition. And the aims of the bloc are only the aims of all the reactionaries, couched in "farm" terms. Or put it this way:

Farm bloc: Wants to squeeze the small farmer off the land. Desires to kill all progressive agencies—FSA, rural electrification, OCD, WPA, CCC, NYA, etc. Urges passage of the Smith, Connally, and Vinson anti-labor measures. Favors a sales tax. Opposes the President's limit of \$25,000 on incomes. Wants to freeze surplus products owned by the government. Fights price control and higher profits taxes.

Economy bloc: Under the leadership of Harry Byrd, objects to all "non-essential" spending—defined as appropriations for FSA, rural electrification, OCD, WPA, CCC, NYA, etc. Favors the sales tax. Violently opposed to organized labor, throws its weight behind all anti-labor proposals. Every leading member of the "farm bloc" is included in the ranks of the "economy bloc."

It should be noted that many Republicans in particular have rallied to the "economy" slogan. Yet, for all their tirades against "non-essential expenditures," the cancellation of social legislation won in the past hinders the fight against the Axis. New Deal agencies have more and more been transformed into weapons to prosecute the total war. The bloc ignored the army's plea for the CCC, for example: Maj. Gen. James A. Ulio, judge advocate general, testified that the continuance of CCC would enable soldiers to be released from non-combatant duty and permit their training in combat activities. The economy spokesmen turned down the WPB's request for an REA project to bring power lines into a new government aluminum plant in Oklahoma.

"Economy" has wiped out a great majority of defense housing plans—delaying war production, and in the case of shipbuilding, actually interfering with the victory construction program. The economy fight against NYA was in direct opposition to the President's advocacy of continuing this agency which trained young people as skilled workers. Essential steel and copper would be wasted by the pruning of FSA: the cooperatives encouraged by the FSA stimulated community use of farm machinery, thereby reducing the demand for new machines, and the materials needed for new machines could be diverted into other war purposes. As Representative Kopplemann remarked about the economy cabal: "Their records are quite black . . . objections come from the same voices which objected to the many other war measures which fortunately were adopted in spite of them." The bloc opposed measures vital to "the nation's adequate preparation and protection." It would, in the words of another critic, "win the war with a medicine dropper."

Actually those who shout against non-essential expenditures are mostly concerned with continuing politics-as-usual, and not with the war effort. Their tactics are clearly obstructionist. As an instance, Representative Rich told the House that "if we just dilly-dally a little longer, and cut this [an appropriation for an inland waterway] down from \$144,000,000 to \$80,-000,000, and then cut out the \$80,000,000, we will be doing a grand job this afternoon."

Anti-labor bloc. Takes the position that the government can expect no support until it shackles labor. Opposes measures considered special pets of "radical labor" or the government— FSA, rural electrification, OCD, WPA, CCC, NYA, etc. Favors sales tax. Opposes higher excess profits taxes. Every leading member of the "economy bloc" and the "farm bloc" takes his place within this larger "anti-labor bloc." Conversely, the anti-laborites go to the aid of their economy and farm colleagues when this seems necessary.

THUS, the leading "blocs" are all part of the same cabal, assuming a specialized vocabulary to confuse and obscure their purpose. Each "bloc," for all its decorative self-description, is devoted to the same end; each is a sub-section of the reactionary junta, which in one form or another obstructs the war program.

Ostensibly, the diversionists "support" the war effort. The poll taxers endorse the administration's foreign policy. But only action counts. For all the huzzahs, those who bait labor, slander the administration, talk defeatism, push legislation to squeeze the small farmer from his land, discriminate against the little businessman, berate the Negro people and the foreignborn, and try to place the greatest burden of paying for the war on those least able to carry the burden-these men are hardly helping the nation toward speedy victory. Fortunately, the diversionists are a minority in Congress. And it would be a mistake because of them to fall into the trap of condemning Congress as an institution or of throwing up the struggle to improve its quality. It is well to remember that the AFL, CIO, and Farmers Union forced the restitution of most of the cuts in agricultural appropriations. It is well to recall that many big business spokesmen have condemned the few who have sought exorbitant profits and have carried on the vendetta against labor. Every anti-labor bill has gone down to defeat. Every war measure that the administration has pushed has been approved, despite the yapping of the minority junta.

To be sure, a dangerous number of reactionaries sit in Congress. But the pro-war supporters of the government still predominate. So far, this majority has lacked organization and initiative; it has allowed the diversionists to monopolize the floor and to prevent debate on crucial issues. The diversionists hardly look forward to the test of the coming elections. And Congress as it is now constituted is composed of a nucleus that can press the war effort despite all reactionary opposition. The picture is neither gloomy—nor anything to write home about. There is a job to be done to revive and rehabilitate Congress. I want to discuss the good chances of achieving this reformation in the subsequent articles.

> BRUCE MINTON (with the assistance of Charles Humboldt)

(In an early issue, Mr. Minton will continue his analysis of the 77th Congress, discussing lobbies and pressure groups.)



Who's Subversive?

AM not speaking officially and the opinion I am about to air is entirely my own. But can this war ever be won until we shall have decided who happen to be our friends and who happen to be our enemies? Not infrequently these last few months I have had more or less illiterate young men approach me with a desire to be informed about the character of divers citizens who had applied for an official position. They invariably wanted to know about possible "subversive opinions" upon the part of those candidates. As a rule I could assure them that the gentlemen under discussion hated Hitler and all his evil works, hated Mussolini and all his evil works, hated Ham Fish and all his works, were staunch patriots, and had never indulged in isolationist activities. But they always wanted to know what these future servants of the state thought about Bolshevism. To which I was then forced to reply that it would be very bad taste indeed on my part to speak against our most useful ally, the only one who thus far has done any effective fighting, the only one who has defeated the Nazis for us and who in return for these services has been rewarded by Washington by being granted very liberal lend-lease loans.

Most of the young men who came to interview me were hazy on this subject, for as they explained, they were much too busy hunting Bolsheviks to do much reading of newspapers. I then tried to persuade them to read the papers and we parted the worst of friends, for they invariably suspected me of a secret love for the doctrines of the wicked Bolshevik. No use my telling them that those doctrines did not in the least interest me as long as Soviet Russia was our official ally and a most useful helpmate. These youngsters were out to get their Red, though it was the same Red who had helped save them from wearing the brown shirt of little Adolph the Unspeakable.

I might now go one step further and inquire what we are supposed to take as the official attitude of other countries toward their Moscow allies? The one thing in the world that happens to interest me personally more than anything else is to see the country of my birth set free from the obscene Nazi yoke. That most desirable purpose can only be brought about by killing so many Nazis that the others will surrender and will allow themselves to be conducted (none too politely) to the gallows on which they belong. Up to the moment of writing this article the only success along this line has been achieved by the followers of the late Nicolai Lenin. They are killing Nazis at such a rate of speed that the day of delivery for the people of the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies is no longer a vague hope and a futile dream but an actual possibility. And when a man is saving me from drowning I do not feel that it is up to me to inquire into his taste in neckties or whether he is a faithful member of the Church I myself happen to attend.—HENDRIK WILLEM VAN LOON.

(Condensed from an article in "Knickerbocker Weekly," "Free Netherlands")

	NEW N	AASSES	
E	ditors		
ARA GILES	JOSEPH NORTH	Washington Editor	BRUCE MINTON
MAGIL	JOSEPH STAROBIN	Business Manager	CARL BRISTEL
McKENNEY	JOHN STUART	Promotion and Circulation	HERBERT GOLDFRANK

THE ANSWER TO TOBRUK:

A Second Front Immediately

HERE is an old Chinese proverb: beware the claws of the wounded beast. Last week saw the sorely pressed Axis armies-bleeding from the wounds of a year's fighting on the Eastern Front-lunging forward desperately on all the war-torn continents. Before the historic gates of Sevastopol, the attackers were losing sixty percent of their men-an estimated 100,000 in eighteen days -in their effort to storm the Black Sea stronghold. The enemy had wedged into the outer defenses of the city; the defenders were prepared to fight block by block within the city. In North Africa General von Rommel's armies plunged forward into Tobruk which fell after a previous siege of nearly eight months. Hitler's scouts stood at the borderline of Egypt. Halfway across the world, Kiska Island, some 600 miles west of Alaska's Dutch Harbor, was invested by Japanese troops, and the North American Pacific coastline-in Canada and in Oregon-was shelled by a Japanese submarine. In Hawaii Gen. Delos C. Emmons urged all "non-essential citizens" to leave the island.

It is not at all accidental that the conjuncture of Axis assaults bursts upon the world this first anniversary of Russia's entrance into the war. The Axis, harassed by its weakened internal setup, its terrific losses in manpower and materiel, and by the increasingly improved relations among the United Nations, must press for an early decision, for the early success of its grand strategy before it is altogether too late. The strategy of the fascist powers envisages a breakthrough in the Near East, the swastika over the oilfields of Batum and Syria, and the Axis powers ultimately joining banners somewhere in India. Hitler is sticking by his strategy; his principal problem today is to disrupt ours.

O URS is the result of a year's tragic experiences, which, however, taught us much. We learned that Hitler's objective is to keep our strengths scattered, to keep our land, naval, and sea forces dispersed across the seas and continents. We learned that concentration is the essence of military success, and that drove home the concomitant political

lessons—the increased cordiality of the United Nations. These lessons resulted in the historic second front agreements of Roosevelt, Churchill, Molotov.

Hitler's task was to frustrate that alliance, to disrupt our plans, to disorient our painfully acquired equilibrium. He sought and seeks frantically to retain the initiative; to choose the fronts and to conduct the fighting on his terms. To date his strategy has been upset by the tremendous resistance of the Red Armies; he sees his last chances go a-glimmering altogether if the Soviet armies, which occupy ninety percent of his strength, are joined in a great pincer action via a Western Front. How to disrupt that strategy? It was felt weeks ago by the strategists of the Wilhelmstrasse that a Nazi success in Africa might provoke a storm of debate over the Western Front issue. Hitler knew it would hearten his concealed partisans within the United States and Great Britain; he knew it would confuse many within the anti-fascist camp. He gambled on political reverberations and hoped to benefit from all consequent turmoil. The Axis geopoliticians recalled the fears engendered when Singapore fell-the arguments that arose then against the second front.

Viewed in this light one can readily see why Hitler commanded his generals to take Tobruk and Sevastopol at all costs; why he gave the signal to the Mikado to drive toward the Aleutians, to begin a series of token shellings of the West Coast precisely at this moment when the faint-of-heart and the concealed fifth columnists are clamoring about Tobruk. The strategy is manifest for all with eyes to see. *Now*, if ever, the enemy believes, is the time to divide and dissipate the profound sentiments of our people and of Britain toward the Soviet Union, toward the understanding about a Western Front.

In Britain, as in America, frantic voices of the cautious, the confused, and the covert fifth column rise to sow panic, to cast doubt upon the second front agreements. The Scripps-Howard press here leads with warnings of another Dunkirk; the appeasement newspapers have a field day spreading defeatism.

Totally missing from their columns is the

essential reality: Hitler's all-consuming fear of an invasion while nine-tenths of his army is occupied in the East. Totally missing, too, is the fact that von Rommel requires replenishment of his forces to continue his drive into the more powerfully fortified area of Egypt to Suez. Totally missing is the fact that a Western Front would prevent those reinforcements from ever being sent to Africa. Speculation is rife that Hitler's pincer movement may be successful-that his forces may join in the Near East by smashing through the Caucasus and meeting von Rommel somewhere east of Suez. Suddenly these gentlemen forget the tremendous resistance and staying powernay, the increased fighting power-of the Red Army, and they overlook the problem Hitler faces even should Sevastopol fall (as Colonel T. points out elsewhere in this issue) in bridging the Kerch Straits, in breaking through at Kharkov and forcing his way down into the Caucasus through the Rostov lines. He failed when he was stronger, last fall. And Soviet President Kalinin points out, according to the Associated Press, that "the German Army does not have the strength to launch an offensive all along the front." The Nazis, he said, in marking the first year of successful Soviet resistance, "are considerably enfeebled, both physically and morally."

M^{ISSING, too, from the columns of the defeatist press is the fact that Europe} seethes with rebelliousness and readiness to rise in support of British and American troops landing anywhere on the Continent. Stockpiles of materiel rise mountain-high on the British Island; American and British troops there are eager for action. Air superiority in Western Europe has been overwhelmingly won by the United Nations. Lord Beaverbrook put it this way at Birmingham the other night: "The army in my opinion is adequately equipped for opening a second front; it is waiting for it and wanting to do it; the need is for urgency." And he said the word that must be said: "There must be no unnecessary delay in sending forthwith a second expeditionary force to fight on a second front."

Fortunately the world can credit the American and British leaders with greater military and political astuteness than the "goslow" commentators. The Churchill and Roosevelt conferences have before them the popular mandates for a second front; they had already agreed upon this endeavor, put their signatures to agreements on it. These agreements were made after all facts and eventualities were taken in consideration. Among these eventualities was, undoubtedly, the possibility of local defeats and defeats of great magnitude. But the lessons of the past year pointed to the concentration of our combined strengths, namely, the opening of a second front while Hitler is desperately engaged in the East. Thus will we most certainly retrieve the positions in Africa, as well as guarantee that the Japanese will be successfully overcome.

There is an old American saying: "Keep your eye on the ball." Let us hope that this maxim will not be forgotten in the current clamor from certain sections of the grandstand. The statement of such legislators as Rep. Andrew May, of Kentucky, chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, have real significance. The capture of Tobruk, he said, was "distressing news" but news which should provide "new impetus" to the promised opening of a second front. He was joined in this sentiment by Sen. H. H. Schwartz, of Wyoming, a member of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, who expressed belief that "we are ready now." These men have their eye on the ball: they realize America's sovereignty and freedom are the stakes.

Too Little

Four months is a long time to spend in framing anything so urgent as a "win the war" tax bill. It is inexcusably long if, as has happened, the result falls short of the purpose. As drawn up (at this writing) by the House Ways and Means Committee, the bill is unsatisfactory in virtually all important respects save two. One, of course, is the elimination of proposals for a general sales tax. For this victory thanks are due the people in general and organized labor in particular, for their insistent campaign against this most unfair of all levies. The other outstanding progressive feature of the bill is the "pay as you earn" provision. Under this provision, individual income taxes would be paid through a ten percent levy on the taxable amount in each person's pay envelope. Thus the government would regularly receive "cash in hand" for waging the war, the taxpayers would be saved the concentrated headache of March 15.

There is little else in the bill to celebrate. As it stands now, it would probably raise around \$6,600,000,000 or about \$2,000,000,-000 less than would result from the Treasury Department's proposals. Worse, it runs counter to the administration's equality-of-sacrifice program. The House committee turned down President Roosevelt's proposal for a \$25,000 ceiling on family incomes. It lowered income tax exemptions to impose burdens on single people earning anything more than eleven dollars a week, and married ones earning more than twenty-six dollars. True, it plugs a loophole by providing for compulsory joint income tax returns for married couples; but this does not compensate for the failure to tax state and local bonds. Nor does it excuse the congressmen who not only refused to increase real estate and gift taxes, as requested by the Treasury, but actually lightened them.

As if these concessions to the wealthy and



London (by cable).

HE most immediate popular reaction to the Anglo-Soviet treaty was the spontaneous stream of congratulatory telegrams and resolutions from the factories. Naturally keenest was the enthusiasm aroused by the second front agreement.

The uplifting effect is particularly understandable. Again the mass of working people were given the demonstration that national unity behind the government isn't simply a passive affair wherein the people agree to keep their mouths shut for the duration. On the contrary, here was an issue where the hesitation and nervousness the government may have felt have all been overcome by the strength and solidity of the popular demand for maximum cooperation with the Soviet Union.

So far as the working people are concerned the agreement has also certainly strengthened friendship for the United States. From all sorts of sources during the past months there has been spread—for fairly obvious political motives—the suggestion that American reactionaries and isolationists were still in a sufficiently strong position to prevent the administration from aligning itself fully in the joint struggle of 1942. Although it is dangerous to generalize about such a matter, I think it can be said frankly that there existed a vague impression among British working people that the apparent lack of response to earlier Soviet requests for closer strategic cooperation could be blamed in part on supposed reactionary strength in Washington.

Major Cazalet and company, of course, make this sort of propaganda part of their regular stock in trade. Cazalet himself was busy, at the time of Molotov's visit, trying to make all and sundry believe that full agreement with the Russians would have a "deplorable" effect upon "neutral opinion," notably the United States. Now a good deal of that sort of support has been shot from under the reactionaries and defeatists. That is not to say that they do not represent any sort of danger any more or that they will entirely cease from creating trouble. Within a few hours after the second front agreement we had Captain Crowder, secretary of the "1922 Committee," openly attacking the second front and spreading alarm and despondency about the situation on the Eastern Front among his Conservative constituents at Finchley. And furthermore Crowder showed his hand pretty clearly in his speech by quoting almost verbatim from the bulletin of the defeatist Imperial Policy Group. That is important in two ways because it makes nonsense of the pretense that nothing should be done about stopping the mouthings of the Imperial Policy Group on the grounds that they are only a small insignificant body. Secondly, I think we may find that this kind of thing is going to be the beginning of a serious and thoroughly healthy split within the 1922 Committee itself. There's a lot of misunderstanding as to what the 1922 Committee really is. And this leads to miscalculations about the true position here.

The committee was founded in 1922 by Sir Gervase Rentoul—then newly elected Conservative Member for Lowestoft—as a club of "Young Tories." All of them were also men who had been newly elected to Parliament in the elections of 1922—the elections which ended the coalition government of the war and immediate postwar years. It was thus at first intended as a concentration point of "pure young Toryism" and a demonstration against flirtations by the Conservative Party with devilish Liberalism. Later, however, the committee became extended so as to develop into a body open to all Conservative members in Commons who did not hold any sort of government post. That's what gives it its real importance.

There have been times when the 1922 Committee has voiced views of the least reactionary Conservative backbenchers. There have been times, on the other hand, when the whole of that powerful-looking and impressive dog was being wagged by a bitterly reactionary and none too clean-looking tail. When Erskine Hill, the committee's chairman, joins forces with a Major Cazalet, and when Crowder, its secretary, echoes the defeatist mutterings of the IPG, then those Conservative backbenchers who support a maximum war effort begin to be restive at the fact that their organization is being used for views which are not theirs at all.

Meanwhile, Major Cazalet appears ambitious to constitute himself the fairy godmother of the most reactionary elements in business circles. His latest effort at the present writing is understood to have been a speech to a private gathering of the Manufacturers Research Group, at which, according to reports of persons present, he exceeded even his venomous little booklet in his attack on the Soviet Union.

All of these intrigues however are powerless in the face of the enthusiasm and unity of a nation preparing the utmost efforts and sacrifices for a second front and an early victory. Churchill in Washington carries the mandate for the earliest fulfillment of the agreements of the treaty from a nation more united on this essential issue than at any previous time. impositions on the poor were not bad enough, the majority of the Ways and Means Committee are reported to be considering a "workable" plan of turning back to big corporations some twenty percent of their excess profits taxes after the war. The argument that this would speed peacetime conversion sounds plausible on the surface. But it would be far more persuasive in the context of a generally democratic attitude toward war taxation. This the majority of the Ways and Means Committee obviously does not have. The bill it has produced symbolizes, with a few worthy exceptions, the worst elements of reaction, indifference, and plain defeatism that exist in Congress. This measure should be drastically amended in House and Senate. It will be, if the congressional majority are made to feel, and follow, their constituents' wishes.

Time to Change

A LARGE number of college administrators seem to have evolved the curious theory that America has the kind of "past" which shouldn't be talked about. According to a recent survey by the New York *Times*, eightytwo percent of our institutions of higher learning do not require courses in American history as a basis for graduation. Seventy-two percent do not require it, either, as a basis for admission. Which means just this: that hundreds of thousands of Americans get nothing about their nation's history except the elementary facts taught them in the grade schools.

The reasons for this situation, as given in responses to the Times questionnaire, are as strange as the situation itself. One is that a required course is distasteful to students, since the compulsory smacks of Nazism. The other is that students might tend to get a "provincial" viewpoint if they did not concentrate on world, instead of American, history. But many other college courses are required. As for provincialism-how can a student be expected to understand world history without understanding that of his own country? And who suggests teaching American history without reference to the rest of the world? It is, indeed, in this latter respect that America's past is richest in associations, ideas, lessons for the present. To deny this is to accept the ultra-provincial view that this country is an isolated, self-contained nation with a people and an outlook completely separate from the Old World. And this, we submit, is worse than provincialism-it is playing into the hands of Martin Dies and Charles Lindbergh.

It is gratifying that sixty-nine percent of the colleges queried felt at least that American history should now be made a required course. They themselves recognized that with this country engaged in a world war for democracy, students should thoroughly learn the traditions for which we are fighting.

Question for the "New Republic"

THE new American and British agreements with the Soviet Union have been received with such universal acclaim that even the appeasers and defeatists have for the moment had to reduce their sour notes to little more than querulous whispers. There was, however, one comment that ignored the most elementary decencies. Shockingly enough, it appeared not in the McCormick-Patterson or Hearst newspapers, but in the New Republic for June 22. The publication on the anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Russia of TRB's Washington Notes indicates a frivolous irresponsibility on the part of the New Republic's editors that is incomprehensible.

TRB is Kenneth Crawford. As is well known in newspaper circles, anti-Communism is an obsession with Crawford, and he is no more capable of rational thinking on anything he imagines is even remotely connected with Russia or Communism than is Martin Dies. As a result of the Washington-London-Moscow agreements, according to Crawford, "Soviet Russia now stands pledged to have nothing to do with the Communist Parties of the United States and Great Britain, both of which are in essence Russian nationalist groups. . . ." There is, of course, not a word in the treaty about any such thing. There couldn't be because there is no connection between Soviet Russia and the American and British Communist Parties—a fact which even Crawford later concedes when he writes: "Indeed, the conduct of American Communists all through this period [of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact] suggested that they had no pipe line to the Kremlin."

What Crawford distorts is a pledge in the Anglo-Soviet mutual assistance treaty to "act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states." This is an entirely different matter; it binds both parties equally and conforms to long-established Soviet practice. Crawford's malicious interpretation not only libels our Soviet ally, but our own government. For it implies that our government has hitherto blinked at the violation by the USSR of its pledge of non-interference made when this country recognized the Soviet Union in 1933.

The Communists, Crawford says, are concerned only with Russia's interests. "Frequently in the past few years Russian interests and American interests have been inimical." And he tells his readers not to take too literally pledges of future cooperation, for even though today "the major objectives of Russia and the United States are identical," "there already are divergences in the secondary lines that trace means to the common end." Proof? "... what if the Communist-dominated unions on the West Coast decided that too much American material was going to China and not enough to Russia?" In his perverted crystal-gazing Crawford already has Harry Bridges ordering a slowdown of shipments to China. And adding the arts of the provocateur to his other gifts, the *New Republic's* correspondent asserts that "two of the most influential men in the Washington office of the CIO would work hand in glove with Bridges to force the government to back down from its policy of aid to China and step up its aid to Russia"; moreover, "a few obscure government officials" would also participate in this sabotage.

Note how maliciously Crawford has turned white into black. His twisted fantasy about the West Coast unions, which he himself admits "probably won't happen," is offered as *evidence* of divergences between the United States and Russia. The Communists, who for years fought against appeasement of the Japanese militarists, and demanded an embargo against Japan and all possible aid to China, are depicted as favoring the betrayal of China. And Harry Bridges, who is not a Communist, but who likewise fought for an embargo against Japan and as author of the Bridges Plan has been chiefly responsible for *increasing* shipments from the West Coast to the fighting fronts, is cast in the role of an ally of the Japanese and a saboteur of shipments!

As for the alleged past conflict of interests between this country and Russia, Crawford himself says: "Even the most conservative columnists have in retrospect defended the Soviet-German pact. . . All this has been right and needed saying." To quote one of these conservative columnists, Walter Lippmann: ". . . Russia—be it czarist or Soviet—is and always has been the natural ally of the United States." (New York *Herald Tribune*, June 6.) Who is it, then, that best represented *the interests* of the United States, the Communists and other progressives, who understood in 1939 and 1940, as well as in 1941 and 1942, that the pact, by blocking Germany, helped America, or those reactionary appeasers and their echoing Kenneth Crawfords who in the earlier period succeeded in driving a wedge between us and our natural Soviet ally and are trying to do the same today?

The question still remains: how did this poisonous sixth-column propaganda manage to get into an anti-Axis magazine? We venture to guess that quite a number of *New Republic* readers feel that the editors owe them an explanation.



Which Side Is Pegler On?

To New MASSES: What's cooking? Who's fighting what in this war? That's what I want to know. "The office clerks' union," "the communications union" are "two of the most dangerous organiza-

union" are "two of the most dangerous organizations in the country, from the standpoint of espionage," says Westbrook Pegler in his June 15 column in the New York World-Telegram.

Pegler says my union—the United Office and Professional Workers of America, CIO—is "red" and such an organization would not "forbear to engage in espionage against the employers of office workers, having access to the employers' confidential affairs."

Pegler says that "patriotic" Americans should spy on such organizations. Pegler boasts of exchanging "information with employers and lawyers engaged in fighting off predatory unioneers."

I can't see anything patriotic about labor spies. America isn't fighting against fascism to establish its own Gestapo. As far as UOPWA "spies" are concerned, Pegler couldn't back up his charge with a single example. The UOPWA has always stated that any member making use of confidential information coming to him in the course of employment is liable to expulsion after due trial.

' I don't think Red-baiting is patriotic, either. It sounds like Hitler, Laval, and all the other fascists. In our union we believe the defeat of fascism is the only issue—and it doesn't matter whether you're red or black or white or yellow so long as you're fighting on the side of freedom and democracy.

Nobody has to spy on me or my union. What we do is on the record for everyone to see.

Take me. I'm a research worker, one of the hundreds in my office who voted UOPWA in a recent labor board election. We're negotiating a contract now.

As chapter chairman, I've been working with the company on a save-and-salvage program. I arranged for blood donations in which 170 took part, including many company executives. I invest ten percent of my salary in war bonds through a payroll allotment plan. Off the job I'm a sector commander in the air raid warden service, where I also succeeded in getting a number of people to donate their blood.

Until the union came into the picture, a lot of us didn't quite see our place in this war effort. Of course we could see it was our war—that all the things white-collar workers prize were at stake. The right to read the books you want to read, the right to say and *think* what you want to *think*— those things mean a lot to us. We could see it was our war, all right, and that we had to win it and win it as quickly as possible.

We saw these things individually, but through the union we began to *work* together on them. We saw how solving our everyday bread-and-butter problems on the job was part of the bigger fight to solve them on the battlefront.

I don't want to pat us on the back. We've done a lot but there's lots to do. We've offered to do more; we've got to do more. We've got to bring our Victory Program to the thousands of unorganized white-collar workers and show them how joining a union is a "natural" if you're looking for a way to fight fascism.

But still I can't help being proud of what we're doing. Every time I see a copy of the Office and Professional News I see what's being done by all the people who make up our union—the industrial insurance agents, the social workers the book and magazine workers, the advertising workers, the stenographers, bookkeepers—and a lot more.

Over 700 UOPWA boys are in the Army now; more are going every day. "Dig Down Deep for Victory" is one of our union slogans. We've given \$25,000 to American and Allied War Relief. Many of our organized shops have received Treasury certificates for over ninety percent participation in payroll allotment plans.

Our agents sell war stamps on their debits. Our social workers call and participate in welfare-towin-the-war conferences. And in all our locals screen, publishing, advertising—UOPWA members are working hard to mobilize and convert their industries and businesses behind our country's war effort.

You'll find our members on the street corners with leaflets and petitions calling for a second front, endorsing President Roosevelt's seven-point program. Maybe you saw us marching in the homefront section in the recent New York at War parade.

I don't know what side Pegler's on, but I know what side I'm on-my union's side, and it's the side of the United Nations. Everything we do has one aim: victory in 1942-from our participation in blood donorship, to buying bonds, to war relief, to civilian defense, to labor-management victory committees, to industry conferences, to avoidance of strikes, to organization of the unorganized in our field.

I suspect I know what side Pegler's on. I don't

have to spy. He has a record too. Pegler chose to attack my union as "dangerous" and "Red" on the basis of one issue of our paper, the Office and Professional News, which attacked him as an enemy of national unity. It seems to me his attack was not simply a matter of retaliation. It seemed rather like part of the offensive of our native fascists, scared out of their pants at the prospect of victory, particularly victory in 1942. Could it be that Pegler is out gunning for unions like the UOPWA just because they're all out for victory over fascism?

What is Pegler's record? He's in favor of lynching. After Pearl Harbor he decided President Roosevelt was the right person to lead the country because, like the fascists, he wouldn't hesitate to hit below the belt. This questionable compliment has been followed by unceasing attacks on the President and Mrs. Roosevelt.

Russia isn't any better than Nazi Germany, according to Pegler. But the Dies committee meets with Pegler's approval. Pegler's slanders against organized labor as "racketeers," "dictators," even murderers are applied generally and unconditionally to 11,000,000 workers. Never a conditional phrase, never an "alleged." But when it comes to Coughlin, even after Social Justice has been banned as seditious, Pegler talks about agitation "alleged" against Coughlin's weekly.

What is Pegler's record on war relief, on bonds, on support to our Allies and the winning of the war? Has he ever devoted his columns to the simplest kind of demonstration that he takes his stand with the United Nations in the war of a free world against a slave?

To my knowledge, the answer is no.

I'll take the UOPWA, the CIO—and the road to victory in 1942!

ARTHUR GYNT.

New York City.

For the Children

To New Masses: Frankly, this is an appeal for funds. It is an appeal in behalf of a relatively small number of children. Theirs is a small cry in a world filled with the groans of the wounded and dying. But it is a cry that cannot be submerged. Letting it go unheeded would mean to let down a suffering group whose hardships the war has multiplied; letting down men whose peace of mind rests on the fact that there are people who have promised to look after their families until they are free to come home to them once more.

The International Labor Defense in making its annual appeal for support to the organization's 1942 Summer Milk Fund Drive, turns for the most part to its old friends. It appeals for aid to men and women who know of the work it has done for labor and political prisoners and their families for seventeen years, and the work it must continue to do in their behalf for as long as they need this assistance. For the funds raised in this annual drive go to replenish the Prisoners Relief Fund that must function all year round.

The sons and daughters of labor and political prisoners still need your help. Their mothers' burden has been increased by the rise in the cost of living, by the fact that the difficult job of raising families in wartime America falls on already bent shoulders.

They depend on us for comfort and support. We depend on you to make it possible.

VITO MARCANTONIO, President, International Labor Defense, 112 East 19th Street, N. Y. C.

21



RUSSIA'S FIGHTING FORCES

Captain Kournakoff's outstanding study of the Red Army's offensive spirit and strategy. The social values which form the core of morale and technical achievement.

N AN earlier stage of the war I would have been even more hesitant than I am now about reviewing a book like Capt. Sergei N. Kournakoff's Russia's Fighting Forces (Duell, Sloan & Pearce, \$2.50; International Publishers, 50 cents). A year ago I would sooner have been caught posing as Napoleon than setting myself up as another "armchair strategist." That epithet was the final expression of contempt, and it was always a satisfaction to pin it on the next fellow, especially if you disagreed with him. But now it turns out that the name callers, as usual, were too hasty. In a people's war we need all the "amateur strategists" we can get. If we have learned anything, it is that military problems cannot be divorced from civilian problems, that strategy, as Captain Kournakoff puts it, is rooted in policy. And it is an interesting fact that we stopped labeling one another "armchair generals" at the moment of maturity when we began to realize that opening a second front in Europe or ending discrimination in the armed forces were not "purely military" questions.

The great advantage that Kournakoff has over most other military commentators-besides his superior technical equipment-is his dynamic sense of the relation between modern war and all sorts of apparently "non-military" factors. Kournakoff has written his book for laymen, and I think most laymen would like the military experts to perform two main jobs for them. One is to place day-to-day tactical moves in the context of larger strategic developments; it's awfully easy for us to lose sight of the forest for the trees. The other is to correlate military methods and objectives with national tradition, policy, productive forces, social relations, and so on. The military commentator, in other words, has to be a social analyst as well as a technical expert, and it is noteworthy that Karl Marx's military comments on the American Civil War, the Spanish wars, and other conflicts have outlived the contemporary technical journals.

An expert like Hanson Baldwin of the New York *Times* is proved wrong so constantly because he is unable to survive his social prejudices. His underestimation of the Red Army reflects his false evaluation of Soviet society. Despite his sometimes ostentatious caution, Baldwin thinks in absolutes; he proves that there is such a thing as military metaphysics. Fletcher Pratt, formerly of the New York *Post*, and others of his unblushing kind, have been leading mythical armies—fortunately the real ones are not generaled by them—to destruction with every edition of their newspaper and every radio broadcast. On the other hand, Kournakoff's analyses, as they have appeared from time to time in *Soviet Russia* Today, bear up under events because his thinking is governed by military experience, a knowledge of history, considerations of social policy, and awareness of dialectical development as the undeviating law of warfare as of life in general. His book is an illuminating survey of the Red Army and at the same time a contribution, as he had hoped it would be, to the building of American-Soviet friendship "which humanity can use as a bridge over a terrible chasm to a better future. . . ."

OURNAKOFF's achievement is all the more K interesting in view of his background. In the first world war he fought in the Russian Imperial Army as a cavalry subaltern. After that he fought the Red Army from the Donetz Basin to Central Asia. "I know war," writes this fighting descendant of a long line of Russian warriors. "I have paid dearly with defeat and exile for a knowledge of the fighting qualities of the Red Army." During his twenty-one years in America he has made it his business to study the army which he came to realize "was following the great highway of history while we, the so-called White armies, were trying to head it off by tortuous lanes.'



Capt. Sergei N. Kournakoff

Conscious that the Red Army rightfully inherits the best in Russia's military traditions, Kournakoff begins his book with a historical sketch of seven centuries of fighting. This approach helps explain why so many Soviet books, films, and plays have celebrated the deeds of figures like Alexander Nevsky, Alexander Suvorov, Denis Davydov. Nevsky led the fight at the Battle of the Neva in 1240 against the Swedes; he helped the citizen warriors of Novgorod defend their independence against the German knights at Pskov. Alexander Suvorov, the great military leader of the eighteenth century, established, despite reactionary opposition, the basic principles that the soldier must know what he is fighting for and against and that attack is the best defense. Denis Davydov, prototype of Denissov in War and Peace, carried on a brilliant guerrilla campaign against Napoleon's army in 1812. In struggles against Tartars and Turks, against the Prussians under Frederick the Great, Russia's military commanders, when the cause was just, led a people that was self-sacrificing, valiant, determined.

But wars under the czar were not always just, least of all the first world war, and Kournakoff shows how the Red Army emerged, like a phoenix, out of the ashes of the Imperial Army. The decree founding the Red Army was signed by Lenin on Feb. 23, 1918: "The Peasants' and Workers' Red Army is to be created of the most class-conscious and organized elements of the working classes." This people's army prevailed in the period of civil war and foreign intervention. For the liberated peasants and workers fought. under a strong leadership that had renounced imperialism and aggression. The first Red Army detachments fought under Stalin, Voroshilov, Budenny, Schors, Shchadenko, and other heroes. Of first importance was the historic defense of Tsaritsyn by the Tenth Army under Stalin and Voroshilov. Other great names appear in this exciting narrative: Kuibyshev, Frunze, Chapayev, Kirov, names that inspire the Soviet people today.

A S KOURNAKOFF points out—and this is of obvious importance today—Stalin's military role in this early period has been insufficiently appreciated by Americans, some of whom have received a thoroughly false impression from Trotsky's propaganda. The decisive role of Stalin in military affairs today is grounded in his experience and leadership during the Civil War period. It is extremely interesting to note that the absolute disagree-

ments between Stalin and Lenin on the one hand and the falseface Trotsky on the other were as clearly reflected in matters pertaining to the Red Army as they were in all other phases of Soviet life. For example, the Leninist conception of the Red Army combined an insistence on professional quality with an emphasis on soldiers devoted to the revolution. Opposed to this Bolshevik conception, Trotsky wanted to lean on czarist specialists. Trotsky proposed shifting the attack from Kolchak to Denikin, but the Central Committee of the Communist Party rejected his proposal and went on hammering Kolchak till his defeat was absolutely certain. Trotsky had to be ordered to stop his interference with the operations on the southern front, which would have led to disaster. He advocated plans that would have broken the necessary alliance between peasants and workers in the army. He violated the principle of consolidating the advance of the armies on the northwestern front, "simply dashing on headlong without organizing their rear and their service of supplies."

NE turns gladly from this traitor to the great figure of Mikhail Frunze, Commissar of Defense until his death in 1925. Frunze elaborated the principles that guide the Red Army today. Frunze fought those commanders who favored the "modern" French idea that a proper defense is superior to offense. "The victor," he wrote, "will be the one who finds in himself the determination to attack; the side which will only defend itself is doomed to defeat." In 1920 Lenin had said that "In any case, we must maintain our military preparedness. We cannot deem our task ended with the blow already dealt imperialism, but we must exert our strength to the utmost to preserve our Red Army in complete military preparation and to heighten its military preparation." And Frunze, recognizing that the army was a powerful instrument of peace as well as a formidable weapon in war, stressed the initiative and judgment of commanders, mobility, maneuverability, and the spirit of attack. Not cannon fodder, but inexhaustible reserves of educated fighters, was the conception which lay behind his work. He saw that the forms and methods of Red Army warfare were determined by the class character of the Soviet state, its economy and politics, and the character of the war it would probably be forced to wage.

Kournakoff goes on to show how the motorization of the army accompanied the Five Year Plans, and he cites impressive evidence of the parallel between economic and military gains. The General Staff rejected the superficially advanced theorists who argued for the "exclusive" use of tanks or the "exclusive" use of planes, just as they rejected the mossbacks who in other countries thought neither of these arms was important. They felt, and we see the results today, that what is needed is "the massed use of both weapons, in coordination with *all other arms*." (Italics in original.) The success of this principle is studied by Kournakoff in two very instructive chapters on the border clashes with Japan in the Far East and the war waged against Mannerheim Finland during the winter of 1939-40.

The popular character of the Red Army is reflected in its composition, its training, and its leadership. Men like Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Budenny have come up from the ranks. Voroshilov is the son of a railroad watchman and a charwoman; he worked in the coal mines at the age of seven; as a metal worker in Lugansk he participated in the people's revolutionary struggles; today he is Vice-Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Timoshenko and Budenny were both of peasant origin, and the former farmhands are today Marshals. On the other hand, the former czarist colonel Marshal Boris M. Shaposhnikov is today director of the Frunze Military Academy, having more than proved his loyalty to the socialist state. This is an army of the people, and Kournakoff in his chapters dealing with individual heroism of guerrilla fighters or with the strategy of the General Staff shows how such an army reflects its democratic origins in action.

It is as far as possible from being an army tied to the orthodoxies of a caste system, as its flexible and daring use of new arms and tactics demonstrates. What had been entrapment and surrender in previous campaigns of the Nazi army turned out in Russia to be pockets of resistance. Scorched earth tactics and guerrilla warfare; speed in testing, production, and use of new weapons; parachute troop landings, novel use of cavalry and the "artillery wringer"; the tank-drawn armored sleigh and the anti-tank plane—these are made possible in a social system that has a scientific approach with no special interests to serve.

Captain Kournakoff has not given a detailed picture of the socialist basis of the Red Army, but he has adequately projected the social values which sustain its fight. The political consciousness of the Red Army man -his knowledge of what he is fighting for—is a "new dimension" of incalculable importance. The core of his morale is a deep attachment to the life he is defending against a barbarous enemy. Discipline for him is not external restraint, but a vivid sense of mutual responsibility. And this morale and discipline equip, him superbly for that remarkable "war in depth" strategy that Kournakoff discusses here. They equip him, and this is the essence of the war, for that spirit of the offensive, of the attack, in a war which has been forced upon him. Events have taught free people the world over that to defend ourselves we must conduct an unhesitating and remorseless counter-offensive that will bring the war to the enemy. And in this respect too events have merely confirmed the insights of a Lenin or Stalin or Frunze.

In his epilogue, written May 11, Kournakoff points the clear moral of this war's experiences. "This battle," he says, "can be won for and by the United Nations this year if they strike in unison," and he goes on, in anticipation of the Roosevelt-Molotov conversations, to stress the necessity for opening a second land front in Europe. I think his book will immeasurably deepen our understanding of the strength, the courage, the loyalty-indeed the nobility-of our Russian ally. He has translated the most complex technical matters into terms that are magnificently clear. The scientific technique of the book, its precision and restraint, do not obscure an imaginative and lively personality. Russia's Fighting Forces is a splendid portrait of that courageous army on whose banners rest the hopes of mankind. It is a mighty contribution to our fight for freedom.

SAMUEL SILLEN.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Severance From Life

RAINER MARIA RILKE, by E. M. Butler. The Macmillan Co. \$4.50.

THIS is the most complete study in English of "the greatest German poet since Holderlin." Rilke is a fascinating subject for biographic inquiry-a writer of extraordinary quality who exhibits in his work as in his personal history the modern poet's characteristic severance from life. Like Eliot or Yeats he unconsciously bespoke that sense of being born in a wilderness which afflicted a whole generation. Professor Butler's book is wholly satisfactory for the way in which it arranges the known factual details of Rilke's experience. But she has been content to deal with him in terms of personal situation alone. Only from a total analysis of his writing itself can we discover how well Rilke sustained the assignment of art in our time. Only then can the man's career be seen in its social operation.

We can take a single theme treated biographically by Professor Butler and observe

what it is capable of yielding us from a slightly more complex point of view. Rilke complained all his life of his inability to love. On one level this has an easy psychological explanation which our biographer has not been slow to provide. Rilke had thought of and rejected the idea of psychoanalysis, fearing to cast out inspiration with his torments. The peculiar sanctification in his poetry of virgins and the early dead (who escape sex) and his inability to incorporate another human being into his life have their roots in the same inadequacy. "I am no lover at all, it only affects me externally, perhaps because no one has ever absolutely convulsed me, perhaps because I don't love my mother. I stand there quite poverty-stricken before that rich little creature [Marthe, a Paris waif] by whom a less cautious and not just so imperilled nature might have been boundlessly enchanted and developed. . . ."

But is not this life pattern extremely suggestive on another level? Let us enrich our understanding of the Rilke who had an un-



happy childhood by noting the analogy with, let us say, Proust. Both were pathologically dependent upon a luxurious degree of comfort and quiet, worshipped the aristocracy, corresponded with princely patronesses with a mellifluous courtesy, seem never to have written a frank, warm letter. Yet deeper than idiosyncracies is seen that watermark which matches Rilke with all the long line that begins with one of his own favorite poets, Baudelaire. Like so many writers, Rilke felt cut off from humanity altogether. His sense of isolation has social meaning. We know that he hated newspapers, that he was unable to finish reading War and Peace while worshiping the morbid Danish writer Jacobson. The real definition of the man is to be found in that intense strain of almost unbearable loneliness which culminates in the great Duino Elegies. Neglecting this entry into his historic character limits Mrs. Butler's power to tell us the full truth about the poet. She seems only able to add the intolerable platitude that life and art are always incompatible.

But this problem of Rilke's relationship to humanity becomes really significant when we look at the poetry. In 1913 he wrote that he had "skipped the chapter of mankind." Under the influence of Rodin his "New Poems" are concerned with "objects" in the literal sense. Yet these poems are extremely subtle and introspective. We realize that a unique sensibility is collecting these studies of statues, paintings, frozen moments of feeling, animals, flowers, periods of the past. This is the method of college; masonry out of potsherds is the occupation of the artist for whom the firm brick-builded universe of ideas has crumbled. His poetry lives for its capacity to communicate the painfulness of real life through any symbols. Two influences worked upon him at this period, that of the naturalist Rodin, and that of the Parisian poor whose · lives he saw for the first time. He was momentarily torn out of himself in poems that he wrote as early as 1906 with a new feeling of obligation, hoping that they would help the book "Henceforth not to be given out as merely esthetic in character." Even a poem like "Archaic Torso of Apollo" is not merely a museum tag, but compresses an immense longing for a civilization as magnificently selfassured as the Greek of whose mere fragmentary relics it can be said, "There is no part that does not see you; you must change your life."

Yet he knew better than his biographers where the fault lay.

For indeed there comes in time a limit to looking. The looked and the looked-at world Long to bear fruit in love. Work of sight is achieved, Now for some heartwork On all these pictures, these prisoned creatures within you!

This is from the remarkable poem "Turning" which was written in June 1914. As I've tried to show, the meaning of the word



NEW MASSES Classified Ads 50c a line. Payable in Advance. Min. charge \$1.50

Deadline Fri. 4 p.m. Approx. 7 words to a line

APARTMENTS-ROOMS

FURNISHED apartment to SUBLET. 8 Barrow Street, Apt. 12A. 3 Rooms & Kitchen, suitable for 2 or 3. Con-veniently located. Reasonable. Call after 5:30 P.M. All day Sat. & Sun. Ch. 3-5254.

Share beautifully FURNISHED Apt., modern, free access entire apartment, Brooklyn Heights, telephone, very rea-sonable. Reply New Masses, Box 1796.

FURS

SKILLED FUR CRAFTSMAN with factory in whole-sale district offers you exceptionally low rates on remod-eling, repairing, cleaning, glazing and custom-made gar-ments. STORAGE. PLEASE ASK FOR MR. ARMAND. 145 West 30 St., N. Y. C. Armand et Soeur, Ch. 4-1424.

INSURANCE

PAUL CROSBIE and CARL BRODSKY — whatever your needs — FREQUENT SAVINGS, 799 Broadway, TRADE UNION AGENCY. Tel. GRamercy 7-5978.

LAUNDRY

FOUR STAR HAND LAUNDRY—excellent work—very reasonable—also FRENCH Dry Cleaning. Call & deliver. 404 E. 10 St. GR 3-1869.

SUMMER HOMES

EASY COMMUTING or 1 hour drive, 4 room furnished apartment in country home. Gas, frigidaire, tiled bath, Horn, R.F.D. No. 1, Peekskill, phone Peekskill 1974W.

VACATION RESORTS

EAST HILL FARM, Youngsville, Sull. Co., N. Y. Mountaintop hideaway. Modern. Colorful rooms, rustic dining room. Swim, tennis. And food! Mmmmm! \$20 wk., \$3.50 daily July 4th. Tel. Jeffersonville 78F21. BOOK-LET. Managers: Those Young City Slickers.

WANTED-FOR NEW MASSES

THE FOLLOWING ISSUES

1935—November 19; **1936**—All Issues; **1937**—February 23; March 2, 9; October 12; November 2, 16; **1938**— March 15, 22, 29; April 12; September 20; **1938**— May 2, 16; August 29; November 28; **1940**—April 2; July 23; September 3; October 22; **1941**—February 11; 18, and all copies from July 1 to December 31; **1942**— March 24.

SUBSTANTIAL COMMISSIONS FOR NM SUBS will be paid throughout the campaign for 5,000 new readers. For details communicate with Martha Strumpf, Circula-tion Mgr., New Masses, 461 Fourth Ave., N. Y. C.



"love" must be expanded when we are dealing with Rilke. In August the World War began. He was thrilled at first by the immense sweep of national emotion, the illusory unity of the first few months. War almost seemed what he had been waiting for, access to the people, a manner of loving.

Blessed am I beholding the possessed. Long, long ere this Our dramas seemed unreal Nor did the symbols used make a decisive appeal.

But he soon became horrified by the brutality and profiteering of the real war. He was again alone. "Not to understand: yes, that was my whole occupation during those years -I can assure you it was not an easy one," he wrote in 1920.

If he had understood, we might have had a very different sort of poetry from him, I believe. As it is, we have that Mount Tacoma of difficult and superb isolation, "Duino Elegies." Prof. Butler has told us under what agonies of composition the ten long poems were created. We recall a sentence in his early autobiographical novel (Journal of my Other Self), "Then you set about that unexampled act of violence, your work, which more and more impatiently and more and more despairingly, sought among visible things equivalents for the vision within." Instead of studying men he proceeded to elaborate the symbology of his "angels," beings perfect in action, beyond the "incomprehensible humans." Professor Butler sees this as merely "mystical" poetry akin to Blake's "Prophetic Books" and she is satisfied with giving a careful paraphrase as an exegesis. More must be said. He had to supply himself in the end with a synthetic structure of value symbols for society no longer provided in that direction. Like Yeats he even dabbled in occultism and spent years in composing a frame for reality out of pseudo-Christian brica-brac, personal memories, and an untiring sense of phrase. But "Alas," says the first Elegy,

Who is there we can make use of? Not angels, not men;

And already the knowing brutes are aware We don't feel very securely at home With our interpreted world. There remains perhaps,

Some tree on a slope to be looked at day after day.

There remains for us yesterday's work and the cupboard-love loyalty

Of a habit that liked us and stayed and

never gave notice.

MARIAN ANDREWS.

A Mexican Novel

NAYAR, by Miguel Angel Menendez. Farrar and Rinehart. \$2.50.

HIS is a poet's novel. The writing is crisp and sensitive (judging by Angel Flores' excellent translation) and, whatever its weak-







Ints Adult Camp... in safe little sheltered cove near swimming, sailing, boating and fishing on premises. Dancing, tennis, trips and all sports. Six hours by train from New York. Write for booklet and rates



nesses on the structural side, it is worth reading for the jungle descriptions alone, or for the violent and dramatic vignettes of life in remote sections of Mexico, or for the sheer excitement of the prose.

Actually the story breaks into two parts, the first dealing with small-town murder and revenge and the flight of the petty official, Enrique Salerit, with his friend Ramon, the half-breed murderer. Menendez draws an acid picture of sterile violence. Poverty, local official corruption, isolation from any sense of creative life have brought this village to a deplorably low moral level. Ramon kills and maims brutally to avenge an unfaithful wife. He and Enrique travel through the jungle seeking a place of security. After various picaresque adventures they befriend the chief of an obscure tribe of Cora Indians and live for a time with this tribe. The second part of the book is a study of these Indians and of the ultimate tragedy of their existence.

Menendez is evidently tinged with what the Peruvians call *Indigenismo*. He treats the daily life, superstitions, and ancient beliefs of the tribe with romantic nostalgia. And it is true that the social organization of most of these agricultural Indians has admirable communal virtues. There is a dignity about them, a poise that is always impressive.

It is also true that in large sections of almost every South American country such tribes live anachronistically, avoiding all contact with their official governments; hence the problem which Menendez treats is not an isolated one. For his fundamental theme is the conflict between two civilizations. All through the book he stresses the Indian sense of having been conquered and betrayed, of knowing himself morally superior to his conquerors and therefore clinging bitterly to his old ways. Says an old Indian woman, speaking of a certain parasitic vine, "The camichin asked permission to live in the shade of the silk-cotton tree and the foolish tree permitted it. Little by little it entwined its vines, tightened its knots until it killed the cotton tree. . . . This was how the leafy trees died out."

When fighting breaks out between clerical rebels and the government troops, the Indians join neither and are cold-bloodedly murdered by both. (Although there is no indication of when the story took place, one assumes it was prior to the Cardenas regime, although such conditions were possible locally even under a progressive national government.) To add to the tribe's misery, the rains do not stop and their corn is in danger of rotting. The scene in which they pray to their ancient gods to stop the rain is magnificently poetic. When the tribe finally decides that its troubles are caused by a sorcerer and takes steps to punish this scapegoat, we reach the most dramatic part of the book. Gervasio, the chief, more intelligent than his tribe, makes efforts to save the victim but has to bow, in the end, to their superstitious fears. Ramon, the half breed, who makes nothing of shooting down his neighbors in a quarrel over his wife, cannot stomach the judicial murder of the condemned sorcerer and brings in government troops. Shooting follows and Gervasio is taken off to prison. The conflicting moral and social values have come to a head. Gervasio is an honorable man according to his lights. Menendez puts words in his mouth: "I am innocent. I only fulfilled my tradition. I obeyed my people, my ignorant, conquered people." Actually Gervasio goes to trial without uttering a word.

Gervasio is the protagonist of a tragedy which has the very deepest social roots. He is the focal point of a cultural conflict which can never be completely resolved until such natural minorities as the Indians achieve full autonomy. For oppressed, primitive peoples will resist cultural change, even if it be for their own good-whenever such change is or seems to be imposed upon them by an alien force. Only as free men will they be able altogether to cast off harmful customs and superstitions, because they will not feel their integrity as a people involved in retaining them. The brilliant manner in which the USSR has solved the vast-scale problem of its own cultural minorities is an exemplification of all this.

Nayar is a moving and beautiful book. H. R. HAYS.

Haldane on Genetics

NEW PATHS IN GENETICS, by J. B. S. Haldane. Harper & Bros.

PROBABLY no other living scientist can equal Professor Haldane's contributions both to scientific knowledge and to the popularization of that knowledge. His position in the field of science is proved by the fact that he was one of the five men recently elected as honorary members of the Soviet Academy of Scientists. His fame as a popularizer of science is known to every literate person.

This latest of his sixteen books cannot be considered as belonging to the "popular" field. It is quite technical and can be understood only by one familiar with the basic terminology of genetics. However, for those who have such a foundation, the work will be most rewarding.

Of the many points raised, most important is the evidence which has transformed the science of heredity from a mechanistic, static level to a functional, dynamic level. The mysterious, fatalistic association of genes and chromosomes with various types of structure, normal and abnormal, has given way to the view that the genes present in every cell take an active part in the chemistry and function of the cell and thus determine the final result.

This approach is of tremendous significance; for if heredity depends on function, then it is quite capable of being changed just as other functions are. What this point of view does to reactionary race theories and to ideas of the unchangeability of human nature is apparent.

DAVID COSGROVE.



ACTORS WITH HALF A CHANCE

Despite the drought on Broadway the season witnessed some remarkable performances. Alvah Bessie commends Lee Cobb for his interpretation of an Odets character.

I F WE are agreed that the season just ended produced not a single play that will be remembered as a solid expression of the times, it might seem paradoxical to write about a few fine acting jobs. But it's not paradoxical. It's merely indicative of the fact that a fine performer can—if he is given only half a chance—frequently succeed in making something out of almost nothing.

The reasons for this should be obvious. One of the components of an acting performance is the art of pantomime. A fine pantomimist can—without benefit of any script come out on a bare stage and turn into a score of human beings. He creates these characters out of his own life and his own experience, and if he is an artist you will recognize these characters and applaud them.

Now give the actor his ability to pantomime character *plus* a script—however inadequate—and he can sometimes build a character for you that will say more about that character than the author did. Much of what he says is the actor's own creation—the result of his life experience, his observation of other human beings, his understanding of what motivates them, his appreciation of the author's intention.

The outstanding performance of this season-and of many others, I am inclined to feel-was the job Lee J. Cobb did in Clifford Odets' play Clash by Night. Here the actor had at his disposal one of the better scripts of the season (relatively speaking), and he had the best written character in that script to work on. Jerry Wilenski, as written, had nothing in common, shall we say, with the life experience of the actor, Lee J. Cobb. Yet so thorough was Mr. Cobb's understanding of Wilenski-WPA worker, motion-picture projectionist with a vain wife and a small child-that his interpretation of that role was just short of a masterpiece of creation. The Cobb who moved about in the body of Wilenski was definitely not the Cobb we saw before-in Ardrey's Thunder Rock, in Golden Boy on stage or screen (where he played both Mr. Bonaparte and Bonaparte's philosophical friend), in any of the other parts he's played. Everything about the man Wilenski was different from the man Cobb; his voice, his gait, the movements of his body, his appearance.

Mr. Cobb later appeared in the title role of Raphaelson's play, *Jason*—a role that had originally been played by Alexander Knox. I did not see this performance, but if the consensus of the other critics was correct, some of Cobb's limitations were manifest in the part. Mr. Knox, who had done an outstanding job—dry, mannered, cold, and intellectual—was the ideal "type" to play Jason. Mr. Cobb, in physical appearance, was his opposite. And one critic said that Mr. Cobb was obviously such a nice, warm-hearted guy that he could not be believed in the role of the dry stick of a drama critic. This is possible, but even without seeing the performance it is a safe bet that Mr. Cobb's intelligence and talent made it possible for him to create a viable character.

For a really fine actor can readily surmount his physical appearance. They say that Burbage, who originally played Hamlet in Shakespeare's acting company, was a short, fat, bearded, bowlegged man-and that he was magnificent. Not having seen Burbage in the role, it's hard to say. But I did see the elder Schildkraut-Rudolph-who was also a short, fat individual, and a great actor. When he came onto the stage in any role you could immediately forget what he looked like, because he became another person-at will, King Lear or any other personality whose stamp was dignity and lofty character. Mr. Schildkraut actually grew several inches as you watched him.

I F NO other performance of the season could touch Mr. Cobb's in *Clash by Night*, this does not mean that some fine performances were not turned in. They were, and certain of them were memorable.

I'm thinking of Sam Jaffe's Hymie in the play Cafe Crown-a shrewd piece of obser-



Lee J. Cobb

vation and projection. To oversimplify, you could readily believe that Mr. Jaffe had been a cafe waiter all his life. This is only a way of saying that when he has the right material, Mr. Jaffe can become a fine artist. His limitations as an actor were startlingly manifest last season when he essayed the role of *Lear. Lear* is the actor's dream and the actor's nightmare; to fill that tragic skin there is but one prerequisite—you have to be a great performer.

Joseph Schildkraut, who had turned in so poor a performance opposite Mr. Cobb in *Clash by Night*, found *Uncle Harry* more suited to his particular talents, and was thoroughly believable as the worm who turned into a homicidal maniac. Here was a fine piece of character revelation, distinctly to the actor's credit. It had meat, intelligence, and only a minimum of cliche.

According to the Broadway press agents, Judith Evelyn of *Angel Street* was the acting find of the fall season. Certainly it is true that her performance of the tormented wife in that thriller displayed virtuosity and control, especially in the climax of the play where she made my few hairs stand on end.

It is impossible to agree, however, that Miss Mary Anderson, "the All-American Five-Letter Female" of *Guest in the House*, is the "find" of the spring season. As the neurotic young woman who drives an artist to drink and his wife to distraction, Miss Anderson drove me to boredom. She manifested everything she has ever learned in whatever school of acting she attended—and if she attended none, that only goes to prove the point.

Victor Kilian, however, in the poor play Solitaire, will be remembered for his performance as the philosophical tramp. Staggering under the burden of a treacly role, Mr. Kilian nevertheless possessed human warmth (not sentimentality) and dignity. You can readily remember his kindness (in the role) and the universality of his plight. Young Pat Hitchcock (the film director's daughter), playing opposite Mr. Kilian, contributed the finest child's performance of the year; and children playing children are frequently unbearable. Miss Hitchcock was what all children should be—in life: lovable, intelligent, imaginative, delightful.

F^{INEST} comedy performance of the season was the spiritualist medium of Mildred Natwick in Noel Coward's *Blithe Spirit*. She lifted this soap-bubble onto the plane of high satire—when she was on the stage. She neither spoofed the role nor underplayed it; she neither caricatured it nor played it straight. What she did was a beautiful example of feeling your way around inside an impossible character, and externalizing that character so that it became thoroughly credible.

Out of the welter of bad plays and poor performances, we can remember certain brilliant bits: the two jobs Art Smith did—in Johnny Doodle and Paul Vincent Carroll's play The Strings, My Lord, Are False. Mr. Smith, like Mr. Cobb and other fine performers, got his best training with the Group Theater—an ensemble that, whatever you may think of it, was serious about acting and attempted to train its personnel. Mr. Smith played with authenticity and human passion.

Will Lee should be remembered for his morgue attendant in Ben Hecht's dreadful play *Lily of the Valley*. He captured this half-mad human being in all his pathos; something 'he could not succeed in doing in Carroll's *The Strings*, where he was a one-armed veteran of Dunkirk with a lot of high-flown verbiage to spout. Martin Wolfson's barber in Brooklyn, USA makes one regret that this able performer is seen so seldom on the stage. He possesses acting intelligence and, in common with the other actors mentioned here, what Morris Carnovsky has called "a sense of the object"—the ability to concentrate wholly and without stint on the job in hand, together with the ability to relax and let the role flow through him.

The same is true in especial degree of William Hansen (another Group Theater graduate) who played the porter to Maurice Evans' Macbeth. If I were Mr. Evans I would never allow an actor of Mr. Hansen's power and imagination to appear in any play in which I was the lead. The contrast is too vivid and too humiliating—to the star. Mr. Hansen is a slight young man who is almost protean in his ability to change into other people. He is so successful at it that you have to look twice at your program to be sure you are seeing the man you've seen before in other manifestations.

Alvah Bessie.

WASHINGTON TALKS TO HOLLYWOOD

". . . These are the specific themes that we would recommend." Hollywood

H OLLYWOOD, which fondly hoped that it was doing everything possible for the war effort, got socked where it hurt a few days ago. It was told that the federal government is tired of glamorous spy and super air dramas—that it has to tackle the tougher job of telling movie audiences just why the United States and our allies are fighting. The punch was delivered by Nelson P. Poynter, associate director of the Office of the Coordinator of Government Films, who spoke at a meeting of the Hollywood Writers Mobilization on "What Washington Expects of Hollywood."

Little publicized, the HWM was formed a week after Pearl Harbor by representatives of the Screen Writers Guild, Radio Writers Guild, Screen Publicists Guild, Screen Readers Guild, Screen Cartoonists Guild, and the American Newspaper Guild. Enlisting some of the best talent in Hollywood—Ring Lardner, Jr., Robert Rossen, Michael Kanin, Jay Dratler, Julius and Philip Epstein, W. L. River, Jerome Chodorov, John Bright, Henry Myers, Jay Gorney, and Michael Blankfort, among scores of others—the mobilization has furnished posters, slogans, camp shows, and radio skits for the war work of the government and private agencies.

The material, which often had to come through on less than twenty-four hours' notice, has been good. The success of the recent Hollywood Caravan of Stars attests to that. In less spectacular fields it has helped army and civilian morale. H. R. Washburne, Los Angeles information officer of the Office of Emergency Management, says that after receiving radio copy from the mobilization, salvage collections on the Pacific Coast increased by tens of thousands of tons of scrap metal, rubber, paper, etc.

But the meeting of June 9 was "not called for self-adulation," said the program notes. "These are not days for complacency; we cannot rest upon our laurels. Rather we are called together for an examination of what has been accomplished, as an impetus for our renewed effort." More than 800 writers, actors, directors, artists, producers gathered for the meeting. They laughed at army camp skits presented by Henry Fonda and the Three Stooges; applauded a documentary film, Food -Weapon of Conquest, produced in Canada, and nodded approval when Rossen, mobilization chairman, said: "There are no escape stories nor escape pictures. Let's destroy this myth once and for all. Actually, in the grim business of war there are all the elements: there are humor, romance, conflict, redemption, sacrifice, action-yes, there's comedy as well as tragedy, nobility as well as brutality, dreams as well as violence. Everything we have known is also in this world at war. Make no mistake about it, we don't like it at war. But it is at war. And that is the world we're writing about, giving meaning to. It does not preclude entertainment. If we did, we would not fulfill our task."

It was late and the audience was squirming



when Poynter sat down at the small table before the microphone. He spoke less than ten minutes, quietly and slowly, but he hit out hard.

"We have analyzed the majority of pictures that have been released since Pearl Harbor," Poynter said. "I realize that many pictures were in production before Pearl Harbor, but actually very little of the total footage has been dedicated to telling the terribly difficult story of what this war is really about. A great deal of the government's information could be conveyed to the public without the screen. The radio could explain how to put out a fire bomb. However, a picture is better. But when we approach those intangibles that are the very basis for this war, we are more dependent upon the screen than any other mass medium of communication."

Poynter spoke of the Four Freedoms which President Roosevelt defined more than a year ago, saying "That is the type of thing that is the great challenge to genius in Hollywood. Have you sufficient craftsmanship to really bring those Four Freedoms to life on the screen and give some meaning to this war?

"Analysis of what has been on the screen during the past six months shows you have been lured by the spectacular, the photogenic, the sensational in reporting this war to the people, whether through the documentary or through the various mediums. It is easier to glorify the air corps than the infantry," Poynter continued. "It is easier to portray the gallant struggle of Great Britain than that of China and Russia—the two front lines of the eastern end of our war."

NOMPARING the freedom of American U writers with the slavery of those in Italy and Germany, Poynter said: "We have a great arsenal of truth in this country that you have never used. We are here to urge that you use it. We are here to help you get specific material on it. We are here to help you achieve a more balanced program of information on the screen. An analysis of what is on the screen today and what is immediately coming up shows definitely that there are gaps of information that the people are hungry to get-that you can convey to them. This is not merely a challenge to your good motives. Evidence of your good motives is abundant. It is a challenge to literally invent new techniques of conveying information in an enterprising way in order that the hungry public would know more about their war.'

After that, there was only one question asked Poynter—would he "recommend some particular themes the government would like to see dramatized?"

"If someone could do a 'Mrs. Miniver' of Russia and China," answered Poynter, "it would go a long way in an effort to confuse our enemy and aid our allies. It would show that China is not only a country where they make nice exotic dishes and do laundry very well—a picture that would portray the fact that China is a world power and an equal among nations would be enormously useful. "We have heard a great deal about unity, and perhaps they were talking about democratic will-o'-the-wisps—a unanimity which we will never achieve in this country, which we don't want to achieve. A picture that can show the innocent sabotage of patriotic people that are wedded too much to their own group—where farmer is suspicious of labor; labor of other groups—can go a long way toward clearing some basic problems.

"On the matter of war objectives, we had a great burst of enthusiasm immediately after Pearl Harbor, which has fallen off since then —unanimity that began to shatter within ninety days because the public is not entirely aware of the underlying issues.

"All of the public opinion polls have shown definitely that the people will go along. They run to fantastic figures—to eighty percent in a genuine war of idealism—but they are not aware (and here is where the screen can be enormously helpful) of the specific sacrifices to them as individuals that it will take to implement the successful winning of the war. By the same token, they are not aware of the specific losses to them as individuals if we do not win.

"In other words," Poynter concluded, "it is not clear that this is a war of survival. Anything that you can do to get on the screen part of the speech of Sumner Welles where he says that imperialism is dead—what is imperialism, etc.—or a speech such as that of Vice-President Wallace—these are the specific themes that we would recommend."

JACK YOUNG.

Under the Bombs

Joy Davidman finds "Mrs. Miniver" a stirring film.... A good spy melodrama.

WE HAVE, in Mrs. Miniver, an American war film to be proud of. Although based on an Englishwoman's book about England and played largely by English actors, the picture was made in Hollywood by our own Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, and style and technique are in the tradition of the American screen at its best. Coming after the animated comic strips of spies, supermen, and stooges which have served till now as war pictures, Mrs. Miniver is particularly heartening in its adult dignity, the restrained power of its tragedy, and its foursquare approach to the fact of the people's war. It is hard to know whether to call it a great film—but that it is a fine and serious and profoundly moving description of England under the bombs is attested by the tears which this hardened reviewer dropped all over Radio City.

A middle class English family is studied through a year of the war. The Minivers are a couple in their handsome maturity; their oldest boy is just finishing Oxford, their other two children are in the tree-climbing stage. Reasonably prosperous, they feel guilty but not painfully so over the extravagances of a new car and a new hat. They live in the pleasant English countryside where the annual Flower Show is a big event, and here the war finds them. The boy goes to the air force; the father goes to Dunkirk in his motorboat to help in the evacuation; the mother has a terrifying encounter with a German flyer; the children cry in their air raid shelter while bombers destroy the house; the son's young bride is killed by machine gun bullets during an air raid. Through all this the Minivers and their neighbors feel their fighting spirit harden. And through all this, in an effective and moving fashion, the small details of life continue. There is tremendous excitement about the roses at the Flower Show, Vin Miniver proposes to his girl at the family dinner table (in horrible embarrassment), and Mr. Miniver slaps Mrs. Miniver in the right place.

As a presentation of typical English middle class life, Mrs. Miniver is somewhat questionable; in spite of the claim of the film's foreword, its characters are rather high in the social scale, so much so that they have several servants and that young Vin can marry into an ancient noble family. Moreover, only a very small proportion of English youth can manage to go to Oxford. The vast army of the middle class which never achieves Oxford; which lives in jerry-built suburban villas; which worries seriously about money, in short -that army is left out of Mrs. Miniver. The film might have had more lasting values had its people not been so graciously comfortable. Yet the exact social status of the Minivers is of little moment compared with the tremendous feeling of solidarity which the film does build up for them and their townsfolk. The Minivers are, primarily, a functional part of the English people, knit closely with the workers and tradesmen on the one hand and old Lady Beldon and the vicar on the other. And all these people overcome their individual resistances and unite in the war effort. The vicar speaks for all of them at the end when, over the dead bodies of the air raid victims, he declares the basic principles of the people's war.

Technically Mrs. Miniver is enormously dexterous. The sly comedy of its genre painting, done in the Jane Austen manner habitual to writing Englishwomen, contrasts brilliantly with the terror of air raids, the setting out of brave small boats for Dunkirk in the gray foggy dawn, the simple and quiet way in which a young girl loves and marries and dies. Told for the most part from the standpoint of the indomitable Mrs. Miniver herself, the film is a woman's picture in the best sense, and the understanding with which William Wyler has directed it is therefore the more remarkable. It is Greer Garson, however, who sets the tone of the picture. As Mrs. Miniver she has enormous variety; she can be an imp, a flirt, a heroic mother, an enchanting lover, a disentangler of snarls for the whole villageand all of her moods harmonize in one convincing human character. Mrs. Miniver is her picture, filled with the warmth of her acting. All the acting, moreover, is harmonious and



Consult New Masses resort columns before going on your vacation or week-end.



woodbirder, NEW FORM For a vacation or weekend that's somewhat different —amidst unspoiled country—wholesome and delicious food—swimming in a dammed up brook other sports—for relaxation and a real good time —come to Tanglewood—\$24-\$26 per week. \$4.50-\$5 per day. MARTHA BERLIN Tel. Woodstock 14 F 13 right, ranging from that of Dame May Whitty as the old lioness, Lady Beldon, to that of a very small boy named Christopher Severn as the youngest Miniver. This child is extraordinarily spontaneous, quite without the smirking self-consciousness of most screen children. Walter Pidgeon is effective as the husband; Teresa Wright has her usual serene power as the young bride. Next to Miss Garson, however, the best work is the radiant performance of Henry Travers as Mr. Ballard, an old man who grows roses.

"NAZI AGENT" is another spy melodrama; but, incredibly, a good one. Turning on the threadbare and scientifically absurd device of twins who look alike but have opposite characters, the film might easily have been sheer hooey. It is saved partly by the smoothness of writing and direction, but mainly by the magnificent performance of Conrad Veidt. This virtuoso of the screen, a refugee from the Nazis, has been unfortunately typed in recent years as the Nazi-villain-with-a-monocle; he does it well, but it must be beginning to pall. Nazi Agent, naturally, repeats the stencil, but adds an interesting variant in the form of its dual role-a gentle and democratic ex-professor of history. The transformation of Mr. Veidt in this role is worth studying for its technique. His voice, his intonations, the lines of his face, even the stoop of his back as he goes upstairs, are all the results of being that professor of history-beautifully set off by the harsh nervous and muscular tension of his performance as the Nazi. And, at the inevitable point where one brother replaces the other, Mr. Veidt actually manages to create the professor of history under the mask of the Nazi. The film's incidents are fairly sober and believable, as such things go; they are well put together, and there are competent supporting performances by Martin Kosleck and Ann Ayars; but Nazi Agent's real merit is as an actor's field day.

"RING OF STEEL," a brief documentary history of the American soldier, is being shown in most theaters at this time. It is a good example of the government's film-making, effective and economical in technique, dramatic in presentation, compressing a great deal of the meaning of democracy into a few shots. Indeed, its camera work is far more intelligent than that of the ordinary entertainment film. The faces of American soldiers of today, white and black, and their weapons climax the story of America's battlefields-the revolution that made us, the civil war that preserved us, the conquest of our unknown western lands. The commentary, spoken by Spencer Tracy, drives home the unity of the American soldier with the American people. Garson Kanin's expert direction gives the film an electric quality, and the tremendous emotional impact of its material is heightened by one of the best of recent film scores, composed by Morton Gould.

Joy Davidman.



Resort News



NNISQUAM differs from most resorts in A that the management stresses fish, not so much as an item of food but as a means of daily recreation. This camp is pitched at Gloucester, and although tennis and the usual sports gamut are part of the agenda, most people spend their days in boats.

Mamanasco Lake Lodge, Birdland, and Plum Point have in common the fact that they were once private estates, with most of the luxury gadgets still around. In fact, Plum Point still retains the Grand Staircase in marble, with its dignified sweep.

Ira Stadlin, the official comic of the student Pens and Pencils revues, and Adele Jerome one of the brighter spirits from Of Vwe Sing, have joined the staff of Chesters' Zunbarg.

While most of the resorts are beginning their season with full-length performances during the July 4th week-end, Green Mansions is beginning a week earlier with a revue called Make Mine Manhattan. The cast includes Natalie Hall, Arthur Mahoney, Joan Woodruff, Paul Hecht, and others.

The School For Democracy has entered the lists with a summer school at Arcadia. The school has very cleverly mapped courses to meet the needs of students with from one to two weeks of vacation. Vladimir Kazakevich, Dr. Howard Selsam, Morrris U. Schappes, Philip Foner, Margaret Schlauch, William Blake, and others are some of the lecturers who will make up the faculty. Between classes the students will have 1,100 acres of greenery in which to digest their lectures.

George Podorson, of Locust Grove Farm is one of the few remaining members of a fast dwindling class of country squires who spend their days in the kitchen overseeing the cooking. A retired artist, he has transferred his creative talent to the culinary field, and the high point of the day to his guests (he has a small place) is when he brings in the roast, boar's head style.

The memorable thing about the Woodlands is the scenery, which is literally spectacular. It is located at Phoenicia, one of the really beautiful areas of New York state. The owner was formerly with publisher A. A. Knopf, and has consequently built up a library second only to the scenery.

Next week, this column will publish full details on the July 4th holiday programs.

Est. 1861



Keep Faith with Them



President Roosevelt says-

"There is nothing finer than to build up this fund for the Navy Relief Society. I urge you to do your utmost, and do it now!"

CLIP ENROLLMENT COUPON, BELOW, and send it to the Navy Relief Society. Give all you can -and give TODAY!

	5,
ZN	
	PROTECT THE FAMILIES
The last	OF THE NAVY'S
	FIGHTING MEN
	FIGHTING MEN
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	A Real and

Join the work of the Navy Relief Society and BACK UP THE NAVY'S FIGHTING MEN!

JOHN FALTER

O HELP THE NAVY MAN and his dependents, his widow, his orphaned child, his mother and other dependent members of his family, is the purpose of the Navy Relief Society.

Organized forty years ago by the Navy, to look after the Navy's own, it gives immediate financial aid to Navy men and their families when necessary . . . assists in emergency operations . . . cares for the Navy man's dependents . . . makes possible the education of dependent young.

Until the present emergency arose, the Navy proudly "took care of its own," through the generosity of the officers and men of the Service. Now, with the risks of war, and a greatly expanded Navy, with a larger Marine Corps and the inclusion of the Coast Guard Welfare, the ociety needs your help.

For the first time in its history, the Navy Relief Society, through its Citizens' Committee, asks you to contribute generously and help protect the families of the Navy's fighting men. By your assistance, those in the Service may know that we at home will look after those they left behind . . . and the men who are doing the fighting need not worry about the folks back home.

Back them up ! ENROLL TODAY !

No amount is too small—\$1...\$2...\$5... \$10. None too large—\$100 ...\$500 ...\$1000. Every contribution making up the \$5,000,000 fund-whether in dollar bills or larger unitswill promise protection at home, and freedom from worry, to more than 500,000 men in our Navy, Marine and Coast Guard* Services.

hrough Coast Guard Welfare



Checks should be made payable to Navy Relief Society and sent to National Citizens' Committee, 730 Fifth Avenue, New York City. I want to help the Navy men and their families. Enclosed please find my contribution of \$
Name
Street
City State