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REBOLUSYON

Theoretical and Political Journal
of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Philippines

**ON THE POLITICAL WORK
OF THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY**

**REPORT OF THE BICOL
REGIONAL PARTY COMMITTEE**

**THE POLITICAL-MILITARY CAMPAIGN PLAN
FOR BICOL IN 1990-91**

**CORRECTING THE CONCEPT
OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT**

**RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTY WITH THE NPA
AND THE UNITED FRONT**

Number 2
Series 1993
April-June

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Published by the Central Publishing House, Luzon, Philippines

EDITORIAL NOTE

The rectification document, "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors", was formulated and drafted by the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines and finally approved by the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee, on the basis of scores of documents from lower Party organs and organizations from 1980 to 1992.

These documents were the result of democratic interaction between the Party center on the one hand and the lower Party organs and organizations on the other hand through direct investigation, reports, consultations, conferences and other forms of communications.

We are publishing in this issue three important examples of documents that are among those used as basis for the rectification document of the Central Committee.

These are "On the Political Work of the New People's Army", the report of the Political Department of the NPA to the Conference on Political Work of the New People's Army and two documents from the Bicol Regional Party Committee, namely, the 1990 "Report of the Bicol Regional Party Committee" and the May 1990 memorandum of the Executive Committee of the Bicol Regional Party Committee on the "Political Military Campaign 1990-91".

The Conference on the Political Work of the New People's Army was a major step in systematically presenting the deviations, errors and shortcomings that had long afflicted the main mass formation of the Party, which is the New People's Army, since its so-called regularization. The Conference examined the problems and attempted to analyze them and propose solutions.

This was an important step that helped the central leadership to comprehensively analyze the problems by studying more documents coming from the various interregional commissions, regional leading committees and staff commissions, initially sum up the experience in a draft rectification document and subject the draft document to further verification and analysis in the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee.

"On the Political Work of the New People's Army" is being published in its entirety, with editorial comments based on a reading of the minutes of the

Conference, to present not only its original value of pointing out some major errors and shortcomings and to a certain extent analyzing them but also its weaknesses and deficiencies in framework and analysis.

The most useful and revealing part of the Conference was the discussions in the workshop on the NPA's role in recovering areas lost to the enemy's gradual constriction operations. Concrete experiences shared and case studies discussed show the effectivity of small but militarily capable units (oversized squad up to platoon size, and going under different names in different areas) doing both political and military work. It is a powerful argument against premature large formations and in favor of smaller units doing mass work and military work, with a center of gravity, represented by an armed force of the appropriate size and in relative concentration.

As the report shows, the errors were perceived but these were not recognized as violations of the strategy and tactics of protracted people's war. Thus, these errors were belittled and obscured and the solutions offered (in the resolutions) were of the nature of palliatives insofar as these did not strike at the root causes. Hardly was it realized, for example, that the enemy had been consistently using psychological warfare through special operations teams, albeit ineffectively in the early years when the Party and the people's army were closely linked with the masses through the armed propaganda teams and guerrilla squads but later on with increasing effectivity proportionate to the degree of alienation of the people's army from the masses.

Hardly was it realized also that a considerable number among the so-called regular NPA fighting units (NPA companies and even platoons) were *posturing more and more like the regular standing army of the bourgeoisie*, operating without a wide and deepgoing mass base, becoming isolated and passive and yet seeking to expand its area of operations by using such so-called tactics of "expansion by fire" and "recovery by fire".

We have chosen to publish the two 1990 documents from the Bicol Regional Party Committee because this is the regional committee least influenced by militarist and insurrectionist deviations; it was accused by the former NPA general command of military conservatism.

As the two documents of the Bicol Regional Party Committee show, the leading comrades in the region were conscious of the necessity of building

consolidated guerrilla bases and of maintaining a healthy balance of consolidated and expansion barrios, between armed units for propaganda and mass work and principal fighting units, the correct relationship between the people's army and the party and so on. Nevertheless, the revolutionary forces in Bicol were not immune from the gross deviations and errors generated by "Left" opportunists, like the former chief of staff of the NPA.

It is the duty of the Central Committee, in representation of the entire Communist Party of the Philippines, to gather all the necessary and pertinent information, recommendations and opinions from below and analyze these in order to draw conclusions, and make the policies and decisions for leading the entire Party, its lower organs and organizations.

In pursuance of the rectification movement, we are publishing in this issue two documents from the Central Committee: The Resolution of the 10th CC Plenum on Correcting the Concept of the National Democratic Front and the Directive of the EC-CC on The Relationship of the Party with the NPA and the United Front.

In forthcoming issues, we shall continue to publish documents related to the rectification movement.

The Editors

(Translation from the original in Pilipino)

ON THE POLITICAL WORK OF THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY

REPORT OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY
TO THE FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE POLITICAL WORK
OF THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY
MARCH 22 - APRIL 8, 1991

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Importance of the Conference on the Political Work of the NPA

This conference was called by the Military Commission (MC) of the Party Central Committee and the General Command (GC) of the New People's Army principally to assess political work within the NPA and the political work of the people's army among the people. The assessment should help lay the basis for improving the army's political work, for rectifying errors and shortcomings, and for comprehensively consolidating and strengthening of the people's army.

The conference is being held in response to the Party's call for consolidation while fighting* and is thus an important part of the ongoing consolidation of the NPA and the entire organized revolutionary forces. It is our hope that the result of the conference will serve to strengthen not only the internal unity of the army but also the unity of the army and the people.

[Editorial Comment: The Party's call at that time for "consolidation while fighting" was a reflection of the concern over increasing difficulties and persistent shortcomings, weaknesses and errors that were aggravated by the intense and continuous enemy attacks. However, these problems had not been clearly, definitively and comprehensively attributed to the

"regularization" of the army and much less to the Party's program for achieving the so-called "strategic counteroffensive". Major Party documents since December 1988 have pointed to the error of premature regularization and verticalization (and the SCO concept, which the Political Bureau (PB) eventually discarded). Nonetheless, subsequent decisions, notably the PB's upholding, en toto, of the 1989 Command Conference papers, including the program for further verticalization of the NPA command structure and a military plan that called for intensification and escalation of the war without regard for actual capabilities, reflected the need for a more thoroughgoing assessment in order to draw the correct conclusions and set the correct line of advance.

Thus, the Conference on the Political Work of the NPA is likewise limited by a framework of identifying, and finding solutions to the problems experienced in and created by regularization and the SCO concept, without necessarily departing from and, much less, rejecting it.]

Throughout the NPA's 22-year history, the Party's correct leadership, the firm political unity of the army, and the unity of the people's army and the masses have been the decisive factors in strengthening the NPA and in carrying out and achieving its revolutionary tasks. Political work is indeed the lifeblood of the New People's Army.

These factors, and therefore the entire political work of the people's army, assume even greater importance now that the NPA has entered its third decade of revolutionary warfare and confronts the great challenge of overcoming difficulties and exploiting the excellent opportunities for advancing our people's war to a higher stage and eventually achieving total victory.

B. Objective and Framework of the Report

This report aims to provide a preliminary picture of the state of political work, based on studies conducted over the last three years by the Political Department of the NPA. The report is intended as a reference and backgrounder for an assessment of the current situation and for facilitating the formulation of resolutions.

The first part deals with the history of the NPA's political work in the first two decades of warfare. Included here are the conclusions and resolutions discussed and approved by the NPA's Second National Command

Conference in October 1989 regarding the state of political work at the end of the second decade.

The second part enumerates the problems, factors or aspects of political work which have been identified in our studies as the key or major questions.

The data in this report are taken from the following:

1) interviews with military cadres from nearly all the regions of the archipelago;

2) reports submitted by the Regional Operational Commands (ROCs) and by the Executive Committees of Regional Committees (EC-RCs) according to the Guide for the Survey of the NPA's Political Work in the Regions (Gabay sa Pagsisiyasat sa Gawaing Pampulitika ng BHB sa Rehiyon).

II. THE NPA'S POLITICAL WORK DURING THE FIRST TWO DECADES

At the establishment of the NPA on March 29, 1969, the assembly of proletarian cadres from the city (Manila) and the commanders and fighters from the old people's army repudiated the corrupt line of the Taruc-Sumulong gang which had deteriorated practically into a bandit, antisocial and antipeople gang. The NPA enthusiastically embraced the proletarian leadership of the Party and adopted the Party's revolutionary political line of waging a protracted people's war to achieve national freedom and democracy.

At the outset, the revolutionary principles and tasks of the NPA, as the principal instrument in smashing the armed machinery of the reactionary state and in seizing political power, were laid down and clarified.

Also laid down and clarified were the principles and methods that would serve as the guide and firm foundation for the political work of a genuine people's army. The emphasis was on the importance and necessity of raising the political consciousness, morale and conscious iron discipline of every Red fighter and officer; of maintaining close links with the masses and wholeheartedly serving them; of forging the unity of the commanders and fighters by practicing democracy — political, economic and military — within the army; and of disintegrating the enemy forces politically.

The NPA grew and accumulated strength in the heroic struggle for the interests of the broad masses of the people. Many Red commanders and fighters laid down their lives battling the enemy's intense and vicious

onslaughts. But many more rose to take their place and carry on the armed struggle. The people, especially the toiling masses, nurtured the New People's Army because their dear sons and daughters were in it, and they acclaimed it as their weapon for achieving freedom and democracy.

During the first decade of the NPA, in the entire early substage of the strategic defensive, the people's army had a major role in arousing, organizing and mobilizing the masses in the countryside for the national democratic revolution. During this entire period, the principal stress of the NPA was on mass work.

The Armed Propaganda Units (APUs) were the principal instruments in establishing and maintaining the guerrilla zones. These guerrilla units participated actively in production and in solving the varied problems of the masses. *The people's army served as the mainstay in the implementation of the minimum program of land reform which is the main content of the national democratic revolution and the solution to the hardships of the peasant masses in the countryside.*

Generally, the Party core within the NPA units were energetic and active. Party groups were set up at the squad level; and subsequently the Party branches at the platoon level, when platoons were formed. Eventually, the *Party committees were set up at the company level when companies were formed in a few advanced areas.*

Because mass work was the principal stress, it was the Party organizations within the NPA units that drew up the program and tactical plans for these units. And always, the army units closely implemented the plans formulated by the Party's territorial organs encompassing the units' areas of operations.

Party members within the unit took the lead in its ideological and political work. They led in education work and in mass work. They served as models for the fighters in the people's army not only in the raising of political consciousness but in their day-to-day activities — in strengthening unity within the units and unity of the army and the masses and especially in bravery in combat. Almost all the officers of the units, and no less than half of the officers and fighters, were Party members.

The Party organizations played the key role within the army. Practice showed that when the Party organization in a unit is active, its political work is done well. Conversely, when it was weak, various shortcomings and

weaknesses emerged in political work such as laxity in discipline, coarseness in dealing with the masses and excesses in the treatment of enemy captives, low morale among the officers and fighters, abuse of authority by the officers, etc.

The system of designating a political guide or political officer (PO) for the units was established and propagated. The POs led the units' political work. They were principally responsible for conducting political and ideological education, for carrying out mass work, for ensuring unity of the officers and fighters and the observance of democracy in the political, economic and military spheres.

The PO served as the Party's representative and spokesperson in the command group. The secretary of the Party group or branch usually served as the PO. There were also many cases where the squad or platoon leader was simultaneously the secretary, whereupon the PO was chosen from among the other advanced Party members or cadres in the units.

Together with the Party core within the units, the POs assumed a major role in raising the political consciousness, discipline and morale of the Red fighters and officers, ensuring close unity within the units and between the army and the masses, and also ensuring the proper treatment of the enemy, especially captives.

A model in serving the masses, possessing strong internal unity, high political consciousness and iron discipline, the New People's Army quickly won the affection of the masses in the countryside. Before long the NPA gained a very good reputation even in the urban centers and the people, including the middle forces, familiarly called them "Nice People Around".

During its second decade, the NPA continued to serve as the principal weapon of the broad masses of the people in the struggle for national freedom and democracy.

The NPA continued to adhere to the basic principles and methods of political work that had been laid down and practised during its first decade. And to this day the NPA maintains this great tradition of being the genuine revolutionary army of the people.*

*[Editorial Comment: *This must now be qualified. In the main, it can be said that the NPA continued to adhere to its basic principles insofar as (1) these principles were not directly challenged, questioned, nor repudiated,*

and (2) a significantly larger part of the NPA practiced them, albeit with growing difficulties and increasing incidence of shortcomings and weaknesses. On the other hand, as stated below, the growing neglect of mass work and, in some instances, even its abandonment in favor of military work, becomes a more and more glaring deviation from the basic principles of the NPA and of the Party.]

Upon entering its second decade, the NPA had grown and expanded sufficiently as to be able to position itself in almost all strategic areas of the entire archipelago. The formations had developed from teams and squads of the Propaganda-Organizing Teams (POTs) and the APUs to the platoons, until companies could be formed in some advanced islands. Simultaneous to this was the setting up of formations whose principal task was no longer mass work but military work. This occurred in most areas during the early part of the 1980s.

[Editorial comment: The decision to shift the principal task of "regular" forces from mass work to military work was made in line with the "regularization program" which was in turn a major component of the program to achieve the "strategic counteroffensive". Innocuous at first, this would eventually transform in practice and, in some places even in policy, to shifting the regular units' task solely to military work and neglecting, if not totally abandoning, mass work. In some extreme cases, this would degenerate into the neglect of even internal political and ideological work.]

As the army was enlarged, the demand for internal consolidation, political and ideological education, cultural work, etc. within the units also grew larger and more difficult. Moreover, the lowering of the quality of recruits became a serious problem, as it became the practice in many areas for fighters to be recruited, especially into the regular or fighting units, without having undergone tempering in mass work or in the mass organizations. Given this situation, the need arose for more POs of a higher quality, and for more active Party groups, branches and committees within the units.

[Editorial comment: The lowering of the quality of recruits is a clear indication of the unsustainability of large formations. The difficulty of replenishing troops stems both from a larger attrition rate — profiles of battalion formations show that a large number of fighters have been in the unit for only a year or slightly more, while most officers are cadres who

have been in the army or revolutionary movement for eight years or more — and a reduced or constricted source. The mass base is reduced, there is a dearth of mass activists, especially the youth, who have been sufficiently tempered in mass work and struggle. At the same time the unit's combat effectiveness is lowered as its area for maneuver and vital mass support are constricted.]

The NPA machinery for supervising political work at all levels has been maintained and efforts have been taken to strengthen it. There are political guides for all squads, political officers or instructors for platoons and companies, and political commissars for battalions. Political staffs were designated at the company level and so were political departments at battalion, regional and national levels.

At any rate, ever since companies started to be formed, we have experienced difficulties in providing political officers and other political cadres in sufficient number and quality to undertake the increased work and solve the problems of political work within the army.

The shift in emphasis from mass work to military work clearly and directly affected the army's style of work, especially in integrating and uniting with the masses. Unlike the APUs and the local guerrilla units, the bigger guerrilla formations whose main task was military no longer felt obliged to integrate with the masses as frequently and as closely as before. Aside from this, time devoted to production work was also reduced.

The net effect was a loosening of the bonds between the fighting units and the masses that had been forged when mass work was still the principal task. This gave rise to certain unhealthy tendencies, such as arrogance and coarseness in dealing with the masses.

As "The Principal Conclusions of the Assessment" (Mga Pangunahing Kongklusyon sa Pagtatasa) of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee (PB-CC) in April 1989 points out:

"The existing imbalance between the principal and secondary formations also reflects the problems with regard to balancing the military work and the political work of the NPA. If not entirely lacking, very little time and attention are devoted by the guerrilla units to mass work and political work. As a result, a great bulk of the fulltime forces are not being mobilized directly for developing the mass base. The political consciousness of the officers and

fighters are also dulled, and some negative tendencies within the army are reinforced."

Furthermore, the cadres within the army concentrated more and more on doing and developing military work. Although, in the main, attention was given to political work because of its perceived and assumed importance, not enough effort was made to improving its quality. One manifestation of this was the widespread practice of "the commanding officer having the responsibility for military work; and the political officer and the Party having the responsibility for political and ideological work in the unit".

The Party organizations within the units continued to play a key role in political and ideological work. Where the Party unit was energetic or active, political work was also healthy and well attended to not only within the unit but also at the lower levels which the unit indirectly led. Where the Party unit was passive or unconsolidated, many shortcomings in political work arose within the unit itself or among the units it led.

The situation and level of political work in the army reflect some aspects of the situation in the Party. For instance, shortcomings in Party internal consolidation and political work directly affect the army. A stark example is the problem of coping with the demand for ideological and political education.

In such a situation, the entire burden of leading the political work fell on the political officers and the political staffs. With increasing stress on military work and with Party consolidation being neglected, the unit's political work falls more and more on the POs' shoulders alone. It comes as no surprise that in many cases, fighters and officers who had long been in the army and Party are the very ones violating rules of discipline and giving negative examples to other Red fighters and officers.

A lot of problems regarding political work had accumulated as a result of the change in the political situation from 1986 onward. It was not only to the masses that we needed to explain the present situation and the direction and tasks of the revolution. We needed to do this even within the army itself. There were not a few who got the impression, especially as a result of the ceasefire negotiations, that the war would end and that therefore they might just as well attend to their families. A considerable number of fighters and officers left their units as a result.

[Editorial comment: Clearly, this is rooted in an attitude or concept that the only important work for the army is fighting, and the illusion that the Aquino government could and would eventually give in to the people's revolutionary demands.]

However, it did not take long to reverse the situation after the Party explained the change in the political situation, particularly the character of the U.S.-Aquino regime, and the immediate tasks of the Party, the NPA and the entire revolutionary movement.

Our internal difficulties and shortcomings were aggravated by the impact of the enemy's intense assaults and use of a variety of methods to sow intrigue in the ranks of the revolutionary forces, rend the unity within the army, and separate the NPA from the masses.

[Editorial comment: In retrospect, it must be said that the enemy's "gradual constriction" or Lambat-Bitag campaign strategy merely exploited weaknesses we had imposed on ourselves. The enemy does not have to cast his net deep into the water to catch a fish that is wont to jump out of it from time to time, or that chooses to swim in shallow waters.]

The enemy launched its "gradual constriction" campaigns in the latter part of the 1980s: more intense, more widespread, more sustained and more ferocious than past counterrevolutionary military campaigns.

Through flagrant, vicious and terroristic fascist methods such as the bombing of barrios, forced evacuations, assassinations of mass leaders, blockades of food and other essential needs, the razing of homes through arson and the destruction of crops, the enemy succeeded in causing the temporary disruption, if not the collapse, of the mass organizations, and in narrowing the areas of maneuver of the people's army in some selected areas.

Although the enemy failed to drive out and force our guerrilla forces into a passive position from which his regular battalions and brigades had intended to crush them, it was the masses that bore the brunt of the devastation and destruction wrought, and many mass organizations collapsed. The NPA's areas of maneuver became narrowed and organized mass support was diminished. These caused demoralization and weakening within our ranks and among the masses. With the diminution of the mass base, it became more difficult to recruit fighters tempered in mass struggles.

The NPA valiantly defended the masses; it launched defensive, offensive and counteroffensive operations to frustrate the enemy's schemes. In many places, the NPA carried out the Party's guideline to recover areas seized by the enemy, or open up new areas to widen the revolutionary influence and also the revolutionary forces' areas of maneuver. A sizeable part of the regular fighting units were returned to mass work or were required to devote more time to base building and agrarian reform work. In some places military cadres were returned or transferred to comprehensive territorial work.

However, in the process of carrying out the Party's policies and instructions as well as in its own decisions in military operations the NPA committed certain weaknesses and errors. The most glaring were military operations that unnecessarily caused harm to the masses or were unacceptable to them, and also the excesses in connection with anti-infiltration campaigns in some places.

[Editorial comment: Although there seems to be a recognition of the weaknesses and errors these are not properly evaluated and explained and therefore no effective rectification could be undertaken. There is no recognition of the fundamental error that the NPA had lost the initiative by choosing to fight the way the enemy wanted it to fight. What are underestimated as "certain errors and weaknesses" and "excesses" are actually rooted in this fundamental error. It was not so much the case of the enemy forces having become stronger or much more vicious as of our own forces' throwing away its advantage of mass support or turning its back on the strategy and tactics of people's war and choosing to play by the rules of the enemy.]

It was in the latter part of the second decade that military actions by the people's army began to have political impact nationally and even internationally. It was no longer enough to weigh the political effects of a military operation on the immediate locality where it was to be carried out. It became necessary to consider how the people in the urban centers would view our operations, and how the mass media — which are outside our control — would treat these.

The enemy was quick to exploit our political shortcomings and errors, especially with regard to NPA military actions, in order to sow intrigues, malign the revolutionary movement, and consequently alienate us from the people. In

some cases the enemy succeeded in creating and widening rifts between us and the masses in the locality, and even within our ranks.

[Editorial comment: In the first place, the NPA, especially the so-called regular formations, had priorly undergone a process of alienating itself from the masses and this itself is the political shortcoming, which the enemy would effectively exploit to aggravate the alienation.]

The political work of the people's army is a major factor in the comprehensive strengthening of the revolutionary movement. It is through our effective work in the countryside and urban areas that we develop large numbers of activists and cadres to become Red fighters and officers with firm political foundation — tempered in mass struggles and in organized actions — and with a high political consciousness.

The quality and quantity of those whom we recruit as fighters and as military and political cadres of the people's army reflect how well we carry out comprehensive ideological, political and organizational work in the Party and in the mass organizations, both in the countryside and in the urban areas.

With the advance of the revolutionary movement, certain concerns and tasks grew in importance. One of these is the administration of military justice in the army, related to implementation of discipline.

The need to systematize the codes or laws being implemented in our areas as well as the entire system of judicial administration has become more pressing. This has become a concern of the army as one of the principal enforcers of these laws, especially in areas where the army operates but where Party territorial organs or the people's organs of political power do not yet exist.

The inability of our machinery to provide support to the families or other dependents of the officers and fighters had an adverse effect upon the army's morale. This has become widespread and has been a reason why even some previously loyal and dedicated Red fighters and officers have left the people's army.

The National Command Conference of October 1989 discussed the following situation and problems with regard to the political work of the NPA as it entered its third decade:

1. The efforts to keep political work in step with the rapid enlargement of military formations and military work.

2. A glaring slackening of discipline within the people's army.
3. Coarseness of behavior emerging in relations with the masses.
4. The need to promptly and regularly clarify policies and regulations regarding certain particular matters.
5. The need to revitalize education and cultural work.
6. In the main the three democracies are practiced.
7. The machinery for political work continue to function, although somewhat unenthusiastic and sluggish in some areas.
8. A big shortcoming in developing political work within the ranks of the enemy.
9. The inadequacy in developing internal and external propaganda.
10. Initial steps have just been taken with regard to matters/problems arising from the administration of justice and of personnel.

Based on this assessment, the conference adopted the following resolutions:

1. Convene a national Party conference on political work in the army.
2. Pay attention to the consolidation of the Party organization within the people's army.
3. Systematize training of political officers:
 - a. Finalize the course for political officers, pilot-test the course and propagate it.
 - b. Clarify the orientation and standardize the guidelines for political officers.
4. Build the army's machinery for political work up to the level of the regional and area commands (counterpart staffs). Clarify their relationship to the Party organization as well as their share and layer of responsibilities and tasks.
5. Pay attention to education and cultural work:
 - a. Standardize and regularize the political courses at the various levels.
 - b. Develop the methods and medium of instruction.
 - c. Train instructors as well as cultural cadres and activists.
 - d. Pay attention to the literacy and raising of the general educational level of the fighters and officers.
6. Review and clarify our policies and regulations on the following:
 - a. Drinking.

- b. Religious fanatic and vigilante groups.
 - c. Treatment of prisoners.
 - d. Sexual relations.
 - e. Counterintelligence (against informers and infiltrators).
7. Improve propaganda work from the national to the regional levels.
 8. Consciously assist in base building and mass work.
 9. Confront and resolve the concrete problems adversely affecting the morale of officers and fighters.
 - a. Assure the livelihood of their families and immediate dependents.
 - b. Assure the army's material needs such as clothes, food, tents, hammock, etc.
 10. Systematize political work in the ranks of the enemy.

[Editorial comment: The above lineup of the situation and problems with regard to political work completely ignores the problem of a dwindling mass base that by 1989 — when the command conference was held — had become extremely urgent. The first point in the enumeration reflects the depth of militarism to which the Comcon had fallen: in its perception, political work must simply run after the building of large army formations and military tasks instead of being the basis for them.]

III. SOME MAJOR QUESTIONS

In the past year the Political Department and other NPA political staffs and commands at the different levels continued their investigation and deepened their studies on political work of the NPA.

These were undertaken in connection with the implementation of the measures to systematize and promote political work at various areas or units of responsibility.

It is only appropriate that on this occasion we have assembled the political officers and representatives of commands and political staffs from the entire archipelago. We can share experiences; cooperate in forming a complete picture of the situation of political work in the NPA and in clarifying questions and analyzing problems; and attain unity on measures to be recommended to our higher commands and to the Military Commission to further advance political work in the NPA.

In the main, further studies confirm the conclusions reached by the Second National Command Conference. The problems enumerated require continuing and deeper study and more concrete resolutions.

In the course of our assessment and deeper study, we may discover new problems, or we may find that some have been resolved or are no longer as bothersome as before.

We present some points for consideration and study by the conference:

1. The dynamism of leadership in political work.

Leadership is the key to the systematization and development of political work. In the past, this work was passed on to the political leaders and staffs in a mechanical and static manner. This could be one of the reasons for the slow development of political work, which in some cases, has led to major weaknesses and errors.

It is well to inquire into the role of the commands (whatever is the structure of the command in the unit or area) as well as the role of the Party organizations in the units and that of the leading organs in the territories.

Related to our study of the dynamism of leadership in political work is the study of the machinery by which this leadership is realized: the command structures and the political staffs, the Party organizations in the units, and their relationship.

2. Invigorating education, propaganda and cultural work.

These tasks are interrelated. We must intensify our efforts at these tasks, and the key is to set up the machinery for attending to and administering each of these tasks. The staffs for education, culture and propaganda may be integrated into or placed under the political staff.

Next to the staffs, an important component of the machinery are politico-military schools to undertake systematic, sustained and all-round political and military trainings and courses.

It is important to study how we can intensify our efforts at these tasks and how we can create and propagate popular forms and methods while giving attention to raising and developing the content.

It is most important to study how Party members should perform and take the lead in these tasks.

3. Setting standard requirements for recruitment at each level of the army and in each type of formation.

Standards for recruitment have long been set and clarified; we need to study how practical these standards are and how these are being implemented.

It is also good to study how to ensure that fighters recruited into the "regular" and combat units undergo sufficient training, tempering and political education.

4. Firming up and maintaining discipline.

The most important aspect of this task is that of raising the morale and the political consciousness of the officers and fighters; second is education and orientation on the policies and on the code of discipline; and the third are organizational measures and methods for maintaining discipline, such as the system of military justice.

5. Participation of the units in mass work and in production.

6. Experience in expansion and recovery work, especially in the recovery of areas seized and hardened by the enemy.

These are only some of the outstanding issues. As mentioned above, more may arise and some may be even more important. It is our task in this conference to pinpoint, study and provide appropriate resolution to all these. ●

(Translation from the original in Pilipino)

REPORT OF THE BICOL REGIONAL PARTY COMMITTEE

MAY 1990

INTRODUCTION

This document on the situation in the Bicol region is intended for cadres up to the section level. It strives to show the concrete balance of forces as well as the stage of the struggle between revolution and reaction in the region.

The objective situation in Bicol is discussed. We describe the political forces, some major personalities and their standpoint, the religious situation or the churches, the openly anticommunist groups, the class enemies in the region, the importance of Bicol in the national economy, the general economic plan for Bicol of the reactionary government and the conditions of the people.

There is also a discussion of the situation of the enemy in the region. Here we can see the general deployment and movement of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Bicol, the general picture of the low-intensity conflict - special operations teams (LIC-SOTs), the tactics used by the enemy against the revolutionary forces and the steps being undertaken by the revolutionary movement against the "counterinsurgency" campaign of the U.S.-Aquino regime in the region. [Editors' note: We regret that this portion of the report was not included in the copy sent to *Rebolusyon* and that therefore we could not include it in this issue.]

The discussion of the conditions of the subjective forces or the forces of the revolution describes the level of the capability and capacity of the revolutionary forces as well as the weaknesses, problems and limitations faced by these forces. In line with these discussions, measures, resolutions and tasks presented for resolving the issues. Comrades are enjoined to

promptly and seriously study these resolutions, tasks and measures in order to grasp and implement them in their respective areas.

We hope that this presentation would enable the entire Party membership in Bicol to have a more unified view of the situation in the region, especially of the balance of the political forces, in order to guide the formulation of a program for the entire Party organization.

We also hope that a document such as this can be issued from time to time to guide the entire organization in understanding the regional situation and in formulating the necessary program of action.

**Executive Committee
of the Regional Party Committee
May 7, 1990**

I. THE OBJECTIVE SITUATION IN BICOL

1. The Political Forces

a. Electoral Parties.

There were three general trends among the electoral parties in the region.

First, the domination of the LDP (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino) has been fully established in the region. Leading it is the group of Rep. Imperial and Rep. Lagman in Albay; former Gov. Lee in Sorsogon; Rep. Andaya of the first district of Camarines Sur; Rep. Unico and Gov. Padilla in Camarines Norte; Rep. Bacunawa in Masbate; and Gov. Verceles in Catanduanes.

Although the Espinosas of Masbate have set up the Independent Nacionalistas and Allies (INA), they are closely linked politically to the Imperials of Albay who are hardcore LDP.

In addition, Gov. Villafuerte himself, who controls almost all the mayors of Camarines Sur, claims that he wants to join the LDP but he has not formally done so. The unresolved struggle for power between him on the one hand and Roco and Andaya on the other is a hindrance to his joining the LDP. However, Villafuerte's political stand is the same as that of the LDP.

The second trend is the drastic weakening of the traditional opposition parties.

Salonga's Liberal Party (LP), which can be considered the largest in the region next to the LDP, continues to be puny when compared to the machineries of Mitra and Cojuangco.

Sen. Ziga, who holds the highest position in the LP in the region, has a strong political base only in his hometown. Rep. Alfelor, another LP, cannot even secure his hold on Iriga City of which he is a native. The Alfelors have not recovered from their big defeat when Nansing Alfelor was pitted against Villafuerte for the governorship of Camarines Sur.

In Sorsogon, although Gov. Arnedo, the replacement for the disqualified Gov. Frivaldo, is considered an LP member, he actually takes a posture of independence and does not seriously adhere to the LP program.

The situation is aggravated by the ouster of Gov. Salalima of Albay from the LP as a result of the expose made by Sen. Maceda (LP) in the Senate about corruption in illegal lottery (jueteng) in the region. Suspicion is rampant that Salalima runs the illegal lottery in the province.

Aside from Ziga, Alfelor and Arnedo, only small groups and personalities, such as the Los Banos family in Legaspi City, maintain the LP.

Meanwhile, the group of the Marcos loyalists or KBL (the Marcos Party or the New Society Movement) maintains only one district in Sorsogon headed by Rep. Escudero who is personally loyal to the Marcoses.

The Nacionalista Party in the region is represented by former Sen. Cea of Camarines Sur and former Sen. Aytona of Albay. Both are close to the Laurels.

The latest phenomenon in the region is the setting up of the Federal Party by Sen. John Osmeña at the national level and his assignment of former Rep. Pete Marcellana as his chairman in the Bicol region.

The third trend is the almost total disappearance of progressive groups within the electoral parties in the region. The People's Party (Partido ng Bayan) has not yet recovered from some problems on tactics in the past elections. The PDP-Laban has totally disappeared after Carpio was appointed to the National Bureau of Investigation.

Aside from the three major trends among the electoral parties, there are some rising personalities in the region who are openly aspiring to run for national elective positions. Foremost among them is Villafuerte who, as early as the 1987 elections, has been announcing that he would run as a candidate

for president or vice-president in the 1992 elections. Roco is reported to be seriously after the position of Speaker of the House of Representatives. Andaya is reportedly aspiring to run for election to the Senate. Ziga is expected to run for reelection to the Senate.

We can observe the following trends among the electoral parties in the region:

1) There are upcoming warlord types (having armed groups and/or connections with the military) taking almost monopoly control over politics. Clear examples are Imperial, Villafuerte, Unico, Alfelor, Andaya and the Espinosas.

2) There is no opposition that can come up to the strength reached by the LDP in the region.

3) Other than the conflict between the Espinosas and the Fernandez-Lim-Bacunawa group, there are no big and intense splits among the political parties and personalities in the region.

On the whole, we must closely watch the level of consolidation reached by the forces of reaction in the region, especially the LDP.

b. Other Political Forces

1) The Social Democrats: The social democrats in the region can be divided into three groups: that of Dr. Dorotan of Irosin, Sorsogon; that of Fr. Blanco, in one town also in Sorsogon; and that of Fr. Nero in Naga City.

The Dorotan group in Irosin are organizing among the peasants. They are undertaking a comprehensive program of livelihood development and struggle for reforms.

There is also a "social-democratic" (sodcems) group working among students in Naga City. They have the Social Integration Office of the Ateneo de Naga as a strong base and the group leads a legal alliance, AKMA (Alyansa ng Kristiyanong Mag-aaral / Alliance of Christian Students), with membership in different schools in Naga.

As earlier mentioned, reformism is the primary concern of the sodcems in their political struggle. They are active in the open legal mass struggle. They cooperate with the legal national democratic organizations although they have a tendency to drag whatever struggle they join to less militant forms.

The socdems are silent on the issue of armed struggle and they have not made any statement on this issue.

2) Fr. Blanco: Fr. Blanco has a program in the town of Sta. Magdalena in Sorsogon. In the past, he led the open and all-out attack against the revolutionary forces. His overweening objective is to destroy the revolutionary movement and only secondarily to promote reformism. He has been openly attempting to set up an alliance for nonviolence.

3) Fr. Nero: Nero's group in the Social Action Center, is actively organizing among the peasants and lately among the fishermen. It used to actively participate in HOPE (Hearts of Peace), an alliance for peace. The group tends more to the right of the Dorotan group in its political standpoint. Actually, Fr. Nero's group is among those actively condemning the so-called violations of human rights by the NPA.

4) HOPE (Hearts of Peace): HOPE used to be composed of three groups. The first group is composed of progressives and national democratic forces whose objective is the free discussion of people's issues as well as of the ideology and political program of all contending groups, including the protection of the rights of the people under war conditions.

The second group are the social democrats composed of Fr. Nero's group and the students in Dr. Dorotan's group who actively espouse the reformist line as an alternative to armed struggle.

The third group consists of Archbishop Legaspi and the personages connected with the Coalition of Peace set up by the government. It carries an out-and-out "counterinsurgency" line through a program of reconciliation or surrender by the revolutionary forces.

At present, the socdem group and that of Archbishop Legaspi have left HOPE because of differences over the line and tactics. Only the group of the progressives and national democrats remain in the alliance.

5) Other Major Personalities and Standpoints

Carpio: Removed by President Aquino from the National Bureau of Investigation; returned to lawyering; no bad record against the people even when in position in the NBI. Carries the progressive line within the PDP-Laban.

The General clan: Anti-imperialist, antifascist, do not oppose armed struggle but actively support President Aquino and have close links with Villafuerte.

Trivin-o: Openly criticizes the revolutionary movement, especially the revolutionary armed struggle; hardcore Aquino supporter, vigilante chief in his hacienda/estate.

Anton Dy Prieto: Vigilante funder in Naga; head of Eaglecom and Pakisumaro Jaycees in Naga; aspirant for mayor of Naga; Chinese comprador.

Azana: Anticommunist; political opportunist; Aytona man.

Bordeos: Pro-people; progressive.

2. Religion / Church

a. The Catholic Church.

The dioceses in the Bicol region can be divided into three political categories — (1) outrightly reactionary, (2) conservative and (3) progressive-liberal.

Under the first category are, among others, the diocese of Archbishop Legaspi (in Naga City). At its best, the diocese is actively working to reorient the church from concerns relating to the depressed conditions of the people towards emphasis on doctrine, rites and faith in the church through catechism. At its worst, the diocese pursues the line against violence up to blatant condemnation of the NPA's so-called violence and abusiveness.

An added proof of the reactionary character of Legaspi's diocese has been its *sponsorship of CADENCE*, which is essentially a mechanism for cooperation between the military and the church.

Under the second category — the conservatives — are the dioceses of Camarines Norte, Catanduanes and Masbate. These are principally devoted to institutional and doctrinal concerns of the church and are insensitive to people's issues.

The dioceses of Legaspi City and Sorsogon can be considered liberal, if not progressive. Bishop Sarte of the diocese of Legaspi actively participates in the political affairs of Albay province. Although he does not actively take a position on people's issues, Bishop Sarte does not also hesitate in acting as a negotiator in politico-military struggles in the province. As a matter of fact, he played a key role during the ceasefire and also during the last coup attempt against Aquino.

The diocese of Sorsogon is relatively the most progressive in Bicol. The clergy in this diocese actively carry the antifascist, anti-U.S. bases line and also actively sympathize with the masses in their struggle.

The new diocese of Libmanan has the potential of being responsive to the situation and problems of the people. This new diocese encompasses small and poor parishes of the first district and some parts of the second district of Camarines Sur. It is a victim of the tactic of Archbishop Legaspi to monopolize the earnings of the church from activities of the Penafrañcia.

Among the nuns, there are some congregations that take a progressive stance and participate in the legal struggle of the basic masses, although in the main — especially those in the service of the bishops in administering the dioceses — they remain conservative and unresponsive to the conditions and problems of the people.

In the main, the Catholic Church in Bicol remains heavily inclined to conservatism and reaction. However, it has a significant liberal-progressive part.

b. The Protestant Churches

Although the Protestant churches encompass no more than an estimated five percent of the population in the region, the pastors in the region exercise significant influence politically.

The two conferences of the Protestant churches in the region are both deeply rooted among their mass following. Many of these churches sympathize with or actively participate in the struggles of the people.

c. Other Sects

Among the other religious sects in Bicol, the Iglesia ni Kristo (INC - the indigenous Church of Christ) commands the largest membership. It remains pro-Marcos, anti-Aquino and far Right in its politics.

Aside from the INC, there are the fundamentalist and fanatical groups at the forefront of which are the born-again Christians. These groups have a fanatical and purely metaphysical system of thought and take an outrightly anticommunist stand.

3. Outrightly Anticommunist Groups

Two groups stand out in fighting the *revolutionary movement* aside from government groups, the military, the vigilantes and the CAFGUs (civilian armed forces geographical units).

The first group is ADAM centered in Naga City. This group is funded by the U.S.-based International Christian Outreach and Relief Services Inc. (INCOR).

Its program is focused on medical and economic rehabilitation of so-called victims of NPA abuses.

The second group is an anticommunist organization based in Legaspi City. This is headed by a professor in Aquinas University and is linked to the World Anti-Communist League which is represented in the Philippines by the Australian anticommunist Whitehall.

4. The Class Enemies in the Region

a. The Compradors

The region is outstanding for its monopolies along business and industrial lines. Examples are the Dee family, owner of the pharmaceutical chain New South Star Drug; the Bichara family, owner of the chain of cinema houses; the Chua family of the copra monopoly; the big five in Camarines Sur in control of trawl fishing and shrimp and lobster export; the Lee family of the JB Lines (transport), the Tan family of LCC (cargo) and others.

Also outstanding is the relative concentration of Chinese big businesses.

b. The Landlords

We still need to improve our listing of the landlords in the region. However, it is safe to say that huge haciendas and estates in the region remain untouched by any land reform program of the government.

5. The Economic Situation

Bicol is the most impoverished region in the entire country. Some of the proofs are the following:

a. By 1987 data, 75 percent of families live well below the minimum standard of living for the average family. This means that for every 100 families only 25 are alright while the remaining 75 are impoverished and

hungry. In 1985, the figure was 73.2 percent, meaning that in a span of two years there has been 1.8 percent increase of hungry families in the region. The poverty of Bicol becomes even more stark if this 75 percent is compared to the national average of 59.3 percent.

b. Bicol is second from the bottom nationally in per capita income, which continues to slide.

c. In per capita food intake, the ordinary Bicolano — because of poverty — gets only 65 percent of what he should eat. A result of this situation is the troubling percentage — 77 percent — of the total number of children whose health are in danger from malnutrition.

d. As a result of the grave economic crisis in the region, the average educational level of the ordinary Bicolano is Grade IV.

e. Per capita productivity in the region in 1985 has not improved but has even declined from 1975. Statistics show that the per capita average productivity of employed Bicolanos continued to decrease by 2.6 percent annually.

f. On the question of employment, 8.3 percent of the work force have no jobs. Among those with jobs, 28 percent do not have regular or permanent income. Consider that only 53.5 percent of the population belong to the work force and the rest are children and old people; therefore only 30 percent of the population sustain the rest of the 70 percent.

Aggravating the basic condition of exploitation in a semicolonial and semifeudal society such as that in Bicol, are such other factors as the natural calamities — typhoons, drought, volcanic eruptions and agricultural pests.

The economic crisis is bound to result in the rise of criminality and recourse to religion among the people. On the other hand, the crisis also clearly demonstrates to the people the reality of poverty and injustice in the existing exploitative society.

6. The Importance of the Region in the National Economy

Despite the impoverished situation of the majority of the people, the role of Bicol in the national economy remains important.

First, the geothermal plant in Tiwi, Albay supplies 550 megawatts of the electric power needs of the whole of Luzon against the 30 megawatts consumed by the region itself. In addition to that in Tiwi, another geothermal

plant in Bacon-Manito is planned to start operations in 1992 to supply another 330 megawatts. The towns of Del Gallego, Mercedes, Irosin, Pasacao and the mountains of Isarog and Iriga have been pinpointed as potential sources of geothermal energy.

Another major product of the region is copra, which is a major raw material export of the country. The region also supplies fish and shrimps to Metro Manila and even exports these to other countries.

The bald forests are witness to the quantity of logs felled for export from the region.

It cannot be denied that despite the critical situation of the region's economy, raw materials and minerals continue to be drawn from it at a fast rate.

7. The General Plan of the Government for the So-called Regional Development

The Entire Strategy

The regional development program of the Aquino government has three major directions.

First is supposedly the stress on development of the most impoverished and still unserved areas.

Second is supposedly the development of industries through programs of creating jobs and income generation based on agriculture.

Third is supposedly the development of agriculture through intensified service support.

Actual Strategy and Objectives

On this point, it is important to clarify the actual content of the so-called development strategy. In the main there are two major points that need to be examined.

First, the selection of the most impoverished areas as well as those not reached by government services, though unstated, directly confronts our revolutionary work situated in these areas.

Second, the strategy of industrial development that promises jobs for peasants and is agriculture-based focuses on two objectives — first, is to improve on exploitation from a feudal order towards a more efficient and

effective system of exploitation through agricultural industry and corporations; and second, is to show a slight degree of improvement on the conditions of the peasantry, but which actually is insufficient for their needs and far from what they should justly receive from an identical sharing arrangement. With capital being concentrated in the hands of a few, whatever industries or corporations are set up in the countryside, will certainly deliver further benefits to the ruling classes.

Sectoral and Territorial Approaches

The regional development plan of the government has its sectoral or industry line and territorial or area approaches.

There are two modes in the territorial approach: one is the integrated area development (IAD) and the second is the "growth center".

The concept of integrated area development is supposedly a comprehensive approach to the development of an area; this encompasses not only the development of agricultural production but also all aspects of the living conditions of the masses, such as health, literacy, culture, etc.

The experience of the Bicol River Basin Development Plan (BRBDP) in Camarines Sur is the most advanced implementation reached by the IAD mode.

As a result of the BRBDP experience, two major resolutions are to be accomplished in future projects. One is the designation of an area based on similarity of terrain and not on similarity of products and crops. Another consideration in the designation of an area is the political border or boundary of the towns.

Based on the abovementioned direction and resolutions, six provincial areas and 26 subprovincial areas in the region have been designated.

The "growth center" concept on the other hand selects primary, secondary, provincial and district centers that will provide technical service support (machinery and technology) to the designated IAD. The council of barangays serves as the most basic development unit.

In the actual program, Naga City and Legaspi City were designated as the principal regional centers. The other provincial capitals were designated as secondary or provincial centers. Next to the provincial centers, such towns as Ligao and Tabaco in Albay; Sta. Elena in Camarines Norte; Libmanan, Pili,

Iriga, Pampiona, Sipocot, Goa and Caramoan in Camarines Sur; Baras, Viga, and Caramoan in Catanduanes; Irosin and Gubat in Sorsogon; San Jacinto, Catangian, Placer, San Pascual and Milagros in Masbate were designated as district centers.

Before the basic unit, which is the council of barangays, the municipality is designated as the intermediate center. In addition to the above "centers of development", the area of Legaspi City-Sto. Domingo was also designated as "regional industrial center" or regional center for industries and factories.

In the sectoral approach, agricultural business is referred to as the stepping stone to development. At the same time, the following are referred to as the provincial stresses.

- Masbate : poultry and piggery
- Catanduanes : forest products
- Camarines Norte and Sorsogon : wood industries
- Albay : food industries, cattle, crops, vegetables
- Camarines Sur : food and ready-to-wear clothes

8. The Conditions of the People

a. The Peasants

The peasants in the region number no less than three million. Figures show that the percentage share of the peasants in the total population declined from 81.8 percent in 1975 to 78.5 percent in 1985. This includes various forms of migration from the barrios to areas beside highways or town centers and also to Manila and other areas outside the region.

It is important to deepen our understanding of the roots and form of the migration of various sectors to many places, although the immediately visible cause is the exhaustion of crops and products as well as the fear of abuses perpetrated by enemy military forces in their operations.

The same analysis shows that the peasants have put their bet on the government's comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) in order to ensure at the very least that their assigned farm lots are not taken over by others. *However, this does not mean that they fully believe in the CARP.*

Moreover, the data show that since the land reform program of the government was launched in 1973 and up to 1984, only 10,290 peasants have been benefited by the distribution of 9,452 hectares. At this pace in a span of

eleven years, on the basis of an estimated 1.7 million tenants in the region, it will take 297 years to complete the government's land reform program.

b. The Fishermen

The fishermen are also being pushed rapidly into difficulties due to widespread trawl fishing, use of poison and dynamite and the problem of silting on fish-spawning grounds.

c. The Workers

The workers can be divided into four categories. Those in industries and factories; those in the services; those in transport; and the agricultural workers. A more detailed study will be made in this regard.

d. The Petty Bourgeoisie

The third largest sector are the students and professionals in the cities of Legaspi and Naga.

College students in Legaspi-Daraga, Inga and Naga are about 45,000. The issue of high tuition fees and poor services and facilities remain as major issues of students in the region.

The teachers, especially those in the public schools and small private schools, undertake spontaneous protests to raise their meagre salaries and right to certain benefits.

There have also been disparate and spontaneous actions by government employees demanding better salaries and against job dismissals.

e. The National Bourgeoisie

As at the national level, the national bourgeoisie constitute a very minimal percentage of the population. There has to be a deeper analysis and identification of those constituting the national bourgeoisie in the region, their particular dynamism and situation. We must be able to identify their economic and political role in the region.

f. The Women

Outside those of the churches and of some socio-civic organizations, there is no momentum in women's organizing. There were periods when activities

were launched by some women's groups among the ranks of the professionals, urban poor and peasants but these were not sustained.

g. Special Organizations

Some functioning organizations in the region are those devoted to culture and the arts; civic organizations, "Mr. and Mrs." dancing clubs, basketball clubs and organizations of effeminate. In addition, there is a significant number of the minorities in some parts of the province of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte.

II. ASSESSMENT OF THE SUBJECTIVE FORCES

The subjective forces of the revolution in Bicol remain at the stage of preparing the factors for a leap from the advanced substage of the strategic defensive towards the further intensification of people's war. The Party, the NPA and the NDF in Bicol are resolutely forging ahead.

1. The Revolutionary Mass Movement in the Countryside

a. Organizing

The revolutionary forces in Bicol continue to advance in building basic people's organizations in the countryside despite conditions of intensifying enemy campaigns under the LIC-SOTs (low-intensity conflict special operations teams) scheme of the reactionary regime. Although enemy operations in the region have further intensified, the revolutionary forces continue to be able to operate.

However, because of the intensity of reaction, our organized masses started to decline starting in December 1987. The revolutionary forces could not operate in some areas due to intense enemy operations. But even where there were no enemy operations, there were some shortcomings in the manner of our operations. There was timidity and lack of initiative and creativeness in countering the enemy's movement. *There were problems in consolidation. Our forces could not rapidly adjust to the situation even when enemy operations had waned.*

In one particular guerrilla front, expansion and consolidation could not be sustained because of internal problems in the Party and the people's army.

One district made inflated reports. In another guerrilla front, the favorable situation was not taken advantage of because of the lack of cadres. Plans to open a new guerrilla front were set aside because some other pressing matter came up.

We must seize opportunities to organize in areas where enemy operations have slackened. Areas that have come under the enemy's SOTs must be recovered. The SOTs must be prevented from penetrating new areas.

In order to improve our mode of operation and our cadres' ability to organize and to perform other aspects of mass work, it is important to review basic documents in formal study sessions. The historical roots of our problems in mass work must be shown. At the same time, leading or key cadres must participate in critical aspects of organizing. They should personally take part in testing new ways of operating in areas where SOTs have been deployed by the enemy. Internal propaganda and organization must be systematized within every unit. Organizing work can be facilitated if mass participation in socioeconomic work is sustained. Most importantly, we must sum up our very rich experience in mass organizing and other aspects of mass work.

b. Mass Education

Mass education is in step with mass organizing. For instance, the percentage of specialized studies given to the sectors remains high. No less than 80 percent of such specialized studies are achieved for every targeted sector. However, there are other courses, such as the Revolutionary Program for Land Reform (Rebolusyonyong Programa ng Reporma sa Lupa), that should also be given. There are also some shortcomings in the quality of instruction in terms of teaching techniques, further elaboration of the movement's analysis and viewpoint and incorporation of fresh data into the mass courses.

To improve the conduct of mass education, a good machinery for it and the quality of teaching must be ensured. Political education in the army and the Party must be accelerated. We must increase the number of the texts as these no longer suffice in meeting the needs for conducting mass education. We must also translate the texts to be used in one guerrilla front into all the three languages used there.

c. Mobilization

The revolutionary forces in the countryside strive to mobilize the masses on antifeudal, anti-imperialist and antifascist issues.

The masses continue to be mobilized on various antifeudal issues but the methods for advancing the struggle remain haphazard. We must develop the ability to draw up integrated plans covering relatively wider areas, even if only on the scale of a few clusters of barrios. Priority targets must be identified and timely and sustained supervision by territorial cadres and mass leaders ensured.

We must launch a campaign to convince the masses to stop paying the amortization under CARP ("comprehensive agrarian reform program") of the reactionary government and to stop its implementation in areas controlled by the revolutionary movement, especially the consolidated areas.

The peasants whom the revolutionary movement have not yet reached should, by various means, be organized along antifeudal issues. With regard to the system of land amortization, the masses must be made to understand that they must regard the land as theirs and stop paying the amortization.

Tersyong baligtad (reversed three-thirds sharecropping, i.e., two-thirds of the crop for the tenants and one-third for the landlord) is still considered to be the common demand although the revolutionary movement is open to making stronger demands reaching up to the maximum of land distribution in selected clusters of the most advanced barrios. On the other hand, the antifeudal struggle in barrios along the highway shall be conducted according to the particular conditions in these areas, which are different from those inside areas controlled by the revolutionary movement. In the latter, the agrarian revolution shall be further advanced by implementing the call for the masses to desist from paying the amortization under the onerous land reform program of the reactionary government. At the same time, the terms of the current policy for advancing the agrarian revolution must be negotiated with landlord-allies.

Antifascist mobilizations are also being advanced through various means. These help in slowing the enemy's momentum. At the same time, the revolutionary forces demonstrate their concern for the masses amidst increasingly difficult conditions. Through these mobilizations, the masses also learn to be self-reliant. In the process, the basic mass organizations become

consolidated. As a matter of fact, one guerrilla front was able to relatively sustain its momentum through mobilizations on the scale of the entire front. There was also a significant increase in the mobilizations in one province.

To further accelerate the momentum in the antifascist struggle, human rights organizations must be rebuilt to function as an umbrella organization. Existing human rights organizations must be encouraged to launch bigger and broader mass actions.

Antifascist actions launched by the revolutionary forces in the countryside and in the cities must be coordinated. The machineries for antifascist struggle in both these places must coordinate with each other. We expect from such coordination the formation of a real alliance for human rights. Big front committees must exercise firm and constant supervision over the initial antifascist actions, especially in areas where these are being revived to previous province-wide level of mass mobilization.

Aside from the antifeudal and antifascist line, our revolutionary propaganda and education also advances the anti-imperialist line. Anti-imperialist propaganda and education must center on the anti-U.S. bases issue and mobilizations on this issue must be launched. Thus, we can relate the anti-U.S. bases issue to the political and economic aspects of the anti-imperialist line.

d. Forms of Revolutionary Propaganda in the Countryside

The national democratic line continues to be propagated in the countryside through oral and written propaganda.

The most common forms of oral propaganda are done through house-to-house visits, informal gatherings and mass meetings.

VHF (very high frequency) radio transmissions continue to be employed as a link to the mass media in order to maximize propaganda coverage. This has yielded significant results in three guerrilla fronts. The Regional Operational Command also exerted efforts to use the VHF network for propaganda work. Two fronts continue to send voice tapes for this purpose.

Radio Bicolnon made a number of broadcasts which caught the public's attention in Naga and Legaspi. The system of designating a spokesperson was successfully used by two guerrilla fronts.

The problem is how to sustain widespread oral propaganda in the revolutionary movement.

All areas are using written propaganda in the form of statements, OD-OP (wall posters and graffiti), *operasyon palutang* (leaflet floaters) and streamers.

Propaganda materials in the form of printed statements were employed significantly by two fronts.

The increase in the number of revolutionary newspapers in the localities is notable. Two guerrilla fronts have made significant advances in this regard. Two others are preparing to publish their own newspapers. Another one has a periodical with district-wide circulation.

On the subject of campaigns, three significant propaganda campaigns were undertaken — the campaigns on the Custodio case in Camarines Sur and the Cocadiz case in Quezon (both agrarian reform-related corruption scandals) and the integrated anti-U.S. bases campaign reaching almost district-wide coverage.

e. Culture

Revolutionary culture continues to be propagated in the countryside through cultural performances in the form of songs, poems, plays, etc. among the masses. A significant breakthrough has been the formation and operation of a fulltime cultural group. Still to be attended to is the strengthening of the machinery for cultural work in the guerrilla fronts. This is the key link for strengthening cultural groups among the masses. In setting up the machinery, we must pay attention to training. Songs, poems and skits created in Bicol should also be collected and propagated.

2. United Front Work in the Countryside

The revolutionary movement continues to conduct united front work in the countryside. The movement continues to forge links with the middle forces and conduct propaganda among them.

Support groups and revolutionary groups among the middle forces have been maintained and new ones organized. Some educational work has been conducted among them. One achievement has been the formation of the NDF council at the municipal level in one guerrilla front and also at the barrio level in other places.

We must maximize the mobilization of the middle forces and solve the problem of inadequacy of cadres, both in number and quality, for building the NDF. A plan must be made for building the NDF councils in large numbers from the barrio level upwards.

3. Army / Armed Struggle

The New People's Army in Bicol perseveres in preparing the political and military factors for seizing political power to achieve decisive victory in the raging people's war.

a. Recruitment

The NPA continues to be able to get new recruits and replenish losses. There has been a slight decrease in the number of NPA personnel. Among the reasons are deployment (transfer) to units outside of the region and the redeployment of a considerable number to Party staff organs.

An additional reason is the problem of NPA personnel going AWOL in significant numbers. To solve this problem, closer attention should be given to personal and family problems of NPA personnel. We must systematically enable the NPA fighters to grasp the need for discipline and instill in them the spirit of courage and perseverance in the face of enemy attacks. We must improve and systematize education and organization work within their ranks. We must also systematize recruitment and set additional qualifications for recruits.

b. Education/Training

The NPA is able to undertake political education within its ranks. More than 90 percent of its members have been given the special studies designed for the sectors. Nearly 90 percent have also been made to undertake the course on Military Regulation and the General Mass Course. The percentage of attendance for other courses is also satisfactory. What must immediately be attended to is the General Course on People's War (PKDB - Pangkalahatang Kurso sa Digmang Bayan), which has been studied by less than 30 percent of members. As in conducting mass education, we must ensure the quality of instruction, especially on points where not only reading-translation but also introduction of fresh data and analyses is necessary.

Political work within the ranks of the NPA was not conducted satisfactorily because the group for it could not be constituted and made to function. The present team has problems with regard to the quality of military cadres among the current political officers, political guides and political instructors. There is a need to clarify their respective orientation and tasks.

The Basic Military Course (BMC) continues to be conducted. The problem lies in focusing on those who have not yet received it. There is an urgent need to sum-up the already rich experiences in conducting the BMC, especially because of the need now to further decentralize the conduct of the course so as to be able to cover more people.

The conduct of the Basic Course for Officers (BCO) in our areas up to the district is gaining momentum. Among the regular formations, conduct of the course has reached the squad level. The result has been increased military knowledge among these cadres as well as improved leadership ability and better performance of administrative military tasks. Many more from the staff of the region down to the district have yet to take the course. The military cadres in the APUs and front units (FUs) and in the squads of independent platoons should also take this course. Efforts must be exerted to reproduce the texts of the BMC and BCO.

Only a few full-timers, both in the zone and in the white areas, have received the mass course on intelligence. The conduct of this course should be accelerated. The special course on intelligence work for the intelligence staff has not yet been given. Meanwhile, the section on intelligence work in the BCO can already serve the purpose. The reproduction of the texts of both the mass course on intelligence and the special course on intelligence should be scheduled.

The conduct of the training on explosives is already widespread. A comprehensive manual on explosives has already been made. In order to further improve work along this line, the machinery for explosives in three regions should be improved. The forces in the region, including those in the cities, should be properly trained in the use of explosives for defensive and offensive operations. To further advance explosives work, stress should be put on the use of explosives and their care.

The machinery for medical work is the most developed and the most stable. There are now both basic and advanced courses on medical work. Especially

inside the army, education in medical work has reached a fairly advanced level. The machinery for medical work inside the army may be considered sufficient. There is a machinery for medical work in all our areas and medical work has begun to take off. This is the result of the systematization of medical work. This indicates that there should now be differentiation between medical work inside the army and medical work among the mass base. There should be adequate mechanisms to take care of medical work at the local level. Even if they already have stable machineries, the capacity in three fronts should be made to catch up with the capacity already achieved by the ROC and other fronts. Skills in surgery and traditional medicine should be further raised, at least to the level of the skills achieved in abdominal surgery. More instruments should be acquired and the places for medical treatment should be improved. Those who have already been trained should now really be utilized fully and there should be medical officers at all levels.

Many people were trained on the job to operate HF and VHF radio. These operators have attained a certain level of skill in receiving and sending messages. There are now only a few left of those who had undertaken comprehensive training on radio. The present operators should be immediately trained to fix radios and solve other problems. They should be able to trouble-shoot. The experiences in the use of radio should now be summed up. More technicians and mechanics should be trained.

Training courses on sniping were conducted because the BMC is inadequate for the purpose of producing and training snipers. This kind of training should be transported to and propagated in other areas beyond the region. A training manual on sniping has already been prepared. Sniper training is relatively cheaper to conduct than "battle indoctrination" in BMC. The objective of the training is to produce fulltime snipers and snipers in the NPA units, both of which perform a support role in operations of a primarily attritive character. Fulltime snipers shall be formed into independent teams.

c. Acquisition of High-Powered Rifles (HPRs)

Units of the people's army boosted their strength by the acquiring HPRs through tactical offensives, purchases and donations. Lost and damaged rifles were thus replaced. However, it is still imperative that we increase the acquisition of HPRs in order to be able to form new units and to strengthen old

ones. This can be done by further increasing successful tactical offensives through which many HPRs can be acquired. We must also avoid defensive battles or even offensive battles and other operations that result in the loss or destruction of HPRs.

d. Balance of Horizontal and Vertical Forces

Within a certain context, we can divide NPA formations into two types: the horizontal and the vertical. The vertical formation refers to the regular formations of the army from full-time guerrilla front units upwards. The horizontal formation refers primarily to the units involved in mass work. The full-time guerrilla district units are also considered as vertical formation.

Historically, since the establishment of the NPA in the region in 1971, the emphasis was on the building of horizontal formations such as the armed propaganda unit (APU). This emphasis lasted until 1984. When the advanced stage in warfare was reached during the latter part of 1982, district guerrilla units (DGUs) and front guerrilla units (FGUs) were formed. In 1985 and 1986 the emphasis was on building companies and independent platoons. Units for mass work became inadequate. In the process, a significant number of mass activists, some Party elements in the localities and even in the NPA lapsed into bad practices. The inadequacy of the units engaged in mass work indeed brought about many problems. Guns could be made available for the vertical formations only at the expense of the units engaged in mass work.

To this day, wide areas lay open demanding our attention on mass work. We should therefore maintain a good balance in the growth of both horizontal and vertical formations.

e. Offensive Operations

The NPA in Bicol launched annihilative and attritive operations. As a result, since August 1988, 188 regular and paramilitary forces have been killed; 95, wounded; and two, captured. However, the operations have been mainly attritive. More precision or coordination should be achieved in the dispersed operations; and the problems of logistics and consolidation must be overcome. We must strive for more victories in annihilative operations. We must prevent what are planned as big annihilative operations from turning into mere attritive operations.

In this regard, we should continue to consolidate our regular forces. The focus of our consolidation are: making the squad leader and squad tactics functional and effective, effecting compliance of orders during fighting and preparedness in battle under various circumstances.

We must attain the element of surprise and review our lessons in night fighting and ambush. We must also improve our ability to choose targets and our skills in using explosives. We must also define "superior force" in the context of gaining superiority in battles. This is measured not only by the number of troops poised for battle but also by such important factors such as skill or experience, mastery of terrain, the enemy's vulnerability and precision in timing. This is what we mean by "intelligent use of force", something which we strive to achieve. We must strive to bring our battles to decisive victories. We must also check up on the status of those assigned to intelligence work.

With regard to attritive operations, many were launched in the form of harassment, sniping, use of explosives and failed annihilative operations. Attritive operations from 1988 onward were frequent and fruitful. In one district during the same period, an entire enemy platoon was annihilated. The checkpoint is a form of attritive operation that we must also use. We must hone our skills in the use of indigenous forms of attritive action.

To develop and improve the effectiveness of our attritive operations, we must ensure that sniping operations always accurately hit the target and are effective. We must further instill among our guerrilla front forces, as well as among some units in the localities, the value of alertness both in consciousness and posture. The regular formations must maximize their time during periods when no big operations are being launched by undertaking attritive actions. We must also maximize the use of explosives and the mobilization of the people's militia in guerrilla bases.

We must revive the use of sparrow and partisan operations up to the level reached in 1982-1983 under conditions that enemy targets are many and dispersed. One among the reasons for this, is that the enemy is hitting some of our partisan units. We are immediately attending to the work of securing our base and, in the case of one guerrilla front, we are immediately attending to ridding the area of secret enemy agents. Sparrow operations should have been carried out from time to time. We must review the orientation and lessons in this regard. In this connection, we must focus on hitting those who remain

on our standing order for proven enemy agents. We must more rigorously plan the actions to hit them because they affect the momentum of mass work as well as the mobility and morale of our cadres and couriers.

f. Defensive Actions

There were a lot of defensive actions which wrought a lot of damage to our army units and Party organs. These indicate problems in basing.

In these defensive operations, the enemy suffered more killed and wounded casualties relative to those suffered by the NPA. There were some defensive actions in which the NPA was able to wrest the initiative and was even able to confiscate some HPRs. NPA troops must have the spirit to go on the offensive and to transform defensive battles, into which they are forced, into offensive battles. By frequently launching attritive actions, we create the conditions for avoiding defensive battles. The best defense is strong offense. The mobile and semi-mobile troops must always organize their plans for defense.

There are defensive battles that are immediately analyzed and the enemy agent/s who tipped off our forces are identified. But there are many cases that are not immediately analyzed and those responsible for the tip-off have not been identified up to now. Counterintelligence should be taken seriously. It is high time that secret enemy informers in barrios where our units operate are rigorously identified and immediately removed. Let there be no lapses in security against active enemy infiltration. Such weaknesses should be promptly criticized, related problems solved and limitations, problems and weaknesses overcome.

g. Military Cadres

NPA military cadres continue to perform their respective tasks. More of them have had BCO formal training than those in the past. Many have also been given formal training in other lines of work and services. It is but proper that they be encouraged to take initiatives.

Military cadres receive both formal and on-the-job training. Giving play to their initiative in their assigned areas and training would greatly improve their work. The problems with regard to military cadres stem from the fact that, due to heavy pressure of work, their training is done haphazardly. Training and

consolidation of both young and older experienced cadres who wish to advance should be done constantly.

There are continuing problems of logistics which affect the ability of some military cadres to forge new tracks. Ideological tasks, including giving formal education and paying attention to personal problems are not properly attended to by some military cadres. This affects the enthusiasm and initiative of some military cadres. There should be proper deployment of military cadres thus affected.

h. Militia

The NPA continues to mobilize and train the people's militia. These are formed from among members of the basic mass organizations and are led by the party group (PG) and local Party branch (LPB). Units of the people's militia are usually found in guerrilla bases. The people's militia are mobilized to maintain revolutionary peace in the barrios; participate in military operations; join economic activities; support activities of the Party and services of the people's army; perform tasks in arms confiscation, in the clean-up of enemy secret agents, in intelligence gathering and in their own activities, especially in setting explosives and conducting their studies.

The people's militia has two principal responsibilities. First is to ensure the maintenance of revolutionary peace in the barrio. Second, is to serve as reserves for the full-time NPA fighters.

The biggest militia formation reaches platoon-size. A guerrilla company could be sustained in one front because of the militia, despite enemy activity there. But the common formation is the size of a squad.

People's militia units continue to be given political education.

However we have met some problems in setting up the people's militia. There is a decrease in the number of units and personnel because of enemy attacks and the inadequacy of our attention on them. Also, a lot of militia members joined the NPA as full-time fighters but were not replaced by new members. Even in guerrilla areas, there are not enough militia units. There is thus the need to form more units in guerrilla bases, especially platoon-size and company-size units. We have not also achieved the desirable ratio of five militia members for every full-time guerrilla.

We also have problems in arming and training the militia. They should be given a certain share of arms confiscated during offensive operations. Militia units should also be mobilized to arm themselves both with indigenous and modern weapons.

We must also catch up on giving them political education, basic and special training. Many militia members cannot participate fully in the activities of their units because of economic problems. We must ensure that militia members get benefits from socioeconomic projects.

i. Three Democracies

There is active implementation of the three democracies [among cadres, officers and ordinary fighters]. However, problems related to them must be solved. The lack of promptness in assessing work, offensive and defensive battles, etc. is a hindrance to eliciting ideas from the fighters and the military cadres with regard to the conduct of their activities. We should have a unified view of events so that in the process troop consolidation is neither left unaccomplished nor delayed.

In the main, discipline is maintained within the ranks. Nevertheless, there have been cases of infractions that still need to be corrected if discipline is to be maintained.

The resolution on improving the quality of recruits and systematizing recruitment; making staff organs and the political groups functional; maintaining a certain standard of combat preparedness, health and combat gear for the fighters; strengthening unity and the exercise of democracy; and caring for the welfare of the troops and encouraging them to acquire such skills as sewing and other activities that enhance their remolding as proletarian fighters — all these would enhance discipline within the people's army.

j. Principles in Political Work

In the main, unity exists among fighters, among fighters and officers, and among the fighters and the people. The unity of the army and the people is maintained and developed not only through propaganda work, education and mass organizing but also through the people's army's increasing services to

the people, including medical work and production. There are also some progress in the work of dismantling units of the enemy forces.

On the other hand, the three democracies should be further encouraged. Better implementation will have a big effect on improving the unity of fighters and officers. We must also take action on breaches of discipline by some officers. Political groups and teams in the regular formations should be made to function. This setup will prevent some undesirable habits from arising among our fighters and officers. These habits are manifested by untoward behavior in relating with the masses.

4. Guerrilla Base-building

One mark of the readiness of the revolutionary movement to advance to a higher level of warfare is its seriousness in base-building. A number of guerrilla bases are being developed in many areas of Bicol. There are committees attending to the guerrilla bases. There are fulltime units attending to comprehensive tasks. There are socioeconomic projects being developed in these areas. Defense systems and health programs are also being developed. Problems in this area of work are that of further advancing comprehensive work, getting additional funds for socioeconomic projects, increasing our weapons and consolidating the cadres. The backward guerrilla bases should be made to catch up with the advanced ones. In these backward areas, the staff for socioeconomic work should be assisted.

The ratio between barrios being consolidated and those for expansion remain desirable. In general, the ratio is one consolidation barrio for every three expansion barrios. Because we already have guerrilla bases, we should be bolder in striving for a higher degree of consolidation within guerrilla bases than in non-guerrilla areas. Simultaneous consolidation within and outside guerrilla base areas effectively widens the guerrilla bases.

In the main, our guerrilla fronts remain wide but there is a relative narrowing in some parts. Some of our forces are overextended, having area of operation too wide for them to effectively cover. Amidst the deployment of the LIC-SOTs in our guerrilla fronts, we must attend to the tasks of recovering our areas, increasing linkages between barrios and expanding along the highways and coastal areas.

5. Revolutionary Mass Movement in the City

There has been a general decline since the middle of 1986 in the open mass movement in the city and an overall decrease in the mass base. The reasons for this are the temporary misreading of the character of the Aquino regime, the unhealthy balance between solid and sweeping organizing, the persistence of long running problems in the direction of our activities and other errors and weaknesses.

What aggravated the situation was the kind of Party structure maintained in the urban areas from the start of 1986 to 1987, which essentially slowed down the momentum of sectoral and comprehensive territorial organizing.

The abovementioned problems, weaknesses and mistakes resulted almost in disintegrating the leading committees for organizing the students, peasants, workers, drivers and urban poor. Meanwhile, the organ set up to advance the peasant mass struggles was bogged down by meetings, disagreements and petty problems.

Only the middle forces' organizations were able to preserve themselves and within a certain period carried the open mass movement in the cities. It was recognized that past efforts at solid organizing and consolidation had been key factors in sustaining the organization of the middle forces.

This was the situation when a comprehensive urban Party organ was initially set up in late 1988. Within the first six months the new leadership tackled the huge problems immediately confronting the revolutionary movement.

This organ had already started to gain momentum in its work and had accomplished some major activities at consolidation when the enemy caught up with it and struck it. As a result, some of its key cadres and staff organs, including the leading committee, were smashed, aside from other organs and cadres that were adversely affected.

A tactical leadership was set up in the midst of serious security problems. This tactical center was expanded after one month and initial steps were taken to consolidate the organization. After three months the entire organization was again able to perform comprehensive tasks.

Despite all the difficulties, the open and underground forces in the cities were able to preserve themselves. Only a few became passive. A campaign

to demand justice against military abuses, especially for those who were arrested for no reason at all, was even launched.

The revolutionary movement could not advance according to the target set by the Party regional committee in 1982, but the reversal and the drift towards a decline in our forces and mass base was arrested. The level reached by our propaganda and mobilization was even maintained. We were able to sum up and assess some key areas of work through which we were able to determine the major problems in urban work.

The sharpness of our line and the suitability of our tactics compensated for the relative inadequacy of mobilizable forces for multisectoral activities.

At least at the level of propaganda, our forces could cope with such sudden turns in the situation as the coup attempts, natural calamities and sharp increases in the price of oil and other basic commodities.

Our stress at the moment is on consolidating the secret and open work in the urban areas while vigorously preventing a decline in the current capacity to stage open actions and also preparing for a sudden maturation of the crisis, a spontaneous outbreak of anger among the masses and fierce infighting among the enemy classes.

The orientation of our activities among the student, worker, driver, urban poor sectors and even in the sector of peasants near the towns and cities should be defined and concretized. A balance must be struck between sectoral and multisectoral actions and between secret and open organizing. Errors and weaknesses in attitude, tactics and style of work must be corrected. We must also develop a sufficient number of reserve cadres to succeed those who are now in place.

6. Party Building

a. Organization

1) Recruitment

Our regional Party organization continues to recruit members from the NPA and the localities in the countryside and cities. The raising of candidate-members to full members is also being attended to. Seventy percent of the membership comes from the peasantry and farm workers. This shows that the Party has struck deep roots among the broadest section of the basic masses.

Nevertheless, the majority of members have big limitations in terms of theoretical, cultural and administrative capability. In the past emphasis was put on recruiting from the ranks of those who have acquired at least high school or higher education. This is necessary because of the increasing volume of the work requiring cadres capable of theoretical and cultural work to conduct training in technical and administrative skills. The stress on recruiting intellectuals and those with at least 2nd year high school education must continue.

There was a slight decrease in Party membership. The reasons are: the destruction of local Party branches (LPB) together with the mass organizations in barrios where the CAFGUs have settled, abandonment of post or absences without leave (AWOL), cessation of activities, transfer to other areas, surrender by both local people's army unit and barrio people, and abandonment of barrios. There are also those who have been deliberately removed from Party membership for undesirable practices or for conduct unbecoming of Party elements. Inactive members were also removed from the list. Some areas were deliberately closed for recruitment. Some members also were not reported. In white areas, there was a big drop in membership due to the weakening of the underground and the temporary transfer to the peasant areas.

We should monitor the quality of recruits as they rise from being mass activists through candidate-membership to full membership. In the past, our emphasis was more on the length of one's service as a mass activist and candidate-member. The system of assessing the record and performance of Party elements should be further improved. The effectiveness and situation of Party elements and organs must be promptly ascertained.

2) Building Organs/Units in the People's Army and Localities

We continued to set up local Party branches (LPB) in the barrios and Party groups within the RKPB. In areas where numerous LPBs are adjacent to each other and where the enemy is not active, the subsection committees (SSCs) are formed. These areas are usually in the guerrilla bases and serves as a center of gravity for submunicipal section committees (SMSC). We were not able to set up section committees (SCs) since these have disbanded on two

fronts way back in 1987 and as a replacement we have set up SMSCs and front units (FUs).

There are some problems in connection with the above. In some LPBs the membership is concentrated in only one sitio. In extreme cases the membership comes from almost only one family. In organizing the local Party branch, we should avoid recruiting from only one family or just one sitio. Those in the local Party branch, especially those in its executive committee, should be trained in administration and in making reports or in the basic skills of a cadre. Family and livelihood problems that hamper the activities of LPB members should be attended to. Those in higher organs should keep themselves informed about how often the LPB meets, whether the security situation and personal problems of LPB members are discussed, and whether sessions of criticism-self-criticism, summings-up and assessments are made. In other fronts, we still need to make a breakthrough in holding elections for the LPB in some areas. We must come up with a plan for Party members to continue with their activities during periods when their areas are beset with security problems and are under enemy operation. We must also teach them underground methods, how to conduct secret activities and to keep the identities of full-timers secret. We should designate definite persons in the people's army to liaise with the local Party branch. We should also give them training in basic intelligence work and orient them about the latest enemy movements.

As with the LPBs, we also have problems with regard to basic skills of SSC cadres. They are also bogged down by livelihood problems. In view of the frequent reorganizations of PGs in the sectoral mass organizations, we should from time to time review their orientation. We should focus on training cadres in the skills of public speaking, writing business letter or statements, making reports, use of visual aids and knowledge of basic science.

We continue to build and motivate PGs in NPA squads, SSCs in clusters of barrios, Party branches in regular platoons and Party committees in companies. PGs, EC-SMSCs and SMSCs are fully functional. But in a few cases, units fail to hold meetings.

3) Cadres

We have cadres at different levels of leadership and in different lines of work. They are at different levels from the Party groups upward to the regional committee. By lines of work, there are cadres for military, finance, propaganda, education, technical, medical, explosives and other work. Those on the PG and executive committee of the LPB are assessed and rated by the district committee; and those on the section committee and subsection committee, by the guerrilla front committee. The regional committee classifies and evaluates those from the district executive committee level up to the front executive committee level. The line cadres are also of different levels. Among military cadres there are different levels — squad, platoon and company, and they are divided into CO, PO and VCO. Cadres in instruction work are also ranked.

Cadres in the EC-SMSCs have a minimum of two years' service in the Party while regional-level cadres have a minimum of 10 years' service.

The majority of cadres at all levels come from the peasantry. We still need to raise and develop their knowledge and skills to the level demanded by their administrative and leadership tasks. The overwhelming majority of the cadres, especially the young and new in the service, are still energetic and motivated to advance further.

But there are also cadres who wish to continue working but are hampered by age and physical debility. There are also those who lack enthusiasm, who are passive in confronting the enemy and content with just maintaining what has been achieved. There are those who are bogged down by personal or family problems and, in fact, have been seeking permission to leave. There are cadres who want to be transferred to other work because of problems that stem from lack of administrative guidance or who simply wish to advance along other lines of work. There are also those who are tired of fighting. A significant number of ranking cadres went AWOL. A separate study for this should be conducted and the lessons summed up. Consolidation work must go on and political education and other party courses conducted promptly. Cadre administration should be improved.

4) Committee System

The committee system continues to be practiced, from the level of the Party group to the regional committee. It was given a boost after the review course on the Basic Course for Party Cadres (BKCP) where the topic was discussed in theory and practice. The problem now lies in checking up its practice by the local Party branches and Party groups in the sectoral mass organizations

Meetings continue to be held regularly at all levels. In between meetings, there are consultations for exchanging information, soliciting opinions and, in certain instances, making decisions.

The regularity of the meetings of territorial units and organs vary according to their specific circumstances of concentration and dispersal, with concentrated ones having more frequent meetings than relatively dispersed ones.

There are certain problems in connection with the committee system. In the people's army, Party organs in regular formations rarely meet. Party branches in platoons are hardly functional. There are branches (*bisig*) that hardly meet, if at all. Consultations through letters between committees from the regional down to the district levels are not adequately used.

With regard to duration, ways must be devised to shorten meetings, without sacrificing their quality. Promptness in coming to meetings should be achieved and ways devised to reduce time devoted to administrative details during meetings.

At all levels, preparations are made for the meetings. Among the things prepared are the agenda, the reports and other requirements of the meeting. There are also the technical preparations and those concerning security. Technical centers are set up in the territorial units for the duration of meetings.

In order to further improve the conduct of meetings, written reports should be submitted in advance to give the secretary enough time to study them before the meeting. Data should be laid down in charts and maps and other visual presentations readied. Accounting should be improved and made according to the standard format. Reports should contain more analysis and conclusions based on the data. Those assigned to assume tactical command while the leading committees are meeting should already be called in for briefings even before meetings are convened. All these would help to speed up meetings.

Plenary meetings of the regional committee (RC) and meetings of its executive committee (EC) are held regularly. The plenary meetings concentrate on assessment, summing up, planning, elections, criticism and self-criticism and studying various topics. The EC meetings concentrate on the discussing the implementation of the program, policies and decisions of the plenary meetings. It is also in EC meetings where preparations for convening plenary meetings are discussed.

There are some problems though. It often happens that plenary meetings discuss — in the guise of resolutions — many things that properly belong to the EC such as those pertaining to the implementation of policies.

To achieve more efficiency, we must improve the intervals between plenary and EC meetings. Plenary meetings should concentrate on matters pertaining to the entire organization at every level, such as summing up, planning, programming and study. Matters with regard to implementation or policy formulation with regard to implementation should be delegated to the EC according to its capability. In the main, we adhere to collective decision-making and committee members act according to the decisions. We should study more ways of further enlivening the practice of the committee system at all levels.

A matter that can be further studied is the division of work between the centers and the EC and an agreement on internal procedures. Ways of responding promptly to problems that crop up should also be devised.

5) Basing and Security

All centers of leadership from the regional to the district level maintain offices. Many of the district committee centers' offices are mobile because of the need for close and immediate supervision of the forces that they lead. These mobile offices should strike a balance between the need to station itself for certain periods to be able to attend to office work and the need to be mobile to attend to other administrative tasks.

Stationary offices should have clear plans for regularly going down to the units and forces under them and improving administrative work.

Whether mobile or stationary, every center should undertake active intelligence and counterintelligence work to secure itself and its activities.

Even mobile centers should take active measures to prepare the area where it would stay most of the time.

Many small but important meetings are also held in offices.

6) Communication and transport

In the main, communication and transport work is well attended to. Mainly, we used the radio for communication. Secondly, we used couriers selected from the ranks of mass activists and Party elements in the localities and the people's army for internal communication. In the white areas it is the courier system that is used. In all areas there are units for communications and transport.

7) Reporting

All units and organs of the Party submit reports to their respective higher organs. There are regular and comprehensive reports and there are also special ones.

The majority of cadres at all levels know how to make quantitative reports, especially if there are ready forms to fill up. But cadres are not so used to making qualitative reports, especially those presenting problems and solutions. The majority of cadres find it difficult to make comprehensive narrative reports.

Even in making quantitative reports, there are many instances when counting is not accurate; and reports arrive late. There are also some units that do not send in reports and make their report only during meetings. Financial reports are relatively difficult to make and they occupy people. Ways should be devised to ensure and facilitate the making of such reports.

b. Ideology

The Party performs its tasks in the ideological field. Party courses continue to be conducted and their content practiced. Marxist works and texts continue to be made available for individual reading and study. Criticism and self-criticism continue to be part of the regular style of work. There are efforts to make a concrete analysis of the concrete conditions of Bicol and its various parts. Party documents and reading materials continue to be reproduced. The

Party in the region continues to assess and sum up its practice and experience.

1) Education

The percentage of those who have taken the basic Party course (BKP) remains high. The Party ensures that all full members who work fulltime have taken the course. Major problems in this regard are in monitoring the quality of instruction. The key to solving this problem is having a machinery for it. Aside from BKP, there were study and review sessions on the Special Course on Tactical Leadership, Basic Course for Cadres and Members of the Party and Basic Course for Officers. Measures taken in this regard are part of the overall program for consolidation.

Meetings of collectives at all levels conduct studies on issues, documents and other issuances from higher organs. Some study sessions take the character of refresher courses.

We must ensure that documents are received promptly, that these are reproduced in sufficient numbers promptly and that these are indeed distributed. Under the present circumstances that many documents go through informal channels, we must ascertain the status of documents received and who should be allowed to read them.

Enough copies of the texts for formal courses should be reproduced. The English texts of materials received should be competently translated into Pilipino.

The practice of collectively studying important articles in Ang Bayan should be revived at all levels. The final text of the Five Year Summing Up of the Revolutionary Movement in Bicol (1981-1985) must be studied as well as the Ten Year Experience in Bicol (1970-1980).

2) Individual Readings

Individuals read Marxist and other works on their own. It must be ensured that readings are easy to understand and, if in English, these are translated into Pilipino. The steady supply of newspapers to offices must be ensured. We must make sure that every collective reads newspapers.

3) Criticism and Self-Criticism

Criticism and self-criticism continue to be practiced in regular meetings. There are also CSC sessions which take place outside of meetings. It is best if the CSC is conducted after a unit has summed up and assessed its work. This will ensure that the CSC focuses on the weaknesses and failures in the performance of the work.

To ensure that CSC is conducted, collectives must be able to hold meetings. Criticism sessions should have clear results such that for instance when conducted between a higher and lower organ it should result in a smoother flow of work. Criticism should always be put in context.

There is CSC in the offices between staffers and leaders. In offices, CSC must be held regularly so that criticisms are *not bottled up* and CSC sessions do not just become coping mechanisms. Criticism spread through the grapevine in the form of gossip must be avoided. Criticism must be presented properly and those criticized must be present to give their side. A CSC session can be lively if it is held regularly, if criticisms are placed in their proper context and if it is done as soon as possible.

4) Social Investigation

Social investigation is important in setting the strategy and tactics for an area. Social investigation means concrete analysis of concrete conditions. There is a social investigation report for Bicol ratified by the regional committee but this was made way back in 1985. This must be elaborated on and updated. Other social investigations being conducted must be continued. We must support and assist the units conducting research for these. The resolutions on social investigation passed by the Second Conference in 1986 must be implemented. ●

(Translation from the original in Pilipino)

THE POLITICAL-MILITARY CAMPAIGN PLAN FOR BICOL IN 1990-91

DIRECTIVE OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE BICOL REGIONAL PARTY COMMITTEE
TO REGIONAL STAFF, FRONT AND WHITE AREA COMMITTEES AND UNITS,
DISTRICT COMMITTEES AND UNITS, OPERATIONAL COMMAND,
AND COMPANY COMMITTEES AND STAFF
MAY 1990

We shall launch a regional politico-military campaign next month. This campaign shall constitute our main political and military efforts in this period. We shall attempt to seize the rare opportunity presented in the wake of the December 1989 coup for us to rapidly and significantly advance the revolution and weaken reaction.

The Party made the assessment that after the coup, another rare opportunity exists for the revolutionary forces to seize in order for them to achieve a rapid and significant advance in the revolution and a weakening of reaction.

The national crisis took a sudden turn for the worse. Even if the U.S.-Aquino regime were able to maintain its rule, it cannot stop the worsening of the situation and it can succeed only in further isolating itself from the masses.

There is no solution in sight for the economic crisis which is characterized simultaneously by a financial crisis and a slowdown in production and commerce. The Aquino regime expects to control inflation and stop the continuing decline of production through domestic and foreign borrowing and through official development aid from the capitalist countries.

But the crisis runs deep. Any temporary remedy is immediately nullified by the fundamental factors that are the very motor for the financial and production crisis. Even aid expected from abroad is without certainty and, if at all

forthcoming, is bound to be rife with self-serving conditions for further benefiting the donors.

There will again be a new round of increases in the price of oil and basic necessities such as rice, tuition fees, etc. This will be another hard blow on the people who are already insufferably poverty stricken. This could trigger widespread and massive political and economic protests by the people. It is possible for us to push for widespread and strong mass protests on economic and political issues.

The intense disorder and conflict among the reactionary forces and the military continues. There is the constant threat of a bigger coup d'etat which if realized will certainly weaken the entire rule of the reactionary classes. This favors the advance of the people's struggle, especially the armed struggle. The weakening of the reactionary armed forces provides an opportunity for the NPA to boost its arms and troop strength and to dismantle a large number of CAFGUs (civilian armed forces geographical units) and other Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) personnel.

A trend towards a reimposition of a fascist dictatorship is clear. The contention among the different factions of the ruling classes is centered precisely on the issue of methods of rule that can effectively contain the crisis and the revolution and of who should wield the reins of power. Whichever faction holds power and imposes a fascist dictatorship will certainly deepen the pit into which the ruling system will be sunk as was the Marcos fascist dictatorship. It will again "block the path to peaceful change" so desired by reformists. Although there may be a temporary lull in the people's open protests, there is bound to be a resurgence of ever more determined and intense general resistance.

During the December 1989 coup attempt, U.S. interference in our country's affairs and the extent and depth of U.S. relationship with the factions of the ruling classes were thoroughly exposed. As a result, the question of national sovereignty once again came to the fore, especially because the time came for the renegotiation of the U.S.-R.P. military bases agreement. The patriotic stand grew stronger among the people for the removal of the U.S. military bases and against U.S. interference and manipulation. As the national question gains more attention, the influence of the revolutionary movement increases. The conditions are ripe for building a powerful patriotic movement

to stop the scheme of the U.S. and the reactionary forces to prolong the existence of the U.S. military bases, to interfere in our country's internal affairs and to dominate our economy.

The nation is becoming polarized on the issue of agrarian reform. The latest developments on the Marubeni and Abad cases have exposed the failure of Aquino's land reform and the gross maneuvers of the landlords to frustrate the demands of the peasants for land. There is no other way for the peasants to achieve genuine land reform except for them to rely on themselves in fighting for possession of the land. This demonstrates the correctness of the revolutionary agrarian reform program implemented by the revolutionary movement. This situation will further aggravate the political crisis in the country.

Under these conditions, the U.S.-Aquino regime is pursuing its brutal campaign of "counterinsurgency" under the AFP's Oplan Lambat-Bitag with the vain objective of crushing the revolutionary movement before 1992.

Since 1987, the reactionary armed forces have been launching the SOTs (special operations teams) in some areas in the region, and these are now being launched in Camarines Sur. In other parts of Bicol, including our area, the PC-INP and Scout Rangers are vigorously conducting their own campaigns of gradual constriction.

The AFP military campaigns, especially those of the SOT which is characterized by forced mass evacuation, kidnappings and extrajudicial killings, bombings, terrorism, harassment and other forms of brutality, inflict untold hardships on the masses. These military campaigns lead to forced recruitment into the CAFGUs, rape, and temporary displacement of the mass organizations, and impede revolutionary activities within the affected areas.

These past few years, we launched countercampaigns against the enemy's LIC-SOTs and strategy of gradual constriction. The first was in 1987 and this was followed by another in 1988-1989. These countercampaigns were generally successful in causing disarray in the enemy's ranks, in delaying their advance and in making the recruitment and maintenance of the CAFGU and vigilantes difficult. These sustained the fighting spirit of the masses and the people's army, caused the isolation of the enemy politically and inflicted losses in personnel, equipment and arms on the enemy while strengthening our own ranks.

Even if some parts of our forces, especially those in the mass movement in the localities, incurred some casualties, we preserved our forces in the main. It has become more evident that the enemy is not capable of achieving its objective of crushing the revolutionary movement within the period it has set for itself or even beyond. Its prospects are becoming dimmer especially because the AFP ranks and their command structures are beset by internal weaknesses.

Nevertheless, the AFP are still kicking. The military operations that they are capable of launching against us still threaten destruction on our ranks. Thus, if we do not actively and consistently make our counterattacks, we are bound to suffer great casualties that would stop our advance.

We must therefore launch countercampaigns to frustrate the enemy's attacks and weaken him in the process. Our immediate task is to completely dismantle the CAFGU units in key areas, wrest back areas lost to enemy control and lay the foundation for regaining the momentum of revolutionary work there. We expect that our successful countercampaigns would also make it much more difficult for the enemy to form CAFGU and vigilante groups and would boost the strength of the people's army in arms and logistics.

The Politico-Military Campaign

It is obvious why our present campaign should have a politico-military character. In the first place there are the major political issues and struggles, such as those discussed above, that we have to confront and win. The struggles around these issues, especially if these erupt simultaneously and massive mobilizations are undertaken, will definitely have a strong bearing on the development of the political and military situation. We must therefore combine the propaganda, education, organizing and mobilization campaigns with the military campaign in order to respond to the urgent political tasks of the day.

There is also a great political objective to be achieved, particularly in areas which we must recover from the enemy. There is the outstanding military task of destroying the enemy forces holding these areas in their clutches. However, the wholesale dismantling of these forces entail not only military but also political means.

We must also link our military operations firmly with political objectives.

Particular Objectives of the Campaign

Our general objective is to seize the rare opportunity at present in order to rapidly advance the revolution. We shall carry out this objective within a twin context: first, within the context of confronting and frustrating the enemy's "counterinsurgency" campaign and second, within the context of continuing to reach and to mobilize the biggest number of the masses and thereby to create a broad and strong movement for liberation and democracy.

Towards this end, our present campaign shall have the following objectives:

1. Stop, upset and weaken the enemy's campaign in our areas;
2. Continue to increase the pressure on the CAFGUs in order to demoralize many of them and encourage them to leave or defect to our side;
3. Create the conditions for loosening the enemy's control over CAFGU/SOT areas and pave the way for the recovery of the mass movement and the continuation of base-building in these areas.
4. Organize and mobilize the masses on political issues and against the enemy's "counterinsurgency" drive in order to revitalize the mass movement;
5. Raise understanding by the Party, the people's army and the masses of the enemy's "counterinsurgency" drive and other current issues;
6. Inflict damage on enemy troops, equipment and morale; and
7. Produce arms, logistics and materiel for the people's army.

With the achievement of these objectives and the accumulated results of our previous campaigns, we expect to create the conditions for boosting the all-round strength of our forces, especially in the localities.

The Military Campaign

Our military campaign will consist mainly of a combination of attritive and annihilative operations.

All units of the people's army shall participate in it. Guerrilla companies and platoons shall take charge of annihilative operations while smaller units shall take charge of widespread and intensive attritive operations throughout the region.

We shall implement the policy of not sparing any enemy incursion into our areas from attritive blows, at the minimum, and annihilative blows, at the maximum. Let us boldly use such tested attritive tactics as sniping,

harassment, sparrow operations, arm confiscation by the masses and activists, and checkpoints; as well as such new ones as sabotage of target military personnel and equipment or installations.

Let us also use the campaign to position our propaganda units and, when already positioned, to launch them for operations of which they are capable.

Related to our objective of dismantling the CAFGUs, we must take advantage of weaknesses resulting from forced recruitment, rifts within the military establishment and discrimination from regular troops. By punishing hardcore CAFGU bad elements and by doing political work among CAFGU ranks, we can undermine troop morale, increase distrust within their ranks and induce mass desertion from the military service, especially among the CAFGUs.

At every opportunity, we shall continue the tactics of infiltrating CAFGU ranks while widely encouraging disaffected elements among them to run off with their arms.

We shall launch annihilative operations at every occasion and point at which the enemy is weak and vulnerable to our concentrated unit. Tactical offensives shall be the main stress of big fighting units and shall also be the main content of preparations by territorial units.

Our efforts to launch successful tactical offensives shall cover multiple fronts. We shall employ the widest areas of maneuver for our fighting units and use these to our advantage for attaining flexibility and initiative against the enemy. Tactical commands shall be set up in areas of operations and in units which shall be concentrated to strike at the enemy.

The Regional Operational Command (ROC) shall ensure that the main fighting unit it commands is in a position to carry out the military orders. Simultaneously, it shall pay attention to deploying military support services for the campaign. The military campaign shall proceed while services related to the general consolidation of the people's army continue to be undertaken.

While stress is on hitting regular enemy troops and the CAFGUs, we must also target personages, military or civilian, who have been verified as active participants in "counterinsurgency". This is to further weaken the enemy's campaign generally and to preempt other reactionaries from participating in it. Specific targets have already been assigned to each area and there should be rigorous implementation of the standing order.

We shall also carry out the policy of promptly hitting CAFGU, vigilante and fanatical sect organizers verified to have been deliberately brought in from outside the region by the enemy.

The Political Campaign

The political campaign shall include particular mass campaigns, including those which shall be principally launched by the forces in the white areas.

These shall include campaigns of propaganda, education, organizing and mobilization on the various issues identified above. The objective is to reach as many of the masses as possible and to muster a stronger force for a higher level of struggle in the future. Another objective of some campaigns shall be to support the political and military needs of the countryside.

Let us vigorously advance the propaganda-education campaign. In general, aside from propaganda and education on such specific issues as the U.S. bases, agrarian reform, sectoral issues, culture and militarization, we must also launch mainly illegal campaigns of propaganda and education to promote among the full-time and local cadres the study of the nature of the enemy's "counterinsurgency" campaign and our own countermeasures. We must also promote the study of the national and regional situation and the summings-up of the 1988-89 anti-LIC campaign.

We should continue to circulate *Silyab* and consciously produce leaflets to broadcast particular issues that should be explained to the masses. We should revive "Operation wall posters, wall-painting and streamers". Aside from these, we should continue to use such other forms as house-to-house visits, cultural performances, mass meetings, etc. to bring our stand and our calls to the biggest number of people.

We must directly focus our propaganda offensive on neutralizing and dismantling the CAFGUs. We must broadcast our amnesty program for CAFGU members who have not committed major crimes against the people and revolution. They can be reached through their relatives and friends and through direct contact; open letters, written and taped testimonies of CAFGU members who have previously surrendered to us may also be used.

As long as we continuously and actively conduct propaganda and education, we shall be able to expand the political influence of the revolution

among those whom our propaganda has reached and to begin the process of reaching out to new forces.

We must mobilize the biggest number of the people in protests and struggles involving basic issues. In the countryside particularly, we must advance the campaign against militarization and military abuses by intensifying the various forms of actions against the military.

We must continue to advance the campaign for agrarian revolution. The coverage of our secret and open campaign to reduce land rent shall be further extended. We should have the capacity to launch this campaign on the district or SMS level in the districts where we can use such a mechanism as the small conference of key cadres for setting the target, planning, coordination and checkup.

In areas where the certificates of land transfer (CLT) have been distributed in connection with the government's "comprehensive land reform program" (CARP), it is to the interest of the peasants to push the campaign of refusing to pay the amortization, especially because crop prices are low and the cost of production is high.

We should actively reject the development projects of the reactionary regime while taking advantage of some for advancing the immediate and long-term interest of the revolution and the people.

In the cities, sectoral issues can be raised; and new and additional forces should be drawn in. Multisectoral actions can be launched on such issues as U.S. bases, agrarian reform and human rights with the broad participation of various sectors.

The different mass campaign machineries would reinforce each other. Functioning and relatively more advanced organizations and alliances in the cities can help in setting up those for the countryside, especially the machinery for the antimilitarization campaign. However, the primary responsibility for setting up this machinery lies the territorial leading Party committees in the countryside, with support from the cities.

Let us mobilize the masses for the military campaign and the other mass campaigns in the countryside, especially those with the objective of strengthening the mass organizations and building the organs of political power.

Because the enemy offensive continues, we must prepare against its most vicious measures, such as forced mass evacuation which aims to empty the barrios of people. Pay attention, first, to exposed elements who are in danger of being arrested or killed. Pay attention also to the remaining majority of the barrio people who are in danger of being forced to leave their homes and made to live in evacuation centers.

Elements hotly pursued by the enemy can be transferred to other areas and given political work. There should be clear provisions for their withdrawal and plans with regard to processing them for transfer. There should also be consideration of the disposition and economic plan for their family.

Most of those who shall be forced to evacuate can launch open actions to demand compensation for the devastation of their livelihood and property and to demand immediate return to their land. Aside from this and as a secondary demand, they can push for social services at their place of evacuation. Services given by progressive forces in the cities may help but should not deter the united action of the masses to push for just demands.

Consolidation Work and Our Campaign

We shall launch our campaign still within the context of our major stress of comprehensively consolidating the Party, the people's army and revolutionary mass movement. Therefore, it should not impede but should even accelerate our consolidation campaign.

At the level of each particular task whether in the campaign or in consolidation work, the activities competing for both forces and time shall be decided on a case-to-case basis. Tactical priorities or sequence of implementation should be based on a consideration of the actual weight and implication of each task.

Another important matter is providing the logistical requirements of the campaign. On the whole, we will follow the line of making the campaign solve its logistical requirements in its own course. Therefore, all command centers for the campaign should set provisions for the logistical requirements of the campaign within their areas. Particular campaigns also may be launched for producing financial and logistical needs.

Nevertheless, we should strive to launch the campaign with the minimum of logistics but at the same time achieve substantial results. Let us emphasize

among our Red fighters and the masses in the revolutionary movement the spirit of creativity and self-sacrifice, which have been their mark and strength from the beginning.

Moves in the Event of a Coup d'Etat and Imposition of Martial Law

In the course of the campaign, we must be prepared against another coup attempt and the imposition of martial law by whichever ruling class faction gains the upper hand. Should this occur, our general military line is to intensify our military operations to further weaken the reactionary armed forces. This is apart from the political measure of seizing the opportunity in order to further weaken the enemy and to strengthen ourselves. We must adjust to and persevere in open and legal struggles while at the same time strengthen the underground movement and systematically withdraw and redeploy the forces vulnerable to enemy attack. The people's current demands in this regard must be raised and a widespread propaganda-education campaign against martial law must be launched. We must expose the rottenness of all the factions of the reactionary armed forces — whether it be the Ramos, Enrile, Marcos or Aquino faction. We must carry the call to resist and bring down the fascist dictatorship, advance the people's war and set up the democratic people's government. The education-propaganda campaign may take the form of mass meetings, OD-OP (operation wall posters and graffiti), leafleteering, radio ambush and alternative radio meetings.

In connection with the military policy and measures in the event of a coup d'etat, all units should give emphasis to the task of launching small and big military operations of an attritive or annihilative character.

Timely actions should be undertaken to fully exploit the rare opportunity. In case of an imposition of martial law, this must also be promptly answered by military actions in order to frustrate the enemy's scheme of creating a climate of fear among the people.

Phases of the Campaign

The campaign shall have three phases. The first is preparatory, the second is the initial annihilative phase and last is the phase of intensification.

At the preparatory phase, we shall attend to the task of producing such requirements of the campaign as finance, logistics, medical needs,

propaganda and education materials; and propaganda and education materials shall already be disseminated throughout the Party and the people's army. Units to be deployed shall be chosen and constituted according to each type of mission; the necessary training shall be conducted. The intelligence network shall be laid; tactical commands in the territories, constituted; and attritive strikes shall commence.

At the second phase, there shall be a prop-ed sweep and the machinery for the revolutionary mass campaign shall be laid; mobilizations shall be launched while the intelligence network is being laid and attritive strikes with some initial annihilative actions are in full swing.

At third phase, propaganda shall be more militant, especially in the countryside which shall focus on dismantling the CAFGU and weakening the enemy. There shall be more frequent and more intensive attritive and annihilative strikes, including the punishment of rabid paramilitary elements and their supporters while in the mass movement the achievements of the first two stages are consolidated and issues that arise from developments in the situation continue to be advanced.

At the end of the campaign, we shall start to consolidate the victories achieved by summing these up and drawing up new tasks. ●

(Translation from the original in Pilipino)

CORRECTING THE CONCEPT OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT

RESOLUTION OF THE TENTH PLENUM
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

(With adjustments in the formulation as contained in the EC-CC Memorandum dated March 1993.)

1. After more than two decades of efforts to broaden the National Democratic Front (NDF) as a formal national united front organization, the NDF continues to consist only of the Party and the forces that it directly leads and influences and that, in various degrees, recognize and adhere to the line of the people's democratic revolution or the two-stage revolution.

The bulk of our relations with other political forces are in the legal sphere or are at local levels in the countryside. And those with whom we relate secretly are generally not ready to put themselves within the NDF, although at certain times they agree to cooperate with us in some particular activities or consult with us on important political issues.

This situation reflects the general level of development of the revolutionary movement, the strength established by the basic alliance of the working class and the peasantry to effectively draw the other motive forces to the revolutionary cause, and also the political character and standpoint of other political forces we relate with.

2. Although striving to form the NDF — with the participation not only of the organizations led and influenced by the Party — was correct, it has taken us very long to make the necessary adjustments even when it had become very clear that this could not yet be achieved. The formal building of the NDF itself was delayed.

The erroneous idea also emerged that NDF building could be meaningful only if other forces are strongly represented and, worse, to achieve this, the NDF program must be diluted or laid aside or the Party leadership must be liquidated under the illusion that such a course would encourage other political forces, which are essentially reformist and parliamentarist rather than revolutionary, to join the NDF.

3. In the early years of the 1980s the wrong concepts regarding the united front were encouraged by tactics aimed at forcing a decisive victory over the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship (USMD). These tactics upheld the following:

- general stress on the building of a broad revolutionary coalition (NRUF) encompassing the "liberal democrats" (LDs) and the "left wing of the bourgeois reformists (BRs)" based on the claim or view that the development of the basic worker-peasant alliance had run too far ahead and broad alliance work must catch up with it, and that it was therefore necessary to put the heavier stress on the latter;

- "neutralizing" the "bourgeois-reformist" bloc by drawing its "left wing" to the side of the revolution and isolating its "right wing"; and

- building the NDF as a broad national-democratic coalition within the framework of the NRUF (i.e., encompassing the LDs and the "left-wing of the BRs" and their legitimate interests)

The wish to draw to the side of the NDF the so-called LDs and "left wing" of the anti-Marcos reactionaries resulted in moves to change the program and concept of the NDF, despite the fact that the political groups and forces that were targeted were still very much parliamentarist and reformist and many of them, after the fall of Marcos, would expose their counterrevolutionary character.

Following the above concept of the NDF, the program of the *Katipunan* (proposed new name for the NDF) was drawn up in 1982. This program with its dilutions and compromises was opposed by many Party units and cadres and was subsequently laid aside.

Although the draft program of the *Katipunan* was laid aside, the concept of building the NDF as a broad national democratic coalition within the frame of the so-called NRUF persisted.

Despite the unnecessary dilution and compromises on the NDF program, the dominant feature of the tactics of forcing a "decisive revolutionary victory

over the USMD" was the overestimation of the capability of the revolution to put under revolutionary leadership the majority of the people, the middle forces, the LDs and the so-called left wing of the BRs, and the assumption that the entire antidictatorship struggle could be transformed into a comprehensive (anti-imperialist and antifeudal) revolutionary struggle. An outstanding feature of these efforts was the haste in drawing the majority, if not all, of those considered as "positive forces in the struggle against the USMD" to become revolutionary, without regard for the fact that among the so-called positive forces were groups and elements with a basically reactionary character or whose reactionary aspect is strong.

4. After Marcos fell, the concept of quickly drawing the majority of the people to the revolution and, to this end, the building of the NDF as a "broad ND coalition" persisted.

Because of the persistent desire to go beyond the actual level of the development of the revolution, the angling for projects and for the illusory urban insurrection and its attendant obsession of riding on the spontaneous masses and hastily drawing and inciting them towards insurrectionary actions grew strong.

Under the signboard of seeking to get the majority of the people, there was overemphasis on coalition tactics and currying favor with the middle forces and the bourgeois mass media. Populist, social-democratic and bourgeois liberal influences and tendencies grew strong.

Behind the concept of the broad ND coalition, the concept of NDF-building that developed and gradually came to be aggressively pushed was related to the wish of further broadening and positioning the NDF within the broad political struggle of the people by moving farther away from the line of the people's democratic revolution; by adopting a policy of "all alliance and all unity" with the middle forces; by disregarding the concept of Party leadership, the struggle for the independence and initiative of the revolutionary proletariat and the decisive role of the basic alliance; and by opening up to parliamentarist and pacifist ideas and tendencies.

When insurrectionist illusions and projects temporarily held sway in the tactical political plan drawn up in 1990 for the national capital region (NCR) — a result of the usurpation and misrepresentation of the authority of the Party's central leadership by one leading cadre — there were "pol-mil" actions and

efforts not only to force a general paralyzation and bring about an explosion of the situation but also to rapidly position the NDF directly at the center of the broad legal movement as a whole, to build an open and broad anti-imperialist democratic front (AIDF), which the NDF would subsequently join. It was dreamed that the AIDF would serve as the center for a popular uprising. A people's agenda, a further dilution of the NDF program, was to be drawn up as the program of the AIDF and superimposed on the NDF program. This people's agenda was to be adopted as the common program of the NDF and the various groups and political forces ranging from the Left up to the Right.

5. We hereby revoke the earlier concept of the NDF as a broad national democratic coalition, offering and maintaining a framework for the "equal" competition of the old-type and the new-type national democratic forces in the vain hope that such a framework would attract other political forces to participate in the NDF.

No matter how much we dream or how many times we overhaul the NDF program and organizational mechanism and no matter how much we strain to hide the role of the Party (short of actually repudiating it), we will not succeed in drawing into the NDF the middle forces that are not ready to go beyond reformism and decisively throw in their lot with the revolution.

Therefore, it is senseless for us to go ahead of these forces and dilute and make compromises on their behalf on the maximum program of the NDF before there is any significant allied force willing to join the NDF or a broader revolutionary united front and actually asking for changes in the program of the alliance.

There is no sufficient reason for avoiding any reference in the NDF program to the recognition of the leadership of the working class through the Party, especially because the NDF is still composed of forces led and influenced by the Party. Any concept of the united front that removes the right of the revolutionary proletariat and the forces led by it to adhere to the line of the people's democratic revolution is essentially wrong.

The concept of developing a "mixed economy" and suspending indefinitely the socialist revolution and construction and the concept of "pluralism" opposing the dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of a people's democratic dictatorship both violate the line of the people's democratic revolution and should be combated.

The basic forces of the Philippine revolution, especially under present conditions in the country and in the world, can comprehensively strengthen themselves only by consciously supporting the line of the two-stage revolution and the leadership of the revolutionary proletariat. We can neither broaden the united front nor draw in a growing part of the middle forces if the basic forces of the revolution are allowed to be weakened by the pernicious influences of such bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideas and tendencies as revisionism, populism, social-democracy, reformism, pacifism and bourgeois parliamentarism.

6. As the advance detachment of the leading class in the Philippine revolution, the Party has learned lessons from the failure of the Paris Commune, where the proletariat lost power when it laid the question of political authority to an electoral process in which the bourgeoisie and the reactionary forces participated and at that crucial period prevailed. It is the Party, not the NDF, that leads the government, the people's army and the people, even as the NDF is an instrument for facilitating the building of a broader people's consultative council and a democratic people's government whose core of leadership is proletarian.

The Party must know what type of formal or informal united front is acceptable. It should be the type that upholds and propagates the leadership of the working class in the revolution and accomplishes the new democratic and socialist stages of the revolution.

A different type of united front is where nonproletarian entities prevail over the revolutionary party and transform the united front into a party that supersedes or puts aside the working class party. In such a united front, petty bourgeois and middle bourgeois organizations and individuals first surrounds and overwhelms the working class party and eventually gives way to the dominance of the big bourgeoisie.

7. Even as the NDF remains to be constituted by none other than the Party and the forces that it directly leads and influences, the need for a formal united front organization is not diminished.

The NDF, as the most consolidated part of the united front, should serve as an organizational anchor for further broadening the united front through the establishment of various types of relations — bilateral, multilateral, legal,

illegal, consultative, project-to-project — with other progressive social strata and classes.

It shall serve the following:

- help to facilitate our work among the middle forces, the national minorities and special groups;

- be an instrument for developing different levels of relations with other political forces;

- stand in representation of the revolutionary movement in talks with the GRP;

- be an instrument to pave the way for the local organs of political power under Party leadership;

- be a frame for coordination and cooperation among clandestine national democratic mass organizations;

- be a frame for the revolutionary movement in addressing the entire people;

- be a frame for diplomatic work;

- serve as coordinator of multisectoral campaigns;

- be a frame for facilitating direct political organizing and education among the people;

- be a frame for training mass activists.

8. The NDF is the most consolidated part of the national united front composed of the basic revolutionary forces (workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie). Individuals from the petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie may be admitted on a case-to-case basis, depending upon their willingness and track record in word and deed and provided they represent significant political trends or organizations that are not ready to join the NDF.

The NDF is a distinctive block within the national united front, upholding the leadership of the working class through the Party and the national-democratic revolution with a socialist perspective.

The NDF is being built not only to further strengthen the allied and cooperating organizations within its frame and the basic revolutionary forces but also essentially to build the broadest possible unity and cooperation with all progressive and democratic forces in order to advance the national democratic revolution towards victory.

The NDF is within the entire structure required for building the national united front. It functions within the national united front in order to set up the various types and levels of relations with other political forces that are not ready to come into the NDF. This clarification is being made to preempt the sectarian tendency of building the NDF only as a united front of the basic revolutionary forces.

9. The entirety of the urban petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie must continuously be reached and drawn to progressively relate with us according to their consciousness and willingness to participate in legal, semilegal and illegal struggles, activities, organizations and relations.

However, we must be rigorously objective in estimating their willingness to participate or support the revolution, especially with regard to the upper section of the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. In this regard, it is important for us to sufficiently build our strength and persist in actively building the strength of the basic revolutionary forces.

In drawing the upper urban petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie to the side of the revolution, it is important for us to unite with them on the basis of common national and democratic interests. At the same time, it is equally important for us to struggle against their vacillations and their attempts to suppress the ideological, political and organizational independence and strengthening of the revolutionary proletariat in order to promote the dominance of petty bourgeois and bourgeois-liberal tendencies and influences over the revolutionary forces.

To be able to give due attention to the work among the middle forces, we must plan our work at the national and intermediate levels, where the bulk of our relations with these forces can be found. In the process of correcting the imbalance between military work and mass work in the countryside, we expect to be able to focus sufficient attention on work in well-populated areas where the middle forces abound.

10. We criticize and revoke the old concept of the NDF with a confederative or a federative character. The concept, to begin with, is wrong and have not been carefully examined. Worse, it sets organizational arrangements and processes that violate the leading role of the proletariat and its Party, put the Party and the NDF on a collision course and violate the principle of independence and initiative of the Party and other allied organizations.

It was the 9th CC Plenum that set the organizational character of the NDF as a confederation. At the same time, it set provisions running counter to the confederative arrangement, like the admission of individual members, voting in the making of decisions and two-thirds majority vote for important decisions.

In 1987, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee decided to build the NDF even only with the participation of the Party and the forces that it directly leads or influences. But despite a subsequent decision to admit other political forces, the confederative character of the alliance that had been set earlier was maintained. The provisions violating the confederative arrangement were also maintained.

The First NDF Congress magnified the problem even more when the provisions violating the confederative or federative character were introduced into the NDF constitution, like higher-lower level relations (as in a unitary organization); no proxy vote; setting of a quorum; and disciplinary actions on "member-organizations".

By decision of the NDF Congress, the Party is subordinated to a confederative center exercising federal powers and, in some instances, unitary powers over it. The NDF was made arrogate unto itself the formal power to subject the Party to decisions that could be made against its will and without its voice because of a provision on quorum and another one on "no-proxy" voting.

Worse, the draft NDF constitution stipulates the equal rights of "member organizations" and individual members.

The concept of the NDF as a federation or confederation came from the mistaken notion that as such an NDF would accelerate the setting up of a broad political center that would stand as the unified command encompassing the majority of the people, including the forces then and now that are reformist and parliamentarist.

According to the tactics of achieving a "decisive victory over the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship," the concept was anchored on an overestimation of the strength of the Party and the revolution and an underestimation of the capability of the anti-Marcos reactionaries as well as of U.S. imperialism to intervene and maneuver within the antidictatorship struggle.

The insurrectionist tendencies that grew after Marcos fell were aimed at building a unified command that would bring the spontaneous masses and

various progressive and positive forces towards a popular uprising. At the same time, these tendencies increasingly played down and relegated to a secondary role the weight and leadership of the revolutionary proletariat and its party; and, oftentimes, even presented them as a negative factor affecting the broadness of the front that was being sought.

Even then, such erroneous concept of the NDF already encouraged supraclass populism although in later years this was to be more systematically used by some elements within and outside the Party to aggressively push populism, popdemism, social-democracy, bourgeois liberalism, and lately, under the influence of Gorbachovism, an anti-Party and anticommunist line.

11. We hereby abandon the concept of the NDF as a political federation through which the Party can be dominated by nonproletarian entities, even if such entities have Party groups within. Such a concept undermines the leadership of the working class presently in the new-democratic stage and subsequently in the socialist stage of the Philippine revolution.

It suffices that the NDF be an alliance or a united front organization operating on a confederal, consultative and consensual basis. It is wrong to build it as a federation whose constitution is further complicated by the introduction of rules and processes of a unitary organization arching over organizations and individuals equally considered as members with equal rights.

Within the NDF as an alliance or united front, the independence and initiative of the Party must be insured. It is wrong for the vanguard party of the proletariat to enter into any arrangement that limits or disregards the Party's independence and initiative. In this connection, the Party should be regarded as an allied or cooperating organization within the NDF, instead of a member-organization of a federation.

If the Party is regarded as an ordinary member-organization of a federation, there is no guarantee that the leadership of the working class will prevail over that of the bourgeoisie. The Party can be outvoted by the nonproletarian entities in a federation.

The united front is properly a frame for consultation and consensus among allied forces. It is not a frame for voting. It is a weapon wielded by the Party and is not a formal arrangement for dominating the Party and the working class and under which they can be outvoted, tied and chopped off.

The NDF as it is currently composed is not a full blown horizontal and vertical organization. It is a confederal, consultative and consensual alliance of organizations within the frame of the national democratic struggle. The view that the NDF does not only have a coordinative role but has fullblown powers of leadership over its member organization is wrong.

The correct way of building the NDF is to build the component or allied organizations (particularly those that are still weak) and afterwards put up at various levels the councils of representatives of the allied or cooperating organizations and possibly some prominent representatives from significant trends and organizations which are not prepared to come into the fold of the NDF.

12. Whether intended or unintended, the building of the NDF as a federation, as demonstrated by our concrete experience, has led to the following:

a. attempts to present the NDF, instead of the working class and its Party, as the center of the Philippine revolution;

b. the presentation of the current revolution as a mere recycling of the old liberal revolution without the leadership of the proletariat and without a socialist perspective (supposedly for the purpose of attracting the middle forces and the national bourgeoisie);

c. the issue of whether the NDF is under the centralism of the Party or vice-versa;

d. the opening for nonproletarian elements to use the name of the NDF in order to attack such basic principles of the Party as the vanguard role of the proletariat, democratic centralism and socialism;

e. the demand that the Party and all the so-called member organizations that were previously independent subject themselves to the authority of the NDF leadership;

f. the absorption of cadres and members of the Party into the administrative structure of the NDF under the signboard of "regularization" and the use of the authority of the NDF to undertake the redeployment of Party cadres in violation of the processes of the appropriate committees of the Party, to the detriment of mass work and Party building which are urgently in need of cadres and members.

What have been enumerated are but a few instances of putting the NDF as a federation on a collision course with the Party or of creating the NDF as a channel for limiting the Party.

13. Everything in the decision of the 9th CC Plenum and the subsequent decisions of the Political Bureau that runs counter to the leading role of the working class through the Party, the two-stage revolution and the principle of independence and initiative of the Party in a united front have been criticized and revoked by the 10th CC Plenum.

14. All Party members, especially those directly involved in the work of the united front, should seriously study the principles of the united front according to the teachings of the Party since its reestablishment and also the pertinent writings of Mao Zedong. We must undertake a thoroughgoing assessment of our more than 20 years of work in the united front, draw lessons from it and advance on the correct line and method of building the revolutionary united front. ●

(Translation from the Original in Pilipino)

RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTY WITH THE NPA AND THE UNITED FRONT

DIRECTIVE
OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
TO ALL UNITS AND MEMBERS OF THE PARTY
AUGUST 1992

The Communist Party of the Philippines is the advanced detachment of the proletariat, which is the leading class in the Philippine revolution.

The vanguard role of the proletariat is absolutely necessary in order to carry out the Philippine revolution in two distinct but continuous stages: new democratic and socialist.

By virtue of its two-stage line of development under the class leadership of the proletariat, the Philippine revolution clearly belongs to the same category as the Soviet, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, Cuban and similar revolutions and not to that of revolutions aimed at mere decolonization towards a neocolonial compromise or at democratization that is without genuine proletarian leadership and therefore ends within the confines of bourgeois rule.

If the proletariat and its revolutionary party are not in the lead, then all efforts at social revolution in a country like the Philippines fall within a vicious circle dominated by the joint class dictatorship of the big bourgeoisie and the landlord class, even as some unremoulded petty bourgeois elements pose as the champions of democracy and social reform and appear to be independent of the exploiting classes in viciously opposing the vanguard role of the proletariat and its revolutionary party.

The Filipino people have three instruments for carrying out the two-stage Philippine revolution: first, the Communist Party of the Philippines as the

advanced detachment of the proletarian leading class; second, the New People's Army (NPA) and third, the united front, whether there is a formal united front organization or not.

How are these weapons of the people related to each other? Representing the leading class, the Party wields the armed struggle and the united front as two weapons in the people's democratic revolution.

Party cadres and members are first of all personnel of the Party when they work in the field of armed struggle or united front. They are duty-bound to pursue and realize the general line of the people's democratic revolution set by the Party and follow the discipline of the Party.

The revolutionary class leadership of the proletariat through the Party has to be stressed time and time again because there are certain elements who wish to evade their obligations and responsibilities as Party cadres and members by asserting the "independence" and "separateness" of either the NPA or the National Democratic Front (NDF)

The same has to be clarified among cadres and members of the Party in the New People's Army in the face of the emergence of some erroneous concepts regarding a separate machinery and premature verticalization of the structure and flow of command within the people's army, simultaneous to the tendency of weakening the leadership of the corresponding Party committee or organ.

From outside the Party, there are the imperialists, revisionists and anticommunist petty bourgeois elements who keep on trying to undermine the conviction of Party cadres and members with regard to the vanguard role of the proletariat, democratic centralism and the socialist future of the Philippine revolution.

The Relationship Between the Party and the NPA

The Party has absolute leadership over the New People's Army. Without this principle clearly and firmly held, then the command of the NPA at every level is liable to fall into the trap of the purely military viewpoint.

The revolutionary politics of the proletariat, represented by the Party, must be in command of the NPA. The Party is the one holding the gun from whose barrel political power grows in the people's democratic revolution.

It is wrong to speak of the separateness and independence of the NPA as if the Party leadership were something dispensable. The Party and the NPA have distinct organizations and functions but they are inseparable and interdependent, with the Party playing the principal role and the NPA the secondary role in this relationship.

The entire Party is at the head of the entire NPA. At every level, from the national level downward, the Party committee provides the political leadership to the command of the NPA.

The Central Committee directly and through its Military Commission leads the National Operational Command of the NPA (NOC); the interregional Party committee, the Interregional Operational Command; the regional Party committee, the regional operational command; the guerrilla front Party committee, the guerrilla front command; and so on.

At no level should the Party leading committee be identical with the command of the NPA for two reasons:

1. The Party leading committee is the comprehensive organ for all matters within and outside the NPA; and
2. The Party leading committee must not be narrowed down to military concerns.

While being at the head of the NPA, the Party is at the same time at the core of the NPA.

At every command level, from the company upward, there is a Party committee. At the level of the NOC/NPA, there is the Political Department to promote ideological and political work within the NPA and in the localities and to insure that there is Party building at the basic level and upward in the NPA and in the localities.

At every command level and in every unit of the NPA, there is dual leadership. The commander is in charge of military command and administration. The political commissar or political officer is in charge of the ideological and political work. The military commander and political officer or commissar must consult with each other and work together in order to achieve combined political and military objectives.

In an emergency military situation in which neither consultations between military commander and political officer nor a deliberative meeting of the entire NPA unit is possible, the military commander assumes full responsibility.

The Party within the NPA, from the branch level to the Party committees at higher levels of the NPA, must do political work among the Red fighters as well as see to it that the NPA units do political work among the people in the localities.

In the localities where units of the NPA have just begun conducting mass work, the Party within the NPA is superior to the Party in such localities for the obvious reason that the former has prior knowledge and experience and better access to the higher levels of the Party. The situation of the Party in the localities may also be fluid because of enemy campaigns.

But in due time, as the Party in the localities gains more knowledge and experience, this becomes a stable force and develops direct relations with higher levels of the Party which are defined according to the territorial scope of jurisdiction.

In fact, NPA units can operate most effectively in any locality through the cooperation of the Party in the NPA and the Party in the localities, besides the close relations of the NPA units with the people and the local organs of political power.

Relationship of the Party and the United Front

To carry out the united front policy and wield the united front as its weapon, the Party may or may not build any formal united front organization.

What is important is that the Party pursues a revolutionary class line involving the following: working class leadership, basic alliance of the working class and peasantry, the alliance of such basic forces as the toiling masses and the urban petty bourgeoisie, the alliance of such positive forces as the basic forces and the national bourgeoisie, alliance with sections of the reactionary classes and isolation and destruction of the enemy.

With regard to the basic alliance of the working class and peasantry, it has sufficed for the Party to lead and coordinate the organizations of the working class and peasantry. And yet this basic alliance is the foundation of the national united front.

Without any formal united front organization, the Party and the NPA have been able to relate to individuals and organizations belonging to the urban petty bourgeoisie and enlightened sections of the reactionary classes since the start of the armed struggle in 1969.

There have been multisectoral and issue-oriented legal alliances combining the toiling masses with the urban petty bourgeoisie and sometimes with the national bourgeoisie or even with sections of the reactionary classes. In these alliances, the Party has not been a formally recognized part but Party cadres and members have worked in them.

These alliances have strengths and weaknesses arising from or related to their legal status. They are strong in legally promoting the national democratic line but they are weak because they are vulnerable to the coercive power of the *reactionary state*.

Since 1973, the National Democratic Front (NDF) has been conceived of as the most comprehensive formal united front organization under working class leadership, along the line of new democratic revolution, and for armed struggle.

The principles of the united front were drawn mainly from a study of Philippine, Chinese and Vietnamese experiences and writings. The works of Mao Zedong were definitely the richest source of ideas. But in addition to learning from Philippine experience in the building of formal united front organizations, the NDF was considered most akin to the South Vietnam National Liberation Front as a foreign example.

In a certain effort to build the NDF recently as a "federation" or "confederation", a number of principles of the united front have been violated in the following manner:

1. The working class leadership, the line of the new democratic revolution and the socialist perspective have been liquidated. What is set forth as the ultimate goal of the revolution is the building of a "national democratic society" upon the seizure of political power. Thus, the program is to recycle the old democratic revolution. The working class is reduced to carrying the sedan chair for the bourgeoisie.

2. The Party is reduced to being a "member-organization" subject to voting and being outvoted by a preponderance of nonproletarian member-organizations, mostly petty-bourgeois even if there are Party groups within them. The principles of working class leadership through the Party and the independence and initiative of the Party are contravened.

3. Under the guise of liberating the NDF from the "centralism" of the Party and making the NDF separate and independent of the Party, certain elements

wish to subordinate the proletariat and its party to the NDF and regard the NDF as the center of the Philippine revolution. These elements include some Party members and members of NDF "member-organizations" as well as individuals who are not at all members of any NDF "member-organization" but are regarded as direct individual members of the NDF.

If the Party is to build the NDF as a formal united front organization, its Program and Constitution have to be in accordance with the following:

1. The working class leadership and the two-stage line of development of the Philippine revolution must be reaffirmed.

2. The concept of "federation" or "confederation" has to be discarded. The organizations coming together under the rubric of the National Democratic Front must be allied or cooperating organizations and not member-organizations. They must enjoy independence and initiative. Their representatives can confer, consult and agree with each other under the rule of consensus and unanimity.

3. There should be no direct individual members of the NDF who do not belong to any allied or cooperating organization of the NDF. Such allied or cooperating organizations must be strengthened. The only individuals that may be invited to the NDF should be those who represent certain significant trends, sectors and sections of organizations outside of the NDF and who are invited to become members of leading councils at various levels.

4. Any basis for certain elements to claim that the center of the Philippines is no longer the Party but the NDF must be removed from the NDF Draft Program and Constitution. Thus, the basis for putting the Party and the NDF on a collision course or invoking the name of the NDF against the Party is removed.

Relations Among the Party, the NPA and the NDF

Is it the Party or the NDF that leads the NPA? It is the Party. At the same time, it is correct to say in the following sequence that the NPA is the army of the Party, the people's government, the NDF and the entire Filipino people.

What is the relationship of the Party, the NDF and the organs of political power? The Party leads the united front and organs of political power. The NDF cooperates with the Party by paving the way for the organization of the

organs of political power and for the effective functioning of these in various aspects of government.

The Party does not yield political power to any united front organization. The NDF has not been formed to supplant the Party leadership over the organs of political power. Upon the basic completion of the national democratic revolution through the nationwide seizure of political power, the Party will still exercise leadership over the democratic coalition government and the people's democratic state, if we are to carry out the socialist revolution. ●