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Further Intensification of the Fight in India.

V. Chattopadhyaya.

Notwithstanding the strict censorship exercised by the British Government of India and notwithstanding the attempt made in the latest official communiqué of May 17th (circulated in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for India) to produce the impression that there have been signs of improvement during the week, even the news that has been allowed to get through to the British Press and through the correspondenst in India of reactionary French and Italian journals is sufficient to show that the movement is spreading among larger and larger sections of the population. There is an all-round increase in the activities of the District and the Village Congress Committees, of the Workers' Unions, of the Workers' and Peasants' Parties, of the nationalist terrorist organisations, of school and college students and of ex-soldiers of the Indian Army.

The Fight for the Masses — A Fight on Two Fronts

The Congress Committees in various parts of India have taken up a militant attitude since the arrest of the principal Congress leaders. The Government has therefore begun inflicting much severer punishment upon members of the Congress Committee. For instance, among the recent Court Martial sentences passed on 23 persons in Sholapur, are the following sentences: the Secretary of the local Congress Committee to seven years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of 225 Pounds Sterling; the President of the Congress Committee to five years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of 150 Pounds Sterling; seven members to two years' rigorous imprisonment and fines of 75 Pounds Sterling each; nine members to one year's rigorous imprisonment and fines of 37 Pounds 10 shillings each; and four to corporal punishment.

The Salt Campaign has been extended from mere breaches of the Salt Law to the "storming" of salt depots at **Dharasana** and elsewhere. Of the 2,000 Congress volunteers who attempted to capture the salt depot in Dharasana some 500 were arrested, after the police had attacked them with their batons and wounded about 350. Among the arrested is **Mrs. Sarojini Naidu** who was in charge of the Civil Disobedience movement after the arrest of **Gandhi** and **Abbas Tyabli.** She has been succeeded in the leadership by the old **Patel.**

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The two most important events since the beginning of the present revolutionary outburst have centred in Sholapur and Peshawar. The importance of **Sholapur** is that it is a very important industrial centre where the 60,000 workers of the cotton and silk spinning mills have been playing a prominent part in the revolutionary movement. These workers are intimately connected with the peasantry of the surrounding areas and, further, the troops of the **Mahratta** regiments are drawn largely from among these peasants. The revolutionary movement of the workers has produced an effect both among the peasants and among the soldiers, and it is not at all astonishing that the city was in the hands of a committee of workers, peasants and intellectuals for a couple of days. Sholapur is now being governed by very severe martial law.

In Peshawar, Bannu and Kohat, the movement of insurrection is spreading, in spite of martial law, the Seditious Meeting's Act and the numerous arrests of "prominent agitators" undertaken by the police with military support. The Congress Committees have been declared to be unlawful associations. And the revolutionary Youth organisation of the

Punjab, the Naujawan Bharat Sabha, that has taken a very prominent part in the organisation of the movement has been declared illegal in the Peshawar area. An organisation known as the "Red Shirts" bearing the hammer and sickle as their badge has made its appearance in the North of Peshawar and its members drawn mostly from among the poor villagers, and organised in military form with lances as their weapon, are carrying on an active agitation among the masses to overthrow the imperialist Government and establish a Workers and Peasants Government. This Red Shirt organisation is more widespread in the Punjab than is admitted by the imperialist press. Similar organisations exist in Amritsar, Guiranvala, Hoshearpur and other cities, where the Workers & Peasants Party has been engaged for some time in organising the peasantry.

The tribal chiefs on the other side of the North West Frontier, such as the Haji of Turangzai, were invited by the revolutionaries to join the anti-imperialist war. A section of the Johnands, of the Afridis, of the Wasiris, and of the Mahsuds, have organised small armies for the support of the movement in Peshawar. The forces of the Haji of Turangzai were bombed from the air by the Royal Air Force, during which action his son, Bad Shah Gul, was wounded. The tribes in Tochi are up in arms against the British and a lashkar (armed force) attacked the British post of Datta Khel on May 11th, and on May 14th several villages of the Madda Khel which were concerned in the attack were bombed from the air.

The tribes, however, have not taken concerted action because a number of their chiefs are in the pay of the British Government and are doing their best to prevent a general movement of, the North Western tribes in support of the movement in India. But the events in Pesh a war—the mass demonstrations, the fraternising of Hindus and Mohammedans, culminating in the refusal of the Garhwall troops to open fire on the demonstrators, the sympathetic movement of the tribes, the revolutionary ferment among the peasantry and the massacrè perpetrated by the British regiments and 40 bombing of the Royal Air Force—have shaken the power of British imperialism in the most sensitive, the North West Fronthier.

The Sikh ex-soldiers of the Army have been very active among the soldiers and the peasantry throughout the Punjab, under the guidance of the Workers and Peasants Party in Amritsar consisting mostly of Sikhs. In Calcutta and in Rangoon the Sikhs have played a very prominent part in the anti-imperialist demonstrations and in the attacks on the police. The Sikh ex-soldiers in Bengal have an organisation and in conjunction with the terrorists, they organised the attack on the arsenal at Chitagong some four weeks ago. They are reported to have carried off several motor lorry loads of arms and ammunitions for distribution among the peasants of Eastern Bengal.

Owing to a rumour that an Indian who had been run over by a tram had been murdered by the police, a tremendous demonstration in Bombay took place in which 100,000 participated. Another rumour that the Director of the Bank of India in Bombay had taken part in the police attack on the headquarters of the Indian National Congress resulted in thousands storming the Bank; all business was closed, the Stock Exchange suspended its activities and a very severe conflict ensued between the masses and the police when the latter searched the National Congress building, confiscated literature, arrested its President, K. F. Nariman, who is also President of the Bombay Presidency Youth League and closed the Congress building.

The movement is spreading in the Madras Presidency which was comparatively quiet when the campaign started. There have been mass demonstrations following one upon another in the city of Madras and in the latest demonstration the police attacks were met not only with usual shower of stones which have characterised demonstrations in all parts of India, but actually with bombs which wounded several police constables. There have also been similar demonstrations in Masulipatam on the eastern coast. Among the railway and textile workers of Madras there is a growing

tendency to join the General Strike that is being prepared by the revolutionary unions.

Intense excitement has been caused by the sentence of one year's imprisonment on Mrs. Lakshmi Patthi of Madras, of Mrs. Sarojini Naidu in Bombay, and of Karmala Devi, a prominent woman member of the Youth league, who has received six months imprisonment.

An event of considerable importance is the mass meetings of Mohammedans that have been held in Bombay and Madras, the one in support of the Arab General Strike and for Arab Independence, the other against MacDonald's imperialist policy in Egypt. The leaders of the Khalifat Committee, such as Mohammed Ali and Shaukat Ali, who for their own personal ends are against the independence movement in India are unable to prevent the expression of an anti-imperialist temper among the Muslim masses. While advising them not to take part in the movement in India they mobilised a mass meeting attended by 100,000 Muslims in Bombay to demand Arab Independence and to protest against the brutality of the Imperialist Labour Government in Palestine and other Arab countries. The meeting for Egypt in Madras was charged by the police with batons, the masses replying by throwing bombs on the police injuring several constables.

The movement for the non-payment of taxes and of land revenue is being organised mainly by the Congress Committees, the province of **Gujrat** where the land revenue is paid direct to the Government being at present the main centre of the campaign.

The Trade Union Congress has called on all workers to declare a General Strike and the Workers & Peasants Party has issued an appeal to the peasants to form committees, expropriate the landlords, join the workers and overthrow imperialism and feudalism.

Anxiety over the Situation in North-West India.

According to latest reports, the situation in the North West Provinces of India is causing increasing concern to the British authorities. The insurgents, with the leader of the Tusangsai tribe, Hadshi, at their head, are capturing further forfifed positions in the mountains thirty miles from Peshawar, and do not think, of retreating. The question of ridding the Peshawar district of insurgents is a source of considerable worry to the British authorities, as the refusal of Hadshi to obey the ultimatum of the British supreme Command is greatly damaging the prestige of Great Britain in the whole of the frontier districts.

Every morning and evening British aircraft carry out demonstrations over Hadshi's headquarters in Ghalandi, as well as over the fortifications of the village of Matta Mukhal Khel, where the forces of Hadshi's son, Bad Shah Gul, are concentrated. Volunteers and redshirts (peasant partisan troops) are guarding Hadshi's son and supplying the village with food. The British aircraft are fired upon by the insurgents. The Redshirts are continuing to operate along the Swat and Kabul rivers, to cut the telegraph wires etc.

The Fights in Rangoon.

The events in Rangoon (Further India) are of special importance in view of the revolutionary movement in India proper.

The immediate cause of the events was the ending of the dock workers' strike, in the course of which the employers and the authorities did everything in order, for their own purposes, to stir up racial hatred between the workers and the strike-breakers. After the conclusion of the strike, native strike-breakers from Burma attacked workers belonging to the Andhra tribe who had resumed work. The latter gathered together in large numbers, armed themselves with iron rods and other objects, and offered determined resistance. Collisions took place in all parts of the town. Both parties erected barricades. Furious fights and attacks on houses took place. The population of the town were seized with panic; the shops

were closed. It was only with great difficulty that the armed police succeeded in restoring order.

Many houses and several motor buses were damaged as a result of bombardment with stones. There were many wounded among the Riksha pullers. The total number of the victims amounts to eighty, including twenty killed.

POLITICS

The New "Campbell" Case in England.

By Albert Inkpin.

All the portents go to show that the Communist Party in Great Britain is on the eve of another "Campbell" Case, but this time on a much bigger and wider scale.

The circumstances in connection with the previous incident may be usefully recalled. During the summer of 1924, when the first Labour Government was in office, the Party was engaged in a vigorous anti-war campaign leading up to mass demonstrations of the workers on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the great imperialist massacre (August 4th, 1914).

In this campaign the Party's organ, the "Workers' Weekly", was in the vanguard, and its militant slogans: "Don't Shoot the workers", "Turn your guns against the common enemy, the capitalists", and "Transform imperialist war into civil war for the overthrow of capitalism", etc. etc. played a leading part in the fight.

Naturally, this bold and outspoken campaign caused a scream of rage and terror to rise from all sections of the Bourgeoisie. In the whole capitalist press there arose a chorus of demands for the Labour Government to take action against the Communists.

There were consultations between the War Office and the Admiralty. The matter was taken up by the Director of Public Prosecutions. The Law Officers of the Crown were approached, a clear case for action was presented, and the chief legal executive officer of the Labour Government, the Attorney General, and ex-Liberal named Sir Patrick Hastings, gave his consent to proceedings being instituted. The immediate result was that the editor of the "Workers' Weekly", comrade J. R. Campbell, was arrested and placed in the dock on the charge of "inciting His Majesty's armed forces to insubordination and mutiny".

When the news of the arrest and prosecution of comrade Campbell became known, a storm of indignation and protest swept through the whole Labour movement. From every quarter, from hundreds of trades councils, trade union branches local labour parties, resolutions of protest and demands for the prosecution to be withdrawn poured in upon the Government, to individual Labour members of Parliament and to the Labour press. Again there were feverish consultations. A special meeting of the Cabinet was held, and it was decided to abandon the proceedings against Campbell. The same prosecuting counsel who opened the proceedings in the police court, had to explain to the magistrate the legal defects that had been "discovered" in the case for the prosecution, the charge was withdrawn and comrade Campbell was released.

What followed is a matter of history. The rage of the bourgeoisie broke out afresh. The Conservatives and Liberals combined to make the withdrawal of the prosecution a question of "no confidence" in the Government. MacDonald and his satellites had served the particular purposes for which their capitalist paymasters had required them to take office twelve months earlier. The vote of censure was carried by a large majority and the first Labour Government was overthrown. Then followed the General Election and the cowardly attitude of the Labour leaders on the question of the "Zinoviev letter", forgery. The Labour Party was heavily defeated at the polls and the Baldwin Government resumed power. For various legal reasons it was not considered advisable for the new Government to re-institute the proceedings against comrade Campbell. But the Communist Party was marked down for attack. The whole legal apparatus of the State was set in motion preparing the case, which culminated

in the arrest a few months later of twelve leading Party members on a general charge of conspiracy against the State, and the sentencing, after a memorable trial lasting well into two weeks, of five to twelve months' and seven to six months' imprisonment.

The fear of attack, persecution, imprisonment can never intimidate a really revolutionary Communist Party. In the struggles of the last few years the Communist Party has been strengthened immeasurably in experience, in determination and in vigour. As the process of the fascisation of the Labour Party has developed, at the same time the Communist Party has grown more militant and revolutionary, more direct and outspoken in its approach to the working masses. In its daily paper, the "Daily Worker", our Party has fashioned a weapon of tremendous importance in the task of preparing and organising the workers for revolutionary mass struggle. The value of the "Daily Worker" is seen in the Party's campaign in the woollen textile lock-out where, for the first time, a huge industrial dispute involving tens of thousands of workers, is being conducted to a considerable extent under the leadership of the Communist Party and the Minority Movement. It is seen particularly also in the Party's fight to awaken the British Workers to the decisive stage that the Indian revolution is now approaching, and to organise them for resistance to the murderous terror that the social-fascist MacDonald Government is imposing on the Indian people.

The "Daily Worker" has been fearless in its denunciation of Labour Imperialism, in its slogans: "Not a man, not a gun to crush the Indian revolution", "For the overthrow of British Rule in India", etc. etc., in its support of the revolting Indian troops at Peshawar, and in its calls to British soldiers to fraternise with the Indian workers and peasants. The British Bourgeoisie is fully alive to the danger of this menace at home, and a scream went up for the "Daily Worker" to be throttled. On Wednesday, May 8th, the first shot in the attack on the Party and the paper was fired, Earl Winterton raising the question in Parliament of what he described as the "Daily Worker's" "incitement of a most gross character given to persons in India to revolt against the British Government". This question was ruled out on technical grounds, but the noble Earl announced his intention of pressing the matter later, and the capitalist press became almost incoherent in its furious demands for action against the paper. The Party's reply was an intensification of the campaign, the organisation of mass demonstrations at the week-end, and propaganda amongst the transport workers to stop the shipment of arms for use against the Indian workers. The attack was renewed the following Monday (May 12th) when two Conservative members of Parliament called attention to an article in the "Daily Worker" of May 8th "applauding the insubordination of a regiment in India" and "inciting to disobedience a British regiment". This article was linked up with the May Day Manifesto of the Communist International, and the demand made for these occurrences to be the subject of a protest to the Soviet Government. The reply of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in which he referred to the "obviously serious character of the document" and said he was "not yet in a position to announce the decision of H. M. Government in regard thereto", was a clear indication that the Government was considering an attack on the Party and the paper.

In the meantime the rage and fear of the capitalist press increased daily. Only the ostrich-like "Daily Herald", the capitalist-owned organ of the Labour Government, refused to admit the existence either of the Communist Party or the "Daily Worker", considering it wiser to remain silent until the Government had decided the time was opportune to strike. On Friday, May 16th, it was announced that Mr. J. S. Wardlaw-Milne, the chairman of the Conservative Committee on India, would on the Monday inquire of the Government whether "criminal proceedings are to be taken against those responsible for the conduct and publication of the 'Daily Worker", At the same time, the "Daily Telegraph", whose close association with the permanent staff of the Foreign Office is well known, referred to "a growing feeling of indignation in the House of Commons at the failure of the Government before this to check the continuous revolutionary propaganda in the iournal which describes itself as the organ of the British Section of the Communist International". On the Monday (May 19th), however, it was announced that Mr. Wardlaw-Milne's question, obviously

at the request of the Government, had been postponed until the Thursday, although other questions were asked to which noncommital answers were given. At the time of writing this article, the reply to Wardlaw-Milne's question is not to hand, but in answer to other questions on Wednesday, May 21st, the Foreign Secretary, Arthur Henderson, newly returned from his "conversations" in Paris, made it perfectly clear that the question of action against the "Daily Worker" is on the Government's order of the day. Whilst he declined to give a specific date on which he would make a statement on the subject, he significantly re-iterated his assurances that the question was receiving the most "serious and careful consideration".

It is as clear as daylight that the attack on the Party and the "Daily Worker" may be launched at any moment. The hatred of the MacDonald Government for the Communist Party and its dread of the Party's rising influence over the workers is beyond doubt. It is willing and anxious to strike at this deadly and implacable enemy of social-fascism and Labour imperialism. It is only its recollection of the precipitancy of its line of attack in the Campbell case, and its fear of the reaction on the large section of genuine workers who still adhere to the Labour Party that repressive measures against the Communists will provoke, that stays its hand. But we can be assured that the attack will come; the capitalist paymasters of the Labour Government will give it no option. Equally we can be assured that our Party will steel and prepare itself to resist the attack with courage, determination and the conviction of its ultimate victory. In the process of struggle, the Party will strengthen its organisation and increase its influence over the masses. As some leaders may be removed, others will come forward from the lower ranks to take their places. The steps taken by the party during the past twelve months to bring forward and develop new elements in leadership will thus bear their fruit.

The War Policy of the Rumanian Government.

By Petrescu.

The Rumanian press, including the military press, in its polemics regarding the plans for the coming war, confines itself mainly to indicating the theoretically "most probable enemy" and pointing to the necessity of defending the country against this enemy, thereby endeavouring to justify the increased military budgets and the enormous armaments of the last few years. It does not require any particularly great acumen to conclude who this unnamed enemy is. It suffices to read the protocol of the last meeting of the Regency Council, at which the Liberals raised a great outcry against the Soviet Union, accusing it of concentrating troops on the Dniester and maintaining a ramified espionage system in Bessarabia.

Now, when the question of the regime in Bessarabia and the reorganisation of the army has become particularly acute in the fight for power between the National Zaranists and the Liberals, we are in a position, on the basis of first hand information, to ascertain more or less completely how the Rumanian bourgeoisie and its military clique are preparing for the approaching war with the "most probable enemy", the Soviet Union.

In the first place there exist divergent opinions between the present Maniu government and the oppositional Liberals regarding the question of allies, which have an influence on the strategic plan for the coming war. The National Zaranists, even before they took over office, were already orientated towards Great Britain and enjoyed its support. In keeping with their policy in the question of national minorities, the National Zaranists, especially in the first period of office, endeavoured to bring about an improvement of relations to the Hungarian National Party, the leader of which is the brother of the Hungarian Prime Minister Count Bethlen and which acts according to instructions of official Hungarian circles. The task of the Maniu government consists in softening the contradictions between Rumania and Hungary and, if possible, to bring about a reconciliation with the latter country by means of

concessions to the Hungarian bourgeoisie and the large landowners of Transylvania. The mediators in this action are
Italy on the one hand and Poland on the other. The latter
country is interested in drawing Hungary, which is not reconciled to the Treaty of Trianon, into the Anti-Soviet front,
Rumania, which is securing its rear on the Hungarian side,
is, according to the opinion of the National Zaranists, tving
its hands on the Bessarabian frontier, where the "probable
enemy" stands. It is this conception which underlies the
National Zaranist theory of the war of defence, which was
recently championed by Maniu when he introduced the law
for the reorganisation of the army. The expression "defence
of fatherland" used by Maniu is, of course, only a pacifist
facade. The National Zaranists assume that in the coming war
against the Soviet Union the Rumanian army will not play the
role of cannon-fodder for Poland or serve as targets for the
first shots of the red army. In their opinion, the Polish army,
must take over the role of the advance guard, and after it has
penetrated Soviet territory the Rumanian army will then
occupy the fortified positions. Its main task will consist in
defending the Dniestr line.

The National Zaranist strategists are of the opinion that that army which first crosses the Dniestr and enters foreign territory runs the risk of defeat. Translated into everyday, language, this means that the Rumanian army, which has Bessarabia in its rear, can in the event of the slightest military, reverse find itself in a very serious position. Rumania believes that if it takes up a position on the relatively small terrain between Dniestr and Prut, it will be in a more favourable strategical situation to meet an attack by the Red Army.

This theory of a war of defence is encountering great opposition from the Liberals. As is known, in their foreign policy the Liberals are orientated towards France, as the most faithful guardian of the interests of her vassals in postwar Europe. The Liberals know that a war against the Soviet Union cannot be an isolated action. Rumania will be compelled to fight according to the orders of her patrons, and the plan of campaign will be determined not by the narrow national interests of the Rumanian bourgeoisie, but by the will of imperialist Europe, of which Rumania is the protecting wall in the East. Hence the critical attitude of the Liberals to the "defence of the fatherland", hence their complaints that the National Zaranists are disarming the people and the army, and their declaration that attack is the best means of defence.

The Rumanian National Zaranists can point out with pride to the bourgeoisie the services they have rendered their country, for under their rule poverty-stricken Rumania has advanced to the second place in Europe (immediately after France) in regard to armaments. The development of the war industry with the aid of France and Great Britain, and of late also of Germany, the mobilisation plan of Rumanian industry, the creation of a general staff of industry, the new law on the reorganisation of the army are all further contributions of the National Zaranist government to the theory of the "war of defence". The Bill on the reorganisation of the army was popularised under the slogan of a reduction of the term of active service from 4 to 3 years for the navy, gendarmerie and frontier guards. This proposal was adopted after a fierce fight with the Liberals. In reality, however, instead of a shortening of the military service, a considerable lengthening has been introduced.

It is difficult to mention one big administrative measure of the National Zaranist government recently which does not at the same time pursue military-strategic aims. The reform which allegedly introduces local self-administration and extends the right of national minorities, splits up Rumania into seven districts according to the territorial distribution of the Rumanian army corps. In addition to the governor of the various districts, there is the commander of the military corps in whose hands the whole apparatus of power will be placed at the moment of mobilisation.

This is how the National Zaranists are preparing for the war against Soviet Russia. The Maniu government is endeavouring to prove to its patrons that it is not worse than the Liberals and not less inclined to act as watch dog on the Soviet frontier.

THE BALKANS

The Trial of the Croat Nationalists.

By P. Dragatchevatz.

The trial of Dr. Matschek and the Croat nationalists has undoubtedly created a greater stir among the international public than any previous political trial in Yugoslavia. The facts which have reached the public regarding the trial of Dr. Matschek are really appalling. Professor Jelatchich, a former deputy of the Croat Peasant Party, who is only 33 years of age, when brought before the State Special Tribunal, presented the appearance of a completely broken down old man. He repeated the horrifying report of the tortures carried out by the police against hundreds of victims.

The frightful tortures to which the 23 Croat nationalists were subjected were undoubtedly not carried out on account of alleged prepared attempts on the life of single persons, or on account of attempts to destroy State buildings railway trains etc. of which they are accused in the indictment. These tortures were carried out because the accused personify the protest of the Croat people against the Great Servian dictatorial regime.

The various elements with various ideolodies of which the Croat nationalist movement consists, also found expression at the trial. The young nationalists, without a definite revolutionary ideology, mixed with a good deal of anarchism, were represented at the trial by the youthful Hadjija, who in his justified national indignation cried out during the proceedings: "Yes, when we are forbidden to fight openly and legally for our rights, then I believe all means are permissible to us. Our actions are inspired by the conviction that the Croats are prisoners and that we must defend ourselves against slavery".

The elder bourgeois elements among the accused emphatically repudiated the idea that they wished to set up illegal organisations or that they ever thought of undertaking any illegal action for the overthrow the regime.

The leader of the Croat Peasant Party, Dr. Matchek, was very reserved at his first examination. With regard to the Croat Youth movement after the 6th January 1929, he only said that this movement was directed against the regime, but he considered it very important to emphasise that the Croat student organisation "Reunija" had not undertaken any action. In addition, Dr. Matchek got his lawyer, during cross-examination, to put to him the question of his attitude to the unity of the Croat, Servian and Slovanian peasant people, to which he emphatically replied that neither he nor Raditch nor the Croat Peasant Party were opposed to harmonious cooperation with Belgrade in order to create a State which should serve as a model to the whole world.

The defending Counsel made every effort to exonerate their clients from any charge of having undertaken or having intended any action against the regime or the State. They wish to give to every action a demonstrative character, and their chief concern is that the main question on account of which the accused are brought before the court, the question of the freedom of the suppressed Croat people, shall not be raised.

Beside this opportunist attitude of the Defence, Jelatchich's attitude makes an all the more sympathetic impression; he declared at the end of his cross-examination, after reporting on the bestialities of the police: "I must still say that all this was done in the name of the king". And in reply to the remark of the president of the court that the king is not responsible when any State officials exceed their duties, Professor Jelatchich said in a loud voice: "Yes, after the 6th of January the king is formally and actually responsible for this".

This is undoubtedly true. The blood-stained king Alexander is the most prominent representative of the militarist spirit of the big Servian imperialist bourgeoisie. He is the most powerful financial magnate, whose capital is invested in the strongest and most privileged financial institutions; he is

the biggest landowner in the whole country; his estates comprise thousands and thousands of acres.

Jelatchisch has only indicated the path which is to be followed. Reduced by the brutal treatment of the police to a physical wreck, he best characterises the suppressed and ruined Croat masses, to whom there remains no other way open than to overthrow the bloody militarist dictator's regime of the financial oligarchy and the big landowners.

While the trial was being heard two new representatives of the Croat opportunist bourgeoisie deserted the ranks of this movement. Drs. Schibenik and Preka, actuated by their personal material interests and the interests of the profitseeking Croat big bourgeoisie, have entered the dictatorgovernment. The Croat masses will condemn their treachery more sharply than the treachery of all preceding deserters, because it occurs precisely at a moment when the dictatorship wishes by means of this trial to condemn the Croat people. But their treachery raises the question of the future policy of the Croat national peasant movement, the question of the complete purging of the movement of all opportunist big bourgeois elements. The broad masses of Croat peasants, as is to be seen from a whole number of examples from oll districts of Croatia, are demanding this more and more. The Communist Party of Yugoslovia will know how to help the Croat peasant masses to wrest the movement out of the hands of the treacherous Croat bourgeoisie and to weld it into a strong united front with the revolutionary proletariat and its leader, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

IN THE INTERNATIONAL

The Fight for the Masses—A Fight on Two Fronts.

The following article appeared as the leading article of the Pravda of May 21, 1930. Ed.

The economic crisis which has already seized a great part of the capitalist world, is continually growing and spreading. This fact has to be recognised by the most zealous defenders of the consolidation of capitalist stabilisation, the social fascists and their political echo, the Right and Left renegades of Communism. The theoreticians of social democracy and of Right opportunism are compelled for the time being to continue spinning their theories of "organised capitalism."

But how can one nowadays apply such a theory say, to Poland, where the number of the unemployed already exceeds the record figures of the beginning of 1926, shortly before Pilsudski's coup d'etat, where whole branches of industry, one after the other, are closing down, where the industrial crisis is accompanied by a serious agrarian crisis which has placed millions of peasants and landworkers in a completely hopeless situation.

The extension and deeping of the crisis means an aggravation of all the contradictions of the imperialist system, a growth of discontent among the masses (and in many localities the development of this discontent into a revolutionary mood) and an undoubted acceleration of the upward revolutionary movement in a whole number of capitalist and colonial countries.

This upsurge is expressed in the development of the revolutionary partisan fight in China, in the insurrectionary movement in India, the powerful actions of the unemployed in America, especially on May 1st, and the intensification of the economic fight in Europe.

The chief task of the Communist Party in this situation of deepening crisis and growing revolutionary upsurge consists in converting the elementary discontent into an organised movement, and providing it with concrete revolutionary slogans capable of rallying the masses. Otherwise the elementary movement will be "led and robbed of leadership" by the social fascists (in Europe), by the bourgeois nationalists who are prepared to betray it to the imperialists (in India); other-

wise this discontent will be made use of by openly reactionary fascist groups for the purpose of consolidating the class rule of the bourgeoisie.

The actions on the 6th of March and 1st of May, the economic strikes, especially in England, and the factory council elections in Germany show beyond doubt that our Communist Parties have achieved indubitable successes in winning and retaining the revolutionary inclined masses. But they are achieving these successes - thanks only to their systematically overcoming right opportunism in theory and practice, thanks only to the ruthless purging of their ranks of social democratic agents represented by the opportunist elements. The social democracy is the main point of support of the bourgeoisie in the ranks of the working class. The fact that it has in its hands considerable organised masses, enables it to hamper and paralyse the revolutionary movement of the working class against capitalism. The social fascist apparatus affords the bourgeoisie active assistance in suppressing the labour movement and preparing imperialist wars, in preparing for the imperialist counter-revolutionary war against the Soviet Union. Only when the Communist Parties will have isolated the Party and trade union apparatus of the social fascists from the working masses will they be in a position to let loose the revolutionary movement of the working class. From this there follows the task of ruthlessly exposing and combating social fascism.

The fulfilment of this task is hampered by the Right opportunists advocating the "united front" not only with the social democratic workers, but also with the social democratic leaders; by their demanding from the Communists that they observe discipline in the reformist trade unions, i. e. unconditional submission to their fascisised apparatus; by their opposing the independent tactics of the Communist Party in the economic fights; by their recognising only such strikes which the social democratic strike-breakers are inclined to conduct; by their opposing the setting up of independent lists at factory council elections and advocating support of the reformist lists.

The Right opportunists, who cover themselves with the Communist flag, are in their nature deadly enemies of Communism and of the proletarian revolution. It is therefore perfectly clear that the purging of the Communist Parties of the Right opportunist elements (of whom there are still a considerable number in the trade union fractions, municipal administrations etc.) means not a disintegration (as Bukharin attempted to prove eighteen months ago), but an improvement of the Communist Parties; that without such a purging there are lacking the elementary prerequisites for fighting capacity, and this in a moment when we are faced with a life and death fight against the bourgeoisie and social fascism. What army can be capable of fighting if the agents of the enemy forces are permitted to disintegrate it with impunity?

The Communist Party of Germany has won a magnificent victory at the factory council elections in the Ruhr district, in which they carried out the most definite fighting tactics against the reformist trade union bureaucracy and pursued the clearest line of independent leadership of economic struggles.

The C. P. of Germany suffered a defeat in some big factories in Berlin in which there were hitherto red factory councils, because these factory councils, which were headed by opportunist elements and worked with opportunist measures, were incapable of organising and leading the fight of the masses.

The elections have once again shown what a great fight the Party must still conduct against the Right opportunists in order to shatter social fascism, in order to win the working masses, including also the social democratic workers, in order to prepare for a victorious fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Meanwhile the C. P. of Germany, as regards its organisation, the firmness of its cadrs, the connection with the masses and the political line, undoubtedly occupies first place among the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries.

That which applies to the Communist Party of Ger-

many, applies doubly to the C. P. of France, the C. P. of Czechoslovakia, the C. P. of Great Britain and others.

The danger of Right opportunism still remains the chief danger for the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries. Nevertheless, besides it there exists the danger of "Left" sectarianism, which has shown itself to be particularly real of late.

The C. C. of the C. P. of Germany, at its last Plenary Session, sharply raised the question of the struggle against "Left" deviations. After the Plenary Session, the C. C. adopted a special decision against the "Left" views of Comrade Merker and those associated with him. Already previously, the Comintern was faced with the concrete question of the "Left" opposition to the present leadership of the C. P. of Czechoslovakia. Very distinct "Left" moods also became apparent in some sections of the Young Communist International.

The main feature of these "Left" moods and deviations consists in the liquidatory attitude towards winning the social democratic workers for Communism. Whilst the Right opportunists propose the tactics of the united front with the social democratic leaders, the "Left" deviators are gliding down to the negation of the united front tactics altogether. It is also characteristic of Merker's views that he simply denies the well-known contradictions in the camp of the working class social facism, which must be made use of by the working class in its struggle. Merker and his followers tend to regard the bourgeoisie and social demacrocy as a "uniform reactionary mass", the individual groups of which are conducting only a sham fight among each other in order to deceive the working class.

It is perfectly clear that the Left opportunist views of Comrade Merker and his followers in Germany, in Czechoslovakia and in the YCI only serve to bring grist to the mill of social democracy and that they represent a very great obstacle to the Communist Parties in winning the masses.

Therefore, the C. C. of the C. P. of Germany acted quite rightly when it declared a ruthless war on the Left opportunist views of Comrade Merker. It is true, some comrades in the fight against them have made obvious mistakes and gone too far in maintaining that "Left" sectarianism at present constitutes the chief danger or "the second chief danger" to the Party (resolution of a Party nucleus in Berlin), in a certain blurring of the social fascist character of the leaders of the social democracy (article by Comrade Remmele). These mistakes have been already recognised and corrected.

The fight against "Left" sectarianism can in no way replace the fight against Right opportunism or push it into the background. But the fight against "Left" sectarianism is a necessary pre-condition, one of the forms of overcoming the fundamental right opportunist danger. Hence, any cloaking of the importance of this fight, any reconciliation towards "Left" moods in the Communist Parties must be emphatically rejected.

The struggle for the masses which the Communist Parties are conducting under the conditions of the extending and deepening crisis, under the conditions of the approaching prerequisites of a revolutionary situation in the various countries, under the conditions of the developing mass movement, is above all a fight against social fascism as the main support of capitalism in the working class, as the main dam which the bourgeoisie has erected in the path of the revolutionary upsurge. In order to be successful, this fight requires that every element of Right opportunism, of social democratic traditions and remnants within the Party, which fetter the revolutionary activity of the Communist parties, and all sectarian moods which play into the hands of right opportunism, and thereby into the hands of the social democracy and of the bourgeoisie, must be ruthlessly overcome.

Before the XVI. Farty Congress of the C.S.S.U.

The Collective Economy Movement and the Improvement of Agriculture.

Theses on the Report of Comrade J. Jakovlev to be submitted to the 16th Party Congress of th C.P.S.U.

T.

The Results of the Collective Economy Movement.

The two and a half years which have passed since the 15th Party Congress constitute a period of a great turn in the development of agriculture in the Soviet Union.

This turn is characterised by the fact that up to 1st of May 1930, 40 to 50 per cent of the peasant undertakings in the most important grain districts were collectivised, as compared with 2 to 3 per cent in Spring 1928. The cultivated area of the collective undertakings in the whole Soviet Union rose from 1.5 million hectares in Spring 1928 to about 30 to 35 million hectares in Spring 1930, without the winter sowing. As a result, the collective farms, together with the Soviet estates, are already supplying the main mass of the marketable grain in contradistinction to the period of the 15th Party Congress and the 16th Party Conference when the overwhelming portion of the marketable grain was supplied by the individual peasant undertakings. In this way the Party has in fact solved the fundamental and most difficult problem of agriculture, the grain problem.

The great historical significance of the turn taking place in the development of the Soviet Union consists in the

fact that:

1. A considerable portion of the middle peasant masses in the most important grain districts have, following the poor peasants, recognised the advantages of the large scale collective farms and are proceeding on the socialist path. It is thereby proved, not only theoretically but by the experiences of millions, that it is possible, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the backward, poor yielding, small and smallest individual peasant undertakings to be converted immediately into great collective, profitable undertakings.

2. On the basis of the development of 100 per cent. collectivisation in a number of districts of the Soviet Union, the Party has gone over from its former policy of restricting and driving out the capitalist elements in the village to the new policy of liquidating the kulak as a class. The Party is realising this policy as an inseparable constituent part of the 100 per cent collectivisation which is being carried out by

the poor and middle peasant masses themselves.

3. As a result of the mass development of collective and Soviet undertakings and the beginning liquidation of the kulak, relations are changing in the economic system of the Soviet Union. In addition to the socialist order represented by industry, there is growing up a socialist order in the agriculture of the Soviet Union, which is supplanting the capitalist order.

4. The socialist conditions in the Soviet Union, which up to now were based exclusively on the socialist industry, are beginning to be based also upon the rapidly growing socialist sector of agriculture (big agricultural andertakings: collective and Soviet estates). Thereby there arises the possibility of overcoming a great difficulty of the proletarian revolution, consisting in the fact that the proletarian power does not arrive at "finished, socialist "conditions", "if it does not seize upon the most developed productive forms of capitalisism, which at bottom were made use of by the small upper section of industry but left agriculture untouched". (Lenin in his report on War and Peace to the VII. Party Congress.)

5. In connection with all these questions there again arises the question of the points of support of the Soviet Power in the village. In this respect the village is divided in the most important grain districts in two main parts: in the group of the collective members, who are the real firm support of the Soviet Power, and in the group of the non-collective, poor and middle peasants who do not yet wish to enter the collective farms, but who, as a result of the mass experience on the collective farms, will doubtlessly in a very

short time become convinced of the necessity of proceeding on the path of collectivisation.

The Party Congress considers it necessary to state that the Party could achieve this turn in the development of agriculture only by

- a) the rapid pace of development of industry, which served as a key for the reconstruction of agriculture on a collective basis:
- b) co-operation experiencing a mass development, organising the machine and tractor stations and developing the Soviet undertakings;
- c) the attack upon the kulak elements in the village being carried out on the basis of the alliance with the middle peasants, which vonstitutes the basis of the collective economy movement at the present movement;
- d) Counter-revolutionary Trotzkyism and the Right deviations having been beaten.

II. The Consolidation of the basis of the Collective Economy Movement and the Fight against the Mistakes.

The consolidation of the achievements in the sphere of collectivisation and the further development of collectivisation on this basis are possible only if the following fundamental, Marxist-Leninist principles of the collective economy movement are carried out, deviation from which would mean a severe crime against the proletarian dictatorship:

1. The collective undertakings can be organised only on the basis of voluntariness. Every attempt to employ force or administrative pressure against the poor and middle peasant masses in order to bring them into the collectives, is a blatant

violation of the Party line and an abuse of power.

2. The chief form of the collective undertaking in the present epoch is the agricultural artel. To demand that the peasants, when entering the artel, shall at once abandon all their individualistic customs and interests, for instance, the possibility of carrying on their individual economy (cow, vegetable garden, pigs, poultry etc.) apart from their collective economy, and that they abandon all possibility of saving something out of their wages, means to forget the ABC. of Marxism-Lennism.

3. The form of the collective undertaking must be in accordance with the economic peculiarities of the district. Apart from the artel, in various districts which mainly produce other crops than grain, also in the national Republics of the East, the co-operatives for the common cultivation of the soil will prove to be the appropriate transition form to the

artel.

4. The collective economy movement can rise to its highest form, the **Commune**, by raising the technical level, by the growth of the cadres of the collective undertakings and raising the cultural level of their members only under the indispensable precondition that the necessary alterations in the statutes are recognised by the peasants themselves and are realised from below.

5. To achieve the highest productivity of labour it is necessary to set up a new collective discipline on the collective farms; this can only be reached on the basis of real self-activity and active participation of the collective farmers in the administration of the undertakings of their

collective

6. The transition to the collective cultivation of the soil can, as Lenin repeatedly pointed out, be realised only under the precondition that the collective undertakings enjoy large-scale organisations and financial assistance on the part of the Soviet State:

"Every collective system arises only by means of the financial support of a definite class". (Lenin "On the co-

operatives").

7. Every attempt to transfer the organisational system of the administration of the Soviet estates to the collective farms is anti-Leninist, because the Soviet estates are established with State means and are State undertakings, whilst the collective farms comprise peasants who voluntarily unite, are established with the means of the peasants themselves with all the consequences resulting therefrom.

8. The transition from the individual farm to the collective farm can take place only on the basis of the alliance of the working class with the poor and middle peasantry, which involves the systematic attraction of the middle peasants to

the management of the collective farms.

Proceeding from all these facts, the Party Congress considers it particularly important to explain to every Party member the character of those mistakes and distortions of the Party line which were made in Spring last in the practical

carrying out of collectivisation.

These mistakes and distortions found expression in the employment of coercive measures and violence towards poor and middle peasants for the establishment of collective farms; in the socialisation of poultry and cows which were in the possession of members of the artels and served their personal needs, in introducing the tempo of collectivisation to non-grainproducing areas, which tempo, as a result of experience and according to the decisions of the C. C., was only intended for grain-producing districts; in the premature establishment of communes, which were not previously materially and organisationally sufficiently prepared; that under the cloak of founding "gigantic" collective farms, lifeless bureaucratic organisations were set up on the basis of command; in that government credits, which were intended for the collective farms, were withheld and privileges which the government had granted to the collective farms were withdrawn; in the rude, bureaucratic attitude adopted towards the collective farms and their members and in the substitution of election to leading posts by nomination and commanding from above; in passing over the middle peasant and leaving unused his economic experiences; in transferring the means of struggle directed against the kulak, to the middle peasant (dekulakisation, deprival of the suffrage etc.).

The nature of these mistakes and the main distortions of the Party line which were committed chiefly in a number of grain importing areas and in the national Republics of the Soviet East, are characterised by the Central Committee in

its appeal of 2nd April as follows:

"In place of the consolidation of the alliance with the middle peasant and simultaneous reliance upon the poor peasant, while at the same time ruthlessly combating the kulak, there was conducted a policy which is altogether hostile to Leninism, of commanding the middle peasant". (Appeal of the C. C. of 2nd April 1930.)

These mistakes called forth in a number of districts not ony anti-collective demonstrations, but in some cases there took also place, under the influence of the kulaks, anti-Soviet demonstrations. The most terrible thing was the fact that.

"not infrequenty the Party organisations have attempted to cloak over the situation instead of recognising and rectifying the mistakes and shortcomings, and have attributed them to the vacillations of the middle peasants" (Appeal of the C. C. of 2nd April 1930).

If the C. C. had not rectified these mistakes in time (decisions of the C. C. of 20th February, 10th March, 15th March, 2nd April and the articles by Comrade Stalin: "Many are being rendered giddy by the successes", and "Reply to the Comrades on the Collective Farms") it would have meant the danger of the collapse of collectivisation of agriculture, of the collapse of the Basis of the Soviet State, the alliance between the working class and the peasantry.

All the measures which the Central Committee adopted to rectify the mistakes which were committed in collectivisation, consisted in the last resort in restoring the true Leninist attitude towards the middle peasants — an attitude which was distorted in a number of districts —, in the consolidation of the achievements of the collective economy movement and in the realisation of the policy of liquidating the kulak as a class on the basis of hundert per cent collectivisation and in alliance with the middle peasants.

As a result of the rectification of the mistakes committed by the Party and Soviet organisations, the greater portion of the seed in the most important grain districts was sown by the collective farms, and in the non-grain producing districts the individual farms are energetically cultivating their fields, whilst at the same time there exists a certain number of firm collective farms which can become the nuclei of the future collective economy movement for the main mass of the peasantry in these districts.

III. On the Pace of Collectivisation and the Tasks of Transforming Agriculture.

The course of the Spring seed campaign 1930 shows that the Party is succeeding, on the basis of collectivisation and the promotion of the Soviet Estates, to solve the difficult grain problem. The solution of the grain problem is facilitating not only the further development of economic plants and cattle-breeding, but, by means of the development of the collective and State farms, is also solving the question of leading the backward branches of agriculture out of the difficulties which the small and smallest farms cannot solve owing to their meagre yield.

The possible rate of the further development of the grain farms and the overcoming of the crisis in cattle breeding is determined by the enormous possibilities of development of the productive forces inherent in the collective farm movement.

Already this Spring, not only the machine and tractor stations and the old collective farms, but also the new collective farms, which were established by means of the simple pooling of peasants' stocks and implements, were able largely to extend their area of cultivation and work up fairly big plots of fallow land. Indicative of the possibilities opened up by the development of the collective farms is the fact that the Soviet estates (the old and the new) already in this year will alone supply 100 million poods of grain for the market, and in the next year at least 250 million poods. This shows that, on the basis of collectivisation, the development of the machine and tractor stations and the organisation of Soviet estates, the Party can begin to realise the slogan of "catching up and passing the capitalist countries" not only in regard to industry, where the advantage of big undertakings has long been revealed with elementary force, but also in the sphere of agriculture, the rate of development of which was hitherto determined by the small and dwarf farms, the productivity of which is very low. The rate of development in agriculture will now be determined by the accelerated development of the collective and Soviet farms, which represent the new type of agricultural unit hitherto unknown in the history of humanity and is for the first time arising in the Soviet Union as a result of the experience of economic construction.

In accordance with these facts, the Party Congress con-

siders it necessary:

1. Thoroughly to revise the Five-Year-Plan of the development of agriculture. In this respect we must proceed from the rate of collectivisation provided for in the decision of the C. C. of 5th January, and which has been fully confirmed by experience. In addition to an accelerated development of grain and economic crops cattle breeding also is to be greatly enhanced, and this before all by means of developing special Soviet cattle-breeding undertakings, similar to the Soviet grain estates, and the wholesale organisation of collective farms with considerable commodity production.

2. While consistently preserving the privileges for collective farms and their members, laid down in the decisions of the Party, to raise the credits for the collective farms for 1930/31 to double that of this year's sums, i. e. to 1000 million

roubles.

3. To secure the sowing of the State grain trust for the next year over an area of at least 4,5 million hectares and to prepare for sowing 9 million hectares in the year 1932.

prepare for sowing 9 million hectares in the year 1932.

4. The State Trust for pig breeding shall supply in 1930/31 at least 400 000, in 1931/32 at least 3 million, and in

1932/33 at least seven million head of swine.

5. To increase the lifestock of the "Skotovod" (catte-breeding trust) to 3,2 million in 1930/31, to 5,5 million in 1931/32 and to 9 to 10 million in 1932/33.

6. To develop the cattle-breeding on the collective farms by employing a considerable portion of the agricultural credits

for this branch of the collective farms.

7. To instruct the agricultural Lenin Academy to work out a plan of rational distribution of the agricultural branches

according to the districts of the Soviet Union. This plan shall provide for the replacing of less profitable crops by more profitable ones; it shall secure the position of the Soviet Union in regard to supplying itself with the most important economic plants and provide for the maximum use of the local sources of energy for agriculture.

In accordance with the tasks set the agricultural Lenin Academy, it shall receive for its work the necessary technical basis, on a level with the latest scientific achievements, and

further Communist cadres shall be at its disposal.

8. To extend the work of the collective economy institute In such a manner as to enable it to elaborate in time on a scientific-operative basis the forms and methods of collective construction and to secure the theoretical generalisation of local experience.

9. To secure the carrying out of the tractor construction programme and the production of agricultural machine parts to the extent provided for in the decisions of the C. C.

IV. On the Preparation of the Mass Collective Movement in the Non-Grain Producing Districts.

The Party Congress draws the attention of all Party organisations of the non-grain producing districts and of the Eastern Republics and districts of the Soviet Union to the necessity of developing a broad preparatory-campaign for a mass collective movement in these districts.

This preparation campaign must before alle consist:

- 1. In the development of a co-operative organisation of the poor and middle peasants, beginning with the co-operative settlements and special associations for production and communal life.
- 2. In the mass spreading of co-operatives for the collective cultivation of the soil as the first form of collective economy leading to the artel.
- 3. In the all-round consolidation of the existing collective farms and the extension of the network of machine and tractor
- 4. In the organisation of Soviet farms, in particular of cotton farms, dairies, flax growing and pig breeding farms.
- 5. In an intensified attack upon the kulak in the sense of a further restriction of his exploiting tendencies and growth, with a simultaneous development of the organisation of the poor peasants.
- 6. In enhancing the work for the development of the type of big farm in those agricultural branches which constitute the peculiarity of the respective district and organisation of machine production which serves for the establishment of such farms (sowing machines, machines for the cultivation and collection of flax, hemp, cotton etc., machines for planting and gathering potatoes, garden implements, machines for big dairies

The Party Congress devotes particular attention to the absolute inadmissibility of underestimating the collective farms which exist in these districts, simply because this Spring they numbered only 7 to 8 per cent, instead of the previously (on paper) calculated much higher percentage. The Party Congress considers it inadmissible to ignore these collective farms and takes into account the experience in the development of the collectivisation of the grain districts, where in the past year the number of collective farms did not exceed the number of collective farms at present existing in the grain importing districts, and where this small number of collective farms played a big role in the further development of the whole collective economy movement, insofar as the collective farms were the models and examples for the whole backward peasant mass and insofar as it trained cadres which, in the further development of the collective economy movement became the organisers of the mass collective movement.

V. The Relation of the Collective Farms to the Individual Farms.

The Party Congress takes into account the whole complicated nature of the complete transition, which is to take place in the next few years, of the small individual farm to the big collective farm, in particular in view of the enormous territorial extent of the Soviet Union, of the pre-capitalist order and the lack of numerous models of the big under-

takings in all the non-grain producing districts. Hence, the Party Congress warns the Party organisations not to ignore the individual farm, which in a number of districts will still exist for some time to come.

The initiation of correct relations to the individual farm. which will facilitate collectivisation in the future, is to a great extent a question of the relations of the collective farmers to the peasants of the individual farms. The straining of the relations between the collective farmers and the peasants of the individual farms which arose in the Spring of this year as a result of the numerous withdrawals from the collective farms and the struggle of the active members of the collective farms to maintain the collective farms, is a hindrance to the further collectivisation. Therefore the Party Congress recommends all Party organisations so to strive that the relations between the collective farmers and the peasants of the individual forms be improved. We must not incense the peasants of the individual farms, but must help them and draw them by all means nearer to the collective farm.

The Party Congress categorically condemns the fact that the co-operative forms of organising the poor peasants with individual farms and of the middle peasants, whose development is the most important prerequisite for the gradual transition to collective economy, are ignored. The Party Congress considers it a grave mistake when, as has actually been the case in a number of districts, the initial forms of simple co-operative organisations are actually liquidated (housing co-operatives, special organisations to secure co-operatives) and proposes to all Party organisation to secure immediately the establishment and further extension of the co-operatives, and to render them the necessary organisational and financial support.

VI. Organisational Questions of the Collective Economy Movement.

1. The formation of cadres of collective farms is one of the most important prerequisites for the consolidation of collectivisation. The selection of new cadres from the masses of members of collective farms must be made the basis of work. This is the most important work of the 25 000 workers sent to the collective farms. Many of these workers have proved excellent organisers and already obtained authority among the collective farm members, particularly in those cases where they considered it their chief task to train cadres from the members of the collective farms themselves. The Party proceeds from the fact that in the next few years, withoud doubt under the influence of the most advanced workers, there will arise tens of thousands possessing real organisational talents from among the mass of collective farm members, who will build up socialism in agriculture.

The most important tasks in this sphere are:

- a) to organise a system of promotion of cadres to leading work from the ranks of the collective farm members themselves.
- b) to organise a great number of short training courses for the cadres of the collective farms and Soviet States, as well as schools for the peasant youth, technical high schools, agricultural technical schools, secondary schools and machine and tractor stations.
- c) to attract the youth of the collective farms in a greater measure into the agricultural high schools and technical
- d) to organise and to develop the work of the production conferences and delegate meetings on the collective farms.
- e) to organise women delegate meetings of collective women farmers and to train collective farm cadres from the masses of women of promote them to leading posts.
- The present state of affairs in which the co-operative organisations and the co-operative apparatus do not serve the mass of peasant individual farms and at the same time refuse to be guided by the collective farms either in organisational or production questions is inadmissible. Therefore, the Party Congress considers it to be immediately necessary to revise fundamentally the whole organisational structure of the collective farm and co-operative systems. For this it is necessary:

a) to concentrate the functions of the organisational and production leadership of the collective farms of a district (cadres, organisation of work, technical basis) for all the collective farms in a single collective farm league. These measures shall be carried out in those districts in which at least 30 per cent. of all peasant farms are collectivised.

b) to concentrate the support of production and the leadership of the individual farms and their simple associations, as well as the preparatory work for all economic forms, in the agricultural cooperative league of the district.

c) to liquidate the intermediary links of the collective farm and co-operative systems and to put in their place the links

of the lower collective and co-operative systems.

d) to revise the special centrals and to establish that special centrals may only exist for the most important agricultural branches.

e) to restrict the administrative apparatus of the co-operatives and to combat energetically the extension of the apparatus of the collective farms by transferring the administrative functions on the collective farms in general to elected persons from the midst of the collective farm members.

3. The work among the groups of poor peasants who have united in the initial forms of collective farms, must be improved and promoted, as we can secure the transition from the most simple associations to higher forms of collectivisation only if we support ourselves on the poor peasantry. The Party organisations in the collective farms must organise the work of the poor peasants in such a manner that they not only defend the immediate interests of the poor peasantry but also promote the consolidation of the alliance between the working class and the village poor with the middle peasants.

4. In accordance with the practical experiences in the work of the artels the necessary improvements must be inserted in

the model statutes for agricultural artels.

5. Model statutes for the co-operatives for the common cultivation of the soil and for the communes shall be worked out.

The basis of the model statutes for co-operatives for the common cultivation of the soil must be the collaboration of their members for the period of sowing and harvest and for common purchase of complicated machinery and other means

of production for common property and use.

The basis of the model statutes for communes must be the complete socialisation of all means of production without exception and the gradual establishment of institutions and undertakings for the supply of the collective farm members (communal kitchens, communal houses etc.). These tasks must in no way be replaced by useless and harmful petty socialisation of the mode of life.

In the period between the 15th and 16th Party Congreß the Party achieved a decisive turn in the collectivisation of

agriculture.

If the confiscation of the land of the big landowners was the first step of the November Revolution in the village, the transition to the collective farms is the second and decisive step, forming the most important stage of the basic construction of socialist society in the Soviet Union.

It goes without saying that such a great upheaval in the lives of millions of men as constitutes the transition of the small individual peasant farms to great socialist farms, is inevitably connected with a number of great difficulties which are called forth by the increased resistance of the class enemies in the country and by the capitalist surroundings outside of our borders. Therefore only bureaucrats and non-revolutionaries can believe that an upheaval of such dimensions, which touches the foundation of the economic order and of the life of enormous masses, can be carried out without any vacillations on the part of the middle peasants.

The kulak is not yet quite defeated and he will oppose with bitter resistance the victorious march of collectivisation. The liquidation of the kulak as a class requires a consistent and tenacious struggle against the kulak, systematic work for the carrying out of collectivisation and must proceed in full harmony with the realisation of 100 per cent collectivisation as on indispensible constituent part of it.

The creation of a new collective discipline, the training of the peasants for socialist construction is not yet completed in the artel, but has only begun. In the collective farms the peasants are ultimately overcoming the psychology of the small proprietor, the urge for private capitalist accumulation which they inherited from their forefathers in the course of years of tenacious work directed towards endowing the collective farms with the basis of great mechanised undertakings; after years of work in the creation of cadres from the masses of collective farm members, after years of work in the culzural raising of the whole mass of collective farms.

The Party achieved the decisive turn in the collectivisation thanks to the defeat of both the counter-revolutionary Trotzkyism, whose policy would inevitably have led to the collapse of the alliance with the main mass of the peasantry, as well as of the Right deviation with its political rejection of the industrialisation of the country carried out by the Party, with its rejection of the extension of the system of Soviet estates and the development of the collective farms, with its policy of capitulation to the kulak.

The Party achieved this decisive turn in the collectivisation because it unswervingly pursued the policy of the industrialisation of the country and thereby created the preconditions for the development of the production alliance with the peasantry and the consolidation of the alliance between the

working class and the poor and middle peasants.

Only in this way was the Party able to create the necessary preconditions for the collective economic construction. Only in this way will the Party not only consolidate the successes achieved up to now but also complete the cause of collectivisation, thereby laying the foundation of socialist

The Carrying out of the Five Year Plan of Industry.

Theses on Comrade Kujbyshev's Report for the XVI. Party Congress of the C.P.S.U.

The Results of the Carrying out of the Five-Year Plan in Industry.

The creation of a socialist big industry, of the foundation of socialist reconstruction of economy, which is capable of reorganising agriculture, of increasing the defensive capacity of the country and of freeing the economy of the Soviet Union from dependence upon the capitalist countries, is the most important task of the successful building up of socialist society.

"The real and only basis for the consolidation of resources, for the creation of a socialist society is big industry." (Lenin.)

Proceeding from these premises, the XV. Party Congress passed the "directives for the setting up of a Five-Year Plan of National Economy", and on the basis of these directives the XVI. Party Conference approved the Five-Year Plan of development of economy.

The rapid rate of development of industry as a whole and of its various branches which produce the means of production, was prescribed by these decisions of the Party, Thanks to the ever growing mobilisation of the working masses for the struggle for the realisation of the tasks laid down, and thanks to the correct Bolshevist leadership of the C. C. given to the whole practical carrying out of the industrial plan, the rapid rate of industrialisation which has been adopted, has not only been realised in the last two years but has been even surpassed.

Already in the year 1927/28 the task of industry which was laid down in the plan (control figures for the year 1927/28) was actually surpassed both in regard to industry as a whole and in regard to the various branches of industry producing the means of production. The actual growth of the whole of industry compared with the previous year was 26 per cent as against 24,5 per cent provided by the control figures, whilst the growth of production in heavy industry amounted in reality to 28,7 per cent as compared with 21,3 per cent provided by the control figures.

The results of the year 1928/29, the first year of the Five-Year Plan, have shown that with regard to gross production, planned industry has exceeded the estimates of the Five-Year Plan (24 per cent growth of production instead of 21,4 per cent

envisaged by the Five-Year Plan). This success of the first year of the Five-Year Plan rendered it possible considerably to increase production in industry in the year 1929/30 and to fix the growth of production at 31,3 per cent as against 21,5 per cent originally laid down in the Five-Year Plan.

The first months of 1929/30 have shown that although the growth of industry exceeded by far the provisions of the Five-Year Plan, the decisions of the Party on the control figures of the current year have not been completely carried out, as a result of which the carrying out of the whole plan of industry of the year was threatened with failure. The Party, under the leadership of the C.C., mobilised all the forces of the working class in the struggle for the carrying out of the industrial plan and for the liquidation of the mistakes which had come to light, by ruthlessly exposing and censuring all the shortcomings in the work of the economic organs, and also of the Party and trade union organisations. As a result of a number of measures adopted by the C. C. (appeal of the C. C. of 25th January on the carrying out of the control figures in industry, the work reports in the press, the control of the activity of the various trusts and industrial associations, the delegation of members of the C. C. into the industrial districts etc.), it was possible to achieve certain progress in the carrying out of the industrial plan. In spite of this, even today the rate of development of industry provided for this year, has not yet been reached. The results of the first six months of 1929/30 show that the growth of production in industry compared with the previous year amounted to 29,4 per cent, whilst we should have reached 31,3 per cent. A further real Bolshevist mobilisation of the forces of the Party and of the whole working class for the decisive struggle for the realisation and surpassing of this year's industrial plan is necessary.

The Party Congress records that the carrying out of this year's plan firstly, secures the growth of the gross production of the State planned industry, which in the two first years of the Five-Year Plan increased by 65 per cent instead of the 47,5 per cent provided for in the Five-Year Plan, and that secondly, a considerable increase in the rate of industrial growth took place in 1929/30 as compared with 1928/29.

With regard to the whole of the big industry of the Soviet Union (both planned industry and the remaining industry), gross production has grown in these two years by 59 per cent as compared with 43 per cent provided for in the Five-Year Plan. As a result, the production figures of the census industry will in this year amount to double the pre-war figures.

According to the line firmly carried out of specially promoting those branches of industry producing the means of production, the gross production of heavy industry has increased by 88 per cent (in the branches comprised by the plan) as against 58,4 per cent provided for in the Five-Year Plan. As a result, the share of heavy industry in the output of the whole of planned industry has grown from 42 per cent in 1927/28 to 48 per cent in 1929/30.

In the individual important branches of heavy industry the growth of production shows the following picture:

Production in engineering has grown in the two years to more than double, and surpasses the general rate of increase both of the whole of industry and of heavy industry.

The output of the electro-technical industry has grown in 1929/30 by 2,7 times compared with 1927/28 as against 1,8 times provided for in the Five-Year Plan.

The production of agricultural machines has grown in the first two years by 45,8 per cent as against 31,6 per cent provided for in the Five-Year Plan, thereby exceeding the pre-war production by 78 per cent.

The output of naphtha has increased by 37,8 per cent as against 26,5 per cent envisaged by the Five-Year Plan, and

exceeds pre-war production by 74 per cent.

The production of cement has increased by 84,9 per cent as against 63,9 per cent provided by the Five-Year Plan, thereby exceeding pre-war production by 78,8 per cent etc.

Capital investments in industry amounted in 1928/29 to 1,800 million roubles and is to reach 4,000 million roubles in 1929/30 (this being 5,800 million roubles in two years instead of 3,900 million as provided in the Five-Year Plan).

As a result of the investments in the first two years the basic capital of industry will increase by 52 per cent, that of heavy industry by 75 per cent.

At the same time there was an increased utilisation of the existing industrial plant, thanks to socialist rationalisation, the introduction of the uninterrupted process of production and the increased (although by far not yet sufficient) number of shifts. The enterprises which introduced the uninterrupted labour process comprise two thirds of all workers engaged in industry. While in 1927/28 the number of shifts in the whole industry was fixed with the coefficient of 1,49, the coefficient had risen in the first quarter of 1929/30 to 1,60.

The rapid rate of development of industrial production was accompanied by a considerable numerical growth of the working class (increase of more than 520,000 since the 15th Party Congress) and by a not only relative but also absolute decline in unemployment. This process of drawing fresh hundreds of thousands of workers into industrial production was accompanied by a considerable improvement in the material and cultural position of the working class, by an increase in its share in the public revenue, and by rise of the standard of living of the working masses as a result of increased wages, the introduction of the seven-hour day in a great number of untertakings, a decline of unemployment, the growing budget for social insurance (which was increased to 1,400 million roubles in the current year) and the great investments for the construction of workers' dwellings.

The growth of socialist industry, which is increasing its share in the national economy and its role and influence upon national economy, at the same time determined the growth and the extension of the influence of the consistent socialist forms of the relations of production, enormously enhanced the positions of socialism in our country, and created a technicaleconomic basis for the decided turn of the poor and middle peasant masses to socialist organisation of agriculture.

The Shortcomings and the Struggle for Quality.

The exceeding of the tasks established by the plan in regard to the quantitative increase of output in industry was, however, accompanied by a systematic decline in the qualitative side of work. The tasks of raising labour productivity, of lowering the prime costs of industry and reducing the cost of construction were not fulfilled, with the result that the general achievements of industry were reduced.

Particularly unsatisfactory is the position in regard to the quality of industrial products, which is on a very low level and in some cases shows a tendency to become worse. Party Congress is of the opinion that in regard to the quality of the industrial products the economic organs have to bear responsibility no less great than in regard to the nonfulfilment of the quantitative tasks; it therefore sets the economic organs, the trade unions, the Party organisations, the Young Communist League, the press and the whole working class public the task of drawing broad masses of the toilers into the qualitative improvement of the products, and for this purpose to make use of such forms of workers' organisations as socialist competition and the shock brigades.

The Party Congress further states that the tasks set in regard to the **lowering of the prime costs** have not been carried out in 1929/30 (only 4,4 per cent was achieved instead of the 7 per cent provided for in the Plan) and that the carrying out of respective big tasks in this year is thereby endangered (6 per cent in the first six months instead of the 11 per cent provided for in the plan). The Party Congress takes into account the extraordinary importance of lowering the prime costs of production and the construction index for the acceleration of the rate of development of socialist construction, and especially draws attention to the socialist rationalisation of industry. This rationalisation must take place on the basis of the struggle for a better organisation of production, for an increase of labour productivity, for a rational utilisation of raw material, of fuel and of machines, whilst combating losses and waste in production and in circulation, and thereby achieving the fulfilment of the systematic task of lowering the prime costs while simultaneously raising the quality of the products.

The Party Congress declares that in spite of a certain improvement achieved in the sphere of capital replacement during the last few years, the practice of industrial construction reveals a number of great shortcomings. To these belong: the lagging behind and the unsatisfactory position of the planning work, the inadequate utilisation of the building season, the extended front and the slow pace of building activity, the high building costs and the bad qualitative level of the buildings, the non-fulfilment of the tasks for reducing the building costs, the failure of the delivery of machines to synchronise with the completion of the buildings, the inadequate organisation of the geological investigation work, the inadequate scientific investigation activity etc. The struggle against these shortcomings in the sphere of industrial building activity must constitute the centre of attention of all organisations of the working class.

III.

The most Important Task in the Development of Industry.

The realisation of the Five-Year Plan of industry revealed a number of difficulties and weak points to the overcoming of

which the attention of the Party must be drawn:

a) One of the weakest points in the development of industry and national economy is their energy basis. It must be the task of the next few years to secure the rate of development of the fuel industries (coal, naphtha, peat) and in particular the generation of electricity, in order to guarantee the uninterrupted development of all branches of industry and of national economy.

b) The rapid rate of collectivisation demands of the industry which has to supply the socialised peasant farms with means of production, the securing of the construction of tractors, of agricultural machines, of automobiles, the development of the chemical industry to an extent commensurate with the requirements of the reconstruction of agriculture. It is therefore of enormous political significance to set going the Stalingrad tractor factory, to increase the output of tractors in the red Putilov works to 25,000 tractors in 1930/31, to complete the Kharkov tractor-works in 1930/31, to accelerate the building work on the Cheljabinsk tractor works, on the combine factories in Saporosche, in Siberia and in Saratov, on the automobile factories in Moscow and Nishni, on the chemical combines, on the factories for artificial fertilisers, and the reorganisation of the agricultural machine factories for the maximum extension of the tractor inventory and the complete freeing of our country in the shortest possible time from the necessity of importing such machines from abroad.

The Party Congress instructs the Central Committee and the appropriate Soviet organs to pay special attention to the continuation of the above-mentioned buildings and to their

completion at the dates fixed for them.

c) The general growth of the goods traffic in the country, far exceeding the figures of the Five-Year Plan, requires of the industries supplying the transport system an increased output in order to secure the development of transport.

- d) The capital investments in industry and in national economy, which are increasing from year to year, require of the industries supplying building material a rate of development corresponding to the requirements of national economy, which is becoming more and more industrialised. The growing extension of industrial buildings requires a maximum mechanisation of building work.
- e) An enhanced development of those industrial branches which increase the distributive capacity of the Soviet Union is of first class importance.

f) Special attention must be paid to the development of the export branches of industry, which increase our stocks of valuta and thereby open up new possibilities for the accele-

ration of the rate of industrialisation of the country.

g) The growing demands of the broad working and peasants masses and the task of systematically raising the material and cultural standard of living of these masses on the one hand, and the narrow basis of the agricultural raw material supply, which restricts the possibility of development of light industry, on the other hand, necessitate that in the next three years of the Five-Year Plan the industry working up agricultural raw material be freed from dependence upon foreign countries and that the industry of the Soviet Union acquire a raw material basis which secures the complete carrying out of the Five-Year Plan and the maximum utilisation of the existing machines by the respective branches of light industry.

The XVI. Party Congress instructs the C. C. of the C. P. S. U., on the basis of these general directives, to work out in the shortest possible time a concrete plan of development of the agricultural raw material basis and a plan of

measures for securing its carrying out.

- h) A sufficiently rapid rate of development must be secured for those branches of industry which supply the broad masses with food.
- i) The solution of the above-mentioned tasks, and at the same time the task of the technical reconstruction of the backward branches of economy and of industry, is only possible on the basis of the accelerated development of machine construction, in particular the production of work benches, electrotechnical machines, boilers, turbines and Diesel motors, of big-machines etc. In spite of the rapid rate of development, the output of the machine construction industry is one of the weakest points in our national economy, thereby retarding the rate of development both of our industry and of our whole national economy.

The XVI. Party Congress considers it necessary that the plan for machine construction be revised from the standpoint of the complete freeing of industry and of national economy from dependence upon the foreign countries and from the standpoint of satisfying the main requirements of industry in the way of machines.

k) The basis of the development of machine construction, of the electro-technical, the automobile and tractor industries and also the construction of agricultural machines is the production of black and coloured metal. More than that: the development of the smelting industry determines also the rate of industrial building activity and the rate of development of all backward branches of national economy (transport, municipal economy, defence system etc.). Therefore, the carrying out of the reconstruction plan of the existing smelting works for the production of black and coloured metal, the accelerated construction of the Magnitogora, Kusnetzk, Saporshe works, the timely beginning of the construction of the Nishni Tagilskoi and Bakal factories, the construction of the smelting works in the Ural, in Kasakstan, in Siberia, are tasks of first class importance and must occupy the centre of attention of the respective Party, Soviet, economic and trade union organisations.

The Party Congress instructs the C. C. and the respective economic organs to pay increasing attention to these building works and to see that they are completed at the time fixed.

The Party Congress, by approving the decisions of the C. C. of 15th May 1930 in regard to the Ural, confirms that the industrialisation of the country in the future cannot be based solely on the coal and metal industry of the South. It is a vital necessity for the rapid industrialisation of the country to establish a second coal and metal centre of the Soviet Union in the Eeast by utilising the rich coal and ore deposits of the Ural and Siberia. (Decision of the C. C. of the 15th May 1930.) The Party Congress further considers it necessary to accelerate the development in the Eastern districts (Ural, Siberia, Kasakstan, Central Asia) and of the other industrial branches relying on the raw materials of these districts (smelting industry for coloured metals, textile industries etc.).

(To be concluded.)

The Great Transformation in Soviet Agriculture.

(Leading Article of the "Pravda" of May 20, 1930.)

The abolition of private property sweeps away the conditions of exploitation of man by man, does away with the old conditions of production, abolishes the conditions of antagonism between classes, and creates the fundamental pre—requisites for the complete abolition of classes.

The Party which stands at the head of the October Revolution is guided by the revolutionary theory, the foundations of which are furnished by the Communist Manifesto.

The nationalisation of industry and the nationalisation of the land mean the forcible crushing of the big bourgeoisie and the big landowners and their annihiliation as a class.

Emancipation from the fetters of private property in the most important means of production, under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of industrial construction and development of agriculture - tremendous in its pace and extent — on the basis of complete and all-round organisation of the toiling population of the rural districts in the co-operatives, and the collectivisation of agriculture, creates real. guarantees against the resurrection and development of the bourgeois class. Every step — and they are gigantic steps — made in the industrialisation of the country, is a step towards the actual revolutionary carrying out of the theory of the Communists, "Abolition of Private Property".

The turning of a considerable portion of the middle peasantry to the socialist path of agricultural development, to collectivised forms of farming, yielding a rich return, created new relations of class forces and enabled the Party, on the basis of one hundred per cent. collectivisation,

"to go over from its former policy of restricting and driving out the capitalist elements in the village, to the new policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class".

What is fundamentally new in the present period is the going over of millions of individual farms, based on private property in the means of production and incapable of yielding much—the going over of these farms not only to new forms of large-scale agriculture, but also to other forms of ownership of the most important means of production.

The socialisation of the most important means of production on the peasant farms is converting (and consequently also abolishing) private property in these means of production into common property of the collectives. The circumstance that members of the collective farms incidentally possess private property (cows, small cattle, vegetable gardens etc) does not in any way change the general tendency of the development of collective forms of ownership, which embrace an ever-increasing part of the socialised means of production, or the fact that the means of production still in private possession are continually becoming relatively less.

From this there follows the socialistic nature of the collective farms. Therefore, it is quite correct when it is stated in the Theses:

"As a result of the mass development of collective and Soviet undertakings and the beginning liquidation of the kulak, relations are changing in the economic system of the Soviet Union. In addition to the socialist order, represented by industry, there is growing up a socialist order in the agriculture of the Soviet Union, which is supplanting the capitalist order."

The form of development of socialist relations in the village is the collective farm movement. With this there begins the solution of a great historical task: the overcoming of the antagonism between town and country, between industry and agriculture. In the collective farms, in their fundamental form, the artel, there commences the transformation of the small and dwarf farms of the private property owners into big socialist farms. There the peasants commence to overcome their habits (stamped into them by century-old private property economy), the desire to accumulate private capital, and the psychology of the small-owner. On the collective farm new conditions of production, collective relations are beginning to be formed.

Precisely, therefore, it is necessary clearly to point out the difference which exists between the peasant of the individual farms, who on the basis of their privately owned farms can only develop along capitalist paths — and the members of the collective farms, before whom, by virtue of their position in regard to the socialised means of production, the socialist path of development is opened.

The middle peasant on the collective farm, that is the middle peasant outside of the collective farm is still, for the time being, on the capitalist path of development. Also the poor peasant on the collective farm differs from the poor peasant on the individual farm.

"In connection with all these questions there again arises the question of the points of support of the Soviet Power in the village. In this respect the village in the most important grain districts is divided into two main parts: into the group of the collective members, who are a real firm support of the Soviet Power, and into the group of the non-collective poor and middle peasants, who do not yet wish to enter the collective farms, but who, as a result of the mass experience on the collective farms, will undoubtedly in a very short time become convinced of the necessity of proceeding on the path of collectivisation".

The pedants, for whom Marxism is a dead doctrine, and not a creative method, cannot grasp how suddenly the middle

peasant on the collective farm can be "a real firm support" while the poor peasant with his individual farm does not constitute such a support in the most important grain districts.

For these pedants the great change in the development of the village is inexplicable, and consequently they cannot understand the political necessity of raising again the question of the alliance with the middle peasants.

At the present stage there are middle peasants and middle peasants. The middle peasant who stands formally for collective economy is already a real and firm support of the Soviet Power. The middle peasant who has not yet joined the collective farm is only our ally. Tomorrow he can be a member of the collective farm. It is our task so to fight in order that he will be.

The thesis rightly points out this difference and declares that

"The transition from the individual farm to the collective farm can take place only on the basis of the alliance of the working class with the poor and middle peasantry".

In this connection the present relation of the collective farms and the individual farms is a problem of special importance. The theses state:

"The Party Congress warns the Party organisations not to ignore the individual farms, which in a number of districts will still exist for some time to come".

The present relation of the collective farm to the individual farm is to a considerable extent the mutual relation between the members of the collective farms and the peasants of the individual farms. Between these two main portions of the village, the members of the collective farms and the peasants with their individual farms, strained relations arose in the fight for the maintenance of the collective farms. The theses say that such a relation is a hindrance to further collectivisation, therefore, it is necessary to set up the demand:

"We must not incense the peasants of the individual farms but must help them and draw them by all means nearer to the collective farms".

With a correct application of the policy of the Party, with good mutual relations between the peasants of the collective farms and the peasants of the individual farms, the present individual farms will tomorrow belong to the collective farms, i.e. will be "our true and genuine supports".

The tasks of attracting the poor and middle peasants to the collective farms have to be carried out not only by the members of the collective farms, by guarding against a sharpening of the relations to the peasants of the individual farms and by rendering them help, but also by the Soviet Power and the co-operatives, by organising the poor peasants of the individual farms for the consolidation of the alliance with the middle peasants who have not joined the collective farms, for the fight against the kulaks and for attracting the masses of the poor and middle peasants to the collective farms.

The theses concentrate attention on the question of the intensification of the class struggle, which in a period of transition of many millions of small individual farms from one system to another, incomparably bigher, system are unavoidable.

"Only bureaucrats and non-revolutionaries can believe that an upheaval of such dimensions, which touches the foundation of the economic order and the life of enormous masses, can be carried out without any vacillations on the part of the middle peasants."

The great transformation in the development of the village took place as a result of the rapid pace of the industrialisation of the country, of the development of the Soviet farms, of machine and tractor stations, of mass development of co-operatives, of a determined attack upon the kulaks, carried out by the Party; on the basis of the alliance with the middle peasants and the crushing of counter-revolutionary Trotzkyism, whose policy would have inevitably led to the collapse of the alliance with the main mass of the peasantry. On the other hand, these successes were only possible "thanks to the defeat of the Right deviation with its political rejection of the industrialisation of the country carried out by the Party, with its rejection of the extension of the system of Soviete estates and the development of the collective farms, with its policy of capitulation to the kulak".

The Party comes to its XVI. Party Congress out of the fire of the most difficult fight and the magnificent transformation of the economic foundations of the country, with achievements and perspectives which leave no doubt that "the collectivisation is being accomplished, whereby the Party is laying the foundation of the socialist society".

ENLARGED PRESIDIUM OF THE E.C.C.I.

The General Situation in Italy. The Position and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party.

(Resolution of the Central Committee of the C.P. of Italy, Endorsed by the Enlarged Presidium of the E.C.C.I.)

(Conclusion.)

- 5. Since fascism came into power certain elements of the petty bourgeoisie have played an important political role only as an instrument of the big bourgeoisie against the proletariat. These strata of the population, however, particularly the small peasants, disillusioned and discontented with the fascist regime, are actively preparing to fight against fascism. But their struggle will be effective and politically consistent only to the extent that it is conducted under the hegemony of the proletariat.
- 6. Those who believe, and try to induce others to believe, that the overthrow of fascism can be brought about by the legal manoeuvres of the bourgeoisie itself, or by the action of the petty-bourgeois masses, or by "the democratic evolution of fascism"; those who believe that fascism will be overthrown "legally" and peacefully and that this "overthrow" will mark the opening of a new phase of "bourgeois, parliamentary, democratic" rule—are playing the role of bourgeois agents in the attempt to side-track and paralyse the development and victorious progress of the revolutionary actions of the masses against fascism.
- 7. The old petty-bourgeois groups, now scattered and in exile (the social-reformist party of Turati, the Maximalist Party, the Republican Party, the Buozzi syndicalist group, the League of the Rights of Man, the Sturzo group of "Populari", the Nitti group, etc.) stand on a platform of verbal, pseudo-opposition to fascism. In an acute revolutionary situation, however, these groups, either on their own initiative or on that of the fascists, will strive to save the capitalist system by attempting to sidetrack the movement and political actions of the masses from their primary object, namely, the overthrow of fascism and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Such attempts will undoubtedly be made and unless the C.P.I. frustrates them in time by winning the leadership of the revolutionary movement, they will have the effect of temporarily retarding the revolutionary struggles.
- 8. Hence, the most important task of the C.P. of Italy, which is the only Party in Italy that is fighting effectively and consistently against fascism, is to work untiringly for its fundamental aim of preventing the masses, who are displaying increasing opposition to fascism, from falling back under the baneful influence of the socialdemocrats and other pettybourgeois groups in the coming revolutionary crisis. Communist Party can fulfil this aim only by carrying on a systematic struggle to unmask the social-fascists and also the opportunists in its own ranks, and by taking the lead in every struggle, and in every movement of the workers and peasants against the employers, against the big landed proprietors and against fascism. Only in this way can the proletariat, under the leadership of the C. P., win the hegemony in the revolutionary struggles against fascism and capitalism, and ensure the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. All those in the ranks of the Party who sincerely believe in the approach of a period of "bourgeois democracy" as a stage in the development of the anti-fascist revolutionary movement, prove thereby that they fail to understand the degree of development and pecularities of imperialist capitalism in Italy, the indissoluble organic unity that exists between fascism and capitalism, and the true nature of the political struggles that have taken place in Italy since the outbreak of the imperialist world war. Not

only do they betray pessimism in regard to the fighting capacity of the Italian proletariat and excessive optimism in regard to the revolutionary fighting capacity of the petty-bourgeoisie and of even certain elements of the big bourgeoisie, but they theorise along the lines of the defeatist ideology of the opportunists, and unless an irreconcilable struggle is carried on against this ideology it will be impossible to proceed with the real political and organisational preparation of the proletarian forces for the fight against fascism.

The prospects of development of the revolutionary struggle in Italy are thus directly dependent on the results which the Party obtains in all its political and organisational work among the decivise elements of the working class, which, from the very start, the Party, as the only active anti-fascist force, must lead in the process of the whole revolutionary movement.

9. The fundamental task of the C.P.I. is to exert every effort to win the majority of the working class in town and country and the poor peasants, in order to place itself, from the very start, at the head of the masses who are already entering the struggle and who will be drawn into the struggle to an even greater extent as the situation becomes more acute.

The activity of the Party among the workers in the factories, among the agricultural workers, among the semiproletarian workers and poor peasants of the South and on the islands, among the farmers, the tenant farmers and the middle peasants, among the artisans, among the national minorities and among the colonial populations, as well as among those elements of the urban petty-bourgeoisie which have been ruined by the fascist policy—must be carried on in such a way as to prove to the entire working population that the Communist Party is the only active anti-fascist force, the only organised force which will victoriously lead the struggle against fascism. obtain these results, to attach itself closely to the masses, to stimulate, enlarge, and push the movement forward, and to place itself at the head of it, the Party, in close contact with the Red trade unions, must carry on the most widespread agitation for the everyday partial demands of the workers and the poor peasants. This agitation must be carried on with simple and concrete slogans appropriate for conditions in which the workers and peasants actually find themselves. The Party must link up more closely than it has done hitherto its agitation for partial slogans and its agitation and propaganda for the final aims of the proletarian revolution.

All this work of propaganda, englightenment and agitation must be accompanied by persistent work to organise mass struggles and mass revolutionary actions (demonstrations, partial economic strikes, demonstrations of the peasantry against the fascist municipalities, combination of strikes and demonstrations, etc.). The C.P. must take up the decisive problem of the present period of transforming partial economic strikes into political mass strikes, leading the proletariat into decisive struggle for power. In taking up this problem in a practical manner, the C.P. must strive to develop the separate struggles of the workers into broad mass actions and, when the concrete situation is propitious, to link up strikes with street demonstrations, with fraternisation with the soldiers, with revolutionary mass demonstrations and with the revolutionary struggle of the agricultural labourers and poor peasants. In the villages, peasant committees must be established for the purpose of coordinating the sporadic local movements, which are now taking place in the rural districts, and of transforming them into a struggle of the rural toiling masses against the landholders, against the church and against the fascist author-

Moreover, in order to accomplish all these tasks, it is absolutely necessary for the C.P.I. immediately to intensify its efforts to establish workers' and peasants' mass self-defence organisations in the factories and in the villages for the defence of strikes and demonstrations, as well as in preparation for later struggles for the overthrow of the fascist regime.

In the villages the activity of the Party must be developed very widely, basing itself mainly on the agricultural labourers, whose movements can play a very great role, and establishing a united fighting front with the most important strata of the working population of the villages (agricultural labourers, the poor peasants and a large portion of the middle peasants) against the landowners, against the capitalists, and against the fascist State. Basing its work on the nuclei of the Association for the Defence of Poor Peassants, the Communist Party must

widen their ranks, make them more active and secure the leadership in them. It must carry on a widespread agitation against the fascist municipalities, against taxes, etc., and on the basis of these partial demands of the peasants it must stimulate and direct their struggles so that they shall acquire the character of revolutionary mass struggle against the fascist bourgeois State.

Finally, the struggle against the danger of imperialist war and for the defence of the U.S.S.R. assumes very great importance in Italy owing to the aggressive policy of Italian imperialism, which seeks to solve its contradictions and its crisis by

means of war.

10. The problem of social-democracy is a very important problem for the Italian Party. Italian social-democracy, and all its tendencies, in no way differ from the other social-fascist parties in the II. International. One section of Italian socialdemocracy (the majority of the reformist trade union leaders) has already merged with the fascist regime. Another section (the Reformist Party and the Maximalist Party), which has transferred its activities abroad is waging merely a verbal struggle against fascism, but is actually becoming an instrument of fascism in the struggle against Communism and against the revolutionary proletarian elements. Certain elements of Italian social-democracy are even discussing with Mussolini the conditions under which they may return to Italy and become a part of the reactionary regime of the Italian bourgeoisie. There is not the slightest doubt that with the development of the general crisis of the fascist regime, Italian social-democracy will play a primary role in the suppression of the mass revolutionary movement, and that it will arrive at complete agreement with fascism. The fact that social-democracy is now trying to establish contact with certain groups of the working class and the peasants and resorts to "revolutionary" phraseology for this purpose, may be regarded merely as a method of utilising the mass movement for its reactionary end. The Communist Party must carry on among the masses a strenuous and energetic fight against socialdemocracy and against every bourgeois and petty-bourgeois "democratic" tendency. It must root out and destroy the entirely false and dangerous opinion that Italian social-democracy differs in any way from other social-fascist parties in the II. International. The Communist Party must tirelessly expose the social-democracy as a social-fascist party; at the same time it must destroy all democratic illusions regarding the "progressive" and "revolutionary" role of social-democracy, and prove by the facts of the class struggle that the Communist Party alone really champions the interests of the workers and peasants.

Only by pitilessly exposing the Italian social-democracy as a political appendage of Italian fascism will the Communist Party of Italy be able to fight consistently and to the end against the fascist dictatorship, which will endeavour at its most critical moment to find support among the working masses

through the social-democrats.

11. The Party recently has undoubtedly achieved successes (it has re-established contacts with districts, with which contact had been lost, reorganised its basic units, the 1st of August campaign, active participation in the conference of the C.C.T.U. etc.). The Central Committee at its September meeting subjected to correct self-criticism the policy of the Party, and rectified the general line in accordance with the general line of the CI. and with the new situation in the country. It rectified certain mistakes which were committed in the past; it laid down an ideological and political basis for the struggle against opportunism and conciliatory tendencies, and has energetically carried on this struggle in its own ranks, expelling the renegade, Tasca.

The state of the Party organisation and the manner in which its activity is developing cannot, however, be regarded as satisfactory as yet. The political activity of the local organisations, taken as a whole, is exceedingly weak and not infficiently linked with the masses. They confine themselves to general agitation and fail to stimulate the working and peasant masses or to urge them forward to the necessary and possible extent and, in the majority of cases, they fail to take

the lead of movements that spring up spontaneously.

The intermediate cadres are inadequate and their ideological and political level is very low. There is too wide a gap between the Party centre and the local organisations and the tempo of work is generally, too slow. The same weaknesses are to be noted in the Communist Youth organisations. Moreover, the local youth organisations up till now were

almost completely merged with the Party organisations, and, consequently, are at a very low level of development.

In regard to trade union work, a tendency prevails to identify Party organisations with trade union organisations, which hinders the development of an organised trade union activity amongst the mass of sympathisers and non-Party workers.

While making allowances for the difficulties of the situation it must be said, nevertheless, that the development of the Party lags behind the development of the situation, with regard to organisation, political activity, contact with the masses, and ability to lead their movements. The C.P.I. will be menaced with a serious danger unless it succeeds in eliminating this defect and ceases to drag at the tail of events and of the mass movements. In order to bridge this gap and to accomplish the enormous tasks which the development of the crisis and the awakening of the labour movement sets before it, the C.P. of Italy must bring about a decisive change in its methods of organisation and practical work.

12. The Polit-Bureau of the C. P. I. although belatedly, has nevertheless raised the question of the necessity for such a change. Among the principal conditions required for carrying out this change, it is necessary to mention:

a) All the Party organisations must concentrate their attention and their daily work on recruiting new members for the Party, for the Young Communist League, and the revolutionary trade unions. Success in this work will determine to a considerable extent how far the Party has really carried out the change in its work. b) The Party has issued correct instructions regarding the work in the fascist mass organisations (trade unions, cooperatives, sport organisations, etc.), but until very recently these instructions have been very inadequately carried out. These instructions must be quickly and resolutely carried into effect. c) The work in the trade unions must be developed to the utmost, and a proper division of labour must be introduced between the trade union organisations and the organisations of the Party. Active sympathising workers must be drawn into leading trade union work. d) The most serious attention must be devoted to questions concerning work among the unemployed. The Communist Party must develop the greatest activity in this field—organise committees and councils of unemployed, link up the activity of these committees and councils with the tasks of the C. P. in the trade unions and in the factories, and link up the movement of unemployed with the general class struggle of the proletariat. e) Intensify the work among the emigrants. In view of the new tasks which at present face the C.P. the importance of the work among the great numbers of proletarian emigrants from Italy increases enormously. In this work the C.P. must set itself the task of destroying the influence of the social democracy among the emigrants and organising in a systematic manner the work of recruiting new Party members from among the emigrants as well as training from among them new leading cadres. This work among the emigrants must be carried out in close contact with the Communist Parties concerned, whose duty it is to support and assist the C.P.I. in this work. All the work among emigrants must be organised in such away as to strengthen and multiply the political and organisational contacts with the working class and peasant masses who have remained in Italy, for the main activities of the Party must be concentrated within that country. f) The C.P. must also intensify the struggle against the Catholic Church, and unceasingly explain to the masses that the church assists fascism and the international bourgeoisie to enslave the toilers, to prepare for war against the Soviet Union, and to suppress the revolutionary movement of the oppressed masses.

13. In the present conditions, in view of the intensification of the economic and political situation and the beginning of vast mass movements and struggles of the proletariat against the capitalist state, the very urgent, responsible, and difficult task must be taken up of reaching the masses ideologically and organisationally so as to conduct their movements in the channels of consistent revolutionary class political struggle.

This the Party will not be able to accomplish unless it overcomes and finally destroys all opportunism in all its forms. At the present stage the greatest danger that menaces the Party and the whole labour movement is the Right opportunist danger, Right opportunist tendencies and moods. Against these moods and tendencies the Party as a whole and each Party member individually must carry on a ruthless struggle on

all sides. This struggle must be carried on with persistence, without conciliatory waverings, frankly and outspokenly, and without any attempt to gloss over differences. It is precisely in this respect that the Party leadership has committed a serious political blunder which was expressed in the hesitation and vacillation of the C.C. and in the insufficient mobilisation of the rank and file of the Party for the struggle against the right wing, opportunist, liquidator attitude of Tasca.

The conditions now prevailing in Italy create objective reasons for the spreading of an opportunist ideology among certain strata of the working class and in the Party itself. Among the masses and in the lower ranks of the Party, opportunism finds expression mainly in the failure to understand the leading role of the working class in the antifiscist struggle, in the tendency to wait passively for fascism to fall as a result of the activity of other classes and other factors (a section of the bourgeoisie, social democracy, a military defeat, etc.), and in the tendency to postpone the attack of the proletariat against the capitalist regime until a later date, etc. In practice, opportunism assumes the form of passivity, of renunciation of agitational work among the masses, of fear of the mass movement and of passively waiting for the movement to develop apart from the organised action of the Party. It leads the Party to passivity, to the shirking of tasks, to lack of confidence in the strength of the working class, to capitulation before the enemy. The eradication of opportunism in the Party and in the working class is an essential condition for the achievement of the hegemony of the proletariat in the struggle against fascism and for the struggle assuming a revolutionary class character. The struggle against opportunism is all the more necessary for the reason that recently a strong opportunist tendency has revealed itself even among the leading organs of the Party. The declaration submitted to the Central Committee by Comrade P., member of the Polit. Bureau, represents in fact an opportunist platform. This comrade is in profound disagreement with the political line of the Communist International and in a concealed way supports the position taken up by the opportunist and liquidator elements in all the Parties in the International (denial of the radicalisation of the masses, failure to apreciate the character of the present period, attempt to discredit the line of the C.I., to present it as a line which leads to the destruction of the Communist movement, etc.). Comrade P. upholds the false and profoundly opportunist theses of the possibility of the democratisation of the Italian situation and of fascism. He displays complete ignorance in regard to the organisational tasks of the Party and characterises the activity which the Party must carry out in Italy to stimulate and direct the mass movement as an "artificial factor"; he defends passivity and disseminates the deepest petty bourgeois pessimism. The position this comrade takes up is deserving of severest condemnation as leading to the liquidation of the Party. The struggle against this position must be carried on openly and ruthlessly, and at the same time all those who fail to dissociate themselves from Comrade P., who refuse to oppose him or who display a tendency towards toleration of and conciliation with this point of view, must be strongly combatted.

The organisational plan which was submitted by certain members of the Polit. Bureau must also be regarded as a platform likely to lead to the opportunist position of Comrade P. The ideological basis for this organisational plan supports the - tendencies which accept the theory of the spontaneous development of the revolution, and by that it supports the tendency to under-estimate the leading role the Party must play from the very inception of the mass movement. These comrades strive in fact to justify their position on the ground of the weakness and organisational defects of the Party, which they deliberately exaggerate. The weaknesses and defects of the Party must and fearlessly exposed by collective self-criticism, and attempts must be made to remove them by carefully supervising the carrying out of the decisions which are adopted to this end. But these weaknesses cannot serve as an argument against making a radical change in the methods of work, and against the discussion and solution, as rapidly as possible, of a whole series of new problems. Consequently, the C.C. of the C.P.I. deems it necessary energetically to overcome all resistance to the new line of the Party, laid down for the central organs of the Party, for the Party apparatus, as well as for the lower ranks. The purging of the Party apparatus must be carried out on the basis of an ideological struggle against opportunism with the view to testing the ability of every Party functionary to work in the manner required by the new tasks and with the aid of the new methods.

14. But the struggle against survivals of Tascaism and against the Right wing opportunist danger will not be consistent and sound unless the Party will at the same time frustrate any attempt to revive the Anarcho-liquidationist tendencies of Bordiga. This means that the struggle against the main danger, against the Right wing opportunist deviations and sentiments, must not obscure the danger of "left" sentiments, the attempts to revive survivals of anarcho-liquidationist Bordigaism. Comrade P's. Right wing opportunist ideology cannot be completely smashed and made politically harmless unless the pseudo-left Bordiga outer-covering of his platform is exposed. While politically, comrade P's. platform, in substance, is a belated defence of Tascaism, nevertheless, it represents a shrewed attempt to speculate with certain mistakes committed by the C.C., which they have long ago publicly admitted, and to play on the sentiments of honest proletarian Party elements who are dissatisfied with certain shortcomings in the organisation and carrying out of practical work. At the same time Comrade P. also plays on the sentiments of those who have not yet completely and definitely rid themselves of the last remnants of Bordigaism.

The C. C. C. P. I. deems it necassary, in relation to honest and devoted revolutionary minded proletarians in the Party who betrayed certain vacillations to apply the method of patient persuasion and systematic explanation, and of drawing them into the daily work and even into responsible positions. At the same time the C. C. C. P. I. and the local Party organisations must fight strenuously against right and "left" opportunist tendencies and against the avowed as well as against the cowardly concealed advocates of either tendencies.

15. The forms which the discussion in the Polit. Bureau of the Party have assumed on the new organisational tasks reveal the inherent weakness of the leading organs of the Party. This weakness is partly due to the very difficult situation in which these organs and the whole Party have worked during the past years and to the remoteness of the Party centre form the lower ranks of the Party. But this weakness is also due to the erroneous method of leadership employed in past years owing to the fact that the political differences which exist at the Party centre were not revealed in their entirety for fear of disturbing the composition of the Party centre. Consequently the Party was led to commit certain errors (hesitations on the German question, slowness in developing the ideological and political struggle against Tasca), and opportunity has been given for certain opportunist views to continue to exist in a concealed form in the Party to this very day. These opportunist views can be thoroughly exposed only when the struggle against opportunism and against conciliation with opportunism is widely and ruthlessly developed and when it is brought on to the practical plane, the plane of concrete immediate tasks and their fulfilment. This struggle will undoubtedly serve to strengthen the internal solidity of the C.C. and of the Polit-Bureau; because it will link the C.C. of the Party with the best revolutionary elements of the lower ranks of the Party and of the working class. In the course of this struggle and in the course of the entire work of the Party, the discipline and interna' unity of the central organs of the Party must be safeguarde. against all attempts to disparage collective self-criticism, whiel must be widely developed, or to transform it into a disruptiv factional struggle. This result will be attached much mor easily if the C.C. fights vigorously for the general line of the C.C. and of the Party and if it defends this line against an attack, and if it refrains from seeking to come to terms with those who disagree with or resist the application of this line. In particular, the C.C.C.P.I. deems it necessary, to accelerate the application of the decision to coopt new working class elements from the factories on to the Central Committee.