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CONTENTS
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CONTENTS

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1. THE EXAMPLE OF THE MINERS' STRIKE IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

Forty-five thousand miners are embraced by the greatest and most important mass political struggle on the entire European Continent, now going on in Czecho-Slovakia. A concrete example of correct united front tactics.

(See page 251)

2. LESSONS THE COMMUNIST PARTIES MUST LEARN FROM THE C.P.S.U. (Part I.)

O. Piatnitsky. The first part of a report, giving a detailed comparison of the organisational development and methods of the Bolshevik Party with the post-war Communist Parties of advanced capitalist countries, and drawing conclusions. Invaluable for all organisers.

(See page 256)

3. EVENTS IN IRELAND

Gerhardt. A historical review of Irish politics and economics, together with a critical analysis of De Valera's policy—and a detailed exposition of the tasks of the Irish—and the British Communists in relation thereto.

(See page 267)

4. COMRADE STALIN'S LETTER AND THE PURGING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF SOCIAL- DEMOCRATIC RELICS (Part II.)

Z. Serebryansky. In the second and concluding portion of his article, the author deals with the C.P. of France and, analysing its literature, particularly in regard to the history of the French movement, exposes the connection between the Party's errors and the Social-Democratic relics, showing the value of Stalin's letter on this question (No. 20, Vol. 8).

(See page 276)

5. THE LAST AGRICULTURE CENSUS IN THE U.S.A.

M. Spectator. An analysis of recently published data on the basis of the same classification as used by Lenin in his study of American agriculture, confirming Lenin's conclusions.

(See page 284)

6. COMRADE LI-KWEI, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDO- CHINA (Obituary)

(See page 289)

THE EXAMPLE OF THE MINERS' STRIKE IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

A TREMENDOUS struggle of miners has broken out in Czecho-Slovakia. Forty-five thousand miners in five different mining districts are embraced by this struggle. The heart of the struggle is in North-West Bohemia, where at the moment 25,000 miners have already been out for more than three weeks in a united and heroic strike.

It is the greatest miners' strike in Czecho-Slovakia since 1923, and also the greatest and most important mass struggle politically during the economic crisis, not only in Czecho-Slovakia, but on the entire European continent.

At the moment this struggle is still continuing. It is, however, not too early to call attention to its significance, and also one or two important facts of this struggle which are very instructive for all sections of the Communist International. For this struggle shows convincingly, in all its phases, how the economic struggles should be organised and led, and it also shows how one can mobilise important sections of the proletariat and lead them in such an economic struggle which is directed against the Achilles heel of the bourgeoisie. It also shows how one can and must aim successful blows at the agency of the bourgeoisie in the working class, namely, social fascism.

What important features in the development of the struggle should be raised? What are the lessons of this action of the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia for the remaining sections of the Communist International?

1. *From part struggles to mass struggles.* This is the path to the great miners' strike. We have already had occasion to record in our journal that the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia has concentrated the attention of all its members and organisations on the concrete day-to-day interests and mobilisation of the masses, by utilising the most varied methods of struggle, already since the Tenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. In this connection the decisions of the Third Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia (1st November, 1931) were, above all, of the greatest importance. This Plenum collected all the preceding experiences of the Party in organising the struggles in the works and factories, among the unemployed, and in the villages, and placed them before the entire membership as a concrete guide. The concrete account of various methods and forms of the struggle for part demands which is given in the decisions of the Third Plenum, enabled the Party to lead hundreds and hundreds of partial struggles and

strikes in the factories, and also to organise and develop a powerful fighting movement among the unemployed and also the poor peasantry, especially in Carpathian Ukraine. In its daily work the Central Committee convinced the Party that one cannot capture the factories with phrases, nor deliver serious blows against the bourgeoisie, that one cannot undermine the influence of the social fascists with phrases and curses, but that, on the contrary, for this purpose a dogged daily revolutionary work is necessary in the factories and among the toilers. Fighting against practical opportunism and "left" sectarianism, the Central Committee carried out this line in the Party to a large extent. In this way the Party succeeded in creating an unemployed movement throughout the entire Republic, exclusively led by itself, in arousing the poor peasants of the Carpathian Ukraine to a mass struggle against hunger and Czechist imperialism, and organising many separate partial strikes in the factories. It thereby succeeded in essentially frustrating the starvation plans of the bourgeoisie. For example, the bourgeoisie was compelled to give the unemployed many more millions relief than it had originally anticipated. The Geneva system of unemployment relief was practically destroyed. Similarly in Carpathian Ukraine.

In the factories, however, only partial struggles took place, no mass struggle had yet been organised. The Fourth Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia (20-3-32) concentrated the attention of the Party anew on the question of factory work, and emphasised that the Communists and members of the red trade unions must concern themselves daily with the smallest interests of the workers in the factories and learn to utilise every event in the factory for the mobilisation of the masses on the basis of the united front. That they must create this united front on the broadest basis of the common struggle of all workers in the smallest actions if it is to come to the outbreak of great mass struggles. The revolutionary perspective is also a further important factor. The Central Committee placed the entire preceding experiences of innumerable successful and unsuccessful strikes and factory workers' movements again before the entire Party.

The great mass struggle of the North-West Bohemian miners convincingly proves that this policy of the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia is the only correct one. The Party and the red trade unions had long since organised in North-West Bohemia

a united front of the miners against dismissals and for assistance to meet the high cost of living. They succeeded in many pits, by the organisation of demonstrative strikes, in defending themselves from dismissals and winning assistance to meet high prices. In this movement they successfully forged the united front. Above all, attention should be directed to the great district conference of factory councils and elected delegates from various factory staffs which met in the autumn of 1931 and was attended by numerous *reformist officials*. In comradely debate with them the Party succeeded, on the basis of the partial struggles previously conducted, in winning wide strata of the reformist factory officials for joint action. At this conference a united front council for further leadership of the movement was elected. This conference represented a very significant step in the creation of the united front. In the entire development of the movement in the district, in the partial struggles, and the creation of a firm united front, the Party grew, consolidated itself, increased its authority among the workers and delivered a heavy blow at the influence of the social fascists. When the employers sought to increase their attacks against the miners, the Party was already in the position to oppose a mass struggle to this attack, to lead the workers in a mass counter-attack on the entire North-West Bohemian front.

2. The attack of the employers consisted in mass dismissals and a considerable reduction in wages. In Mähr. Ostrauer mining district they demanded the mass dismissal of 15,000 miners and a reduction of wages of more than 30 per cent. In Kladno district they carried these dismissals out and also in North-west Bohemia. By this means the already unbearable misery of the remaining workers was to be still more worsened and the army of unemployed still further increased. The question of reduction of wages stood in the forefront. The employers openly admitted this. When the struggle had already broken out, the industrial organ of Czechish finance capital "Hospodarsky rozhled" of 31.3.32 wrote:

"One cannot deny that throughout the entire world the tendency to fit wage standards to the altered economic relationship is finding expression. For this reason Czecho-Slovakian economy, which is closely connected by its exports, with foreign undertakings cannot hold aloof. Although the wage standards in Czecho-Slovakia in relation to those of the remaining countries are among the lowest, it cannot be held that the maintenance of these standards is justifiable. . . After the reduction of the wages of private officials, the reduction of

wages can no longer be a question of principle but only a question of tactics and time. In general the conviction is paramount that it must come to this. For this reason it is expected. It was naturally a very long time before anybody could be found in this most unpleasant situation to take the initiative. Finally, the Ostrau employers decided to do this."

Heavy wage reductions and new mass dismissals; this was the plan of the coal barons in all mining districts, and the successful carrying through of this plan was to represent a *great initiative* for the attitude of the employers in the remaining branches of industry. The State power and the Social-fascists also undertook to carry through this attack, giving every assistance. On this occasion, however, they did not find themselves in a position to realise their plans with the same ease as previously.

As a result of the permanently increasing impoverishment of the masses, and their suppression, the *radicalisation of the miners* grew rapidly. The masses were constantly more conscious that "something must come," something which would solve their difficulties and make a change in their miserable situation. The Communist Party has succeeded in convincing the masses that this "something" is only the struggle, can only be a mass united strike. The colossal radicalisation of the masses and their determination to put an end to the employers' attack—this defined the tactical approach of the Party and was the basis of its revolutionary activity.

3. The development of the mass struggle of the miners through the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia frustrated the plans of the employers, as well as those of the social fascists and the State power. When in West Bohemia a catastrophe took place in a pit and mass dismissals were carried out at another pit, the Party at once mobilised the entire staffs of these pits for struggle. Partial demands were drafted and the surrounding pits called upon for solidarity and mobilised. With slogans against dismissals and wage reductions, the great majority of the miners in the Brucher district were mobilised and led on strike. At the pits, *strike committees* were elected by the men, and a *conference of factory councils* of all pits called for this district. This conference issued the slogan of "broaden the strike" to the entire district, and proposed the calling of a district conference for a united front. The strike was then extended in stormy forms. From the pit "Humboldt," where the first strike broke out, the strikers marched with their women and children and the unemployed in serried ranks to the nearest pit,

fraternised with the men there, stopped the pit, then marched to the third, fourth and all remaining pits. Everywhere the miners joined the strike. In this way it went from *one pit to another* throughout the entire North-West Bohemian district. On the first day of the struggle 400 were on strike; on the next day 5,000; on the third 10,000, then 14,000, 18,000, 22,000 and finally the entire mining population, 25,000. All pits were on strike (over 100), both the largest (1,200 miners) and the smallest (30 miners).

The example of the North-West Bohemian miners was rapidly followed by the *Ostrau* and *Kladno* miners. In Ostrau twelve pits were stopped and 11,000 miners came out. In Kladno all big pits (7,000 miners) came out; in the district of Handlova (Slovakia) the entire staff of 1,000 workers came out on a one-day demonstrative strike; and in Falkenau approximately 15,000 miners struck for several days. In the meantime, however, the State power and the social fascists succeeded in Mähr. Ostrau, in Kladno and in Falkenau in breaking the strike. But not in North-West Bohemia. Here the fighting front is firm. In fact, it even extended to the remaining branches of industry, so that it was possible on the 13th April to carry through the general strike.

Under what *chief demands* was the strike called? In the forefront, above all, two demands: (1) immediate reinstatement of all those dismissed and suspension of all dismissals until the end of 1932. Not one man outside the factory! (2) Consolidation of the existing wage rates: not a penny off wages!

It is very important that among the demands of the striking miners are also to be found the *demands of the unemployed* who stand together with the miners in struggle: support for the unemployed, away with the Geneva system!

A series of demands exceed the limits of partial demands. For example, limitation of the working time in the mines to six hours daily without reduction in wages; against any worsening of the independent miners' insurance and for its operation at the expense of the employer and the State. Also one political demand: recall of the *gendarmerie* and the military from the strike area. In the course of the struggle these demands were increased by one other which arose from the situation, namely, the demand that negotiations were to be conducted exclusively with the Central Strike Committee.

The general slogan of the miners' struggle was Unity—Strike—Victory!

What important features distinguish the development of this mass struggle? How was

this movement, which not only extended to the miners but literally to all remaining workers and embraced the entire toiling population, organised? The most important feature, the basis of the movement, is:

(a) *To be seen in the united front.* The C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia has been successful in this struggle, in creating a united front, from the first to the last man. The famous "theory" of the social fascists that during the crisis it is impossible to lead a strike and that the workers being split into various parties and trade unions renders impossible any united struggle, was exposed and smashed in this struggle by the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia as a piece of deceit. The C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia created a united front of the struggle for the partial demands of all workers irrespective of differences. This united front was extended in the previous partial struggles in the separate pits and built up with every step of the broadening of the movement. The united fighting front was also extended beyond the pits. In the strike committees not only the miners are represented irrespective of differences, but also the *miners' wives* and the *unemployed*. The united front is deep-rooted in struggle. Two powerful united-front conferences in which factory-council members, elected delegates, and members of strike committees participated, and in which reformists, *Hakenkreuzler*,* Christian, Socialist and unorganised participants greatly outnumbered the members of the red trade unions, were not only the expression of the already existing united front, but a further consolidation and extension of it. They led to the consolidation of the united fighting front of all miners; they elected a united central strike committee and drafted common demands. The members of the red unions and the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia, as stated, were in the minority, but the slogans and proposals of the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia and the red unions were unanimously accepted and declared to be the only correct ones. The strike-breaking methods and the standpoint of the social fascists were unanimously condemned and declared to be contrary to working-class interests.

This *real* united front of the mass struggle is the most important feature of the North-West Bohemian miners' strike, the greatest achievement of the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia.

(b) *The defeat of the social fascists* among the North-West Bohemian miners; their exclusion from the ranks of the miners is not only a preliminary to, but at the same time a necessary result of, the united front which has been created.

The united front could only be created in bitter

* Fascist T.U.S. Ed.

struggle against the social fascists, only through the complete exposure of their treacherous intentions, only on the basis of convincing the masses that the struggle against the employers must also be a struggle against their allies, namely, the social-fascist leaders, if it is to be successful. The C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia succeeded in this.

The social fascists quite *openly opposed the strike* from the commencement. They declared that this strike was "wild" and "unorganised." They openly called upon their members *not to strike*, and to boycott the strike committees. At the same time they developed a high-sounding "*left*" manoeuvre; they proposed in Parliament that the State take over the pits which they put forward as "nationalisation," and "socialisation." They sought to keep the miners away from the strike by this means, but they *over-estimated* their forces, influence, and positions, as was quickly shown. At the same time they *under-estimated* the effectiveness of the united front tactic and the influence of the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia. *Not one member of their organisation followed their strike-breaking slogans.* In this connection it is necessary to understand that the reformists have more positions than the red trade unions both organisationally, and in the factory and pit councils. When their strike-breaking slogans suffered shipwreck they endeavoured to break the strike in an organised way. At a district conference of their officials which they called, they tried to compel them to oppose the strike, and leave the strike committees. But the united front, in the meantime, had been so deeply-rooted by the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia; the workers being so deeply convinced of the correctness of this tactic and the necessity of a solid struggle, that the great majority of the workers at this reformist conference declared themselves against the views of their leaders, and for the continuance of the struggle, in a united front with the remaining workers under the leadership of the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia.

The social fascists also met with defeat in Parliament with their proposal for "socialisation" of the pits. The Communist fraction put forward a bill with much "more modest" demands. These were the demands of the fighting miners. The social fascists voted against these demands, and their bill for the "socialisation" of the pits was exposed to the masses as a demagogic and deceitful manoeuvre.

When the slogan of the General Strike was issued from five district conferences of the united front on the 10th April, the social fascists issued an appeal, in which they directed the following strike-breaking words to their members: "The undersigned local trade union committees are of

the opinion that these Communist efforts to extend the strike are neither in the interests of the workers generally, nor in those of the miners. The local trade union committees *issue, therefore, an urgent warning to all their members to decisively and manfully reject the Communist 'Putsch'-ist endeavours!*"

Nevertheless, the workers carried on with the general strike, together with the members of the reformist trade unions "manfully and decisively" under the slogans of the united front conference.

The significance of this is of extraordinary importance for the further development of the class struggle in Czecho-Slovakia. The Czecho-Slovakian bourgeoisie is very well aware of this, with great misgivings. The Central organ of the Agricultural Party writes, for example:

"The socialists have proved incapable of guiding the movement called forth by the difficult social situation of the miners and the hard-fistedness of the coal barons. *The socialist trade unions have failed at a very serious moment, especially the social-democratic organisations.* This is a lesson for us: that when we have to do with a movement, with a political basis or one which would be directed against the peace and order of the Republic, *that one cannot rely upon the social democracy* This is the lesson of the extent and the entire character of the miners' strike."

The above cited facts and the tone of the bourgeois press suffice to illustrate the complete impotence of the social fascists in regard to the united front, and their complete defeat among the workers of North-West Bohemia. On the other hand, these facts signify a tremendous success for the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia which has understood how to fight the social fascists *in deeds* and not merely with speeches, and also to smash them.

(c) *The hegemony of the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia* became an unquestioned fact in the struggle of the North-West Bohemian miners, which extended to the entire working class. Only the *Hakenkreuzler* attempted to shatter the fighting front from within. They declared themselves in favour of the struggle, adopting all the slogans of the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia, but at the same time fruitlessly endeavour to place themselves at the head of the struggle, at least, at the side of the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia and win such a position as to enable them to carry out their strike-breaking intentions. The C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia has exposed them as agents of the employers step by step, and the *Hakenkreuz* leaders remain at the tail of the movement. The *Hakenkreuz* workers did not fight under the slogans and direction of their own leaders but under the leadership of the united front organs

led by the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia. The C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia is, therefore, becoming the acknowledged, the sole leader of the working class, in this struggle. It stands alone at the head of this struggle, which it has organised, and the social fascists stand openly on the side of the employers. The entire working class of the North-West Bohemian industrial districts followed the slogans of the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia for the general strike. The influence and authority of the Party in 1920, was not so great in this district as it is to-day.

(d) *The strength and extent of the struggle* express themselves above all in the following: The miners' strike extends to every pit. There is no scabbing. The unemployed and the wives also participate daily in the struggle. The Central Strike Committee forced recognition from the authorities under the pressure of the masses as the sole representative of the miners and the authorities now pass all the requests of various concerns for coal to it. The Central Strike Committee alone decides who shall receive coal and who shall not. Workers in other industries have taken advantage of the struggle of the miners to draft their own demands and come out on demonstrative solidarity strikes for these demands and solidarity with the miners. On the day of the central mass demonstrations in Brůx more than 30 factories and building jobs came out on strike and 40,000 people took part in the mass demonstration. On the 13th April in practically every factory and works of the North-West Bohemian industrial district the general strike was unitedly and solidly carried out. In addition to the miners' wives, and the unemployed, the workers from the small shops and also the small peasants were drawn into the fighting front. During the general strike and the great demonstrations, the hand-workers without exception closed their shops and took part in the demonstration.

We therefore have to do with a genuine *people's movement*. The entire toiling population has been set in movement. All the strike-breaking attempts of the social fascists and all the attacks of the *gendarmes* and dragoons are helpless before this force.

(e) *The shortcomings and mistakes of the movement*. In the miners' strike it has been strikingly shown how one should utilise the united front tactic to lead to successful struggles, and also how one should not do so. The North-West Bohemian miners' struggle is the result of the correct application of the united front tactic. The united front here was formed exclusively *from below* and embraces all reformist members, and also factory officials. In *Ostrau*, however, the Party was guilty of gross errors in the prepara-

tion of the struggle and the application of the united front tactic. The "united front" was at the start created more *from above*, than from below, so that actually it was no united front of struggle in the factories at all. In this way, the pretence of the truth of the "left radical" militant speeches of the social fascists and their authority, was strengthened through us. The creation of a united front in the factories for the struggle was thereby made essentially more difficult, and when we later endeavoured to do this, the social fascists rapidly succeeded in limiting the strike to twelve pits and finally breaking it. In *Kladno*, it is true that the Party had created the united front only from below, not sufficiently energetically, however, nor on a broad enough basis (the reformist pit officials were hardly embraced at all and the members of the reformist trade unions only partially so), so that also in *Kladno* the social fascists and the police terror were successful in breaking the strike. In the meantime the social fascists had concluded a miserable collective agreement for the miners of *Ostrau* but this agreement was, however, rejected by their own officials' conference. On the basis of this, and the fighting experiences already gained, a new strike situation is rapidly ripening in *Ostrau* in which the Party must understand how to apply a similar tactic to that in North Bohemia.

* * *

At the moment of writing the fighting front in North-West Bohemia is firm. The Government has opened negotiations for a conclusion of the strike inviting, however, only the trade unions but not the strike leadership. The social fascists have *openly objected* to the invitation of the strike leadership. This means a new provocation of the miners by the social fascists, and the Government, by trying to conclude a collective agreement with the employers and each organisation separately, which has openly declared itself against the struggle and demands of the miners and done everything possible so far to break the strike. The miners declare quite definitely that negotiations *can only be conducted with the Central Strike Committee*, and already repudiate any agreements of the social fascists or other antagonistic trade unions.

* * *

The mass struggle of the miners signifies a *change in the political situation of Czecho-Slovakia*, as Comrade *Gottwald* has correctly declared in Parliament. This change consists in the fact that the Party answers the attacks of the bourgeoisie with mass struggles, frustrates their hunger plans in mighty battles, and delivers heavy blows at the chief social support of the

bourgeoisie inside the working class, namely, *social fascism*. The change consists in the fact that the Party has not only been successful in passing from partial struggles to *mass struggles* but also from struggles in light industry, to great militant movements and mass strikes in *heavy industry*. The miners' struggle is a signal and an *example for the entire Czecho-Slovakian working class* for the development of further mass battles, and represents from this viewpoint an important step on the road of the organisation of the struggle for the revolutionary way out of the crisis of capitalism. Further successes of the

C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia on this road must bring about a destruction of the social fascist organisations, the creation of mass organisations of the red trade unions, and the consolidation of the factory groups. All the features of the miners' strike in Czecho-Slovakia which we have described above, and the methods by which the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia has brought about the mass struggle, are extremely instructive for all sections of the C.I. The sections must absorb the experiences of the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia because these experiences can be useful to them in the organisation and extension of economic struggles.

THE BOLSHEVISATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES BY MEANS OF OVERCOMING THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS*

O. PIATNITSKY.

THE XI Plenum of the E.C.C.I. recorded the fact that the sections of the Comintern in the capitalist countries lag behind the rise of the revolutionary labour and peasant movement.

Since the XI Plenum of the E.C.C.I. a year has passed, a period sufficient for drawing some conclusions. Has this lag been liquidated?

The last three quarters of 1931 and the first quarter of 1932 brought a sharp deterioration of the conditions of the toiling masses, of the workers and of the poor and middle peasant masses. The Social-Democratic and Socialist Parties and the reformist trade union which still have a large following among the workers and employees, have long completely deserted to the side of the bourgeoisie and have been daily betraying the interests of the working class. During this period the revolutionary labour and peasant movement did not subside while in some countries (Spain, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, China, Japan, India, America, France) it even continued on the up-grade, yet in the principal imperialist countries (England, America, Germany, France) the Communist Parties are just as backward as they were before the XI Plenum of the E.C.C.I. As the last elections in Germany and France have shown, the Communist Parties of these countries have not only failed to break the hold of the Social-Democratic Party and of the reformists upon the great working masses, but have even lost votes compared with the

parliamentary elections of 1928 and 1930. Each country has its objective causes to explain this lag. This does not mean, however, that the lag is not due in a very large measure to the subjective factor—the failure to utilise the discontent of the great masses of the toilers with the lowering of the living standards, with unemployment, starvation, the burden of taxation, the actions of the Social-Democratic and Socialist Parties and reformist trade unions.

How are we to explain this failure to capture the working masses from the Social-Democratic and Socialist Parties and the reformist trade unions, and to consolidate, organise and keep those workers who joined the Communist Parties and revolutionary trade union movements of the capitalist countries.

It is due mainly to the Social-Democratic and reformist traditions, prevailing in every field of party and trade union work, which are deeply-rooted in the Communist Parties, red trade unions and trade union oppositions.

By contrasting the Bolshevik and the Social-Democratic methods of mass work, organisational forms, estimations of the current situation and tactics we shall show below that the sections of the Comintern in the capitalist countries took over and preserved a good deal of the practices of the Social-Democratic Parties.

The Bolsheviks and Reformism, Opportunism and the adaptability of the Socialist Parties of the West during the Epoch of the Pre-War Second International.

Czarist Russia was dominated by an autocracy,

*This article comprises the revised stenographic record of a report delivered at the conference of teachers of Party structure of the International Communist Universities.

by a feudal-landlord clique. Not only the position of the workers, but also that of the peasants was unbearable. The entire petty bourgeoisie (and even the liberal bourgeoisie) were discontented with the autocracy. (This, by the way, explains the extensive participation of the intelligentsia and students in the revolutionary movement against the autocracy in 1905.) Russia, as the events of 1905 proved, was headed for a bourgeois-democratic revolution. Comrade Lenin wrote in March, 1905, on this question as follows: "The objective course of events has confronted the Russian proletariat precisely with the task of a democratic-bourgeois revolution . . . The same task confronts the whole nation, i.e., the entire mass of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry; without such a revolution any more or less extensive development of an independent class organisation aiming at a Socialist revolution is unthinkable." ("The Revolutionary Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Peasantry," Volume VI, Page 136, First Edition.)

This period of the bourgeois-democratic revolutions had already been passed in the 90's by the principal countries abroad. The bourgeois-democratic revolutions there were made, under the leadership of the bourgeoisie, by the proletariat and petty bourgeoisie with no revolutionary labour parties in existence.

The Social-Democratic and Socialist Parties which already existed as mass parties in the principal countries abroad in the 90's, adapted themselves to the existing regimes and legislations. Before the world war the political struggle conducted by the Social-Democratic Parties was a struggle for reforms in the field of social legislation and for universal suffrage, the struggle itself being carried on chiefly by means of the ballot.

While they did not reject in words the ultimate goal of the struggle of the proletariat, Socialism, in reality they did nothing of a serious and practical character to prepare for and wage the revolutionary battles, to train for this purpose the necessary cadres, to give the party organisations a revolutionary policy, to break through the bourgeois legality in the process of the struggle, etc. The entire policy of the Social-Democratic and Socialist Parties resolved itself into securing through universal, equal suffrage, etc., a parliamentary majority, in order then to "inaugurate Socialism." Attempts at such adaptation, which met with resolute resistance on the part of the illegal Bolshevik Party, found an expression in Russia as well as among the Menshevik liquidators (and Trotsky) who proclaimed the Stolypin regime a bourgeois one and sought to adjust themselves to it by taking up legal activities, and fighting for reforms after the model of the West-

European Socialist Parties. The Mensheviks ignored the fact that the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution remained unsolved after the 1905 revolution as well.

The rôle of the trade unions in the West was deliberately restricted to that of a subsidiary organisation of the great working masses protecting nothing but the daily, even if important, economic interests of the working class without pursuing the aim of overthrowing the bourgeoisie and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. They left the entire field of "pure" politics to the political party. They had no other aims except to negotiate collective agreements and conduct economic strikes. Even more reformist was the rôle of the workers' co-operatives. The trade unions sometimes found themselves in conflict even with the Social-Democratic Parties on the question of the calling of political strikes and revolutionary holidays, while the co-operatives clashed with the trade unions seeking aid from the workers' co-operatives during economic strikes. It was for this reason that the foreign Social-Democratic and Socialist Parties regarded Bernstein's revision of the fundamental principles of Marxism so tolerantly, without even thinking of a split, despite the fact that certain Social-Democratic Parties passed resolutions against the opportunists, revisionists and reformists, for the whole work of the Social-Democratic Parties and of the Labour organisations led by them, was permeated in practice with Bernsteinism.

The situation in Czarist Russia was quite different. During the 90's there existed in every city, particularly in the industrial centres of the former Russia Empire, not only groups of populists but also groups and organisations of Social-Democrats. From their very inception there existed among them opposing tendencies: "Economists," Bundists, with their demand for cultural-national autonomy, who adhered to the "Economists," Revolutionary Social-Democrats, ordinary Social-Democrats — the swamp which swung both ways. The Social-Democratic newspaper, "Iskra," which began to be published by the revolutionary Social-democrats headed by Comrade Lenin, opened from the very outset a struggle against all deviations from Marxism in general, and against "Economism" in particular.

Lenin and the revolutionary "Iskristis" who gained a majority at the second congress of the Party (the Bolsheviks) continued in their subsequent activities to follow the revolutionary Social-Democratic line of the old "Iskra." In a tireless struggle against Menshevism, liquidationism, recallism,* Trotskism, the right deviation,

*Otsovism.—Ed.

opportunism in practice, sectarianism, conciliationism within the Party, and all deviations from the Party line, in the name of the capture, maintenance and consolidation of the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, in a heroic revolutionary struggle against the Czarist autocracy, in a relentless struggle against the liberal bourgeoisie which was prepared to compromise with the Czarist autocracy and sought to deflect the Russian revolution on to the "Prussian road," in a struggle against the entire capitalist system, at all the stages of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the Bolshevik Party, headed by Lenin, forged the Bolshevik strategy and tactics, the methods of mass work, the organisational principles and the Bolshevik Party structure. *The Bolsheviks in Russia, unlike the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries, did not have to overcome the old, deep-rooted opportunist and reformist traditions in the policy, organisation and methods of their work.* Besides, the Bolsheviks carefully studied and learned the lessons of the bourgeois-democratic revolutions, the rôle of the liberal bourgeoisie in them, rejected the weak points of the theory, programme and practice of the Western Social-Democratic Parties and mass labour organisations and absorbed the good elements.

What conditions prevailed in Czarist Russia and abroad when the Bolshevik Party began to be organised in Russia and the Social-Democratic Parties in the West.

Up to 1905 there were no legal parties in Czarist Russia. Even the liberal bourgeoisie were forced to publish their printed party organ, "Emancipation," abroad (in Stuttgart, Germany). In the other countries, on the contrary, there existed practically throughout the history of the mass labour movement (with some rare and temporary exceptions such as the anti-Socialist law in Germany), freedom for the Social-Democratic Parties not only before, but even during the war. In the decisive capitalist countries (France, Germany, England, America, Czecho-Slovakia and many other countries) the Communist Parties exist more or less legally. It is these parties that we shall deal with. It is these parties that I will contrast and compare with the Bolshevik Party of former Czarist Russia.

Up to 1905 Russia had no legal mass trade unions, and after 1905 when they were created by the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks and Mensheviks) they eked out a miserable existence until 1912. The Mensheviks endeavoured to give the T.U.'s they had created functions and a character analogous to that of T.U.'s in Western Europe. If they did not succeed in this, it was only thanks

to the tireless struggle of the Bolsheviks against these efforts inside the workers' mass organisations. From the outbreak of the war until the February Revolution the T.U.'s were either closed or placed in such police conditions as to be unable to function normally. Abroad, in the principal countries (England, America, Italy) trade unions were created before the organisation of the Social-Democratic Parties, while the trade union movement of France was permeated by syndicalism which ignored the political parties. At the same time, in some countries (England, Belgium, Sweden, etc.) the trade unions were collectively affiliated to the Labour Parties so that it may be said that in a certain measure these Parties were formed out of the trade unions. Even of Germany it may be said that the trade union movement is older than the independent political Labour Parties. In the 60's the trade unions in various Labour centres (such as the unions of compositors, cigar makers in Berlin, etc.) originated and functioned before the workers' educational societies which gave rise to the two Labour Parties of Germany, the Lassalians and the Eisenachers (which subsequently constituted the German Social-Democratic Party), broke away from their bourgeois navel cord, the bourgeois progressive party. The workers' strikes took place without the leadership of political parties, especially during the latter half of the 60's.

It goes without saying that both individual Socialists and, particularly, the First International as a whole, which was led by Marx and Engels, exercised a very great influence over the existing trade unions and the strikes of that time. But the fact is that even in Germany of that epoch the political parties did not organise strikes or lead the trade unions. Later, with the passing of the anti-Socialist law, the German trade unions suffered less than the political Social-Democratic Party. The powerful development of capitalism strengthened the trade union movement despite the persecutions. Under the conditions of the time the trade unions could not but strengthen their independence. The Parliamentary Social-Democratic fraction which assumed the functions of the General Committee did not direct the economic struggle of the proletariat, restricting itself to Parliamentary-political problems. Thus, from the very beginning of the existence of the Social-Democratic Party, and of the trade union organisations, the latter displayed tendencies towards independence. In Czarist Russia, on the contrary, the Party organisations of the Bolsheviks led the entire struggle, both economic and political. Abroad the functions of the trade unions and the Social-Democratic Parties were divided, the Parties engaging in pure politics

while the trade unions conducted the economic struggle. It must be emphasised that some Communist Parties in capitalist countries do not even now consider it their duty to lead the economic struggle, but entrust it completely to the trade union opposition or the red trade unions. Thus, the Communist Parties have taken over these Social-Democratic traditions. In those countries where the Communist Parties organise strikes and attend to the trade union movement we observe cases of a sectarian attitude towards it. It is only with great difficulty that the Communist Parties succeed in ridding themselves of this attitude.

The Bolshevik and the Social-Democratic Forms of Party Organisation.

In Czarist Russia there were no elections or election campaigns up to 1905. If the municipal councils (the *Zemstvos*) were elected bodies, neither the peasants nor the workers participated in the elections. They were disfranchised. After 1905 when the State Duma was created the workers were given special voting conditions, labour "curias"* being created and the workers voting in the factories and mills.

The illegal condition of all the parties in Czarist Russia up to 1905, the absence of elections and (and this is of chief importance) the correct attitude of the Bolsheviks towards the structure of the Party—they recruited into the Party the workers of the factories, created political and self-educated circles from among the factory workers — such were the special forms of the Bolshevik Party in Czarist Russia. The illegal condition of the Bolshevik Party as per the reasons given prompted it to establish Party groups in the factories where it was easier and more convenient to work. The Party structure of the Bolsheviks thus began with the factories, and this yielded excellent results both during the years of the reaction, after the February revolution, and particularly during the October Revolution of 1917, the civil war and the great construction of Socialism. During the reaction following upon 1908 when in places the local party committees and the party leadership (the C.C.) were broken up there still remained in the factories and mills a certain base, small party cells which continued the work. After the February Revolution when the elections were held to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies the factories and mills also served as the basis for the elections. It is noteworthy that the elections to the municipal and district councils and the Constituent Assembly, which were based not upon occupational but upon territorial principles, were also carried out by the Bolshevik Party very successfully after the

February and October Revolutions, despite the fact that the party had no territorial organisations, and its agitation was concentrated in the factories and barracks. The cells and the district and city committees conducted the election campaign without creating special territorial organisations for the purpose. During all periods the lower party organisations of the Bolsheviks existed at the place of work rather than at the place of residence.

Abroad the situation was entirely different. There elections were held not in the factories but in the election districts, in the places where the voters lived. The main task pursued by the Socialist Parties was to gain electoral victories, to fight by means of the ballot, and the Party organisation was therefore built along residential lines which made it easier to organise the Party members for the election campaign in the respective election districts.

It cannot be said, however, that the Social-Democratic Parties were not connected with the factories and mills. They kept in contact with them through the trade unions which they headed through their members. Although the trade unions were not built along factory lines they still had their representatives and financial secretaries in the factories, and since all of these financial secretaries and trade union delegates were mostly Social-Democrats, the Social-Democratic Parties, through these trade union delegates and through the trade unions, were connected with the factories. When the Communist Parties appeared (and they appeared in some countries as a result of secessions and withdrawals from the Social-Democratic Party, while in others, such as Czecho-Slovakia and France, the majority of the Social-Democratic Party decided to join the Communist International, the remaining minorities constituting themselves into Social-Democratic Parties), they built their organisations exactly after the model of the Social-Democrats. And this despite the fact that the Communist Parties, from the very moment of their inception, aimed at an entirely different objective to that of the Social-Democratic Parties. They made it their object to overthrow the bourgeoisie and establish the power of the proletariat, while the international Social-Democracy during the war, supported its bourgeoisie and after the war developed into the chief social support of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the Communist Parties constructed their organisations along the same lines as the Social-Democrats, on the basis of election constituencies, along residential lines. In addition it must be said that they did not have their trade union organisations, and where they created their own trade unions, the latter did not,

*Polling Stations.

and do not, to this day, have firm organisational connections with the factories. Thus, the organisations of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries were built *without permanent organisational connections with the factories*. Such is the principal defect in the structure of the Communist Parties which must be clearly and sharply stressed by the teacher in the universities. The Communist Parties have different tasks yet they built their organisations along the same lines as the Social-Democratic Parties. While the Social-Democrats are connected with the factories through the trade unions, the Communist Parties do not have even such connections with the factories; this is true of even those Communist Parties which strongly influence the red trade unions (the Communist Parties of Czecho-Slovakia and France). The Communist Parties immediately after their formation took over the organisational forms of the Social-Democratic Parties, because they did not know of, they were not familiar with, the peculiar Bolshevik forms and methods of Party structure. However, during the war, and immediately after it, the factory workers in many countries appointed revolutionary representatives; in Germany these representatives played an important part in the big strikes conducted during the war, elected factory committees (such as the shop stewards in England) and even sent representatives to Soviets. In this way they were able to realise the advantages of organising at their place of work compared with organisation along territorial lines. But after the revolutionary storm subsided, the Social-Democratic traditions gained the upper hand over the forms of organisation approaching the Bolshevik forms of work in the factories. This is the main reason why the Communist Parties, especially the middle and lower Party and revolutionary trade union organisations and cadres which are actually carrying out most of the Party and revolutionary work, rejected at that time the nearly-Bolshevik methods of work in the factories and are now resisting the adoption of these methods despite the fact that their superiority to the Social-Democratic methods has already been proven. In this, however, they do not meet with sufficient opposition on the part of the Party leadership.

That the absence of Party organisations in the factories strongly affects the work of the Communist Parties is shown by such an example, for instance, as that of Germany, in 1923, when the Party failed to utilise the revolutionary situation for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, this being due in no small degree not only to the absence of a truly revolutionary leadership, but also to the absence of extensive and firm connections with

the workers in the factories. In 1923, the German Social-Democracy was seriously weakened by unbelievable desertions. The reformist trade unions in 1922 had nine million members (7,895,065 in the all-German Federation of Trade Unions and the rest in the clerical workers' unions) of whom only three million remained in 1923. The apparatus of the reformist trade unions was demoralised, it had no money to pay its officials. The German Communist Party could then have captured power had it been headed by a revolutionary leadership, had it conducted a real struggle against the Social-Democratic Party and the reformists, had it been strongly connected with the factories, had it been familiar with the interests of the factory workers, had it mobilised them, applying the revolutionary united front policy in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat instead of the Brandlerist united front with the "left" Saxon Social-democrats and with Zeigner's Government. The meeting called by the Brandlerist opportunist leadership in 1923 to decide the question of whether they were to co-operate or not consisted mainly of Party officials, co-operative workers and trade union officials, among whom there were a good many opportunists of the type of Brandler, Thalheimer and Walcher who were not connected with the masses, who did not know what the working masses were thinking and interested in, and it was this meeting which decided not to act.

Factory Cells and Street Cells.

In Czarist Russia the cells (or the individual Bolsheviks in the factories and mills in which no Party cells existed) utilised all the grievances in the factories; the gruffness of the foremen, the deductions from wages, fines, the failure to provide medical aid in accidents, etc., for oral agitation at the bench, through leaflets, meetings at the factory gates or in the factory yards, and separate meetings of the more class conscious and revolutionary workers. The Bolsheviks always showed the connection between the maltreatment in the factories, and the rule of the autocracy, for the workers felt the effects of the Czarist whips on their own backs, and jail and exile for their protests and strikes against the employers. At the same time the autocracy was connected up in the agitation of the Party cells with the capitalist system, so that at the very beginning of the development of the Labour Movement the Bolsheviks established a connection between the economic struggle and the political. When the sentiments of the workers in the factories became favourable towards a strike, the Bolshevik cells immediately placed themselves in the leadership. The strikes in single shops spread to all departments, a strike in a single factory spread to all

the other factories, and the strikes of the factory workers, under the influence and leadership of the Bolshevik Party organisations, frequently assumed the forms of street demonstrations, and in this way the economic strikes developed into a political struggle.

In the history of the Labour Movement of Czarist Russia there were many cases when strikes at individual factories developed into strikes of all the factories of the entire city and affected other cities as well. All such strikes, despite the underground work of the Bolsheviks, demanded incredible sacrifices on their part as well as on the part of the revolutionary workers. But these sacrifices, this struggle and daily activity gave rise to new cadres who continued the struggle. In this way the Bolshevik cells became organisers of the struggle of the masses and conducted the economic and political struggles.

The third congress of the Comintern held in 1921 adopted the first theses on the question of the structure of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries. Up to 1924 the Communist Parties completely failed to respond to these decisions of the third congress. Now many of the Communist Parties already have factory cells but in most cases, especially in the legal Communist Parties, they do not work at the factories. The Social-Democratic traditions of Party structure have been so strongly rooted in some of the Communist Parties that they press upon the Party members even when Bolshevik forms of organisation are already applied. Factory Party cells already exist in many of the factories but they are still very far from changing the method of their work. They discuss the Party questions, participate in the campaigns for the election of factory committees, sometimes even publish factory newspapers, but they do not attend to the questions of the factory, they do not conduct oral individual agitation in the factories, at the factory gates, in the tram-car, sub-way and train, while travelling to and from work, they rarely speak at the meetings held by the factory committees, which are addressed by Social-Democrats and reformists and where it is easier to prove and reveal their treachery. The factory cells do not direct or control the work of the Communists in the factory committees led by the reformists. They leave the red factory committees without leadership; that is why the work of the red factory committees is frequently in no way superior to that of the reformist committees. The most important Party and trade union campaigns are not conducted by the Party committees through the factory cells. Even the municipal, Landtag and Parliamentary elections which are held quite frequently are still carried out, not through the factory cells, but

through the street cells. All this leads to the factory cells learning of strikes in the shops and even in the factories in which the members of the cells are employed, *only after they are already begun*. Even in those cases when the factory cells and the groups of the trade union opposition and red trade unions do prepare for a strike, as soon as the strike committees are elected, they withdraw from the leadership and cease to exist as organisations, of which the reformists are naturally quick to take advantage.

This may be said of the majority of the cells existing in the factories and mills of the capitalist countries. This does not mean that there are no cells there which are working excellently, which have proved that the factory cell system is superior to the Social-Democratic system of building the Party organisation. Unfortunately, however, such cells constitute a minority, while the enormous majority of the cells in the factories do not work at all, or work poorly. In very many cases not all the members of the party employed in the factories join the factory cells.

The Bolshevik Party knew only one form of lower organisation, the cell in the factory, office, army barracks, etc. Taking into consideration the conditions abroad, the Comintern was forced to introduce an additional form of organisation, the street cells. They were introduced for such members of the Party as housewives, small artisans, etc. The street cells were to be used for the Party work in the places of residence. The street cells are to embrace also the unemployed members of the Party until they find work; it is impossible to force an unemployed member of the Party to go to the factory where he was formerly employed in order to attend a cell meeting (if a cell exists there) when these unemployed simply have not the means of paying for their fare to the factories. The street cells have definite tasks; to canvass the homes of the workers, to distribute handbills, to help in the election campaigns, to give outside help to the factory cells.

In the big cities abroad, it happens that a worker is employed in the city itself, but lives far away from the city, sometimes even in a town located several miles from the city. But in the evening, as well as week-ends, the Party members living far from their places of work must be utilised by the local Party committees and street cells for Party work in their place of residence. The basic work of these Party members still remains that in their factory cell.

But instead of making it into a subsidiary organisation, the Communist Parties made the street cell the predominant organisation. They began to create street cells on such a scale that

they embraced 80 per cent. and sometimes even more of the Party members.

In other words, in the street cells they found a loophole through which they sought to *drag in the old form of organisation*, to leave intact the old territorial form of organisation of the Party members. And the entire struggle of the organisational department of the E.C.C.I. for the past five years to get the Communist Parties to check up the membership of the street cells and remove from them those employed in the factories gave practically no results. If we take the figures of the German Communist Party we will see that at the end of December, 1931, they had 1,983 factory cells and 6,196 street cells. In membership they are full-blooded, but their activity is weak. In other cases they began to create so-called concentration groups so as to avoid organising factory cells. They take a few men from different factories and create a group to serve this factory. Such concentration groups, especially in England, could not produce the same results as factory cells. In France cells were created consisting of 1-2 workers of the factory and 12-16 members from outside the factory. And these were also called factory cells! To these 12-16 members of the Party, the events in the factory appear trifling, so that the cell naturally attends to anything, but what takes place in the factory.

Difficulties in the work of the Communist Cells in the Factories of the Capitalist Countries and the Methods for Overcoming these Difficulties.

There are, of course, serious difficulties in the work in the factories which the teachers must not ignore. In Czarist Russia the Bolshevik Party was illegal and the Party cells were naturally also illegal. When the Party became legal the cells also became entirely legal. Abroad the situation is quite different. The Parties in the principal capitalist countries are legal, but the cells must be illegal. Unfortunately, they do not succeed in working unnoticed. The employers and their spies detect the revolutionary workers and throw them out of the factory without meeting with any protest on the part of the reformist trade unions; on the contrary, the latter frequently act themselves as the initiator in the expulsion of the Communists from the factories. But inasmuch as the work of the Communists in the factories is weak as a rule the workers do not defend the discharged Communists (though there have been opposite cases, as well, of course). Under these conditions the factory cells do nothing in most cases, or if they display the least activity, their members are thrown out of the factories, owing to failure to conceal even their insignificant work. There are frequently also cases when the Communists are thrown out of the factories even when

they do nothing there, simply because of their membership in the Communist Party. The teachers of the International Communist Universities must remember this difficulty. They must explain to the students in the discussion of the work in the legal Communist Parties how such cells can and must organise their work, and it is here that the *Bolshevist experience of illegal work in the factories* under the Czar which produced such excellent results, can be utilised. Let this not appear as a trifle. The Communist Parties suffer very much from their inability to conduct conspirative work in the factories, losing members and revolutionary workers, through their expulsion from the factories. To some Communists it may appear a shame that the Social-Democrats, the nationalists and the members of the other Parties are able openly to proclaim their Party affiliation while they, despite the fact that the Communist Party is legal, must hide their membership in it. Is not such secrecy cowardice? Or right opportunism? Not in the least. This would be cowardice and opportunism if the members of the cells, or the individual Communists, feared and evaded addressing the factory workers' meetings against the reformists and Social-Democrats, when they proposed to agree to a lowering of the living standards of the workers, to approve the dismissal of the workers, or when they vote for the proposals of the Social-Democrats and reformists, etc. Such cases, unfortunately, have occurred. But there is no need at all to shout in the factories and mills that we are Communists and while shouting thus, not always conducting Communist work. It is possible and necessary to carry on *real Party work* connecting the Party slogans with the every-day struggle in the factories, without calling oneself a member of the Party or cell. It is always possible to find appropriate forms for this. Is it not possible to say; to-day I read such and such a report, this or that, or "a worker, from our factory or from the neighbouring factory told me . . ." etc? In short, everything in the spirit of the decisions of the cell and Party, though in form there is no shouting about it; it may even appear "innocent." Even in those cases when anyone addresses the workers' meeting in the factory on instructions from the cell, it is not always necessary to declare that he speaks in the name of the cell. The main point is that their speeches should always be in the spirit of the decision of the cell, while the motions should be prepared or approved by the cell bureau. The other members of the cell and their sympathisers must not only vote for the motion made by the comrade sent by the cell but also conduct agitation among the workers for this motion. In the illegal Parties the situation is different. There

both the Party and the cells are illegal, but unfortunately even the illegal Parties have not yet learned properly to disguise their work.

There is one more important difficulty which the teachers must remember and sharply emphasise.

In Czarist Russia the rules and regime in the factories were lenient compared with those in the factories of the big capitalist countries, especially compared with what we have now after the introduction of capitalist rationalisation which sweats the workers to death, after the introduction of the conveyer system. Before the fall of Czarism the workers were so miserably paid by their employers, and conducted such a vigorous struggle against the deterioration of the rules in the factories that the manufacturers were forced, on the whole, to give up the idea of introducing Taylorism in the exploitation of the workers. This facilitated the Party work in the factories. Besides, the workers in the factories and mills, no matter what so-called Socialist Parties they may have belonged to,* joined the Bolshevik workers in the economic and political struggles (strikes, demonstrations, and even uprisings). But this does not at all mean that the Bolshevik Party, the factory cells, or the individual Bolsheviks drifted with the current, that they hid their Bolshevik principles in the factory. On the contrary, in the factories and mills as well as in the illegal newspapers and appeals, the Bolsheviks conducted a great, vigorous campaign against the Mensheviks, liquidators, Trotskists, Socialist-revolutionists, people's Socialists, etc. The Bolsheviks, by their convincing agitation, by their arguments in the debates with the members of other Parties, by their reasoned and timely proposals, by their knowledge of the situation of the workers in the factories, by their methods of work, by drawing the workers into the solution of the questions, by patient preparation of the struggle, by their methods of organisation, proved their corrected and superiority to the other Parties; that is why the Bolshevik Party succeeded in establishing in the factories and mills the united front from below, with the workers of all tendencies throughout the history of the Labour Movement in Russia, even when the Mensheviks shouted about the Bolshevik "strike fever" in 1912-1914 and when under Kerensky, the Moscow Bolsheviks in August, 1917, called a general strike against the Moscow State Conference in which the Mensheviks and the Socialist-revolutionists played the first fiddle, and later, during the October days of 1917,

*After 1905 there were formed "Black Hundred Gangs" led by Czarism, which wormed themselves into the railway service, especially among the clerks. In the factories and mills they completely failed to gain an influence among the workers.

when the Bolsheviks organised the uprising against the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-revolutionists.

Some of the favourable conditions mentioned above are not enjoyed by the present-day Communist Parties. Thus, they are forced to conduct the economic struggle—and not only the economic—both against the Social-Democrats, the reformist trade unions, the Fascists, the yellows and everybody else.

All of them go hand in hand with the employers. The least carelessness in the work and the Communists, whether as members of the trade union opposition or the red trade unions, are thrown out of the factories. This makes it necessary to resort to such methods of work as will produce, in the struggle of the revolutionary proletariat, the highest effect with the least losses.

Such methods are the tried Bolshevik methods alone. The Communists must and should overcome all the difficulties. The greater the difficulties, the more patient and determined must be the work of the Communists inside the factory, near its gates and everywhere where the workers and the unemployed are found.

The contents and methods of the work must be Bolshevik. It is necessary to systematically convince, and prove by convincing arguments instead of denouncing the opponents, especially the Social-Democratic and reformist workers. It is necessary to systematically expose the Social-Democracy and the reformists in a popular manner with the aid of facts, without, however, forgetting the national Socialists and all other enemy Parties still followed by the workers. But agitation alone is insufficient. It is necessary to organise the struggle, it is necessary to prove to the workers that the Communists are able to organise the struggle and paralyse the manoeuvres of the Social-Democrats and reformists. This can be achieved by the application of Bolshevik methods of work and organisation, not a mechanical application, but one depending upon the concrete conditions. At the present moment when the situation of the workers in every capitalist country has been incredibly worsened, when the number of unemployed has mounted into the millions, when all the burdens of the economic and financial crisis coupled with the expenses of the preparation for imperialist wars and the attacks upon the U.S.S.R. are being thrown on the backs of the toilers, it becomes possible and absolutely necessary for the Communist Party to overcome all the difficulties and improve its work.

Enrolment of Communist Party Members and the Membership Fluctuation.

How are new members enrolled by the Communist Parties? The Bolsheviks enroll and have

enrolled revolutionary workers in the factories. Only after the capture of the power did the Bolsheviks begin to organise Party weeks, that is, campaigns for the enrolment of members, these campaigns also being conducted in the factories. Prior to the October Revolution the Bolsheviks enrolled members on the basis of the every-day work. Those admitted to the Party were drawn into the Party work and included in political circles.

How is the enrolment of members by the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries organised to this day? Members are enrolled at meetings, at great mass meetings. Sometimes even in the streets (in England). A speaker makes a fiery speech, carries away the worker, and the latter submits an application for admission to the Party. Let us assume that in doing this he gives his address. However, our Party organisations have not been in a hurry to establish contact with such comrades, to bring them into the Party organisations, to find them in their homes, to ascertain where they work in order to get in touch with their factory cell or street. While they take their time a large number of applicants disappears in an unknown direction: some changing their addresses, some leave for other cities, some lose their ardour about joining the Communist organisation. Precisely because the admission to the Party takes place not in the factories, not on the basis of the work of the Party in the factories, through the creation of a body of active non-party workers who make themselves conspicuous in the everyday work, particularly during strikes and demonstrations, and from among whom the cells recruit new Party members, even those whom we have already enrolled leave us. I could cite perfectly amazing figures to characterise the fluctuation in the Communist Parties.

In January, 1930, the German Communist Party, according to its data, had 133,000 dues paying members; during 1930 another 143,000 members were admitted, so that in 1931 the total membership ought to have amounted to 276,000. But at the end of December, 1930, the C.P. of Germany had only 180,000, which means that in 1930, 95,000 members dropped their membership in the C.P. of Germany. In 1931, the situation, according to the figures of the Organisational Department of the E.C.C.I., based upon the statistics of the C.P. of Germany, was as follows: the number of newly-admitted members was 210,000, but at the same time as many members left the Party as in 1930. Would all of these Party members have left the Party had the organisations worked well, had they given attention to the new members, had they drawn the new members into

Party work, had they supplied them with proper literature, had they formed circles and included within them these members so that they would study there? Would under such conditions all those who felt the party have left it? I think they would not.

While the workers and employees are being thrown out of the factories in masses, the enrolment of Party members must be carried out mainly among the employed workers, especially in the big factories of the key industries. The Party organisations are obliged particularly to pay attention to the members of the Party in these factories and industries; they should be drawn into the discussion of all the questions of the current policy of the Party. They should be given assistance in the preparation of speeches at the factory meetings, in the oral agitation among the workers of the factory, they should be supplied with materials against the social-democrats, reformists, national Socialists, the Government, etc. Similar work should be carried out among the Party activists who conduct the Party and trade union work among the unemployed and within the reformist trade unions. If such work is carried out the number of Party members, new and old, leaving the Party, will decline. For the fact that thousands and hundreds of thousands are joining the Communist Party and the revolutionary trade union organisations proves that the workers agree with the slogans, tactics and programme of the Communist Parties and with the programmes of the mass organisations. But the internal life of the local organisations and their activity does not satisfy the revolutionary workers so that a large section of the newly-admitted members leaves them. To the teachers of the international universities as well as to the activists and cadres who are to engage in the Party work, these questions of enrolment and maintenance of new members are far from indifferent. To these questions must be given special attention. The question must be carefully studied. Perhaps the teachers are already giving attention to the fact which I have pointed out, but what I say is based on practice and practical results. And in this field we find that the Communist Parties have not yet received the cadres which are necessary for the correct building of the Party organisation.

The Party Committees, Inner-Party Democracy, Party Discipline, Methods of Leadership, Self-Criticism, Democratic Centralism, the Question of Cadres.

Take the Party committees. When the Bolsheviks built their party during and after the Czarist régime the Party committees were collec-

tive organs, all of whose members participated in the decision of questions, and had distinct functions of their own.

The district and city Party committees considered and decided all questions connected with the economic and political struggle of the proletariat within the framework of the decisions of the congresses and plenums of the Party C.C., of the C.C. directions, of the Central Organ and of Comrade Lenin's instructions. They not only discussed and issued instructions as to how these decisions and directives should be applied in the given province and city, but took upon themselves the organisation of the operation of these decisions, explaining and popularising them. They gave special attention to the local committees which were directly connected with the factories. They saw to it that the Party decisions and the directions of the Party committees should be discussed in all the Party organisations, especially that they should pass resolutions on them and adopt methods for their realisation. They saw to it that the Party organisations should not violate the inner-party democracy, but at the same time they also saw to it that the strictest discipline should prevail in the Party organisations. The questions were discussed before a decision was adopted. But as long as a decision was adopted it had to be carried out without question by all the Party members, including those who opposed it and voted against it. This did not of course interfere with any criticism of the Party committees after the decisions had been carried out, as well as with self-criticism on the part of the Party committees, etc. But the criticism and self-criticism only led to an improvement of the methods of work of the leadership, to the strategy and tactics being worked out more carefully and the mistakes being corrected. The leadership of the Party, the leadership of the district and city committees did not restrict themselves to "pure" politics only. They engaged in questions of programme, policy and organisation. They did not separate policy from organisation, the adoption of decisions from their realisation. This was in the tremendous majority of cases correct, vital, revolutionary Bolshevik leadership. This is why the divergency between the ideological influence over the masses and its organisational consolidation was not large.

An entirely different position prevails in the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries. There very frequently no local Party committees exist, and where they do exist the only one doing any work, at best, is the secretary, who is sometimes paid and sometimes unpaid, while the Party committees exist only in the form of attachments

to the secretaries, do not function regularly as collective organs.

Where the Party committees exist, very frequently all the reports at the plenums are made by the secretaries and whatever they propose is adopted because the Party committees (that is their individual members) are not in touch with the Party affairs. These local and city committees are unable, of course, either to organise the work of the cells or to give them proper leadership. To the local party organs, especially the lower ones, special attention must be given.

In many cases the decisions of the congresses and C.C. of the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries are not discussed in the factory, street, cells or residential party groups which still exist in large numbers. These decisions are discussed at meetings of the city or district activists and that is where the matter ends.

The directives of the C.C. and regional committees rarely reach the cells, are marooned in the district committees, yet directives applying, say, to the conduct of mass campaigns are meant mainly for the cells since it is precisely the cells which come into direct contact with the masses. The cells, residential groups, are on the whole passive. They do not live a full life as is dictated by the conditions of the present period; this too is a social-democratic tradition. These Party organisations come to life only before election campaigns. That is why there are many cases of inner-Party democracy and Bolshevik discipline being absent from the Party organisations. In this situation it is not surprising that the decisions of the congresses, the directives of the Comintern and C.C. remain unfulfilled. Take for instance the decisions of the C.I. congresses, of the congresses of the different Parties, of the E.C.C.I. and of the C.C. calling for the shifting of the centre of gravity of the Party and trade union work into the factories, for the improvement of the work of the lower links of the Party and trade union organisations, especially in the factories, etc.

Apparently the cause for the absence of Bolshevik methods of Party work should be sought in the incorrect policy of the leading (central, district, sub-district and partly local) Party cadres.

But there is "self-criticism" galore. They criticise themselves openly during strikes, when it is necessary to reorganise the work in the course of the struggle, during campaigns, when it is necessary to change the methods and contents of the work in order to improve the organisation of the Party forces for the purpose of extending and deepening the campaign. They criticise themselves upon the conclusion of the

strikes and campaigns, which is all right, but they repeat the same old mistakes during the next strikes and campaigns. We have plenty of such cases.

In the Bolshevik Party, even under the Czar, when the Party was illegal, we had democratic centralism. The Party organisations did not wait for instructions from the C.C., the regional committees, the provincial committees and the city committees; without waiting for them, they acted, depending upon the local conditions, upon the events, within the framework of the general Party decisions and directives. The initiative of the local Party organisations, of the cells, was encouraged. Were the Bolsheviks of Odessa or Moscow, of Baku, or Tiflis, always to have waited for directives from the C.C., the provincial committees, etc., which during the years of the reaction and of the war frequently did not exist at all owing to arrests, what would have been the result? The Bolsheviks would not have captured the working masses and exercised any influence over them. The provincial and city committees themselves published appeals and leaflets on all occasions when this was necessary.

Unfortunately, in many Communist Parties there is *supercentralism*, especially in the legal parties. The C.C. must supply leaflets to the local organisations, the C.C. must first state its opinion on the events in order that the locals should wake up. The responsibility does not exist which the Party organisation must have in order to act at any moment, regardless of whether directives exist or not, on the basis of the decisions of the Party and Comintern. And even in those cases when corresponding directives of the centre do exist, they frequently do not reach the mass of the membership, and at the same time there is not sufficient control over the execution of the directions on the part of the higher organs. All this must be combatted and the teachers must remember this side of the question in the work.*

Since the Bolshevik Party under the Czar was illegal up to the February revolution, no big apparatus existed either at the centre (in the C.C.) of locally (in the district, local and provincial committees); they did not and could not have permanent headquarters necessary for any more or less reasonable apparatus. The financial resources would also not allow a large apparatus. For this reason the centre of gravity of the

Party work (and not only of the Party work, but even of the work of the legal and illegal trade unions) was naturally shifted into the factories and mills. This situation of the Party work continued during the period of February to October, 1917, as well, when the Bolshevik Party became legal and carried out enormous mass work while the apparatus of the C.C., of the regional and provincial committees was quite small. As before the principal attention was given to the work of the local committees, sub-local committees and factory cells.

In the legal parties of the capitalist countries the order in the Party apparatus is the reverse: these Communist Parties, being legal, have quite a number of convenient premises at their disposal to house their apparatus.

The main forces of the apparatus (the agitation, organisation, trade union, women's, parliamentary, village and other departments) are concentrated in the C.C., regional and provincial committees, while the local committees and the cells are empty. In many local committees in the industrial centres—not to speak of the cells—there are even no paid secretaries. The local committees must receive "everything" from the centre: that is why the initiative of the local Party organisations is deadened. The E.C.C.I. has been waging a determined struggle against this phenomenon. In the Bolshevik Party the centre of the Party work lay in the factories and mills, in the factory cells. The struggle is all the more necessary because here again the question is not one of simply organisational condition of legality or illegality. The question consists in taking a course to the masses, to a close permanent connection with them. The forms of organisation must be subjected to these aims and serve them, not the reverse.

In the legal Communist Parties of the capitalist countries the connection with and leadership of the masses are in most cases of a paper character—through circulars; the press, literature, written and oral agitation are abstract and not concrete: they do not, as a rule, correspond to the concrete situation. This is due to the fact that under the conditions described above there are not suitable cadres capable of acting locally and directly in contact with the masses. This leads us therefore to the question of proper Party cadres. In the Bolshevik Party the Party cadres were forged in the mass practical work. They learned through this work to react to all the events in the life of the worker. They not only knew what the worker thinks and how he lives, but they also responded to it; they organised the struggle, they pointed the way out to the worker; that is why the Bolshevik

*In the Bolshevik Party the buttress of Party work was cells in the factories and works. The connection with the masses, who were led through the cells and Communist fractions in the mass organisations was a living one. The Party press literature, the written, spoken agitation, was based on the masses.

Party even during the days of the Czar exercised such a great influence over the masses, enjoyed such a great prestige among the working class.

The higher and middle Party cadres in the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries are in most cases revolutionary ex-members of the Social-Democratic Parties. Their methods of work remained in most cases the same as in the S.D. Many of them have not yet freed themselves from the Social-Democratic traditions.

And even a large section of the new young cadres who have been brought to the fore during the last few years in some of the Communist Parties, are inexperienced, are also unable to work concretely and independently, and, in view of the excessive centralisation of the leadership ("everything" from the centre!), they are poorly learning the art of independent initiative and concrete leadership in the local work.

(To be continued.)

THE EVENTS IN IRELAND

By GERHARDT.

THE new Irish government led by De Valera announces the abolition of the oath of allegiance to the King of England and states that it will no longer pay the three million pounds annual payment on land annuities to the English treasury. The oath of allegiance to the English king is the mere legal form of the actual sovereignty which the British imperialists have imposed on Ireland by their bayonets. The yearly payments of the land annuities date back to the time when Ireland was parcelled out among the English feudal landowners, to whom the Irish peasants were compelled to pay rent as tenants. Later, the land was reluctantly returned to them. But they were forced to continue this stupendous yearly tribute, which was guaranteed to the former English landowners by the government. For the last ten years, the Free State government has wrung this shameful tribute out of the Irish peasants and faithfully paid it over to the English treasury. This sum represents to Ireland, economically and financially weakened, a heavier burden than the reparation payments of Germany, or a relative tax burden on the shoulders of the Irish people ten times as great as the British debt payments to the United States.

De Valera's stand called forth a storm of indignation and threats from the British imperialists. And, as always, when the imperialists of a country campaign to establish or defend some repression, they had the most active co-operation of the English social-fascists. In 1916, after the suppression of the Dublin uprising, Jim Conolly, the revolutionary workers' leader, was shot by order of an English cabinet in which Henderson, the present leader of the Labour Party, sat as minister. Now again, the Secretary for the Dominions in the so-called National government—the MacDonal "socialist," Thomas, began the campaign against Ireland in the English House of Commons. In a voice vibrant with resentment

and outraged patriotism he said that allegiance to the king was an inseparable part of the Treaty with Ireland which the British government would never permit Ireland to break.

The imperialist press—the "Times," "Daily Telegraph," "Daily Mail," etc., set forth a vicious programme of threats: the treatment of all Irish in England as foreigners; the discharge of Irish workers from English factories; the suspension of the dole for Irish workers; the dismissal of all Irish from the English civil service. These drastic acts of retaliation were to include the Irish living in the British dominions and colonies. With such threats, the British imperialists hoped to drive those Irish living in England and in the Dominions, especially the great mass of the Irish workers, into opposition against the demands of De Valera.

At the same time, the imperialists are mobilising the whole of reactionary Ireland—the bourgeoisie, remittance men, and landowners. They appeal to their interests and warn them against supporting the demands of De Valera. The "Times," the "official" organ of the British government, wrote on the 24th of March:

"There is some £150,000,000 of Irish money invested in British securities of one kind or another, and by virtue of an agreement made by Mr. Cosgrave's Government with Great Britain, Free State rentiers are relieved from the payment of double income tax. In practice they pay the higher rate which at the moment is the British rate and get a refund on the smaller. If Mr. De Valera repudiates the payment of the Land Annuities it is feared that the British Government may withdraw its concessions in respect of income tax, in which event a very serious financial crisis would arise."

Added to the campaign of intimidation by which the British imperialists hope to organise those Irish living in England or other parts of the

Empire against the De Valera demands, there is also the attempt to turn the Irish farmers, especially the wealthy ones, against the new government. The "Irish Times," a paper representing the interests of the English and Irish capitalists, wrote the following on March 24th:

"If and when Mr. De Valera compels Britain to defend her rights under the treaty the question will be not what Britain can do, but what there is that she cannot do. A prosperous Free State is unthinkable without the elements of British co-operation and goodwill. By a few strokes of the pen the British Government could put ruinous tariffs on the Free State's exports to her only market."

England is the most important market for Ireland's farm and dairy products, such as cattle, butter, milk, etc. The threat of a high protective tariff against the importation of Irish farm products aims at making all the farmers, especially the big ones, who depend on this market, active on the counter-revolutionary front in the defence of British interests. The paper "forgets," however, to make it clear that Ireland is, in its turn, one of the best markets of British industry. Ireland stands fifth on the list of Britain's customers.

The reason for the threatening language of the British government and the British press, the announcement of such a formidable array of repressive measures against Ireland, is the following: The British imperialists are striving for the formation of an economically united empire as a way out of the crisis. They are preparing for the Empire conference to be held in June, at which agreements will be made with the Dominions on the steps necessary for the fulfilment of this aim. In India, these preparations are being made with blood and iron, through a system of emergency measures, through a rule that can only be compared with the rule of the Tsars in old Russia. With the Dominions, however, the British imperialists must bargain.

The nearer the Ottawa Conference approaches the more concerned the British imperialists are becoming over its possible results. Baldwin on the 4th of April directed the following veiled warning at the Dominions: "If we in England cannot build an economic union with our own flesh and blood in the Dominions, then it may well be that we will be driven back to Europe." In other words, if the Canadian, Australian, and South African bourgeoisie do not allow the entrance of our industrial products at reasonable rates, then we will, in turn, be forced to exclude their agricultural products and make agreements with the European agricultural nations, who will be glad to accept our industrial wares in exchange for

their agricultural products. The recent abolition of free trade and the introduction of tariffs by the British government, has left the question of duties on wheat, meat, wool, and other products, which the Dominions export chiefly to England, still open. This is in order to use it as a weapon at the Ottawa Conference.

When, just a few months before the convocation of the Ottawa Conference, puny little Ireland dares to defy the British imperialists and nullifies Treaties without the agreement of Great Britain under its very nose, the prestige of the British representatives at the Ottawa Conference, no less than the very authority of the British government in the Colonies and Dominions, is weakened. Therefore the threatening language and projected reprisals of the British imperialists against Ireland, are also a threat against all the growing anti-empire tendencies in the Dominions, and above all against the national revolutionary liberation movements in the Colonies. The battle of the British imperialists against the "one-sided breaking of agreements," is the battle of British imperialism against those tendencies in the Empire which wish to break away from British bondage.

The conservative "Sunday Times" of the 10th of April writes:

"This is not merely a question between the Irish Free State and Great Britain; it is a question between the Irish Free State and all the members of the Empire equally. Members of the Empire are free and equal: the bonds that unite them are self-imposed. Correspondingly, the intention of any one member to tamper with them touches all the others concerned, and the constitutional effect of such action must be judged accordingly. . . . The rights of one party to make fundamental alterations on its own initiative to a treaty signed between two parties can never be admitted."

The violent outburst of the British imperialists against the demands of De Valera, was not implicitly directed against these demands (for an agreement is probably possible), but against the tendencies they symbolise. The British imperialists thought they had solved the Irish problem. But on the sixteenth anniversary of the Dublin uprising, the Irish Republican army marched through the city accompanied by tens of thousands of sympathisers. And from these masses came the shout "separation from England."

The British imperialists understand the significance of this. They understand that hatred for British imperialism still lives in the broad Irish masses, and that it is growing more intense in the last few years with the deepening of the economic and social crisis. The British imperial-

ists understand that the Irish masses are ever ready to "stab them in the back." This represents a very real danger at the time of a possible world war. Ireland, the western outpost of Europe, is of the greatest strategic importance because of its proximity to the British Isles. In all the historic English wars—in the wars with Spain, France, and in the World War against Germany—England's enemies have always tried to use Ireland as their base of invasion. And the Irish nation has always seized upon the moment when English imperialism was hard pressed, to renew its fight for independence. It is no wonder that the British imperialists, with the increasing probability of a new world war and their intervention in Soviet Russia, view the national movement of the broad Irish masses with rage and hatred.

In the year 1921, after the century-long heroic uprisings of the Irish people, conducted with a force and tenacity as to occasion Engels once to say, "Give me 200,000 Irish, and I'll shatter the entire British Empire," the British imperialists were forced to give Ireland the status of a Dominion. A series of factors forced England to do this. England fought the World War under the slogan of "free the nations" together with the American imperialists, in whose country millions of Irish lived. After the war, these Irish Americans demanded the freeing of Ireland.

The difficult position of the British imperialists after the war—the growing wave of discontent of the English working class—the revolutionary independence movements in the colonies and the national revolutionary movement unbroken by the most fearful terror and the bloody suppression of the Dublin revolt in 1916—made it advisable for the English capitalists to buy off the Irish bourgeoisie with important concessions. In the English-Irish agreements of 1921, Ireland received the same status as the other Dominions in the Empire. The chief concessions of British imperialism to the Irish bourgeoisie were the right of customs and taxation, the right to organise an independent army which must not exceed, however, the proportion of Irish population to that of England. The coastal defence, however, remained in the hands of the English Government. In case of war, the Irish Free State was forced to place its harbours and lighthouses at the disposal of the British government. This meant that the Irish "Free State" is practically forced to take part in every English war.

The concessions which were won by the Irish bourgeoisie through this agreement came to them through the heroic struggles of the workers, farmers, intellectuals and common people against the British imperialists. The Irish bourgeoisie

betrayed the complete liberation of Ireland from the yoke of British Imperialism for these concessions. They agreed to the division of Ireland through the separation of the most industrially developed six northern provinces, which remained under the overlordship of England with a separate Parliament and civil and military apparatus. In this way the British imperialists secured themselves a permanent military foothold in the island.

In repayment for these concessions, the Free State obligated itself to pay the dismissed English officials pensions amounting to two million pounds yearly. It further declared itself willing to pay back the British loans, as well as the yearly instalments for the return of the land. This plan was accepted in the Dail in 1922 by a vote of 67 against 57. Lord Birkenhead declared at that time in the British Parliament, in a speech defending the agreement with Ireland: "The Free State Government hopes in a short time to be strong enough to suppress any groups that may seek to rebel against it. *And I would much rather see the Free State have that job than us. I have no doubt that she will soon be strong enough to successfully do so, and that will be, if nothing else, a saving of English lives.*"

The right wing of the Irish Revolutionary Party (Sinn Fein)—Collins, Griffith, Cosgrave, etc. — accepted this agreement after De Valera, the leader of the Republican opposition, withdrew from the conference. What Lord Birkenhead so confidently prophesied now came about. The former revolutionists, who were now building the national government, undertook the task of helping the British imperialists to "save English lives." They initiated a bloody campaign of repression against the Irish Republican Party which was still continuing the fight for a united, independent Ireland. Innumerable leading Irish Republicans were shot down with the help of English guns and officers, by the new Irish Free State Government, and the republican movement crushed with blood and fire.

In 1923 De Valera capitulated. He asked his followers to stop fighting and bury their arms. Only a small group still remained true to the old ideals and traditions of the Sinn Fein. The great majority of the Sinn Fein split over the question of participating in parliament, and, with De Valera as their leader, built the Fianna Fail Party. Only a small group of Republicans still kept the now outlawed I.R.A. alive. But they lost the connection with the broad masses through inability to reorganise the struggle on a new basis as a mass struggle.

The De Valera group became a loyal parliamentary opposition to the Free State Party, whose interests now went hand in hand with British

finance and trade, and the allied interests of the Irish bourgeois and land-owners. The newly-won concessions of the Irish bourgeoisie made them the partners of the English capitalists in the exploitation of the Irish workers and peasants. The ten Irish banks of the Free State are closely allied with the English-controlled Ulster banks. The transportation and commercial system is financed by British and Irish capital. The land reforms, which removed the large British land-owners, have only opened the way for the capitalist exploitation of the Irish farmers, for the replacement of English land-owners by English banks, and the creation of a class of rich farmers.

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The 1932 elections, which ended with the victory of the De Valera party, found Ireland in the throes of the severest economic crisis. The agrarian reforms had removed the English land-owners, but not the frightful misery of the broad Irish masses in the villages. Seventy per cent. of the Irish peasants possess less than 30 acres each, and have collectively only twenty-three per cent. of the land. Out of 560 thousand farm-owners, only 90 thousand possess more than 50 acres, and collectively only 11 out of 19 million acres. The yearly land tribute amounts to three million pounds, to which must be added one and a half million in leasehold rents of those peasants who could not buy, or receive outright ownership to the land.

When we realise that it is the poor peasants who own the worst land, then we can imagine what insupportable burdens these tributes represent. These burdens became even more oppressive during the world crisis, when the price of cattle and farm products dropped tremendously, while the price of industrial products were still artificially maintained by tariff manipulation. A further factor in the deepening of the misery of the Irish peasants was the terrible crisis in America. Great numbers of poor Irish peasants depend almost entirely upon the sums which their more adventurous relatives sent them from America. The widespread and long-lasting unemployment in America has practically dried up this source of income. In addition to this, the international character of the crisis has stopped the "traditional form" of Irish export—the production of emigrants. In the latter half of 1931, 467 people left the Irish Free State for America, as against 8,468 for the same period of the preceding year. At the same time, 1,080 returned. A capitalist paper makes the following comment on the situation: "Since the Norman invasion, there has never been such a situation—more immigrants than emigrants."

The widespread unemployment in the towns,

the dwarfed industries hit by the crisis, offer the wretched Irish peasants no escape. The number of evictions is continually growing as their land and possessions are being sold up for the non-payment of debts and taxes, at the same time that the Free State Government is assisting the rich farmer class by reducing its taxes, extending credits, and establishing capitalistic co-operative associations. It is an interesting fact that 76 per cent. of all the milk that the dairy companies buy for exportation comes from the farms of the rich farmers. The hopeless situation of the 140 thousand land-labourers grows unspeakably worse daily. As usual, the wealthy farmers and land-owners, in seeking to escape losses incurred in the crisis, throw the entire burden upon them.

The development of the strike movement in the Free State according to *official* figures is as follows:—

Year	No. of strikes	No. of strikers	Strike days lost
1928 ...	52	2,190	54,292
1929 ...	53	4,533	101,397
1930 ...	83	3,410	77,417
1931 ...	60	5,431	310,199

Irish industry is also hard hit by the crisis. In Belfast practically the entire ship-building industry is at a standstill. The linen industry employs less than 50 per cent. of its former workers. In Northern Ireland, the most industrialised part of the country, there are more than 100 thousand people unemployed in a total population of 1¼ million.

There are no accurate statistics of the number unemployed in the Free State. The government has carefully avoided the publication of precise statistics. The number of unemployed in Southern Ireland is estimated at from 90 to 100 thousand, of whom, however, only 23 thousand are registered and receive doles. The wages of the Irish workers were heavily cut during last year, while the cost of living, because of the duties on shoes, clothes, tobacco, sugar, etc., remained relatively high. The cost of living index is 15 per cent. higher than in England.

The crisis has crippled Ireland, already enfeebled by imperialist exploitation, but it has also rapidly strengthened the proletarianising process of the petty bourgeois strata and intellectual elements, for whom there is no work or means of existence. The unbearable pressure on the broadest masses in this situation of economic crisis is increasing their discontent. The remnants of the old Sinn Fein, the I.R.A., who have not forsaken the fight for the free Irish Republic, gained influence over the masses—especially over the poor peasants and farm labourers, and also over the petty bourgeoisie and industrial workers

in the cities. The terrorist activities against the agents of the government, the police, spies, and tax collectors, began again.

The Cosgrave Government answered these growing revolutionary activities by declaring permanent martial law. All nationalistic and revolutionary organisations, such as the Irish Republican Army, the Soar Eire, and the Irish Workers' League (the Irish Communist group), were forbidden. Under the banner of the fight against Communism, with the moral support of the high catholic clergy, the revolutionary republican organisations were declared dissolved. Martial law and emergency decrees were established, and the military and the police sought to reinstate the old reign of terror. Partisans of the Irish Republican Army were forced with torture and threats of death to reveal the hidden arsenals of the organisation. Prisoners were brutally beaten. But the Cosgrave suppression could not intimidate the growing mass activity. It merely served to strengthen it.

The Irish bourgeoisie had two alternatives — to establish an open fascist dictatorship and continue a bitter fight of extermination against the revolutionary and republican organisations and risk arousing colossal mass struggles, or to dissolve parliament and allow the De Valera national reformist party, with their growing influence over the broad masses, to act as a safety valve, for a time, by taking over the reins of government. The Irish bourgeoisie chose the second alternative. Parliament was dissolved, and the election was held with the following results: De Valera's party received 566,000 votes and 70 seats; the government party, 449,000 votes and 56 seats; the Labour Party (the social-fascist agents of the British imperialists), 98,000 votes and seven seats. Parliamentarily the De Valera Government is dependent on the votes of the Labour Party.

The broad masses of Irish labourers and the petty bourgeoisie in town and country voted for De Valera, who campaigned under the slogan of abolishing the oath of allegiance and suspending the yearly land payments. The Labour Party lost both votes and seats, the Communist group (Irish Workers' League), who ran two candidates in Dublin, got 1,100 votes. What chiefly characterised this campaign was that the De Valera Fianna Fail party successfully swayed the masses with its nationalistic platform against England.

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Under the pressure of the crisis, the old undying hatred of the broad masses rose to the surface. The national demands had not yet lost their mobilising power. This hatred was directed against the British imperialists and their open

agents, the higher strata of the Irish bourgeoisie and landlords, who have been granted the privilege of joining the British imperialists in their exploitation of the Irish masses. and who, with the help of British guns, succeeded in doing what the British imperialists themselves could never do, crushing the national revolutionary movement. The entire truth of what Lenin said at the time of the heroic Dublin uprising in 1916 reveals itself: "Every crisis unmasks the superficial—discards the outer husk—throws all that has outlived its necessity aside—and uncovers the deepest inner springs and forces."

The national reformist De Valera party was in a position to mobilise the broadest masses with national slogans directed against the British imperialists. The Party's demands are not essentially national-revolutionary in their nature, and the method it uses to obtain them—the forces on which it depends—will never create the prerequisites for the wide iron front of the toiling masses, who alone can fight to the bitter end against the British Empire for their national demands.

De Valera demands the repeal of two points of the 1921 agreement; the revocation of the oath of allegiance, and the suspension of the annual land annuity payments. Lloyd George explained to the Irish delegates in 1921 that if they would not subscribe to the article which contained these points, "you will have a war on your hands immediately." Only open agents of the British imperialists, like the leader of the Free State party, Cosgrave—or the Irish and English social-fascists—can deny the incontestable right of the Irish nation to "one-sidedly" abolish the oath of allegiance. *But the abolition of this oath can only be a step towards the real battle for the complete freedom and independence of Ireland, or the completion of the reconciliation of the De Valera party with the British imperialists on the basis of a few concessions.*

The British imperialists are using a threatening tone against De Valera's intention to abolish the oath, but at the same time they are prepared to offer several compromises if necessary. A compromise which would strengthen the British imperialists at home is being propagated by the English and Irish social-fascists. William Norton, the leader of the Irish postal workers, and also a chief and faction leader of the Labour Party, declared in the "Weiner Arbeiter Zeitung," the organ of the Austrian social democrats:—

"I consider the entire issue a formal one.

The *incontestable fact* is that Ireland *will still remain a part of the British Empire* even if the oath of allegiance is done away with. *It is the actuality, not the form, that matters.* What if

De Valera decides to fight for the complete severance of Ireland from England? He has not the people's consent for this, since this possibility was not an issue in the election. If this problem presents itself to us at some other time, then we shall see. *It is certain that at present the world political situation does not warrant such a step.*"

This cynical agent of the British imperialists, under the pressure of mass opinion, fears to declare himself openly against the abolition of the oath. He is even willing to grant its abolishment as long as the real issue—the continuance of Ireland in the British Empire—is safeguarded. A somewhat similar position was taken by the English "left" labourites. Maxton declared in the House of Commons that "Ireland is a free nation, of course within the British Empire, but nevertheless a free nation," which is exactly like saying to a man in prison: "You are a free man, of course inside of a prison, but nevertheless a free man." By tentatively agreeing that the oath of allegiance might be removed on condition that Ireland remains in the British Empire, the English social-fascists attempt to block the national revolutionary struggle, offering themselves as mediators. This is exactly the same diplomacy which the leaders of the Labour Party and the I.L.P. use in regard to the Indian problem. They suggest to the British imperialists that the Indian bourgeois and land-owners be given such concessions as will make them the watch-dogs of British interests in India, to keep the broad masses under control, ensuring the exploitation of India through the active co-operation of the Indian bourgeoisie.

In the "Daily Express," the organ of the imperialist newspaper king, Beaverbrook—who, by the way, once escaped by accident an attempt made on his life in Ireland—an article by an eminent Irish jurist, one of the adherents of the Treaty of 1921, as he styles himself, was published. This jurist proposes to the British imperialists, instead of the whip, the tactic of concessions to Fianna Fail and De Valera. He writes:—

"For the first time since the days of Parnell, or some might even say, for the last three hundred years, the British Government has to deal with an Irish leader 'who can deliver the goods.' In other words, De Valera has the support of even the extremists in any agreement he might make. And that is something that neither Redmond or Cosgrave could boast. England has nothing to lose and everything to gain. England will have Ireland's friendship in war and peace—the closest trade relations with her best customer—and instead of a forced loyalty,

the king of Great Britain might well be greeted with enthusiasm in the streets of Dublin, and be fittingly received by De Valera himself."

The tactics of the British imperialists and their open agents in England and Ireland are clear. They threaten De Valera and his party, to hold them in check; and yet they offer De Valera concessions at the same time, to allow him to save his face as a mass leader and disorganise the national movement still more than Cosgrave and Collins could. Is there any greater cynicism than the expression of this Irish jurist—"De Valera is the man who can deliver the goods." But it must be said that the cynical expression of this eminent Irish jurist can be tagged on to a statement De Valera made to the Irish Senate: "The British Government must realise that there can be no real freedom in Ireland as long as the free and unhampered representation of the people in Parliament is made impossible by the oath of allegiance."

Through the removal of the oath, De Valera wishes to attract the remnants of the old Sinn Fein, and the leaders of the Republican Army (who have the real sympathies of the broad masses), to participate in parliament, which was rejected by them up till now because of the necessity for taking the oath. And even more explicitly does De Valera make it clear that once the oath is removed there will no longer be the necessity for a republican movement and its irregular army, which can then be incorporated in the Free State. Through these remarks it is clear that for De Valera the abolition of the oath is *not the starting point* in the battle for the independence of Ireland from the yoke of British imperialism, but only an attempt to conciliate and render harmless those elements of the old Sinn Fein groups within the frame of British imperialism who remain true to the old traditions, and through them to get the broad masses under control.

The abolition of the annual three millions has undoubtedly great significance for impoverished Southern Ireland. But De Valera explains at the same time as he informs the British imperialists of the necessity of abolishing this tribute, that the Irish peasants must continue to pay these taxes, which are the outcome of their right to the soil. They will revert to the Free State Government. Thus, instead of removing a part of the unbearable burdens from the shoulders of the poor peasantry by the complete suspension of payments, the national reformist De Valera shows his true social-reactionary character by merely transferring the money from the English treasury to the coffers of the Irish bourgeoisie.

De Valera's social-reactionary policy actually means an attempt to prevent the national revolu-

tionary fight for freedom. The real fight against the mighty British imperialists and their agents can only come through the mobilising of the broad, despoiled masses for the complete removal of all the crushing taxation and for the solution of the vital land hunger as a step towards national and social freedom. De Valera not only defends the fearful situation of the Irish village of to-day and the cruel behaviour of the Irish bourgeoisie towards the poor peasantry, he defends not only the bourgeois agrarian reforms which do not guarantee the great mass of Irish peasants even a miserable beggarly existence, but countenances the continuance of a form of taxation which can be traced back to the days of English feudal overlordship. There is only one difference: the Irish tax-collector and deputy who formerly dispossessed the peasants from their land and homes in the name of the English State, will now do exactly the same for his new masters, the Irish bourgeois. The peasants who had hoped to hear that they were freed at least of this burden of taxation, once the tribute was ended, hear instead, from the Minister of Land and Fisheries, the demands of the Free State Government for the tax.

The same social-reactionary policy of De Valera and his party extends to the working class. In the question of the dole and its extension to agricultural workers—in the fight against wage cuts—the creation of new work schemes—the reduction of rents and the abolition of the slums, etc.—in all these issues the policy of De Valera is no different from that of Cosgrave, the policy of the bankers, the wealthy farmers, and the trusts. This policy of De Valera makes it easy for the Irish Labour Party to preach its platform of submission to British imperialism, under the pretence of the defence of social demands.

These social reactionary tactics of De Valera have even more dangerous effects in Northern Ireland, where 42 per cent. of the industrial workers are to be found. There, the bourgeoisie and social fascists, through the use of religious differences (protestant and catholic), partly drive certain of the workers to actively participate in the struggle against a free united Ireland and prevent them from organising a revolutionary fight for their country's freedom. But the terrific crisis has hit the workers of Northern Ireland harder than any others, and has undermined the position of the Labour aristocracy, the chief support of the bourgeoisie and the social fascists in the struggle against the Irish national revolutionary movement. Until the mass of the workers of Northern Ireland are drawn into the fight for a free independent Ireland—until the influence of the bourgeoisie, the Labour Party, and the pro-

testant clergy is destroyed—until then, the solid front of all the Irish workers and peasants, irrespective of religious faith, is impossible. Precisely because De Valera combines his national demands against British imperialism with a reactionary internal policy—precisely because in reality he is the spokesman of the Irish bourgeoisie, and not the representative of the great majority of the people, the workers and peasants—he, De Valera and his party, are unfit to be the leaders in such a bitter struggle for the social and national liberation of Ireland from the yoke of British imperialism.

De Valera has released all the republicans and revolutionaries imprisoned by Cosgrave. He has removed the ban on republican and revolutionary organisations. But he does not think of removing the "force apparatus" of the open agents of British imperialism in Ireland. The army is under the very same officers whose hands are already covered with the blood of thousands of Irish revolutionists—the same which was created with the help of British arms and British money and officers. The police, the secret service, the prisons, the courts, are all in the hands of those officers and officials who were the tools of Cosgrave in the suppression of the revolutionary movement. The workers' strikes—the farmers' movements—were suppressed by these same men, in the defence of British capital and the Irish bourgeoisie. De Valera has formed a new government, but the entire counter-revolutionary governing apparatus is intact, and is his means of government. There can be no real struggle against English imperialism without the destruction of the apparatus of force which has served the Irish bourgeoisie to enforce the Anglo-Irish Treaty against the overwhelming mass of the Irish people.

In this situation the Irish Workers' League, the group of Irish Communists, has a tremendous task. The last elections have shown that the influence of the Irish Workers' League over the masses is as yet relatively slight, and its organisations still weak. But precisely the present situation gives it the opportunity to strengthen its influence and to form a real mass Communist Party. The Irish Workers' League will only be able to do this, however, when it stands before the workers as an independent force—as the independent leader of the working masses of Ireland, with its basis in the toiling masses, in their fight for social and national freedom. The Irish Workers' League cannot in the present situation avoid taking a concrete stand on the immediate demands of De Valera.

It would be wrong to take a negative position in regard to the De Valera demands, on the pre-

mise that the national grievances divert the class struggle for the moment, etc., that Ireland's freedom can only be won after the Irish revolution. No, the Irish Communists must understand that the national grievances of the broad Irish masses are closely connected with their social demands, and they must stand out as the champions of both their national and social demands.

If the Irish Communists do not take this position, they will remain completely isolated from the Irish working class, who believe to-day that De Valera and his party are the real leaders in the struggle for Irish independence. The Irish Communists will remain isolated from the active worker and peasant elements, who are still under the leadership of the Republican Army. The Irish Communists must also join the fight for the abolition of the oath of allegiance and the land annuities without hesitation or vacillation. They must explain that they will support every one of De Valera's measures which is even only one step forward in the fight against British imperialism.

Does that mean they must follow in the train of De Valera, Fianna Fail, or the Republicans? Assuredly not. That, too, would mean a substitution of the policy of isolation for that of liquidation of the Irish Communists, as well as the liquidation of the fight for Irish freedom, which none but the Communists can lead. The Irish Communists must expose to the masses every vacillation of De Valera, not because his policies divert from the class war, not because they are purely nationalistic, but because they are insufficient, incapable of accomplishing the liberation of Ireland. That is the point to explain.

The Irish Communists do not stand only for the abolition of the oath of allegiance, but for the complete breaking away of Ireland from the British Empire, the creation of a united independent Ireland. The Irish Communists not only stand for the abolition of the annual payments, but for the freeing of the poor Irish peasantry from every vestige of feudal taxation. The Irish Communists call upon the peasants to refuse to pay them. The Irish Communists demand the immediate cessation of these oppressive taxes, the cessation of pensions to former English officers, the removal of those officers from the army and police, the removal of the civil officials who have oppressed the Irish people in the interests of British imperialism.

In so far as the Irish Communists unite the national demands with the class demands of the worker and toiling peasant masses, they will mobilise them around the following demands: the extension of unemployment insurance to all the workers and farm labourers—the improvement of social insurance—the prevention of wage-cuts—

increased wages—the starting of new work schemes by taxation of the Irish propertied classes—the freeing of poor peasants from taxation and mortgages—the division of large estates among landless peasants, etc.

The Irish Communists must prove that the social reactionary policies of De Valera support that class which, with the aid of British imperialism, has held Ireland in bondage. It is the same class that has made its peace with the British imperialists, so as to be able to exploit the Irish working masses with the aid of British capital. The Irish Communists must convince the masses that the workers of northern Ireland must be drawn into the common fight of all the Irish workers against their exploiters.

To the extent that the Communists expose the inconsistencies and half-measures of the De Valera and Republican Parties, on the national issues and unmask their Social-fascist policies—it will gather the factory workers and poor peasants, all the broadest masses—in the battle against the social and national reactionary policies of De Valera, by sharpest struggle also against the social and national reactionary policy of the leaders of the Labour Party.

Through such a policy the Irish Communists will help the broad masses to understand step by step on the basis of their own experience of the vacillations and treachery of De Valera and Fianna Fail, and their absolute impotence in even lessening the burden of the masses in this crisis. In this way, the Irish Communists can convince them that the battle for social and national freedom can only be led by the Irish worker in alliance with the toiling peasants, under the leadership of a Communist Party. The Irish Communists will prove to the workers and toiling peasants on the basis of this struggle that only by removing the rule of the Irish money-bags, who have sold their country's interests to England, and through the establishment of an Irish Workers' and Peasants' Republic, can national and social freedom be achieved. Through such resolute tactics, the Irish Communists will gather the best elements of the Irish Republicans who have remained true to the traditions of Connolly and Sinn Fein, to the camp of the revolution.

The vague, vacillating, "classless" republicanism of De Valera and the leaders of the Republican Army, has mobilised a great part of the masses by national demands. But it is clear, that either De Valera or the Republican leaders will make their peace with the British imperialists (if they accept certain tempting concessions), in which case they will only repeat what Griffith, Collins and Cosgrave did in 1921. They will go over to the camp of the open agents of British

imperialism in Ireland. They have only one other recourse. They may actually attempt to defy the British imperialists. Their present demands could conceivably be a preliminary to such a move. In that case, they will have to stake their hopes on the mobilisation of the widest masses. De Valera's stand on the social problems proves that he shrinks from this step, which would endanger the interests of the Irish property classes, which are the limits of his social policy.

Since De Valera and the Republicans depend on the broad masses they may try to manoeuvre between the two extremes, might even split, or even return to parliamentary opposition rather than lose the following of the masses. But the growing tenseness of the situation will inevitably distinguish the true from the hypocritical friends of the Irish people in their struggle for freedom. In Republican circles, also, the first doubts on the politics of the Fianna Fail are finding expression. The Republican, Peadar O'Donnell, writes in "An Phoblacht"—the Republican organ—warningly against De Valera. "*The oath of allegiance and the land tax must not become the screen behind which the enemy interests in Ireland can gather new strength.*" The Irish Communists have the tremendous task and the most favourable circumstances for gathering the working masses, who are seeking a way out of the national and social crisis, around the banner of Communism.

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Precisely at this time, when the imperialist war in China has begun, and when the extension of this conflict into an attack on the Soviet Union is feverishly prepared, it is imperative that the English and Irish Communists take the admonition of Lenin to heart. In his article on the Irish rebellion of 1916, he warned all revolutionaries:

"One cannot deal seriously with the very serious problem of war without utilising the least discernible weakness of our enemies — without utilising every possibility — especially because it was impossible to know beforehand at what particular moment, and with what degree of strength, here or there, one or another powder magazine will explode. We would really be a sorry band of revolutionists if we did not, during the great proletarian battle for Socialism, understand enough to utilise every movement of a nation against any isolated grievances, which are brought about by imperialism, in the interests of a broader intensification and spread of the crisis."

Not only the Irish, but also the British Communists should take this admonition to heart, the more so since the "Daily Worker," the organ of the English Communists, took a tactically incorrect position in the conflict between De Valera

and the British imperialists. The British Communist Party, as the only revolutionary party in England, naturally called upon the masses clearly to fight the British imperialist and Social-fascist threats. It also led the fight for the Irish right to self-determination with the right of separation.

But the "Daily Worker" made the mistake of devoting too large a part of its campaign to the unmasking of De Valera. At a time when the British imperialists and Social-fascists were waging a vituperous campaign against the De Valera demands, this stand could easily confuse many workers. Also, the Irish enemies of Communism could much too easily confuse the masses by saying that the English Communists did not support the demands of De Valera against the imperialists of their country. This tactically wrong stand, which was corrected in the April 10th issue of the "Daily Worker," might have made easier the deception of the Irish workers in Ireland and England.

The task of the British Communists is before all else—the battle against British imperialism—the unmasking of the Social-fascists—and the defence of the "isolated complaints of the Irish people" called forth by the imperialists. Precisely the British Communist Party, the Party of those workers whose imperialist bosses rule Ireland, must avoid lecturing Irish workers like a school teacher. De Valera and the Fianna Fail may not want things, in a situation where the widest masses stand behind De Valera's demands against England, to go too far—but the more they try to draw the battle away from the masses into the legal chambers, the more the deepening of the crisis is creating a situation where the "small" demands may father a conflict that will dangerously exceed the bounds intended by those who first raised them.

The British imperialists, as their tactics in India, Cyprus, Malta, in New South Wales and Newfoundland (where they recently sent a war-ship) show—grow daily more brutal and aggressive in combating all those tendencies (however weakly they are put forward by the official representatives) which infringe the prison house laws of the British Empire.

It is within the realm of possibility that the present conflict between De Valera and the British Government may develop into a movement of greater consequences than either conflicting party imagined. The job of the British Communist Party is clear cut. It must expose the treacherous "manoeuvre" of the Labour Party and I.L.P. It must mobilise as many as possible of the British working class into a fighting opposition to the British acts of aggression on the Irish nation, and through this establish a united front of the English and Irish workers.

COMRADE STALIN'S LETTER AND THE PURGING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC RELICS

Z. SEREBRYANSKY.

PART II.

THE reorganisation of the old type of European Parliamentary party, which is in reality reformist and is only slightly coloured by revolutionism, into a new type of party, into a truly revolutionary, truly Communist Party is a very difficult thing. The example of France illustrates this difficulty perhaps most clearly," wrote comrade Lenin in the article entitled "About Ascending High Mountains."

From some examples of the modern practices of the Communist Party of France one may see very clearly what influence the social-democratic relics exercise over the revolutionary practice of our parties. If, for instance, in the C.P. of Germany and in the C.P. of Poland the social-democratic relics manifest themselves at the present time chiefly in the form of Luxemburgism, in the C.P. of France they appear as relics of Jaurèsism, Guesdism, anarcho-syndicalism, Hervéism, etc. That is precisely why the renegades of communism in France—the French Trotskists, "Popists," minoritarians, etc.—attack the line of the Comintern and of the C.P. of France, making Jaurèsism, Guesdism, anarcho-syndicalism, etc., their banner, while their agency within the C.P. of France—the opportunists of all shades—attempts, under the mask of reviving the "revolutionary" aspects of this social-democratic heritage, to smuggle it into the ranks of the communist movement, substituting it for Leninism.

What question can be more vital to the Communist Party at present than the question of the struggle against war? Everybody understands this. How does the literature of the French communists reply to the question of the struggle against war? First we shall take a look at this literature, and then we shall see what influence this literature is able to exert upon the practical activities of the C.P. of France.

Let us take the book by Servé and Bouton, "The Treachery of the Socialists in 1914." In this book one may read that Jaures gave "an absolutely Marxist" estimation of the causes of the war. Hervé, according to the authors of this book, adhered to a "clearly revolutionary defeatist position." Let us take another book:

J. Clement's "Jaurès—the Reformist." In the preface signed by "a Circle for the Study of Marxism attached to the C.C. of the C.P. of France" we read: "Clement describes Jaurès as a forerunner of modern social-fascism. This is not entirely so. The reformist, pacifist and democratic Jaurès has ideologically very much in common with the military and fascist socialism raging at the present time." By contrasting Jaurès "the reformist, pacifist and democrat" to Jaurès "the forerunner of modern social-fascism" the comrades from the "Circle for the Study of Marxism" showed that they did not understand the real ideological connection between reformism and social-fascism, did not appreciate that social-fascism is the continuation and further development of reformism under the conditions of the general crisis of capitalism. While modern social-fascism in France hides the preparation of a new war under the mask of pacifism, the idealisation of pacifism (in this case of Jaurès) adds grist to the mill of "military and fascist socialism," renders it a direct service.

This is what the comrades from the "Circle for the Study of Marxism attached to the C.C. of the C.P. of France" must understand (at the same time it would not do them any harm to think of changing the very name of their circle which completely ignores Leninism as a new stage in every field of Marxism without exception).

Let us finally take the recently published book by comrade Ferrat which for the first time relates the history of the French Communist Party. Comrade Ferrat has done a very big and useful thing in writing this book. But, at the same time, comrade Ferrat unfortunately has not avoided making mistakes in it. Take, for instance, the characterisation of Guesdism given by Ferrat, while showing Guesdism's evolution towards social-chauvinism comrade Ferrat declares that Guesde (during 1880-1894) adhered to a "Marxian-Leninist position" on the questions of war.

While regarding Guesdism of the period of 1880-1894 as "a consistent Marxian tendency," comrade Ferrat considers the negative features

of Guesdism of this period as "secondary." The C.P. of France regards Guesde's revolutionary services to the French labour movement highly, such as his struggle against the Possibilists, Jaurèsists, and the other varieties of opportunism, his non-Parliamentary actions, etc. Comrade Ferrat is also right in pointing out that the C.P. of France is the only inheritor of the revolutionary Guesdist heritage which has long been repudiated by the Socialist Party. But at the same time the C.P. of France is faced with the task of critically overcoming the negative, opportunist features of the Guesdist heritage. These features cannot be overcome if they are regarded as secondary ones. In speaking of Guesdism of 1880-1894 Ferrat has underestimated the negative heritage of Guesdism of this period, which must be repudiated by the C.P. of France; primarily the Guesdist sectarianism. Comrade Ferrat has ignored Engels' statement (see his letter to Bernstein of September 22, 1882) that the Guesdist policy "is absurd and at times puerile," and Engels' criticism of the "senseless Purism" of the Guesdists, has ignored Guesde's mistaken views, expressed during this period, about a "peaceful revolution," and failed to show Guesde's social-patriotic tendencies even of that period (for instance, his statement in 1893 that "should France be attacked she will have no more fervent defenders than the socialists"), etc. Misinterpreting the tasks of the C.P. of France with regard to the ideological heritage of Guesde, comrade Ferrat seeks to idealise the revolutionary-Marxian character of the Guesdist tendency at all costs and to conceal his mistakes. Thus, in connection with the question of Guesde's attitude towards war, comrade Ferrat writes: "It is true that Guesde could not adequately explain how war should be combatted before it has broken out, but this did not prevent him from adopting a consistently Marxian position during this period. (A. Ferrat, "History of the Communist Party of France," page 37.)

This is the way the literature of the C.P. of France elucidates the attitude of the different tendencies of the pre-war French labour movement towards war. What effect can this attitude have upon the fight of the French Communist Party against war? In this respect the Guesdist traditions are very strong. What the fundamental weakness of the Guesdists on the question of war consisted in is well known. Lenin noted that Guesde's resolution on war represented a "dogmatic exposition of the general truisms of socialism" and "did not contain any suggestion of the active tasks of the proletariat" in the struggle against war, which made it possible to read it "through opportunist spectacles" (see

Lenin, volume XII., pages 82-92, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart").* The thesis that it is not necessary to conduct a special, concrete, active, practical struggle against war was defended by Trotzky also when he opposed the special theses of the VI. Congress of the Comintern on the struggle against war (on this point the function of Trotzkyism as the vanguard of the international counter-revolution in the struggle against the U.S.S.R. was very strikingly revealed). One will recall Guesde's "revolutionary neutrality" towards the various manifestations of capitalism such as war, the high cost of living, etc. Guesde's position was that the struggle against war is a struggle against capitalism, so that there is no need for a special struggle against war.

Is it possible after all this to idealise, as Ferrat essentially does, Guesde's attitude towards war in the 90's, is it possible, considering Guesde's entire evolution on the question of war, to regard his position even for a single moment as "Marxian-Leninist"? Of course this is wrong; for such a position can only do political injury to the cause of the struggle of the Communist Party against war.

The C.P. of France has more than once given a striking example of a revolutionary struggle against war. Now, under the conditions of the imperialist war which has broken out in the Far East, an international duty of exceptional importance devolves upon the C.P. of France. French imperialism, the gendarme of Europe, acts in a close alliance with Japanese imperialism, the most aggressive imperialism at the present moment. The aims pursued by French imperialism in supporting the Japanese jingoes consist in a struggle against the U.S.S.R., against independent China and against the Chinese revolution, consist in strengthening the Versailles system and France's European positions. It is quite clear that the active support given to Japanese imperialism by French imperialism most vitally and closely affects the interests of the millions of French workers and peasants. We are concerned with an attempt to involve them in a new slaughter. We are concerned with efforts on the part of the French bourgeoisie to find a solution of the crisis in war.

In his "Notes on Current Topics" (1927) comrade Stalin, pointing out the real and practical threat of war, said:

"The task consists of sounding the alarm in every country of Europe on the threat of a new war, of raising the vigilance of the workers and soldiers of the capitalist countries and preparing the masses, of tirelessly preparing to meet, in

*Russian edition.

the full armament of the revolutionary struggle, each and every attempt of the bourgeois Governments to organise a new war.

"The task consists of nailing to the pillory all those leaders of the labour movement who 'regard' the menace of a new war as an 'invention,' who lull the workers to sleep by the pacifist lie, who close their eyes to the fact that the bourgeoisie is preparing for a new war, for these people want the war to catch the workers off their guard." (Stalin, "On the Opposition," page 613.)

Do the organisations of the French Communist Party adequately appreciate all of these factors? In the ranks of the Party (and of the red trade unions) one still meets with an underestimation of the entire reality of the war danger, with an underestimation of the fact that the war has already begun. Some of them thought that there must be an official declaration of war, failing to see that now, as comrade Molotov correctly pointed out at the XVII. Party Conference of the C.P.S.U., "the line between peace and war is being increasingly obliterated; they creep into war and fight without an open declaration of war." Some people thought that, as the war was taking place at some great distance it did not "affect" the immediate interests of the French proletariat, forgetting that the new imperialist war, and the threat of intervention against the U.S.S.R., which is more imminent than ever, puts the vital interests of the proletariat of France and of the entire world, in jeopardy.

Only by the underestimation of the war danger and of the entire immense, world political importance of the Far-Eastern events is it possible to explain, for instance, the fact that the congress of the Red T.U. railwaymen held just before these events paid no attention whatsoever to the questions of the impending war. The Communist Youth League of Marseilles distributed leaflets with the slogan "Against the participation of French imperialism in the war against China." As if French imperialism was not already taking a most active part in the war! What does this position signify if not a most dangerous underestimation of the tasks of the struggle against one's "own" imperialism?

In some organs of the C.P. of France one could have read in connection with the Japano-Chinese war talk about the "inability" of the League of Nations to put an end to the Japanese invasion of China. Such a statement was contained even in an article published by "Cahiers du Bolchévisme," the theoretical organ of the C.P. of France. As if the League of Nations which is being directed by French imperialism

wanted to prevent this invasion and did not really support it.*

One of the most important tasks of the Communist Parties in the struggle against war consists in the widest exposure of social-fascism and of its part in the preparation of war, before the great masses. This task has not yet been carried out by the C.P. of France in sufficient measure. Moreover, there have been cases when this exposure followed wrong channels. Thus, it was possible to meet in the communist press with the suggestion that the social-democrats "do not want to interfere with the transportation of war materials." As if the social-fascists merely "do not want to interfere" with the preparation of war and do not support and organise this preparation (under the cover of a pacifist disguise) in the most direct and concrete manner! Entirely insufficient has been the exposure by the party of the "left" manoeuvres of social-fascism on the question of war, of the sham pacifism and deceitful demagoguery. Frequently the party press takes up a defensive position in regard to the arguments of the social-fascists instead of going over to the offensive and exposing the real meaning of all the subterfuges, insinuations and moves of social-fascism. The party and its press do not always respond properly to these manoeuvres of social-fascism.

Thus, "Populaire" (of February 26) commented on comrade Litvinov's resolution in Geneva as being a "brilliant resolution" but, being true to its duplicity, "Le Populaire" proceeded with a discussion of the impossibility of realising the proposals of the Soviet delegation with regard to complete disarmament owing to the fact that the Soviets are opposed to international control of disarmament. "Humanité" ignored this fake "praise" of Litvinov and did not expose the actual solidarisation of the French socialists with the imperialists who rejected the principles expressed in the "brilliant resolution" of Litvinov by this concrete example.

The task of the C.P. of France consists of systematically, persistently, and concretely unmasking pacifism by which social-fascism is covering up its active support of French imperialism and anti-Soviet intervention.

Under the pressure of the powerful sympathies of the masses for the U.S.S.R. "Populaire" is also forced to talk about the threat of intervention against the U.S.S.R. But what "Populaire"

*The following fact was recorded at Onnami, in the North: The Communist members of the Municipal Council moved a resolution censuring the League of Nations for its procrastination with regard to the Japano-Chinese conflict. The Council which, apart from three Communists, consists of Socialists, unanimously passed this "Communist" resolution.

is obscuring, what for easily understood reasons it ignores to mention, is the rôle of French imperialism (and its own) in the preparation for this intervention. The C.P. of France must keep on explaining to the masses constantly, daily, this rôle of French imperialism and of the Socialist Party, its main social bulwark.

From the very beginning of the conflict "Populaire" wriggled like a worm in order to preserve the pacifist appearance on the one hand and to create a most favourable atmosphere for an anti-Soviet intervention on the other.

At first "Populaire" conducted a furious attack upon the U.S.S.R. by alleging the existence of a secret agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the United States; then it continued the same attack on the strength of the allegation of the existence of a secret agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Japan. In its unfathomable baseness "Populaire" does not hesitate at present to maintain that the U.S.S.R. is responsible for the Japanese invasion (!?) because it did not respond at once to Japanese aggression, that the U.S.S.R. betrayed China (!?). Now with the further strengthening of the threat of intervention "Populaire" (on March 3), through Rosenfeld as its spokesman, openly writes that the French social-fascists give their sanction to the seizure by the Japanese imperialists of various parts of the Soviet Far East. "Now it is too late to turn back," writes "Populaire." "If the U.S.S.R. does not want to experience the horrors of war it must yield. 'Prestige,' the rights of the U.S.S.R. to the Chinese-Eastern Railway, even the loss of a remote province cannot and, in any case, must not, justify war."*

Unfortunately, the party was late in exposing these interventionist statements of the social-fascists. Thus, it was only on March 6 that "Humanité" responded to the interventionist article published in "Populaire" on March 3 and even then did not make this the centre of its

*By the way, the Parliamentary fraction of the Socialist Party, upon discussing the question of granting a loan of 600 million francs to Czecho-Slovakia, passed the following resolution: "Considering the circumstances (!) and the Socialist sympathies for the Czecho-Slovak nation," not to oppose the loan either in the Financial Commission or in the Chamber of Deputies but to abstain from voting. At the meeting of the Chamber on March 5th . . . the representative of the Socialist Party declared: "We studied the bill for a loan with the greatest sympathy for we do not forget the rôle played by this fine nation, which is the hope of democracy, a bulwark of peace."

Comrade Cachin in the Chamber exposed the true face of the Social-fascists who are on the one side delivering left demagogic speeches against Schneider-Creuzot and on the other supporting the preparation of war and of intervention by the branch of the same Schneider-Creuzot in Czecho-Slovakia (the Skoda Works which are the first to benefit by the French loan).

entire work. To stigmatise immediately every interventionist statement or action of the social-fascists, to make these facts known to the great working masses, to show the true meaning of each pacifist manoeuvre of the social-fascists, such is the urgent task of the C.P. of France in the struggle against war.

The complexity of the situation in China, too, is not always correctly understood by the C.P. of France. As was the case in some of the other sections of the Comintern, the C.P. of France has been guilty of an underestimation of the national emancipation struggle, which, despite the treachery of the Kuomintang, is being conducted by the masses of the Chinese people against the imperialists, guilty of failing to understand that at the present stage the defence of the Chinese people and of China's independence constitutes part of the defence of the U.S.S.R.

Only in this way is it possible to explain why the French party, instead of issuing the slogan of the defence of the U.S.S.R., of the Chinese revolution and of an independent China, advanced the slogan "Defend the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Soviets" which completely ignores the events in Shanghai. The non-appreciation of the national uplift of the masses as a most important factor in the struggle of the Chinese forces in Shanghai was manifested also in the incorrect slogan which one could find in the pages of some of the regional newspapers of the C.P. of France: "Stop the supply of arms to the Kuomintang and Japan." Some of the regional newspapers even stressed particularly the need of a struggle against the Kuomintang, making this task the principal task of the present period.

It is true that the Kuomintang is the worst enemy of the Chinese revolution and of the Chinese Soviets and the hireling of American imperialism which is squaring up accounts with Japanese imperialism. It is true that the Kuomintang which is still conducting an active struggle against the Chinese Red Army and which licks the boot of the imperialists, is pretending, only under the pressure of the national revival of the masses, to support their struggle. In reality the Kuomintang sabotages and betrays this struggle preparing for a complete surrender to the imperialists. It is true that the retreat of the 19th Army was caused by the virtual refusal of the Kuomintang to support it, by the purely defeatist position of the Nanking Government, by the open betrayal and deceit of the masses. But the toiling masses of China are heroically fighting against the invasion of the Japanese imperialists.

Is it possible after all this to treat China and Japan equally in the anti-war campaign? To do

this is not to understand that the struggle for the national independence of China against all the attempts of international imperialism to dismember China now constitutes a part of the struggle in the defence of the U.S.S.R. It is not to understand the very essence of the national emancipation struggle conducted by the workers and peasants of China against the imperialists and against the treacherous Kuomintang. No doubt this underestimation of the national emancipation struggle is connected by many roots with the social-democratic traditions and the social-democratic neglect of the national-revolutionary movements in the colonies.

Recently "Humanité" introduced a feature on work in the village. This is a very important and valuable innovation. But what appears in this section about war, which so closely affects the millions of French peasants? The only article on war addressed to the peasants, was that by Renaud Jean ("Humanité," February 13, 1932). Unfortunately even this article is essentially based upon a repetition of the argumentation of the social-democrats (to the effect that the bourgeoisie fears war, the danger of which therefore is not so real).

The article addressed to the peasants says: "You will do the most against war if you convince the bourgeoisie (!?) by your action that the imperialist war which they will unleash will be speedily converted by the workers and by you into a class revolutionary war."

In conclusion Renaud Jean's article urges the peasants to combat war "as such," completely forgetting Lenin's doctrine on reactionary and revolutionary wars. "To the extent that reactionary wars are criminal and destructive . . ." wrote Lenin, "to the same extent are revolutionary wars, that is wars in the defence of the oppressed classes against the capitalists, in the defence of the nations oppressed by the imperialists of a few countries, legitimate and just wars in the defence of the socialist revolution against foreign invasions."*

In the theses of the C.C. of the C.P. of France published in connection with the Party Congress, shortly to be held, one can read severe criticism of the "opportunist passiveness of the party in the handling of the anti-war work." This opportunist passiveness of the party reflected itself in a number of facts in which the Guesdist traditions played no small a part. But the Jaurèsist traditions also have their place here.

*Lenin, Volume XX, Part II, Page 476. "On the theses on the agrarian question of the French Communist Party." Incidentally, Comrade Renaud Jean was most intimately connected with these theses which were criticised by Lenin but has apparently learned very little from Lenin's criticisms.

Among a section of the French communists the vulgar pacifist slogan "Fight for Peace" was rather popular (see, for instance, "La Vie Ouvrière" and certain regional newspapers of the C.P. of France, "Avant-Garde"). Here the Jaurèsist roots of this treatment are clearly evident. Is this a Leninist treatment? Lenin sufficiently explained that the slogan "Fight for Peace," *separated from the revolutionary struggle against imperialist war*, is a false pacifist treatment of the question. Lenin pointed out more than once that "one of the forms of humbugging the working class is pacifism and the abstract gospel of peace" (Volume XVIII, page 127). "Peace propaganda at the present time, *unaccompanied by a call to the masses for revolutionary mass action*, is capable only of sowing illusions, of corrupting the proletariat into a belief in the humanitarianism of the bourgeoisie and making it a plaything in the hands of secret diplomacy" (Ibid).

The communists are not indifferent, of course, to the profound anxiety of the great masses for peace. On the contrary, the communists alone direct the masses to the only true road to peace, the road of the revolutionary struggle against imperialist war, exposing the pacifist "recognition" of the slogan of peace as a hypocritical and base deceit concealing the preparation for new wars.

"The slogan of the conscious vanguard of the workers are one thing," wrote Comrade Lenin on this question, "the spontaneous demands of the masses are another. The desire for peace is one of the most important symptoms of the development of *disillusionment* in the bourgeois lie regarding the 'liberationist' aims of the war, regarding the 'defence of the fatherland' and the other deceits by which the capitalist class misleads the 'great unwashed.' The socialists must give this symptom the greatest attention. All efforts must be made to take advantage of the sentiment of the masses in favour of peace. But *how* is it to be taken advantage of? To recognise the slogan of peace and to repeat it would be to encourage the 'airs of the powerless (and what is frequently even worse—the *hypocritical*) windbags.' This would be to *deceive* the people with the illusion that the present Governments, the present commanding classes, are *capable* of maintaining peace without being 'taught' (or, to be more exact, removed) by a series of revolutions Nothing can be more harmful than this deceit" (Lenin, "The questions of Peace," volume XVIII., pages 227-228).

It is precisely the social-fascists who are trying

to deceive the masses by the illusion that the modern imperialist Governments are capable of maintaining peace, without being removed by a revolution. This is precisely their aim in exploiting the pacifist slogan, "Fight for Peace," so intensively.

But does it become the communists to repeat this pacifist deceit? Is it not, on the contrary, the most important task of the French bolsheviks to most extensively expose this deceit; to explain that "imperialism is the capitalist reality, bourgeois pacifism a capitalist illusion"? *Without a resolute elimination of the social-democratic traditions which still survive in certain links of the C.P. of France in the form of pacifism, it is impossible for the party to successfully fulfil its tasks in the struggle against war and the danger of intervention.*

Alongside the pacifist tendencies, the C.P. of France must strike a powerful blow at the anarcho-syndicalist tendencies which are already manifesting themselves in some links of the party.

The anarchist and Hervéist phrase which has done enough harm to the working class of France in the past, makes itself felt quite frequently now as well. It has particularly manifested itself in some of the provincial newspapers of the C.P. of France which published the bare slogan "Respond to war by revolution" (for instance, in the communist newspaper of Limoges "Le Travailleur du Centre-Ouest") and where the persistent, systematic practical work of combatting war has been replaced by "revolutionary" fireworks in the anarchist style.

One of the worst features of the Second International was the discrepancy between word and action. Without the complete liquidation of this social-democratic tradition no genuine Communist Party can possibly exist.

The experience of the first steps of the C.P. of France in the struggle against the war in China shows that this tradition still lingers on to a certain extent. Resolutions, frequently good and correct in themselves, were sometimes not followed up by the necessary revolutionary actions: strikes, demonstrations, the prevention of the transportation of arms and ammunition, and of the dispatch of white guards to the Far East, etc. Yet it is only by these actions of the Communist Parties in the struggle against war that it is possible to judge the real fighting capacity of the parties.

The party has not yet made sufficiently concrete the slogans and methods of the struggle against the war which is already being waged, and is connecting up these slogans quite inadequately with the economic struggles of the working masses. A few examples taken from the latest

issues of "Humanité" strikingly illustrate these weak spots in the struggle against war.

First example. At the Salmson Aeroplane Engine Works overtime has been introduced on Japanese orders. "Humanité" (on February 29) reports this and advances a number of correct political anti-war slogans. But no demands were advanced to organise the struggle against the war among the workers of the given factory.

Example number two. On February 26 "Humanité" noted that at the conferences of the biggest industrial regions of the Seine and Seine-Oise dealing with the danger of an imperialist war there was "general" talk; the attention was not focussed upon concrete methods of combatting war, the war preparations, in the factories, particularly in the war factories.

Example number three. On February 28, "Humanité" reported that several hundred white guards, on their way from Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia to Manchuria, will pass through the French port of Cherbourg. However, the newspaper merely limited itself to reporting this fact without advancing the concrete slogan: "Prevent the Transportation of the Russian White Guards!"

Very many examples of the same kind could be cited. All of them testify to the inability to concretise the struggle against war as the greatest weakness of the C.P. of France. The numerous weaknesses and mistakes of the C.P. of France in the struggle against war urgently necessitate sweeping bolshevist self-criticism and immediate correction.

The C.P. of France, under the leadership of the C.C., has already corrected a great part of its mistakes committed during the first stage of the struggle against the war in the Far East. From day to day the press of the French Communist Party, headed by "Humanité," has been sounding the alarm, exposing the support of the Japanese imperialists by the French, mobilising the masses in the defence of the U.S.S.R., the fatherland of the world proletariat, against the new danger of intervention threatening it, exposing the anti-Soviet preparations of the white guards in France, etc., etc. Contrary to all the efforts of the bourgeois and social-fascist press which attempted to divert the attention of the proletarian masses from the imperialist war and the danger of intervention threatening the U.S.S.R. by "sensations" about the Cabinet crisis, etc., the French communist press succeeded from the very outbreak of the Japano-Chinese war, in placing the questions of the war in the centre of attention. The mobilisation of the masses for the struggle against war is be-

coming more and more concrete and effective; this may be illustrated by the strike of the Dunkerque dockers who have refused to load ammunition, by the seven anti-war workers' meetings held at the gates of the metal factories of Paris (on March 2 alone), etc., etc.

However, on the whole, the struggle of the C.P. of France against war, even as late as the beginning of March, 1932, did not essentially pass beyond the phase of agitational work. The C.P. of France is still slow in mobilising the masses for the struggle against war and developing the necessary revolutionary actions on the part of the railwaymen, dock workers, seamen, chemical workers, etc., etc.

Its anti-militarist work has always been the pride of the French Communist Party. No doubt exists that now, also, when the real war places an exceptionally heavy responsibility upon the C.P. of France, the latter will prove equal to its task.

But it is quite obvious that the liquidation of the enormous mistakes and weaknesses of the C.P. of France in its struggle against the war is impossible without a resolute fight against the ideological basis of these weaknesses and mistakes, i.e., the Jaurèsist, Guesdist, anarcho-syndicalist, Hervéist and other varieties of social-democratic traditions.

Here we have dealt with the question of war, but the same applies to the peasant question which still receives entirely inadequate attention from the C.P. of France. The same applies also to the absolutely insufficient support of the national revolutionary movement and to the revolts in the colonies and semi-colonies oppressed by French imperialism (Indo-China, Syria, Madagascar); to the weakening of the work of the C.P. of France in the colonies (for instance, in Algeria), to the indifference displayed by the C.P. of France to the national emancipation movement in Alsace-Lorraine, to the insufficient assistance given by the C.P. of France to the communists of Alsace-Lorraine. The same applies to the inability to lead the every-day struggle of the proletarian masses and march at the head of all the forms of mass resistance to the bourgeois dictatorship and to the offensive of capital. The same applies to the cases of incorrect interpretation or neglect of the united front policy, to cases of the mistaken interpretation of the "class against class" policy as one applicable only during elections. The same applies to the insufficient criticism of the "left" manoeuvres of social-fascism, etc., etc. An urgent task of the C.P. of France consists in completely uprooting all the relics of counter-revolutionary Trotzism,

thoroughly exposing all the disguised Trotzist agents who wormed themselves into or remained in the party in order to bore from within and conduct demoralising counter-revolutionary work. The Trotzists who carry on in France a furious agitation against the U.S.S.R., the C.P.S.U. and the Comintern, who oppose the "class against class" policy and urge the united front from above, and the liquidation of the United Confederation of Labour, who oppose the "exaggeration" by the Comintern and the C.P. of France of the crisis in France which they claim is in an "exceptional" position, who urge the impossibility of conducting successful battles during the crisis, etc., etc., strikingly demonstrate the counter-revolutionary essence of Trotzism, the agency of social-fascism, the direct accomplice of Rosenfeld and Co.

That is why the struggle against the rotten liberalism displayed in some links of the C.P. of France towards the Trotzists constitutes an urgent task of the party. It is utterly intolerable that Trotzist agents who have wormed themselves into the party in some cases are not only not cleaned out of its ranks but even elected to various offices (such a case took place, for instance, in a cell in Argenteuil which nominated the Trotzist Billatte as its candidate in the elections).

In the French party one of the forms of social-democratic relics which must be overcome with all determination is that of anarcho-syndicalism.

Anarcho-syndicalism, which Lenin characterised, even before the war, as "revisionism from the left," has evolutionised, together with the development of revisionism, in the direction of social-imperialism; of social-chauvinism and later in the direction of social-fascism, and at present represents nothing but a variety of the social-democracy. This was pointed out by comrade Stalin at the meeting of the activists of the Leningrad organisation of the C.P.S.U. on July 13, 1923, when, in speaking about the draft programme of the Comintern, he said "The draft stresses the social-democracy as the basis support of capitalism among the working class and as the main enemy of communism, *finding that all the other tendencies in the working class (anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism, guild socialism) essentially represent varieties of the same social-democracy.*" (Our italics.)

The relics of the anarcho-syndicalist variety of socialism still weigh down upon certain links of the French section of the C.I. This is evident from the work of the C.P. of France in the trade union movement (the party did not take the leadership of the struggle for trade union unity

into its own hands), from the sectarian attitude towards the trade unions, from the mechanical methods adopted in the relations between the party and the unions. This is clear from the estimation or, rather, underestimation of the rôle of the partial struggles, when in some cases a policy is adopted not of preparation, organisation and leadership of these struggles, but of waiting until the workers themselves should start.

In a number of cases we meet with a purely anarcho-syndicalist conception of the strike struggle as "revolutionary gymnastics" (see, for instance, the popular pamphlet published by the C.P. of France, "Poverty, Fascism, War"). Traces of syndicalist and Guesdist relics clearly manifested themselves in the entire campaign of the C.P. of France in connection with the social insurance law when the Communist Party issued the false slogan that under capitalism there can be no social insurance. The "left" sectarian group of Barbé-Celor put in no small effort to discredit the struggle of the party for partial demands by representing it as an entirely unnecessary "fight for beefsteak."

The social-democratic and anarcho-syndicalist traditions in the C.P. of France manifest themselves also in the entirely insufficient attention to organisational questions and even in direct neglect of organisational questions. It is quite natural that the result of this is extreme weakness of the party in the big factories, particularly in the ammunition works, the absolute insufficiency of the number of factory cells, and irregularity and weakness in the work of these cells.

Various social-democratic traditions survive not only in the Communist Party of France. They manifest themselves in a number of sections of the C.I. These traditions represent certain remnants of the heritage of the Second International which have not yet been uprooted and which still cling to life in some links of the communist movement. *These traditions are fed by the bourgeois and petty bourgeois pressure upon the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat.*

That is why the struggle for the uprooting of every social-democratic tradition constitutes a most important and pressing task of the sections of the Comintern, a most important factor of their bolshevisation, a most important condition of the successful fulfilment by the communist parties of their basic strategical task, that of capturing the majority of the working class, of freeing the working masses from the influence of the social-democracy.

In one of his remarkable series of articles

written in February-March, 1922, and entitled "On Ascending High Mountains," Vladimir Ilyich wrote that we are faced with "not noisy, not striking, not clamorous, not speedy, but thoroughgoing work of creating in Europe and America real Communist Parties, genuine revolutionary vanguards of the proletariat." The Comintern has already done a good deal of this "not noisy, not striking, not clamorous, but thoroughgoing work of creating real Communist Parties." The Communist Parties are no longer what they were during the period of the revolutionary battles of 1918-20. And the proletariat which has gone through the painful and extensive experience of the past years is no longer what it was during the period of the first series of wars and revolutions.

In the circumstances of the new war, which has already broken out, of the end of the capitalist stabilisation, of the convulsive attempts of the bourgeoisie to find a capitalist way out of the crisis, and of the growth in a number of countries of the factors of a revolutionary crisis, the Communist Parties, the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat, are confronted with gigantic historical tasks.

To utilise the favourable situation, to prepare and *organise* the revolutionary way out of the crisis, such is the task of tasks of the sections of the C.I. The struggle for a revolutionary way out of the crisis is taking place and will continue amidst conditions of an unusual sharpening of the class struggle. That is why Comrade Stalin's signalisation of the necessity of a steadfast and systematic exposure of and struggle against all opportunist distortions in the communist ranks and against all manifestations of rotten liberalism towards these distortions was so timely.

Comrade Stalin's letter again reminds the sections of the C.I. of the "basic strategical rule of Leninism" which consists in that "the most dangerous social support of the enemies of the revolution during the period of the impending revolutionary clash are the collaborationist parties" (see Preface to the Book, "On the Road to October"). *But the sharpening of the struggle against the social-democracy—the main support of the bourgeoisie—is impossible without the resolute elimination of all the social-democratic relics in the ranks of the communist movement itself, without a tireless advancement of the ideological bolshevist level of the cadres of the C.I. sections, without a broad development of Marxian-Leninist education by them.*

Comrade Stalin's letter must mobilise all the sections of the C.I. against the social-democratic

relics for a resolute struggle. It is precisely these relics which largely interfere with the liquidation of the lagging of many C.I. sections behind the vital tasks of the revolutionary struggle. Only through the merciless exposure of all the different opportunist distortions and of rotten liberalism towards them, only through resolute bolshevist self-criticism of the theoretical

and practical mistakes committed by the Communist Parties, can the latter be converted into true bolshevist parties. Only through a ceaseless struggle for the purity of the Marxian-Leninist doctrine, only on the basis of the bolshevist theory and policy, will the Communist Parties succeed in fulfilling their historical rôle.

Z. SEREBRYANSKY.

THE LAST AGRICULTURAL CENSUS IN THE U.S.A.

By M. SPECTATOR.

IN the dispute with Bulgakov, David and Suchanov, Lenin wrote as follows about the U.S.A.: "That ideal country shows a growing concentration of agricultural production, crowding out of small by large scale production, a process of proletarianisation and need among the great majority of the agricultural population" (Vol. IX, Page 193). The recently-published incomplete results of the latest agricultural census in the U.S.A. more than confirm Lenin's words. They reveal that the processes indicated by Lenin are making extremely rapid headway at present in view of the existing crisis.*

Let us take, to begin with, the expropriation of the small farmer, the flight from the village. Whereas the total population of the U.S.A. increased from 105.7 to 122.8 millions between 1920 and 1930, the farmer population decreased from 31.6 to 30.4 millions, a drop from 29.9 per cent. to 14.8 per cent. of the total population. Had the increase in farmer population equalled that of the rest of the population it would have registered an additional 5 million; as a matter of fact it decreased by 1 (one) million, recording therefore an actual decrease of 6 million persons. It must also be borne in mind that this is the first time that the history of American agriculture reports an absolute drop both in its population as well as in the number of farmsteads. Prior to 1920 the agricultural population (data covering farmers did not exist) definitely increased, though more slowly than did the rest of the population. Similarly the number of farms was continually growing up to 1920. From then on the decrease commenced.

There were 6,448,000 farms in 1920, 6,371,600 in 1925 and 6,238,800 in 1925. 160,000 farms were deserted by their owners. Since the farm acreage, as is shown farther on, was not

diminished, this fact speaks of concentration, of the forced replacement of the small by the larger farmer. But more on this subject later.

The census covers the farmer population inhabiting agricultural sections. In 1920 they numbered 31,358,600 persons and in 1930 31,157,500. Or it may be put otherwise. In 1920, 255,700 "farmers" lived in city settlements whereas in 1930 the number was 287,800. Although this is a comparatively small figure we believe nevertheless that it is indicative of a tendency to transfer agricultural undertakings into the hands of city traders, industrialists and bankers. This, too, is a factor in the ruin of farmers.

In our further analysis of the new census we will maintain the same divisions as did Lenin—northern, southern and western states. The census being discussed follows no such division. We therefore drew up the corresponding calculations ourselves. First let us divide the farmer population into agricultural districts in accordance with the scheme used by Lenin:

	Farmer population in thousands	
	1920	1930
New England	499.1	535.4
Middle Atlantic	1,673.7	1,861.2
Central North-West	4,453.1	4,887.2
Central North-West	5,035.6	5,153.2
Northern States	11,661.5	12,437.0
South Atlantic	5,879.0	6,397.8
Central South-Eastern	5,084.4	5,174.8
Central South-Western	5,307.9	5,210.6
Southern States	16,271.2	16,783.1

*The census refers to the beginning of 1930 and was therefore unable to lay bare all those tendencies which later came to the fore so strikingly in connection with the present world economic crisis.

Mountain Region	1,123.7	1,153.0
Pacific States	1,101.0	985.5
Western States	2,224.7	2,138.5

Thus the north lost 775,500, the south 510,000 and the west increased its population by 86,000 persons. More exactly the west has not yet reached the stage of definite decrease in population. As yet this is only a relative change. The movement of the population from eastern to western states requires no comment. The 4 per cent increase during the course of 10 years is considerably below the normal increase in population.

Let us now consider the distribution of the number of farms and their land in the districts indicated :

	Number of farms (in thousands)		Changes during 1920-30 in %
	1920	1930	
North	2,763.4	2,561.8	-7.3
South	3,206.7	3,223.7	+0.8
Western	478.3	503.1	+5.2
Total	6,448.4	6,288.6	-2.5

	Farm area in mill. hectares		% changes
	1920	1930	
North	432.3	425.7	-1.5
South	350.1	343.1	-2.0
West	173.5	218.0	+5.7
Total	955.9	968.8	+3.2

Only the western states show an increased area of farm land. In the northern states, however, the decrease was also relatively small. At the same time 200,000 farmers or 7.3 per cent. abandoned their farmsteads. It is clear that this concerns small farms which are not in a position to withstand competition, for the area, as such, merely decreased 1.5 per cent. During the same period the sown acreage has even increased since 1925—from 226.9 to 236.7 million acres. Clearly the entire brunt of the crisis cannot be laid at the door of the competing western sections. This competition unquestionably aggravated the condition of many small farms, but even the states furthest west suffer almost as deeply from the crisis as do the northern states. The increased acreage is explained by the fact that the crisis naturally does not affect farmsteads of different scales alike; large undertakings using tractors and combines find they can profitably extend their sown acreage in order to cut down production costs while the small, poorly-equipped farms are forced to diminish their territory, to shut down, ruined. Therefore we observe a greater

sown area in the northern states, and still greater in the western states, despite the fact that the crisis is raging in both sections.

A graphic picture is obtained by watching the movement of prices of land in the districts under discussion :

	Value of all land in million dollars		Price per acre in dol.	
	1920	1930	1920	1930
North	35,536.0	19,536.2	82.2	45.9
South	12,324.9	9,269.0	35.2	27.0
West	6,968.7	6,124.7	40.2	28.1
Total	54,829.6	34,929.8	57.4	35.4

The prices on land have fallen 30 per cent. in the western states, 44.2 per cent. in the northern states and in the southern states 23.2 per cent. If the crisis were exclusively limited to the competition of the western states as Zering claims,* prices of land in these states should have risen, dropping on the other hand in the western states. The fact that they are falling everywhere about equally indicates that we are dealing with a general phenomenon which has affected all districts, though not to the same extent. Where the prices of land are particularly high, the rent aggravates the effects of the crisis and a sharp drop in prices causes the ruin of the small owners, who have purchased their land at high prices, and are now forced to pay interest on their loans.

We have previously seen that the increase in farm land was small. Nevertheless all bourgeois scientists insist that there has been an *absolute* overproduction of grain, that is an overproduction not as far as the purchasing power is concerned but of the consumption possibilities (needs). Yasny claims that the world is stocked up to the brim with grain, Zering maintains that production has exceeded the limits of possible grain utilisation (consumption). Not speaking of the fallacy of all these statements, that average grain consumption is exceedingly low (according to calculations made by the Agricultural Institute of Rome the per capita consumption of wheat during the years 1925-26 on the average for all countries excluding China, Turkey and the U.S.S.R. was 63.2 klg. as compared to 65.9 klg. for the five year period preceding the war and 128.7 klg. the European average) the American census statistics categorically repudiate these statements.

If we take all the reclaimed (improved) farm land we find that it has extended from 505 to 522 million acres in the period from 1925-30, altogether only 3.4 per cent. In itself such an insignificant increase in area could not have occasioned a crisis. Comparing this enlarged

*Die Deutsche Landwirtschaft (German Agriculture), 1932, pp. 877-878.

area with the 7.7 per cent. population increase we see a decrease in the area of cultivated land of from 4.43 to 4.25 acres per capita. Since the yield has been no greater during this period the supply of grain to the country has therefore been diminished.

The census furnishes the following data with regard to the acreage planted and the yields obtained: Tilled land increased from 391 millions to 413 million acres or 5.5 per cent. (1925-1930); the area harvested from 344.5 to 359.2 million acres or 4.2 per cent. Clearly much less than the population. Similarly the number of head of live stock in the country decreased. There were:

(In million heads)

	1930	1920
Horses	13.4	19.8
Mules	5.4	5.4
Horned cattle	54.2	66.6
Milk cows	20.5	19.7
Hogs	32.8	59.3

All these figures fail to indicate an overproduction even in the sense that production progressed with even greater rapidity than did the population.

The calculation of production in its natural volume indicates that there was a sharp drop in grain and that the entire production of agriculture registers a slight increase, less though than that of the population.

Index of Production of Agriculture
(1919-27 = 100)

Year	Including				
	Total	Grain	Meat	Milk	Cotton
1920	97	116	92	80	105
1925	106	95	102	110	128
1929	109	87	105	122	118
1930	107	86	99	122	113

The table discloses a general drop in production for the crisis year of 1930. Up to 1929 the total production of agriculture increased minimally whereas the population increase was 7.7 per cent. The production of grain crops even dropped.

From 1920 to 1929 the population increased by 16 per cent., and production—at most 5 per cent. The grain yield dropped sharply.

How then did "over-production of grain crops" come about?

According to the general statistics gathered from year to year we know that the wheat yield is no greater than in pre-war years. For instance the average crop for the years 1911-15 amounted to 806 million bushels and to 867 million bushels for 1927-29. Consequently the wheat crop increased 7.4 per cent., whereas the population correspondingly increased 23 per cent.; plainly there can be no talk of absolute "overproduction" of wheat.

Another common explanation of the crisis frequently met in bourgeois literature and harped

upon by the Social-fascists is that the technical progress of recent years and particularly the introduction of the tractor is the root of all evil. The census unqualifiedly rejects this explanation.

According to the census the general expenditure (cost) of machinery and equipment employed in American agriculture has dropped during the last decade from 3,594 to 3,301.7 million dollars or 7.9 per cent. Since the prices on agricultural machinery have fallen an average of 15.4 per cent. during this period the general increase in machinery *has been extremely limited.**

However, the area under cultivation in its turn did increase somewhat—3 per cent., so that per unit of area (per farmstead) machine capital investment increased somewhat. The analysis of the use of machines according to districts is very significant.

	Cost of Machines and equipment in million dollars	Decrease in 1930 as compared to 1920 in %	
	1920	1930	
North	2,400.6	2,165.1	-9.8
South	771.1	696.7	-9.6
West	423.1	439.8	+4.0

	Cost of machines per acre in dollars	Decrease in %	
Total	3,594.8	3,301.7	
North	5.55	5.09	-8.3
South	2.20	2.03	-7.7
West	2.44	2.02	-17.2

Average 3.76 3.35 -10.9

In the northern and southern states the average value of machines in use dropped slightly less than did the prices of same. In this connection their actual total did increase somewhat—although to a minimum degree. In the western states there was an actual decrease in the machinery in use, figuring per acre. This might have been the result of the introduction of better machines and of their better exploitation. In any case no outstanding progress in the sense of improved equipment of agricultural production took place. Totalling all the agricultural machines it is seen that only engines increased: automobiles, tractors and other motors used in agricultural production.

Number of farms owning

Year Automobiles Trucks Tractors motors motors
(in thousands)

1920	1979.6	131.6	229.3	?	?
1930	3650.0	845.3	851.5	256.7	945.0

*We regret that we are prevented from analysing the use of machines in the various groups.

% of total number of farms

	1920		1930	
	% of total number of farms			
1920	30.7	2.0	3.6	—
1930	59.0	13.4	13.5	4.1
Number of farms who reported about tractors in thous. % of total number of farms.				
	1920	1930	1920	1930
North	163.0	624.0	5.9	24.3
South	32.9	129.7	1.0	4.0
West	33.4	97.7	7.0	19.4
Total	229.3	851.4	3.6	13.5

The introduction of tractors progressed most rapidly in the *north* and in the north-west-central districts. In the former section 24 per cent. of all the farms acquired tractors and in the latter as high as 26.5 per cent. In the south far fewer farmsteads have tractors, in the west the number of farms owning tractors increased threefold.

The total number of tractors on farms—920,395 was divided into 663,572 (72 per cent.) for the northern section, 146,153 for the south and 110,670 for the west. In this manner the advantage of the west over the north is exclusively limited to lower rents, and not at all to better equipment of machines and tractors.

On the whole, the mechanisation of American agriculture has unquestionably improved. But since the general cost (value) of machines on the farms has risen very little it follows that the tractor and other motive power affected a better exploitation of the machine equipment on hand but did not completely mechanise production. In all events it had no effect on introducing machines into the middle and small undertakings. The records show that tractors are used in only 13.5 per cent. of all farmsteads. It may be presumed that tractors are to be found on farms with an acreage not under 175-259 acres. There were 691,000 (11 per cent.) farms with at least 260 acres. Approximately 100,000 farms with an acreage of from 175 to 259 acres, must be added to this total. The remainder of the farms are not in a position to make use of tractors. The great majority of farmsteads could not afford to improve their production. Herein lies the explanation of the fact that the average production expenditures (cost) apparently remained unchanged of recent years. We have already seen that production itself did not increase. Prices had therefore to be regulated by the production expenditures of enterprises with less capital while enterprises better-off received the differential rent. "An insufficiency of capital in the hands of the majority of farm renters (they were the majority for had they been the minority they would merely

have had to sell at a price below production cost) has the very same effect as a differentiation of the land itself in a descending order. Poorer means of cultivation used on poorer land increases the tillage cost (rent). It may even be a cause for rent from better cultivated land of just as poor quality which ordinarily brings in no rent." (Capital, Vol. I, Part 2, 1923 Edition, Page 243). This did not happen. Contrariwise, prices dropped. The obvious explanation of this fact is that at the present stage of development of production, tractors are not within reach of the majority of the farmsteads. The tractor is not the issue—as apologists of capital insist. It lies in the *general caprices of capitalism* which form the basis of the agrarian crisis.

The present agrarian crisis has been called forth by an absolute decrease or limitation of consumption during a period of widespread capitalistic crisis. The relative overproduction when prices were no longer determined by the worst or medium, but by the *best* organised concerns using tractors and combines was the direct outcome of this. Only in such circumstances did the tractor become a factor aggravating the crisis—causing a terrific drop in prices and bringing complete ruin to fair-sized as well as small enterprises.

The statistics obtained in the last census also exploded the "theory" of David, Kautsky and others as to the vitality of the average peasant farmstead. First of all the rent relation is rapidly growing and the number of freeholders in the total number of farmsteads is similarly decreasing. In 1920 the total number of freeholders was 3,925,000. In 1925 it had dropped to 3,868,000, and in 1930 to 3,568,400. This number included tenants of additional land registering 558,600 in 1920 and 656,700 in 1930. The number of tenants increased from 2,454,800 to 2,664,400, or from 38.1 per cent. to 42.4 per cent. of the total number of farms. Moreover, the fact that the money rent progresses but little is worthy of cognisance. There were 430,000 tenants who paid money rent in 1920 and 489,000 in 1930. Tenants who made payment in other forms totalled 1,970,000 in 1920 and 2,170,000 in 1930. The rented area increased from 264,980,000 to 306,400,000 acres or from 27.7 per cent. to 31 per cent. of all farmland. And again the mixed form of rent, share-cropping and other forms showed a decided increase—from 20.9 to 23.8 per cent. of the entire area.

The distribution of the number of farms and land according to the form of land ownership in the three sections is portrayed in the following table:

THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

	Own Land		Managed Land		Rented	
	1920	1930	1920	1930	1920	1930
	number of farms in thousands					
North	1,945.2	1,768.2	38.4	25.1	779.2	768.5
South	1,597.2	1,415.7	18.3	17.4	1,591.1	1,790.8
West	382.7	384.5	11.7	13.4	84.5	105.1
Total	3,925.1	3,568.4	68.4	55.9	3,454.8	2,664.4

	Farmers' Land in millions of acres.					
	1920	1930	1920	1930	1920	1930
North	288.8	273.4	11.8	9.1	131.6	143.3
South	220.6	190.1	22.4	27.6	107.1	125.4
West	127.4	154.9	19.8	25.3	26.3	37.7
Total	636.8	618.4	54.1	62.0	265.0	306.4

	Freeholders		Managers		Tenants	
	1920	1930	1920	1930	1920	1930
	Number of farms in % to total number of farms of given dist.					
North	70.4	69.1	1.4	0.9	28.2	30.0
South	49.8	43.8	0.6	0.5	49.6	55.7
West	80.0	76.4	2.3	2.7	17.7	20.9

	Farm land in % to all farm land of the given district					
	1920	1930	1920	1930	1920	1930
North	66.9	64.2	2.7	2.2	30.4	33.6
South	65.0	55.4	6.5	8.0	30.6	36.6
West	73.4	71.1	11.4	11.6	15.4	17.3

Thus the rent relation has grown outstandingly in the south where in 1930—55.7 per cent. of all the farms were rented and 36.6 per cent. of all the land was leased.

A striking fact is the growing number of croppers—enslaved tenants, nothing more than bound workers. In 1925 there were 613,000 croppers in the south and in 1930 already 776,000. The croppers were divided for these periods into 279,000 and 383,000 whites and 344,000, and 393,000 coloured persons. Thus the number of negroes formally renting land but actually enslaved workers is now considerably greater. The crisis "ruins the mass of owners, radically breaks up the established relation of property and *in places* leads to technical regression, to a revival of the middle age relationship and form of economy" (Lenin).

The influence of the crisis and the tractor on concentration can be followed by the statistics quoted above with regard to the number of farms and the area they cover. An average farm is somewhat bigger as compared to the previous census. In 1920 it covered 148.2 acres and 156.9

in 1930. Taken for separate districts we find the following division in acres :

	1920	1930
North	156.46	166.22
South	109.20	106.45
West	362.74	433.31

We see that the west shows a more clearly defined process of concentration. Here the farms are three or four times larger than in other sections and the process of their growth is more intensive. However, the mean statistics are no indication of the actual tendency. We illustrate the distribution of the number of farms and farm-lands by groups in proportion to the total in the following table :

	Groups on all land in acres		
	1920	1925	1930
to 10	4.5	5.9	5.7
from 10-19	7.9	9.2	8.9
from 20-49	23.3	22.8	22.9
50-99	22.9	22.3	21.9
100-499	38.1	36.5	36.8
100-174	22.5	21.7	21.3
175-259	8.2	7.9	8.3
260-499	7.4	6.9	7.2
500-999	2.3	2.3	2.5
1000 and over	1.0	1.0	1.3
Farm land in % to the total.			
Up to 20 acres	0.9	1.1	1.0
20-49	5.1	5.0	4.7
50-99	11.1	11.0	10.0
100-174	20.4	20.1	18.3
175-499	29.0	28.0	27.0
500-999	10.6	10.7	11.0
1000 and over	23.1	24.1	28.0
Tilled land in % to the total.			
to 20 acres	1.6	2.1	1.8
20-49	7.7	8.5	7.9
50-99	14.4	14.6	13.1
100-174	25.5	25.7	23.7
175-499	33.8	34.2	34.4
500-999	9.6	9.4	11.1
1000 and over	7.5	5.4	8.0

The wiping out of the average (medium) farmstead, particularly of those unable to employ tractors, i.e., of farmsteads with an acreage below 174 acres and the strengthening of the large, specialised and strongest groups with more than 1,000 acres is reflected in the above table. Yet the new programme of the Social-fascists is based in the very "vitality" of the small and middle farms and peasant households. As in all else, revisionism has suffered complete defeat in this question.

TO THE MEMORY OF COMRADE LI-KWEI, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDO-CHINA.

THE revolutionary workers and peasants of Indo-China have sustained a heavy loss in the person of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Indo-China, Comrade Li-kwei.

Upon being arrested in Saigon on April 19, 1931, Comrade Li-kwei was placed in the central jail of Cochinchina, where he died several months ago from the brutal tortures to which he was subjected by the French gendarmes. No brutalities succeeded in forcing him to reveal a single Party secret, however.

Comrade Li-kwei's youth was a sad one: his parents died leaving him no means of existence and he would have had no opportunity to study had it not been for the material assistance (miserable and irregular though it was) of his older brothers and sisters. At the age of 20 (in 1922) he graduated from college and became a primary school teacher in Winkh.

Comrade Li-kwei took part in the political struggle from a very youthful age. In 1918, he was one of the active founders and leaders of the educational society of the Annamite youth, whose real object was to establish revolutionary solidarity among the students.

In 1924, Li-kwei was one of the five founders of the revolutionary party of New Annam, which a year later delegated him to Laos to organise the miners. In July, 1926, he was deputed to negotiate a merger with the Association of the Annamite revolutionary youth in Canton, where he also regularly attended a Communist school. He returned to Winkh in September, 1928, for the purpose of reorganising and amalgamating the two parties, but, being persecuted by the police, was prevailed upon by his comrades to withdraw from active political work. This time he utilised for gaining a deeper knowledge of the Marxian-Leninist theory.

Despite the fact that in 1927 Li-kwei was sentenced, in his absence, to death, he could

not reconcile himself to the necessity of refraining from participation in the revolutionary struggle of the workers and peasants of Indo-China. In February, 1930, he took a most active part in a conference called to unite the scattered Communist groups into a single centralised party, thus returning to active work in the party which soon elected him general secretary of the Communist Party of Indo-China.

Under Comrade Li-kwei's firm leadership our Party was transformed into a truly mass party and carried out a tremendous work of rallying the masses to the revolutionary struggle: in the course of one year (April, 1930, to April, 1931) the party membership greatly increased. The party began to create mass organisations, such as red trade unions and peasant leagues. These comprised several tens of thousands of workers and peasants. The party organised over a hundred strikes and 400 peasant demonstrations; in seventeen regions of Northern Annam the party succeeded for a certain period in establishing the Soviet Power. Li-kwei also carried out an enormous ideological work of bolshevising our party: a number of political theses of the first (November, 1930) and second (April, 1931) Plenums of the C.C. of our Party which clearly proclaimed the principles of action and the tactics of the Bolsheviks, were written by his own hand or worked out under his direct supervision. Both in the propagandist pamphlets and newspapers Comrade Li-kwei always acted as an ardent advocate of the Marxian-Leninist theory and practice and a most determined enemy of every deviation from the political line of the Comintern.

Comrade Li-kwei, the General Secretary of our Party, is dead, but his memory will live for ever in the history of the revolutionary struggle of Indo-China and in the heart of every Indo-Chinese worker, both of the present and of the future generations. His revolutionary work, his loyalty and unim-

peachable conduct in the imperialist jail should serve as a living example to the Communists the world over, especially to the Communists of Indo-China.

French imperialism is pursuing a bloody policy of repressions against our fighters and is seeking to strangle the revolutionary movement. But the workers and peasants of Indo-China continue vigorously to fight under the leadership of our party against French imperialism, the feudal elements,

the landlords, and the local aristocracy, for the establishment of a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry in the form of Soviets. Only by the final victory over our class enemies is it possible to avenge the heroic death of our comrade as well as of the millions of other fighters who have fallen, like himself, in the bitter fight for the great cause, for the world revolution.

KON-SHAN.

Saigon, February 26, 1932.

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