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CONTENTS
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CONTENTS

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1. THE SITUATION IN JAPAN AND THE TASKS OF THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY

This article gives much required information on the actual economic situation in Japan, both in industry and agriculture and the war. The condition of the Japanese workers and peasants, and, most important, the growing strike wave and the unrest among the peasantry and the troops, are described in detail. Finally, the character of the Japanese revolution is defined. (See page 215)

2. BRITAIN'S TRANSITION TO PROTECTION AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE SITUATION

E. Burns. A statistical review of Britain's economic and financial position, the reason for the fall of the pound and the passing to a policy of Protection as an offensive weapon against competitors. The author examines the centrifugal tendencies in the British Empire, concluding that the protection policy of Empire Preference will not mitigate them. (See page 224)

3. CONTRADICTIONS AMONG THE IMPERIALISTS AND CONFLICTS ON THE PACIFIC COAST

N. Terentyev. Is there a "united front" of the Imperialists against the Chinese Revolution and the U.S.S.R.? Are Japan and Britain really united against the U.S.A.? Is the conflict between U.S.A. and Japan greater than that between Britain and Japan? A detailed review of the relations between the leading Imperialists in trade, commerce and policy. (See page 230)

4. COMRADE STALIN'S LETTER AND THE PURGING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC RELICS

Z. Serebryansky. This contribution shows that in almost every country where Communist Parties were formed they were unable to break the mass influence of the Social-Democracy because the burden of the relics and traditions of the Second International still weighed heavily upon them. This article is a practical application of Stalin's letter published in No. 20 of the "Communist International" (1931). (See page 238)

THE SITUATION IN JAPAN AND THE TASKS OF THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY

MODERN Japan is in the throes of an unparalleled, widespread and ever-growing economic crisis. The foreign trade of Japan has drastically declined during the past years. In 1930, the Japanese exports dropped by 32 per cent. and the imports by 30 per cent. compared with 1929. During the past year of 1931 another sharp decline of the Japanese foreign trade was recorded, exports falling by 22 per cent. and imports by 21.5 per cent. against the previous year. Industry is working at less than half capacity. During the last two years the cotton industry reduced operations by 47 per cent., the engineering industry by 34 per cent., the ship-building industry by 70 per cent., the steel industry by 38.7 per cent., etc.

The reduction of output has been accompanied by a drastic cut of the number of workers employed in industry. During 1930, and especially during 1931, there were mass discharges of workers from various undertakings. The army of unemployed in Japan has reached the enormous figure of three million. But the effect of the crisis has been particularly disastrous in agriculture. The worst to suffer were the rice and silk-breeding plantations. Despite the crop failure of 1931, resulting in a general decrease of agricultural production by 20 per cent., the prices of rice continue to decline, this being accompanied by an ever-growing destruction of the productive forces of agriculture, by the ruination and pauperisation of the peasant masses. The prospect of a financial collapse is also becoming more and more threatening and imminent. The gold reserves during the past two years have sunk to less than half, from 1,124 million yen in January, 1930, to 521 million yen in December, 1931. The private deposits in the Japanese banks have been reduced during the same period by more than 3.5 times.

It is quite clear that the crisis of the national economy of Japan is interconnected with, and directly affected by the modern world economic crisis. But on the other hand, the causes which gave rise to it, its force and depth must be explained by the structure of Japan's economy and social system.

Here it is necessary first of all to emphasise the backward, Asiatic, semi-feudal system prevailing in the Japanese village. The landlord estates play a predominant part in Japanese agriculture. Seventy per cent. of the Japanese farms (3,836,000) are poor farms restricted to less than one hectare of land each. All of these

farmers are forced to lease land from the landlords under the most slavish conditions. It is characteristic that the acreage of the landlords' estates during the last 50 years (that is precisely during the years of the speedy capitalist development of the country) not only has not decreased but has, on the contrary, noticeably increased, from 36 per cent. to 46 per cent. of the total cultivated area. During this half century the ruinous rents, the semi-feudal exploitation not only affected fresh sections of the peasantry but assumed even more oppressive forms. We refer to the steady rise of the rentals during the past decades. Thus if the rent payments for 1886 are taken as 100, those for 1909-1913 are equal to 113 per cent., and those for 1917-1921 to 117 per cent.

The Japanese landlords who do not as a rule engage in agriculture themselves, fleece their tenants of 50-60 per cent. of the total crop. But the Japanese peasantry are forced to carry the burden not only of landlord slavery. To it is added the monstrous yoke of the commercial and usurious capital, their ruthless exploitation by the mortgage banks and monopoly trust companies. In the complexity of these conditions one of the fundamental causes of the constant degradation of Japanese agriculture should be sought, one of the causes of the ever-growing pauperisation of the bulk of the peasantry, and the steady contraction of the home market and the consequent growth of the crisis of the entire national economy.

We shall now pass to the characteristic features of Japanese industry. There is no doubt that Japan has made considerable strides in her industrial development during the past three decades. The coalescence between the banking and industrial capital in the form of gigantic vertical trusts has reached unusually enormous dimensions during the past years. It is a well known fact that 18 monopoly companies control 65 per cent. of the entire national income of the country, and that five of the biggest trusts actually dominate the economic life of the country.

WAR AND JAPANESE DEVELOPMENT.

There were a series of factors responsible for the rapid industrial development of Japan, for the enormous accumulation of capital and its centralisation in the hands of a small clique of financial magnates. A special rôle in this respect has been played by war as a result of which the plunderous Japanese imperialism consolidated its power

and captured enormous wealth. The colonial robbery and the trophies of victorious wars waged by Japanese imperialism during the past decades served as one of the principal sources of capitalist accumulation. Japanese industry has always developed by leaps and bounds, the different stages of this development being directly connected with plunderous wars of Japanese imperialism. These leaps of Japanese industry are indicated by the following table :

Years	Number of factories		Number of workers		
	With motors	Without motors	Total	Women	Total
1897	2,910	4,377	7,287	254,000	437,000
1907	5,207	5,731	10,938	385,000	643,000
1917	14,310	6,656	20,966	713,000	1,280,000
1926	37,141	11,253	48,394	929,000	1,789,000*

The years quoted in this table were not selected at random. These were years following directly upon victorious wars in consequence of which capitalist and landlord Japan obtained tremendous indemnities and war trophies. Thus, in 1895, upon defeating China, Japan captured Formosa, annexed Korea and imposed upon China an indemnity of 350 million yen. After the war against Russian tsarism in 1904/1905, Japan seized half of Sakhalin, the leased territories of South Manchuria and the South Manchurian Railway, and received 200 million roubles in the form of payments for the maintenance of prisoners of war. During the years of the world slaughter (in 1915) Japanese imperialism presented China with the famous 21 demands aiming at the complete colonial enslavement of China. During the same years when the economic connections between the imperialist powers and many of the most important countries of the Pacific and of the Near East were weakened and the demand for industrial products tremendously increased, opening up new prospects before Japanese capitalism, Japan experienced a speculative boom. She created new business enterprises with feverish speed, expanding her industries and trade tremendously. But the blows of the post-war crisis of capitalism received by Japan were only the more painful. Indeed, during the subsequent period when the Eastern and European markets were gradually recaptured by the imperialist countries which had dominated them previously, Japan entered a period of stagnation and depression followed by a deep and unprecedented crisis.

We have seen what an unusually important rôle wars have played in the development of Japanese capitalism. But while gaining on war

* To this figure should be added 180,000 workers employed in 380 Government factories, 350,000 miners and about two million non-factory workers.

Japanese imperialism always lost on peace. This circumstance is due to the fact that the increasing aggressiveness of capitalist-landlord Japan, which runs counter to the plans and schemes of the other imperialist powers, could not but meet with their resistance. Indeed, after the war with China in 1895, Japan, under the pressure of the other powers, including Czarist Russia, was forced to abandon many of her claims. Similarly after the world war, at the Washington Conference of 1922, Japan, on the direct demand of the United States, was forced to evacuate the province of Shantung and withdraw many of her 21 demands. The clash of interests of the imperialist plunderers and the growth of contradictions between them strengthened in turn the aggressiveness of Japanese imperialism. There can be no doubt that the present robber war of Japanese imperialism is directly connected with all the previous stages of its expansion. But it is just as doubtless that Japanese imperialism is aiming to consolidate itself further on the Asiatic continent by this war and prepare for the inevitable new wars between the imperialists for the domination of the Pacific.

Without considering this war situation, or the many feudal relics to which we have referred above, on the basis of which Japanese capitalism has developed, it is impossible to understand its characteristic peculiarities. There are many gaps in the economic situation of Japanese imperialism explaining some of its weaknesses. Particularly noteworthy is its lack of a raw materials base, especially from the point of view of the needs of the war industry. We may further note the predominance of light industry, particularly textiles, and the relative weakness of the metal industry. No less symptomatic is the steady rise of the importance of the war industries; accompanied by the decline of such industries as machine tool construction, for instance, which fell from 10.4 per cent. in 1928 to 8.8. per cent. in 1929. Further, while the centralisation of capital has reached gigantic proportions it does not correspond to the relatively low level of the centralisation of production. From the table quoted above it is easy to see the absolute and very considerable growth of the number of motorless factories during the last decades (from 4,377 in 1897 to 11,253 in 1926).

It is also necessary to take into consideration the fact that Japanese industry has grown upon the crutches of State subsidies and has appropriated enormous State funds.

CONDITION OF LABOUR.

A description of the characteristics of Japanese capitalism would be incomplete without an

elucidation of the monstrous forms of the exploitation of the working class and peasantry.

One of the main sources of accumulation of Japanese capital has been the truly monstrous exploitation of the Japanese proletariat and of the bulk of the peasantry. The Japanese working class whose labour productivity is not less than that of European labour, finds itself in the position of colonial labour, represents essentially semi-slave labour and is subjected to merciless exploitation on the part of Japanese capital. Starvation wages accompanied by a long working day, barrack discipline, indentured contract labour, a lack of social legislation and complete political disfranchisement, these features characterise the position of the Japanese working class. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of the Japanese peasantry represent essentially semi-serfs while agriculture as a whole in its character, resembles the semi-feudal system of any colony.

Japan has not yet completely broken all the feudal relations. The development of capitalism therefore has always clashed with the narrow limits of the home market. Having failed to break down all the feudal barriers in the path of its development, Japanese capital took the path of the utmost utilisation of the relics of the pre-capitalist relations. Capitalist exploitation has been combined with the robbery of the bulk of the peasantry upon a semi-feudal basis. But the more Japanese capitalism adjusted itself to and utilised these relics of the feudal relations, the more limited did the home market become, the more dependent did it become upon the foreign market, the more powerfully was it prompted on to the road of violent, military expansion of its markets.

Just as in Czarist Russia so in Japan "the newest capitalist imperialism is entangled in a particularly thick mesh of pre-capitalist relations." In an article entitled "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism," Lenin wrote :

"In Japan and Russia the monopoly of armed force, vast territories or special facilities for plundering foreigners, China and others partially compensate, partially replace the monopoly of the modern, newest finance capital."

That is precisely why the imperialist policy practised by the dictatorship of finance capital and of the feudal landlords in Japan resembles the features of Russian imperialism of the "semi-feudal type."

In its present plunderous war against China, Japanese imperialism seeks to utilise its monopoly of military force, its opportunity to rob in order to realise some of its annexationist dreams. First of all the Japanese landlords and capitalists are

seeking through the further robbery of the toiling masses of China to find a solution of the sharp and general economic crisis experienced by Japan. Realising their plans of preparation for the coming imperialist war for a new partition of the world, the Japanese imperialists are seeking in the present war against China to entrench themselves on the Asiatic continent, to secure sources of raw materials, especially for the war industry, and to insert beneath Japanese plunderous, military, feudal imperialism a more solid and firm economic foundation. Further, in the present war against China the Japanese landlords and capitalists are making an attempt to establish a firm barrier between China (becoming revolutionised) and the land of victorious socialism, are seeking to create a spring board for a war against the U.S.S.R. on the one hand, and an offensive against the Chinese Soviets on the other. By their present war action the Japanese imperialists are also attempting to stifle the growing revolutionary movement of the toiling masses in Japan itself, to drown in a wave of chauvinism, to stamp out by a new war the growing revolutionary struggle of the Japanese exploited masses.

However, the robber war of Japanese imperialism does not weaken but, on the contrary, sharpens to the extreme the class antagonisms within the country, does not postpone but, on the contrary, accelerates the revolutionary climax in Japan. There are a number of symptoms testifying to the further and unprecedented development of the revolutionary struggle of the working class and peasantry of Japan.

The growing economic crisis could not but most painfully affect the situation of the working class and of the bulk of the peasantry. The offensive of the Japanese capitalists and landlords upon the already miserable living standards of the workers and peasants caused a growth of ever more resolute mass actions of these against the exploiting classes. The last few years present a picture of the steady rise of the strike movement, of the spread of the economic struggle of the Japanese proletariat from one industry to another. Below is a table based upon official and, therefore, underestimated figures on the number of conflicts between labour and capital and on the number of workers involved in the struggles of recent years :

Year.	Number of disputes.	Number of persons involved.
1925	... 816 ...	89,387
1927	... 1,202 ...	103,350
1928	... 1,022 ...	101,893
1929	... 1,420 ...	112,144
1930	... 2,289 ...	191,805
During 1931	the strike movement gained	

further momentum. Thus, while during the first half of 1930, 728 strikes took place, involving 76,791 persons, during the same period of 1931 there were 879 strikes, involving 84,344 workers. *But what is of still greater importance, during the present imperialist war the strike movement not only has not declined, but on the contrary continues to grow.* Thus, between September and December, 1931, there were 842 strikes against 740 during the previous four months.

But the sweep of the strike movement is not only characterised by these purely quantitative data. The duration of the strikes grows, the number of repeated strikes increases, the workers display ever greater determination in the struggle. The economic battles are more and more frequently combined with an expression of political discontent against the Japanese monarchy and the entire bourgeois-landlord Governmental super-structure. Ever more frequently do these strikes lead to bloody street battles between the Japanese workers and the police.

And this despite the ruthless terror which assumed particularly monstrous dimensions just before and during the war of the Japanese imperialists against China. It is sufficient to point out, for instance, that after an order for the arrest of all the revolutionary workers was issued by the Japanese Government on August 26th, 1931, more than 400 active trade unionists were arrested in Osaka, over 600 in Kobe, 260 in Kyoto, etc. On March 3rd, 1932, a general round-up was carried out by 15,000 police in Tokyo resulting in the arrest of 67,000 persons.

To characterise the acuteness of the struggle we shall cite a few examples indicating how strike battles now proceed in Japan. Thus, the one month's strike (from December 16th, 1931, to January 16th, 1932) of the workers of the Tagi chemical manure factory in the prefecture of Hiogo led during the very first days to a bitter clash with the police in which two workers were killed and 210 thrown into prison. During the strike of the woodworkers in the Akamatsu prefecture 26 workers were arrested. Last February 200 workers were arrested in the Hiogo prefecture during a strike in a leather factory. At the biggest State metal factory, where in January, 1932, the workers protested against discharges and ill-treatment, the police arrested more than 100 people.

In spite of this cruel terror we see not only no decline of the labour movement but on the contrary a growth of the anti-monarchist sentiments, a revolutionisation of ever-growing masses of the Japanese proletariat, a strengthening of the strike struggle, a growth of the anti-war actions

of the working class. Even the fragmentary information which reaches us paints a picture of an interrupted development of the struggle of the working masses against the robber war of Japanese imperialism.

Thus, we learn from the newspapers that at the end of September of last year conferences were held by the left-wing mass organisations of the industrial districts of Tokyo and Yokohama, with the metal and chemical workers' unions at the head, for the purpose of directing the labour struggle in these biggest centres of the war industry into the channels of a mass struggle against the new imperialist war. At the same time was recorded another event when, owing to the arrest of 30 workers, the police succeeded in preventing an anti-war demonstration by the workers of the "Totensi" and "Yamada" silk factories. Further, on October 5th, delegate conferences were held in Tokyo at the tramway park, electrical station, a textile mill, and a tobacco mill, and on October 6th at a light fixtures factory, a metal factory, a musical instrument factory, a rubber mill, a woollen mill, a printing shop and at two labour exchanges, under the following slogans: "Down with the war in Manchuria and Mongolia," "Hands off Manchuria and China," "Down with the imperialist Government of Japan," "Relief for the unemployed to be met from the war Budget," etc.

The newspapers further report that early in October the workers of the dyeing mill in the town of Wakayama distributed anti-war leaflets. In the prefecture of Oamori shop meetings were held under anti-war slogans at a canning mill, and factory delegate conferences were organised in two factories and three printing shops. In the middle of October a strike broke out at a military aeroplane factory near Tokyo. On November 28th the striking workers of seven Tokyo factories organised, under the leadership of a joint strike committee, a united demonstration under the slogans: "Down with the imperialist war," "Against dismissals," etc. On December 12th, at a conference of representatives of twelve glass factories and two unemployed organisations of Tokyo, a resolution was adopted against the imperialist war and in the defence of China and the U.S.S.R. In order to conclude the list of these highly significant signs of the growing struggle of the Japanese workers against the imperialist war we will cite only one more report of the wave of demonstrations against the war and in the defence of China and the U.S.S.R., which swept all the industrial centres of Japan during the anniversary of the October Revolution and which gathered in Tokyo alone more than 2,500 workers.

THE PEASANTRY.

The Japanese peasants, who are subjected to merciless exploitation, are also far from silent. The sharpening of the agrarian crisis and its effects have created the prerequisites for a mass and constantly growing peasant movement. The following table, drawn up on the basis of official data, conveys an idea of the growth of the agrarian disputes during the last few years. The number of such disputes has been as follows:—

1928	1,866
1929	1,949
1930	2,109
1931	2,689

It is characteristic that while in the past the majority of the disputes were conducted more or less peaceably, armed clashes have lately become very frequent. We shall cite here also cases of agrarian disputes reported in recent newspapers. Thus, in the middle of January of this year a serious clash occurred between the peasants and the police in the village of Kanagana (in the prefecture of Fukko). This village had up to that time been regarded by the landlords as entirely safe. As a result of this action 94 peasants were arrested and 30 were committed for trial on riot charges. About the same time 600 peasants stormed the court in the prefecture of Niagata, where 22 peasants were being tried, demanding their release. In the middle of January the landlords in the village of Gokamura (in the prefecture of Nagan), fearing the peasants' action which was being prepared by the Tseno peasant union, themselves released the peasants from 70 per cent. of their rentals. The newspapers further report that in January the peasants of six villages of the prefecture of Koti organised a no-rent union. On January 24th, a bloody battle occurred between the police and the peasants of one of the villages in the prefecture of Nagana, in consequence of which 28 persons were arrested. On February 2nd a peasant meeting was held in the village of Yosima, in the prefecture of Saitama, leading to a clash with the police and the arrest of 12 peasants.

The list of these occurrences could be continued, but even the examples already quoted testify sufficiently to the growing struggle of the Japanese peasant masses, a struggle which is assuming ever sharper and more organised revolutionary forms. The intolerable and unbearable situation of the bulk of the peasantry and their awakening to the active struggle against the landlords and the entire police régime may be judged also by the statement of a representative of the ruling bureaucracy, the former Minister of Finance, Inouye (who has since been

killed), who, expressing mortal fear of the coming revolution, stated in February, 1931:

"The peasant masses, which have hitherto served as the most valuable source of exploitation for Japanese capitalism, from which it received its principal weapon in the international competition, cheap labour, are now in a catastrophic situation."

The peasantry is beginning to take a more and more active part in the anti-war movement. Thus, already on September 17th and 22nd of last year, peasant meetings were held in six villages of the prefecture of Toyama. These meetings adopted resolutions against the imperialist war and the Manchurian intervention. Similar anti-war resolutions were adopted in October, 1931, at a conference of the regional council of the left peasant organisations of the prefecture of Gif. In November of the same year an anti-war meeting was held in the village of Hadboni, in the prefecture of Toyama, in which more than 500 peasants participated. The meeting developed into a regular anti-war demonstration. A clash with the police followed, during which the demonstrators shouted: "When we establish the Soviet Government the police and the monarchists will not be left alive." On the following day the police released five peasants who had been arrested during the demonstration, owing to fear of a mass attack upon the police. At the same time anti-war demonstrations were held in the villages of Nametawa and Osawano.

THE ARMY:

But the most noteworthy development is the spread of anti-monarchist sentiments among the Japanese army, the beginning of grave fermentation among the masses of soldiers and sailors. It is sufficient to recall the exceptional measures systematically taken by the ruling classes of Japan in order to maintain the prestige, discipline and belligerent spirit in the army, and to compare them with the anti-war actions registered in the Japanese army from the very beginning of the hostilities in China, in order to appreciate the entire importance of these processes. Kajiro Sato, one of the ideologists of Japanese imperialism, discussing the question of the inevitable war between Japan and America, consoled himself by talk of the superiority of the Japanese Army over the American. He referred to the mass desertions from the American Army during the world war, boasting that the Japanese Army did not know of any desertions.

"In the Japanese Army the regimental commander must resign, begging to be relieved of his post, if one or two of his men desert from the ranks," wrote the Japanese Général. The war

in China at once produced a new phenomenon in the Japanese Army, the refusal of the soldiers and sailors to fight. No matter how few cases of this kind may have been recorded they are symptomatic and highly significant.

Some of these facts, despite the efforts of the Japanese censorship, reach the press and throw light upon the processes developing in the Japanese Army. Thus in one of the newspapers we read the following :

"In the town of Dagu, in the province of Kiansiando, Korea, anti-war handbills addressed to the 80th regiment quartered in the town were distributed at the beginning of December. The handbills were signed by the League against Imperialism. Immediately after the discovery of the handbills a careful search was made in the barracks and all the handbills found were taken away and destroyed. The authorities had to admit that according to all evidence the handbills were distributed by Japanese, since Koreans are strictly forbidden to enter the barracks. Careful searches and arrests were made throughout the city, particularly in the labour quarters. A few days later the authorities succeeded in unearthing a secret communist organisation in which several officers of the 80th regiment took an active part."

The impression which this fact created upon the military authorities may be seen from the fact that the press was forbidden to publish any account of this case. It is only known that 70 Japanese and Koreans, including two officers who participated in the organisation, were arrested.

Similar handbills were distributed in the city of Fengtsian. In the province of Kesianda, in the Kimchen county, the newspapers reported another anti-war demonstration.

The press notes that during the struggle for Shanghai several cases were recorded of Japanese soldiers and sailors refusing to fight. Thus, the Chinese newspaper, "Tavan-Pao," reports that on January 29th more than 200 Japanese soldiers refused to move to the front. They were disarmed and sent back to Japan. On February 11th about 300 soldiers held a meeting in Hongkew. A manifesto was distributed among the soldiers, signed by the revolutionary soldiers' committee, and urging them to refuse to fight against the Chinese soldiers, to prevent the invasion of China and to conduct agitation in this spirit among the masses of the soldiers. According to the Japanese newspaper, "Nichi-Nichi Shimbun," the Japanese steamer, *Shanghai Maru*, which arrived in Shanghai with arms and ammunition, returned to Japan carrying Japanese soldiers aboard who "had become homesick and refused to fight." The

Chinese newspaper, "Eastern Times" reports the refusal of 600 Japanese soldiers to fight, who arrived in Shanghai in February, 1932. On February 20th these soldiers, on orders from the Commander of the Japanese land forces in Shanghai, were disarmed and taken back to Japan in a cruiser, while the Chinese newspaper, "Tavan-Pao," reports that "more than 100 of them were shot and the rest sent back to Japan."

The newspaper, "Changchun-Pao,"* reports that a Japanese detachment of 300 men dispatched to the Fushun mines in the province of Mukden refused to obey the order and mutinied. General Hondsio had to send a whole brigade to suppress the rebellious soldiers who put up a valiant and determined fight. The battle between the mutineers and the punitive brigade lasted all night until all the mutineers were wiped out. Several meetings in honour of the insurgents were organised in Tokyo.

The following noteworthy facts should also be recorded: In the prefecture of Gif anti-war talks were organised in October with the reservists who passed a resolution refusing to report for provisional mobilisation. Last October, in connection with the mobilisation of a worker in Toyama, a farewell meeting was organised at the station which developed into a demonstration under the slogans: "Down with the imperialist war," "We demand the immediate withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Manchuria and Mongolia," "Improve the condition of the soldiers," "Defend the U.S.S.R.," "Fight for a worker-peasant Government." In the Japanese newspaper, "Niyako" we read that the War Ministry was seriously alarmed by reports from Mukden to the effect that "in the parcels sent to the Manchurian Army leaflets were discovered agitating against the war."

SUMMARY.

It is time to sum up all of these facts of the labour, peasant and soldier movement. We are able to note a definite growth of the revolutionary sentiments, the development of an ever-growing revolutionary struggle against the imperialist war, against the exploiting classes, against the military-police monarchy. The signs of this revolutionary upsurge, the symptoms of the coming Japanese revolution, are becoming evident even to the ruling classes themselves. This may easily be seen from a careful reading of the recently published findings of the Committee of Inquiry into the causes of the radical trends among the students. This committee, which

* We are quoting from comrade Akhmatov's article "On the Front of the War Upon War," see the Manchurian Symposium. (Russian.)

worked under the chairmanship of the Minister of Education, was forced, among other things, to note:

"The extreme difference in the standards of living of the capitalists and workers, the extreme impoverishment of the village, a sharpening of the labour and leasehold disputes, an economic decline of the middle classes, the absence of any prospects of the students finding employment upon graduation, the decay and rottenness among political circles, the discontent with the political situation and the parties, a tendency to achieve one's aims by united mass actions, a failure to appreciate the essence of communism and its movement."

When Ministers are forced to draw such conclusions the ground beneath their feet is pretty hot.

But the foreign bourgeois observers are also looking to the future of Japan with increasing alarm. Take for instance, the editorial of the "Peking and Tientsin Times," published on October 10, 1931. Here we read:

"Should everything end in failure, considering the existence of an ineradicable 'plague of dangerous thoughts' which has infected the Japanese intelligentsia, and remembering the intolerable economic situation of the Japanese peasantry and the condition of industry, the consequences for Japan may be immeasurably dangerous."

The revolutionary movement is growing in Japan despite the fact that the Japanese social-democrats of all shades and hues are doing their best to keep the masses away from the revolutionary struggle, to preserve and consolidate the military-police monarchy and the entire system of ruthless exploitation of the workers and peasants practised by the Japanese landlords and capitalists. With unblushing impudence the chairman of the social-democratic party, Abe, addressing the congress of his party, "Siakai Minsuto," in January of this year, did not hesitate to declare:

"I realise that the social-democracy has finally grown into State Socialism. We, Socialists, are supporters of the monarchy."

There is nothing surprising about the fact that in the present war the Japanese social-democracy has taken up an openly imperialist position. It was this party which propounded the theory that Japan is a proletarian country and China a bourgeois country, and that therefore Japan's war against China is a "people's," a "socialist" war, etc. Carrying on active agitation and organisation work in favour of the imperialist war the Japanese social-democracy is holding patriotic

demonstrations, inciting the Japanese imperialists to a war against the U.S.S.R.

The Communist Party of Japan which took up a correct position in regard to the war has already scored a good many successes in the organisation of the revolutionary struggle of the toiling masses against the imperialist war, against the exploiting classes and the military-police monarchy: But these successes are far from sufficient. The present situation presents exceptionally important tasks for the Japanese Communists. The Communist Party of Japan constitutes a decisive factor. Upon IT depends the further development of the events, upon IT depends the outcome of the growing revolutionary struggle. The Communist Party of Japan will succeed in performing its part only by overcoming its own weaknesses, its lagging behind the growing activity of the masses, only by strengthening its ranks ideologically and organisationally, by extending its still very weak connections with the great masses of the workers, peasants and city poor and leading their struggle.

But the Communist Party of Japan will not be able to rally the toiling millions to its slogans unless it corrects its mistaken policy on the fundamental question, the question of the character and tasks of the coming revolution in Japan. Thus, in the draft of the political theses worked out by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Japan and published in April of last year the character of the future revolution is defined as follows: "The coming Japanese revolution is by its character a proletarian revolution with a great scope of bourgeois-democratic tasks."

This erroneous definition of the character of the future revolution is directly connected with the underestimation of the tasks of the agrarian revolution, with a failure to appreciate one of the most important peculiarities of the future revolution which consists precisely of the acuteness of the agrarian question, and the necessity of completely smashing the landlord system. From what we said at the beginning of the article regarding the power of the feudal relics in the country, regarding the landlord slavery, the conclusion must inevitably be drawn that the agrarian question, the struggle of the peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat for the land and against the landlords represents one of the pivots, one of the central tasks of the future revolution in Japan. The underestimation of this factor constitutes a most serious mistake of the Japanese comrades. The Japanese comrades for the same reason are ignoring the revolutionary possibilities of the middle peasantry also and are adhering to the completely mistaken view, which has been refuted by the experience of the

movement, that the middle peasantry in Japan is incapable of a revolutionary struggle against the landlords and the existing régime.

On the other hand, in advancing the thesis of the proletarian character of the future revolution the Japanese comrades are displaying an under-estimation of the rôle of the monarchy, this principal bulwark of the political reaction and of all the relics of feudalism in the country, this enemy of the toiling masses of Japan against which the main blow must be directed. The Japanese comrades ignore the absolutist character of the Japanese monarchy and draw the hasty and incorrect conclusion that "the State Power in Japan is in the hands of the bourgeoisie and landlords under the hegemony of financial capital."

The absolute monarchy which was formed in Japan after the so-called Meiji revolution in 1868 has maintained complete power in all the subsequent years, covering itself up only by pseudo-constitutional forms, but interfering in reality with any limitation of absolutism, with any restriction of the rights and powers of the monarchist bureaucracy. True, the Japanese monarchy which is an historical product of feudalism, formerly based itself upon the landlord class, while now, as a result of the peculiar capitalist development, as a result of the fusion of finance capital with the overwhelming relics of feudalism, it has developed into a bourgeois-landlord monarchy, and is basing itself upon the landlord class on the one hand, and upon the bourgeoisie on the other, thus representing the interests and carrying out the policies of these two exploiting classes. But this class character of the Japanese monarchy does not in any way remove the question of the independent rôle played by the monarchist bureaucracy.

Remember what Lenin said about the Russian monarchy: "... The class character of the Czarist monarchy does not in the least lessen the tremendous independence of the Czarist power and of the 'bureaucracy' from Nicholas II. down to the last local magistrate. This mistake, the overlooking of the autocracy and monarchy, its reduction to a 'pure' rule of the upper classes, was made by the 'recallists'* in 1908/1909 (see "The Proletarian" supplement to No. 44), by Larin in 1910, and is still being made by certain authors (for instance, M. Alexandrov), and by N. R—kov, who has joined the liquidators." (Lenin, volume XV., page 304).†

The Japanese comrades must ponder seriously these words of Lenin. They must realise that

precisely because of the monarchy, is the country still governed by the most reactionary police régime, are the workers and peasants completely disfranchised, and the toiling masses subjected to the most barbarous economic and political oppression. Now particularly, during the plunderous war started by Japanese imperialism, is the rôle of the monarchist bureaucracy, particularly of the military, its most reactionary and aggressive section, becoming even greater. The Japanese comrades must clearly realise that the future revolution in Japan will be directed primarily against the bourgeois-landlord, military-police monarchy.

What are the basic tasks of the coming stage of the Japanese revolution? They are (1) the overthrow of the monarchy; (2) the liquidation of the landlord system; and (3) the establishment of the seven-hour day and a radical improvement of the situation of the working class. But the revolutionary situation will at once put on the order of the day also the task of merging all the banks into a single national bank, of control over it as well as the big capitalist undertakings, primarily all the concerns and trusts, on the part of the Soviets of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers' Deputies. The economic dislocation, the oppression and ruthless exploitation by trustified and banking capital will prompt the masses to carry out this measure during the very first days of the Japanese revolution.

The worker-peasant revolution in Japan, upon overthrowing the monarchy and removing all the exploiting classes, including the bourgeoisie, from political power, upon establishing the power of the Soviets and carrying out revolutionary measures, will take up the path of speedy development into a Socialist revolution and transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat. That is why we have the right to define the character of the coming revolution in Japan as bourgeois-democratic, with a tendency towards a speedy development into a Socialist revolution.

In calling the future stage of the Japanese revolution bourgeois-democratic we do not in the least deprecate its tasks and importance. "The struggle of the working class against the capitalist class cannot develop sufficiently widely and end in victory until all the more ancient historical enemies of the proletariat are overthrown." (Lenin.) A consistent and determined struggle for the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution will bring about a close alliance between the working class and the peasantry, the capture by the proletariat of the hegemony, this decisive condition of the victory and development of the Japanese revolution.

* "Otsovists." Ed.

† Russian edition.

The capture by the proletariat of the hegemony presupposes the utmost strengthening of the Communist Party, particularly the broadening of its connection with the working masses. The Communist Party must take a resolute turn towards work among the masses, must strengthen its rôle in the mass movement. By reinforcing the struggle on two fronts, against the rights as the main danger, and against opportunist passiveness and the "left" sectarian deviations and cliquishness, the Communist Party must secure the necessary ideological consolidation of its ranks. At the same time measures must be taken to strengthen the Communist Party organisationally, to create sound local party committees and a wide network of factory cells. The revolutionary illegal work must be combined with the utilisation of all legal opportunities. It is necessary to systematically improve the methods of conspirative work. The work of the fractions in the mass organisations must be given shape and reinforced.

The capture of the hegemony by the proletariat presupposes the greatest development of the economic struggle of the proletariat, the fanning and organisation of the peasant struggle against the landlords. The Communist Party must work out a programme of vital partial demands of the workers, peasants, unemployed and clerks, adapted to the concrete conditions. Winning the greatest masses of the toilers in the struggle for partial demands, the Communist Party must lead them to the struggle for the basic slogans of the revolution. Carrying out the policy of the united front from below the Communist Party must prepare, widen and sharpen the conflicts between labour and capital, between the peasants and the landlords, securing independent leadership of the battles against the social traitors and the leaders of the yellow trade unions. The party must take every measure to strengthen the revolutionary trade union movement, to overcome a certain self-isolation of the left trade unions; the party must stimulate and broaden the spontaneous eagerness of the working masses for organisation, providing it with flexible leadership.

The capture of the hegemony by the proletariat presupposes a resolute and tireless struggle of the Communist Party for the masses against the social-democrats of all shades and hues. In the every-day struggle of the working class and peasantry for an improvement of their material and political conditions it is necessary to systematically expose the treacherous rôle and the

imperialist essence of the Japanese social-fascists, the struggle must be sharpened particularly against the so-called "left" social-democrats who are attempting more than the others to cover up their treacherous actions by radical phrases, by verbal fireworks.

The capture of the hegemony by the proletariat presupposes an able direction by the Communist Party of all the manifestations of discontent, protest and struggle of the great masses of the workers, peasants and city poor into the channel of the political struggle against war and the military-police monarchy. The entire activity of the Communist Party must now be subjected to the fundamental task of developing the struggle for the vital demands of the masses in close connection with the struggle against the war and the monarchy. Being guided by the object of converting the imperialist war into a civil war the Communist Party of Japan must direct its entire oral and printed agitation and propaganda against the imperialist war, exposing its plunderous character and the rôle in it of the leaders of the social-democracy and of the trade unions. The Party must demand the immediate withdrawal of the troops from China and fight for the full independence of that country. The Communist Party must resolutely fight against the policy of the monarchy and of its social-democratic henchmen directed towards the establishment of class peace within the country. The Communist Party must seek to develop the strike struggle to the utmost.

A particularly responsible and important task devolves upon the Japanese Communists in connection with the vigorous preparations of the Japanese imperialists for an armed intervention against the U.S.S.R. The Communist Party must propagate by all means the successes of the Socialist construction, the achievements of the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. and the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union. The Communist Party must expose and prevent the Japanese imperialists' preparation for war against the land of victorious Socialism.

Such are the main tasks of the Japanese Communists at the present time. Under the central slogan of agitation, "A people's revolution against the imperialist war and the police monarchy, for rice, for land, for freedom, for a workers'-peasants' Government," the Communist Party of Japan must rally the million strong masses, become converted into a truly mass party which is firmly and confidently leading the masses to the coming revolutionary clash.

BRITAIN'S TRANSITION TO PROTECTION AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE SITUATION

BRITAIN'S traditional policy of free trade was built up on the basis of her early industrial development and her monopoly of the world market in the middle of last century. It was continued after the emergence of rival national capitalist groups, on the basis of the financial and shipping monopoly which had grown from the industrial monopoly. Its abandonment, and the adoption of a policy of general protective tariffs, was made necessary by the weakening of the financial and shipping monopoly, especially since the war, culminating in the disastrous fall in the income of British imperialism from its investments and shipping services abroad which has resulted from the world crisis of capitalism. The factors which have forced British imperialism to adopt a policy of protection are not, however, temporary and transient, but arise from the undermining of its parasitic base, and the aims which British imperialism hopes to achieve through protection involve the restoration of that basis, though in a new form. But here British interests clash with those of the Dominions. The crisis which has brought the issue of protection to the front in Britain has also placed urgent problems before the bourgeois groups in the Dominions, and is forcing them too to seek a way out along the lines which are in fundamental conflict with the British imperialist conception of "empire economic unity."

THE BASIC PROBLEM OF PROTECTION.

In introducing the new import duties in the House of Commons on February 4, 1932, Chamberlain showed that the balance of payments between Britain and other countries had changed, between 1929 and 1931, from a favourable balance of £100,000,000 to an unfavourable balance of £113,000,000, and stated:

"These figures establish the vital necessity of any action which it is in the power of the Government to take which may restore the balance of payments once more to the right side."

In this decline of the balance by £213,000,000, no less than £186,000,000 was due to the decline in "invisible" exports—receipts from shipping and investments abroad. But a further most serious feature of the situation was that the volume of imports into Britain had remained practically unchanged, although the volume of British exports had fallen by 38 per cent. British capitalism had continued its largely parasitic consumption, although the financial basis for it—the income from shipping and investments

abroad—became more and more restricted. British capitalism no longer has a surplus income which could be invested abroad, and therefore British export of capital has heavily declined, while export of goods has also fallen, owing to the world economic crisis and the contraction of the colonial markets and to the relative backwardness of British industrial technique.

These are the factors which were at the bottom of the exchange crisis which drove Britain off the gold standard, and they are the factors which have driven British imperialism to a general "protective" tariff, as a combined offensive and defensive measure intended to "restore the balance of payments once more to the right side."

THE DEPRECIATION OF THE £.

Immediately after the fall of the £ it was thought that the lower value of the £ would have "the effect of a protective tariff without its disadvantages"—it would automatically and immediately reduce imports, and, by the lowering of costs measured in gold, enable British manufacturers to quote lower prices and win an increased share of sales in the world market. But the actual course of events was not altogether "according to plan." An immediate result was that many other countries were also driven off the gold standard, so that, in relation to these countries, British imperialism was not able to reap the advantages of the depreciated £. But of even greater importance was the fact that the *world crisis continued and deepened*; the volume of international trade declined still further, and prices (in gold) continued to fall. Under the pressure of still accumulating stocks, prices of commodities in the gold standard countries were marked down towards the sterling equivalent, instead of the sterling equivalent rising towards the gold prices. As a result, commodities imported into Britain after the fall in the £ in many cases cost little more than existing stocks in Britain (bought before the fall in the £), and therefore *imports continued to flow in Britain*. On the other hand, British exports as a whole showed no substantial improvement, the slight increase in the export of textile goods being counterbalanced by declines in the export of coal, machinery and other items. This was partially due to the continuance of previously existing factors, but also to the measures taken by a whole series of countries to protect their own markets against British goods offered at prices based on the depreciated £—the fixing of import quotas, as in the case of coal; special tariffs against

Britain, and other measures including restrictions on foreign exchange transactions. The so-called "automatic tariff" of the depreciated £ had therefore failed to bring any relief to the adverse balance of trade, and the problem was becoming more urgent every day.

THE TRANSITION TO PROTECTION.

A general protective tariff was therefore an immediate and vital necessity for British imperialism, and the "National" Government began to take action immediately after its election. "Abnormal importations duties" were at once placed on a large number of items, which were however relatively unimportant in the total number of imports. This was only a preliminary step, and on February 4, 1932, the Government announced a programme of a general protective tariff of 10 per cent. on all imports (except those already liable to duty under previous legislation). The programme of February 16th contained certain important items of import which were altogether excluded from the tariff—chiefly wheat, meat and wood pulp; the special interest of these exclusions is that they are products of the Dominions, and no scheme of Empire preference would have importance if Britain's imports of these items from foreign countries remained untaxed. Therefore, this question of taking foreign wheat, etc., remains open as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the Dominions. So far as the interests of British wheat growers are concerned, these have been protected by fixing a quota for British wheat in milling, an extension of which would provide a basis for Empire preference.

The tariff system now in operation in Britain includes:

- (a) Duties for revenue purposes on a number of food and other items of consumption—tea, sugar, cocoa, etc. These date from last century, but were considerably increased during and after the war. It is to be noted that they are chiefly Empire *colonial* products, and the Empire preference (of about one-sixth of the duty) is in the main a benefit accruing to British imperialist companies.
- (b) The so-called "McKenna" duties (33½%) on special items, of which the most important are motors and artificial silk; these date from the period after the war, and are of a definitely protectionist character, the development of concentration on the British motor industry having undoubtedly been helped by them.
- (c) The "abnormal importation" duties (averaging 50 per cent.), which date from November, 1931.

- (d) A general tariff, dating from March, 1932, on imports not previously taxed, with some exceptions.
- (e) In all cases, there is either exemption or a special preferential rebate for imports from the British empire.

FROM DEFENSIVE TO OFFENSIVE.

Apart from the general tariff of 10 per cent., the Government has taken legislative power to levy special penal tariffs (up to 100 per cent) on imports from other countries which may take retaliatory steps to exclude or restrict imports from Britain. This provision is in itself an admission of the fact that Britain's transition to protection is not taking place in a vacuum or in a "normal" situation, but in a condition of acute economic crisis throughout the capitalist world, with every imperialist group facing severe competition within its own market as well as in the world market outside. The "restoration of the balance of payments once more to the right side" involves therefore not merely "defensive" tariffs to protect the British market for British capitalists, but also "offensive" tariffs as a weapon to force British exports through the tariff walls and other defensive measures taken by other countries. The fighting character of this provision for special penal tariffs up to 100 per cent. was shown by Chamberlain's statement on February 4:

"We mean to use it for negotiations with foreign countries . . . and we think it prudent to arm ourselves with an instrument which shall at least be as effective as those which may be used to discriminate against us in foreign markets."

The measures which were taken by other capitalist states to check the British competition based on the depreciated £ are a clear indication of the struggle which must develop from Britain's transition to protection. The sharpest struggle actually developed on coal, which is not imported into Britain, but is one of Britain's important exports (before the war, one-third of Britain's coal production was exported, and in 1929, one-quarter; even in 1931 the coal exports were valued at £35,000,000 or 9 per cent. of the total value of British exports). Both in France and in Germany the quota of coal imports from Britain was drastically reduced, and in Poland a prohibitive increase (250 per cent.) was made in the railway charges on imported coal. The British Government attempted to negotiate for the removal of these restrictions, but found itself powerless. Negotiations with the French Government secured only an abatement, in the case of coal, of the special tariff of 15 per cent. imposed by France when Britain was forced off

the gold standard, but this was a meaningless concession, as the restriction on imports of British coal was maintained unchanged (at about one-third of the 1929 figure). In the case of the similar restriction on British coal imports into Germany, long negotiations took place without result. These are the first shots in the long struggle on which British imperialism has embarked with its transition to protection, and it has not felt its position secure enough to use the weapon of penal tariffs which Chamberlain boasted of to the House of Commons on February 4th. Meanwhile, the exports of coal, instead of rising on the basis of the depreciated £, have fallen, pits are being closed in South Wales and on the North-East Coast, and the number of unemployed miners is again rising.

The depreciation of the £ has not even had any marked effect in increasing the exports of cotton goods. The very slight increase recently shown is almost entirely due to higher exports to China and Hong Kong—the reflection of the boycott of Japanese goods in China. The export of woollen goods continues to fall. Another most important item of British exports—machinery—shows a decline in the first two months of this year as compared with last year. In every case the 1932 exports, even where they show a fractional rise as compared with 1931, are only from one-half to two-thirds of the exports for the corresponding period of 1929. The depreciation of the £, constituting an export bonus of 25 to 30 per cent. for British imperialism in competition with its most powerful rivals still on the gold standard, has not been able to improve the desperate position of British imperialism in its struggle for markets.

THE CHECK TO IMPORTS.

On the other hand, the depreciation of the £ combined in certain cases with the "abnormal importations duties" has had some effect in reducing the imports of foreign manufactures into Britain. For the first two months of 1932, when both these factors were fully in operation, British imports of foreign manufactures fell by £6,000,000 as compared with 1931—in spite of a special increase of imports in February, 1932, to anticipate the new general tariff of 10 per cent. which became effective on March 1st. Imports of cotton and woollen manufactures were almost entirely stopped—the countries affected being France, Belgium, Germany and Italy. It was on the basis of this protection of the home market, and not of any general increase in sales for export, that the British cotton and woollen industries have recently expanded production. But imports of iron and steel actually increased in comparison with the same period of 1931, the

main countries of origin being Belgium, France and Germany—all still on the gold standard. This fact is indicative of the severity of the competition which British imperialism has to meet in those branches of industry in which British technique is still relatively low—even a 25 to 30 per cent. depreciation of the £ is ineffective where Britain's competitors have a far higher technical level and are desperately seeking markets for their mass production.

In general, however, the "automatic tariff" of the depreciated £ and the actual tariffs already in force in January and February have been effective in reducing British imports of manufactured goods, and to that extent in widening the internal market for the products of British capitalist industry. But the increase in British production involves also an increase in the imports of raw materials and food—it is not in itself a very effective factor in reducing Britain's adverse balance of trade. Moreover, the internal market is entirely inadequate for British capitalism. *The problem of increasing exports is therefore vital, and it cannot be solved by a protective tariff covering only the home market.*

THE TRADE DEFICIT CONTINUES.

The total trade figures for the first two months of 1932 show the relatively small effect of the combined depreciation of the £ and the "abnormal importations duties." Total imports were £132,468,000, total exports £71,826,000, resulting in an adverse balance of over £60,000,000 or at the rate of £360,000,000 for a full year. For the first two months of 1931 the adverse balance was £58,000,000 (for the whole year it was £409,000,000). These figures provide little comfort for British imperialism, especially as the decline in "invisible" exports (income from shipping and investments abroad) undoubtedly still continues, on the basis of the world economic crisis and the continued fall in gold prices.

The relative failure of the measures already in force shows that the new general tariff of 10 per cent. cannot have any considerable influence on the situation. The rise of the £ which took place in March (in relation to gold standard currencies) was itself equivalent to 10 per cent.—thus negating the effect of the tariff so far as Britain's main competitors are concerned. It is clear that considerably higher tariffs will have to be enforced in order even to protect the internal market, and that the path of protection leads upward in a steep gradient.

PROTECTION AND RATIONALISATION.

Protection is the traditional weapon of a growing capitalism. Both in Germany and in the

United States it facilitated the growth of capitalist industry by the exclusion of foreign manufactures, especially those of British industry; it facilitated concentration and the development of a relatively high technique. Protection in Britain to-day is also intended to facilitate the concentration and technical improvement of British industry. In Chamberlain's parliamentary language:

"We hope by the judicious use of this system of protection to enable and to encourage our people to render their methods of production and distribution more efficient."

The complete protection of the British market (by considerably higher tariffs than this first instalment of 10 per cent.) is intended to establish a preserve within which higher profits can be made by the most powerful groups, and on this basis it is hoped that the capital required for technical reconstruction can be secured, while at the same time the protection of the internal market will help to solve the problem of sale of the products of mass production methods.

It is true that the fundamental difficulties which have hitherto prevented any rapid improvement in British technique will remain—the relics of the past period of British capitalism and particularly the enormous number of separate concerns in many vital industries. Moreover, in the present situation of imperialist rivalry, the groups which benefit from protection are not confined to the nationals of the country which imposes a tariff. The "McKenna" duties encouraged the growth of the British motor industry, but Ford, Citroen and other foreign manufacturers set up their factories in Britain and shared in the resultant profits. Under the pressure of the crisis in their own countries, and in anticipation of a rapid heightening of the tariff wall in Britain, foreign capitalist groups are entering Britain and setting up or buying factories which will also be "protected" by the National Government's measures. This will be a factor preventing that complete concentration and monopoly which British imperialism hopes to secure within Britain on the basis of which rationalisation can be rapidly carried through.

But in any case the British market is utterly inadequate for the productive capacity of British industry. The position of British capitalism to-day is fundamentally different from the position of early German and United States capitalism, which had the possibility of decades of growth before they exhausted their own internal markets. Protection of the British market is only a beginning; the increased competitive power in the world market which is to come from protection and the rationalisation based on it is too far off to bring any quick relief, too hypothetical in

relation to the immensely superior technique of German and United States imperialism. Even the very possibility of mass production methods depends on winning new markets *now*. The position of the trade balance emphasises the need for immediate results from any action taken. Hence the renewed attempt of British imperialism to secure an extension of the tariff wall to surround the Empire.

"EMPIRE ECONOMIC UNITY."

The general tariff of 10 per cent. which has just been established in Britain does not apply to imports from any part of the Empire. So far as the Crown colonies are concerned—the colonies directly administered by the Colonial Office—steps are being taken to secure corresponding preferential tariffs for British products, either by the imposition in each colony of an additional tariff on non-Empire goods or by a rebate from existing tariffs for British goods. In the case of the Crown Colonies, and also India, British imperialism can apply imperial preference by direct administrative acts, although in India certain formalities will have to be observed. But from the standpoint of the volume of trade and market possibilities, the Dominions are as important to British imperialism as the colonies and India. The inclusion of the Dominions in the tariff scheme of British imperialism, however, presents difficulties of a very serious nature.

The policy of "empire economic unity" is not new. Repeated Empire Conferences since the war have discussed the issues involved, and have failed to agree on any proposals which are of any real value to British imperialism, in spite of political concessions to the Dominions. The fundamental factor is the existence in each of the Dominions of separate capitalist groups whose relations with British imperialism are not those either of identity or of agents, compradores, for British imperialism. Like all capitalist groups, they want to buy in the cheapest market and to sell in the highest market; they want to accumulate capital and to set it to work to produce profits for themselves. And the conflict of interests between these groups and British imperialism has become more evident, more conscious, in proportion to the rise of their industry on the one hand and the decline of British imperialism on the other. The present world crisis of capitalism has made the issues sharper both for British imperialism and for the Dominion groups.

THE CRISIS IN THE DOMINIONS.

The catastrophic fall in the prices of raw material and agricultural products during the last two years has brought disaster to the Dominions

and has strengthened the forces of disintegration within the Empire. In Australia, imports have fallen from £161,000,000 in 1927 to £95,000,000 in 1930 and £44,000,000 in 1931. This fall reflects the smaller purchasing power due to the decline of revenue from Australian exports, combined with the cessation of British and United States exports of capital to Australia owing to the crisis which has engulfed industry as well as agriculture in Australia. Some measure of the industrial crisis is given by the New South Wales figures of output of factories and works, which fell from £185,000,000 in 1928-29 to £118,000,000 in 1930-31. Figures for the current year will undoubtedly show a further sharp decline. This is the background of the Lang "repudiation" of interest payments and the support this policy has won among bourgeois and petty bourgeois elements in that state. The trade figures for New Zealand, which are also now available, show similar features. In Canada the economic situation is even more serious with agricultural prices that barely cover transport costs, and the most important branches of industry working at little more than one-fifth of capacity.

In this general crisis and the consequent check to the growth of industry from which the accumulated profits of the Dominions bourgeoisie are largely drawn, the "empire economic unity" advocated by British imperialism, which means the admission on privileged terms of British products — will, if carried to its logical conclusion, mean the abandonment of the capital investments of the Dominions bourgeoisie and the reversal of the tendencies to industrial development. The Canadian reaction to the depreciation of the £ in September last was significant. An immediate check on any growth of imports from Britain was imposed, in the form of a special rate (not the depreciated rate) for the calculation of duty on imports from Britain. A similar reaction was shown in South Africa, where a special duty was imposed on British products, and where also, in spite of pressure from British imperialist interests, the gold standard was maintained. The financial and exchange position of Australia made it impossible for the Australian Government at that time to take any action, but the pressure from industrial interests has resulted in the Government's decision, announced in March, to bring in new and higher tariffs. The tendency not only to an independent development which cuts right across the British imperialist conception of "empire economic unity," but also to the emergence of interests which are themselves imperialist, is shown in the statement made by

the Australian Commonwealth Minister of Trade and Customs:

"The unemployment problem would be solved when the largest manufacturing industries were on the export line. Australia had unparalleled raw material resources and ideal manufacturing conditions, but high costs meant that she exported practically nothing" ("Times," March 26th, 1932).

This statement, made in reply to a Trades Hall deputation protesting against the new import duties, was a declaration of war on the standards of the Australian workers, but it was equally a repudiation of the British conception of "empire economic unity" in which the rôle of exporter of manufactured products is reserved for British imperialism. In fact, it was a declaration of independence on the part of an Australian imperialism which is ready to adventure beyond the Solomon Islands and to enter into the mighty battle for the world market.

THE IRISH CONFLICT REOPENED.

The disintegrating forces at work within the Empire have also come to the surface in the Irish Free State with the coming to power of the De Valera Government, and show most clearly in De Valera's threat to stop the payment of the Land Annuities to Britain, and even to reclaim the sums paid by the Cosgrave Government. These annuities are the interest and redemption payments in respect of loans made through the British Government (from 1885 onwards) for the purchase of land by the small farmers. They are collected by the Irish Free State Government from the farmers and transferred to Britain. De Valera's programme of withholding them does not mean that the burden on the small farmers, now in the throes of the agricultural depression, will be lifted; the £3,000,000 a year will still be collected from the farmers, but De Valera proposes to use it, not for the British bond-holders, but for the Irish bourgeois elements—to ease the Irish budget position and perhaps to lighten the burden of taxation on the Irish bourgeoisie whose prospects of industrial development behind the tariff wall of the Irish Free State have been cut away by the present crisis. De Valera's threat to put an end to the oath of allegiance to the British Crown is only the symbol of the economic clash which appears both in the proposed stoppage of the transfer of the Land Annuities and in the alleged plans to raise the tariff wall against Britain. The rejoinder made by J. H. Thomas on behalf of British imperialism—that the imposition by Britain of tariffs on imports from the Irish Free State would be its reply to the stoppage of the Land Annuities—is not an

indication of "empire economic unity" but of precisely that economic rivalry which characterises the trade policy of the rival imperialist groups throughout the world.

THE NEW PHASE IN EMPIRE RELATIONS.

The world crisis of capitalism has merely brought to the surface the contradictions which have developed within the framework of the British Empire. In the colonial areas properly so called (including India), where British rule is openly an alien rule in countries with low economic development and considerable relics of feudalism and pre-capitalist relations, the imperialist exploitation remains in the form of keeping these areas as sources for the food and raw material requirements of British capitalism and as markets for its manufactures. In connection with such areas, the British imperialist conception of "empire economic unity" does not imply any change in the existing relationships, but merely an intensified and better "protected" exploitation by British imperialism. In connection with the Dominions, however, where in the main the system of production has developed as an extension of British capitalism, the British imperialist designs of "empire economic unity" have to take into account the fact that these "children" of British imperialism have grown up and established their own households. The productive system in the Dominions is not still entirely controlled by British imperialism; it is no longer simply an extension of British capitalist production. The settlers have developed their own group interests; their separate accumulation has been the basis for the development of a separate capitalism; and the Dominion form of Constitution is a political expression of this change.

The development of these separate groups within the framework of the British empire, with their separate accumulation and building up of separate capitalist industries, has gradually weakened the control of British imperialism over their State machine, and at the same time reduced the rôle of the Dominions as consumers of British manufactured products. In the case of Canada, the penetration of United States imperialism has accelerated the process of separation from dependence on British imperialism. As a market for British manufactures, Canada is a rapidly declining asset of British imperialism. In 1929 Britain contributed only 15 per cent. (£11,000,000) of Canada's imports, while the U.S.A. share was 71 per cent. (£190,000,000). The growth of Canada's industrial production is shown by the increase in the net output from £117,000,000 in 1911 to £374,000,000 in 1928. But Canadian production is not merely for the

internal market; in the boom year 1929, Canada exported to Britain alone motor cars and parts to the value of over £1,000,000, and £5,500,000 to other European countries. Canadian capitalism enters the world market as a separate imperialist group, more closely linked to United States imperialism than to British imperialism.

To a certain extent the position is similar in Australia and South Africa. Australian capitalism too has entered the stage when it is striving to find markets for its manufactures. In all the Dominions the crisis has raised very sharply the problem of finding markets, and the approach of the bourgeoisie of the Dominions to this problem is precisely the approach of all imperialist groups, including British imperialism. And the weakening of the parasitic basis of British imperialism, with the consequent decline in accumulation available for export to the Dominions, has reached a catastrophic stage during the present world crisis. In these circumstances an attempt to find a solution through an "empire economic unity" which does not correspond to the needs of the Dominions bourgeoisie is foredoomed to failure.

UNITY OR DISINTEGRATION?

The uncertainty with which British imperialism is approaching the Ottawa Conference is shown by the "National" Government's empire policy in connection with the new general tariff of 10 per cent. The tariff does not apply to the Empire—at present. As indicated above, exemption from the tariff will continue for the colonies, which will give Britain (at Britain's command) at least a corresponding preference. *But the exemption will apply to the Dominions only until the Ottawa Conference.* British imperialism thus announces in advance that it is prepared to sell this preference to the Dominions if they will accept its terms, but that it is equally prepared to use its new protection against the Dominions if need be; it is prepared to fight them as it is prepared to fight other imperialist groups.

But if British imperialism is to gain any considerable advantage from protection—if protection is to lead to rationalisation and concentration of industry, with mass production—protection must not be confined to the home market, but must be extended to the whole empire. And with the rising capacity of industrial production in the Dominions, protection of those markets (or of Empire markets generally) against foreign imperialist production is not enough. British imperialism is faced with the task of inducing the Dominion groups, already developing towards imperialism, to protect British industry against even their own manufactures. British imperial-

ism must turn back the tide as the result of its negotiations at Ottawa.

What has it to offer the Dominions in return for concessions? Only protection or preference for the raw materials and agricultural products of the Dominions. But these branches of production (with the transport of the products) are precisely those which to a great extent still form an "extension" of British capitalism, are still largely controlled from Britain. Protection or preference in Britain for these products of the Dominions is relatively useless for the Dominions bourgeoisie. To the latter, British imperialism has practically nothing to offer except the Union Jack and the Prince of Wales—useful enough for decorative purposes, but without exchange value in a world filled with surplus commodities in search of markets.

And because British imperialism has nothing to offer, it is approaching the Ottawa Conference with a threat—the threat of tariffs even against the Dominions, the threat of open economic struggle. The failure of the Ottawa Conference will therefore not be a secret affair, concealed in high-sounding phrases; it will be open and noisy, marking the stage of conflict within the empire. But it will also mark the defeat of Britain's protectionist policy in the only form in which it offers any solution of the crisis of British imperialism. And it will mark, too, the depth of the crisis facing British imperialism, and destroy one more of the illusions with which the Labour Party and the I.L.P. are striving to hold back the British workers from the revolutionary way out of the crisis.

CONTRADICTIONS AMONG THE IMPERIALISTS AND CONFLICTS ON THE PACIFIC COAST

N. TEREITYEV

"The most important result of the world economic crisis is that it has laid bare and sharpened the contradictions inherent in world capitalism.

"(a) It is laying bare and sharpening the *antagonisms between the most important imperialist countries*, the struggle for markets, the struggle for raw materials, the struggle for export of capital. To-day none of the capitalist States are satisfied any longer with the old distribution of spheres of influence and colonies. They see that the relation of forces has changed, and that correspondingly markets, sources of raw materials, spheres of influence, etc., must be divided afresh."

(Stalin's Speech at the XVI. Congress of the C.P.S.U.)*

THE world crisis of capitalism has sharpened to the utmost the crisis of Japanese capitalism and has encouraged the Japanese bourgeoisie to force on the offensive in China and thus to begin a new imperialist war. On the other hand the same world crisis has for the first time since the war of 1914-1918 created a situation which in a sense is favourable to the expansive plans of Japan. In truth, the financial catastrophe in Germany, the abolition of the gold standard in England and the deepening of the crisis in America has upset the whole system of world capitalist credit. The presence of millions and tens of millions of unem-

ployed, the intense unrest, the dissatisfaction of the broad masses of the people—all this to a considerable extent has tied the hands not only of the European powers as regards Japan, but also of America as well. At the same time the intensification of the world crisis very considerably sharpened the aggressive tendencies of the world bourgeoisie to China, which meant that the resistance of some of the Powers at any rate towards Japanese intervention in Manchuria, which was to lead to international intervention in China and its partition, was of necessity weakened. Finally, what is most important, the sharpening of the anti-Soviet tendencies of the world bourgeoisie, again as a result of the development of the world crisis, mobilised on Japan's side all the most aggressive elements of world reaction, who dreamed of transforming Japanese intervention in Manchuria into intervention against the U.S.S.R.*

The present events in the Far East are a result of all this, and the direct outcome of the world crisis of capitalism, including the seizure and actual annexation of Manchuria, and the war which Japanese imperialism began in China proper and which it is now trying to continue in the form of international intervention against the Chinese revolution. The Japanese plan for the creation

* The theme of this article is an analysis of the contradictions among the imperialists on the Pacific coast. Consequently we do not intend going into the question of the danger of intervention against the U.S.S.R., as this question is outside the scope of our subject and demands treatment in a special article.

* Modern Books Ltd.

of a neutral zone around the five biggest Chinese ports, side by side with the efforts of Japanese diplomacy to transfer the "Shanghai question" to discussion at a Round Table Conference of the Powers interested, proves beyond all doubt that Japan is concretely seeking to partition China and reckons to obtain the lion's share of the spoil. The concentration in Shanghai of ever-increasing numbers of soldiers, the most active assistance in the form of arms and munitions given to the Japanese troops by all the Imperialist Powers, show that international intervention has already begun. It is quite obvious that in the course of this intervention there will be a considerable deepening of contradictions which will raise the immediate danger of armed clashes among the imperialists.

The alignment of forces in the struggle of the imperialists for domination in the Pacific cannot be isolated from the alignment of forces on a world scale. If we leave aside considerations and factors of second-rate importance, we find that in the main the alignment of forces amounts to the presence of a three-cornered conflict between three leading Imperialist Pacific Powers—America, England and Japan; a conflict which, it goes without saying, is developing in co-relationship with the cardinal contradiction of our epoch, i.e., the contradiction between the capitalist world and the U.S.S.R.

ANGLO-AMERICAN CONTRADICTIONS.

"The most important of the imperialist contradictions," said Comrade Stalin in his report to the XVI Congress of the C.P.S.U., "is that between the U.S.A. and England. Both in the sphere of export of manufactured goods and in the sphere of export of capital, the struggle is going on mainly between the U.S. and England. It is enough to take up any economic journal, any document concerning the export of commodities and capital, to convince oneself of this. South America, China, the colonies and dominions of the old Imperialist States form the main arena of struggle. The superiority of forces in this struggle—and very definite superiority—is on the side of the United States." The Anglo-American struggle is developing in all the countries of the Pacific and is, therefore, one of the most essential considerations in the Pacific problem. In the British Dominions this struggle goes on in the main along economic lines: it should be emphasised that American capital, which is penetrating into the outlying parts of the British Empire, has gained the biggest victories in the Pacific Ocean Dominions of England, especially in Canada and Australia (in 1929, 68 per cent. of Canada's imports came from the United States, while only

16.8 per cent. of them came from England; only 43.4 per cent. of Australian imports were from England, while America's share rose to 24.6 per cent.; while in New Zealand imports, America's share was 10 per cent. in 1913 and rose to 19 per cent. in 1929).

The same economic struggle which is developing into a political struggle is going on in South and Central America; as this struggle proceeds each side uses the native feudal-bourgeois elements, erects and destroys governments, organises *pronunciamento* "revolutions." The acute situation in connection with trade rivalry in the four South American States, situated on the Pacific coast—Chili, Peru, Ecuador and Columbia, can be seen from the following figures: In 1926 America's share in the imports of these countries was 32.6 per cent., 46.2 per cent., 42.4 per cent., and 47.6 per cent. respectively, while England's share was 17.2 per cent., 15.6 per cent., 22.6 per cent., and 16.2 per cent. In Mexico and the republics of Central America (Panama, Costa-Rica, San Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala, which during the last ten years have been converted completely into American coffee and banana plantations) the superiority of American Imperialism is even more sharply defined; but despite this the violent struggle continues, complicated in Central America by the territorial-strategic game which is going on between England and America in close proximity to the Panama Canal, and in connection with the problem of guaranteeing the safety of this canal which is of such enormous importance for American domination in the Pacific Ocean.

On the Asiatic coast England owns an enormous colonial Empire—India, Ceylon, Burma, Straits-Settlements, the Malay States, Borneo, Hongkong—and to a considerable extent rules over Indonesia with her 50 million population, where Dutch Imperialism "in actual fact is more and more forced to play a secondary rôle of, as it were, "commissionaire," and which at the same time has to fulfil the function there of gendarme and hangman" (resolution of the VI. E.C.C.I. Congress on the revolutionary movement in colonial countries).

India's rôle in the British Empire is well known. As for Malay and Indonesia, it is here that the overwhelming majority (in Indonesia—one-third) of the world's output of rubber is to be found; the monopoly is in the hands of English capital and is the object of an extremely acute struggle between England and America, which last country is the chief rubber consumer. Here are considerable oil resources—in fact the only important oil wells in Eastern Asia. Here are also to be found

large deposits of iron ore (in Indonesia alone, ten times more than the Japanese deposits and four times more than the Chinese), and tin (Dutch East Indies supply one-fourth of the world output of tin). Backed up by her numerous bases and her "colonial monopoly," acquired during a long process of colonial development, England naturally defends the *status quo* here, while American capital, having no pretensions at present as regards territorial expansion, energetically advances along the whole front, penetrating both into Malay and Indonesia and, to a certain extent, into India, and striving to obtain a more favourable alignment of forces for herself. Finally in CHINA, which we might perhaps call the most important theatre of struggle, American capital not only violently competes with England in all the most important spheres of trade and as regards all the most important objects of capital investment (this competition is especially severe around the markets connected with cotton, oil products, railway equipment, electrical apparatus, machines, etc.); American capital is not only striving to seize all the most important sources of raw materials (wool, leather, vegetable oil products, etc.), but it is preparing to gain control of the economic and political key positions of this country, using its political influence extensively, putting forward its own favourites among the Chinese generals against those of the English and Japanese, organising military-technical and financial help to these generals (American military instructors, advisers, supply of war materials, aviation, etc.), and by means of these generals gradually gaining predominance on the entire Chinese market. The economic and political enfeeblement of British Imperialism as a result of the world war is compelling her to retreat before the pressure of American capital and to take up a defensive attitude all along the line.

In the political sense Anglo-American antagonism in the Pacific has been especially acute during the last few years, and in particular has turned out to be one of the most decisive factors of the international situation which has been brought about in connection with the present intervention of Japan in China. Despite all the traditional talk in the English press about Anglo-American friendship, there is not the slightest doubt that it was just this antagonism which opened up the way for Japan to seize Manchuria and to invade China proper; that it was just the absence of support from England which, for the time being, paralysed America's counter-advance. The ambiguous, passive policy of the English Cabinet, which on the whole has favoured Japan, is in no way an expression of real common interests between

British and Japanese imperialism in China, but in particular an expression of the combination of Anglo-American contradictions and the anti-Soviet, anti-Chinese policy of the English bourgeoisie. The fact that American capital is already deeply involved in the British Dominions and has enormous political influence there, and that in view of this the position which the Dominions themselves take up in this connection acts to a certain extent as a brake upon the anti-American policy of Britain, can obviously only help the further deepening of these already acute contradictions.

ANGLO-JAPANESE CONTRADICTIONS.

In spite of the considerable development of Anglo-American antagonism, English imperialism has no opportunity, however much she may desire it, of forming an effective common united front against America with Japan, since her interests are also in serious contradiction to the interests of Japan.

1. Commercial rivalry in Eastern Asia, as well as competition in the sphere of shipping are most acute between Japan and England. A violent struggle is in progress between them, first and foremost in connection with textiles, which play an important rôle, both in Japanese and English exports to China and other Far Eastern markets; but it extends over an enormous host of other most important commodities. In this struggle Japan is carrying on a determined offensive which, especially during the last few years, has meant serious losses for England in trade in Eastern Asia. The position in textiles is well illustrated by the following figures:

China.

Share of England, Japan and the U.S.A. in the import of cotton cloth:

	Japan	England	United States
1913 ...	18.1%	56.3%	7.8%
1929 ...	66.5%	21.8%	0.3%

Indonesia.

Import of cotton cloth (million yards) during the third quarter July-September:

	From England	From Japan
1929 ...	35	70
1930 ...	21	70
1931 ...	11	72

In the third quarter of 1931 as compared with 1929 the entire import fell by 22 per cent.; imports from England by 70 per cent., while the imports from Japan rose by 3 per cent.

British Malay State.

Import of cotton cloth (millions of yards) during the third quarter of the year:

June-September	From England	From Japan
1929	24.7	12.7
1930	8.5	15.4
1931	4.3	15.0

In the third quarter of 1931 as compared with 1929 the entire amount of imports fell by 50 per cent. ; imports from England fell by 82 per cent. ; imports from Japan rose by 18 per cent.

British India.

Average monthly import of cotton cloth (millions of yards) :

	From England	From Japan
1925	107	18
1929	106	45
1930	66	32
1931 (9 months)	33	27

In 1925 Japan imported six times less cloth to India than did England. In 1929 Japanese imports amounted to over 40 per cent. of English imports. In 1931, as compared with 1929, English imports fell by 70 per cent., while Japanese fell only by 40 per cent.

The situation on the textile and other markets has only improved for England during the last few months, as a result of the abolition of the gold standard in England and, in the main, as a result of the anti-Japanese boycott which is the outcome of Japanese intervention in China, and which has spread partially to other Far-Eastern markets (Indo-China, Indonesia, Malay and Burma, where the trading network is in the hands of Chinese).

Besides this violent struggle in connection with commerce, England is up against equally violent competition in connection with Japanese shipping. This competition exists not only in connection with Trans-Pacific and Asiatic-European lines, but is especially acute in connection with local coastal shipping, and the inland waters of China.

2. To take another side of the question, in China and the Malay Archipelago, England and Japan are the main competitors as regards capital investments. In the Malay Archipelago and Indonesia, Japanese capital is acquiring the iron deposits and oilfields. In China, in particular, according to the latest sources of information (Blakeslee : "Foreign Affairs," October, 1931), the investments of each of these countries amounts approximately to the same amount of 1,250 million American dollars. English capital is in conflict with Japanese on the Chinese railways, with regard to railway equipment, in the Chinese textile industry (where formally over 40 per cent. and actually over one-half of the industrial equipment belongs to Japan, whereas England only owns four large factories), in port equipment and even in the sphere of credit and money circulation (the struggle

between the English and Japanese banks in China). True, a considerable part of Japanese investments are concentrated in Manchuria, while the main sphere of investment of English capital is South and Central China ; but Japan has very large interests in Central and North China as well, and here the rivalry both as regards the export of commodities and export of capital is of a very acute character. It should be mentioned, furthermore, that English capital has very few direct investments in Japan itself.

3. The political contradictions are of no less importance. To Japan, which is thirsting for foreign markets and which was later than England in choosing and dividing the colonies, has been assigned by the conjunction of all her economic and political conditions, the rôle of breaking the territorial *status quo* which had come into being in the Western part of the Pacific Ocean. "Despite the tendencies to conflict among different nations in the Pacific," declared Niccolo Roosevelt, "there is one deciding fact : that it is in the interests of the British Empire or at any rate of her Dominions . . . to maintain the *status quo* throughout this region" (page 11). "Great Britain . . . is the great conservative which is trying to hold on to all it has," says Roosevelt in another place ("The Troublesome Pacific," page 143). Indeed the objects of desire of Japanese imperialism are not only China, where English capital has such strong interests, but the Malay Archipelago, Dutch East Indies, where iron and oil, tin and rubber, attract Japan, as well as all the colossal opportunities of exploiting the native population, not to mention (as a prospect) even British India and the British Dominions in the Pacific. The attitude of the latter is correspondingly anti-Japanese. The programme of Japanese colonial expansion in the end could only be fulfilled at the expense of British imperialism.

In China Anglo-Japanese relations are complicated by the considerable apprehension which British Imperialism has of the Chinese revolution, which is developing in spheres of British influence and which is shaking the foundations of this largest of all colonial empires of the world. The struggle against the Chinese revolution, which is closely connected with the struggle against the Soviet Union, is the link which binds England to Japan and, to a certain extent, unites them. Decrepit England is reckoning upon robust Japan as a standby against revolution in the Far East, and is endeavouring to use her as the gendarme of the Far East. This consideration is of enormous importance as a factor which defines English policy towards Japan, but it is not in a position to remove the antagonism which arises

from the consideration mentioned above of the conflict between the economic and political interests of these two countries. Discussing the problem of regulating the "Chinese question" and of bringing "Chinese anarchy" under control, Sir Frank Fox, in "The Mastery of the Pacific," 1928, declares that one of the means of solving this problem is through Japanese domination in China. He expresses opinions in favour of this domination, but adds that "it is possible that this might, and probably will, give Japan the opportunity, having in view its organisational capacity and national preparedness, of ruling not only in China, but throughout Asia, and then of dictating her will to the rest of the world" (page 288). This price "is too high for England. Japan has in her hands the solution to this problem (Chinese) and the strength required for its solution, but this solution . . . would be a catastrophe for the peace of the world. It would at all events put an end to peace." (Ibid., page 231.)

All that has been said should be sufficient to explain the zig-zag line of policy taken by England towards Japan. The ascendancy of Japanese imperialism took place over a period of twenty years on the basis and with the help of an Anglo-Japanese alliance. As is well-known this alliance came to an end at the Washington Conference, 1921-22, because of pressure on the part of America and the British Dominions. On the heels of this England began to build up a mighty military-naval base at Singapore, which was objectively a menace first and foremost to Japan ("There is only one purpose for which the Singapore base can be used: for war with Japan."—"The Nation," December, 1924), although, obviously, it was directed against the United States. The years that followed saw superficial collaboration between the United States and England, with Japan more or less isolated. As Anglo-American contradictions became more acute, England and Japan once more came closer together and in November, 1928, something in the nature of an agreement to collaborate in China was drawn up. It is possible that in carrying out this agreement British Imperialism occupied an attitude towards Japanese intervention in Manchuria and China, which actually left Japan free to act as she is acting at present. England's refusal to support America, and the acuteness of Anglo-American antagonism, without doubt was an important factor which ensured an extremely cautious policy on the part of America. Moreover, the position adopted by England in the League of Nations, the leading part played by the English representative in the comedy of the despatch to China of a "commission of investiga-

tion" appointed by the League of Nations, and the declarations of the English Foreign Minister, Simon, on the Manchurian question (in which declarations, Simon continually refers to the lack of information, and his inability to speak on the subject until information is received from the League of Nations Commission, etc.) — all this proves that British Imperialism is prepared to sanction the seizure of Manchuria by Japan (in spite even of the losses sustained by English capital as a result of this expansion on the part of Japan, and in particular in consequence of the concession England was forced to make concerning the Mukden-Shanghai huang Railway), and that at the present stage it is refraining from making any active declarations against Japan (even of a diplomatic character) in China proper.

This does not mean, however, any mitigation of the Anglo-Japanese contradictions in the Far East. On the contrary, in the very process of the development of the Japanese offensive, these contradictions must of necessity become more obvious and more acute. "If many are prepared to launch forward with the programme of complete hegemony in China, England, for her part, will find herself in a position where diplomatic measures alone will not be sufficient to defend our interests, for in this case, not only would the policy of 'open doors' be menaced, but also the safety of our trade routes on the Pacific, and also the position of Australia and New Zealand," declared the secretary of the British Joint Chambers of Commerce in China and in Hong-kong — Hull, in his article in the "News-Chronicle," of February 4, 1932.

THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CONFLICT

Japanese-American contradictions in the Pacific, while occupying a position of secondary importance in the whole system of world contradictions and conflicts (after the contradictions between the capitalist countries and the U.S.S.R., and between England and America), have, nevertheless, during the last few years taken on a very real, very acute form, and at the present moment can be quite definitely called a Japanese-American conflict. The essence of these contradictions and the cause of their acute, obvious form does not lie in any competition for trade, which on this side of the triangle is much less developed than on the other two sides. American trade in China and on other markets does not so much compete with Japanese trade as supplement it: a considerable part of American exports to these markets goes on through Japanese brokers and middlemen (according to the "Japan Times" of 6.10.31—as much as 40 per cent.), and a more considerable part goes on through the Japanese banks (in

fact, one-half—according to the same paper), while a large percentage of Japanese exports to China (especially textile) consists of goods, manufactured from American raw materials, or semi-manufactured goods. America supplies steel and machines, not only to Japan, but also to Japanese firms in China (according to the figures of the South Manchuria Railway, the purchases by this railway from America on 31.3.29, amounted to a round sum of 129 million yen as against 193 million yen, representing the round cost of materials bought in Japan). As regards textiles and articles of general consumption, which represent the greater part of Japanese exports to colonial markets and China, American export is not active; on the contrary, Japan exports neither tobacco, nor oil products, nor timber, in which America is strongly interested. In just the same way the American mercantile marine, unlike the Japanese and English, plays no great rôle in Chinese and Eastern-Asiatic transport. Neither do the actual, existing capital investments of America in China compare in any way with the English and Japanese (according to Blakeslee in "Foreign Affairs" of October, 1932, they amount to no more than 250 million dollars), while they are only to a very small extent connected with the Chinese railways, and are not connected in any way with Chinese heavy industry or with the textile industry, i.e., with those spheres which particularly interest Japanese capital. Finally, it should be emphasised that America's trade with Japan herself considerably exceeds her trade with China; America's present trading interests on the Japanese market are more considerable than those on the Chinese market. In fact, during the years 1922-26 Japan swallowed up on an average 5.5 per cent. of America's exports and was responsible for 9.5 per cent. of America's imports, while China's share was correspondingly 2.9 per cent. of the exports and 3.7 per cent. of the imports. It might be mentioned in passing that America occupies the first place also in foreign investments in Japan. According to the latest official statistics from America, the amount of American investment in Japan is 453.5 million American dollars.

If, nevertheless, the Pacific Ocean is at present the arena of almost open conflict between Japan and America, this can be explained by the cardinal fact that the conflict between Japan and America in Eastern Asia is a *conflict of two offensive forces*, of two imperialist Powers, each of which is dissatisfied with the territorial, economic and political alignment of forces which have been created, but each of which is actively fighting to extend its sphere of domina-

tion. Japanese imperialism is importunately knocking at the door of the Eastern world, on the threshold of which Japan is situated; and its immediate task is the colonial seizure of Manchuria and all, or the main part, of China; with these territories as its "place d'armes," it will inevitably extend its advance towards subjecting the whole of Eastern Asia to its domination, and the whole of the extensive Pacific Archipelago, in this way menacing the British Dominions, already half-way along the road to becoming American, and threatening the most important interests of America in South and Central America. The Japanese line of advance comes into conflict, therefore, with the road of development of American imperialism. The latter's road of development, in turn, lies through the same Eastern Asia for which it yearned immediately after it was formed towards the end of the nineties (Spanish-American War), and through China, where for the last ten years or more it has been carrying on an organised, aggressive, counter-offensive against Japanese Imperialism.

The fact that the Japano-American conflict is one between two of the most active, most aggressive imperialist forces, between the very two Powers which are characterised by attempts, each of which excludes the other, to gain the dominating monopoly of all Eastern Asia and the West Pacific Ocean, presupposes that this conflict, which is felt with ever-growing force and particularly clearly in China, will be most acute and irreconcilable. In China, Japan, with its enormous military advantages because of its territorial proximity to China, has been carrying on an open policy of expansion, ever since the beginning of the world war, directed towards the annexation of Manchuria and the partition of the remains of China, in which she will herself take the lion's share. Of course this policy of partition and expansion is common to all the Imperialist Powers, especially, moreover, to the United States, but the latter strongly objects to partition, where Japan is the leader, or the basis of which is an agreement between Japan and England. Having entered the arena of colonial expansion later than the European Powers, American Imperialism was too late to guarantee for herself a suitable base and "spheres of influence" on the Asiatic continent, and this circumstance pre-defined her policy of "the open door," a policy directed against the partition of China in a form which would be disadvantageous for America; and hence America puts forward her own plan of "internationalisation" and "international control" against the plans of the other Powers. During the pre-war period this plan was of a

more defensive nature, seeking to stop the process of territorial expansion and the deepening of spheres of influence of separate European Powers in China; of late, on the basis of a new alignment of forces, much more advantageous for America, this plan has revealed its aggressive, offensive side, as a weapon with which American imperialism is seeking to institute its own dominating monopoly in China.

American capital, which continues its policy of putting forward schemes of this kind on every suitable occasion, at the same time is carrying on, as stated previously, a counter-offensive in China, in particular penetrating into transport and communications (air communications, radio) and making use of the Nanking Government and its Mukden allies as tools in its anti-Japanese policy. The acute relationship between Japan and China in Manchuria during the last few years has been a direct result, and the downright expression of this counter-offensive on the part of American capital: the outward expression of the Japano-Chinese conflict in these parts simply serves to hide up the real essence of the matter, which is the Japano-American conflict. This is quite apart from the importance of the Japano-Chinese conflict in connection with the war for national independence which is being carried on by the Chinese people, and the beginning of which war can already be distinguished in the fighting which recently took place near Shanghai.

The seizure of Manchuria by Japan and the war which is being waged by Japan at present in China proper is exhilarating the Japano-American conflict, which has been steadily developing during the last few years. The very fact of the seizure of Manchuria, which guarantees Japan an important new "place d'armes" on the Continent and an enormous increase in her material resources (raw materials, foodstuffs, fuel, heavy industry), means that Japanese imperialism is now strengthened to a colossal extent and that the prospect of war for the domination of the Pacific is brought much nearer. On the other hand, the seizure of Manchuria could not but be followed by a further Japanese offensive inside China proper, by her demand that the Washington Nine Powers Agreement and the principle embodied therein of the territorial, political and administrative integrity of China should be re-examined (for China—"is not an organised State"), and consequently by Japan's policy of heading straight for the partition of China, or in any case of seizing new "place d'armes" which would safeguard her present seizure of Manchuria in the future. America has always been, and still remains, irreconcilable towards these Japanese aims, which

radically change the relation of forces in the struggle for the domination of the Pacific and threaten in the very near future not only the complete paralysis of any further offensive on the part of America, but more than likely will mean that American capital will have to make a complete exit from China and the whole of Eastern Asia (if it wants to avoid being reduced to the position of a "sleeping partner" financing Japanese expansion, as was shown clearly in the affair of the projected American loan to the South Manchurian Railway Co. in 1927), and that Japan will become a menacing rival in the struggle for domination on a world scale. The Japanese offensive is a corresponding menace to England, in so far as her immediate object in China proper is the valley of the Yangtse river, which for years has been the recognised English sphere of influence. Among the most decisive factors, however, there remains the antagonism between England and America, which hinders effective co-operation between England and America for a joint struggle against Japan, and the fear and hatred of all the imperialists towards the Chinese revolution and the Soviet Union, by force of which world reaction is at present supporting the aggressive activities of Japanese Imperialism. All these factors taken together, together with the support which is being given to Japanese imperialism by France and the specific influence of the universal economic and financial crisis in the capitalist countries, to a certain extent tie the hands of American imperialism in its rôle of main antagonist of Japan, and compels American imperialism to be extremely cautious. Nevertheless, the Memorandums of September 24, 1931 and January 7, 1932, concerning the Manchurian question, and the latest activities of America on the question of the war in Shanghai (Stimson's letter to Senator Borah, and his letter to Senator Bingham), all go to prove that America is neither able nor desirous of reconciling herself to the successes of Japan's acts of aggression, and that the conflict between Japan and America has entered a much more acute stage, a phase which threatens open conflict.

THE ROLE OF FRENCH IMPERIALISM

France is not a factor of first-class importance in the situation which has arisen in the Pacific. Her part in the commerce and shipping of the Pacific is insignificant and cannot be compared in any way with the commercial interests of the three leading Pacific Powers. However, she has a most valuable colony in the Pacific (Indo-China), and island possessions in the South Pacific, as well as large interests in Siam and South China. In the past French Imperialism

was engaged in the Far East as the financial support and partner of Tsarist Russia (even earlier, in the middle of the nineteenth century France was in league with the British Empire in the Pacific, and took part with it in two consecutive wars in China). Of recent years the financial power of France has increased relatively. French capital is once more actively seeking means to penetrate into the Far East. In so far as France has insufficient naval forces in the Pacific sphere of world events, she is once more seeking an alliance like the Franco-Russian alliance, which would make it possible for French capital to expand in the Far East with the help of foreign bayonets. It is beyond dispute that Japan is just this sort of ally at the present moment, since France has no commercial rivalry with Japan, nor needs to fear for her colonial possessions (Japan is quite willing to leave Indo-China out of her own plans for expansion). It is characteristic that even before the Washington Conference, the press of the world was full of rumours about a secret alliance between Japan and France. Now Japanese imperialism is acting with the direct political support, and possibly the financial help of French imperialism, which safeguards in particular Japanese interests in the League of Nations, at the same time holding back English interference and counteracting any interference on the part of America. There is not the slightest doubt that the French bourgeoisie, in return for this support, are reckoning to obtain first and foremost the right to seize certain territories in South and South-West China, which for years have been recognised "spheres of interest" in China.

It should be emphasised, however, that the Far East and the Pacific still remain, for France, a mere secondary fighting area. Her main interests lie in Europe, and the secret agreement, which is supposed to exist between France and Japan, and which was apparently formed a short time before the beginning of Japanese intervention, no doubt makes it obligatory upon Japanese Imperialism to fully support France's hegemony in Europe and first and foremost France's intervention against the U.S.S.R., as well as to support France's position at the Disarmament Conference, the essence of which is to give active support to Japanese aggression and to participate in international intervention against China; in the long run the position of French imperialism additionally assists the sharpening of the Japanese-American conflict.

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Up to now we have limited ourselves to an examination of the struggle of the imperialists for

the domination of the Pacific. It must not be forgotten, however, that this struggle is developing on the basis of the cardinal contradiction, the main contradiction of our epoch—the contradiction between the capitalist world as a whole and the U.S.S.R. :

"The world political situation has now placed the dictatorship of the proletariat on the order of the day and all the events of world policy are inevitably concentrated around the one central point—the struggle of the world bourgeoisie against the Russian Soviet Republic, which is grouping around itself; on the one hand, the Soviet movements of the advanced workers of all lands, on the other hand all the national liberation movements of the colonies and oppressed nationalities, who have become convinced by bitter experience that there is no salvation, except in the victory of the Soviet Power over world imperialism." (Lenin.)

It goes without saying that the Pacific is still of enormous importance, moreover, in the plan of development of this fundamental contradiction of the post-war epoch—the contradiction between the capitalist world and the Soviet Union. It is precisely for this reason that the colonial and semi-colonial world is the Achilles' heel of imperialism; the imperialists fear nothing so much as the alliance and collaboration of the toilers of the Soviet Union, freed from the yoke of capitalist exploitation, and the workers and peasants of the enslaved colonial and semi-colonial countries, fighting for their freedom :

"We want no special propaganda in the East, now that we know that the whole of our system of government is built up on the partnership and fraternal collaboration of the peoples of the most varied nationalities of our land. Every Chinaman, every Egyptian, every Indian who comes to our country and remains for six months can meet with the conviction that our country is the only country which understands the mind of the oppressed peoples."

(Stalin, Political Report of the Central Committee to the XIV. Congress of the C.P.S.U.).

Nowhere, for this reason, are the aggressive anti-Soviet aims of the world bourgeoisie so clearly obvious as in the Far East; nowhere do these aims express themselves in the form of such open, callous acts of anti-Soviet banditism as there.

Finally, it should be borne in mind that in the Pacific are to be found the most distant territories of the Soviet Union, and that in very close proximity to these lands (where, incidentally, intervention of the first period took place consider-

ably later than in the European part of the Soviet Union; in the former before 1922, in Sakhalin before 1925), there are trained White Guard cadres, which are being equipped and made use of by the imperialists and their Chinese agency especially in view of new anti-Soviet undertakings and adventures. It goes without saying that the Far East can never become the main theatre of fighting on the part of the world bourgeoisie against the U.S.S.R., but that the decisive section of their front will always remain in the West, in direct proximity to the vital centres of the Soviet countries. Nevertheless, several of the conditions mentioned make the Soviet Far East in certain respects the most menacing object for the first onslaught against the Soviet Union, for the beginning of the anti-Soviet adventure which will later, according to the idea of its organisers and inspirers, spread along the whole of the borders of the Soviet Union and be converted into a world war between imperialism and the land of Socialism.

All this is sufficient to enable one to understand the degree of importance of the war menace, which is being created for the U.S.S.R. by the present events in the Far East. The

menace of war is formed on the basis not only of the directly aggressive aims of definite circles of the Japanese bourgeoisie towards the Soviet Far East, which abounds in fish, timber, oil and coal, and towards the Chinese Eastern Railway, which belongs to the Soviet Union and is under joint Soviet-Chinese control; the menace of war is to the same extent a result of the sharpening of contradictions among the imperialists, which is inevitable in consequence of Japanese intervention and all that is going on under our eyes at the present moment, which has reached the limit beyond which there is no solution, and the accompaniment to which is a corresponding sharpening of tendencies towards an agreement at the expense of the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Union stands alone against this menace and against the rapacious policy of the imperialists, with her policy of active struggle for peace and her preparedness to defend herself against all attempts to enroach upon her territory. *"We don't want a single foot of foreign territory, but we shall not give up a single inch of our own territory either, to anyone.* (Stalin, Political Report of the C.C. to the XVI. Congress of the C.P.S.U.).

COMRADE STALIN'S LETTER AND THE PURGING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC RELICS

Z. SEREBRYANSKY.

PART I.

AT the Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. held in November, 1928, Comrade Stalin pointed out that the growth of the elements of a new revolutionary upsurge in the countries of capitalism raises the task of "sharpening the struggle against the social-democracy and primarily against its 'left' wing as the social buttress of capitalism." Thus Comrade Stalin explained the necessity of focussing the attention of the Communist Parties upon the slogan of the "purging of the Communist Parties from the social-democratic traditions." In his letter to the editors of the "Proletarian Revolution,"* Comrade Stalin, unmasking the Trotskyist and the other falsifiers of the history of bolshevism and flaying the rotten liberals who condone them, again raises before the Comintern sections the question of the necessity of sharpening the struggle against the various relics of social-democracy (including left-

radicalism), against the smuggling of hostile ideologies in various forms into the ranks of the Comintern sections.

The presence of social-democratic relics, particularly in the form of left-radicalism, played a tremendous negative rôle in the past as well as in the revolutionary battles of the first period of the general crisis of capitalism (especially during 1918-1920).

The most important cause of the defeats of the proletariat in the revolutionary battles of that period was the treachery of the social-democracy. By acting as the "last anchor of salvation" of the bourgeois society the social-democracy succeeded, through moving to the forefront now the right and now the "left" wing and utilising the influence which it had accumulated during the "peaceful" epoch of the Second International, in putting down the proletarian revolution and saving the capitalist régime.

But the social-democracy succeeded in achieving

* See No. 20, "Communist International," 1931.

this only because in a number of capitalist countries (Italy, Czechoslovakia, France, etc.) no Communist Parties existed at all, while in a number of others (Germany, for instance) they were very weak.

The youthful Communist Parties formed during the storm and stress of the post-war years found themselves at once confronted with tasks of exceptional importance and difficulty. Despite the heroic struggle against the organised power of the bourgeois State supported by the strong reformist influence over the masses, the youthful Communist Parties did not prove to be capable of breaking the mass influence of the social-democracy and securing the victory of the proletarian revolution. One of the most important causes of this outcome of the revolutionary battles of the first period was the fact that at the time of the revolutionary crisis the proletariat did not yet have real Communist Parties. Over the best elements of the Labour movement of Western Europe still hung the "yoke of the damnable tradition of 'unity'" (as Lenin said); the heavy burden of the numerous social-democratic relics and traditions of the Second International prevented the youthful Communist Parties from successfully fulfilling their historical mission. The social-democratic relics in the ranks of the Communist movement, the weaknesses and mistakes of the young Communist Parties were utilised to the highest degree by the counter-revolution. They facilitated the counter-revolution, particularly the counter-revolutionary social-democracy in its "work" of saving capitalism. The rôle of these social-democratic relics in the revolutionary battles of the first period will become evident even from a most cursory review (restricted to the limits of a short article) of the path travelled by the Communist International during this period.

GERMANY.

Take, for instance, the revolutionary movement in modern Germany immediately after the war. The "Spartakusbund," as well as later the youthful Communist Party of Germany, unquestionably have tremendous revolutionary services to their credit. The "Spartakusbund" and the Communist Party of Germany were the only force opposing the bourgeois counter-revolution, the entire gang of Scheidemanns, Noskes, Kautskys, Hilferdings, etc. Even during the years of the war itself the "Spartakusbund" supported by all of its forces the mass revolutionary actions against imperialism (for instance, the strikes in January-February, 1918). In the November revolution of 1918 the "Spartakusbund" advanced the demand for the arming of the proletariat, the disarming of the bourgeoisie, the transfer of the

entire power to the Soviets. During the uprisings of January-March, 1919, the Communist Party of Germany, which had just been formed, courageously fought against Noske, the "bloodhound" of the German bourgeoisie, sacrificing in these battles tens of thousands of revolutionary workers and its finest leaders, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Leo Jogiches (Tyschko). But despite the tremendous revolutionary merits of the "Spartakusbund," which should be stressed by all means, it is a fact that at the time of the revolutionary crisis the vanguard of the German proletariat strongly felt all the weaknesses of Luxemburgism, all the menshevist and semi-menshevist mistakes of left-radicalism. "No really revolutionary party," wrote Lenin in his "Letter to the German Communists," "proved to exist among the German workers at the time of the crisis owing to the delay in the split, owing to the pressure of the damnable tradition of 'unity' with the corrupt mercenaries (Scheidemanns, Legiens, Davids and Co.)."

The pressure of the damnable tradition of "unity" made itself felt already at the First Congress of the Communist Party of Germany, where there was a very strong sentiment in favour of creating an independent Communist Party only after the masses had left the independent social-democracy. This reflected the worship of spontaneity which marked the entire activity of the "Spartakusbund" and of the young Communist Party of Germany, the non-appreciation of the entire gigantic rôle of the Communist Party in the proletarian revolution. The Luxemburgian and left-radical relics further made themselves felt in the entirely mistaken position adopted by the First Congress towards the work in the trade unions (the "Leave the Trade Unions" slogan), in the decision to boycott the elections to the Constituent Assembly (which, to be sure, was adopted against Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht). The menshevist and semi-menshevist mistakes of Luxemburgism and left-radicalism made themselves felt further in the programme of the Constituent Congress of the C.P. of Germany: in the agrarian programme (not to give land to the poor peasants), in the characterisation of terrorism (terrorism as a method of the bourgeois revolutions only), and finally in the organisational questions (the programme of the youthful Communist Party granted full autonomy to the local organisations; the C.C., according to the programme, was to be only a spiritual and political leader). The Luxemburgian mistakes (on the questions of an armed uprising) finally reflected themselves upon the very development of the "Spartakusbund" uprising when, instead of raising a revolt of the Berlin workers (on

January 6th, 1919), instead of taking up a resolute and rapid offensive without permitting the enemy to prepare for a counter-blow, the "Spartakists" remained in the buildings seized by them and thus went over to defensive positions which could (and did) lead only to the crushing of the armed uprising.

If we trace the activity of the Communists in the Bavarian Soviet Republic we will see here as well that the mistakes committed by them were directly due to the influences of various social-democratic traditions.

Even while leading the struggle of the revolutionary workers of Bavaria and heroically repulsing the attacks of the counter-revolution, the Bavarian Communists adhered to the fatalist view that the Soviet Republic was doomed. The social-democratic traditions strikingly reflected themselves in the menshevist-Luxemburgian neglect on the part of the Communists, of the task of winning the peasant reserves of the proletarian revolution (the landlords' estates were not confiscated, the land leased by the small peasants was not handed over to them for permanent use, etc.). How erroneous the conception of the Bavarian Communists concerning their tasks in the village was, may be shown by the letter published by one of the Bavarian Communists, Com. Ar., in the "Communist International" for 1919:

"Any compromise between the Soviet Power and the Bavarian peasantry is hardly achievable," wrote this comrade. "In our opinion the rule of the proletarian dictatorship in Bavaria can be assured only if the socialist revolution is victorious throughout Germany and the victorious proletariat exerts armed pressure upon the reactionary mass of the small landowners of Bavaria."

The anti-bolshevist treatment of the peasant question by the Bavarian Communists led them in reality to the rejection of the struggle for the winning of allies of the proletarian revolution in Bavaria. At the same time the Bavarian Communists failed to take up the independent organisation of the farm labourers, which constitutes the foremost task of the Communist Parties.

The menshevist and semi-menshevist heritage of the Bavarian Communists was further reflected in the underestimation by them of the military-organisational measures (particularly in the "democratic votes" in the Red Army). It reflected itself in the absence in the Bavarian Soviet Republic of true Soviets (the leadership being effected by the loose meeting of 4,000 representatives of factory committees and soldiers' deputies). It was finally reflected in the very fact of the voluntary abandonment of the Soviet

Government by the Communists after the Munich meeting of factory committees, which did not reflect the real sentiments of the masses (the factory committees had been elected during the previous stage in the development of the revolution in Bavaria), made a decision to create a Government of "native Bavarians." The worship of spontaneity, the policy of "automatic" development was strongly felt among the Bavarian Communists as well as among the leaders of the "Spartakusbund." Here, for instance, is the speech of E. Levin of April 15th, 1919, his conception of the essence of a proletarian Government:

"The essence of the proletarian Government consists in that it can do nothing alone, in that it can only appeal to you, make proposals to you; it is you yourself who must act."*

As we see, here is reflected very strikingly, in a concentrated form, the worship of spontaneity and the non-appreciation of the correct interrelations between the vanguard and the spontaneous movement which represents a characteristic feature of the activity of the entire German Communist Party of that period.

Comrade Stalin gave in the "Questions of Leninism" a brilliant analysis of the essence of the theory and worship of spontaneity:

"The theory of spontaneity," wrote Comrade Stalin, "is a theory of opportunism, a theory of worship of the spontaneity of the Labour movement, a theory of the actual denial of the leading rôle of the vanguard of the working class, of the party of the working class . . . The theory of worship of spontaneity is resolutely opposed to giving the spontaneous movement a conscious, planful character, it is opposed to having the party march in front of the working class, to having the party raise the masses to a level of consciousness, to having the party lead the movement, it believes that the conscious elements of the movement must not interfere with the movement developing in its own way, it believes that the party should only keep its ear on the spontaneous movement and lag in its wake . . ." (Stalin, "Questions of Leninism," 4th Edition, pages 22-23).

It is characteristic that the theory of spontaneity has been and continues to be preached precisely by the parties of the Second International.

* It is interesting to note that the Luxemburgist Ernst Meyer who was until his very death one of the most prominent representatives of the conciliationists towards the right wing in the ranks of the C.P. of Germany, greatly lauded the mistakes and weaknesses of the Bavarian Communists which he characterised as classic tactics from a proletarian standpoint.

We shall not deal with the well-known mistakes of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. There can be no doubt that one of the ideological roots of the gravest mistakes committed by the Hungarian Communists during the period of the proletarian dictatorship was Luxemburgism with all of its characteristic features. This was reflected both in the very fact of the amalgamation of the Communist Party with the social-democratic party, as well as in the flagrant mistakes committed on the agrarian question and on a number of other questions.

POLAND.

Let us now take the Polish Communist Party, its position during the period of the revolutionary crisis in Poland in 1918-19. Despite the merits of the social-democratic party of Poland and Lithuania in the struggle of the Polish proletariat against Czarism, in the struggle against the Polish bourgeoisie, Polish chauvinism and conciliationism (particularly against the social-patriotism of the Polish Socialist Party), the example of the C.P. of Poland strikingly reveals what a negative rôle the relics of Luxemburgism and of the left wing of the P.P.S. played in this party during the revolutionary crisis.

"Long before the organisation of the C.P. of Poland, Luxemburgism," according to a recent decision of the C.C. of the C.P. of Poland, "was the official ideology of the party and, coupled with the fatal menshevik traditions of the left wing of the P.P.S., served as a serious obstacle to the party's transfer to the positions of Leninism. In practice the Luxemburgian doctrine severely affected the fate of the proletarian revolution in post-war imperialist Poland, which oppressed the conquered nationalities. The erroneous Luxemburgian doctrine prevented our party from developing a bolshevik proletarian strategy: from capturing revolutionary allies in the peasant and toiling masses of the enslaved nationalities for the victorious socialist revolution (1918, 1920, 1923)."

Under the influence of the menshevik traditions of the left wing of the P.P.S. and of the Luxemburgism of the Social Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania, the vanguard of the Polish proletariat did not prove to be equal to its task at the time of the revolutionary crisis. When the situation demanded action, the organisation of the masses, the organisation of the revolution, the C.P. of Poland concentrated upon propagandist work, and even this work was frequently handled in an abstract manner out of all connection with the concrete state of affairs. At the time of the revolutionary crisis the Polish Communist Party,

as we have seen also in the case of the German Communist Party, adhered to the standpoint of unlimited spontaneity. "The revolution . . . cannot be the work of the party, the revolution must be started by the masses themselves." The sentiment expressed in this statement (taken from the draft political platform worked out by the Communist fraction for the Congress of Soviets of Poland) was exceptionally characteristic of the ideology of the Polish Communist Party during the period of the revolutionary crisis.

Let us take the position of the Polish Party during this period on the agrarian question. Here we meet with the slogan: "No Cutting Down of Forests, no Destruction of the Landlords' Estates," and with the estimation of the peasantry as a "completely reactionary mass."

Let us take the position of the Polish Communist Party of this period on the national question. Here is the "policy" suggested on the national question by the platform of the Constituent Congress of the C.P. of Poland:

"During the period of the international social revolution which destroys the foundation of capitalism, the Polish proletariat rejects all political slogans such as autonomy, independence and self-determination . . . in the international camp of the social revolution the question of boundaries does not exist."

It is not difficult to see what nihilism on such an important question to the Polish proletariat as the national question led to. Already during the years of the war Lenin pointed out that "the necessity of proclaiming and securing freedom for all the oppressed nations (that is, their right to self-determination) will be as vital in the social revolution as it was vital to the victory of the bourgeois democratic revolution, for instance, in Germany in 1848 or in Russia in 1905" (see Lenin's theses, "The Social Revolution and the Right of the Nations to Self-Determination"). The Polish Communists neglected these teachings of Lenin.

"The erroneous Luxemburgian position of the S.D.P. and L. on the national question prevented the Polish proletariat from playing the rôle of the leading factor towards the great masses of the petty bourgeoisie and peasantry, moreover it hampered the struggle of the party against the influence of the petty bourgeois social patriotism of the P.P.S. over the working masses" (from the Resolution of the C.C. of the C.P. of Poland dealing with the overcoming of the ideological heritage of Luxemburgism).

The process of overcoming the relics of Luxemburgism (which began at the second congress of

the C.P. of Poland in 1923), the process of the assimilation by the party of the Leninist policies on the national and peasant questions, became long drawn out. This was largely due to the fact that the leaders of the menshevist left wing of the P.S.P. (Koszeva, Lapinsky) and some comrades from the S.D.P. of Poland and Lithuania (Varsky and Prukhniak), who revised Luxemburgism, did this on the basis not of Leninist, but of menshevist and Troztkist positions.

The last, Fifth Congress of the C.P. of Poland made it its task to complete the overcoming of the heritage of Luxemburgism and the purging of the party ideology from the menshevist equipment of the left wing of the P.S.P. Comrade Stalin's letter shows to the C.P. of Poland how this vitally necessary work should be carried out from the only correct, Leninist positions.

The menshevist and semi-menshevist relics had a most fatal effect upon the battles of the proletariat of Latvia, Lithuania and Finland as well. But the bolshevist policy on the agrarian question was characteristic both of Soviet Latvia and of the Lithuanian-White Russian Soviet Republic.

LATVIA.

This is how this policy was characterised in the Manifesto of the Eighth Congress of the C.P. of Latvia (held in 1931):

"The Soviet Government committed a serious error in 1919 in not permitting the division of the holdings of the landlords and big landowners, in not assuring free use of the land by the small and middle peasants, in not fighting with sufficient determination against the compulsory formation of communes locally. Surrounded on all sides by counter-revolutionary bands under conditions of hunger and ruin, the Soviet Government, owing to these mistakes, failed to unite around the proletariat the poorest peasantry in the struggle against the common enemy. The mistakes of the party were ably utilised by the bourgeoisie which divided the land in its own interests, in the interests of a new enslavement of the toilers . . . These mistakes are now being sharply condemned by the Communist Party itself. The mistakes of 1919 must not and will not be repeated."

During the existence of the Lithuanian-White Russian Soviet Republic the armed forces of the Soviet Power protected the property of the nationalised estates and forests from being "plundered" by the agricultural workers and poor peasants. It is not difficult to see that in this policy of denying the "division of the landlords' land," in this underestimation of the agrarian question as a question of political strategy, was reflected the menshevist denial by the left radicals

of the policy of the union between the working class and peasantry, was reflected the influence of the semi-menshevist scheme of the permanent revolution which they supported. The same applies to the most flagrant mistakes in the national policy committed, for instance, during the period of the existence of the Lithuanian-White Russian Soviet Republic, mistakes testifying to the influence of the complete underestimation of the national question widespread among the left radicals.

FINLAND.

Everybody knows of the fatal rôle played in the proletarian revolution of Finland by the social-democratic traditions of those best sections of the Finnish Social Democracy which led the revolutionary struggle of the Finnish worker against the bourgeoisie. These social-democratic traditions were expressed primarily in a tendency to secure the "highest democracy."

Under the influence of these tendencies the "most democratic constitution" worked out by the Council of People's Commissars (during the very heat of the civil war!) did not draw any class distinctions; the leaders of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie were not arrested or were subjected to very slight repressions; in some places during the organisation of the red guard, arms were given to the bourgeoisie as well; Soviets were not organised; while freeing the tenants from the payment of rent and turning the land over to them the Council of People's Commissars left intact about 10,000 big estates as well as the farms of the kulaks (only in case of desertion of the owner was his property handed over to the farm labourers). As a result of this mistaken land policy the independent small peasants and the farm labourers did not obtain anything from the proletarian revolution. Thus, the proletarian revolution did not secure the support of these classes which it could have secured.

Comrade Kuusinen was perfectly right in pointing out that the leaders of the proletarian revolution in Finland participated in the revolution with closed eyes, failing to understand the true sense of the social revolution that was being made.

"In the heat of the most embittered battles," wrote Comrade Kuusinen, "they still continued to talk of a democratic system, of the very same democratic system with which they intimately connected the thought of the elimination of an armed revolutionary clash" (Kuusinen, "Self-Criticism").

The leadership of the Finnish revolution sought to "bridge the gulf" between capitalism and socialism by consolidating the democratic system. The attempts of the leadership of the Finnish

revolution to carry out the proletarian revolution in "peaceful" "democratic" forms, the democratic illusions and prejudices, served as evidence that the leadership of the revolution was addicted ideologically to the traditions of the pre-war Second International. This was not the least factor in the defeat of the Finnish proletariat.

BULGARIA.

Let us consider now the Bulgarian Communist Party.

The "tesniaks"* unquestionably have tremendous revolutionary merits before the world labour movement. The long struggle of the "tesniaks" against Bulgarian capitalism, against the "broad" socialists, against the different forms of opportunism, against chauvinism, and for the international education of the masses, is well known. The 30-year revolutionary struggle of the "tesniaks" helped them during the post-war period to rally around themselves the majority of the working class, to make the Bulgarian Communist Party the second party in strength in the country (after the Agricultural Union), and to lead under the banners of the Comintern the great masses of the Bulgarian workers.

At the same time the "tesniak" ideology which had sunk deep roots in the Bulgarian Labour movement reflected itself by a series of negative features in the revolutionary battles of post-war Bulgaria. The party was not the leader and organiser of the revolutionary struggle. The party was only an agitator and propagandist. This was the "tesniak" conception of the rôle of the party "inherited" together with a number of other traditions of the Second International by the Communist Party of Bulgaria during the revolutionary crisis. And it was not by accident, therefore, that when the mass soldier uprising of Vladaisk broke out in 1918 the party underestimated it, regarding it only as a soldiers' "riot" and assuming an attitude of "neutrality" towards it. Under the new conditions when "the contradictions of capitalism have reached the highest degree, when the proletarian revolution has become a question of immediate practice, when the old period of the preparation of the working class for the revolution came up against and grew over into a new period of the direct storm of capitalism" (Stalin), the Bulgarian Communist Party, owing to the influence of the "tesniak" relics and traditions, proved to be unprepared for the fulfilment of its historical mission.

The party assumed an abstract propagandist and passively "tailist" position at the time when the development of the revolutionary movement

demanded action to organise the masses. It was not by accident that the party did not concretely raise the question of the capture of the power by the proletariat. The party did not correctly approach the question of the union of the working class with the bulk of the peasantry and of the toiling masses of the oppressed nations, the party did not clearly realise the tasks of the winning by the proletariat of the hegemony in this union.

It was not by accident that the opportunist view was adopted by the C.C. of the Bulgarian C.P. (for instance, in 1920), that the revolution in Bulgaria has no internal forces, as it "depends mainly upon foreign conditions." It was maintained that the victory of the Bulgarian proletariat was possible only after the proletariat of the advanced and developed countries comes out victorious. The fatal mistake of the Bulgarian Communist Party during the fascist coup of Zankov in 1923 when the Bulgarian Communist Party adopted an attitude of "neutrality" was also not accidental (this decision of the Communist Party was communicated to Plevna by the Government wire and circulated with the permission of the Zankov Government, as it was fully in the interests of the fascist Government).

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.

We shall now turn to the Czecho-Slovakian Communist Party. Here, too, we see the fatal rôle of the relics of the so-called "Marxian-left," of the menshevist and semi-menshevist relics in the development and outcome of the revolutionary battles of the proletariat of Czecho-Slovakia.

"Every national policy," wrote the "Reichsberg Vorwärts" of March 19th, 1921, "is superfluous. Every national policy, every 'sympathy' to the oppressed nationalities, every measure aimed at 'eliminating' or 'mitigating' the national oppression represents a betrayal of the cause of the proletarian revolution."

Such are the views given currency in the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia on the national question. In the case of one of the leaders of the "Marxian-left" the theses that the "national struggle in the present epoch interferes with the development of the class struggle" was oddly combined with the recognition of Masaryk's imperialist theory of the national "unity" of the Czechs and Slovaks.

Similar menshevist views existed in the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia on the question of the rôle of the party as well. In the Communist Party the view was widespread that the party must not take the initiative in the fighting inasmuch as it was itself within the power of the spontaneous movement, views which could, in practice, transform the party only into a "recorder" of the events instead of a revolutionary vanguard of the prole-

* Meaning "Narrow" in the sense of orthodox Socialists.

ariat. This is how it actually happened that the "Marxian-left" and subsequently the C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia followed in the wake of the mass movement (for instance, during the biggest revolutionary action of the working class of Czecho-Slovakia, the December strike of 1920). The theory of spontaneity, the effect of which can be traced in a series of revolutionary actions thus makes itself felt very painfully here as well.

GREAT BRITAIN.

The C.P. of Great Britain, from its very inception, found itself confronted with the task of overcoming the opportunist, sectarian ideological heritage received from the former socialist organisations. It was not by accident that the very first Congress of the C.P. of Great Britain (in 1920) had to deal with two major questions: the question of affiliation to the Labour Party and of participation in the bourgeois Parliament. Only with the aid of the C.I. and of Comrade Lenin did the C.P. of Great Britain cure itself of the "infantile sickness of leftism" and learn to understand that "the revolutionary class, for the realisation of its task, must be able to master all forms or aspects of the social activity without the least exception" (Lenin, volume xxv., page 232).

U.S.A.

Like the Communist Party of Great Britain, the C.P. of the United States (or to be more exact the C.P. and the C.L.P.) carried the opportunist sectarian load (including De Leonism) for a fairly long time. Refusal to work in the old reformist trade unions, and neglect of the mass work and the struggle for partial demands, acted as the greatest hindrances to the development of the party and inevitably led it to self-isolation from the mass struggle.

FRANCE.

The influence of the social-democratic traditions was felt with special acuteness by the Communist Party of France.

Together with such centrist elements as Favre, Verfeuille, Souvarin, etc., a good many social-democratic, centrist and anarcho-syndicalist traditions passed over into the C.P. of France after the Tours Congress (December, 1920). These elements dragged the party back, into the "old home" of the Second International, to Longuet, Boncour, P. Faure, Renaudel. On the other hand, a section of the anarcho-syndicalists who joined the French Communist Party continued to advocate the opportunist positions of syndicalism, which is "above the party" and "sufficient for everything and unto itself." Even many of the best syndicalists who were prepared to break with the anarcho-syndicalist conceptions of the "purely

economic revolution" and of "all-embracing syndicalism," nevertheless defended the theory of the "independent trade union movement."

The absence of the Communist Party at the time of the post-war revolutionary upsurge resulted in the French proletariat finding itself without a leading revolutionary staff to organise and direct the movement. On the other hand, the opportunist-sectarian theory of "non-interference" with the trade union movement, which was preached, for instance, by such organisations as the "Committee of the Third International," led to the best elements of the French proletariat isolating themselves during the period of the powerful sweep of the strike movement (1919-1920) from the mass movement, virtually passing by it, and limiting their activity to propaganda alone. The C.P. of France was destined to go through the complex and difficult process of bolshevisation in order to purge itself of the social-democratic and anarcho-syndicalist elements which did not break with their past but on the contrary sought to smuggle their old opportunist rubbish into the Communist Party.

Such, very briefly, is the rôle of the different social-democratic relics in the activity of the Communist Party during the past revolutionary battles. As we have seen, these relics prevented the young sections of the Comintern from adopting a bolshevist strategy and served as one of the most important causes of the defeats of the proletariat.

That is why the fact that some authors advanced the thesis in our literature to the effect that "the theoretical defects and shortcomings of the left-radicals . . . were easily overcome under the influence of the experience of the October revolution" is extremely harmful. This is how Comrade Radek, for instance, wrote in "The German Revolution" (in 1923).

As we have seen, the dead-weight of traditions and relics of the Second International have been overcome with much less ease, in a number of our Communist Parties, than Comrade Radek imagines.

* * *

Since the revolutionary battles of the first period a good deal of time has elapsed. Our parties utilised this time for the bolshevisation, for the consolidation of their ranks.

The Communist International grew, hardened and strengthened in a merciless struggle against the social-democracy in all of its manifestations and in a determined fight on two fronts, against right and "left" opportunism in its own ranks, against all sorts of distortions of Marxism-Leninism. At the time of the creation of the Comintern many left social-democratic elements

joined it. But the Comintern admitted them only after bolshevism (which subjected their mistakes, their erroneous views, their weaknesses and prejudices to merciless criticism) put before them the condition of overcoming the social-democratic relics and traditions (recall, for instance, the famous "21 conditions" of admission to the Comintern). The Comintern was created not on the basis of a combination of bolshevism with left-radicalism, but solely on the basis of bolshevism which alone represented and represents completely consistent revolutionary Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and the proletarian revolution, revolutionary proletarian internationalism. Against the social-democratic relics, the Communist International has been stubbornly fighting from the very moment of its foundation.

But can it be said that now these social-democratic relics no longer play any rôle? Of course, it would be completely wrong to say this. And the importance of Comrade Stalin's letter to the sections of the Communist International consists, among other things, precisely in that at the *time of the preparation of the proletariat for decisive battles it is necessary to strengthen the blow at all the open and disguised forms of penetration of social-democratic elements into the ranks of the sections of the Comintern. It is necessary to strengthen the blow against every form of right and "left" social-democratic deviation and relic, against the damnable traditions of the Second International which still continue to survive, in a certain measure, in the ranks of the Communist movement.*

From these relics and traditions of the Second International, from the weaknesses and mistakes of the left radicals, the renegades of the Comintern, such as the Brandlerists, for instance, made a "bridge" for themselves to social-fascism. Exploiting the weaknesses and mistakes of Luxemburgism, they spoke and still speak of the "backwardness" and "specifically Russian character" of Leninism, of its "peculiarity" and "unsuitability" to the conditions of developed countries; of "West-European Communism" which stands "above" Russian bolshevism. Like Thalheimer, they refer to the C.P. of the Soviet Union as the "fated party of the Comintern," etc., etc.*

The arguments of the renegades who have

been cast outside the Comintern, regarding the "specifically Russian" character of bolshevism have long been refuted by Lenin and Stalin.

"Is not Leninism a generalisation of the experience of the revolutionary movement of all countries?" wrote Comrade Stalin ("Principles of Leninism," 4th edition, page 247). "Are not the principles of the theory and tactics of Leninism suitable, obligatory to the proletarian parties of all countries? Was not Lenin right in saying that 'bolshevism is fit as an example of tactics to all'?" (see volume xxiii., page 386). Was Lenin wrong in speaking of the 'international importance' of the Soviet Power and of the principles of bolshevist theory and tactics'?" (see volume xxv., pages 171-172).

In its turn, counter-revolutionary Troztkism, which has developed into the vanguard of the international bourgeoisie, being unable at present to appear under the discredited counter-revolutionary banner of Troztsky, attempts to drag in the old Troztkist rubbish, under the flag of the idealisation of Luxemburgism, about the "re-arming" of bolshevism, about "bolshevism having come upon the international arena only after the war," about the "underestimation" by Lenin and the bolsheviks of the opportunism of the centre before the war, about their "underestimation" of the revolutionary essence of the left radicals, etc., etc.

The Troztkist smugglers are seeking to split Leninism into two parts by all of these attempts: pre-war Leninism which was "unfit," "old" Leninism, and post-war Leninism, which "re-armed" itself with the aid of Troztsky.

Comrade Stalin has long exposed the essence of these Troztkist attempts to smuggle in under the flag of history the "little ideas" of counter-revolutionary Troztkism. By the theory of dissecting Leninism into two parts, Troztkism seeks to discredit Leninism as an "integral theory which originated in 1903, underwent the trials of three revolutions and is now marching forward as the battle flag of the whole world proletariat" (Stalin, "On the Opposition," page 122).*

"He who looks back from the present position of the Comintern sees also the correct and valuable elements which were contained in Rosa Luxemburg's warning against the hasty foundation of the Comintern. They consisted in the prediction that the Comintern in which there was not a single mature and independent party, in addition to the Russian Party, but were only small immature groups and tendencies with the exception of the Spartakusbund . . . that in such an International the tremendous weight of the Russian Party would crush all the other parties and retard and harm its development, that the International would gain a specific Russian imprint."

* Russian.

* Here is a characteristic example of how the Brandlerite renegades defend the mistakes of Rosa Luxemburg and make them their banner. In No. 10 of the Brandlerist organ, "Gegen den Strom" (March 9, 1929), A. Thalheimer writes the following on the resistance offered to the organisation of the Communist International by the Spartakusbund.

Therefore, Comrade Stalin pointed out in the same book, "the theory of dissecting Leninism into two parts is a theory of destroying Leninism, a theory of supplanting Leninism by Troztkism."

It is quite clear that all of these positions of the right and "left" renegades of the Comintern represent an attempt to attack the line of the C.P.S.U. and of the Comintern under the flag of the idealisation of the social-democratic traditions and relics, to discredit and besmirch the leading rôle of the C.P.S.U. in the world Communist movement and the rôle of the U.S.S.R. as the lever and base of the world proletarian revolution. Thus, are the right and "left" renegades of Communism executing the "social order" given to them by the imperialist bourgeoisie.

As we see, the Troztkists and the Brandlerites not only assimilated all of the negative features from the Luxemburg heritage, but "enriched" them in turn, introducing into them their counter-revolutionary "tribute." The Brandlerites and the Troztkists have been cast out of the ranks of the Communist International and are now on the other side of the barricade.

However, in the ranks of the modern Communist movement we still meet with the influence of many social-democratic relics, particularly that of the Luxemburgian relics. Take, for instance, the "theory of spontaneity." We still meet in the practices of the Communist Parties all too often a policy of relying upon the spontaneous development of the movement, an underestimation of the fact that "the party cannot be a real party if it is to limit itself to recording what the mass of the working class is experiencing and thinking, if it is to follow in the wake of the spontaneous movement, if it is unable to overcome the inertia and political indifference of the spontaneous movement, if it is unable to rise above the momentary interests of the proletariat, if it is unable to raise the masses to the level of the class interests of the proletariat" (Stalin). "The party," pointed out Comrade Stalin, "must be ahead of the working class, it must see further than the working class, it must lead the proletariat behind it rather than plod along in the

wake of spontaneity" (Stalin, "Questions of Leninism," pages 83-84).

Many sections of the Comintern still frequently do not correspond to these most important conditions laid down by the leader of the Communist International, Comrade Stalin. It was not by accident that the last (Eleventh) Plenum of the E.C.C.I., in the section of the theses* devoted to the "weaknesses and shortcomings in the work of the majority of the sections of the Communist International," emphasised in the first place the "tailism" in regard to a number of important revolutionary movements, unemployed actions, the peasant movement, the backwardness in the mobilisation of the masses in the struggle for the every-day needs.

It is quite obvious that very frequently the ideological root of this passiveness, backwardness and tailism consists of the relics of the "theory of spontaneity" which the left radicals worshipped. The Luxemburgian relics make themselves sharply felt in the question of the allies of the proletariat also, in the weakness of the work of a number of sections of the Comintern in the field of the national-colonial question, in the weakness of the work in the village. Finally, we still frequently meet with different varieties of the theory of the "automatic collapse of capitalism," a theory which Rosa Luxemburg had attempted to develop but which now serves as the banner of the "left" social-democratic theoreticians. It is quite obvious that this "theory of the automatic collapse of capitalism" only serves to justify the opportunist passiveness and the lagging of the subjective factor as represented by the Communist Parties, behind the objectively favourable situation. Examples of the effect of the social-democratic relics (in different forms) may be found in every section of the Comintern. We shall briefly touch upon these relics as affecting the Communist Party of France alone, in which the process of bolshevisation developed under particularly complicated and difficult conditions.

(To be concluded.)

* Modern Books, 3d.

CORRECTION.

Owing to a translation error the sentence beginning "Parliamentary illusions" (page 185, line 21, No. 6) in the speech of D. Z. Manuilsky reads "Parliamentary illusions are SOWN here much more rapidly than in England." This sentence should read: "Parliamentary illusions will *therefore* be *destroyed* much more rapidly *in these countries* than in England."

With apologies, EDITOR.

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