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RESULTS OF 1931 AND PROSPECTS FOR 1932 IN THE U.S.S.R

IN 1931 the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., led by the C.P.S.U. and its Leninist Central Committee, completed the foundation of the socialist economy. The question "Who will beat whom?" has been finally decided in the U.S.S.R., from the point of view of the internal forces, not only in the city but also in the village. An epoch-making victory of world importance has been gained.

Ten years ago, in 1921, at the very beginning of the N.E.P., Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, addressing himself to the international working class in his speech to the Third Congress of the Communist International, formulated the main task of a complete historical stage of the socialist revolution in the U.S.S.R. as follows:—

"The importance of the period which is now opening up in Russia, from an international standpoint—if we regard the international revolution as a single process—essentially consists in that we must practically solve the problem of the attitude of the proletariat towards the last capitalist class in Russia . . ."

". . . towards the last capitalist class, the deepest foundation of capitalism, towards small property, towards the small producer . . ."
(Lenin, volume XVIII., part I., pages 325-326, Russian Edition.)

In that same year the Third Congress of the Communist International, guiding itself by the Leninist conception of the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry as an alliance signifying the "strengthening and consolidation of the proletariat" (Ibid, page 326), gave a concrete description of the quintessence of this period as being

"a correct definition and realisation of measures necessary for leading the peasantry, for a firm alliance with it, for a long series of gradual transitions to large-scale socialised mechanised agriculture."

This transition to large-scale socialised agriculture received a powerful momentum in the Summer of 1929, this "year of great change," when the working class of the U.S.S.R., under the leadership of the C.P.S.U. and of its leader, Comrade Stalin, "succeeded in turning the bulk of the peasantry in a number of districts from the old capitalist road of development . . . to the new socialist road of development" (Stalin), when in this connection the party passed on directly from the policy of limiting and liquidating the kulaks, to the policy of liquidating them as a class on the basis of complete collectivisation, when the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., under the leader-

ship of the C.P.S.U., took up a broad socialist offensive all along the front.

What are the results of 1931, the third, decisive year of the Five Year Plan, in the capitalist countries and in the Soviet Union? Under what conditions do the proletariat and the toiling masses of the Soviet Union take up the task of carrying out the national-economic plan of 1932, of completing in 1932 the Five Year Plan in four years?

In the course of 1931 the complete contrast between the development of the countries of capitalism and the land of rising socialism was revealed with even greater clarity and sharpness. The road of capitalism is a road of crises, a road of economic decline and unparalleled destitution and hardships for the masses. The road of socialism is a road of growth, a road of economic progress and of a radical improvement of the situation of the toiling masses in town and village. In the capitalist countries we have a growth of the million-strong armies of unemployed, a gigantic increase of starvation and destitution in the towns and villages. In the U.S.S.R. we have the liquidation of unemployment and the complete elimination of the class differentiation and poverty among the toiling masses in the village. In the capitalist countries throughout 1931 a crisis of unprecedented force continued to rage, becoming aggravated more and more all the time; production is declining, building operations are being curtailed, complete municipalities are going into bankruptcy (Chicago, Philadelphia, Steyr, Dresden), whole States declare themselves bankrupt, and new millions of starving people are flung on to the street. In the U.S.S.R. during 1931 we had a further gigantic economic upsurge, a growth of the productive forces on a scale never witnessed before in the world; industry made a further immense step forward; construction work was carried on not only in the old but also in the new industries; new socialist cities are being built, and the situation of the masses both in the city and in the village has markedly improved.

One of the most important results of 1931 has been the fact that capitalism as a system has discredited itself, that the theories of the capitalist agents in the camp of social-democracy regarding the successes of "organised capitalism" have been completely discredited before the millions of the toiling masses throughout the world. From the theories of "organised capitalism" invented by the leaders of the Second International, such as Hilferding, and taken up by the right opportunists in the C.P.S.U., not a trace has been left. The

results of 1931 both in the capitalist countries and in the U.S.S.R. fully exposed before the toiling masses the attempts of the "left" theoreticians of social-fascism (Bauer, Seidewitz, etc.) to renovate the bankrupt theory of "organised capitalism" by a discussion about the alleged growth of State capitalism under the conditions of the world economic crisis, supposedly leading to an "automatic" and "peaceful" growth of socialism, without the violent overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of the dictatorship of the working class.

Indeed, industrial production in the capitalist countries during 1931 declined by more than one-fourth compared with 1929. In a number of countries the decline has been even more drastic: in Poland 28 per cent., in Austria 31 per cent. The output of iron in the United States at the end of 1931 sank to less than half compared with 1929. In the principal capitalist countries more than half of the working class is affected by full or partial unemployment. In the United States, England and Germany from one-fourth to one-third of the blast furnaces have been put out. In England the steel industry is working to only one-fifth of capacity and in Germany to less than half. The coal mines in the basic capitalist countries are operating on less than half their normal schedule. The automobile industry of the United States, one of the most progressive and best organised industries, is operating at only one-fifth of capacity.

In 1931 a striking illustration of the unparalleled force of the crisis raging in the capitalist countries was provided by the gigantic "tempo" of the destruction of the productive forces themselves in the capitalist countries: in the first place the most important force of production, the working class, is being physically undermined by a reduction of the dole, cuts in wages, the housing need, and chronic unemployment. At the same time the cultivated acreages are also being reduced and in places large quantities of raw materials and means of consumption are being destroyed in order to maintain the prices at a higher level. While millions starve, wheat and corn are being burned in the locomotive engines and coffee is being cast into the sea.

What have been the results of the heroic struggle of the working class and toiling masses of the U.S.S.R. conducted during 1931, under the leadership of the C.P.S.U. and its Leninist C.C., for the fulfilment of the national economic plan of 1931, the third, decisive year of the Five Year Plan?

The results of 1931 in the field of industrial production are marked by great achievements. The output of the planned industries exceeded that of the previous year by 20-21 per cent.

Capital investments throughout the national economy were financed to the extent of 16 milliard roubles. During 1931 new industrial enterprises valued at 3.5 milliard roubles were put into operation. Employment in the country during 1931 advanced from 14.4 to 18.5 million, while wages went up by 18 per cent.

In a number of industries the whole of the Five Year Plan was fully completed during 1931. Among the biggest industries which completed the Five Year Plan in two and a half to three years are oil, tractor, electro-technical and general machine building. Leningrad, the greatest industrial centre of the U.S.S.R., also essentially completed its Five Year Plan of industrial output in 1931.

The tractor industry which surpassed its Five Year Plan in 1931 has been created entirely anew in some two to three years and now represents one of the most advanced industries in the world, having produced already in 1931 557,000 h.p. while the Five Year Plan called for an output of 550,000 h.p. in 1932/33.

During 1931 the foundation of the socialist economy in the U.S.S.R. was completed, the socialist elements gained an absolute ascendancy not only in industry but also in agriculture.

Indeed, in 1928 the collective farms comprised only 1.7 per cent. of the peasant households. In 1929, the percentage of households entering collective farms rose to 3.9 per cent. In 1930, the percentage of collectivised peasant households reached 23.6. In 1931, the overwhelming majority of the poor and middle peasants joined the kolkhozes* raising this percentage to 62.2 and controlling 79 per cent. of the entire area cultivated by the peasantry (including the Winter sowing of 1931).

Under the Five Year Plan it was proposed to collectivise 20 per cent. of the peasant households by the end of the fifth year. In reality, 62.2 per cent. of the poor and middle households were collectivised by the end of 1931. Thus, the entire Five Year Plan was more than trebled in 1931. In the decisive grain regions collectivisation has already been fundamentally completed. There can be no doubt that the year 1932 will mark the essential completion of collectivisation throughout the U.S.S.R. as a whole.

Accordingly the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. has pointed out the necessity of focusing the attention upon the organisational and economic consolidation of the kolkhozes, upon the proper organisation of labour in the artels† and communes. The exceptionally rapid growth of collectivisation does not, as yet, mean that the

*Collective farms.

†Limited collective organisations.

millions of new kolkhoz members have already divested themselves of the customs and views of small property owners. This requires lengthy educational work. The failure to give due consideration to this fact, the harmful, unbolshevik idealisation of the still youthful kolkhozes, resulted in temporary difficulties being experienced with the realisation of the grain collection plan during the Autumn of 1931. Therefore the work of socialist education among the kolkhoz masses and, particularly, the fulfilment by the kolkhozes of their obligations to the State, especially as regards the delivery of their surpluses, were made the central task of the bolsheviks in the village.

The Five Year Plan of construction of State farms has similarly been surpassed at the end of 1931. The system of grain and cattle State farms as well as of State farms growing industrial crops developed with remarkable speed.

The cultivated area at the end of 1931 exceeded that of 1928 by 27.7 per cent. and was equal to 137.5 million hectares, thus exceeding the planned estimates under the Five Year Plan. However, it is necessary to add that during the coming period the main attention will have to be centred not upon the extension of the cultivated area (the plan for 1932 calling for 141 million hectares) but upon the struggle for more crops, for a higher yield per acre, for the proper organisation of the harvesting operations.

The reconstruction of the whole of agriculture which has proceeded with giant strides during the first three years of the Five Year Plan, would have been impossible without a change of the technical basis of agriculture, without the supply of tractors, combines, sowing and harvesting machines. Therefore, simultaneously with the development of collectivisation on the basis of the simple peasant implements, which met with resistance both on the part of the right and of the "left" opportunists in the C.P.S.U., there has been effected during the first three years of the Five Year Plan a veritable revolution in the agricultural machine-building industry. From the production of old machines adapted to small, individual farming, the agricultural machine-building industry made a great step forward to such a high level that it surpasses the corresponding average level of any capitalist country.

An outstanding place in the reorganisation of agriculture belongs to the machine and tractor stations, which have during the last three years of the Five Year Plan become most popular organisations eagerly sought for by the collective farms.

In 1931 the tremendous advantages of the machine and tractor stations which have a firm technical base locally, working on the basis of a

uniform plan and under the general leadership of their all-Union centre, and which realised the co-ordination of the State organisation with the co-operative kolkhoz organisations, were revealed even more strikingly than before.

The experience of the machine and tractor stations which began their work in the grain regions is beginning to be applied in the other fields as well. In 1931 there were created about 200 machine mowing stations. On the basis of the experience of the machine and tractor stations it has been found necessary to organise machine-forest stations for the timber camps and motor fishing stations in the fisheries.

The absolute ascendancy gained by the socialist elements in the country during 1931 resulted in an entirely new structure of the national revenue which increased by 13 per cent. compared with 1930, while in every capitalist country the national revenue during 1931 dropped by 10 to 20 per cent. The share of the socialised sector in the national income in 1931 reached 81.5 per cent. This growth of the socialist elements represents the principal result of the three years of the Five Year Plan.

However, despite these enormous achievements, the planned estimates for 1931 were not fulfilled both as regards some of the industries (for instance, the metal industry) and as regards the qualitative indices (along the line of labour productivity and reduction of the cost of production); this applies equally to agriculture, industry, transport and building.

Thus, the productivity of labour in industry increased during the three years by 34 per cent. compared with 110 per cent. estimated for the five years of the Five Year Plan. The cost of production in industry declined in 1927/28 by 4.2 per cent. against 7 per cent. provided for in the Five Year Plan, and in 1929/30 by 6.3 per cent. against 7.4 per cent. The year 1931 brought an increase of the cost of production by 2 per cent. as against the decrease of 7.6 envisaged in the Five Year Plan. As a result, the total reduction of the cost of production during the three years amounts to only 10.7 per cent., and if the plan for 1932 is to be taken into consideration, the reduction of costs will be only 18 per cent. against 35 per cent. estimated for the entire period of the Five Year Plan. A similar situation exists with regard to the qualitative indices in the field of agriculture and transport.

It must be added that this under-fulfilment of the qualitative indices has been taking place despite the fact that the mechanisation of production and the technical re-equipment of labour have been pushed ahead faster than was foreshadowed by the Five Year Plan.

What does this fact demonstrate? It demonstrates that the problem of labour organisation and administration now constitutes the central problem in the U.S.S.R. Every condition exists for securing a speedier tempo in the fulfilment of the qualitative indices. This will be achieved by a struggle for the unswerving fulfilment of Comrade Stalin's six conditions,* by a day-to-day practical solution of the problems of the stimulation and payment of labour, of the reconstruction of the wages system, the liquidation of the lack of personal responsibility, the enforcement of economic accounting, the solution of the problem of cadres, etc.

To be sure, the struggle for the realisation of Comrade Stalin's six conditions which developed during the third quarter and more especially during the fourth quarter has already yielded important results by rehabilitating production and bringing about a turn in favour of the fulfilment of the plan. Nevertheless, these results, as may be seen from the figures quoted above, are still inadequate; the fixed capital in industry is still insufficiently utilised (in the metal industry particularly is the coefficient of the utilisation of the equipment low, this being one of the causes of the lagging behind of the metal industry in 1931) and the technical basis in agriculture is also still poorly utilised. That is precisely why the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. in its decision of December 25, 1931, concerning the "National Economic Plan of the U.S.S.R. for 1932" stated the following regarding the results of 1931:—

"The Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. emphasises that these successes are a result of the heroic efforts of the working class and toiling peasants, a result of their competition and shock brigade spirit, lastly, a result of the correct policy of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., a result of the struggle for bolshevist tempo and against opportunism in every shape and form . . ."

"Despite the considerable successes achieved in the national economy of the U.S.S.R., despite the fact that such successes represent an unattainable ideal for any capitalist State, the C.E.C. considers these successes far from sufficient from the standpoint of the possibilities of the socialist system of economy. The Central Executive Committee believes that, if the possibilities of the socialist system were properly utilised, the national economy of the U.S.S.R. could display a higher rate of growth. The fundamental cause of the insufficient utilisation of these possibilities are the de-

fects in the work of the managerial organisations both in industry, agriculture, and transport, defects in the organisation of labour in the factories, defects in the organisation of wages, the failure to provide concrete management, the absence of executive control, the absence of proper attention to business accounting."

"A struggle against all these basic defects of management, a struggle to abolish absence of personal responsibility (obelitchka) both in industry, agriculture, and transport, a struggle to abolish the levelling of wages, a struggle for the enforcement of business accounting, a struggle for concrete management and executive control, such are the necessary conditions without which the proper utilisation of the possibilities of socialist economy and the enforcement of a bolshevist tempo of growth are impossible."

In the same decision of December 25, 1931, the Central Committee of the U.S.S.R. approved the control figures of the national economic plan of the U.S.S.R. for 1932.

What are the most characteristic features of this national economic plan of the U.S.S.R. for 1932?

The most important feature of this plan is the fundamental completion of collectivisation in 1932. At the end of 1932 collectivisation is to embrace 72-75 per cent. of the peasant households. This means that collectivisation will be fundamentally completed, this means that the kulaks as a class will be fundamentally liquidated. Such is the first basic feature of the national economic plan of the U.S.S.R. for 1932. The plan is at the same time marked by an immense development of production and by a tremendous building programme as well as by a steady rise of the standards of the workers and collective farmers.

The second most important feature of the plan for 1932 is the completion of the Five Year Plan in four years.

Indeed, the growth of industrial output of the planned industries by 36 per cent. outlined in the plan, signifies not only the complete fulfilment of the Five Year Plan estimates in 1932 but also their over-fulfilment.

In the field of industry, the Five Year Plan for coal will be surpassed in 1932 by 20 per cent. (90.5 million tons against 75 million tons under the plan), for oil by 28 per cent. (28 million tons instead of 21.7 million respectively), for copper by 19 per cent. (100,000 tons and 84,700 tons respectively). The machine building industry as a whole will exceed its Five Year programme by 42-43 per cent., the electro-technical industry by 7-8 per cent, the tractor industry by 47 per cent. (82,000 tractors instead of 55,000). Despite this systematic growth some industries will not com-

*See "New Conditions, New Tasks." Modern Books, 2d., for full outline of Stalin's famous speech on this question.

plete their Five Year Plans in 1932; this applies to the textile and certain other industries.

In the field of agriculture the plan provides for a growth of the cultivated area of 1932 to 140 million hectares, marking the complete fulfilment of the Five Year Plan.

In the transport industry the plan provides for an increase of loadings in 1932 to 320 million tons, which means that the Five Year Plan will be exceeded by 13.8 per cent. (under the Five Year Plan it was proposed to carry over 281 million tons in 1932/33).

Lastly, the fulfilment of the plan for 1932 will mark further important progress in the improvement of the material standards of the toilers, a growth of the light industries and an improvement of the supply, an advance of the housing and municipal construction, a development of Soviet trade, extensive cultural construction, etc.

Which are the most concrete elements of the plan for 1932 in agriculture, industry and transport?

In 1932, agriculture will receive a huge amount of tractors aggregating no less than one million h.p., as well as 11,000 motor cars and 900 million roubles worth of farm machinery and implements. It must be noted that the tractors and complex machines to be supplied to agriculture in 1932 will be completely manufactured by our socialist industries. The entire machinery in agriculture during 1928, expressed in money, amounted to 1,058 million roubles. In 1932, the farm machinery to be supplied to agriculture alone will have a value of 900 million roubles and will include 90 per cent. of complex machines and tractors against a large majority of horse-drawn machines and hand labour in 1928. In view of the specific tasks of 1932 the harvesting machines will constitute 67.2 per cent. in value of the entire machines and implements supplied to agriculture.

All this naturally confronts the machine and tractor stations, which are being introduced into every region in the U.S.S.R., particularly the national regions, with the important tasks of developing the struggle for the better employment of the tractor, the liquidation of lack of personal responsibility in the management of the tractor stations, a struggle against careless handling of the tractors and machinery. This must be accompanied by a further development of socialist competition, shock brigades and piece-work so as to raise the productivity of labour and get the most use out of the tractor stations.

Agriculture in the U.S.S.R. is passing from the backward, exhausting peasant labour to the labour level of the industrial worker. In 1932, the army of skilled collective farmers and State farm workers capable of handling the modern farm machines, tractor combines and complex im-

plements will grow to five million (compared with 2.5 million in 1931).

The plan for 1932 devotes special attention to cattle breeding. The capital investments in the State cattle farms will be 30 per cent. higher than they were in 1931. Of the total investments 55 per cent. will be used to build sheds for the cattle, and the amount of cattle breeding machinery in the total production of farm machines will be relatively increased. In 1932 the cattle breeding trusts will receive 67.4 per cent. of the investments into agricultural electrification.

A giant growth has been recorded in the amount of cattle both in the State farms and in the kolkhoz cattle farms, the central problem of the plan for 1932 consisting of the forced development of the speedily maturing types of cattle and fowl (pigs, poultry).

At the same time the decisive link of the plan for 1932 is the struggle for higher crops per acre of granular cultures, the conducting of a real struggle against harvesting losses. The plan for 1932 provides for an increase of the crops to 8½ centners per hectare (against 7½ centners in 1931), this involving an increase of the total grain crop in 1932 by 120 million centners.

The successful development of machine and tractor stations in the cotton, sugar-beet and flax-growing districts, the development of agronomic technique in the State and collective farms should ensure a notable increase of the cotton, flax and sugar beet crops. Thus the plan for 1932 in the field of agriculture represents at the same time a plan of further development of the raw material base of the light industries of the U.S.S.R., and in this connection the plan provides for the construction of 150 factories for the primary refining of flax and hemp, thereby causing and deepening the revolution in these universally backward and labour-consuming fields of agriculture.

In the sphere of industry the national economic plan for 1932 outlines the following fundamental tasks:

An increase of the gross output of the State industries by 36 per cent. which means that the Five Year Plan will be fulfilled in 1932 and the pre-war level of industrial output will be nearly quadrupled. The growth of the gross output in the industries producing the means of production should be equal to 43 per cent. and that in the industries producing articles of general consumption to 29 per cent.

The output of coal in 1932 should reach 90 million tons against 57.6 million tons in 1931, which will essentially eliminate the difficulties experienced by the entire national economy of the U.S.S.R. owing to the shortage of coal both in transport, in industry and particularly in the metal industry. The rôle of the new coal basins

(Kuzbas, Ural, Moscow, Karaganda) must be considerably strengthened already in 1932. During this year 810 million roubles will be invested in capital construction in the coal industry against 587 million roubles in 1931. The bulk of this sum will be used to speed up the construction of the mines already sunk during previous years and only a slight portion of the investments (13,420,000 roubles) is assigned for the sinking of new mines in new fields.

These capital investments in the coal industry for 1932 will make further progress possible in the mechanisation of coal mining. The percentage of mechanised coal output will reach 72 per cent. in 1932 compared with 61 per cent. in 1931. The housing appropriations for the coal industry amount to 238 million roubles and this will be of tremendous effect in putting an end to the excessive labour fluctuations. The coal industry will assume the fourth place in the scale of wages compared with the ninth place which it held in 1931.

During 1932, it is planned to produce 9 million tons of pig iron compared with 4.9 million tons actually produced in 1931, thus achieving nearly 100 per cent. increase in the output of iron during this year. This intensive programme of iron for 1932 is due to the fact that the low output of ferrous metals in 1931 has created considerable difficulties throughout the national economy. Nevertheless, this intensive programme must be fulfilled and the workers of the metal factories, already after the adoption of the plan calling for an output of 9 million tons of iron, are beginning to advance a counter-plan of 10 million tons since the need for metal will not be met even by this doubling of the output compared with 1931.

The production of steel in 1932 should amount to 9.45 million tons against 5.35 million tons in 1931, while the output of rolled iron will amount to 6.66 millions tons compared with 4.05 million tons in 1931.

During 1932, the output of special quality steel for the automobile and tractor industry, lathes, turbines, etc., is expected to reach 676,000 tons, against 200,000 tons in 1931, the output thus being more than trebled.

The capital investments in the metal industry during 1932 will amount to 1,800 million roubles against 1,027 million roubles in 1931, thus ensuring both the completion of the reconstruction of the Southern and Ural metal industries and the speeding up of the construction of the Novo-Taguil, Krivorojie and Azov works, the beginning of construction work on the Bakal works, and the completion of the first parts of the Magnitogorsk, Kuznetzk and Zaporojie steel mills.

All this makes it necessary to single out the metal industry both as regards the organisation of labour and as regards wages and supply, as an industry which must be placed in an exceptionally privileged position. The investment during 1932 of 225 million roubles in housing schemes in the vicinity of the metal factories, making it possible to provide accommodation for 209,000 workers, will facilitate the creation in the metal industry of a permanent body of workers, the struggle against the labour fluctuation and, on this basis, a further rise of the productivity of labour.

The backwardness of the transport in 1931 had a very adverse effect upon the fulfilment of the entire national economic plan. Consequently in the plan for 1932 the transport industry is given one of the first places. During 1932, railway transport must carry 320 million tons of goods, the increase against 1931 amounting to 28 per cent. By accomplishing this transport will exceed its Five-Year Plan in four years.

The investments in the transport industry will amount to 2,500 million roubles, these investments being concentrated in the most important sections and upon the acquisition of machinery for the technical reconstruction of railway transport. The plan for 1932 provides for the intensified construction of the Nijni-Taguil car factory and the Lugansk Locomotive works as well as for the beginning of operations for the building of an electrical train factory.

According to the plan for 1932 the wages of the transport workers will be raised by 13 per cent. and 155 million roubles will be invested in housing, social and cultural measures and the training of cadres (against 100 million roubles in 1931) which will considerably improve the working conditions in transport.

In the machine tool industry almost one-and-a-half times as much machinery and metal products will be produced in 1932, as in 1931, aggregating 6,800 million roubles in value. It is important to note that the industry producing new machines demonstrated already in 1931 that there is no machine in existence, the production of which cannot already be undertaken by Soviet industry. The plan for 1932, therefore, calls for the production of six Blooming presses, nineteen rolling presses, thirty-five excavators, 600 heavy boring machines, 400 light borers, etc.

The stupendous scale on which the construction programme of 1932 is planned may be seen from the fact that the total investments during this year will amount to 21.1 milliard roubles compared with 16.1 milliard roubles actually invested in 1931. This will result in a huge increase of the basic fixed capital during 1932.

A characteristic feature of the construction programme of 1932 is the highest concentration of the investments upon the continuation of factories already begun, this being absolutely necessary in order to put to immediate use the large amount of capital invested in previous years. Building costs during 1932, according to the plan, are to be cut down by 17 per cent.

What are the main objects of the construction programme of 1932?

In the field of electric power, 1.5 million kilowatts will be added to the country's resources which were equal to 4,050,000 kilowatts at the end of 1931, compared with 2,900,000 kilowatts on January 1, 1931. This will make it possible to considerably increase the production of electric power: from 10.6 milliard kilowatt hours in 1931 to 16.7 milliard kilowatt hours in 1932.

During 1932, the programme of the chemical industry calls for the opening of operations at a large number of big factories, including the Berezniki Combine, the Neva and Voznessensk Combines, a part of the Bobriki Mill, etc., which will be made possible by an increase of investments in the chemical industry to 675 million roubles compared with 583 million roubles in 1931.

In the field of non-ferrous metals the building programme for 1932 ensures an increase of the copper output to 100,000 tons against 53,000 tons in 1931, the production of zinc to 28,700 tons against 11,400 tons in 1931, the output of lead to 46,250 tons against 19,600 tons in 1931, the total capital investments into this industry amounting to 600 million roubles against 375 million roubles actually invested in 1931. In the non-ferrous metal industry as well, the bulk of the investments will be concentrated upon factories whose construction has already been commenced so as to open operations in them as soon as possible.

It is highly characteristic that the construction programme of 1932, even more strikingly than the construction programmes of the three preceding years of the Five Year Plan, reflects the two leading principles by which the All-Union Communist Party is guided in this field: firstly, Lenin's advice that the industries should be brought as closely as possible to the principal sources of raw materials and fuel; secondly, Lenin's instructions in the field of the national policy of the U.S.S.R. calling for the industrial development of the national regions in the solution of the problem of the distribution of the forces of production over the U.S.S.R., so as to create a basis for a more active participation of the backward nationalities in the socialist construction and speed up the development of the backward national regions.

In the application of these two leading principles the C.P.S.U. attained notable successes al-

ready during the first three years of the Five Year Plan. However, the national economic plan for 1932 gives a further strong impetus to the operation of these two principles.

Indeed, while during the previous years the operation of these two principles was marked primarily by the extensive development of the Urals-Kuznetzk Combine, the industrial development of Karaganda, and the great transport construction works in Kazakstan and Siberia, the characteristic feature of the national economic plan for 1932 is the new relationship of investments in the most important regions and centres. These investments are distributed as follow:

Central Region (Moscow, Ivanovo, Nijni-Novgorod, Central Black Earth District), 2,800 million roubles.

East (Urals, Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia), 3,220 million roubles.

South (Ukrain, Northern Caucasus), 3,980 million roubles.

The two basic coal and metal fields of the Union, the Donetz Basin and Urals-Kuznetzk, receive 45.1 per cent. of the total investments and 60 per cent. of the industrial investments.

We have noted above the considerable backwardness, during the first three years of the Five Year Plan, of the qualitative indices both along the line of labour productivity and the reduction of costs.

In 1931 the industries controlled by the Supreme Economic Council were supposed to reduce the cost of production by 10 per cent., instead of which they completed the year by raising the cost of production by 2 per cent. involving a loss to the national economy of 1,800 million roubles. The transport, instead of reducing its costs by 20 per cent., reduced them only by 2 per cent., causing a loss of 500 million roubles to the national economy. The industries controlled by the People's Commissariat of Supply also failed to reduce their costs by 11 per cent. as planned, reducing them instead by only 1.5 per cent., in consequence of which the national economy sustained a further loss of 400 million roubles, etc.

This failure to fulfil the estimates in the field of the reduction of costs has been due primarily to the fact that although the business organisations have secured a turn in the direction of fulfilling Stalin's six conditions, lasting success in this field requires a further determined struggle for enforcement of economic accounting, the elimination of the petty bourgeois levelling tendency, the abolition of depersonalisation, etc., etc.

The national economic plan for 1932 calls for a reduction of primary costs in industry by 7 per cent., thus saving the country more than five milliard roubles if we take only the industries controlled by the Supreme Economic Council and

the People's Commissariat of Supply. In the fuel industry the reduction is to be equal to 10 per cent., in the metal industry to no less than 15 per cent., and in the building industry to no less than 20 per cent. This difficult, intense task must be fulfilled by all means, and to this end the broad proletarian masses must be mobilised under the tried and tested leadership of the C.P.S.U.

The plan for 1932 provides for a growth of the productivity of labour in industry by 22 per cent. compared with the average productivity for 1931. Finally, an improvement of the quality of production also constitutes an organic element of the plan for 1932.

The plan for this year provides for a considerable growth of the industrial cadres, of the number of engineers, technicians and skilled workers. During 1932, the universities will admit 257,600 new students which is equal to 139 per cent. of the 1931 quota, the technical institutes 591,000 students, or 155 per cent. of the 1931 quota, the workers' faculties 358,700 students or 196 per cent. of the 1931 quota, and the factory apprentice schools 1,036,000 pupils, equal to 144 per cent. of the 1931 figure. The graduation quotas in 1932 also increase in the same proportion: the technical institutes will graduate 175,000 people, that is more than 200 per cent. of the 1931 figure, the workers' faculties 121,000 persons, 80,000 more than last year, and the factory apprentice schools 364,000 skilled young workers or four times as many as in 1931. As a result the number of students in all the universities, technical institutes, workers' faculties and factory apprentice schools at the end of 1932 will be in the proximity of four million compared with 2,700,000 in 1931. In the field of elementary education a tremendous programme is also projected. A total of 24,700,000 children will receive tuition in the elementary schools run by the Commissariat of Education.

The slanderous lies of the social-fascist servants of capital regarding the situation of the toilers of the U.S.S.R. are best refuted by the measures of the national economic plan for 1932 calling for a further rise in the living standards of the working class and collective farmers.

At a result of the steady growth of the national economy the total number of wage workers in 1932 will increase by 2,400,000, from 18,600,000 to 21,000,000. The wage fund will also grow in proportion to the rise in wages and increase in employment and will reach in 1932 the sum of 26.8 milliard roubles compared with 21.1 milliard in 1931, this marking a further rise of the share of the working class in the income of the population.

Further, during 1932 the seven hour day will be introduced throughout all industry.

The plan for 1932 provides for an enormous increase of investments in the improvement of the working conditions, no less than 111 million roubles being assigned for labour protection measures in the industries of the Supreme Economic Council alone, which is 80 per cent. more than was spent in 1931. Suffice it to state that the investments in labour protection will be twice as large as those originally planned for the last year of the Five Year Plan.

The capital investments in municipal housing schemes on the part of the socialised sector of the national economy will be equal in 1932 to 1,942 million roubles, and those in municipal development to 950 million roubles, this being twice as much as was invested in 1931.

The average wages throughout the branches of the national economy in 1932 will exceed the Five Year Plan estimates by 20.7 per cent., while the wage fund, in connection with the large increase of employment, far exceeding the Five Year Plan figures, will also be above the estimates of the Five Year Plan.

The social insurance fund in 1932 will be 69 per cent. above the Five Year Plan figures.

It is particularly characteristic of the U.S.S.R. that the rise of the living standards of the workers is not at all limited to the growth of the individual wages earned by the individual worker; the abolition of unemployment and the increase of the number of persons in the worker's family engaged in industry plays a tremendous rôle in raising the welfare of the working class in the U.S.S.R. The workers' wives are speedily being drawn into industry. The workers' children studying in the factory apprentice schools not only do not pay anything for tuition but receive wages in their turn. At the same time it is necessary to note the very important fact that the social funds for the reproduction of labour power, the so-called socialised wages, have been growing even faster than the nominal wages.

Among the other favourable factors characterising the structure of the worker's budget in 1932 should be pointed out the increase of the expenditure on industrial goods which will grow from 14 per cent. in 1931 to 16.4 per cent. in 1932, accompanied by a decline of the expenditures on food from 58.6 per cent. to 50.1 per cent., this being connected with the growth of the centralised (State) and decentralised (local) supply on the part of the socialised sector and the reduction during 1932 of the part played by the private trader in the supply of food to the workers. The plan for 1932 calls for a considerable increase of communal feeding, the total number of meals served by the communal restaurants being raised to 50 million, this being an advance of 50 per

cent. over 1931. The price of a meal of two to three courses in the workers' dining rooms will range between 30 and 90 kopecks.

The expansion of agriculture and of the heavy industry in 1932 creates a basis for considerable growth of the light industries; the output of the food industry is to increase by 36 per cent., that of the canning industry by 80 per cent., of the seed oil industry by 69 per cent., of the sugar industry by 58 per cent., etc.

The increase of the cotton crop to twice the pre-war level should result in a 23.8 per cent. growth of the output of the cotton textiles and a 28 per cent. increase of the output of the clothing industry.

The October Plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. of the C.P.S.U. issued directions for the development of Soviet trade and improvement of the still unsatisfactory supply to the workers both at the newly built factories and in the most important industrial centres. The struggle for the fulfilment of this directive is reflected in the plan for 1932 in the form of a growth of the commodity turnover during that year to 45 milliard roubles, 30 per cent. more than in 1931. During 1932, no less than 10,000 stores must be opened by the Centrosoyus and People's Commissariat of Supply alone.

At the same time the State and collective farms, the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and the various industries are also to open an enormous number of stores in 1932.

In the village the growth of the living standards of the peasants based upon the progress made during 1931 and planned for 1932 will be entirely unprecedented. Collectivisation and the liquidation of the kulaks as a class has opened before the masses of the poor and middle peasants entirely new opportunities which for the first time in the history of the world lead the mass of the toilers out of poverty and darkness. Thus the contrast between the city and the village is already beginning to be wiped out.

All the facts enumerated above indicating a further marked rise of the living standards of the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. during 1932, are accompanied by a further growth both in the city and village of the U.S.S.R. of the new socialist forms of labour, socialist competition and shock brigades. Of special value in this respect is the fact that during the last several months this movement, under the leadership of the Communist Party, while growing quantitatively, has been steadily rising to a higher qualitative level. There have been extensively organised quality brigades, rationalisation brigades, and the move-

ment for counter-plans, counter-tasks, etc., has been further developed.

The anxiety of the workers of the U.S.S.R. to improve not only the quantitative but also the qualitative indices is best illustrated by the growth of the movement of economic accounting brigades. All this serves as the surest guarantee that, under the tried leadership of the C.P.S.U. and of its Leninist C.C. headed by Comrade Stalin, the working class and the toilers of the U.S.S.R., by a heroic revolutionary effort, will fulfil and over-fulfil the national economic plan for 1932, will fulfil the Five Year Plan in four years, thus recording a new gigantic victory of world historical significance.

In the leadership of the tremendous heroic battles of the masses of workers and toilers of the U.S.S.R. for the fulfilment of the Five Year Plan in four years in 1932, the most important and fundamental task of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) remains as before the continuation of a tireless struggle against the agency of the class enemy within the party, against the opportunist capitulators to the class enemy, against the right, openly opportunist deviation which still remains the main danger at the present stage, as well as against "left" opportunism which arrays itself in "revolutionary" attire, and also against all conciliationism towards the anti-Leninist deviations. The continuation of this struggle on two fronts constitutes the first and foremost condition of the victorious onward sweep of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. both within the land of rising socialism and on the front of the struggle of the world proletariat for the victory of socialism all over the globe.

Conscious of the international importance of their struggle the proletariat and toiling masses of the U.S.S.R. will respond to the provocations of the war incendiaries from the imperialist camp by the following words of Comrade Molotov, President of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., uttered by him at the time of the adoption of the national economic plan for 1932 by the Second Session of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R.:

"In our country creative labour works full blast; titans of construction are becoming realities; we are victorious in building socialism. In this we see a strengthening not only of our internal, but also our international position.

"We will answer our class enemies by the glorious consummation of our plan of national economy, the termination of the Five Year Plan in four years, the struggle for socialism all along the line. *Our task is to promote general peace and international Socialism, to make certain the victory of the working class.*"

HOW LENIN FOUGHT IN THE ERA OF THE FIRST REVOLUTION FOR ITS GROWTH INTO THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND AGAINST CENTRISM (Part II).

(Conclusion.)

HOW LENIN FOUGHT AGAINST CENTRISM.

COULD the Bolsheviks, the most revolutionary Marxists in the Second International, the most left-wing tendency in the modern world movement of the proletariat, have *underestimated* Centrism in the Second International before the war? Is it the truth or a pitiful slander to allege that before the war they *underestimated* it? By everything we have said, this question is pre-determined. However, there is no harm in pausing over it, because both the "left" and the right opportunists equally distort the very concept of Centrism and the history of its appearance.

Comrade Stalin, in his lectures "On the Fundamentals of Leninism," has given a characteristic of the relation of Leninism to the pre-war Second International from the viewpoint of the revolutionary tasks in the epoch of Imperialism and proletarian revolution:

"between Marx and Engels, on the one hand, and Lenin on the other, there lies a whole period when the opportunism of the Second International was dominant. In the interests of accuracy I should add that the question here is not one of the formal domination of opportunism, but merely of its actual domination. Formally the Second International was headed by 'consistent' Marxists, the 'orthodox' ones—Kautsky and others . . . The opportunists adapted themselves to the bourgeoisie because of their adaptable petty-bourgeois nature—the 'orthodox' ones, in their turn, adapted themselves to the opportunists in the interests of 'maintaining unity' with the opportunists, in the interests of 'peace within the party' . . . This was the period when capitalism was developing comparatively peacefully, the pre-war period, as it were, when the catastrophic contradictions of Imperialism had not yet become openly apparent . . . when the party of the Second International had considerably fattened and had no desire to think seriously about revolution, about the dictatorship of the proletariat, about the revolutionary education of the masses.

"Meanwhile, there was approaching a new period of imperialist wars and revolutionary battles of the proletariat. A re-examination of the entire work of the Second International was essential . . . The whole arsenal of the Second International had to be verified . . . Without

preparatory work of this kind there was absolutely no point in going out to war against capitalism . . . It fell to the lot of Leninism to do this section of the general verification and general cleansing of the Augean stables."—J. Stalin, "Problems of Leninism," pp. 82-83.

Did Lenin see this opportunism of the Second International *during the pre-war period* with the commencement of the "Iskra" period, or did he "underestimate" it, as the counter-revolutionary Trotskists assert? The way this question is put by the Trotskists is in itself vulgar, gross and calumnious. For it was Lenin and the Bolshevik party, *and no one else*, who in the epoch of the first Russian revolution put forward numerous most important problems, directly connected with the transformation of this revolution into the proletarian revolution—the problem which made manifest all the opportunism of the Second International, the problem which was carefully avoided, ignored, or openly distorted in the most opportunist fashion by the leaders of the Second International. Was this not absolutely obvious to the Bolsheviks?

Lenin fought against the opportunist assertion of the Mensheviks that "the proletariat cannot and must not seize power if it is not in the majority in the country." Was not this accusation aimed to the same extent against all the leaders of the Second International who called themselves "orthodox Marxists"? Lenin fought against the opportunist, kvostist,* Menshevik theory of bowing before spontaneity. Did not this accusation of kvostism refer to the same extent to the "vulgarised leaders of the Second International, with their so-called theory of 'productive forces' . . . which lays facts on record and explains them after they have become boring to all"? Lenin fought against the opportunist theory of the Mensheviks which stated that it is not possible to "organise the revolution," that the revolution comes by itself. Did not this apply in the same measure to all the leaders of the Second International? Lenin fought against the Mensheviks on behalf of the slogan of the "revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry." Was there a single leader of the Second International who recognised dictatorship of this kind, or the dictatorship of the proletariat (in the Marxist sense of the word), into which the dictatorship of the proletariat and

*"Kvost": tail; hence—dragging at the tail.—Ed.

peasantry was to be transformed? Can it be said that Lenin's struggle against the "indifferent, or, rather, directly negative attitude towards the peasant question," did not refer to the leaders of the Second International to the same extent as to the Mensheviks? Did not Lenin's idea of the party as a monolithic party imbued with the intolerance of the Jacobins, permitting of no co-operation with opportunists, entirely differ from the theory and practice of both the Second International leaders and the Mensheviks alike? We could considerably add to this list of opportunist theories, against which Lenin fought in the pre-war period and which were common both to Mensheviks and so-called "orthodox" leaders of the Second International.

The Bolshevik Party alone, headed by Lenin, drew the correct conclusions from the very beginning from Engels' words, written in his "Criticism of the Erfurt Programme" in connection with the fact that this programme said nothing about the Republic:

"This neglect of great fundamental considerations for the sake of the momentary interests of the day, this chase after momentary successes, and this race after them without account of ultimate results, this sacrifice of the future movement for the present, is, perhaps, the result of 'honest' motives, but is and remains, none the less, opportunism, and 'honest' opportunism is, perhaps, more dangerous than any other . . ."—N. Lenin, "State and Revolution," 1925.

That Lenin and the Bolsheviks already in the pre-war period rendered a complete account to themselves on the opportunism of the so-called "orthodox" Marxist leaders of the Second International on a whole series of principle questions is an *axiom* which is not worth further controversy. But to correctly understand the declarations of Lenin in regard to those leaders in the pre-war period it is insufficient merely to know this axiom. For this it is necessary to understand the Leninist *strategy* of that time in the struggle with opportunism.

Comrade Stalin wrote the following in the lectures already referred to previously:

"Strategy means determining the *direction of the main blow* (my italics—A.M.) of the proletariat *on the basis of the given stage of the revolution* (my italics—A.M.), the elaboration of the corresponding plan for placing the revolutionary forces (main and secondary reserves), the fight to put through this plan throughout the course of the given stage of revolution." — J. Stalin, "Problems of Leninism."

This general definition of strategy refers also to Leninist strategy in the struggle against opportunism. It is quite obvious that the strategic plan of the Bolsheviks in the struggle against opportunism in circumstances of proletarian revolution was one thing, and quite another thing during the pre-war epoch, when on the one hand there was a revolutionary situation in Russia, and, on the other hand, a still comparatively peaceful situation (up till 1905-1907) in Western Europe, and in particular in Germany.

Lenin, taking into account the dual nature of the position during the pre-war epoch, directed the *main blow* at that time against the opportunists and centrists, against the Mensheviks and Trotsky, who entered the ranks of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, because they were working in a country which was passing through the revolution. Lenin waged a relentless struggle then against the opportunists and centrists at home, so to speak, not because he was suffering from "national limitations," as the counter-revolutionary Trotskists calumniously declare, but because, first of all, one of the general principles of the tactics of the revolutionary Marxists is: beat the enemy first of all in your own country; secondly, because the mistakes which were common to the Mensheviks and so-called "orthodox" Marxists of the West were particularly dangerous for Russia, because here they were a *direct* hindrance to the wave of revolution, and, thirdly, because the Russian revolution was of enormous international significance. The revolutionary struggle which was being waged by the Russian proletariat indicated the road to the world proletariat. The Bolsheviks, in relentless fighting against the Mensheviks, gave an object lesson to the entire Second International of how to prepare for the revolution and how to organise it, by driving the opportunists out of the working-class party.

At the same time Lenin gave the most active support to the Western European so-called "orthodox" Marxists of the Second International in their international struggle against open opportunists, Bernsteinists and Jaurès followers, criticising their vacillations in the struggle (the "india-rubber" resolution of Kautsky on the question of Ministerialism) and their half-heartedness in the struggle—(their unwillingness to go as far as the expulsion of the Bernsteinists from the party).

Lenin not only took the most active part in the international struggle of Marxism with revisionism. He was the *first* to raise his voice against a revision of Marx. Already in 1894 he issued a comprehensive criticism of the book of the "legal Marxist," Struve, who later claimed responsi-

bility for the "idea" of Bernstein. And it was shown that at the time when Struve's book was still considered "Marxist," although with certain reservations, Lenin, in a sub-heading of his criticism, characterised this book as "an expression of Marxism in *bourgeois* (my italics—A.M.) literature."

Lenin, however, was to a certain extent cautious for strategical reasons on the question of the struggle against opportunist viewpoints of the so-called "orthodox" European Marxists until, from their centrist tendencies, they definitely took up a centrist stand and formed a bloc with the Rights.

These so-called "orthodox" Marxists (Bebel, Kautsky and others) to a certain period (1907), in contradistinction to the open opportunists, occupying an openly revisionist attitude to the teachings of Marx, had their social base not in certain strata of petty-bourgeoisie and the labour aristocracy—but the majority of the working class.

Nevertheless, at the same time they were soaked in "opportunism and legalism." The force of habit, the routine of a comparatively "peaceful" evolution, national prejudices, fears of sudden changes and lack of belief in them—all this played the rôle of extending the conditions (italics mine—A.M.), strengthening opportunism (based on the labour aristocracy—A.M.), and hypocrisy and cowardly conciliation with it (this evidently refers already to the "Marxist" centre—A.M.).² Lenin was cautious in his attitude towards them (approximately until 1907) for two reasons: Firstly, Western Europe, and especially Germany, until 1905-1907 was passing through the "peaceful," "stagnant" epoch, when the main task was to collect the forces of the proletariat and to prepare them for future revolutionary struggles. This task of the "peaceful" epoch the so-called "orthodox" Marxists (Bebel, Kautsky, Guesde) was not fulfilled with all the determination required; they did not undertake the revolutionary education of the masses, did not explain the need for revolutionary struggle, opportunistically kept silent on the revolutionary tasks of to-morrow, vacillated, retreated, did not conduct an irreconcilable struggle with the open opportunists.

Lenin's careful tactics in regard to them, understood through the special value of their activities in the "peaceful" epoch, and consisted in, not showering blows on them to assist the open opportunists, but the reverse, to deepen the wedge between them and the open opportunists and thereby shove them to the left and smash with their help the open opportunists.

Lenin, who from 1903 had been proceeding

along the line of a split with the opportunists, not only inside the R.S.D.L.P., but also in the Second International, at the same time, when the Left social democrats first made themselves known in Germany, had no one else upon whom he could depend for the purpose of fighting Bebel and Kautsky on this ground.

"What was Lenin to do, what could the Bolsheviks do, if the Left social democrats in the Second International and primarily in the German Social Democratic Party, constituted a weak, powerless group, an organisationally unformed, ideologically unprepared group, fearing even to say the word 'rupture,' 'split'? (J. Stalin, "Concerning certain questions in the history of Bolshevism").¹

Lenin each time took into consideration the question as to where, in circumstances of time, the *chief division* is to be drawn in the working-class movement. In his article, "The Anniversary of the Third Communist International," Lenin wrote the following:

"Before the war it seemed that the main division in the working-class movement was the division into Socialists and Anarchists; this was not just seeming, but actually so. In the prolonged epoch before the imperialist war and revolution, there was no objective revolutionary situation in the huge majority of European countries. The task was to utilise this slow work for revolutionary preparation. The Socialists began to do this, but the Anarchists did not understand this task."

Lenin writes further that after the war the main division went along a new line—"not the line of Anarchists and Socialists, but along the line capable of leading to the dictatorship of the proletariat." The term "main division" used in this quotation should not be confused with the terms "chief danger" and "main line of fire." The anarchists were the chief danger in the epoch of the First International and for this reason during this period the Marxists directed their main line of fire against them. In the Second International as well this danger had not vanished. In German social-democracy it took the form of semi-anarchism displayed by Most in the Seventies, and in the movement of the "youth" in the Nineties. But beginning with the appearance of Bernsteinism, Right opportunism became the ever-growing danger, and, therefore, the revolutionary Marxists from 1897 until the war, directed their main line of fire against Right opportunists and not against the Anarchists. In stating that before the war the main division was that into Socialists and Anarchists, Lenin had in mind that during the epoch when the working class were

¹Lenin: Collapse of the Second International.

²Ibid.

¹Com. Int. No. 20. 1931.

gathering together their forces, during the epoch of the formation of class organisations of the working class, during the epoch of preparation for the coming Proletarian Revolution, there was and could be no place inside the International for anarchists, who were quite foreign to the tasks of the epoch. Lenin, therefore, in the pre-war epoch, fought against the Right opportunists as the chief danger. But in carrying on this struggle, his attitude to countries in which there was not yet a revolutionary situation was one which never forgot the main division and the main tasks of the epoch in these countries—the task of collecting together the forces of the proletariat and preparing for future revolutionary struggles, and judged the “Marxist” leaders from the viewpoint of how they fulfilled this task.

These were the reasons why Lenin at that time was somewhat cautious in his attitude towards, and criticism of, Bebel and Kautsky. The second reason was that Lenin already foresaw (and foretold) that however much the Second International leaders were at the time resisting the complete break with the opportunists, a break would be *inevitable*, with or against them, when the revolutionary situation arose in the West. In 1908 Lenin wrote:

“That which we are at present experiencing often only ideologically, that which at present shows itself in practice only in connection with certain isolated questions of the working class movement, as tactical differences of opinion with the revisionists and a split on these grounds,—this will of necessity be experienced by the working class on an incomparably larger scale, when the proletarian revolution makes these disputable questions much more acute, concentrates all these differences into points which are of the most direct importance for the behaviour of the masses; forces us in the heat of the struggle to differentiate between enemies and friends; and throws out all bad allies in order to aim determined blows against the enemy.”²

The cautiously critical position which Lenin took with regard to Bebel and Kautsky during the period when their centrism was only just born, when they were as yet only manifesting centrist tendencies (remaining silent, or completely ignoring, questions concerning the relation of the State to the Social-Revolution and vice versa, etc.), reminds one in some respects of the open position taken up by Marx as regards Lassalle in the middle of the Sixties. Marx, of course, knew and saw from the very beginning all the opportunist mistakes of Lassalle not only as regards

theory (eclecticism), but also in the practical sphere; moreover he mentioned them in private correspondence. In 1858 in a letter to Lassalle about his tragedy “Franz von Sickingen,” Marx pointed out his radical mistake of principle, which distorted the historic perspective, and which consisted in the fact that Lassalle put upon a higher plane the “Lutheran-knightly” opposition of Von Sickingen, the representative of the dying gentry, than the “plebeian” opposition of the peasantry and the town poor, which defended revolutionary interests, despite its ideological backwardness. Already in this mistake, which was revealed by Marx, we find the reason for the fact that Lassalle later failed to take the road of revolution in Germany. Marx in 1859 therefore indicated the position taken up by Lassalle, which was incorrect in principle, when he wrote his first political work—“Italian War and the Tasks of Prussia,” in which is to be found the reason of his future relations with Bismarck. Later in 1864, Marx in a letter to Kugelmann characterised the main shortcoming of all Lassalle’s policy as a “practical policy” as opposed to a revolutionary one, without which the “proletariat is nought,” as a policy capable of seeing nothing but what “is under its own nose.” In spite of all these big mistakes of Lassalle, which clearly reflected his opportunism, Marx, as he later wrote, consciously made no open decisive attack upon Lassalle, in so far and so long as Lassalle was doing important historical work, laying the foundations for an independent working class party in Germany and liberating the party from the influences which bound it to the liberal bourgeoisie. Only when Lassalle and his followers (Schweitzer) began to have dealings with Bismarck, Marx attacked them openly and with all his might.

Lenin took up a similar exemplary (the analogy being conditional) position with regard to Bebel—the leader of the German proletariat, until he (Bebel) concluded a bloc with the Rights on several fundamental questions. Lenin, in the interests of a destruction of open opportunists differentiated in his attitude to the so-called “Marxist” and to the Bernsteinian wing of German social democracy, endeavouring to drive a deep wedge and in these circumstances, shove the “Marxist leadership” to the left—from the “Marxism of words”—to a definite revolutionary Marxism. In this respect, Lenin was forced to fight for German Social Democracy on two fronts in the pre-war epoch; both against the Western Anarcho-Syndicalists and the Russian Social Revolutionaries who criticised German Social Democracy as one united whole “from the left”; and against the German Right opportunists, who lowered the rôle of German Social Democracy by asserting

²Article by Lenin: “Marxism and Revisionism.”

that not *only* they, but the *whole* of German Social Democracy, had always been a reformist party, thus "justifying" their opportunism and their revision of the theory of Marx.

On this question Lenin fought on two fronts as far back as in 1915—against the ultra-Right liquidator Potresov and against the "Left" Centrist Trotsky.

Potresov in 1915 wrote a programme article "On the Boundary of Two Epochs," in which he gave a devastating characteristic of Social Democracy throughout the period of forty-five years from 1870 to 1914—a characteristic which coincided with the estimate given by Trotsky in his pamphlet "War and the International," which was issued in 1914.

Potresov, characterising Social Democracy in the period indicated stated that the working class movement as a whole at that time was "permeated with gradualism," was "nationalised," avoided "any violation of gradualism," avoided "catastrophes," was diminished, became "covered with mildew."

Potresov, with this devastating estimate of the past of the *entire* Social Democracy, with this assertion about the national narrow-mindedness of Social Democracy as a whole in the past, made a sophistic attempt to justify his own conversion to national liberalism, as his *international* duty in the direction of concentrating the struggle of all Social Democrats against the main (in his opinion) danger—Prussian militarism. Lenin replied to Potresov in his article "Under a Foreign Flag," which is of great interest, for Lenin gives a demonstration in this article of how the history of the working class movement and Social Democracy of the "peaceful" epoch, should be approached *dialectically*. Lenin, of course, in no way denied the presence of this prolonged "peaceful," "stagnant" epoch, nor denied the corrupting influence of the conditions of this epoch upon the Western European Social Democracy and its leaders as upon the Russian Mensheviks; he had written about it all himself before the Potresovs and Trotskies, and partially demonstrated it at their expense, but at the same time he pointed out that the characteristic given by Potresov and Trotsky was *incomplete*, and therefore incorrect, in so far as they "are unwilling to see and recognise the deep inner contradictions" in Social Democracy, "developing upon the basis described." Potresov and Trotsky looked upon Social Democracy of this epoch as *one united whole*. Lenin strongly objected to this:

"Actually, this could not be so, for side by side with the tendencies indicated, there were indisputably operating other, contradictory

tendencies, the "being" of the working masses had become internationalised—the attraction of the towns, and the levelling up (equalising) of the conditions of life in the big towns of the whole world, the internationalising of capital, the mixing of the town and village populations, natives and foreigners, in the large factories, etc.—class contradictions sharpened, the owners' unions strongly oppressed the workers' unions, a sharp, heavy struggle began to take place in the form of mass strikes, for example; the cost of living was rising, the yoke of finance capital became unbearable, and so on and so forth.

"Actually, this *was not so* (united Social Democracy.—Ed.)—this we knew for sure. Not one literally, not a single one, of the large capitalist countries of Europe during this epoch was spared the fight between two contradictory tendencies inside modern democracy."

"This struggle in each of the largest countries was frequently most violent and even took the form of splits, despite the general "peaceful," "stagnant," sleepy character of the epoch. These contradictory tendencies made themselves felt in all the various spheres of life and in connection with all questions of modern democracy" without exception; the attitude towards the bourgeoisie, the alliances with the liberals, voting for credits, the attitude to the colonial policy, to reforms, to the character of the economic struggle, to the neutrality of the trade unions and so on." (Lenin). (Lenin, Vol. XVIII., Russian Edition, 1929. Page 112).

Further on Lenin describes how one of the two contending currents gradually drifted into a "completely opportunist position *which at first was supported by petty-bourgeois satellites, then by a definite section of parliamentarians, journalists, officials, and finally found its main support among "a certain kind of bureaucracy and the working-class aristocracy."* Later Lenin states that it is just this most important fact—the crystallising inside social-democracy of an ever-strengthening opportunist wing, the fact which predetermined the treachery of social-democracy during the war, that Potresov and Trotsky glossed over, when they defined the *complete* past of social democracy as *one united whole*.

Lenin, although he saw full well all the opportunist mistakes of the "orthodox-Marxist" leaders of German Social Democracy, which

³In this article which appeared in a legal symposium, Lenin, because of the censorship, used the expression "modern democracy" instead of "social-democracy."

mistakes became, in the future, a whole system of opportunism, nevertheless, in circumstances of the "peaceful" epoch in Germany and the West, considered it necessary to differentiate between the tendencies inside Social Democracy. Lenin, in speaking of the "Marxist" leadership of German Social Democracy, always dropped strong hints regarding opportunism in it. During the time of the old "Iskra," Lenin wrote :

"Neither are we prepared to make a present of the Germans to B. Krichevsky and similar numerous defenders of "freedom of criticism." If the "most outright Bernsteinists" are still tolerated in the ranks of the German Party, this is only in so far as they subject themselves both to the Hanover resolution which determinedly turned down Bernstein's "amendment," and the Lubeck resolution, which (despite all its diplomacy) contained a direct warning to Bernstein. It may be argued as to whether this diplomacy was in place from the viewpoint of the interests of the German Party, or whether it were not better in the given case to come to an unstable peace rather than to a good quarrel; there may be differences of opinion, in a word, as regards the estimate as to the expedience of this or that WAY of turning down Bernsteinism, but the fact cannot be avoided that German Social Democracy turned down Bernsteinism twice."

We see that Lenin, although unwilling to "present" Krichevsky with the "orthodox-Marxist" leaders, nevertheless considered it necessary to stipulate that these "orthodox ones" were too diplomatic with the opportunists and did not understand that a good quarrel is better than an unstable peace. It was in this spirit of "praises" with essential reservations that Lenin wrote of the "orthodox-Marxist" wing of German social-democracy even during the revolution in 1920, in his book, "Left Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder" (when the task of the moment was to aim a special blow at the "Left" deviation) :

"History, by the way, has now on a large, universal scale, confirmed the opinion always advocated by us, that the revolutionary German Social Democracy (note the fact that Plekhanov, even in 1900-1903, demanded the expulsion of Bernstein from the Party, and the Bolsheviks, always continuing this tradition, in 1913 exposed the whole baseness, knavery and treachery of Legien) was the *nearest* approximation to that party which is necessary to the revolutionary proletariat to enable it to attain victory."

Here again Lenin, in speaking of "REVOLU-

TIONARY German social-democracy" of the pre-war epoch, i.e., about the whole party; excluding the opportunist wing, made two essential reservations: first, that despite the demand of the Bolsheviks, it was unwilling to throw the opportunists out of its ranks, secondly, that it was only "the nearest" of all others to the sort of party which is necessary to the *revolutionary proletariat* to enable it to attain victory; that only *relatively*, as compared with other Western European social democratic parties, did it correspond to the interests of the revolutionary proletariat.

Lenin and the Bolsheviks not only critically noted opportunist mistakes each time they were made by the so-called "orthodox-Marxist" leaders of the Second International, but while fighting determinedly against the Mensheviks, while directing a tornado-fire against the Mensheviks, very often struck a blow much further than the Mensheviks, and aimed at the whole Second International. In this respect one fact was typical of Lenin's tactics. When Lenin began the campaign against "economism" — advocated by "Rabochoe Delo" — he knew that at the time a considerable section of the local party organisations in Russia were giving their support to the "Rabochoe Delo." Why did he choose the "economists" from the "Rabochoe Delo" for his chief butt? He explained this afterwards: "Man schlägt den Sack, man meint den Esel." In just the same way he very frequently aimed a blow at the Second International as a whole, through his blows at the Mensheviks; for in the Second International during the "stagnant" epoch which followed the defeat of the Paris Commune, the old revolutionary traditions faded out, as Lenin clearly pointed out, for example in "Two Tactics."

Lenin cautiously criticised the "orthodox-Marxist" leaders of the Second International so long as they waged war against the open opportunists, even though their struggle was not sufficiently consistent; he aimed blows at them with all his force only through the Menshevik "Sack," for the time being hoping that either the experiences of the Russian revolution and the example shown by the Bolsheviks — the example of relentless struggle on the part of the Bolsheviks against the Russian opportunists — would correct their line, would drag them out of the slough of opportunism, or that, on the other hand, it would be necessary to change the tactic towards them altogether. The Western European "Marxist" leaders turned out to be incorrigible, and as soon

¹"Beat the sack, aim at the donkey."—Ed.

²Lenin, Vol. XII., Part II. Russian Edition, 1924. Page 77.

³Lenin, Vol. V., Russian Edition 3, page 371.

as this became obvious, Lenin not only attacked them, but was the *only one* who immediately discovered the deep social roots which explained the capitulation of the Centre before the open opportunists.

* * *

Lenin cautiously criticised Kautsky and Bebel, when they fought against the Rights and fulfilled to some extent a useful function in the basic task of the pre-war "peaceful" epoch of the Second International in the West—the task of "broadly disseminating Socialism," of building up and extending "all kinds of organisations of the proletariat in all fields of work for the achievement by them of their mighty world historic aims; and this in spite of the fact that they either remained silent or entirely ignored questions like that of the relation of the social revolution towards the State and of the State towards the social revolution; in spite of the fact that they were unwilling to carry their struggle against the Right opportunists to a split; although they manifested centrist tendencies." But it was in quite a different way that Lenin began to speak and to write about them, when they began to rapidly slide down, and eventually slid into open Centrism, when they concluded a bloc with the Rights, when, in the words of Comrade Stalin, their ideology became "an ideology which subjected proletarian interests to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie in the confines of one common Party," when the Second International became, in the words of Comrade Stalin, "the party composed of a bloc of proletarian and petty bourgeois interests, which was advantageous for petty bourgeois Social Pacifists, Social Chauvinists."

In characterising the life of Bebel up to the "Red" party conference of German social-democracy in Dresden, 1903, and before the Amsterdam Congress of the Second International, 1904, when Bebel fought for the last time against the opportunists, Lenin called Bebel "the most influential among the workers and the leader most beloved of the masses of German social-democracy." Concerning the later years of his activities, Lenin never gave him any praise, but spoke of him with strong disapproval.

In the pre-war period, when the internal and external contradictions of imperialist Germany were becoming more and more acute, and when new, more militant tasks faced the party, the party leadership was not equal to the test and,

beginning with 1907, began to slide rapidly downwards and in 1910 finally slid into open centrism. Kautsky himself, in his book, "The Political Mass Strike," published in 1914, confirmed this fact: "At the Magdeburg Party Congress in 1910, the so-called 'Marxist Centre' was formed for the first time . . . Since 1910 the majority of each party congress has in the same way been turned against the revolutionary intolerance of the extreme left. This has already become a rule nowadays. On the other hand, since then there have also been party congresses of the sort where no reason has been found at all to attack the Rights." (It is a pity that Mr. Kautsky later discontinued his autobiography and did not tell the tale of how from "Centrism" he took another step "forward," how he became a renegade!)

The Russian Revolution in 1905 brought forth revolutionary echoes among the masses in the East and in the West. But it also called forth mobilisation among the reactionary forces of the bourgeoisie. The French bourgeoisie with its millions helped Tsarism to smash the Russian revolution, but the German Government was beginning to encroach upon universal suffrage in Germany. This raised the problem before German social democracy of the mass political strike as an actual problem which was to defend the political rights of the workers. And here we find that the Cologne Congress of trade unions in 1905 voted against the mass strike, while the Jena Congress of the Social Democratic party in the same year declared itself in favour of the mass strike in principle, in the event of encroachments upon universal suffrage, Bebel and Kautsky, however, at the same time, wavering on this question, the first in *theory* and the second in *practice*.¹⁰ This was extremely symptomatic.

The inner and outer contradictions of imperialism were beginning to become extremely acute. The political and economic pressure which was being brought to bear upon the working class grew stronger. At the same time it was felt that war was rapidly approaching, particularly an imperialist war for the redistribution of the

¹⁰Kautsky, in words, is an "orthodox Marxist," but in deeds, in practice, is a typical Philistine and coward, for he declared himself "in principle" in favour of "revolution" when this revolution swept over the country beyond the borders of Germany, the other side of Eydkunen. But as soon as things became *warm* at home, in Germany, he immediately took fright and began to put off "until to-morrow" the revolutionary struggle which was ripening in Germany, or to recommend other countries to begin.

For more details on this point see my pamphlet: "Karl Kautsky's Provocation," by A. Martynov. Russian Edition, 1925. Pages 32, 33, 34.

¹Lenin, Vol. XII., Part II. Russian Edition, 1924. Page 177.

²Stalin: "Problems of Leninism." Page 582.

³Lenin, Vol. XII., Part II. Russian Edition, 1924.

colonies. Consequently two opposite processes became apparent in the working class. The masses became revolutionised and were anxious to fight. But at the same time the aristocracy of labour and the trade union bureaucracy increased its pressure upon the party in just the opposite direction. In such conditions the leadership of German social democracy were duty bound to open fire upon the opportunists, upon the trade union bureaucrats, and to begin to mobilise the masses in a revolutionary spirit. And it was here that we found that because of the way the party leadership had avoided vital questions, had maintained a diplomatic silence, thanks to its opportunism, during the long, "peaceful," "stagnant" epoch, it had become incapable of reconstructing its methods to fit the new militant conditions which had arrived. A situation occurred, of which Lenin wrote as follows:—"Out of the sum total of avoidance of vital questions, maintenance of silence, deviating courses, there has come about the inevitably complete conversion to opportunism."¹¹

Lenin gave the signal of the appearance of centrism in the Second International and German social democracy, the leading party of the Second International, from the very beginning of its birth. *Lenin was the first and only one to discover its deep social roots.* And every time when he expressed himself in political activities, he revealed it.

Already at the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International in 1907, *Lenin revealed strong opportunist and centrist tendencies on two most important questions: on the colonial question and on the question of the struggle against militarism.* In view of the fact that the majority of the delegations at this Congress of the larger countries which owned colonies, spoke in favour of the value of "colonial policy," Lenin sounded the alarm and revealed the roots of this dangerous phenomenon:

"Here," he wrote, "was to be found one of the negative features of the European labour movement, which is capable of bringing no little harm to the cause of the proletariat. . . . The broad colonial policy has resulted in the European proletariat having *partially* fallen into a position where the whole of society is maintained *not* by its labour, but by the labour of almost enslaved colonial natives. . . . In these circumstances there is created in certain countries the material and economic basis for the proletariat becoming infected with colonial chauvinism in one country or another. . . . The evil must be strongly realised, its causes

understood, in order to muster the proletariat of all countries for a struggle against opportunism."¹²

On the question of the struggle against militarism at the Congress, it transpired that although all the leaders of the Second International felt, and even said, that the war which was imminent was not like those which took place in the middle of the nineteenth century, but was an imperialist war, nevertheless, both the French and German delegations upheld the viewpoint of "defending the fatherland." The French delegation (Jaurès, Valian) demanded determined action (the general strike) in the case of war for *the strict purpose of defending the menaced French Fatherland.* Bebel argued in the old way about "defensive" and "aggressive" wars, believing that the German Government had no intention at all of attacking. Because of this inner contradictory position of the leaders of the Second International, Lenin, who headed the Russian delegation, was able to break through their opportunist front.

Bebel introduced a resolution at the Congress, from which Lenin quite justifiably concluded that German social democracy was unwilling to take upon itself serious obligations in the work of fighting against militarism. In view of this Rosa Luxemburg proposed the famous amendment in the name of the Russian and Polish delegation, of which Lenin was the author and which Rosa Luxemburg defended in the commission in the name of the Russian Bolsheviks; this amendment states that should war be declared, it was the duty of the workers in the Socialist parties "to rouse the people and hasten on the destruction of the class domination of the capitalist class." On the subject of this resolution of Bebel and its Russian amendment, Lenin wrote that Bebel's resolution was "dogmatically one-sided, dead, and capable of Völmarrist interpretation," and that after the amendment had been introduced by him and Rosa Luxemburg, "Bebel's resolution became quite another resolution," that "all the theoretical truths had been repeated in it. . . . but all these truths served as an introduction *not to the justification of parliamentary cretinism, not to an explanation of peaceful means alone, not to submission to the given comparatively peaceful and quiet situation, but to a recognition of all means of struggle.*" (Italics mine . . . A.M.).¹³ In the words underlined, Lenin sufficiently clearly showed how *at that time* he had begun to re-estimate Bebel's policy.

At the 1910 International Congress at Copenhagen, on the question of the capitulation of the

¹¹Lenin, Vol. XII. Russian Edition. Pages 79-80.

¹²Lenin, Vol. XII. Russian Edition. Page 92.

¹¹Lenin, Vol. XI., Part II. Russian Edition. Page 338.

Marxist Wurm to Von Elm, the opportunist, Lenin laid on record the presence of a *crisis in German Social Democracy*. He wrote in this connection as follows:—"On the whole the Germans are not capable of carrying out a consistent line of principle at international Congresses, and the leadership inside the International is frequently lost by them. The weakness of Wurm towards Elm is only another illustration of the crisis in German Social Democracy, which consists in the development of an inevitable, determined reckoning with opportunism."¹⁴

It was just at this time, in 1910, when Lenin was speaking of the "inevitability of a determined reckoning with the opportunists" that Lenin found it necessary in connection with a special case to prevent the opportunists from hiding their baseness behind the name of Kautsky who, at the time, still enjoyed the reputation of an "orthodox-Marxist." It was precisely this circumstance that was made use of by Mr. Slutsky in order to falsely accuse Lenin of underestimating the centrism of Kautsky at that time. Let us examine the position more closely.

Kautsky, the "orthodox-Marxist," in words and philistine in deeds, whom Marx unmasked when he was 26 years of age, has constantly swung from side to side like a pendulum: in 1897 he wavered on the question as to whether he should go against Bernstein, then took courage and attacked him; later he again drew up an "india-rubber" resolution on the question of ministerialism and Millerandism. Then in 1902 again he swerved to the Left in connection with the disputes with Lusney on the question of the armed uprising; again he swung to the right and took the side of the Mensheviks in 1904. Once more he swerved to the left, towards Bolshevism in 1905 on the question of boycotting the Duma, and in 1906 on the question of the driving forces of the Russian revolution. There was another swerve to the Right in 1907 on the colonial policy, then in 1908 Kautsky swung to the Left and evinced the maximum "revolutionism" of which he was capable in his book, "The Road to Power." Finally, a year later, he once and for all slid down into the morass of opportunism.

The year 1910 saw the beginning of the dispute between Kautsky and Luxembourg on the question of the mass strike, during the course of which Kautsky expounded his notorious theory of the "Starving Out Strategy" (Ermattungsstrategie) against the "violent overthrow-strategy" (Nieder Werfungs-strategie) in the conditions existing in Germany. In this dispute Kautsky slid down into centrism. In the begin-

ning, however, he still tried to maintain his "Marxist" appearance. He said, therefore, that he did not reject the strategy of violent overthrow in general. It was right, said he, for Russia in 1905 and will also be right for Germany when there is a revolutionary situation. But in the existing circumstances it would not be expedient to adopt it in Germany.

The Mensheviks seized upon this dispute, siding with Kautsky, and called him "one of their own" in order to use the authority of Kautsky to defend their own liquidatorship. Trotsky and Martov published an article in the "Neue Zeit" to this end, in which Martov, referring to Kautsky, proved that the Mensheviks were right when in 1905 they adopted the mass strike *for so long, and in so far as the mass strike was used with the sympathy and support of the Liberals*. When, said Martov, the Bolsheviks instead of the "starving out strategy," began the tactic of violent overthrow and urged the movement forward to an armed uprising, the revolution was defeated as a result. Thus the Mensheviks, Martov and Trotsky, tried to make use of the dispute between Kautsky and Rosa Luxembourg to discredit the Russian Revolution of 1905. Lenin decided to resist this foul attack upon the Russian Revolution. Comrade Markhlevsky, with Lenin's consent, wrote an article in the "Neue Zeit," in which he proved that the Mensheviks had no right to hide behind Kautsky's back, for Kautsky, in his dispute with Luxembourg, recognised that the strategy of a violent overthrow was expedient in Russia in 1905 and would be expedient again in Germany in circumstances of a revolutionary situation. Only now, in his opinion, was this strategy inexpedient in Germany. This article of Comrade Markhlevsky, which was previously discussed with Lenin, served as the only argument with which Slutsky was able to "show" that for Lenin, the years 1910-1911 were, apparently, still "a period of faith and hope as regards Bebel and Kautsky," whereas Rosa Luxembourg had already fully revealed their mistakes.

These arguments of Mr. Slutsky are not at all surprising. How could Slutsky, a true disciple of the erstwhile liquidator and present counter-revolutionary, Trotsky, estimate the activities of Lenin in defence of the honour of the revolution of 1905 and the December armed uprising, in any other way than as proof of the fact *that Lenin still "believed" in Kautsky or that "for fractional purposes" he did not want to quarrel with Kautsky?* For a counter-revolutionary Trotskist like Slutsky, behind Lenin's defence of the 1905 uprising and the December uprising, there would be nothing more than either

¹⁴Lenin, Vol. XVI. Russian Edition. Page 362.

“faith” in Kautsky, or “fractional purposes”! This is how the miserable worm Slutsky from his dung-heap, “evaluates” the revolutionary giant Lenin.

Lenin achieved the direct aim which he set himself. The “*Neue Zeit*,” after printing Comrade Markhlevsky’s article, was compelled to keep aloof from Martov and to declare the following in a footnote to Radek’s article: “It is not our business to defend Martov’s article here and we are in no way at one with it.” This note wiped out the stain which Martov and Trotsky wished to cast on the Russian Revolution of 1905, for all Western-European public opinion and the proletariat to see upon the pages of the “*Neue Zeit*.” But it did not save Kautsky, the editor of “*Neue Zeit*.” After the middle of 1910 he remained a centrist. And it was as a rotten opportunist that Lenin treated him. In connection with the preparations for the Basle Congress, Lenin wrote the following to Plekhanov: “Kautsky *taboos* the revolutionary mass strike. It is impermissible both from the Russian point of view . . . and the European.” And Lenin asked Plekhanov to inform the Congress Commission that the Bolsheviks “are absolutely in disagreement” with Kautsky, and added that “Kautsky’s article . . . is the open official viewpoint of the Germans, Austrians and others.” This already meant a declaration of war upon all the leading parties of the Second International.

Not only did Lenin step by step reveal how opportunism grows and how the “Marxist centre” capitulated before it. Every time he gave a deep analysis of this phenomenon, showing its roots and birthplace. We have already said how in 1907 in connection with the opportunist positions of the delegations of some of the largest countries on the colonial question, Lenin noted the appearance of the *labour aristocracy*, which had grown up upon the basis of colonial super-profits. In 1912 Lenin revealed the social roots of opportunism in the parliamentary fractions, their “parliamentary cretinism.” One root was the limitation of electoral rights of the workers; the other, the fact that the non-proletarian elements in the workers’ parties in bourgeois society more easily specialise on “parliamentary professions.”

In 1914, Lenin laid on record the existence of a nest of opportunism in the German trade union movement in connection with Lenin’s speech. Lenin wrote as follows on this point: “Legien is no accident. He is the representative of an army, or, rather, an officers’ army corps of trade unions. His speech is no accident, no slip of the tongue, no single isolated case . . . In Stuttgart half the German delegation turned out to be pseudo-Socialists of this type and voted for an arch-oppor-

tunist resolution on the colonial question.” We have already mentioned that a year later, in 1915, Lenin showed in his article, “Under a Foreign Flag,” that the mainstay of opportunism in Social Democracy was at one time petty-bourgeois satellites, whom the party attracted during the “constitutional” epoch, that later these petty-bourgeois peculiarities of their existence imbued certain sections of parliamentarians, journalists and so on, with opportunism, as the mainstay of opportunism gradually became the trade union bureaucracy and the labour aristocracy.

* * *

This is how Lenin consistently fought against Centrism in the Second International. But Trotskyist Slutsky is not satisfied. He accuses Lenin of not supporting the German left radicals headed by Luxembourg, in their struggle against the German centrists sufficiently energetically. This is childish accusation, apparently a result of the fact that Mr. Slutsky imagines that to support an inconsistently revolutionary group means to give way to them, to capitulate before their mistakes. Lenin was certainly absolutely incapable of “support” of this kind. He recognised the revolutionary services of Rosa Luxembourg and the left radicals, which amounted to an energetic struggle against the Centrists. He correspondingly tried in every way to make a bloc with them not only on international affairs, but on Russian questions. And if this bloc frequently did not come about, this was only because the left radicals were incapable of being consistently revolutionary. Lenin not only sharply criticised, but patiently explained all their semi-Menshevik mistakes to Rosa Luxembourg and other left radicals on the question of the party, of spontaneity, of the armed uprising, the peasant question and the national question. Not only did he sharply criticise, but constantly patiently explained their mistakes to them, and thus supported them. Lenin was especially dissatisfied by the fact that the left radicals in fighting against the Centrists neither wanted nor were able to carry the fight against the opportunists to the point of a complete “reckoning,” by the fact that organisationally they did not prepare the necessary conditions for a split with the opportunists. In 1912 Lenin wrote in his letter to B. Karpinsky: “Let Bebel diplomatise with his opportunists *if it is necessary* (???)—but this is not for us.” (Question marks are Lenin’s own . . . A.M.). Lenin thought that “this is not for us” just as Rosa Luxembourg did. Lenin split with the Opportunists and Centrists in Russia, Lenin welcomed the split in Holland, Italy, Bulgaria; but he could not get the German

left radicals to take the same road, either before the war or during the war. Even during the First Congress of the Comintern, they considered its foundation premature, and Rosa Luxembourg even in 1918 did not recognise the October Revolution, and only after her release from prison did she begin to take up her stand under the banner of Lenin; but this process of understanding Leninism and the lessons of October in the heat of the revolutionary struggle in Germany was unfortunately very quickly broken off by her heroic death.

Rosa Luxembourg, while in the Breslavska prison, wrote a pamphlet in September, 1918, in which she criticised the policy of the Bolsheviks during the October Revolution; a pamphlet which after her release from prison she no longer wished to publish, but which, after her death, was, nevertheless, published by the renegade, Paul Levy.

In this pamphlet Rosa Luxembourg recognises that the "Leninist Party was the only Party in Russia which understood the true interests of the revolution in its first period," which "won for itself eternal historical recognition for the fact that for the first time it raised the final aims of Socialism in its immediate programme of practical policy." But, adds Rosa Luxembourg a little later, the Bolsheviks, faced with tasks of enormous magnitude, made several "mistakes," which considerably increased their difficulties. Here is a short summary of these alleged "mistakes" of the Bolsheviks:

1. "The immediate direct seizure and distribution of the land by the peasants" led to the following: That "now after the seizure of the land, every Socialist form of socialisation of agriculture is up against an enemy in the form of the exceedingly developed, strong mass of the peasant-owners, who will defend teeth and nail their newly-acquired property against all Socialist infringements."

2. The Bolshevik slogan of "self-determination of nations" actually amounts to the "downfall of the Russian State."

3. The dissolution of the Constitutional Assembly in November, 1917, meant a "turning point" in Bolshevik policy. The Bolsheviks drew a false conclusion from the correct assertion that the given "Constitutional Assembly was belated and still-born" when they declared that any kind of Constituent Assembly is superfluous, that "any kind of national representation, based upon universal suffrage, is useless in time of revolution." The electoral rights worked out by the Soviet Government, says Luxembourg, amount to a "very fine product of the Bolshevik theory of dictatorship."

4. The Bolsheviks recognise only "freedom for

the adherents of the Government," whereas "freedom is always freedom for the heterodox ones."¹⁵

All these accusations aimed at Bolshevik *policy* during the October Revolution by Rosa Luxembourg, coincided with the accusations of the *Mensheviks*. But there was an essential difference in their positions. The Mensheviks were against the October Socialist Revolution in *principle*, and considered it utopian. Rosa Luxembourg believed that the Bolsheviks had rendered an "everlasting service" in achieving the October Revolution, and blamed them only for their apparently incorrect policy during the process of revolution. And even this apparently incorrect policy she mildly put down to circumstances; to the fact that the October Revolution in a backward country was left entirely to itself and not supported by the German proletariat:

"Let German Governmental Socialists shout about the domination of the Bolsheviks in Russia being a caricature of the dictatorship of the proletariat. If it was and is a caricature as they say, then only because it was the product of the behaviour of the German proletariat, behaviour which can only be called a caricature of Socialist class struggle."

This conclusion at which Rosa Luxembourg arrives, again coincides exactly with the Trotskyist theory of the "permanent revolution:" "The question can only be raised in Russia. It cannot be solved in Russia."¹⁶

Thus we see that Rosa Luxembourg in September, 1918, i.e., four months before her death, still clung to all her old opportunist mistakes; that at this time her estimation of the October Revolution was still a sort of mixture of classic Menshevism and Trotskyism. The Opportunist mistakes to which Rosa Luxembourg clung, were a *methodological* consequence of her *mechanist theory of the automatic breakdown of capitalism and the spontaneous proletarian revolution*; were an *historical* consequence of the traditions of German Social Democracy of the "constitutional period," of the vicious circle from which Rosa Luxembourg, despite her radicalism, could not at that time break away.

But as soon as the November Revolution in Germany opened the doors of the prison in which Rosa Luxembourg was confined; as soon as she found herself heart and soul in the wave of German revolution and began to fight against the treachery of Messrs. Scheidemann, Haase

¹⁵I quote Luxembourg's pamphlet from Klara Zetkin's book "Um Rosa Luxembourgs Stellung zur Russischen Revolution." Pages 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25.

¹⁶From Klara Zetkin's "Um Rosa Luxembourgs Stellung zur Russischen Revolution."

and Kautsky, she immediately *began* to revise her outlook, to re-arm herself, she *began* to understand the lessons of October and the Leninist policy, she *began* to adopt this policy in Germany, the same policy for which she had so recently condemned the Bolsheviks. But she did this spontaneously, by instinct, because of her inherent revolutionary spirit and revolutionary temperament (for which Lenin called her the "eagle"). Therefore, her new policy, which was so close to the Bolshevik policy, was not theoretically founded (and she was unable to base it theoretically in time). As a result she operated this policy *insufficiently dialectically and not consistently enough*. There are documents to show how, in the fire of the German revolution, Rosa Luxemburg, on her release from prison, began to revise her outlook, to re-arm herself, during the last two months of her life—her articles in the *Rote Fahn*, which she edited together with Karl Liebknecht, and her programme speech at the Foundation Congress of the German Communist Party, which took place from December 30, 1918, to January 1, 1919.

Contrary to the recent accusation then made against the Bolsheviks of rejecting universal suffrage, Rosa Luxemburg, in *Rote Fahne*, immediately upon her release from prison launched the slogan, "All Power to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies!" and she spoke as follows at the foundation congress of the German Communist Party:

"The setting up of Soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies — this is the slogan of the present (German) revolution, which has laid the stamp of proletarian, Socialist revolution upon it, in spite of all the imperfections and weaknesses of the first moment; and we must never forget to reply, when we are faced with calumny against the Russian Bolsheviks: where did you learn the alphabet of our present revolution? You learned it from the Russians. . . It was the Russian Revolution which gave the world revolution its first slogans."¹⁷

Contrary to her earlier blame of the Bolsheviks for dissolving the Constitutional Assembly, Rosa Luxemburg, after her release from prison, published the slogan: "Down with the National Assembly" in the *Rote Fahne*; this meant down with the German Constitutional Assembly. At the meeting of the Spartakus Bund on December 1, after the paper read by Rosa Luxemburg and on the basis of her paper, the following resolution was passed:

¹⁷See "Bericht über den Gründungsparteitag der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands (Spartakusbund). Page 28.

"This meeting considers the calling of the National Assembly to be a means of strengthening the counter-revolution and a method of deceiving the proletarian revolution as regards its Socialist aims. The meeting demands the transfer of all power to the workers' and soldiers' deputies, whose first duty will be to dismiss from the Government all traitors to the working class and Socialism — Scheidemann, Ebert and Co.; it demands that the working population be armed for the defence of the revolution, and that determined measures be put through energetically for the socialisation of society."¹⁸

Again on the question of the right of nations to self-determination even to separation, Rosa Luxemburg took a definite step forward towards a dialectical understanding of the question. On November 27 she wrote the following in the *Rote Fahne*:

"What is separatism? . . . All the cursing against the 'Prussians' during the war was but a manifestation of the indignation of the South-German proletariat against the extreme representatives of the war policy, against the Prussians. The cursing against the 'Prussians' now amounts to an expression of the apprehension of the South-German bourgeoisie at the proletarian revolutionary struggle in North Germany. *Separatism in this sense before the revolution was a revolutionary phenomenon*, now, as regards its social content, it has become reactionary."¹⁹ (My italics. A.M.)

Again on the peasant question Rosa Luxemburg took a step forward towards Leninism, though she stopped half way. In her programme speech at the Foundation Congress of the German Communist Party, she spoke as follows:

"It (the November Revolution in Germany) was also only a town revolution; the village up to now has remained almost untouched. It would be futile to imagine that Socialism can be accomplished without agriculture. . . . If we seriously want to consider Socialist reconstruction, we should pay attention to the village as well as to the industrial centres; yet in this sphere we, unfortunately, have not yet reached the beginning of the beginning. We must seriously take this matter up not only from the point of view that without agriculture we cannot socialise, but also because in enumerating the last reserves of counter-

¹⁸See Klara Zetkin, "Um Rosa Luxemburgs Stellung . . ." Page 70.

¹⁹See Klara Zetkin, "Um Rosa Luxemburgs Stellung . . ." Page 78.

revolution we . . . have not yet pointed out one important reserve — the peasantry. . . . There is no other means against this menacing counter-revolutionary force than the introducing of the class struggle into the village, than the mobilisation of the landless proletariat and the small peasantry *against the peasantry*. (My italics . . . A.M.).²⁰

The fact that Rosa Luxembourge made the proposal that the agricultural proletariat and small peasantry should be mobilised is a big step forward, but her expression "against the peasantry" was neither correct nor Leninist, because, first of all, the agricultural proletariat, the small-holders and the small peasantry, whom Rosa Luxembourge intended to mobilise, comprise the *majority of the peasantry*; secondly, from the point of view of Leninist strategy, the proletarian revolution should have taken up the task also of *neutralising the middle peasantry* (see the thesis on the agrarian question at the Second Congress of the Comintern on this point).

Again on the question of "freedom" in the heat of revolution Rosa Luxembourge revised her old liberal viewpoint. When the soldiers in Munchen raided the bourgeois printing shops and confiscated a hundred thousand leaflets "against the Bolsheviks," the *Rote Fahne* defended this "terrorist act," justifying the behaviour of the soldiers because "they do not believe" that freedom of the press means freedom of calumny.²¹ However, on the question of revolutionary mass terror, Rosa Luxembourge and the Spartakus members at that time took up an inconsistent position which was not entirely free from the old distaste of a revolution brought about by "pitchforks." In the programme passed at the foundation congress of the Communist Party of Germany, the initial phrases are absolutely in the spirit of the "good old traditions" of German Social Democracy:

"The proletarian revolution needs no terror for its purposes, it hates and is repulsed by murder. It does not need this means, because it fights not against persons, but against institutions."

Further on, however, the programme correctly runs as follows:

"It would be futile to imagine that the capitalists will voluntarily submit to the Socialist verdict of a parliament or a national assembly; that they will calmly give up their property, their profits, their right to exploit. In cases of this kind they have always and will

always turn to bloody methods of civil war" and then "all this resistance must be broken step by step with an iron hand and with relentless energy. The violence of bourgeois counter-revolution must be faced with the revolutionary violence of the proletariat."²²

Thus we see that Rosa Luxembourge, in the fire of the German Revolution, re-armed herself and in practice, in the course of the struggle, accepted, though not completely, the lessons of October, and learned the methods of Leninist policy, although she did not completely understand them or their theoretical basis. Rosa Luxembourge's evolution towards Leninism was cut short in the last four months of her life by the social fascist executioner.

What conclusions should be drawn from this evolution of Rosa Luxembourge? First of all that the assertion that Rosa Luxembourge, who followed and finally came to Communism, brought into the Comintern her own special ideological viewpoint does not correspond with the facts and is entirely opportunist. We have seen that Rosa Luxembourge, on the contrary, came to Communism because, and in so far as, she was able to leave behind her earlier opportunist mistakes, thanks to her revolutionary instinct; in so far as she took up her stand under the banner of Lenin. Secondly, that Lenin, in supporting Rosa Luxembourge, the revolutionary, by criticising her mistakes, was absolutely justified by history. If this criticism before the war and during the war was not yet able to correct Rosa Luxembourge's line, nevertheless, from the moment when the revolutionary situation arose in Germany, this criticism and the example of Bolshevik October, brought Rosa Luxembourge into the camp of the Communists.

Lenin, by his deeds, by his example, by his ardent criticism of some and patient persuasion of others, sought to drive opportunism out of the Western European Parties. How was it that there he was unsuccessful, whereas he was able to do it in Russia? Not through his fault, but because the revolutionary development of the advanced Western European countries was very far behind the revolutionary development in backward Russia. A world war, the October Revolution, the advent of the crisis of capitalism were all necessary, in order that the revolutionary development of these countries, in order that the development of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in these countries might *begin* to catch up with the revolutionary development in Russia. It has still not caught up to Russia, but it will

²⁰See "Bericht den Gründungsparteitag . . ." Page 79.

²¹See Klara Zetkin, "Um Rosa Luxembourge . . ." Page 79.

²²"Bericht, etc. . . ." Pages 52, 53.

inevitably cover the ground, and then all this band of Right and "left" Social Fascists, renegades from Communism and ordinary opportunists will be thrown into the scrap-heap, just as they were in the U.S.S.R.

The counter revolutionary Trotskist smugglers will not succeed in belittling the leading rôle played by the Bolsheviks, at the very commencement of the revolutionary movement of the international proletariat. The Bolsheviks and only the Bolsheviks raised precisely those questions, on the eve of, and during the process of, the first revolutions, which finally served as the watershed between the Comintern and the Second International.

The Bolsheviks, and only the Bolsheviks, conducted right from the start a *consistent* struggle with Centrism on precisely these questions.

The Bolsheviks appeared right from the start on the historical arena as the most revolutionary and consistent tendency in the modern world proletarian movement.

Thus it was and thus it had to be, for Bolshevism grew in a backward country, but a country which stood at the commencement of the 20th century as the most revolutionary country in Europe. Bolshevism grew in a country where side by side with a powerful concentration of industry and a modern industrial proletariat there were numerous remnants of feudal barbarism and serfdom, in a country of a colossal agrarian overpopulation, depressing the standard of living of the workers and peasants and revolutionising them in a country, where the proletariat aroused and led the revolutionary movement of the many millioned peasantry.

Bolshevism grew in a country which achieved its belated bourgeois-democratic revolution already in the epoch of imperialism, of dying capitalism in the country which was "the greatest reserve of Western Imperialism" and with which "history confronted . . . with the next task constituting the most revolutionary of all next tasks put before any country"—the destruction of the most powerful bulwark of European and Asiatic reaction, of emancipating the oppressed nationalities from Czarism.

Thus it was, and had to be, because "Bolshevism came into being in 1903 on the very firm foundation of Marxist theory because "For half a century — approximately between the forties and nineties of the preceding century—advanced intellects in Russia, under the yoke of the most wild and reactionary Czarism, sought eagerly for a correct revolutionary theory, following each and every 'last word' in Europe and America, with astounding diligence and thoroughness"; because "Russia has attained Marxism, the only revolutionary theory, by dint of fifty years travail and sacrifice, through the greatest revolutionary heroism, the most incredible energy and devotion in seeking, educating, practical experience, disappointment, checking and comparison with European experience." (Lenin. "Left-Wing Communism," 1920).

Thus it was and had to be because Bolshevism "matured in the course of many years of struggle against various expressions of opportunism."

Thus it was and had to be, finally, because at the head of the Bolshevik Party stood a giant—Vladimir Ilyitch Lenin.

SOME LESSONS FROM THE LATEST MINERS' STRIKE

By S. WILLNER (New York).

I.

THE first wave of strikes against wage-reductions in mining is, in the main, over. More than 40,000 miners in Kentucky, Western Pennsylvania, Eastern Ohio and West Virginia struggled on for months with the greatest spirit of self-sacrifice. The fight was carried on against the reduction of wages, against the outrageous conditions prevalent in mining and for wage-increases. The strikes were ended without visible material successes on the part of the miners. The struggling workers were not yet strong enough to put through their demands. Insufficient organisation and inadequate widening of their battle-front, lack of assistance in their strike, prevented them from breaking down the reign of terror organised by the united forces of employers, government and social-fascists, from rendering ineffective their treacherous manoeuvres intended to confuse the workers, and from winning success in a material sense. It is, however, certain that the intensity of the wage-reduction offensive in mining, at least for the time being, has been lessened by the strikes. They have resulted in deepening the miners' class-consciousness, in enlarging their experience in struggling and in improving their organisation. Provided the lessons of this strike are properly evaluated and generalised, the entire revolutionary trade union movement of the U.S.A. will profit greatly by this strike. Furthermore, the miners' strikes have been a signal for hundreds of thousands of workers in other industries to be watchful and to begin their preparations for their own struggles against wage-reductions. They have had a mobilising and activising influence; they helped along the strikes of the textile workers and the growing movement in the steel industry.

The miners' strikes began about two years after the announcement of the so-called "Hoover plan," "for overcoming the economic crisis in the U.S.A." The Hoover plan proposed several economic measures for attaining this goal. But its most important content was an appeal to the employers to avoid any reduction in wages, in order to maintain the purchasing power of the masses within the country and thus to secure the home market for the products of industry and agriculture.

The employers agreed to Hoover's plan and specifically promised to renounce any steps towards wage-reduction until the economic situation had taken a turn for the better. This promise was described by the leaders of the A.F. of

L. as a guarantee for the quick return of prosperity. The great majority of the workers believed in the Hoover plan, in the employers' promises and in the demagogical utterances made by the A.F. of L. Thus, for years they were the victims of the great manoeuvre of deception executed by the government conjointly with the big industrial magnates, the bankers and the fakers of the A.F. of L., in order to lead the workers astray.

The Hoover plan is nothing but a masterfully devised tool for the frictionless lowering of the living standard of the masses of workers. The first step in this direction was the introduction of the so-called "stagger-system." It was carried through by use of such "humanitarian" phrases as "no discharges," "every worker sure of his living despite the economic crisis." It threw on to the shoulders of the mass of workers the tremendous burdens of unemployment, for it lowered the workers' income by 30 to 60 per cent. The stagger-system compelled the individual worker to bend his energies ever harder in order to preserve himself and his family from starvation. And it led likewise to the great intensification of competition within the ranks of his own class.

In working out the Hoover plan, Mr. Hoover and the masters of industry and banking already knew what was the only possible capitalist way to lessen the crisis in the U.S. for the time being. They knew that this goal could be attained only by the conquest of fresh markets abroad for the products of American industry and by conquering fresh possibilities for investing the American capital accumulated. They knew that every step towards attaining this goal must lead to the aggravation of the class struggle between capital and labour, and to new imperialist wars.

Besides that, they knew very well that the immediate precondition for the conquest of fresh positions on the world market by American imperialism was the lowering of the standard of living of the American workers. The employers have worsened the position of the masses of workers—as we have indicated—by applying the stagger-system. Through it, the workers' fight for wage-increases, for unemployment relief and social insurance and against wage-reductions was to be hindered and their organisation in trade-unions to be restricted. A starving, cowed and disunited working class is the aim of the Hoover plan. Granted such a mass of workers, the government and the employers hope to be able

best to carry through the temporary softening of the economic crisis by means of fresh rationalisation, by universal and direct wage-reduction, by driving more hundreds of thousands out of the factories.

When there was no more advantage in the stagger-system alone the employers threw on the junk-heap the phrases about "high wages preserving the purchasing power of the home market," "no wage-reductions for the sake of the quick victory over the economic crisis," and set about an open, brutal, direct offensive of wage-reduction.

Among the basic industries the miners were the first victims of this new offensive of wage-reduction. On this sector the employers were counting on a quick and certain victory. The miners live under such wretched conditions that, according to capitalist conceptions, no serious resistance was to be expected from them. The employers hoped that in case of strike, hunger would drive the workers back to the pits within a few days.

But the employers' attempt to lower wages further by direct means destroyed faith in the Hoover plan among the workers with the greatest speed. Hence the employers' attack encouraged the liveliest resistance on the part of the workers. The miners showed the employers that their calculations were false. They gave the public an example of how the working masses—those in work and those out of work—will defend themselves against attempts to worsen their already wretched state still more. They showed through action that the masses of the workers will finally take the counter-offensive and begin the fight for their own demands. Since the miners' strike the local fights continually blazing up in the mining districts, the strikes in the textile industry and the provision trade, the developments in the steel industry, the mass demonstrations and the active measures for struggle by the unemployed are still further serious signs pointing this way. The coming months will be a period of great mass struggles by the American workers for their demands—against wage-reductions and for relief to the unemployed and part-time workers, if the masses of workers find in the Communist Party and in the revolutionary trade-unions an energetic leadership, conscious of its goal, able to organise and lead these struggles by applying a real policy of the united front.

II.

There is no doubt but that the Communist Party and the revolutionary trade-unions will be the organisers and leaders of the approaching struggles of the masses in the U.S.A. The C.P. of the U.S.A. is the only class party of the

American proletariat, the revolutionary trade-unions are the only class organisations of the American workers for organising and leading their struggles against the lowering of the standard of living. The C.P. of the U.S.A. and the revolutionary trade-unions will fulfil their duties toward the working class the more effectively if the party utilises with the greatest conscientiousness the lessons and experiences of the miners' strikes, the textile strikes, the unemployed activities, etc., and makes them the common property of its entire body of members, as well as of the workers as a whole. If, despite the successes won, it exposes to the workers its political, organisational and tactical mistakes and defects with the frankness of self-criticism, it will clear the way for rapidly overcoming them.

The preparation for, and the course of, the miners' strikes fully confirm the correctness of the resolutions of the last plenum of the Communist International, of the Fourth and Fifth Congresses of the Red International of Labour Unions, as to the prospects and tasks of the revolutionary trade-union movement in America.

What is the main point of these resolutions? In them the chief emphasis, above all, was laid on the absolute necessity for organising mass strikes against wage-reduction, for mass action for relief of the unemployed. It was shown that during the economic crisis of American imperialism favourable objective possibilities would be developed at the same time for organising such struggles. The miners' strikes showed that these favourable objective premises for organising mass strikes and unemployed action were already at hand. They were an example showing the degree to which the illusions of prosperity and of the Hoover plan had been destroyed and were being destroyed more and more among the proletarian masses by the terrible effects of the economic crisis.

In the above-mentioned resolutions of the Communist International and of the Revolutionary Trade-Union International the sharpest stress was laid upon the fact that the pre-condition for organising and starting mass strikes in times of profound economic crisis was the linking up of the unemployed struggle with that of the men at work. The events of the miners' strike show what an active factor the unemployed are in mobilising the workers of the different mines, for taking up and carrying through the strike struggle when linked up with the men at work. It was just this joint action of the unemployed during the strike which achieved its greatest political effects as against the unemployed and the government. It was that which assured the solidarity of the struggle for so many weeks.

The resolutions further state that, granted a correct policy and tactics and granted the application of the organisational principles of the Communist International and of the Revolutionary Trade-Union International, revolutionary trade-unions of the masses will arise during the approaching mass struggles and the Communist Party will develop into a mass party. The miners' strikes were a splendid example of the correctness of this conception. The strikes were led and concluded by the National Miners' Union with considerable moral and organisational achievements, despite very great difficulties. Before the strike the N.M.U. had about 100 paid-up members in the Pennsylvania district. During the strike the N.M.U. developed with the greatest speed. Its authority grew daily. Its influence spread into other mining districts (Kentucky, Illinois, West Virginia, Eastern Ohio). During the strike, about 25,000 miners joined the N.M.U. By its active, determined leadership of the strike the N.M.U. laid the foundation for a revolutionary, mass trade-union of the American miners. Although it was unsuccessful in winning direct, material achievements for the miners by the strike, the latter have remained true to the N.M.U. since the strike and have pressed on to strengthen their organisation, politically and organisationally.

The party strengthened its ranks very materially in the course of the strike. About 1,000 miners entered the party. Even during the strike these new members were bound together in local groups, the election of the group leadership was taken in hand and a beginning was made with their systematic training. In this work the party has achieved quite noticeable results; it was able to make use of the new party organisations to organise the anti-war demonstrations on August 1st, and to prepare for the municipal election campaign. The anti-war demonstrations in the strike belt were among the most successful ones in the U.S.A. The party was enabled for the first time to come out with its own candidates in the municipal elections in the strike area. The first communist member of a municipal administration was elected there. It depends on the political and organisational work of the party in the present and in the future how long these new workers, who have come to the revolutionary movement, will be held in the party and in the National Miners' Union and developed into active members.

Finally, it was pointed out in the resolutions that the building up of the party and of the revolutionary trade-unions was possible in America, as well as elsewhere, only by the bitterest political struggle against the social-fascist and reformist betrayers of the workers and the bourgeois

ideology which they spread among them. The miners' strikes, under revolutionary leadership, compelled the employers, the government and the social-fascist miners' organisations (United Mine Workers of America) connected with them, to resort to confusing manoeuvres, backed by merciless terrorisation of the struggling workers. In order to increase its freedom of manoeuvring, the government and the employers tried to rebuild the U.M.W.A., which in Western Pennsylvania had lost its adherents as a result of its treason during the strike it led in 1929. With its help the united battle-front of the miners was to be shattered and the growing influence of the N.M.U. among the miners was to be destroyed. In Kentucky, Eastern Ohio and West Virginia the employers protected the officials of the United Mine Workers with the police-force. They organised murderous attacks against the leaders of the N.M.U. and imprisoned hundreds of revolutionary miners. In Pennsylvania 21 members of the National Miners' Union were sentenced to more than 50 years in the penitentiary because of alleged "disturbance of the meeting of the United Mine Workers in Cannonsburg." That shows how valuable the U.M.W.A. is to the government and the employers.

Developing in connection with the general radicalisation of the mass of miners, great activity was shown in the mining district by the so-called Muste group (South Virginia, Illinois, etc.). By using revolutionary phrases this group succeeded in making the most of the favourable situation and spreading its influence over certain parts of the mining population. The Socialist Party, under pretext of organising strike-relief, also tried to penetrate the strike-area. All this shows the need for the fiercest struggle against social-fascism and reformism in the mines and in the organisation of the U.M.W.A. and of the Muste group by applying a correct united front tactic.

The work of the party and of the N.M.U. in preparing and conducting the miners' strikes was a serious attempt to apply in practice the resolutions of the Fifth World Congress of the R.I.L.U. and the various instructions given by the Communist International. The general line of the political and organisational work accomplished during the strike is therefore correct. So are the tactical measures applied. The self-critical investigation of the activity of the party and of the N.M.U. in organising and conducting the strike is therefore limited to answering the question: to what degree was the line laid down by the Communist International and the R.I.L.U. applied and what mistakes and defects were revealed in carrying it through? In the following sections we shall try to give an answer to this question by

a critical examination of the work of the Pennsylvania party district in organising and conducting the strike in Western Pennsylvania.

III.

The general line of the party developed in preparing for, conducting and concluding the miners' strike in Pennsylvania, Eastern Ohio and Western Virginia consisted of the following:

At several points of concentration the unemployed were mobilised by the party on the basis of local demands. It succeeded in putting forward demands which the workers recognised as right and necessary. Into this movement it drew in a part of the short-time workers. After the beginning of the direct offensive for wage-reductions, local strikes broke out in these districts. The party extended these on a district scale. Within about a fortnight more than 5,000 miners of the Western Pennsylvania district were on strike. In its work the party applied a correct policy of the united front. It had the strikers successfully elect united-front strike committees on a local scale, in the sections and in the districts. Through the central strike-committee it presented the employers with the district demands of the strikers and organised an extensive campaign of strike assistance. The party offered the strikers an organised method of retreat after the strike-situation had shown that there was no longer any immediate possibility of winning the district demands.

In addition the party made the most of the strike movement to raise the class-consciousness of the masses. In order to strengthen the strike-front and simultaneously the movement in general, it replied to the confusing manoeuvres and terrorist measures of the employers, government and the U.M.W.A. fakers with mass propaganda for political demands against the police, against the deceptive contracts concluded between employers and the U.M.W.A. fakers, against arbitration negotiations, etc. It organised various effective mass actions to gain these demands. The hunger-marches to Washington and Pittsburgh, the measures adopted to render ineffective the injunctions secured by the Buttler Coal Co. for the Wildwood Mine, the mass demonstrations of the strikers and unemployed at the capitals in Harrisburg and Washington, the National Miners' Conference, the anti-war demonstrations in the strike-belt on August 1st, were active and successful measures for making the strike political.

Furthermore, the party tried to make the strikers understand the rôle of the C.P. of the U.S.A. its aims and methods of struggle. It undertook several political steps towards com-

batting the Socialist Party. From the viewpoint of organisation, the Party tried to set the strike-apparatus functioning, to build up the National Miners' Union, to strengthen its own ranks by enrolling new members and developing new cadres of leaders. It also carried out successful measures for setting up a united front between the youth and adults, between white and coloured workers. The coloured workers were most active in the strike-committees, relief committees, etc. About 160 negro workers took part in the National Miners' Conference. The party was also able to draw the miners' wives and children for active co-operation in the strike movement. The mass participation of the miners' wives in the picket-lines and hunger-marches made a great impression. It led the government to expressly forbid the participation of the miners' wives in standing picket and in demonstrations for closing down other mines.

What mistakes and defects came to light in applying this political line? The main political mistake lay in the process of radicalisation and the spirit of fight in the mass of the miners being underestimated by a great part of the party in the Pittsburgh district. The party lagged far behind the masses in preparing and conducting the miners' strikes. Its tempo of work was unable to keep pace with the process of radicalisation. The masses of the workers, who were pressing for their struggle to be organised and led, were approached by the party with strong vestiges of the "prosperity" outlook. It had too little faith in the will to fight, in the energy and creative power of the masses. It did not attach sufficient importance to the fact that two years of severe economic crisis with its stagger-system and mass unemployment, and the brutal open offensive of wage-reduction, had not gone by without affecting the outlook of the masses of workers. It was late when the party in the Pittsburgh district observed the fundamental difference between the masses of workers who entered the strike in 1929 as adherents of the United Mine Workers and those who went on strike in 1931 under the leadership of the National Miners' Union.

Another political mistake lay in a certain "worship" of spontaneity. This mistake was reinforced by certain traditions of the American movement. It is a twin-brother of underestimating the process of radicalisation of the masses. It was expressed in:

- (a) Underestimating the leading rôle of the party and its principles of organisation;
- (b) underestimating the manoeuvring capacity of the employers, government and U.M.W.A.;

- (c) lack of perspective on the strike and too superficial analysis of the given strike situation in determining on concrete measures;
- (d) dangerous failure to pay attention to political and organisational work directed towards forming functioning strike-committees, new organisations, the National Miners' Union and the party;
- (e) inadequate resistance to tendencies among individual workers, who do not yet sufficiently understand revolutionary strike-tactics, to substitute individual sets of terror for the mass action which was lacking.

The mistakes were correctly recognised in the resolutions of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on the miners' strike and in the political resolutions of the last plenum of the Central Committee of the Party. It is, however, necessary to repeatedly point out that the work of overcoming them has made but slight progress.

The activity of the party organisation in the textile and silk-workers' strikes, in the work of making the most of the miners' strike, and especially in the beginning of the Lawrence strike, shows that the lessons of the miners' strike have not been spread sufficiently in the Party, and full benefit has not been drawn from them.

The political mistakes committed during the preparation, execution, conclusion and evaluation of the miners' strikes were especially obvious in the following points:

(1) The party organisation of the Pittsburgh district, despite two years of fierce crisis, had not yet faced the work of organising and conducting mass strikes. That cannot be excused with such arguments, for example, as, "The party was too weak, it had too few members," etc. The mistakes lie in the fact that the weak-party organisation did not realise the situation in time and thus hindered its own growth both politically and organisationally. This fact alone explains why, at the outbreak of the strike, a beginning had not yet been made in building up a collective party leadership in the district, why there had been no district conference for about a year, why only about 50 miners and a few steelworkers belonged to the party and the rest of the members were engaged only in small-scale industry or were unemployed.

(2) The work of preparing for the strike was begun by the party in February, after the fraction in the National Board of the N.M.U. had laid down the general line for it. The work of preparation was not made use of by the party either politically or organisationally. The propagation of the miners' demands was not linked up with

the propagation of the aims and fighting methods of the party, as well as with the widening out of its campaigns (the Scottsboro' campaign, etc.). The enrolment of members was not organised either for the N.M.U. or for the party.

The party looked on the work of preparing for the strike as a mere trade-union matter. It limited it to a few fraction sittings and united front conferences of the N.M.U., to a few mass meetings of the miners to present their demands, etc. The preparatory work was carried out without a clear perspective to a mass strike in the near future. The party was too little acquainted with the real state of affairs in the mining area to be able to get such a prospect clearly in mind. It was the miners' conference, which took place at the end of May in Pittsburgh, which first enabled it to get a real insight into the fighting spirit of the masses. This conference gave the party the opportunity to set up demands for the miners on a district scale. It was only a few days after this conference that the workers stopped the first pits and began the strike.

(3) For a long time the party organisation of the Pittsburgh district was thus inadequately prepared for the strike. With its tremendous force, the strike-movement interrupted the so-called day-to-day work of the party, which had confined itself to arranging meetings for general propaganda and to a certain amount of work among the unemployed. For the time being it stifled this latter work entirely, for the small forces which had been drawn into this work, after the outbreak of strike, were entirely absorbed in the needs of the latter. The strike-movement compelled the party to adapt its activity to the new conditions. This process, which was developed very far in the course of the strike, is not yet over, even to-day.

As a result, the party was not able to lead the strike, with a full consciousness of its goal, from the very first day. The weakness of the party organisation in the Pittsburgh district led the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to despatch a number of special emissaries to strengthen the district leadership of the party in Pittsburgh. Together with the secretariat of the district, these comrades formed a special committee (called Top-Committee), the task of which was to prepare the work for the correct leadership of the strike, to organise its carrying through and to supervise it.

(4) The party in the Pittsburgh district, even after the outbreak of the strike, greatly underestimated the radicalisation and political progress of the masses. It offered the greatest obstacles to the political penetration of the strike. Instead of giving a thorough-going foundation of political

propaganda to the real economic demands, on the basis of which the strike had broken out and spread, for a long time it hindered the party, its methods of work and campaigns from being discussed in the strike-meetings. The comrades were afraid that mentioning the party and its campaigns would disrupt the miners' united front. For this same reason also they neglected to have party orators speak in the mass demonstrations, to have party leaflets distributed and to display the party slogans.

Instead of opening the gates of the party as widely as possible for the most active elements among the striking miners and carrying out a systematic mass-enrolment, strong opposition developed in the party to accepting striking miners in any great numbers. The same opposition was made directly and indirectly to drawing the striking workers into daily work in the leading organs of the strike-apparatus and of the N.M.U. "The workers are not class-conscious enough. They are incapable of carrying such work out. They will abandon the party again after the strike, for the party is not strong enough to politically develop such great masses of fresh members. After the strike they will again turn their backs on the N.M.U. unless it succeeds in winning the material demands made by the miners." These were the arguments which were used against drawing the miners into the party and into action in conducting the strike, both openly and in a concealed form.

(5) Consequently, the party developed its rôle as leader of the strike quite inadequately and lagged far behind in the question of building up new cadres. The party's district committee met for the first time about six weeks after the outbreak of the strike. There were no district conferences of the party during the strike. The activity of the fraction in the strike-apparatus and in the N.M.U. was insufficiently developed. All this made itself very much felt—as we shall show later—in the strike apparatus and in the growing N.M.U. The so-called Top-Committee confined its activity to deciding on the current political and organisational measures for directing the strike. It neglected, however, to carry on a resolute and vigorous fight for carrying through the proposals made by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to correct mistakes and defects. Consequently, it aided the forward development of the party, its organisations and fractions, and the process of transformation, set going by the strike, in the party's political and organisational work to a slight degree only. Consequently, it promoted the development of the N.M.U. and of the strike-apparatus in the political and organisational sense, as well as in applying

correct methods of work for leading the masses, to an equally slight degree.

The result of all these mistakes was that during the strike—despite its ten weeks duration—neither a functioning district committee of the party nor one of the N.M.U. was built up. It did not succeed in developing an actively functioning executive committee of the Central Strike Committee. The Top-Committee tried to conduct the strike directly with about 12 organisers sent to the strike area and with the leading comrades of the N.M.U. This was bound to lead to unfavourable consequences for the entire movement.

IV.

Let us now examine in what way these unfavourable consequences made themselves felt in the strike-apparatus and in the N.M.U. as it grew up. We have said that after the outbreak of the miners' strike the party applied a correct policy of the united front and had the strikers elect united front strike committees on a local, sectional and district scale. According to the statistics available at the highest stage of the strikes, there were 130 local strike-committees, with 10 to 25 members each, in Pennsylvania, Eastern Ohio and West Virginia. The local strike-committees accomplished a tremendous amount of work. The picket-marches, picket lines, demonstrations, relief and defence measures organised and executed by them must be described as model performances. They showed the stubborn fighting spirit of the masses and their tremendous creative force.

To a great extent, however, the work of the local strike-committees lacked organisation and system. Despite frequent resolutions they made no registration of the strikers. They neglected the systematic division of the strikers for executing the work needed (picket duty, collection of food, work in the communal kitchen, etc.). Consequently, they also neglected to control this work. The picket-lines, which in the beginning functioned brilliantly as a result of the great enthusiasm for the strike, later broke down gradually for lack of organisation. In the strike-area not more than 30 local strike-kitchens were functioning; an absolutely unsatisfactory number when 120,000 needy workers, women and children, were embraced by the strike and needed help.

Even among their own members, the local strike-committees showed only a quite inadequate division of labour. No functioning organisation, agitation and propaganda or strike-defence commissions were formed, as recommended by the Strasbourg resolution* on strike strategy and

* "Strike," *id.* Minority Movement.

tactics. The connection of the local strike-committees downward to the strikers and upward to the sectional strike-committees was poor as a rule. In scarcely five local strike-committees were there to be seen beginnings of a revolutionary propaganda of their own through posters and leaflets. As a rule the relief and kitchen commissions functioned best.

The strike district of Pennsylvania, Eastern Ohio and West Virginia was divided into 11 sections. To back up its work a representative of the N.M.U. was appointed for each section, to work under the direct control of the Top-Committee. In the sectional strike-conference the sectional strike-committee was elected. According to statistics available there were 11 sectional strike-committees with 15 to 40 members each. The task of the representative of the N.M.U. in the sectional strike-committee was to organise the committee, to form the organisation commission, agitation and propaganda commission, strike-defence commission, and relief commission, to unite the strikers on a sectional scale, to organise general picket-marches, demonstrations and food-collections, to develop an effective propaganda of their own against all manoeuvres of the U.M.W.A. and of the government, and to take measures against terrorisation and for the assistance of wounded or arrested workers, etc. To carry out this work they had to develop some of the members of the sectional strike-committees as speakers, instructors, inspectors, etc.

But these tasks were hardly undertaken. As a rule the chairmen of the local strike-committees and the leaders of the local relief-committees were elected members of the area strike-committees. But they were more than overburdened in coping with their local tasks. Therefore, at best they put in their appearance at the meetings of the sectional strike-committees, but did not participate in their day-to-day work. The representatives of the N.M.U. in the sectional strike-committees, in carrying through this work, neglected to draw in other forces which were available in great numbers among the strikers. Consequently, they remained alone, without a staff of officials or an apparatus. Their connection with the local strike-committees was therefore only a very loose one. As a rule, they were without concrete information regarding the strike situation, etc. This led to confusion and duplication in the work and to disorganisation. It is a certain fact that the men of more than 25 pits, as a result of this mismanagement, were not linked up with the sectional strike-committees, were left without relief and support, and after a short time went back to work. Not more than two of the sectional strike-committees developed

a propaganda and agitation work of their own.

At the highest stage reached by the strike the central strike-committee consisted of about 500 members. But the central strike-committee was by no means a properly elected and functioning body. The temporary delegates to the weekly sittings of the central strike-committee were picked at random by the local strike-committees. There was no clarity regarding the rôle and the tasks of the members of the central strike-committee. There was no list of them. They received no instructions, their activity was not controlled. In various strike districts the conception was developed that different workers should be sent to each sitting of the central strike-committee in order to enable each striker to take part in such a sitting. It was impossible to determine whether the decisions of the central strike-committee reached the knowledge of the strikers and were carried out. It was therefore impossible to get a real picture of the strike situation through the delegates to the central strike-committee. The reports received were often extremely contradictory.

The central strike-committee elected an executive committee of 23 members. The executive committee was made up of a number of workers active in the local strike-committees or relief committees and of some secretaries of the N.M.U. and of the I.U.U.C. The executive committee met very seldom. None of these workers were drawn into carrying out its comprehensive, day-to-day work. Therefore, it was not possible to form functioning committees for the work of organisation, of agitation and propaganda, of work among the young people and the women. It also neglected to develop a staff of instructors and inspectors. All the day-to-day work of the central strike-committee was carried through by the representatives of the N.M.U. and of the T.U.U.L. under direct guidance of the Top-Committee.

V.

Hence the strike-committees were extremely loose, badly organised bodies. They lacked the backbone of a strong revolutionary trade-union. The masses of the strikers demanded just such an organisation. One of the chief tasks of the party was to build up the N.M.U. during the preparation, conduct, and after the close of the strike, and to make it the spearhead of the miners' movement. For this purpose the party carried on a broad propaganda, after the strike broke out, for recruits to the N.M.U. The new members of the N.M.U. were organised locally and received their membership books during the strike. About 130 organisations of the N.M.U. were set up with 25,000 members. Many of these organisations

began to hold their meetings, elected their leaders, etc. In the eighth week of the strike a district conference of the N.M.U., which re-elected the district committee, took place.

The mistakes in the party's work, described above, hindered, however—

- (a) the development of real activity in the newly formed local organisations of the N.M.U. for promoting the strike movement;
- (b) propaganda for the rôle and tasks of the N.M.U. in the strike;
- (c) development of the feeling of responsibility and of a certain voluntary discipline among the newly elected officials of the N.M.U. towards the organisation;
- (d) the utilisation of the growing National Miners' Union to organise and stabilise the strike-apparatus.

As a result the new organisations of the N.M.U. were not sufficiently assertive in the work of leading the strike. They were not sufficiently in the foreground, either in propaganda or in organisational activity. The new organisations of the N.M.U. and their leaderships remained rather loose and unorganised bodies, like the strike-committees themselves. The party paid far too little attention to the fact that for building up a new trade-union a tremendous day-to-day detail work in propaganda, agitation and organisation has to be done. It neglected this detail work and therefore made only little use of the great possibilities for building up the N.M.U. Thousands of the new members have been lost again as the consequence of inadequate political and organisational work. Thousands who wanted to join the N.M.U. were not enrolled in its organisations or its activity. Even at present the party in the Pittsburgh district persists in these mistakes. A systematic propaganda, based on the daily struggle of the miners, is lacking. Systematic work of enlightenment as to the organisation forms of the N.M.U. as to the absolute necessity for building up mine-branches and unemployed branches of the N.M.U. is lacking. Serious work for building up an extensive staff of local officials is lacking, which should maintain connection between the masses of members and the leading organs and guarantee the functioning of the N.M.U. despite the very fierce reign of terror begun by the employers.

The district committee of the N.M.U., since the end of the strike, has visited scarcely 30 per cent. of the newly formed local organisations. It has neglected to instruct the new members on the immediate tasks of organising a strong unemployed movement, securing the release of the arrested officials, mobilising the masses of miners

in the pits; it has neglected to carry through measures for collecting the subscriptions, etc. The work of the district committee of the N.M.U. shows that the active comrades in it, even to-day, are not convinced of the possibility of building up a mass union of miners. There is a danger that the results won in the strike may be lost to an even greater degree by the party unless it ensures that the comrades in the N.M.U. carry through really conscientious mass work among the miners.

VI.

Now we come to examine the strategy and tactics applied during the strike. We will try to answer the question: What influence did the mistakes described above have on its strategy and tactics?

The miners' strike passed through three phases of development, its outbreak and upward development, its stagnation, its decline and close. After the first local strikes had broken out, the party decided to extend them. It set as its aim the adoption of a district scale of wages and the recognition of the National Miners' Union by the employers. Through the N.M.U. and the Central Strike Committee it passed the miners' demands on to each coal company. It demanded general negotiations. The N.M.U., in accord with the party's line, declined the conclusion of local agreements during the first phase of the strike, on tactical grounds. The aim was to shut down as many mines as possible, and thus to stop Pennsylvania's supply of soft-coal. Through its energetic activity in widening the strike, the party won great results, as we have already established. It set loose a tremendous activity and enthusiasm for struggle among the masses of miners.

Some sections of the party were intoxicated by this enthusiasm. They were counting on a brief, fiery attack and a quick ending of the movement, either through a certain amount of concession on the part of the employers or through the latter's brutal measures of terrorisation. Consequently, the party failed to make the most of the highest enthusiasm of the masses to strengthen the battle-front organisationally and to build up the apparatus for leading the struggle. This work was regarded as useless, in view of the quick ending of the strike. For the same reasons the party also neglected the direct fight against the U.M.W.A. and thus for a rather long period exposed the strikers without defence to the latter's attacks, which shortly began.

After a short time the employers, backed by the government and the U.M.W.A., began their measures for defence. They went to work with manoeuvres intended to confuse the workers, and

with terrorisation. It was already plain that the struggle would develop into a long and bitter fight. Governor Pinchot, of Pennsylvania introduced arbitration negotiations. After some manoeuvring, to confuse the masses, the Terminal Coal Co. concluded an agreement with the U.M.W.A. The leaders of this organisation of fakers declared the strike ended for the 3,000 workers of this company. In order to drive the workers back to the mines, they developed a demagogic propaganda: "Carrying on the strike is useless, for the N.M.U. rejects the conclusion of local agreements. It is not strong enough to compel the employers to conclude a district agreement."

The measures taken by the employers, government and U.M.W.A. achieved a certain amount of success. In the mines of the Terminal Coal Co. the united front of the strikers was broken. The extension of the strike came to a standstill. The strike entered the phase of stagnation.

The change in the strike situation demanded immediate reaction by the party. Measures for strengthening the battle-front, for overcoming the stagnation and for further widening out of the movement were necessary. But the careful sizing up of the given situation was the necessary condition for taking decisions as to the political, organisational and tactical measures. A real picture of the strike situation could be formed only by a functioning strike apparatus. The party was unable in the miners' strike to develop such an apparatus to a satisfactory degree. The quick securing of a correct picture of the strike situation at any given moment was therefore out of the question for it. Hence, its decisions often came too late, were repeatedly misrepresented to the strikers or not passed on to them at all. Thus, they did not have the full effect they should have had, although in the main they were correct.

The passage of the strike from the period of advance to that of stagnation was only recognised by the party very late. In its activity it still confined itself to arranging mass-meetings, more or less spontaneous picket-marches, etc., at a time when the organised picket service had long since become a question of life or death for the strike. It still neglected to develop a real, penetrating, political propaganda, based on the actual facts, against the government and the U.M.W.A., connected with popularising the rôle and methods of struggle of the N.M.U., at a time when this work had become the decisive means for stabilising the strike-front and rendering ineffective the demagoguery of the workers' enemies. In this state of affairs it avoided stating distinctly that the N.M.U. was ready to conclude local agreements with each coal company on the basis of the miners' demands. It was afraid to take active

measures to force the conclusion of such agreements, although there were several possibilities for this. Instead, in individual cases when the employers were ready to sign the miners' demands, it refused to conclude a wage-agreement.

After the strike had entered the stage of stagnation, it was very important to carry out comprehensive relief measures, to carry out active measures of struggle to compel the local authorities to grant strike-relief, to concentrate the struggle on the mines of the leading coal companies, in order to increase its effectiveness.

The party was not capable of taking the necessary steps in time. It was extremely badly informed as to the extent of strike-breaking and the growing movement among the workers to end the strike. Consequently, it noticed much too late that the majority of the workers had gone back to work as a result of bad organisation and insufficient strike-relief, as a result of terrorisation and hunger. This was especially true of the mines of the decisive coal companies. The party neglected to introduce the measures of retreat which had become necessary at the right time; it neglected to change its tactics towards the strikers who had gone back to work. The latter were consequently still being treated as strike-breakers, though it had long since been necessary to restore the united front between the men still on strike and those who had gone back to work, although it had long since been necessary to do everything to ensure the continuance of the N.M.U., to organise active measures for the strikers who had been put on the black-list, to develop a strong movement among the unemployed, etc. As a result, it was impossible to take the fullest advantage of the strike.

Despite its faults and defects, the miners' strike was one of the most significant events in the revolutionary movement in the U.S.A. in recent years. It helped the party find the path to a decided change in its work, towards the enterprises of the basic industries. It signified a new phase in the progress of the C.P.U.S.A. and of the revolutionary trade-union movement in America. In it the party accomplished a tremendous amount of work. Each separate branch of activity, such as the campaign for strike-relief, the mobilising of the miners' wives, the work among the coloured people and the young workers brought valuable experience to the party. The decisive lessons of the strike, however, are:—

Unwavering trust in the fighting and creative power of the masses of workers; absolute faith in the party's capacity and strength to mobilise these masses and lead their struggles; the greatest activity in making the most of this movement to

strengthen the party organisation and to build up revolutionary mass organisations.

Fullest conviction of the need and possibility of building up revolutionary mass trade-unions as the pre-condition of purposeful and successful leadership of mass struggles in the basic industries by the party, applying a correct policy of the united front.

Fullest conviction of the absolute necessity of

applying the organisational principles of the Communist International and the R.I.L.U. in organising and leading the struggles of the masses and in building up the revolutionary trade-unions and the party organisations.

Extreme conscientiousness and feeling of responsibility among all members of the party in carrying out political and organisational work to mobilise and organise the masses.

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE PROVOCATEUR

I.

THE history of capitalism in the post-war period is the history of its decline, its crisis, the history of the frenzied struggles of the bourgeoisie to retain its class rule. During the first few years after the war, the ruling classes consoled themselves with the hope that the Bolshevik Revolution had been only a temporary fever, but now it is beginning to seep through into the minds of the leading bourgeois politicians that the entire system of capitalist economy is being threatened, that capitalism must now strain every nerve to defend itself against the new social order created by the heroic efforts of the masses.

This truth is being driven into the heads of the governing "statesmen" with particular force by the blows of the world crisis which is raging with increasing force, despite the hopes of the owning class and all the assurances of the apologists of the capitalist system. The bourgeoisie regard a furious attack on the toiling masses, a war against the Soviet Union, the forcible repression of the colonial revolutionary movement as the only way out of the crisis. In their efforts to force millions of the toiling masses into the clutches of more severe exploitation, the ruling classes are strengthening more and more the state apparatus of violence. An open fascist dictatorship has been in existence in a number of countries for a long time, and now the great capitalist powers are following suit and are also adopting fascist methods of government. It suffices to mention the attempts to drive the German Communist Party underground, the fact that the Communist Party of Canada has been outlawed, etc.

A gigantic class struggle is developing. The proletarian and semi-proletarian masses are proceeding to the counter-offensive. The eyes of all the toilers in all capitalist countries are turned with ever-increasing hope and devotion to the Soviet Union, the country entering the period of Socialism which knows no unemployment and is

developing its productive forces with unprecedented rapidity and is consistently raising the standard of living of its workers and toiling peasants.

But the greater the devotion of the toiling masses to the land of victorious Socialism, the greater is the hatred of the imperialist plunderers towards the Soviet Union. Despite the contradictions which are rending the capitalist world, the great imperialist powers are persistently and untiringly trying to establish a *bloc* of all the bourgeois governments for war against the U.S.S.R.

The preparation for an attack on the Soviet Union also demands the relentless suppression of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, of the peasant masses and the oppressed nations. The wave of white terror is spreading wider and wider throughout the capitalist world. The lead in regard to white terror in Europe is now being taken by fascist Poland of Pilsudsky, which is strenuously preparing for war and is striving to strangle the growing revolutionary mass movement by hundreds of gallows.

In this historic period, when the question of "Who-Whom?"* has become the issue on an international scale, when decisive battles are obviously developing, the ruling classes cannot help resorting with special persistence to one of the sharpest methods of struggle against the developing revolutionary movement, the method of provocation.

Provocation is the oldest weapon in the armoury of the ruling classes in their struggle against the toiling masses. During the very early period of development of the revolutionary proletarian movement the English and later the French bourgeoisie developed a very subtle system of provocation. Russian Tsarism always considered provocation as its most trusty weapon. The

*The famous formulation of Lenin, meaning *who* will conquer *whom*, Socialism—Capitalism—or vice versa. — Ed.

history of the working class struggle in Russia produced such masters in the art of spying and provocation as the Chiefs of the Secret Service Department, Sudeykin and Zubatov, such traitors to the revolutionary movement as Azef and Malinovsky.

But the weapon of provocation has never been used on such a grand scale and in such subtle forms as it is being used at the present time when the decisive class conflicts are becoming more and more imminent. It must be said with all due precision that our Parties underestimate this danger, they do not fully appreciate the *indissoluble connection between the historic moment we are now passing through and the spread of the use of the methods of the agent-provocateur as a weapon in class struggle of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat.*

Formerly, when the ruling classes considered themselves to be an invincible power, the aims of the agent-provocateur were, generally speaking, comparatively narrow: the secret police merely tried to catch this or that dangerous revolutionary, to disrupt a campaign that was being organised, to paralyse a particular action the Party was engaged in. At the present time, however, when the ruling classes are "trembling before the Communist Revolution," the "horizon" of the secret police has considerably widened: they are striving to demoralise the movement from within, to disrupt the forces of the revolution, to drive the Communist Party underground, or to strengthen the reign of terror, to divert the work of the Communist Parties to the wrong track, to paralyse the forces of the proletarian vanguard in the decisive moment.

II.

There is no infamy, no baseness to which the bourgeoisie does not resort in its struggle against Communism. One of the favourite methods of the secret police, one of the most effective means of inciting the wide masses against the Communist Party is *for the political police to organise some terrorist act, some "attempt at assassination," so as to ascribe these acts to the Communists.* This is an old weapon, but it is used to-day to an extreme and unprecedented extent. As an example, mention may be made of the attempt to wreck an express train on the Viatorborg Bridge in Hungary, in September of last year, and, a little earlier, another attempt to wreck a train in Jüterborg, Germany, etc. These acts were immediately ascribed to the Communists. True, it soon developed that the attempt in Viatorborg was committed by the fascist Matushka, a white guard Hungarian officer, connected not only with the Hungarian political police, but also with

military circles, and even directly with the virtual dictator of Hungary, the War Minister, Gembesh. But that makes no difference—the incident served as a pretext for launching a furious attack against the Communist Party, led, of course, by the social-fascists. A cry against the "bloody hand of Moscow" went up and the government instituted court-martials against Communists. The immediate aim of the agent-provocateur was accomplished.

The following, for instance, is what the organ of the Hungarian Government, *Budapesti Hirlap*, wrote about the attempt in Viatorborg on September 15 of this year:

"The bloody hand of Moscow has reached out to Hungary . . . a Communist infernal machine exploded on the Viatorborg Bridge . . . the crime must not remain unavenged."

And the fascist newspaper, *Magyarsag*, wrote on the same day:

"There is no doubt that although this infernal machine exploded on the Viatorborg Bridge, the fuse was made by Moscow hands . . . Here it is, the newest Soviet export to Europe, a worthy part of that Five-Year Plan which must transform Russia into a huge red arsenal against the bourgeois order, against Christian culture . . . They come now with a new form of dumping, the dumping of terror . . . If they wish to provoke this kind of war, there can be no other answer except war to the last drop of blood, war in which every honest citizen, every sensible worker must do his duty for his own, his family's and his country's interest."

The German bourgeois newspapers spoke in the same strain after the wreck of the train in Jüterborg. The social-fascists, who know very well that the Communist-Bolsheviks have always been opposed on principle to the substitution of individual terrorist acts for revolutionary mass action,* were naturally in the lead. Ernst Heilmann, the social-democratic millionaire and friend of Barmat, in the magazine, *Das Freie Wort*, the theoretical organ of the Central Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party, wrote as follows:

"Within the last few weeks, after the murder of two social-democratic police captains, two secret murders of two police commissars were committed in almost the same place, directly near the Communist headquarters. The railroad catastrophe in Jüterborg which, to judge from the news, is one of the vilest crimes ever committed in Germany, and the politically

*See in this connection the valuable contribution of E. Thälmann in the preceding issue, containing Lenin's programme statements thereon.

fanatical attempt to blow up the entire Frankfurt-Berlin express, in which the Reich-Chancellor and the foreign ministers were erroneously assumed to be travelling, are crimes of the same category.

The downright fascists echoed the social-fascists. The newspaper, *Der Angriff*, wrote on August 12:

"The Communists attempted to blow up an express train. The suspicion which immediately arose that the explosion was caused by a Communist-terrorist group has proved correct. But the clue leads not only to the northern quarters of Berlin, but also to Russia, at whose command more than one bomb has exploded in Europe."

Otto Meyer, member of the Central Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party, cynically wrote in the central organ of the Social-Democratic Party, *Vorwärts*, on August 11:

"They are seeking for the protecting obscurity of the underground, they are provoking the government to outlaw the Party in order to rally the crumbling ranks of the Party and distract attention from their own guilt by shouting about emergency laws and blood-hounds. These are the vile tactics of the Communist leaders, who, from their safe hiding-places, are sending our workers into fire and destruction, because they need human sacrifices for purpose of propaganda."

Soon after that the bourgeois horde had another excuse for persecuting the Communist Party. Ammunition dumps were discovered in a number of places in Germany which, it was alleged, belonged to the Communist Party. This caused another savage outcry and gave rise to fresh demands to suppress the German Communist Party. The police began to weave clues leading to the Communist Party and naturally to Moscow. Although the Communist Party definitely declared that it had nothing to do with the ammunition dumps, although it declared that no act of provocation by the enemy would force it from the Bolshevik path of mass struggle for the overthrow of capitalism to the path of terrorism—the fascist and social-fascist gangs were not appeased. The police raided the Karl Liebknecht House—the headquarters of the Communist Party—and thoroughly ransacked it in order to discover proof of the guilt of the Communist Party, proof that never existed. The immunity of a number of Communist Reichstag deputies was flagrantly violated and their homes searched. In the end, of course, the story about the Communist ammunition dumps and about the alleged existence of Communist terrorist groups had to be dropped. But in the meantime, all the bourgeois parties

waged a frenzied campaign against the Communists; in the meantime, a new attempt was made to drive the German Communist Party underground. It was only the defence the German proletarian masses put up for their party that compelled the bourgeois horde to retreat this time.

III.

Acts of provocation from within, penetration of the enemy into the very ranks of the Party itself, are even a greater danger than the acts of provocation instigated from without.

As we have already emphasised, the secret police at the present time are not only trying to discover what the internal situation of the party is, but also to demoralise it; they are trying to influence its political line, to divert it on to the wrong track.

During the period of the tempestuous development of the revolutionary movement in Europe immediately after the imperialist slaughter, one of the most experienced secret services, the French secret police, made systematic attempts to penetrate into the revolutionary vanguard of the French workers, and to direct their movement along a path desirable for the police. Thus, a secret police agent, by the name of Anguetil, in an effort to win the confidence of the workers, began, in 1919, to publish extremely "revolutionary" newspapers, the *Bolshevik* and *Le Titre Censure*. Anguetil was soon exposed; but this case serves to show that the political police is indefatigable in its search for means of demoralising the revolutionary movement. It takes advantage of all the right and "left" Trotskyist groupings in order to incite a struggle against the Communist Party within the very midst of the workers. In this direction the French secret police systematically took advantage of the opportunistic grouping of the "minorities."

The political police take advantage of *all* fractional fights against the general line of the Party and of the Comintern, and sometimes themselves organise such fights, in order to disrupt the Party, to paralyse its activities, to discredit its leadership. The Party must always bear in mind *that there cannot be an unprincipled or any other fractional struggle directed against the line of the Comintern that will not be utilised and aggravated by the secret police.* More than that, fractional fights create an atmosphere which makes it extremely easy for the secret police to penetrate the ranks of the Party. For instance, there is not the slightest doubt that, due to the long-standing fractional struggle within the Communist Party of Hungary, the Hungarian secret police succeeded in placing a number of provocateurs in

the Party. To facilitate this task for themselves, the secret police deliberately spread rumours about provocation within the Party, themselves accused others of acts of provocation in order to cover up their own tracks. Thus, in India and Korea, various groups, for a number of years, accused each other of being provocateurs.

The secret police constantly make a practice of trying to induce the Party to take the path of terror in order to provide a pretext to drive it underground, or to increase the reign of terror against the Party if it is already underground. Thus, in 1925, the Polish secret police tried, through its agents in the Party, to give the May Day celebration a terrorist aspect. On the instructions of the secret police, the provocateurs manufactured bombs. Fortunately the Party succeeded in exposing the plans of the police in time.

The United States police is particularly ingenious in provoking strikes and various other movements of the proletariat at the most inopportune moments in order to disrupt them and demoralise the masses. This provocative method is often used by the social-fascist parties to disrupt the growing labour movement, when they are not able to prevent the movement from achieving its aim in any other way.

IV.

All these methods of demoralising the Party, of distorting its political line, represent only one phase of the activities of the police agents in the ranks of the Party. Not less dangerous for the Party is the work of the provocateurs in disclosing the activities of the Party, in exposing the rôle of individual Party workers. This, of course, is particularly important for the illegal parties. Yet, our parties show unpardonable thoughtlessness in this respect.

Very often a Party regards mass arrests as an accident, although the experience of years of revolutionary activity shows that *mass arrests are impossible without betrayal*. It is time all parties learned this truth; it is time we learned to investigate very carefully the circumstances of every such arrest.

Some comrades think that such things should not be discussed openly. Even if they succeed in exposing a provocateur they consider it best not to speak about it very much, for, they think, it might compromise the Party if it were known that it allowed itself to be deceived by the enemy, particularly if the provocateur was discovered in the leading circles of the party.

Such a point of view is absurd. It must be emphasised once more than provocation is one of

the methods in the class struggle of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. Is it not obvious that the ruling class, utilising the entire apparatus of class rule, will—sooner or later—find ways and means of placing its spies in the Party? It is enough to put the question to make it clear that there is not a party in which the enemy is unable to place its agents. That being so, *it is not the open exposure of a provocateur that compromises the Party, but the inability to expose him, the inability to deal with this question seriously.*

There is not the slightest doubt that it is much more difficult to discover provocateurs in the capitalist countries at the present time than in the old Tsarist times in Russia. The enemy has learned a great deal. Even the Tsarist police resorted to subtle manœuvres in its struggle with the revolutionary movement, but now, the secret police has got its tactics down to a system. Arrests do not always immediately follow the discovery of a secret organisation. The bourgeoisie guard their agents like the apple of their eye. It is better to refrain from making an arrest (often an arrest of prominent underground workers) rather than risk the exposure of the provocateur, rather than direct suspicion against him. It is important for the secret police to keep their spies in the Party for years, for only then can they really penetrate into party secrets, and under certain circumstances even influence party activities, paralyse its work in one direction, and promote it in another direction.

But some inexperienced revolutionary may say: if the question is put that way, it means that provocation is to a certain degree, inevitable. In that case, how can it be combatted, particularly if we bear in mind that the exposure of provocateurs is made extremely difficult by the tactics of the secret police to-day?

But he who is discouraged by the methods of the enemy is no revolutionary. Those who are ready to capitulate before provocation because of its "inevitability" forget that the white terror is just as "inevitable," that all the acts of class oppression of the toiling masses by the bourgeoisie are just as "inevitable." It is obvious that only the worst opportunist, the worst renegade will capitulate before manifestations of class oppression, will refuse to fight against them. The struggle against provocation is just as possible as the struggle against all acts of class oppression. Its success depends on one fundamental condition: *it must be a struggle of the entire class, a struggle of all the masses and the entire Party, and not a struggle of individuals.* But to this problem we shall return later.

V.

The methods employed in placing provocateurs in revolutionary organisations are so varied that to cover the entire field in a brief article is impossible. The political police utilise all means in recruiting provocateurs from among Party members: naked violence (brutal torture in the dungeons of the secret police), the starvation of the unemployed, the national and religious prejudices of the backward worker, and the inexperience of the young revolutionary who allows himself to be drawn into the net of a "heart-to-heart" talk with the secret police agents. Whoever starts discussions on "principles," on "philosophy" with the secret police, must know that he has already stepped on a slippery path, that he is already only one step from treachery. Questions as to how a revolutionary should conduct himself under examination, in prison, at the trial, must be thoroughly worked out by the leaders of the Communist Parties.

The grave danger of factory espionage which makes the development of Communist nuclei in the factories difficult, must be particularly emphasised. Here, the kinds of espionage are most varied: they range from all kinds of detective agencies for spying on workers, which are particularly numerous in the United States, to "Communist" nuclei organised by spies in the factory. The Japanese secret police is especially ingenious in this respect — it organises Marxist courses for its agents in order to enable them to appear as alleged "Communists."

Many cadres of provocateurs are recruited from the fascist and social-fascist parties who have comparatively easy access to the Communist Parties. It is obvious that German social-democracy can take advantage of its own defeats. The social-fascist party can always slip "its man" into every group of workers which splits from it and joins the Communist Party. These people can later carry on detective work in the ranks of the Communist Party. Strict control on the one hand, and intensive work on assimilating the new workers who enter the Party on the other hand, are the only means by which the Party can expose alien and even hostile elements within its ranks.

VI.

The methods of the secret police are many and varied, their possibilities extremely great. Yet, despite this, the struggle against provocation does not present insurmountable difficulties.

It must be emphasised that it is not only a matter of exposing one or another provocateur. This is, of course, extremely important, but it is not the main thing. Just as it is not so important for the secret police to arrest one or another

revolutionary as to disrupt the Party and paralyse its activity, so is it not so important for the Communist Party to expose individual provocateurs as to fight against provocation as a system, to deprive the bourgeoisie of this weapon of disrupting the revolutionary working class movement.

Thus the struggle against provocation can be correctly carried on only as a component part of the general revolutionary class struggle for the overthrow of capitalism. And likewise there can be no real class struggle against capitalism unless a relentless, irreconcilable struggle is waged against provocation as a means of disrupting the working class, as an instrument of bourgeois rule.

But that means that it is fundamentally wrong to undertake the struggle against provocation as a separate campaign, carried through as a shock-campaign, after which the matter is allowed to rest. Not a campaign, but systematic, persistent daily mass struggle against provocation—this is the task before the Communist Parties, a task to which the Communist Parties do not pay enough attention.

Every Party member, every worker, every rank and file member of the revolutionary army must fully realise the great importance of this task. The duty of all Communist Parties is to fix the attention of the wide masses on the struggle against provocation, to increase their vigilance and caution in this field to the maximum degree, to mobilise their entire revolutionary energy for the struggle against all acts of provocation on the part of the ruling class.

The struggle against provocation is first of all the struggle for secrecy within the Party. Laxity in these matters must be sternly combatted. Those who do not observe the rules of secrecy are not revolutionaries. Those who through carelessness expose the entire organisation to the blows of the enemies are not revolutionaries.

But the rules of secrecy cannot simply be learned by rote. It is, of course, necessary to study the experience accumulated by generations of revolutionary workers. But this is not enough. It is necessary to learn secrecy in the ordinary every-day revolutionary work. In this respect very strict mutual control is necessary. All petty-bourgeois sentimentality must be eradicated from party life; confidence in a revolutionary party is based only and primarily on organised mutual control.

Breaches of fundamental rules of secrecy should be punished in the same way as are deviations from the political line of the party. Only then will the importance of secrecy be raised to the proper level.

An irreconcilable struggle must be waged against talkativeness. It is important that all Party members, and this applies equally to so-called legal as well as illegal parties, should realise *that talkativeness is the most dangerous enemy to the revolutionary cause, bordering on downright treachery.*

An incorrigible chatter-box has no place in a revolutionary party.

The most important condition for a successful struggle against provocation is to have a proper form of organisation, correct co-ordination of legal and illegal work. This is particularly important for underground parties. A proper form of illegal organisation, proper subdivision of labour and co-ordination of party functions will make the work of the *provocateurs* very difficult. The great importance of co-ordinating legal and illegal work was strongly emphasised by Lenin in his book *Left Wing Communism*. In speaking about the provocateur, Malinovsky, Lenin said:

"He betrayed scores of the best and most devoted comrades . . . That he did not cause more mischief was due to the efficient co-ordination between legal and illegal forms of our activities. Malinovsky, as a member of the Central Committee of the Party and a deputy in the Duma, was forced, in order to gain our confidence, to aid us in establishing daily papers, which even under the Tsar knew how to carry on the fight openly against the opportunism of the Mensheviks, and to preach the fundamentals of Bolshevism . . . With one hand, Malinovsky sent to jail and to death scores upon scores of the most active Bolsheviks, while with the other hand he was compelled to aid in the training of scores and scores of thousands of new adherents through the medium of the legal Press . . ." (p. 30).

As far as the struggle against definite provocateurs is concerned, it is necessary to say this: Every discovery of a provocateur should be given the widest publicity. What happened in one of our comparatively legal parties is absolutely impermissible. A provocateur was discovered in one of the provincial organisations. He was expelled from the Party, but the matter did not

get any publicity. This provocateur, exposed in one city, was able to join the Party in another district and continued his activities there until a representative of the first organisation, who knew the provocateur, happened to visit that place by chance. Only then did the comrades decide that it would do no harm to announce the facts about the provocateur in the Party press.

It is obvious that a "struggle" against provocateurs which is not given any publicity is not a struggle at all, it is in reality giving protection to provocateurs. It is obvious, too, that only the widest publicity, only the constant vigilance, not only of the Party, but of the entire Comintern, to every discovered fact of provocation will really expose the agent of the enemy, on the one hand, and will make it possible for all parties to study the accumulated experiences in this field on the other.

All parties must raise the question of struggle against provocation in all seriousness. At the present moment, when the bourgeoisie is making desperate efforts to drown the revolutionary movement in blood, to behead the vanguard of the revolutionary class, when hundreds of thousands of revolutionaries in all capitalist countries are shedding their blood for the cause of Socialism, a frivolous attitude toward the questions of provocation is an unpardonable crime. It suffices to recall the execution of tens of thousands of Chinese revolutionaries, the hundreds of workers and peasants tortured and imprisoned and hung on the gallows of fascist Poland, the hundreds of thousands of workers brutally killed by the secret police in the Balkan States, to realise that the question of struggle against provocation is an urgent, burning problem of the revolutionary movement. The brutalities of the bourgeoisie will not save them from inevitable destruction; no "miracle" can restore the strength of senile capitalism.

But we will hasten the historic date of the destruction of the class rule of the bourgeoisie if we will raise the question of an indefatigable mass struggle against provocation to the proper level, if we will connect this struggle with the revolutionary class' struggle of the toiling masses for the overthrow of capitalism.