

## WORKERS' POWER CIRCULATION AND PERIPHERY BUILDING CAMPAIGN

The document which follows this introduction is the first part of a two part document on the political aims and conrecte objectives of the fall campaign to expand WP sales and build the political periphery of the I.S. By periphery we mean that layer of contacts and I.S. sympathizers that arise out of our specific work in various arenas but who also have agreement with I.S. politics and extend beyond their immediate area of work.

This first part of the document deals with the WP aspect of the campaign. The seond part, which will be sent out to the branches next week, deals with the equally important element of building our political periphery.

The discussions on implementing this campaign must proceed in the branches ammediately if we are to be ready to go on September 19th, which represents the latest possible date that we can begin our fall activities.

This campaign was originally conceived at the convention as merely a WP circulation drive, of a month duration, before the main campaign on recruitment which was slated to begin in October. In the course of the last two months, however, it has become increasingly clear that the emphasis on mass agitational work of the last year has not only exhausted our members and depoliticized our organization, it has also made serious inroads into the strength of our periphery. Before we can restart serious recruitment, there must first be a conscious period of rebuilding our political periphery. This two part dicument represents a single campaign to do precisely that.

Comrades should also be aware that there is every possibility that we will have to go into the recruitment campaign hard on the heels of the peripherry campaign. So as to aviod the dangers of key sections of our new periphery bbecoming stabilized as sympathizers of the IS rather than members. We cannot endlessly repeat the mistake of producing a layer of "institutionalized contacts."

Finally, members will be aware that the sag that occured in the organization over the last period was something more than the usual summer lull. It represents a political problem which the organization can and must solve as quickly as possible. The problem represents the fact that our perspectives are now somewhat off-key both at the general and branch/fraction level and thus lack the sharpness and clarity that is required for aggressive and succesful revolutionary activity. The reassertion of the organization's sense of direction (a process we failed to set in train at the convention because of our general concentration on issues which proved to be less central) will require concentrated political discussion in the organization as a whole. Over the next month the EC will be issuing three documents for detailed branch discussion which will result in the re-alignment of our work and prepare the ground for successful periphery and recruitment work in the fall and winter.

Glenn<sub>Sept</sub>. 2, 1976

#### WORKERS POWER CIRCULATION CAMPAIGN

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#### Motivation

Beginning in September the organization is going to initiate a national campaign to boost overall sales and general circulation of <u>Workers' Power</u>. This campaign is in response to the general mandate of our 1976 convention. In the past year we have allowed the paper to slip from playing a central role in the day to day life of the organization. The circulation drive is designed to once again make the paper an organizer for us.

The circulation drive, however, should not be seen as something in itself. It is going to be an integral part of a Fall campaign to build a political periphery for the IS. A successful circulation drive will not just get us more sales. It will get us contacts for the organization. If we begin to actually campaign with the paper we will begin to recruit even before an organized recruitement drive.

A boost in circulation will also mean a more successful Fund Drive this Fall. Not only will we be reaching more readers, but our regular core of readers will  $\sim 1.30 \times \gamma_{\rm c}$  . . . bemore willing to contribute to the organization.

## General Conception

The campaign is going to begin on Sept 19th and run for eight weeks. hsi will end it before the Thanksgiving Holiday. During these eight weeks we expect all the branches to regularize their paper sales. Loose ends should be tied together. We expect the paper to be campaigned with. New readers and selling points should be checked out. This should be sufficient time for the center to intervene in those branches that need help.

The campaign is going to be run throughout the entire organization. This means the involvement of the branches, the fractions, the center, the paper staff, MAL's and even readers of the paper. In each city the campaign will be run thru the branchor district. The NP Coordinator will be the key individual. Local fractions are expected to work thru the branches and National Fractions thru the center.

Our general goal is to boost and strengthen sales of Workers' Power. In particular we are asking the branches that they concentrate their efforts on the six industrial areas that we are active in. Steel, auto, postal, telephone, IBT Freight and UPS. In certain cities we will be asking the branches to campaign with the paper by doing community sales. The focus here will be making contacts in the black community.

Many branches will have exceptions to the above priorities. That's fine. Just let us know where you are selling and why.

Within the overall boost in sales we want to concentrate on developing contact sales. By doing this we will be laying the basis for future recruitement.

It is always possible to sell to a wide range of readers. But within that group there is a smaller group of readers who must be identified as contacts

of the organization. These readers are political, moving in the direction of activism and can be recruited to the IS. Part of the circulation campaign must be to revive the spirit in the organization that it is possible to go out with the paper, to sell it to workers, to talk politics with them, and in many instances to recruit them. One of our goals should be to build a political periphery in the thousands.

Finally, we are going to begin to push for subscriptions to <u>Morkers' Power</u>. This is something that we have never done in the past. Except for the leamster subs gotten during the IBT campaign vitrually all of our subs have been by chance. From now on our attitude must be that we never let a potential sub go by.

# Coordination

The circulation campaign will be organized and run thru the center. Its day to day administration will be carried out by Tom D in consultation with Glenn U. The EC will make regular weekly accessments of its success.

The MP Coordinator in each branch is the key individual. Past experience has shown that a capable and hard driving coordinator can turn a branch around on its use of the paper.

From now on the center is going to demand that every branch appoint or elect a UP coordinator who is capable of doing the job. Ue are also going to demand that every branch organizer and branch exec back that individual up and keep on top of the paper themselves. If we think things are not going well we will suggest changes in either the local perspectives or personnel.

At present the center expects weekly sales reports from all branches. During the life of the campaign this will be insisted on. All reports and communication should be sent to Tom D.

Finally, we expect fiscal responsibility. If we increase our circulation by 50% we don't also want to increase our MP debt by 50%. Those branches that have had difficulity in meeting their paper payments should make financial reorganization a part of their circulation campaign. The center expects and will insist on regular MP payments.

### Branch Perspectives

Every branch is to write a perspectives for the circulation campaign. Copies of the perspectives are to be submitted to the center no later than Sept 16t. Where we feel it is necessary we will make recommendations for changes.

If any branch has not done so allready, it must inform the center of who its WP coordinator is and how they can be contacted. It is our expectation that coordinators who now hold that job will keep it thru the Christmas Holidays. If the coordinator is changed at any point the center will be informed immediately.

We want to begin to move away from our total reliance on special mailings to branch organizers and mimeographed notes stuck in with the MP bundles. These methods when used exclusively are too internal and do not show our readers that we do know how to organize and get things done.

We want the IS page (campaign page) to carry branch reports, letters, instructions from the center and everything else that can be public about the campaign. If you want to know what is going on with the campaign or what your branch should be doing then read the IS page.

During the course of the campaign we expect that every branch will send in at least two stories on their local campaign.

#### Campaign Guidelines

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In every branch sales are located in certain specific areas. Part of the campaign will be to identify those areas, strengthen sales there and to initiate new sales where possible. These areas include, contact sales, factory sales (outside and inside), community sales and subscriptions.

<u>Contact Sales</u> These are clearly our most important sales. A contact sale should mean the sale to an individual who we think we can recruit in a relatively short period of time. Old contact lists must be gone thru and cleaned out. They are only a contact if they are getting the paper. The WP coordinator or branch organizer should have at all times a list of thos e individuals who are contacts of the organization.

Those individuals who are regular readers of the paper and contacts of the IS we want to start selling the paper with us. An intensive effort will be made during the campaign to convince our readers that they should begin to distribute the paper. This means that in some instances we will find out who are the other workers that our contacts can sell to and make the arrangements for them.

Factory Sales (inside) These should be seen as our best source of regular contacts. The campaign must see to it that every comrade is selling where they work. We must be known not just as good trade union militants, but also as socialists. Exceptions to this should not be the general norm.

Where the network of inside factory sales is too large for an individual to handle properly, subscriptions should be pushed among those individuals who are only irregular buyers or who are not as close to us politically as others.

Factory Sales (outside) Here the tasks before us are quite simple. The branches must support our industrial comrades from the outside with the paper. Every branch should submit a list of their outside sales to the center. In drawing up the list they should consult with the local fractions to determine their needs.

Outside sales should be used to make contacts. Names should be gotten when possible. The MP seller should go to those events that the comrade on the

The local campaign perspectives should include a report on present branch sales along with goals set in the various areas of sales. Any special programs that the branches are going to initiate should also be included. In the larger more industralized branches we are interested in knowing the kind of organization that is being set up between the branches and the fractions.

At the first possible branch meeting after the proposal has been drawn up it should be discussed. The discussion should focus on the politics of the campaign, why and how the paper can be used as an organizer, and most importantly, the actual implementation of the campaign. Throughout the course of the campaign regular reports should be made to the branch.

## The Center

The center will have its responsibilities during the circulation drive. In addition to providing the necessary coordination and political direction to the campaign the center will have the prime responsibility for producing the aids necessary to carrying out a successful campaign.

- 1) A general subscription leaflet has already been produced and is now available. Sub forms (cards) will also be printed.
- 2) A <u>workers' power</u> training manual will be available by October 1st. It willinclude sections on the role of the WP coordinator, selling the paper, writing for the paper, the paper as an organizer, taking pictures, etc. It will be smartly produced and printed by the center.

The handbook should be used in all of the branches to lead training sessions of the paper. Some can be done as part of branch meetings. Themanual can also be used in one on one cadre classes. Either way we expect the manual to be used as part of the circulation drive.

- 3) If the resources are available (cash and personnel) a 4 page WP special will be produced. It would contain a mixture of reprints and newly written articles. It would be specifically aimed at attracting new subscribers and initiating factory sales. Because the articles would not be dated it could be used over a period of several months.
- 4) Handy, pocket size WP stickers will be produced. They will have the genaral thems of "Morkers' Power - The Morkers Paper." Several different slogans and styles will be printed.

Plans are already underway for a special renewal drive from September to December. During this period we have a large number of renewals coming up. Naturally we want to hold on to all of them. Special renewal forms have been printed offering a rate of \$7.50 per year rather than the usual \$10.00.

Plans are also under way for a letters campaign. This campaign stresses reader involvement and the use of the paper to organize the campaign itself.

#### Campaign Page

Every effort will be made to run the campaign thru the IS page of the paper.

inside is involved in. The point is not to just be a face that sells papers once a week. If you are selling at a plant you should be involved in the social and political activities of the comrades at that plant.

Community Sales: The organization has a focus that concentrates on six industrial areas. Beyond that, however, we must begin to make pernament ties to the communities in which we live. A specific part of the campaign should be to initiate community sales in certain black communities. A number of branches have attempted these sales in the past but they have not recieved the support of the center.

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Every branch should explore the possibility of starting some kind of community sale in the black community. If the resources are available then these sales should be made part of the circulation drive.

<u>Subscriptions</u> Every branch must have a specific part of the circulation campaign that is aimed at boosting subscriptions.

In the pastcomrades have left jobs and cities without so much as a thought of getting their contacts to get subs to the paper. These individuals have now been lost to the organization. The norm from now on must be that no is comrade ever leaves a job or mover without first getting subs.

<u>Student Branches</u> Those branches that can be called student or part student branches should make specific efforts to get students to start buying the student **paper**. Literature tables should be set up, papers should be sold and the sub leaflets should be distributed.

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## Industrial Fractions

A successful circulation campaign in the wall will lay the basis for a series of specific recruitement campaigns in each of the industries that we are working in information

The national fraction steering cttes will have until Sept 16th to produce their overall national plans for the circulation drive and will also, as a practice run for the recruitement drives, monitor the performance of their local fractions.

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#### Measures of Success

1) Rather than setting an overall total increase to shoot for we will judge our success by percentage increases from each of the branches.

2) Circulation figures will be broken down by fractions. By the end of the campaign we expect healthy sales in every fraction numbering in the hundreds.

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3) A final but less easilly measureable index is the extent to which the campaign helps us build a political periphery,

Glenn V

## REPORT FROM THE WOMEN'S COMMISSION

1. Most of the information for this report can be found in the September Woman's Bulletin which came out last Friday. This bulletin is different from other bulletins, in that it contains theoretical articles, reports on the women's work as well as on the activities of the women's caucuses. We are asking that the members use this for political education and discussion.

2. The pamphlet Communism and the Family is now available, and members should use it as a good readible pamphlet for the family. In terms of other literature, the most recent issue of the International Socialism Journal has anotherarticle on Wages for Housework, which continues the discussion of women's oppression in the home. Another film about women has just come out. It is called 'How we won the Vote,' and as the name implies it is about the woman's suffrage movement. It could be good for women's caucuses, for discussion on why a movement is needed to fight for women's rights; the kind of battle it took just to win that one reform, as well as the importence of not trusting capitalist politicians in the Democratic or Republican parties. The film costs \$35 and is available from Lucerne films, c/o Lucille Feldman, 200 Winston Drive, #1415 Cliffside Park, New Jersey 07010.

3. The Cincinnati Women's conference is getting organized. Women members from Louisville, Bloomington, Indianapolis, and St. Louis are supposed to attend. ALL WOMEN CONTACTS, of either the men or women should be encouraged to attend, unless it conflicts with going to the TDU convention. The sessions will be on revolutionary feminism; Bobbi H. from Chicago and Anna P. from Cincinnati will be giving the session on Black women in White America; Hopefully (not everyone has been contacted or agreed to this yet) the panel on organizing women workers will be a woman from the R ed Tide on the special oppression of younger women, Deborah R. who will chair and talk about the role and importence of the women's cauc us, Mary B. talking about organizing women workers in telephon. We hope to have another wo man either f rom steel, postal or auto speak about building rank and file caucuses and why; the relationship of our women's and trade union work to revolutionary politics. In the evening we will be showing the Film Union Maids, All of you should have seen the leaflet in the Women's bulletin.

4. We are planning to put out more literature between now and Christmas. We are thinking of short pamphlets on women's oppression, the family, women and socialism as well as the general pamphlet on working women fight back.

5. At the Cctober 2,3, NC, there will be a meeting of the expanded women's commission. The expanded women's commission consists of the present women's commission, Barbara, Sara and Enid, as well as Bobbi H. and Lisa A., Anne M (IBT), Lindsey(CWA), and the vomen on the steel steering committee. We will be evaluating our work, but the major agenda item will be on perspectives fo recruitment of Black women.

6. The only new women's caucus report is that the Seattle vomen's caucus is planning a dinner meetin on women under apartheid. We are sending them information. If other groups wish to do the same, please write or call.

Barbara W., for the Women's Commission 1 September, 1976.

## SEATTLE

Although the Seattle branch is smaller and less experienced than before the convention due to comrades heading east, work in many important areas remains. Half our members are in industry, but we are spread out in four unions. In each of these places we have potential.

Recently, Eric H. spent two days in the branch helping us work out perspectives and recruitment plans. He met with the organizer, the exec members and fraction convenors to examine every area of work and make reccomendations. As a result we are now working on an educational program for the exec and a clearer political direction for each fraction.

One of the biggest problems is the lack of a stable and good sized perifery. We have fairly regular public forums and invite contacts to branch meetings, but this hasn't been enough. To help in this we are planning a series of less formal "living room forums" to complement our public ones. We hope to be able to develop members and contacts as speakers and to have a place to regularly bring our contacts.

We just recently had a forum about garment workers given by a Bay Area member that was very good except for the turnout. We have plans for other forums now into fall ranging from an analysis of events in South Africa, to an informal one of "public employees and the right to strike" to a panal and a slide show on a history of the Seattle general strike. We also are planning to make use of a number of good films we have recently heard about.

We have completed the basic and advanced education classes and are now working on a new series.

Our women's caucus continues to be very valuable to our work, holding monthly dinner meetings.

We have one new member since the convention and hope to have several more soon.

The exec discussed Workers' Power and would like to relate some of our experience and ideas. Our branch has consistently used W.P. We have regular and a good number of sales in each of the important areas of work. We plug it at our forums and use it with our contacts.

However, we believe the depoliticization in the organization has affected the paper. It is not so much that the paper has fallen in quality, but it doesn't seem to have grown and developed as much as our work has. With the circulation drive coming up and the fall recruitment campaign coming soon, we want to make sure the paper is as valuable tool as we can make it.

From out here, it seems that we don't have consistent and well-planned coverage for our major areas of work. For example, there won't be any articles on postal work for up to months and then there will be four articles in one issue. This applies generally to the other fractions as well. We realize we can't (yet) plan out exciting events for stories, but still more consistent planning is necessary.

There have been some outstanding articles that have helped us quite a bit that we feel should be used as a model for a more political paper. These include Talking About Socialism, the book review about women in South Africa, the first What Do Women Want column, and the article that was titled "Advances on the Job" with more consistent reporting from the fractions. More articles like these could make the paper become more effective. Bayt Area

This branch is going through a major political re-evaluation this summer. This has been sparked by a rapid turn-over of branch membership and leadership -- three branch leaders are moving to other branches, and one is on a leave of absence. The branch is also trying to sort out anexplanation for the TDC defeat here, and chart a new course for the industrial work.

One thing that became clear is that the branch is ubable to support "satellite" operations, such as the sugar work based in Sacramento. The resources farmed out we to the Valley are now in great demand here in the Bay Area. The branch has asked the EC to allow us to bring two comrades back who were working there.

A long-term branch perspectives has been adopted by the exec, and is going before the branch on Aug. 22. It stresses three political themes: placing industrial agitation at the center of our work, strengthening democratic centralism in the exec and fraction structures, add rasing the political level of the branch.

The IBT work is the main priority and holds the best long-run promise. While we are nearly frozen out of freight due to the TDC defeat there, we still have good bases in warehouse, parcel and beer. The role of the Fifth Wheel is being evaluated, with options of less frequent and less comprehensive coverage under consideration in order to emphasize local bulletins and agitation. The perspective is to add resources to the Vraction and make an all-out effort to get more jobs.

The branch has become the national postal fraction center, and center for the poublication of the national postal newspaper. Our best chances of immediate worker recruitment are in the bulk center. The possibilities for rank and file growth and agitation are good, but complicated by the presence of sectarian groups in the post office here.

The organizing drive in a small garment factory here is proceeding well and is being given full branch support. More than a dozen workers, speaking several different languages, attend the meetings of the workers' committee. A union representation election (with ILGHU) is coming up in the fall. After that, we will begin to phase out the work, in order to fully focus on national priorities.

The method of assigning every member to an industrial fraction and assigning other political responsibilities (such as MP sales) to individuals has *htp* not worked well. Because of that and due to the need to strengthen branch training and the use of MP, we are setting up a MP & Education Committee. It will organt e general branch education, MP sales and coverage, and political campaigns such as Portugal or South Africa.

We are also setting up a temporary "Jobs Committee" to systematize and hack up our job-hunting, and draw a complete industrial "map" of the region.

The branch is smaller that ever before. But the industrial base is stronger and there are fewer obstacles to building a workers' branch than ever.

## SAINT LOUIS NEWS

The biggest gains since the convention have been in the area of industrialization, One new member who is in the process of moving to St. Louis has already gotten a temporary CWA job. Another is getting casual work in the freight local. A new industrial coordinator is helping other members apply to priorities which may be hiring and we are x optimistic about the possibility of making further gains.

In addition, activity has begun to increase in our two most relevant work places: CWA and welfare. In CWA, the Gary Tyler issue has been well received and may link up ± with attempts to raise issue of racism on the job. And the fact that another comrade has been hired will strengthen the fraction considerably. In welfare, the offensive has been felt through speed-up and forced transfers. Our comrades are involved in fielding an alternative union slate in the upcoming election, along with other forces in the local.

IN general, there continues to be an air of sluggishness in the branch. This is revealed in the failure of the Gary Tyler work to take off (there is a functional committee but includes few besides ourselves) and in the sales of WP, which continue to be embarrasingly low. The fact that several key comrades have announced plans to leave the area has not helped reduce the lethargy. The branch division of labor has been reorganized, including a new WP coordinator and we expect this to contribute to improved branch functioning. In addition, it should be noted that the summer fund drive is being taken quite seriously and appears to be going well.

Overall, the branch has made some significant gains since the convention but has not fully realized the potential it possesses.

Report from the Madison Organizing Committee

for those persons who show an interest in our politics.

Madison dropped from a branch to an organizing committee shortly before the IS convention when two comrades left for Cincy and Indy. Now two more comrades are moving to Indy and Gary leaving only three members in Madison.

Due to the lack of industry in the city, which is primarily a university and government center, the Madison IS will be modeled somewhat after Bloomington. In the past year we had very little prescence in the University and most of our activities centered around TDC and UPSURGE. We started a TDC chapter in Madison which led to the starting of a TDC chapter in Milwaukee. Though neither chapter was very active they did provide a network of contacts for TDC in Wisconsin which was useful in the Schneider strike. However our industrial work did not continue because we had no industrialized comrades who could maintain a prescence in the Teamsters local. The problem we faced at that point was that we had no continuing work to fall back on when the campaigns ended. We plan to correct this in the next year.

At the beginning of the fall semester the IS will have a literature table during student registration to help make the IS known on campus. Then there will be an IS forum every 4 to 6 weeks on subjects of interest to the left tendency. Comrades look at this as good experience in planning and carrying out public meetings, learning to speak in public, and developing a periphery around the Madison IS. There will also be an IS study group to expand on our politics INDIANMPC LIS

We have Leen organizational problems since the conventionbut we think these problems are on their Way to being solved. Building a new branch requires building a functioning leadership and we had neither a functioning exector a developing cadre. We have shift differences and feel the lack of an organizer. After the convention though we Legan a campaign around limited of jectives; selling Workers' Power and statting a study group. We have kegun selling WP in the Black community and have been very successful. We are also maintaining our factory gate sales. We have started a branch advenced education course and have different sections for different shifts. The course covers a wide range of our politics seen through historical events.

The branch meetings are not going well at all. Discussion is poor and comrades feel that they could not bring contacts to such a meeting. Cur periphery is small and our three contacts are all men in an already predominantly male k rand. However, all our comrades are industrialized successfully in priority industries. We also have good **xxmicrotypic/Kickold** contact possibility in IBT and CWA and we're planning a UA meeting soon to enlarge our periphery. Cur UPSurge work is very demoralized but we're hoping to re-estak lish ties by having Ann speak here on the UPSurge work. Marquette Park had a good effect on the branch. We're sending people to the TDU convention where we hope to estak lish more ties. The kranch has **xoo**da growing collective understanding of our problems and we are making plans to correct these problems. While you have plans you are never defeated

Indianapolis IS Exec

## Dear Comrades;

What follows is our reply to a letter sent to the Canadian IS by the ISGB. The letter from the ISGB (1) criticizes the policy of industrialization of non-worker members; (2) calls for abandoning the idea of concentrating on priority industries; and (3) recommends recruitment of students and "white collar workers" as a first step in the recruitment of industrial workers.

The ISUS holds the view that industrialization is important aspect in our transformation from a middle-class sect to a workers' combat organization. We believe that industrialization should be carried out by other socialist groups who share many of the same tasks of proletarianization. We also believe in the necessity of industrial priorities to focus the limited resources of a small revolutionary organization, and in a policy of concentrating recruitment on industrial workers.

Here is both the ISGB letter to the Canadian IS, and the ISUS's reply to it.

To: Canadian IS, (copies to ISUS/IS Australia

6, Cottons Gdns., London E2 8DN 23rd June

Dear Comrades,

Just a couple of thoughts about your "Industrial Policy Evaluation" document, in particular on your re-assessment of industrialisation.

The general statement that "industrializati n was... an industrial strategy, rather than... a necessary tactic" goes in the right direction, but doesn't, in our opinion, go far enough.

We would suggest that not only is the policy of industrialization as a whole a substitutionist policy, but that as a result it is a wrong tactic with very dangerous consequences.

You write that "it is a crucial step in developing worker contacts in our priority unions and proletarianizing the organization". Our experience is exactly contrary to that. In general industrialized comrades in British IS have been (1) A barrier to developing worker contacts; and (2) The bearers of the most conservative politics within IS that in turn has held back the building of a workers' organization.

## Substitutionism

Quite rightly, you argue that if conceived of as a strategy, industrialization is a profoundly persimistic and (in our opinion) reactionary view of the working class. Revolutionary socialist leadership has to be injected from the outside! But as a short-term tactic- to make contacts, to "breathe" the class atmosphere- it just doesn't work.

In order to get to the position where an industrialized comrade can make the contacts, reflect the life of the class back inside IS etc, takes time. At least

one year, more like two or there years in most cases. In other words, what might be seen as a tactic for the organization is in reality a strategy for the individual.

The inevitable follows. The belief that you are somehow a necessary ingredient to the self-emancipation (or rise in the level of struggle) of your fellow workers gains force. It increasingly expresses itslef in a conservative assessment of the capacity of your fellow workers to fight back; and finally it leads to political adaption on the part of the industrialized comrade to whatever dominant convervative (right wing) politics that are around.

In Birmingham in 1974/75, two industrialized students were the organizing centre of the right opposition in British I.S. that finally led to the split in December last year. They had capitulated to the politics of the Communist Party,

In Coventry today, a district that in 1972/73 was one of the foremost of our working class districts, with a workers' leadership and real local strength, industrialized students now dominate the District Committee. The worker base has been smashed and Coventry was the only District that moved against the Right to Work March earlier this year, and which at a post-Conference aggregate last week rejected the national perspectives. An excellent former IS organizer, now a shop steward in a local factory, is the driving force cohering the rightist tendency there. One expression of this on the DC was the statement from one of these industrialized comrades that "workers don't have to sell S!" on the streets";

It's not that these comrades are 'bad' comrades. It's just that they are forced to try and cover up their substitutionist feelings by pulling their politics down to an "acceptable" lower common denominator. They hedge their bets for what appears "safe".

One or two comrades dotted around the country or an industry who have industrialized and become conservatized doesn't do much damage. But there are real dangers for us in Coventry today (and were real dangers in Birmingham last year) when these comrades get together in an area or an industry. They become the centre of right wing political opposition. (lest of the 'workers' who signed our FRED faction document this year were industrialized students, for example.)

We would therefore argue that even as a tactic, industrizlization has really big dangers attatched.

Building a Morkers' Organization

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If industrialization today incures that you've got a conservative factional opposition tomerrow, then how do we argue for building a workers' organization?

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The first thing is to forget any nonsense about "British workers always being socialist" or about how "British IS always had workers". The 40% of IS members who are manual workers, and the 50% who are white collar workers were recruited in 1971-3 and 1969-72 respectively. And they weren't recruited because there were other workers already in IS. They were recruited because the non-worker IS fought from the outside to win workers to our politics with our paper.

We assumed that in every strike one striker in a thousand was really interested in revolutionary socialist politics. Haybe you had to go to ten strikes of a hundred workers each to find the real worker who really reckoned Socialist Worker and would be ready to talk. If so, that's what we did. All strikes, any strikes. We didn't argue about "priorities". We just worried about where the class was moving. If it was among teachers, we went there. If it was moving among dustcart drivers, we went there. And by pushing and pulling, we brought a few workers into IS. We then had to re-shape ourselves to resemble much more closely a real workers' organization (making IS "habitable" to workers was the slogan), and we were then poised to make big gains in the rise in class struggle in 1972/74.

This is what "proletarianizing" an org<sub>a</sub>nization is really about. Exstudents, however long they have worked in a factory are not proletarians. Indeed, they often make the atmosphere in a branch smell funny. The "In my factory" speech from AUEN BSC (econ) actually acts to push genuine worker militants away. The revolutionary party recruits its first workers on its politics, not on its promises of thenumber of 'workers' who are around.

So, our conclusions remain those we wrote you in February, after your Convention. Namely that you should see your paper as the key to building a workers' organization. Around it you can pull the first necessary handful of workers. But you'll only get them if you've recruited enough students, teachers white collar workers, etc., to be able to establish your sale regularly in the streets and outside factories.

You must also train your membership to relate to the workers to whom they're selling the paper. That does mean some should make a speciality of knowing about safety, others about the pay freeze laws, labour courts, etc., etc.,. You have to fight to get workers to give interviews to the paper, to identify with it as much as is possible. IS factory bulletins are a vital way of learning how to raise our politics in specific situations. But above all, you've got to be flexible. You've got to build the group to understand that you must go to the class. It won't come to you, and nor can you transform yourselves into it.

In February I wrote raising some critical questions about one key example that appeared to contradict my argument: the excellent Teamster work of our American comrades. Everything that I've heard since bears out that TDC and TDU are tremendous examples of rank and file work in fantastically difficult situations. But notwithstanding, it doesn't alter my analysis one little bit. Maybe the recruitment and paper sales did take place; maybe the industrialized comrades are still way out in front, carrying the politics of the organization, rather than the politics of their milieu. This certainly still appears to be the case. However, I'll still stick to the argument I wrote you in February. Wait and see. Sooner or later, I fear, a Birmingham/Coventry syndrome will appear and an unnecessary fi ht will have to be waged.

> د. موجد که

Yours fraternally, Best of luck with your NC, Steve Jefferys

## ISUS REPLY:

## Why the ISUS Industrialized

The ISUS was formed in 1969, with the perspective of building the revolutionary party of the American working class. The vast majority of its members were young people who had become revolutionaries in the student anti-war movement. The ISC (its organizational predecessor) had Leen a student group. Like similar groups throughout the world, the political practice of our tendency had been divorced from the working class for over 20 years. Cur politics were rusty, abstract and distorted through the years of isolation from the labor movement. The political life of the organization was characteristically middle class--an intellectual talk shop with a multiplicity of factions kazed on every conceivable question.

We did understand, however, that for the IS to even begin to build a workers' party, the entire atmosphere inside the organization had to be transformed. Transformed to recruit and transformed by recruiting. The internal life of the organization would have to center around our work in the class not on endless internal discussions.

The question of industrialization must be seen in this context, a group outside the working class trying to find a way in. Industrialization is not a substitute for developing a working class leadership. It is not a strategy for injecting an artifical layer of revolutionaries into the working class, nor is it a substitute in any way for recruiting workers.

Industrialization is a step, one of the first we made, in entering the working class, developing a periphery and recruiting. Industrialization was not decided on by appealing to timeless principle. It is possible to recruit workers from the outside on the basis of political ideas. But that depends on objective conditions, working class consciousness, and the stage of development of the revolutionary organization. In Portugal, to take the opposite pole, it is clearly not necessary to industrialize in order to take part in the class struggle and build the party. In the United States today, it is necessary.

We came to this conclusion reluctantly, when every semmingly easier possibility proved to lead nowhere. We only did so after years of trying to recruit from the outside (1967-73). In some tranches, we are still forced to do this. In 1971 we also began a policy of industrialization--at first quite restricted and experimental. It was the success of this policy, and the failure of the others which lead us unequivocally to adopt industrialization as a policy.

In trying to kuild a workers' organization from the outside, we tried many ways to approach the working class. We did strike support work. We sold newspapers at factories, at strikes, and at union meetings. We became active trade unionists in those social

layers whose life is closest to that of petit bourgeois intellectuals (school teachers, social workers, civil service workers, etc.). Through these positions, we kecame active in trade union kodies which included industrial workers. We were active in trade union committees against the Vietnam war, trade union women's groups, etc. We got elected to trades' councils (at one point, we had 9 members on the San Francisco and Oakland labor councils). Members taught trade union courses at labor education centers. Everything was tried to make contact from the outside before deciding on the difficult task of industrialization.

Cutside work lead to only the occasional contact or recruit among industrial workers. They were mainly the workers able to join an intellectual, white collar group, and be able to be integrated into that milieu. Occasionally we could recruit workers directly from a single strike experience. Yet it was usually impossible to retain such workers in an organization whose activities, politics, and internal life did not center around the industrial working class.

It was only the limitations of outside work that forced a group of intellectuals to the hard decision that, if they were going to kuild a workers' organization, it would ke necessary to kreak out of the limitations of middle class occupations, pressures, and life styles. We had to transform the whole organization--which could not be done from the outside. We had to go to school in the working class, to relearn the politics of our tendency in the only way possible--by directly taking part in the life and struggle of the working class. Our politics had to be corrected by the class struggle. They had to be more than the abstractions of outsiders, "politicals," who don't feel the pressure--including the necessray "conservative" pressure--of the workers in determining their policy, strategy and tactics.

We had to develop a leadership and cadre whose political life is focussed around industry. Only in this way is it possille to develop a leadership capable of giving a lead on industrial and trade union questions. From the outside, it is impossible to take the middle class intellectuals who form the first cadres of the organization and turn them into a leadership capable of leading a workers' organization. This is ture not just of the ISUS. A significant part of the Central Committee of the ISGB is made up of ex-industrialized radicals who would not be capable of giving an industrial lead if they had not had direct experience inside the factories and unions.

Industrialization proved to be the key to putting out a successful newspaper. It is directly linked to a group of workers who sell it in their factories, to link it to their struggles, who can correct it. A newspaper cannot be the organizer of the work when the only work is outside. The paper as well then lacks focus, consistency, concreteness, and roots. It has to say everything in one issue, because it will probably not be seen again.

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Industrialization allowed not only to recruit workers but to integrate them. We becan to recruit not just workers who were intellectuals and isolated from their fellow workers, kut militants who could not be recruited or retained ky kranches dominated by students, intellectuals, and white collar workers. This milieu, whatever its other virtues, is usually incapable of educating worker militants. Since they don't understand the life of the factories, they tend to avoid any concrete disgussions of industrial work and policy to avoid exposing their ignorance. They try to keep the life of the branch devoted to safe topics of political abstraction, where they can shine. Incapable of giving the new worker recruits a concrete lead, they tend to fall into the trap of crude workerism. They romanticize the workers-they think that the worker recruits are already revolutionary trade unionists who have keen spontaneously developed and only need for completion what the revolutionary aroup can provide, political ideas. To be sure, these workers need ideas and theory. But particularly in countries where the political and organizational traditions of the class are weak, they also have to learn how to put our ideas into practice, how our theories are implemented in struggle. And that requires an organization able to answer not just grand political strategy, but one with the necessary experience and ability to be able to educate its working class recruits. It must be able to win and discipline working class militants on how to carry party policy in their day-to-day factory and union work. And that will never be achieved by intellectuals from the outside.

The most important aspect of industrialization was that it made it possible to carry out the building of rank and file groups. Rank and file work is our key strategic conception of how to build a party. It is the exact opposite of outside work, and can only be carried out by insiders. It is slow, tedious, ung lamourous work. Cur comrades and organization are there every day--andthat is the key to our success. We are not just there at high points of struggle when consciousness leaps. We are also there giving leadership during the long, hard, slogging of everyday work so frustrating to an outsiders' group which, ky its nature, is designed to chase up "exciting strikes" (and we have led our share of those as well), but is not there during the long period of "quiet" when consciousness is slowly changed, when a leadership is slowly developed, when contacts are turned into recruits.

Rank and file work is extremely primitive today. It is the organization of workers in the most elementary form, so that they can struggle over some aspects of control over their working lives. But it is these struggles which introduce them to the politics of the workers' movement. Through these rank and file groups, our members are able to show themselves as militants, to gain the respect of their fellow workers, to prove themselves and their politics in practice. Our comrades do the patient work of providing a lead on the very small, unheroic struggles of everyday factory life. It is this which develops them as leaders with the respect of their fellow workers. It is this which allows them to patiently introduce politics at the appropriate moments.

It is the rank and file groups which allow us to recruit on the basis of showing the power of our ideas in practice, and which are also an important arena in which to politically train our working class recruits as leaders.

These rank and file groups are not just auxiliaries of the party. They are broader, autonomous workers' organizations with lives of their own, in which working class consciousness is developed, and which are also an arena for us to prove our politics and win militants to the IS. While they are autonomous workers' organizations, the backbone of them are the revolutionaries, the IS. They could not at this time in the US be organized or sustained by trade union militants without revolutionary perspectives or revolutionary organization. The spine of the rank and file groups is the IS. To build them we needed a cadre for them. We sent that cadre into industry, to build the rank and file. They are now recruiting and training a cadre out of these rank and file groups, the cadre that will kuild the workers' party. Perhaps in the early days of the movement, it might have been possible to organize this from the outside. Today, with an entrenched union bureaucracy and machine, we maintain that this can only be built from the inside. The first line of demagogery of that bureaucracy is to charge outsiders' interfering for their own interests, without the interests of the workers. Usually they are effective in cordoning off the revolutionaries from the workers. We have overcome this by not being outsiders. We are known to cur fellow workers by our everyday presence as rank and file activists, fighting with them the employers and the union machine. Indeed in some instances where we did excellent, consistent outside work (such as in the post office), insiders, with different politics, not just the bureaucracy, were able to effectively isolate us because of their daily involvement and activity.

Even the most cursory glance at the record of the ISUS will confirm the success of our industrialization strategy over the past few years. From the experience we gained in the seven-month New York telephone strike back in 1971 to the success of the IS-led Teamsters for a Decent Contract (TDC) this year, there is a history of steady progress. In auto, steel, trucking, and telephone, IS members, usually industrialized, have built rank and file organizations and recruited. Today, they put out over 25 rank and file newspapers and bulletins, for rank and file groups in different cities, as well as nationally. It is an achievement which only occurred through the strict concentration of our small forces on these industrial priorities.

Even in the arena where we have been least successful in sustaining strong and developing rank and file organization, the New York telephone company, we have nonetheless gained great advantage for the organization as a whole from the policy we pursued. Witness the fact that, both the newly appointed National Black Crganizer, and the first worker member of our National Committee came from the New York CWA.

The best proof of our overall success is contained in the ISGB letter itself, where it is admitted in the final paragraph that the experience of the ISUS in the teamsters union at least "appeared" to contradict the rest of the ISGB argument. This contradiction is passed over with the comment that an "unnecessary (internal) fight will have to be waged."

While it is true that there would have been no possibility of such a fight if we had not industrialized in the largest union in the world, if we had not created the movement which forced the first national freight strike in American history, if we had not laid the basis for an on-going national opposition in the teamsters union, if we had not turned our members and sympathizers into nationally-known and respected rank and file leaders, and if we had not started to recruit to the revolutionary politics of the IS small numbers of working teamsters.

. . .

It is also true that this possibility of an "unnecessary fight" is an insignificant danger compared with the danger of being an irrelevant sect with no influence in the class struggle. There are real and difficult problems in making the transition to a workers' combat organization, but we in the ISUS prefer to face those problems rather than the problems of political impotence and sectarian irrelevance that we would have faced if we had not decided to industrialize our predominantly middle class, student membership of the early seventies.

The problems that we now have are welcome ones--when compared with the problems we had before we industrialized. They are the problems of an organization with roots in industry and success in rank and file work. They cannot be avoided-except in the pure world of the intellectual sect. One of our major problems is that as insiders we are linked to the level of class struggle. When struggle inside the factories goes slowly, it has its impact on us, and produces difficulties. So be it.

A second problem is that we now have to work out a much more mature trade union policy and tactic than we were accustomed to. This is the result of our successful rank and file work. But this process is uneven, and at times only develops from struggle, including internal struggle.

Lastly, we have now succeeded in creating an organization in which industrial work is not separate from the political life of the organization. It means that real trade union difficulties and problems are what are discussed, decided, and struggled around. All to the good. This would be true whether or not the trade union comrades were industrialized radicals or not. The problems that we have are the problems of an organization which has finally succeeded in penetrating the unions. The hint that these problems and difficulties are unnecessary ones that could be avoided by outside work, is either extremely naive, or falls into a crude workerism that believes that indigenous trade unionists have no problems in their union work, or linking it with party policy.

The ISGB's argument against industrialization is that industrialized comrades will inevitably form a "conservative faction--an opposition." That they will necessarily carry the politics of their more conservative milieu into the IS. They highlight this argument with talk of "unnecessary fights."

This argument or danger, however, applies to any and every person who is in the position of leading workers more conservative than themselves. Comrades who do not feel these pressures are simply not in dialogue with the workers around them. Cne of the essential features of our conception of the party is that these pressures are reflected and combatted inside the organization. This is the only way that the party can arm its industrial members with the politics to combat the conservatism around them. If a group is incapable of this internal education and struggle, its industrial membership will either drop out or form an opposition.

To overcome the pressures to adapt, our members are forced to be open revolutionaries in their shops. They have to sell the newspaper in their factories and defend its politics. They have to bring IS politics into their rank and file work. While we have difficulties at times in accomplishing this, we have been successful in building an organization which can handle and struggle against the tendency to adapt.

It is true that there are differences between the reactions of industrialized workers and indigenous workers to the conservative pressures around them. By virtue of their greater experience and higher level of acceptance in the working class, indigenous workers are generally better able to avoid accomodation to that pressure. It is equally true that by virtue of their middle class education and experience in revolutionary politics, the industrialized workers generally feel more confident to articulate within the organization the pressures they are under.

But it remains the case that, contrary to the implication in the ISGB letter, indigenous workers do not possess magical powers, nor are they born bolsheviks. Such a view runs counter to the experience of any organization that has real experience in the working class. At times we have problems in establishing party control over trade union work. But such problems are not due to the sociological background of the comrades involved. They are due to the political level of the comrades, the organization, and the class struggle.

The fact of the matter is that everyone is under pressure to adapt to their milieu, not least of all intellectuals who have not industrialized and are under the much greater conservative pressure of petit bourgeois and white collar imilieu. The pressures that these comrades introduce into the revolutionary organization are a much greater danger than if these comrades get industrial jobs and try to integrate themselves into the industrial proletariat. Indeed, let us be clear that those comrades who have industrialized, and the indigenous workers they have recruited, are the advanced element of the IS. The backward branches are those that did not industrialize.

In conclusion, our difference with the ISGB is not that every observation they make about industrialization is totally wrong, but that they elevate these observations to the level of a general theory which throws out the baky with the Eath water. The supposed ineviatbility of conservatism among industrialized radicals is used to justify a policy of outside work, with all of its problems, conservatisms, and fights glossed over. We would maintain that the experience of comrades in small, intellectual groups in Australia, Ireland, 'Canada, and Germany is probably closer to our own experience than that of the ISGB, but that the prestige of the ISGB is being given to a policy which will hold the development of other IS groups ky avoiding the horrors of industrialization, and instead being assured that it is easier for intellectuals to build a workers' organization from the outside.

## Why the ISUS Has Priorities

The ISGB letter also rejects the idea of industrial priorities. To quote, "We didn't argue about priorities. We just worried about where the class was moving." Our perspective of industrializing members in pspecific, limited zreaareas is part of our strategic conception of building a rank and file movement in the trade unions--"class struggle unionism."

Every working class has its sectors which are more militunt, better organized, whose activity sets an example of struggle for the rest of the class. The North American working class is no exception. Movement among auto workers, for example, has much more impact on general consciousness of American workers and the politics of the American labor movement than smillsimilar activity among retail clerks.

Prioritization is part of a strategy for building a base where the workign class is at its strongest. It is a way to concentrate our limited resources where they can, over time, have the most impact. We don't see how a small group which is chasing every manifestation of activity quan possible pust into practice a longterm strategy or build on any short-term successes in scattered areas of work.

The final section of the letter outlines a plan for "building a workers organization". We could not agree more with the importance of the newspaper. But, to follow the logic of the letter, if workers are to buy it it must be sold. "You'll only be able to get them (the workers) if you've recruited enough students, teachers, white collar workers etc. to be able to establish your sale regularly. First, recruit the middle-class sellers, so they can

then recruit the working class buyers, goes the theory.

This is the most dangerous advice the letter cantains. For the Canadian IS it demands a toward the University Left and weak white collar sector in a period of rising class strugg in Canada. What will ke the class pressures on our comrades involved in this kind of political work? It is far healthier to be grappling with the conservatism of the working class, even if it is reflected first through industrialized members, than to be wallowing in the student left. At some point, a decisive turn to the working class will again be in order. How many fights with petite bourgeoise tendencies will be necessary then?

These will also ke fights for which both the newspaper and the leadership will be ill-prepared. For the logic of the advise is to return to a general propaganda role, to gain no experience in day-to-day shop floor agitation, and to try to kuild in the working class around a paper which carries its politics on the level of akstract generalisations. Both the ISUS's experience and the greater experience of the ISGB demonstrated conclusively that the road to building a workers party lies in the direction of agitation, not in the direction of the commentary of a middleclass group on events in the working class.

## CONCLUSIONS

A large part of the arguement against industrialization revolves around the concept of "substitutionism", the situation in which non-workers substitute their own leadership for a genuine worker leadership in some area of industrial struggle. Our experience has been that this "problem" is largely non-existant, non-existant because some of the observations of the difficulties of industrialization that the ISGB make are accurate. There is bound to be at least some minor tendency amongst the industrialized members to "tail" the class. This tendency has to be fought by the central leadership, but it must be recognized that it is a tendency which is at odds with the tendency to substitutionism. Indeed, the spectre of substitutionism is invariably raised by the most conservative elements as a cover for an unwillingness to give a lead. Certainly no strategy for implanting an organization in the working class should be blocked because of fear of that vague and amorphous deviation, "substitutionism".

Nor can a real strategy for implantation in the class rest in pointless bravado about the ease of building from the outside. It is not easy. It was not easy in Britain, nor is it easy in the USA. For we have considerable experience at working from the outside even now. There are several branches which, because of the depression, have not been able to get their members into priority industries. Their success at working from the outside is less than our success at working through industrialization.

This is the case despite the fact that over the last two years they have been able to follow the prescription of the ISGB and sell our paper at the gates. The British IS is going to service to IS (Canada) by consistently downplaying the difficulties the ISGB has had in their own "outside" work, and the difficulties we in the ISUS have had, too. A year after the whole ISUS was mobilized around a campaign over the postal contract, we are still only in the position of having a half a dozen caucuses attached to our national rank and file paper, and only a handful of postal workers

are members of the IS.

If the ISGB continues the Canadian IS off the road to proletarianization through a policy of industrialization, it must take the responsibility it has so far avoided to

assist these comrades in developing an alternative strategy. This is the responsibility that

goes along with being leaders of an international tendency. Our tendency will not

go far unless the ISGB learns to improve its international functioning. It is not sufficient to shoot from the hip or automatically assume that what is good for Britain is good for North America. For example, it is fact of American working class life that the plants contain many, many graduates who entered with no other thought than making a living. This in itself would lead the ISGB, if it were as interested in asking questions ds it is in giving answers, to at least reasses its crude position on industrialization, priorities and student recruitment.

We should conclude be saying that the ISUS's policy for transforming our organization into the embryo of a workers' party starts from the weakness of the situation facing the revolutionary left internationally at the end of the post-war boom. It was a position of fantastic weakness and we have developed a temporary strategy of industrialization and priorities for overcoming this weakness. It is not the only possible road, and it certainly isn't permanent. But it is working for us and we think it is worthy of serious consideration by our comrades in Canada and Australia, and perhaps even Ireland and Germany. Certainly these comrades should not outline their strategy on the basis of a scetchy xood letter from Britain. We would urge all our fraternal organizations to make these letters available to the membership and allow a delate on these questions.

Executive Committee ISUS

"sent out to no for comment Tuesday Aug 17 Comments back by Wed Aug 25

## CANADIAN IS: A REPORT TO IS-US MEMBERS

As comrades will know from earlier reports, Canadian IS has been in process of moving away from the perspective of industrialization adopted at their initial founding Convention. This change has now been formalized, and a new general perspective adopted by the group. The purpose of this report is to inform IS-US members of the decisions adopted at the August 28-29 Canadian IS membership conference, which I attended as a fraternal delegate from IS-US, and to indicate what we believe the political implications are.

The conference was attended by about 85% of the group's membership. It was a iginally scheduled as an NC meeting, but the NC voted to dissolve itself and have a full membership conference instead in order to fully discuss the group's new perspective and direction.

# 1. FROM INDUSTRIALIZATION TO NEWSPAPER INTERVENTION

Canadian IS was pretty much totally defeated in its effort to launch and sustain an industrialization campaign. There were a number of reasons that contributed to this, including: a lack of leading members personally going into industry to lead the group there; the weakening of the group by a split, which was caused by the irresponsibility and personality-clique behavior af one of the group's original leading members; and the vastlyinflated expectations of quick successes with which they tried to industrialize. At a steel plant around which they tried to build their first industrial campaign, their member was fired and totally isolated because he tried to carry out an adventurist perspective with no base. They also ran into the same problem which took us years of painful struggle to begin to solve, especially being unable to make non-industrialized members function as part of an industrialized organization.

Certainly, the problems which the Canadian IS encountered were not entirely their own fault. Many of them were bound to happen. What is most important, however, is that in reaction to their setbacks the comrades have concluded that the industrialization perspective was the cause of everything that went wrong for them. In fact, their document which renounces industrialization clearly states: "It was the strategy of industrialization that was at the root of our problems." They now believe that sending people into industry, with industrial priorities, creates an organization that is concerned with its own members instead of the working class, that is too rigid to respond to struggles that break out in non-priorities, that is inherently conservative about raising politics with workers, encourages "petty brougeois to recruit worker militants who already have credibility" wastes the talents of "people in industry who could make more significant contributions elsewhere," and encourages "voluntarism" by assuming we can move the class into action by the force of our own will.

Theý indicate that they have been convinced of many, if not all, of these arguments, by the British IS. In place of the industrialization perspective, Canadian IS now has a perspective based on the following main points:

(i) Making contact with and recruiting workers from the outside through the use of their Newspaper (Workers' Action), primarily through strike support work and similar interventions. Also, to a limited extent, they believe theycan recruit students through their newspaper to this kind of work.

(ii) A clear sense that in doing this, theyare "breaking with the legacy of the American IS" and modelling themselves on the experience of British IS (or at least what they believe that experience to have been).

(iii) A clear rejection of the view which is central to our work that a small organization of revolution ary socialists can seriously lead struggles of workers at the level of actually initiating rank and file organizations or issue-oriented broad groups (such as TDC/TDU or CGC, etc., which they believe are apolitical and substitutionist). Instead of grand schemes of rank and file movement-building, the IS today should be laying the political basis for this by creating a political periphery for its ideas around the newspaper. Thus they explicitly consider themselves to be a "propaganda group" whose main goal is to "fight for ideas", although this should be done "in an an agitational way."

(iv) In the course of the past couple of months, they believe they have been demanstrating this approach through several strike support interventions (National Knitting Mills, Dresge Warehouse, Fruehauf and a know couple of others). Here theyhave met workers and in some case strikers have xakex asked for copies of the paper to sell to other strikers (e.g. one Kresge warehouse worker wants 40 copies of this issue.) They are extremely enthusiastic about these successes. In my opinion, what they don't realize is that all of this means absolutely nothing unless you prove you can acutally recruit these workers to your <u>organiza-</u> tion, not just your newspaper, and then create ongoing revolutionary trade-union and shopfloor activity at the workplace.

(v) All of the work of the group's work, political life and internal prgamozatopm os to be organized around that through the newspaper. In a certain sense, it could be almost said that the organization exists to distribute the newspaper- this is not a totally accurate characterization, but there is a strong element of it. In particular, I think the group doesn't understand that the influence of the newspaper is ultimately determined and limited by the actual weight of your organization inside the working class- not the other way around.

## II SOME OTHER ASPECTS OF CANADIAN IS AT THIS POINT

It should be pointed out that the group is totally unified, confident of its perspectives and apprears to be a genuine activist organization. The tone of the meeting was aggressive and very much on the up-beat. To some degree this is because of the recent crest of strike support work; also, to some degree, because many of the comrades who were demoralized because they felt theyhad no place in an organization committed to industrialization, now feel very sure of themselves and what they are supposed to do- i.e., take the paper to the picket lines, talk politics, make contacts, etc.

Cne aspect of the meeting was unquestionably a positive step forward. The group adoped a position on the world capitalist economy which clearly lays out the Permanant Arms Economy theory (in place of their previous eclectic views on economics), and applies it to development in post-war Canadian economy (in fact, I would recommend the sections on Canada to any comrades who want in introduction to the Canadian economic scine.)

On the other hand, there were two aspects of the meeting which were extremely disturbing and which I feel the IS-US membership should be informed of.

(i) The discussion of "Revolutionary Prospects in Southern Europe". With only a few digressions most of this discussion was devoted to all the things that are supposedly wrong with the PRP. I am pretty sure that any IS-US member who had attended that discussison, including those who agree with ot lean toward the criticism presented in Tony Cliff's articles, would have been as disturbed as I was. There was no sense of the actual dynamic of revolutionary struggle by Portuguese workers, a tremeddous ignorance of many of the most basic facts about the current situation, and above all, a total lack of any sense that the PRP are our comrades in any real way. On a formal level it was stated that we "support" the PRP because it's for b ilding wo rkers' councils and has done one or two other worthwhile things. In reality, however, the whole thrust of the discussion pretty much indicated that they consider the PRP more of an obstacle than an asset to creating a clear revolutionary leadership- although it wasn't posed on anywhere near that precise or scientific a level. The PRP was variously characterized as Castroite, substititionist abstentionist, building uncritical illusions in a populist general, ignoring the unions and so forthall based on a few isolated anecdotes, plus the usual sectarian attacks on the Carvalho campaign. Speaking as the fraternal delegate from IS-US (I was given full speaking rights for all sessions), I stated that this very nearly bordered on being a slander campaign against the PRP, of a type which I had never seen inside our movement. This was, if anything, an understatement.

Underlying this discussion is the fact that Canadian IS underestimates absolutely nothing at all about the meaning of mass politics inside the working class. They have no basis in theory or experience for understanding the real significance of, for example, the campaign for Carvalho or how worthless it would have been to run a PRP party candidtae. Of course, there is nothing disastrous about a young, inexperienced group adopting some mistaken positions, of which we have taken our share. The real danger, however, is that their approach can harden into a thorough right-wing, sectarian method.

Very much the same danger underlies the current attitude of Canadian IS members to the work of IS in the United States. This is basically summed up in their document on IANDUSTRIAL PER-SPECTIVES:

"Cur American comrades describe their current activity as 'mass work' when they are an organization of only 350 members with minimal roots in the working class. This conception has led them to construct grand schemes, the building of broad national contract coalitions in an attempt to mobilize broad sections of workers around limited demands. When broad sections of the class fail to respond to their demands in mass struggles, the coalitions are reduced to paper alliances with reformist bureaucrats. Finally, these alliances become a formula for 'mass work'. Instead of organizing a minority around their class struggle ideas and winning workers to revolutionary politics, this approach reduces their task to winning larger numbers of workers to reformist politics."

Tragically, this string of slanders and stupidities is not just an aberration in themind of a comrade writing a document. It appears to be a pretty worked-out view which was repeated to me by several comrades in lengthy discussions. Some of it is just the natural exaggerations that result from "breaking from the legacy of American IS"- but most of it is the product of the plain, brutal truth that our comrades haven't the first idea about what an actual rank and file movement or a revolutionary organization functioning inside the factories, actually look like.

## **III SOME CONCLUSIONS**

It is very clear that the turn oc the Canadian IS represente a setback for our perspective. We must

recognize that it places a big question mark over the ability of IS in Canada to become a serious projetarian organization. There is a danger that this turn may lay the basis for a semipermanant small sect of white callar workers and students, never getting beyond the outermost fronges of working class live and struggle. To a considerable extent, the problem of transforming the class composition of the organization has been dropped from any mention in its perspective.

This doesn't mean the group should be written off as hopeless. The fact that it has taken what we believe is a detouraround the central problem of creating a workers' organization, still leaves open the possibility that it will re-examine its perspectives in the light of practice and change its conclusions later on. There are a number of **comrades** in industrially relevant workplaces, for whom they want to develop perspectives. This could possibly turn out ot lay the basis for re-establishing work in industry.

We intend to continue fraternal relations with Canadian IS, without trying to hide or cover up differences. We will make it clear that we are not interested in any kind of polemics with them over industrial strategy- only in the test of practice. While we can have no confidence in the road they have chosen, whether it is right or wrong is now to be judged by the results it shows.

Dave F.

#### TREXEXXXXXXXX

#### IBT Fraction Report

The work of the Teamster fraction has probably been gone over and evaluated and re-evaluated more than most fraction work in the last three months. The convention went into it at length. Thus, this report will be somewhat brief. The steering committee does feel, however, that the discussion of Teamster work was hampered by our failure to produce a serious evaluations of the TDC and UPSurge Central States campaigns immediately following them.

The major task now facing the fraction is getting TDU off the ground, giving it some organizational coherence, and making the September Convention a success. The response to TDU has been very good and the response to the convention idea positive. But we are running into a contradiction that while sentiment seems to be flowing our way, it is very difficult turning that acceptance into real organization. Our efforts to have kick-off meetings in various cities as a means to build momentum for the convention has not been overwhelmingly successful. People report an enthusuastic response when publicizing for the meetings, but turnout has been disappointing. At this point we can still expect a reasonably large turnout at the convention from the feedback we've been getting.

What has also been happening has been a series of job actions where the idea of "the need to fight back against the employers' offensive" has become real. MDU and the fraction have been involved in the Associated Freight Line(LA) strike, Schneider Transportation(Wisconsin) strike, Westinghouse Transportation(Pitt.) strike, McLeans(West Middlesex, Pa.) strike, and the carhaulers(Detroit) strike. On the whole our interventions have been good and we are gaining valuable experiemce in getting the word out throughout a company, how to handle strike publicity, build communications in struggle, etc. But we have been stretched and have not always been on top of things. The Detroit carhaulers is an example. We gave their contract publicity in CONVOY, but very little real aid or tactical assistance until after Cincinnati had gone out and been defeated. Then Detroit was out and holding on and the Detroit fraction has been doing its best to stay on top of it, but the steering committee was not able to help in the any but a peripheral manner.

In addition, the East Coast UPS contract still bubbles along without a decisive strike or settlement. There was a short period of wildcats in South Jersey which spread to Philly, but these were not over the contract. Many UPSers thought they were, but this was not so. Indeed, their ability to survive and spread, even in the limited fashio they did, was due to the local president sanctioning the action, both as a show of strength and as part of a maneuver within the Eastern Conf. negotiating **Mis** hierarchy from which he has been excluded. UPSurge has been growing in the East and gaining in organizational strength and spreading into new areas, but it is not any where near strong enough to force the issue. Very little information about the real intentions of the company or the union is known. The contract expiration dates have all been confused, extended, mixed-up in this effort to amalgamate all the regional contracts into one. This uncertainty is a serious limitation.

Many comrades reading this will say, "This sounds fine, but none of that is happening where I am." This underlines one of our major problems--great unevenness among the different fractions. The **EXEMP** job situation has improved somewhat, but it is still diffiuclt for people to find jobs in locals where they can begin to really plug into the work, and build TDU, UPSurge, and the IS from an active, inside base. The steering committee sent out questionnaires to all the fractions asking about your situations in some detail so that we could better know your situation and help. We mailed in out 18 questionnaires and so far have gotten only 8 back. Not bad, but not good enough. It is also true that the steering committee has not had time to fully discuss those we do have, but we intend to use each one as the basis of discussing each fraction and its situation. We have begun to make good on our pledge to administrate the fraction more closely, but we have not gotten fully on top of it as yet. But there is also the responsibility of fractions to keep us informed. The monthly reports to the fraction bulletin are serious matters. We want to know in detail rate the situation in each fraction. We need those reports. (We will edit them for publication. It is not just the bulletin, but the information which counts.)

Resources continue to be a problem. Part of our inability to stay on top of fraction administration has been that the breaking events in the Teamsters and the enormous task of pulling together the TDU has kept the steering committee occupied fully. We have fewer people in Cloveland doing the work and many of the comrades who had been doing exclusively Teamster fraction work are now also involved with other, major responsibilities. We feel that getting on top of the fraction work itself will because a much higher priority once the convention is over.

And it is not only the fraction. Within TDU and UPSurge as well, there is a crying need to train rank and filess to become real cadre of the movement and take on serious responsibilities. We have talked constantly since spring of TDC of the need to spend time with individuals and really push them and work with them so as they know and understand the necessity and the nature of leadership responsibility in interval the norment. We have not had the time or resources to do this properly during the summer as we had hoped. (One thing we did learn though is that the summer is a hard time to really organize mass events and we should have foucsed much more of our efforts on this kind of smaller group and individual work so that by the time of the convention the number of fully committed and fully responsible TDU dadre would be greater than at present. Many people are "with us," but not enough understand what kind of responsibilities thatmeans locally in their area and nationally to the organizati on as a whole.)

Finally, in the area of recruitment the fraction is still weak. We have begun to build a strong IS periphery in only a few areas and even there recruitment is slow. However, it is true that with the greater acceptance of TDU by Teamsters and the known presents of the IS within TDU we are building roots for ourselves in this union which should lead to serious recruitment possibilities, when and where our fractions can really begin to carry out mass work in their local areas with some success.

# WEST VIRGINIA, SACRAMENTO AND ATLANTA

As part of the process of re-focusing the IS both politically and organizationally for the important period of the fall campaigns, the EC has decided, reluctantly to close down two areas of work. These are West Virginia and Sacramento, California

The perspective in West Va. <sup>Was</sup> building a branch in Charleston, and from there beginning work in the UNW. It is this perspective which cannot be continued at this time. This represents, of course, a serious set-back for us, nevertheless it must be done.

Our plans in ?W. Va., have involved two things. First, we had hoped to build a branch in Charleston. This seemed possible, indeed promising, when four young workers joined there and immediately enjoyed a number of successes; in strike support work, in Workers' Power sales in holding meetings, and in developing a perifery.

Second, wehhoped that through building this branch, we could begin to build a UNWA fraction, and that the branch, based on local people, would allow us to do this with a minimum of resources- only three experienced comrades went to W. Va. This failed, both ways. For largely personal reasons (though also because of the political demands of the situation) 4 out of 5 comrades who began the branch resigned, and with them went the group of contacts they had built.

At the same time, the UNWA situation proved to be more difficult than expected. It was, therefore, probably a mistake to think that work in the southern coalfields could be begun with only two or three comrades and this would have been the case, even had the Charleston branch survived. In fact, it became increasingly clear that even the first steps in the UNWA would demand far more resources, and in the end, the decision was made on this basis. The demands of other branches and fractions had to take priority.

There are of course other difficulties. The anti-communism in the UNA is very, very strong. For example, even today, after much time and some important successes, the RU remains underground. There is also geography. The industry is isolated, as are the miners, and this effects revolutionaries as well.

Still, it remains more clear than ever that the miners rank and file movement will be in the fore of the resurgence of the entire American labor movement, and consequently, that we will have to be thereas soon as possible. In the meantime, however, the comrades sent to W. Va., will be reassigned. We will continue to work with our W. A.L.'s in W. Va., and with them we will attempt to maintain our contacts, to use Workers' Power, and to spread the news of the miners' movement.

We will also step up our attempts to build connections with the miners through other rank and file activity, and in this case, we hope that representatives of the miners' strike committee will accept the invitation to the TDU founding convention in Kent, Ohio.

The Sacramento initiative had less significance in national terms but was none the less important as it represented an attempt to build an IS and solid rank and file presence around the pioneer work of a single member in the 5000 strong sugar industry. Given the upcoming contract expriation we decided some time ago to send two extra members from the Bay area to try and strengthen the rank and file work and build an IS presence in this part of California.

It became clear recently that in order to fulfill our initial perspective, even on the minimum level, more resources would be needed. They were just not available. Indeed given the continued necessity to bring commades from the West Coast to the his West it was also increasingly urgent to focus resources in our two main bases if the state, the Bay Area and L.A.

One comrade will remain, until the contract fight is completed, and we will attempt to give him some minimal backing from the Bay Area. The other comrades are being relovated, indeed one of them is already an exec member in charge of IBT work on the Bay Area exec. As can be seen, these two strategic retreats were necessary for much the same reasons- the organization is stretched too thin to be effective. The E had to take these unpalatable decisions, as it did the earlier decisions not to build in Biffalo and Eltimore at this time, in order to protect the organization from its overextension.

Omrades should be aware that the Atlanta/South perspective remains intact. By the end of this month, ten comrades will be in place in Atlanta. This will bring the number of new branches built in major cities over the last year to four : Indianapolis, ary, and the and the state.

> Cal W Ational Oganizer

## MARQUETTE PARK REPORT

Comrades who have not seen/read the Red <sup>T</sup>ide special on Marquette Park should do so. This report will not repeat infomration contained there, In particular, the Red Tide special includes a detailed time table of events leading up to the march.

Our involvement in Marquette Park began on July 17. Before that, we heard of the Nartin Luther King Jr. Novement and tried to participate in an earlier march, but it was so small we couldn't find it. On July 17, there were 150 marchers -90 black, 60 white. The arch had been granted a permit under Federal Court order and the court had also ordered the police to provide the march protection. Instead, the police allowed it to be a set-up. Twenty eight people went to the hospital with injuries after the march was attacked by hundreds of angry whites. We gad around 15 members on the march. Almost half of them were injured. To my knowledge, the typical injury required a few stitiches. No one was critically =injured.

The leadership of the MKK movement consists of four preachers: Revs. Jackson, Hatcher, Turner and Dunlap. They have practically no organized base or organization of their own --- nor do they seem to have influence or ties with <u>any</u> section of Chicago's established black leadership. We knew from the beginning that the group was weak and isolated --- but we underestimated how <u>totally</u> weak and isolated they were.

The July 17 demonstration stirred up an onermous amount of discussion and controversy within the Chicago black community. The e tabl shed black leadership came under shapr criticism for having denounced the MLK movement and having come out against the march --- particularly Finney, head of the Woodlawn organizatiion, and Compton, head of the Urban League. Both had called on the community not to come out and march. Jackson of PUSH also came under criticism for sitiing on the fense and refusing to particpate or give a lead.

There was widespread sympathy and support for the marchers in the Chicago black community but it was passive support. Hany people felt the Black leadership was siding with the Daly machine and the police against the Black community when it opposed the march. These actions also exposed the fact thwt the Black leadership in Chicago had accepted total neighborhood race segregation as an established fact of life terms of apartheid. Finally, many interpreted the response of the Black leadership as conditioned by their dependence on large financial grants from government agencies and provate foundations.

We supported the call for the march following July 17, although we argued unsuccessfully for a longer time to build it. We thought there was a possibility for some of the passive support to be translated into active support. We felt that any

building momentum for the march would put the Jessie Jackson wing of the black leadership in a position where they would be forced either to join the effort or be discredited.

We belived a next march would be either very small or very large. That is, if it started gaining mometum and people thought it would be large, then a big turnout Marquette Park 2222222222222222

was possible ---but if it looked like it wouldn't be massive only the most committed would come. Our decision to throw lots of energy into building it was on the chance that 1) we could make a difference in getting the ball rolling towards a large turnout and 2) building the march would pur pressure on the established black leadership and help lay the basis for a palit with the policies of total captualtion to the white machine.

Such a split would be historic. In this period of the growing racist offensive, no black leadership with any kind of following has been willing to confron the racists head on --- not in Boston, not in Louisville not in Detroit etc. A new leadership and a new movement will have to be built. W believed a successful effort to build this march could help lay the basis for that.

We knew that the effort to build a large march was only a gamble --- that it was a long shor. There us bo shame in the fact that the effort failed. With the exception of forced from committed elemts of the left, the turnout was negiligible. But we should be clear that only those with ideological committment would join a small march under those conditions. Lots of people checked it ou and went away

The IS/RT march contingent was almost 100. It was approximately half

black and half white. All our marchers had helmets- red for the RT, blue for WP. Forty of our contingent had picket signs that concealed steel shields made of barrel drum covers. Forty of our marchers had signs on picket sticks that were sledge hammer handles. Our group was disciplined and orderly. If attacked we had fair derfense capacity- though given the probable odds in an attack, this capacity would have been almost purely defensive and not totally effective.

We do not favor continuing marching- nor efforts to try again for a permit. We will not be trying to organize for a next march. If, however, the LK movement does get another permit to march andthere is some reason to believe there will be a turnout in hundreds or morewewill participate in it- though not mobilize for it. If anyone is fighting racism in a brave and bold way- we are a part of that struggle.

The main thing that came out of the experience is the lesson that we must begin the task of building to put ourselves forward as the new leadership in the struggle against racism. Our tendency operated in the larquette Park marches predominantly as the Red Tide because it is easier for a revolutionary youth group to get a foothold in the community than it would be for the IS. We now have a RT branch based in West Englewood with some good initial cadre. It was out of our efforts to build the march that we got this cadre and this was from the beginning the other wing of our strategy.

It was also out of this effort that we established for ourselves a name and a reputation in West Englewood. In the next period, we will con--centrate on activities less grand than mass marches. We will seek a base in the High Schools of the area. We will engage in defense activities against racist attacks and the struggle against racism on other fronts. It will be out of thesestruggles that we can establish the credibility and leadership to actually start leading masses.

Only mass forces will be able to confront and turn back the racists. This is what we have to build for. Butthese forces cannot be led by pacifists or reformers. Only revolutionaries or those moving toward a revolutionary perspective will be able to lead that kind of movement.

Our perspective is chass unity- white workers and black workers joining in common struggle. Today, virtually the only white workers participating in Chicago that can be won to actually participate in thestruggle- on the streets- against racism, will be those committed <u>politically</u> to our perspective. The mass base needed to start the fight against racism in the streets will be a black base. But, a powerful black movement that fights racism in the streets and that is won to the politics of class struggle will be able to win over to its banner large numbers of white workers.

The conservatism and racism in the working class comes in large part from the feeling of weakness and inability to fight the bosses or the state. A movement with muscle that is committed to fighting the boss can be very attractive. Even though many of the racists we will be physically fighting- on the streets- will be white workers, we need a movement that all politically stands for working class unity and <u>politically</u> identifies the racist offensive as part of the bosses offensive against the entire working class.

Jack W.

# REPORT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SUBCOMMITTEE

1. The International Subcommittee was reorganized three weeks ago. Barbara W. is the convenor, Larry S., Joel and Dave F. are the members.

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2. As mandated by the July convention, our major area of work has been around organizing for our work around revolution in Southern Africa. We have organized the South Africa cadre school, and are encouring comrades to attend. Cut of this school we will be recommending public activities such as meetings, demonstrations etc. We sent out a 'South Africa organizers packet' which we hope will be useful to those members who will be leading and organzing the work. The subcommittee also discussed the political situation in Southern Africa, and will continue to do throughout the fall. The sum of the discussions will be found in Workers Power articles, articles for the South Africa packet, and for the proposed magazine.

3. The overall purpose of this committee will also be to keep up with developments in Potrugal, and Southern Europe. Jane, Joel and Kim have all returned from Portugal, and could give talks to branches about recent events. If your branch wants a speaker, you should contact Barbara W. who will try and make the arrangements. Dave F. is also willing to travel to branches to give a talk on the situation in Lebanon. Larry.S. will be keeping up with developments in the Caribbean; Marilyn with Spain. Other committee are and will be assigned to Italy, Germany, Ireland and Australia.

4. The committee decided that Joel will be sending out monthly reports on the situation in Portugal. A pamphlet or ducument replying to the ISGB is also being written, as well as a pamphlet/ document on the revolution in Portugal.

5. We plan to put out monthly reports about the work and discussions of the International Subcommittee in the national report.

Barbara W., for the International Subcommittee 2 September, 1976.

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## NATIONAL SECRETARY"S REPORT

A report on the last month must start with the impressive achievements of wur youth section, the Red Tide. Despite the difficulties they faced over the summer, once school was out, they have made extremely rapid progress in this period. Branches have been built in six a ties altogether now, Detroit, Chicago, Pittsburg, Cleveland, Louisville and Cincinnati and overall membership is around 80 people. Through the Gary Tyler work (See separate article) and Marquette Park work (see separate article) they have firmly established themselves as an integrated revolutionary youth group of immense potential. Their record of recruitment, particularly of black members, from the RT to the IS is exemplary and with a handful of exceptions accounts for the net growth of the organization since the convention. They still face many, many political and organizational problems because with their success they are outgrowing both their perspectives and resources, but a further effect of that success is to force the IS to make more resources available to this work and we are already moving in this direction.

Last month also saw the mobilization of centre resources, the RT and Mid-West branches for the Madquette park march. As the separate report makes clear, we were not successful in taking the general anti-racist movement a significant step forward, but on the level of the organization, the mobilization was extremely successful for both the IS and the RE, especially in Chicago. The truth is that because of our consistant preparatory work and our disciplined contingent, the march was not the disaster it might otherwise have been and it was clear, even to the biourgeois press, that this was the case. The effort we put into this mobilization is another stip in the direction of IS establishing itself as the most serious force on the left for fighting racism. In this report, I should also bring your attention to the branch and fraction reports, which for the first month follow the pattern of three monthly reporting which was au tlined in the last "News of the Month". This month's edition also contains important information on the womens' commission, the consolidation of various branches, the international ctte and the Canadian IS.

On the industrial front there are the first signs, just two weeks before the contract expiration of movement in the auto industry. In a year when it is increasingly clear that the employers' offensive at the bargaining table has been largely successful, the combination of the ineptitude of the trade union bureaucracy and the hardnosed position of the companies may yer product a significant response from auto workers. This is not yet certain, afterall we have worked hard and con and consistently for more than six months on this contract and the best we can say so far is that we have not been defeated. But we are the moving force in an initiative to coalesce around several demonstrations and a press conference- an anti-sellout grouping which vould mobilize significant numbers of autoworkers over the next few weeks. The forces involved are the Coalition for a Good Contract, in which we have been the moving force from the beginning, various organizations of skilled trades workers, the powerful 30-and-Out Ctte which had the allegiance of several key local leaderships and the similar, but less significant Short Work Week Ctte. This development, if successful, will change the almost total stagnation of our rank and file work in auto, but it will not be the end of our problems. All it will do, on the level of the IS, is create the possibility for solving one of our key problems by developing a solid political periphery of workers. For the auto work if suffering from the same problem as most other sections of the organization. The political isolation of our militants.

In steel, we can now claim to have serious fractions in the two major steel centres of Gary and Pittsburg as well as another committee in the secondary centre of Cleveland. This is a big step forward for this arena and represents the coming of age of a decision taken quite a vhile ago to add steel to our three other priorities. Although we have done successful work around womens' issues in both the major centres, begun to get seriously involved in the growing steel rank and file movement and started to recruit, the difficulties of continuing our forward progress should not be underestimated. The opportunities in the steel industry are vast at this point, given the internal situation in the USW but the field is already quite crowded and we still have relatively little experience in an area that requires considerable political sopnistication to take advantage of the opportunities. We cannot suck out of our thumb years of seniority in the steel industry, but we can and have strengthened the national leadership of the steel fraction by the addition of new comrades with considerable political and industrial experience.

A report from the central leadership of the teamster fraction is contained elsewhere in this report and in our other area of work, the post office is now the possibility of extending the work since our successful intervention in the Houston convention reported in WP. A full report on the postal situation will be carried in next month's "news".

All members should be aware that due to people leaving Detroit, the EC wishes to make two new appointments on the central staff by the end of the month. The first jub is that of assistant to the national secretary which involves running the non-WP part of the national office, maintaining internal communications in the organization, keeping in cantact with the branches and working on other assignments from the national secretary. The second job is that of assistant to the industrial organizer which involves running the new industrial department (please note that this has a new phone number (313) 869 8048) maintaining contact with the major fractions, doing research on our main priorities and working on other assignments from the industrial organizer. Both these jobs involve a high level of administration but they also involve a high level of political responsibility, Comrades who feel they have the combination of skills and experience required for these jobs should access write to the national secretary for more details.

Finally I should add a note about the plans for the next month or so. The auto contract and building of the TDU will remain high priorities in the immediate future and in most other areas of work plans are well advanced for re-gearing the activity after the summer lull. The Southern Africa cadre school comes off next week and the week after that is the first regional women's conference. In short, this coming Labor Day weekend marks the end of the summer for us and the beginning of a new drive forward. In less than three short weeks the periphery campaign will be upon us and will be central to everything else we do. It can be successful if we put the necessary effort and commitment into it. Given the heroic efforts of the last year, the respite wehave just been through was all too short and never total. But its all we are going to get. Good luck.

> Glenn Wolfe National Secretary