INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS

BULLETIN

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LATE August, early Sep

LATE CONVENTION

AMENDMENTS

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In the AFT we are involved in the Grassroots Caucus in NY state, and in an opposition newsletter, Network, in California. The culmunation of the Seldon-Shanker gight is a watershed mark in the union, and will force changes in the national opposition groups after the union is dominated by Shanker. This new situation will mean that we will have to assess the groups we've involved in, and revise our perspectives for the AFT in accordance with these assessments.

In addition to those unions where we have had ongoing presence, we are now becoming involved in the USW. We have been able to do this primarily through the contacts we've made in the union in the past, including older militants, and the younger industrialised radicals that we've met more recently. We are now in the process of setting up a small steel fraction to begin developing a perspective--and we expect this work to develop over the next year.

The development of cur fractions has by and large not paralleded the progress in our union work. Over the next year it will be crucial to develop real functioning national fractions. In the CWA this process has begun. We had the first national fraction meeting last Spring. The problem in this union is to increase our cadre in the union as the basis for further development of the fraction. The IBT fraction has progressed the most, with its own leadership and regular communication. Similar steps must be taken in theothers if they are are going to keep pace with and be able to build the strides we've made in those unions. This is especially true of the UAW, where we expect to have local fractions in ST. Louis, and possibly Cleveland in addition to the contacts we've made in other cities. Local fractions in other cities will lay the basis for the first time for a real national fraction, for which the Detroit Fraction can provide leadership. The AFT fraction must become more cohesive. At present it is poorly situated , in that we only have 2 comrades in the important big city locals, and consideration will have to be given to developing a base in the big eastern and midwestern locals. In all, communication inside the fractions and between fraction leaderships and the industrial secretary must improve over the next year. If we do not take these steps to cohere and develop the national fractions, it will be difficult for the organization to be able to give real leadership adn dirction to our ongoing work, and the new areas that we are developing in that work. It will also make it all the more difficult to integrate into the organization the new members whether they be industrialized radicals or indigenious workers.

Thus events today are proving that our perpsectives--of building local and national rank and file groupings through campaigns, regular newsletters and out of the rank and file rebellions are correct. Because of this small growth and success, we are now in a position to put out industry wide journals in the UAW, IBT, and CLUW that can further consolidate our work, put us into contact with more militants, and help to educate and solidify these militants and organizations we're involved with now. This will be a further step in consolidating our work and extending our ability to influence the rank and file movement.

One of the diffuculties over the past year has been the slow growth of our numbers in industry. With the exception of establishing the Cleveland branch where a majority are now in industry, relatively few members have taken industrial jobs. We believe, as stated before, that significant numbers of additional cadres for industrial jobs. We believe, as stated before, that significant numbers of additional cadres for industrial work will come through recruitment.

We are now beginning to recruit however. And through this recruitment we expect the Cleveland and St. Louis branches to develop substantially and to establish new branches in other midwest industrial cities. This recruitment will lay the basis for deepening our industrial work, and fleshing out our national fractions. It is important to note this, because over the past year until quite recently (the last 2-3 months) we did not grow quantitatively at all, recruiting some, loosing some. Qualitatively, however, the strikes we have made over the past year mean that we can now take advantage of a more favorable objective situation in the left and in our industrial work. These changes in terms of recruitment and the development of a periphery have already begun, and we expect them to continue. We now have branches of between 25-35 members in the SF-Bay Area., NYC, and Detroit; of between 15-24 in Seattle, Los Angeles; of between 5-14 in Chicago, Cleveland, Lousville, Bloomington, St Louis, Portland; and organizing committees in Boston and Madison. In total we have 202 members. We expect all of these branches to grow over the next year. Currently 29% of the conrades work in jobs where they can be politically active and 18% of the comrades work in UAW, IBT, or CWA, our top priorities. At present around 10% are college students, 10% work full time for the organization.

Another major accomplishment over the pat year has been a functioning Women's Commission for the first time in the history of the IS. The commission has played a real leadership role in guiding our work among women and especially in CLUW. Over the next year the women's commission will oversee the CLUW journal and our CLUW work generally, and will continue to work to develop self confident women cadres and leaders for the organization. This is especially important, since the percentage of women in the organization has dropped to 23%. While we believe that this is basically due to the defeats we've suffered over the past couple of years, we do think it crucial that we fight all the harder to develop women into leaders both internally in the IS and externally in our activity, especially in industry.

Our major problem is still the question of black recruitment. Our audience is overwhelmingly black--in our caucuses, for WP. In Detroit we live in a black world. And no matter how correct our politics, strategy and perpsectives are, and how well we implement them, we will remain a sect until we have a black cadre and leadership. Over the past year we have improved the coverage in WP on the black question, and recently we set up a black commission. This commission is a first step--because today we are isolated from the black community and the pplitical developments taking place there. The job of the commission is and will continue to be to educate itself and the organization as a whole as to what are the pplitical currents in the black movement. This we see as a prerequisite for carrying our politics into this movement. Our ability to carry this perspective out will be a crucial determingng point-- for without a black cadre we cannot play an important role in building the revolutionary party.

In the area of education we have begun to make progress in developing a national educational program. But much more must be done. We must learn from our past failures. The last time we recruited significant numbers of people, we failed to assimilate them politically, and this was one of the factors that lead to the faction fight. As we expand, we must politically assimilate the new members as quickly as possible. This requires a systematic educational program that meets the needs of the new members and instills in them our methodology, our strategy, our politics. Recruitment unless it also carries with it this commitment will not bring the fullest gains to the organization and could lead to real problems in the future. Such an educational program means not only working with new members, but also leaders training other members in how to integrate new members so that the organization as a whole expands not only numerically, but qualitatively in its political development.

So, comrades we have begun to go forward. We aremoving from the world of bankrupt trotskyist sects and faction fights to becoming one of the axes for building a revolutionary party in this country. And we have made the changes--at a cost-but without adapting our politics to any of the petty-bourgeois, new left, or

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stalinist varieties that abound in the left. We have hardened and deepened our political analysis and strategy which allows us to make these moves now. We are now recruiting. Our new branches, St. Louis, Louisville, and Portland are and will continue to do so. These newer branches have not gone through the defeats of the past few years. But the odder branches are also beginning to grow. Foremost among these is the LA branch--whose existence was in question just one year ago--and where now we have a substantial number of comrades and an excellent youth periphery. Primarily because of the work of the LA comrades, and to a lesser extent the Bay Area comrades, we now have the possibility of setting up an IS youth group in the near future.

This Convention then represents a transition, our past and our future. We are still in the process of consolidating our political theory. The discussions on capitalism and stalinism represent the nailing down and development of our theory. The rest of the convention, labor, women and left sessions, represent our future--the further elaboration and refinement of cur political perspectives and strategy.

Our potential today is enormous: our basic politics, methodology--our perspectives and strategy for building a revolutionary workers party out of the process of building a workers movement is the only one that exists today that carries the principles of workers control and workers democracy into the conception of the party. We have had a rough and fifficult year, but we have now reached the point where with the gains we've made and the objective developments in world capitalism, we can significantly move ahead along the difficult but important road to building the self confidence, stable organization and leadership of the growing rank and file movement and in that context , begin to build the revolutionary workers party. AMENDMENTS TO GEIER'S "The U.S. Left and that our perspectives" S.F. (LA)

page 3 - first unfull paragraph - decka delete everything from end of line 2 starting with the word exerciting "originally" until the f end of paragraph.

page 4-- second full paragraph--delete first sentence

page 18--first full paragraph--line 5--insert after word Cchass"; "as well as our view of the nature of socialism (ie from below) and of the meaning of the third camp international politics."

page 18--addd at the end of first full paragraph, "We will also unequivocally defend the rights of any Trotskyist or other sects against attempts at political exclusion or thuggery. We will do this not because we agree with them or because "we are all Trotskyists" but because we stand for workers democracy."

page 19--first paragraph--lines 5--7--delete from "as various. . . " to end of sentence and insert the following:

"as our exaggerateedhopes of 1969--70 proved to be unfounded varbous elements in our organization Became impatient with lack of visible results in our work in the working class. Instead of attributing this to the vast objective obstacles that we faced in that task, they instead decoded that what was needed was the "panacea" of the Transitional Program. Meanwhile the political development of the organization had stagnated and large groups inside the I.S. had never assimilated or fully internatlized our fundamental politics or perspectives. Adherence to "our tradition" was not and could not be sufficient to create a unified political point of view. It was in this political context that our losses were greater than they could have otherwise been: many former conrades who were hungry for "harder" and more developed politics to answer their unease and dissatisfaction further. A more politically developed I.S. could have prevented or minimized this. It should also be pointed out that the severe setbacks suffered by the U.S. left in the late 60's created a climate conducive to xpixix our split.

page 19--add at the end of the first full paragraph:

However, the political level of our organization is still low. We must raise the level of political understanding and education of our members as soon as possible. Our ability to recruit is to a significant degree extent dependent on our members having fully internatized and understood our politics and perspectives, thus www.wiwiy.xt enhancing their ability to convince others. This is particularly traw necessary given the fact that our ideas and orientations are by no means predominant on the American Left.

ON JGS THE LEFT

Gordon Walker p. 1 Chicago

This document is not a counter document to JGs, but is an attempt to clarify the meaning of JGs "strategic next step" in terms of organizational reasources, time energy etc. It is followed by a motion that will be presented for a vote.

It is my opinion that the two main things that make the "strategic next step" a worth while project are:

- 1. It is a way of breaking out of our own isolation lnd stagnation and of reinvigorating and enlarging our ranks.
- 2. The creation of a ntework of radicals in industry will enhance our ability to recruit indiginous workers.

Having said this, it is also true that the arguments in the document have some mistakes and weaknesses.

- L. It is not made clear whether this project is intended to replace the work of recruiting indiginous workers. Further, it is my opinion that the position 2 lying behind the arguments is the position that says that it is either too hard or impossible to recruit small numbers of workers today.
- 2. Problems arise from a tendency to over exaggerate the impact of industrialized radicals on the working class.
- 3. The document fails to discuss problems of assimilation that world follow ± large scale recruitment.

IRXREXERSIE

4. The document suffers from what I believe to be some misconceptions concerning the famous "organic link" and party embryos.

These points will be taken in order

L. Joel presents the project as an urgent one that must be carried out before any serious recruitment of workers can begin. This is shown most clearly in the lasp paragraph on page 16 and the first one on page 17. "While this conjucature remains, we must rapidly move to organizationally growing , building our industa trial fractions and trade which caucuses, and laying the basis for the embryo of a party, or else we risk Tmissing GW 7 an historic opportunity which would set us pack for years. Recruiting from this layer (industrialized radicals GW) is in no way a substitute for building a party of industrial workers -- it is part of our road to the wroking class.

"This layer of people we can recruit today, the strategic next step we must take to put us on the road to building a party, is the independent radicals who are organized in local collectives"

While it may prove to be true that the industrialized radicals are a part of our road to the working class. It is also true that the other part is in the person of the few advanced workers who are today recruitabel to our organization. Joel describes in the first pages of his document the international processes that have been producing a layer of revolutionary workers. Those processes have been at work in the US as well and have produced not what you could call a layer, but r rather a handful of revolutionary minded, advanced workers. These few workers, mainly black, are the products of the only thoroughly revolutionary class in society, they have class instinct and once recruited, will quickly learn the neccessary skills to become mass leaders. Further, the conditions of life faced by these workers ppts them in a position to rapidly assimilate and understand our view of the world, and there fore to become leading members of the trIS. These advanced workers will have a value for us something on the order of 1 to 15 as compared to recruits from other that working class backgrounds. Any talk of "building a workers leadership within the IS" must proceed on the basis of real accomplishments in terms of recruitment of these self same workers.

Gⁿordon Walker

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2. Once you have shown the extent of the impact radicals have he on the working class, or rather , once you have claimed the extent that is claimed in the document, you are then in a position to show how urgent it is to recruit them. While it is true that radicals have had some impact on the working class the extent and duration of that impact is being exaggerated in the document.

The claim is made that a majority of the recent working class actions have either been lead aby radicals, or that radicals have emerged during the course of struggle as leaders because of their skills. So far as the actions that are mentioned go (Jefferson, Forge, Mack, Ford contract, St. Louis GMAD, Lordstown Detroit truck,) the claim is accurate, however not all the actions are equally signifacant. In fact the Ford contract rejection overshadows the others, and that action was only marginally participated in by radicals, (unless you count those with 25 years or more seniority). The most significant actions, as far as having an impact on the Labor Movement goes, were left out altogether, possibll because there was little or no radical influence involved in them. For gxample, the MFD take ofer in UMWA and the wave of wildcats that followed and is still going on, the Independent Truckers Strikes, the UFW strikes, and the long and unsuccessfull strikes at Lordstown and Norwood following the 1970 GM strike.

The UMWA contract fight coming up in November, an event which will very likely set the pace in the Labor Movement for some time to come, will only be marginally participated in by radicals.

It is commonly known that in the IBT you are considered an upstart if you don't have at least 10 years in the industry. Furthermore, if, as our analysis indicates, the rate of unemployment continues to rise and throughout industry the 4 and 5 people begin to get hit, instead of having 2-3 thousand industrialized radicals we will have 2-3 thousand unemployed radicals. Any talk of building a network of radicals in industry depends on their position in industry, not on their position in the unemployed queues. The politics of many of the radicals in question has caused them to seek jobs in peripharel industries, and in many cases the first thing we would want them to do would be to get a different job, am fact which would cause them to have even less seniority.

All that this goes to say is that while radicals are present in the working clask and often in the leadership of local formations, they are not yet "imbedded in the working class" and in fact are still on the edges of it.

3. While it is true enough that a large number of industrialized are devoted **p** partisons of the working class, it is also true that the milue of the industrialized radicals is a petty-bourgeose milue, and is shot through with petty-bourgeose political conceptions, the main one being the "alternative institutions" or IWO (independent workers org)syndrome, but also on questions of party and class organization and spontaneity, mainly produced by the wide spreasd admiration of Chairman Mao and his writings.

There will be serious problems of assimilating people, not to mention accomodation on our part to this milue. Joel projects a time schedule of 6 months to a year for his project. In my opinion that is something af a dream. As a timetable for recruitment, fine. But what about assimilating these people? If anybody thinks we are not going to spend alot of time shaking **iiitelykeedex** little red books out of peoples pockets and drumming IWOs out of their mindes they are wrong.

We are not yet the hardened cadre organization that is capable of large scale recruitment and easy assimilation, of people who themselves have a fair amount of political experience and who have a series of fairly well formed political conceptions, many of which are incompatable with our own. Where we make be prepared to take on large scale recruitment of industrialized radicals, we will be hard pressed to assimilate them. This is not to say we should not try the recruitment and assimilition, but we should be prepared to spend something in the neighborhood of 2 years to do it.

22ta Gordon Walker P 2 3

Joel argues in the beggining pages of his ducument that the conjuncture we find ourselves in is producing the "organic link" **xxxxtixx** internationally for the basis of revolutionary partys. What is this "organic link" exactly. Well, **i**the "organic link" is the real live, revolutionary minded, organic workers. The link consists in this: The advanced workers provide the link, that is the direct pipeline, for organized revolutionaries to influence the rest of the working class. In the closing pages of the document this fact is lost sight of. There we find in the above cited paragraphs (Pl6 last Pl7first) that in fact the ingrediant that will allow us to "lay the basis for the embryo of a party" is not the "organic link" at all, but instead is "the independent radicals who are orgaanized in local collectives".

A **mark** word on embryos or even basis of embryos: Embryos of partys like all embryos are, simply put, an undeveloped form for what can develop into a mature being. That means that all the main ingrediants are there, but need to be developed.

Before we can seriously discuss, not to mention, expect to be an embryonic party formation, we must gain our first few worker recruits, to provide for us an embryonic pipeline to the rest of the xx advanced workers.

One last point: As mentioned earlier the recruitment of industrial radicals and their formation into a network in industry will enhance our chances of recruiting **x** worker members. It is also the case that the recruitment of the first few industrial workers will thrice improve our chances of recruiting industrialized radicals.

Motion

Our single most glaring deficit has been our failure to recruit indigenous workers, especially, black and latin workers. There are today, in the working class, a small number of workers, manily black, who are winnable to our politics and strategy. An expample that everyone is familiar with isthe Fellow in St. Loois. The only sure fire method of recruiting these people is hard, tedious and above all <u>systematic</u> individual contact work. Our main job has been and remains to carry out and step up this work. Any strategic next steps we may find necessary cannot replace byt must be subordinated to the recruitment of indeginious workers. The particular next step outlined in Joels document should be carried out with all vigor but not at the expense of the work laid out in this motion.

Amendments to Draft on BUREAUCRATIC COLLECTIVISM

-- Mike P.

Amendment I

Delete section on Russia, pp. 5-7 and replace with sections from Dave F. amendment beginning his page 1 (The Russian Revolution), through and including " (Note: At this point...) on page 8

except delete from these sections of the Dave F. amendment his:

full paragraph 6, page 3 full paragraph 6, 7, page 4 Last part of full paragraph 1, page 7 beginning "But as originally forumulated..." full paragraph 2, page 7

Amendment II

Delete Section II, p. 9, paragraph 3, 4, 5 and substitute

Bureaucratic Collectivism as a new social system has its social origins in the contradictions of a capitalist world, which has sufficiently developed the productive forces and is ripe for socialist revolution but where the working class has failed to make that revolution. These contradictions focused through capitalist imperialism on the underdeveloped countries alters the relative social power and objective interests of the social classes in these countries. This greatly increases the possibility for pre-class elements to take and use state power to consolidate themselves as a ruling class by control of the means of production, extraction and disposal of the surplus product through collective control of the state. The Bureaucratic Collectivist class is unique in that its coming to be as a class coincides with its taking state power.

Once a Bureaucratic Collectivist class was consolidated in Russia its existence and its policies then became new objective conditions in the world. These interact with the underlying social process which tend to give rise historically to Bureaucratic Collectivism and both speeds and distorts the process in other countries. Additional independent Bureaucratic Collectivist countries as well as the social struggle with capitalism further distorts the process.

Prior to taking state power, the elements which provide the basis of a Bureaucfatic Collectivist ruling class are not, taken together, a class in the sense of a common relation to the process of production in the given country. Some of these elements, however, through political and/or organizational ties to developed Bureaucratic Collectivist states or even independently through an anti-capitalist movement which seeks to <u>substitute</u> a disciplined party apparatus for the working class, represent the Bureaucratic Collectivist class forces on a world scale.

Considering only the social forces within a given country, elements or incipient Bureaucratic Collectivist classes have little social power and tend to vacillate between bourgeoisie and working class which do have social power. Without social power provided from the outside, these elements can only take state power and consolidate into a class if the bourgeoisie and working class are extremely weak. This can happen as a result of an isolated workers revolution where the working class exhausts

i'o'P emendments, p. 2

itself and cannot industrialize the society as in Russia, or it can happen under a variety of conditions brought about by imperialism.

Strong internal conditions for the successful Bureaucratic Collectivist conquest of state power are more typical of underdeveloped economies where the contradictions of imperialism are most sharply focused. Bureaucratic Collectivist elements within an advanced capitalist nation are not likely to vanquish the relatively strong capitalist class or working class without significant outside social power such as military force, or strong economic action provided by a developed bureaucratic collectivist state. (An exception to this would probably require catastrophic events such as war which physically devastates both the bourgeoisie and working class.)

Motivation

The first amendment essentially substitutes Dave's much better and longer description of the Russian Revolution and degeneration for my own. I am deleting several of his paragraphs not for political reasons but because I do not feel that they are adequate here and belong expanded in other sections. The portions on his treatment of socialism in one country that I deleted I will explain below.

The second amendment is an attempt to clarify some of my own formulations and to correct some inadequacies pointed cut to me by Dave and others.

There is, however, a significant political difference between Dave and myself. I believe that Dave's substitute essentially represents one theme in the Workers Party analysis of Stalinism, a theme which was developed early and gradually shifted away from. That is the notion that Stalinism had to be understood as a rising from the unique situation of the Russian Revolution or more generally as the result of a workers revolution which degenerated. In a trivial sense, it is of course true -- Stalinism did first take state power in Russia. But the question is whether the <u>social origins</u> of Stalinism are in the specific Russian cituation or whether the origins lie in the social process of developing world capitalism and took the particular form of the events in Russia.

To give an analogy. We understand the social origins of capitalism in the development of Feudalism. In England this was all tied up to religious struggles. We understand that the puritan revolution was a form that the struggle of the bourgeoisie took but was not the essential feature of bourgeois revolution generally.

I have tried in my draft to provide a theory of Stalinism and place its appearance on the world scene primarily as a result of the contradiction of capitalism as expressed in the development (or lack thereof) of social classes and their material environment. (I believe that this conception has more in common with the theory as later developed by the Workers Party -- I.S.L. -- as Stalinism developed in Yugoslavia and China -- But who gets to wear the mantle is a debate of dubious value).

Dave's proposed substitution of a description of the events in Russia for my analysis of the social origins of Stalinism is because those events are his analysis. He confirms this when he states and underlines that "...the class origins of Stalinism lie in this unique historic situation."

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This is reflected in the way he analyzes specific events. In his discussion of socialism in one country he gets so involved with the specific political struggles that he fails to see the important political point. In my analysis, the consequences of "socialism in one country." (giving up on world revolution) were inevitably (in that

Mike P. amendments, p. 3

historical situation) rapid industrialization, state control and totalitarianism. That the Stalinist bureaucracy for political reasons had to maneuver for a few years to sufficiently consolidate itself before it could fully implement the consequences of "socialism in one country" is a secondary point or even a footnote in an overview of the developments of Stalinism. The important point here is what the <u>policy</u> of giving up on world revolution meant not what Stalin claimed or even wanted it to mean.

Developing a theory of the social origins of Stalinism underlying or behind the specific events in Russia is not an abstract exercise. The existence add intervention of Russia is a good explanation for the defeat of a workers revolution in China. It is a weak or only-partial explanation for the rise of Mao and the victory of Stalinism in 1949. The theory I have outlined focuses us on social classes and their social power derived from their relation to the process of production. It is only once we understand these in non-stalinist countries that we can then understand the impact of the Stalinist states. Yes there is a three cornered struggle in the world. But saying this does not mean that the social forces of each corner are the same or equal in all countries.

Dave is most concerned about my conclusion that the social power for Stalinist victory in advanced capitalist countries will likely have to come from outside. But in opposing this he has nothing to say about the source of Stalinist social power internally in advanced capitalist nations.

There is a tendency toward voluntarism in Dave's analysis of STalinism in the advanced capitalist countries. Lacking a developed theory of the social forces which give rise to Stalinism there is a tendency to understand Stalinist movements primarily by their consciousness and aspirations rather than by examining the social forces which have produced them and also limit the.

Finally, in arguing against my analysis of the key social process in underdeveloped countries Dave makes a curious formulation.

"First of all, the underdeveloped countries, whether capitalist or Stalinist, have no decisive <u>independent</u> role in the world. If the potential rise of Stalinism were considered to be only a phenomenon of underdeveloped countries, the Stalinist bureaucracy could no longer be considered a basic contender for power in the world." (p.12)

Russia, China and Vietnam, each in its own way, have proven just the opposite. Besides, our theories of Imperialism and permanent revolution point to the critical nature of struggles in the underdeveloped world. Although I nowhere said that Stalinism is "only a phenomenon of underdeveloped countries," even if it were true, given the current development of Russia and China that would certainly make Stalinism a contender for world power.

Jolie B, Portland, OPEN MEMBERSHIP IN CLUW

It would be catastrophic for us to capitualate on the open membership question in CLUW - rather we should continue to raise the absurdity of excluding working women in agreement withCLUW's stated purpose for lacking the portection which it is CLUW's objective to help them obtain. We should counterpose solidarity between working sisters, to the haxard of permitting male dominated unions to undermine it.

We must be careful with CLUW, lest the potenecy of a working women's movement is transformed by our fervor to help build it, into a potential for CLUSW, which it may never have.

So we must be ready to break form from CLUW, with a perspective to aid the the formation of alternatives, through opposition built in women's cancuses within the unions, coordinated by the CLUW journal. We must be ready to break with CLUW if and when it becomes clear it will be no more than a bureaucrat's lobby.

For IS'ers to effectively function in the working women's movement, we ust move from seeing our activities with working women through CLUW, and come to see our work in CLUW through a more comprehensive perspective on the struggles of all working class women - against a barrage of economics, political (incipient revolutionaries even!) and social pressures for acquiescence $\sharp \phi$ -- to liberate themselves and their loved ones as well.

Jolie B Portland

ADDITIONS TO CLUW PERSPECTIVES DOCUMENT

1.Amendment to Joan McK. amendment on CLUW MNXMNXX committees in the unions. Add the following paragraph to this amendment:

In some local unions it will be possible to implement this perspective. In others it will be difficult if not impossible. Rather than have the CLUW fraction try to implement this now, we ask each industrial fraction - UAW, IBT, CWA, AFT - local fractions, e.g. USW, plus other unions where we have a small concentration of forces, for example AFSCME, SEIU, to discuss the possibility of these union CLUW committees. The CLUW fraction sees the creation of these CLUW committees as part of our ongoing perspective and will continue the discussion in the fraction.

2. Substitute for first sentence of Joan McK. amendment on contract campaigns: We should begin now to organize around these demands.

Add the following final sentence to this amendment:

The CLUW fraction asks that the major labor fractions (as listed above), also the USW fraction, and again where weg have modest forces in other unions, to discuss the contracts and come back to the CLUW fraction with suggestions so that there can be ongoing fraction discussion.

3. Amendment to MD document. After third full paragraph, p.5, insert:

The basis for a national opposition in CLUW does not exist tofay. We do not have a large network of contacts, many of the people with whom we would like to work are still somewhat suspicious or sectarian. We saw at the founding convention that the left could work together on the issue of the farmworkers, but could not do so on anything else. That situation for the most part still exists. Also CLUW is still in embryonic form; no official chapters exist yet. As chapters get chartered, and also as we get more roots in CLUW, possibilities for our work in CLUW open up even further.

To form a national rank and file opposition either locally or nationally now would be a mistake. It would only isolat us from the people we are trying to reach: Those rank and file women who have not yet been convinced that the CLUW lreadership will not build a working women's organization that fights for women's liberation.

Even though the basis for a national opposition group does not exist today, nor can one be set up now, there is a genefal feeling on the left that one is necessary. Many of the soft Maoists at the founding convention spoke of the need for one; at the CLUW workshop at the NAM convention, a national opposition was discussed. However, no other group on the left (with the exception of NAM, which most likely cannot do it) wishes to take leadership for such a formation. The reasons are obvious: it would endanger their cozy relationships with ## the CLUW officials. That is why it is important that we fill the vacuum, and begin to lay the basis for this rank and file grouping.

We have already begun to lay the groundwork for this rank and file group, through the informal caucus meetings that we have been involved **xix** in inside almost every chapter. We are keeping up with contacts made at the CLUW convention, and inspite of xome bad CLUW meetings we continue to meet rank and file women and try to wotk with them. We should continue with these informal meetings all the time, trying to bring in more contacts, and seeing if the women we know will bring their own friends. We also want to build a network of CLUW contacts for our national and local CLUW work. We have started doing that through both CLUW and our industrial work, for example setting up a CLUW meeting at the AFT convention. We have also started meeting contacts through travelling. We should continue to aggressively seek out militants in all CLUW meetings, union meetings and on the shop floor.

We can invite all our contacts to these informal meetings. Many of \$\$\$ them

Women's Commission (CLUW)

are not opposed to what the local or national officials are doing, and/or not yet willing or ready to meet with us. We should however try ϕ to work with them with the perspective of eventually winning them over.

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Because CLUW is only a few months old, it is difficult to formulate the precise principles of a national rank and file opposition. An issue we raise at one chapteer meeting may not now be the issue we raise in another. However, we have a broader perspective for CLUW, as has been stated before - class struggle unionism. We eventually want the rank and file groups to be based on class struggle undonism as it applies to CLUW.

Our CLUW journal will be instrumental in the creation of rank and file opposition. Through it we will be outlining our persp#ectives and ideas. By getting rank and file women to buy it, read it, sell it and write for it, we will also be laying the kxxix groundwork for a national opposition within CLUW.

AMENDMENTS TO STATE OF THE UNLENS

1. Add after last paragraph on the section on Bureaucracy (after 4th par., pg. 10)

For our perspectives, these differences between different bureaucrats and secondary bureaucrats is not just a matter of observation and analysis but also indicates to us tactics that we use in organizing the rank and file. First, we are not indifferent to the actual gains won for the working class such as organizing the unorganized, fight for women's rights, ousting of gangstersk introduction of democracy in the union. All of these give the workers self-confidence and puts them in a stronger and more organized position to fight for more demands, even if that is not the intent of the bureaucrats. We understand, of course, that the bureaucrats. evem tjpigj tjeu , au geuunnely want to win reforms, wgge these struggles in the context of their positions as bureaccrats who depend on the maintenance of the capitalist system for their continued existance. We will not, as the OL will, give them uncirtical support or make alliances with them. At the same time, we recognize that these fiths, becuase they do win gains, often win the rank and file's allegiance to the bureaucrats and may cause the rank and file to-see them as their legitimate leaders, especially if there are additional ties of sex, race or national origin. For these reasons, our absolute condemnation of them, in the way we wo7uld condemn Abel and ENA, would be incorrect and sectarian. Our approach to winning the pank and file to our perspectives and away from the bureaucrats misleadership in these cases is to give critical support to theri progressive programs. We urge them to carry out the program of struggle and urge the membership to organize to see that they do it. In the course of the struggle we demonstrate the limitations of that program and the unwillingness of the bureaucracy to extend xax or even to carry it our. We show that only our methods of class struggle unionism and our political program can succeed. In the process we expose the bureaucrats and organize the rank and file to replace them.

2. SECTION ON CLUW AND CBTU

A.DELETE SECOND SENTENCE PLUS WORK Rather, Begin the sentence "The influx. . Add before the first fill paragraph race 11

The recent awareness of Blacks and women of their rights and also their emerging struggles to win these rights, either through caucuses or individually, did make CBTU and CLUW possible at these time. From the rank and file side, the Black and women bureaucrats could appear to give leadership to their struggles. From the capitalist and bureaucrats side, the Balck and women bureaucrats could contrrl and safely channel other wise potentially militant struggles among the rank and file. In either case, the bureaucrats make themselves, through their organizationd, seem necessary. But they can do this only because the rank and file is beginning to move, even though that movement also poses the greatest threat to them.

B. Add after 3rd full paragraph

The fact that these bureaucrats into have been the victims of racism and sexism add another discussion to our analysis of them shich does not enter into our analysis of white male bureaucrats. This fact gives them legitimacy in the eyes of black and women workers, which can win them support and create the illusions that these bureaucrats can and should lead their struggles. Therefore we must break the rank and file of these illusions as well as point the way to self-activity. Because of their oppression, they in fact will k lead some struggles for reforms which could improve the actual conditions of working blacks and women. The purpose of these reforms, however, is to "make the system work" - especially to make it work for them, the black and women bureaucrats, and to insure and better their positions. We can take advantage of this situation by giving critical support when and if the bureaucrats present a progressive program. This allows us to expose their inability and unwillingness to lead a militant struggle, and also allows us to present our program and strategy. From our perspective, these struggles have the important potential to increase the self-confidence and combativity of the rank and file if they, and not the bureaucrats, get in control of it. Both the CBTU and CLUW organizationd nationally could provide the vehicles for that, in spite of the intentions of the bureaucrats. RESOLUTION TO BE CONSIDERED IN CLASS STRUGGLE UNIONISM That initial publication of the auto class struggle union journal be Discussed postponed from October 74 to February 75.

Motivation

There are a number of problems with bringing out the auto journal in October. They range from a question of internal democracy to the question of production. To rush forward without a clear understanding of these problems and an attempt to solve them will not be beneficial to the journal's success.

The first problem is that most members of the auto fraction are not clear on the whole conception of the journal. The idea for a journal was passed by the NC when thete had never even been a discussion by the auto fraction of the idea. No worked-out proposal for the journal came out until a few weeks ago and only one discussion has been held. We were told it was coming out in October, so approvenit. Even then the Detroit branch organizer ruled this was merely a "preliminary" discussion and vote. When and if will another discussion take place between now and October. The NC passed the journal without even knowing whether members of the auto fraction agreed with it let alone had seen a document on it. This raises serious problems with the idea of internal democracy fwhen what has been said will be a breakthrough in our auto work is never even discussed by the rank and file until after it is mandated by the NC. What is the point of the auto fraction voting on it if the question has already been decided.

Another problem is that the auto fraction has and 13 perspectives in the last 2 and a half years, or a perspective every 4 months. This has lead to demoralization. To have another one without even thoroughly thrashhing it out before hand would only make things worse.

A problem that has not been dealt with at all is the one of priorities. Members of the auto fraction are overloaded and something will have to give. This has never been sorted out. Already auto comrades have the following tasks: lExisting rank and file bulletins

2 Our local caucus work

3 Our current campaign against the 3 year term

4 CLUW work for women comrades

5 Traveling to recruit collectives

6 Writing for Workers Power

7 UNC meetings and work

8 Other branch activities.

All these things are said to be important. Not all can be done. To drop one more activity on the auto fraction without some clear ordering will lead to further demoralization and accomplishment of few tasks well.

There are some political questions that are left unanswered in our one discussion and in the document. One of these is the relationship of this journal to the UNC. The document says that tht journal will support and criticize the UNC. But how this be done when the Auto fraction has never developed a clear, consistent perspective on the UNC. At best we have only individuals attitudes to the UNC. Another is the question of the journals audience. Is it to be indiginous workers or industrialized radicals. The document syas it is to be directed toward workers. But, on the other hand, one of the motivations given for it is that it will solidify our new contacts, who are mostly industrialized radicals. In the auto fraction discussion ther was confusion expressed over who the audience would be. A number of comrades felt it was aimed more at industrialized radicals rather than indiginous worker militants.

Finally, the question of production has not yet been worked out. The Detroit branch cannot handle it. It has been said that to handle the proposed new journals, pamphlets and other publications 2 more people will have to be added to the NO staff. Who are these people and will they be have by October.

So we are asking for a postponement of the implimentation of the NC decision. We believe that it will best serve tha interest of internal democracy and the success os the journal.

SUBMITTED BY:

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