NATIONAL REPORT

Feb.21-March 14, 1975

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FOR MEMBERS ONLY

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NATIONAL SECRETARY'S REPORT Margh 7, 1975

1. NO: branches and ocragnizing committees can now order copies of <u>Revolutionary</u> <u>Feminism</u> by Celia Emerson, and a new edition of International Women's Day by Alexandra Kollontai.

2. Cleveland: The rank and file conference on Building the Working Women's movement was very successrul. Around 200 attended, over \$300.00 worth of literature was sold. Comrades and friends came from New York, New Jersey, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Louisville, Cincinatti, Des Moines, Dayton, Detroit and Chicago. At the end of the conference 5 friends stated thier wishes to join IS: 2 from Louisville, 2 from Cleveland and 1 from Pittsburgh. The EC and Women's Commission will have a full evaluation of the conference out for the next national Report.

3. Detroit: The branch held a forum on International Women's Day which was quite good, with a number of new contacts.

4. Bay Area: We have 3 new comrades in the Bay Area. The Red Tide in Contra Costa recruited 3 new comrades and a Red Tide study group of 10 friends has been set up. The recruitment and study group came out the leadership role played by Red Tiders in a high school student strike.

IMPORTANT: TO ALL BRANCH AND ORGANIZING COMMITTEE TREASURERS, MALS

The following proposal was passed by the February NC as a first step toward moving to unified national dues for the entire organization.

However, we are not sure how this dues schedule compares to the ones **EW** now in effect in most branches. BRANCH TREASURERS ARE **ZEEXCREES** REQUESTED TO ESTI_ MATE BRANCH DUES ON THIS NEW SCHEDULE AND COMPARE THEM TO THE CURRENT DUES SCHEDULE - AND REPORT BACK TO THE NO BY <u>APRIL 15</u> THEIR FINDINGS. It is really important that branch treasurers zzazz do this comparison and let us know so we can get moving on setting up a national dues schedule.

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The dues proposal follows in the next page.

1.1.14

NATIONAL DUES STRUCTURE

- Monthly dues are based on the net monthly income from all sources for the Income: previous month. This includes wages, unemployment compensation, interest, dividends, child support, alimony, income tax refunds, etc.
- Deductions: Allowable deductions from net monthly income are \$100 a lependent and medical expenses. A dependent is defined as anyone who recieves more than half of their from the dues payer. Extraordinary expenses may be deducted in whole or in part in consultation with the branch exec or the national secretary.
- Dues are figured individually in the following manner? Schedule: 1. Round off net monthly income minus deductions to the nearest \$10 2. Multiply this number by itself

3. Move the decimal point 4 places to the left 4. Round off to nearest dollar

Weekly income is multiplied by 4 and 1/3 to get monthly income. Biweekly income is multiplied by 2 and 1/6 to get monthly income. Minimum dues are \$5.

Example:	Income			Dues
	below	\$225		\$5
		300		9
		400		16
		500		25
		600		36
		700		49
		800		64
		900		81
		1000		100
		1100		121
		1200		144
		1300		169
		1400		196
		1500	الله الله الله دور الله عام الله الله الله ومر	225
		1600		256
		1700		289
····		1800		324
		1900		361
		2000		400

MOTIVATION

This structure is lower at the low end and graduates more steeply at the high end than does the one used by most branches now (some varient of the "Berkeley dues structure"). When the IS was mainly a student group, it was necessary for operating funds to have relatively higher dues for low income people as many people were employed part-time, students, unemployed, etc. The IS is now becoming a workers' organization and we can't charge these high of dues for low income workers. The minimum was lowered to \$5 for the same reason. Higher paid workers will now pay a bigger share of the dues.

No attempt was made to have couples or housemates figure their dues jointly, although their living expenses would be less. This unfairly penalizes people in the IS who choose to live together and would be a deterant to getting both members of a working couple to join the IS. Because the dues structure rises sharply at the high end, there would be a considerable penalty for combining incomes before figuring dues.

By making all income eligable for dues, this plan eliminates any ambiguity about what income to count. Also the N.O. will get a bonus each spring (if the branch treasurers are on their toes) when income tax refunds are counted as income. This bonus will be like a mini fund drive, since a few hundred dollars increase in income in a month means a considerable increase in dues.

I did not include a differential for cost of living in different cities. Checking the Consumer Price Index(all items, 1972) for the major metropolitan areas -- the average was 125. The variance from this was less than 5%, from Seattle at 120 at the low end to N.Y.-N.J. at 131 at the high end. It would be unnecessarily complicating to include a correction for cost of living variations.

DP

NATIONAL COMMITTEE MINUTES February 15, 16, 17

DELEGATES: Joel G. Marilyn D. Jack W. Jack T. Kim M. Dave F. Gay S. Bill H.

FIRST SESSION, SATURDAY FEBRUARY 15: National Secretary Report. Seating: All present MD Presentation 10 minutes "Turn to Agitation."

Enid E.

Mike S.

Cal W.

David M.

Barbara W.

Wendy W. Bill R.

3 minute discussion round, summary 5 minutes

MD Presentation 7 minutes "Leadership in the IS." 3 minute discussion round, summar y 3 minutes

MOTIONS:

Delete paragraph beginning bottom of page 3 and continuing on page 4. DM

Vote: 1 for, many against, 4 abstentions LD, MP, SF, ML

SF motion to table to next NC and draft responses and vote then without discussion vote: FAILS

Kevin B.

Joe F.

Leslie D.

Mike P.

Ken P.

Michael L.

Sam F.

DM To delete last sentence page 4, paragraph 3 "It is our hope..." Motivation: The affirmation, at this time, that the EC has the right and duty to put branches into receivership is a caricature of Bolshevism, and a violation of the traditions and practices of our movement.

At no time in the history of the Trotskyist movement in the US has such an act been committed or such a policy enunciated. Even the supposedly bureaucratic Cannon, whom so many comrades find it easy to malign, would have been outraged at the suggestion. He never proposed such a policy, and never acted in its spirit. On the contrary, it was always well understood within the movement that such an act might be committed only under certain clear and obvious circumstances: in case of danger of a split; the danger of infiltration by agents of another group or the government; some profound crisis demanding instant response -- such as declaration of war, etc. In such drcumstances, receivership could be considered. And because it was obvious, so undebateable, the policy was never raised, and never practiced, as I know from personal experience.

Short of extraordinary drcumstances, the concept was always that the way a leadership built a cadre was through political leadership, program, education, setting an example, convincing those who differed, so long as they did not break the discipline of the organization (a charge no one is making in the present situation.)

But the proposal of the EC is posed in quite a different context. It is raised, today, in a situation which 1) there are practically no major differences within the organization of an operational character; 2) nuantial differences on where to industrialize women comrades in NY were not being pressed (after the NC decision), or acted upon by anyone. 3) in the name of non-existing political differences, the EC attempted not just to intervene by suggesting, aiding (its right and duty), but by in effect imposing a branch leadership in at least one branch. Adjustments, compromises, were rudely and categorically rejected. 4) the EC proposal was made without consulting any of the three NC members in NY; 5) instead of producing a leadership which has the confidence of the branch, the EC slate in NY failed to win a majority--i.e., it divided the branch on a non-political basis. It was only on the second ballot that some opponents of the slate (including me) decided to vote for the slate simply because it had a plurality, was adament about changes, and it

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page 2 was necessary to have an exec.

It is impossible not to draw the conclusion, given the present context, that the EC is warning branches, and NC members-toe the line, or else-that if suggestions are not accepted, they may be imposed, so better accept them. NC members, who are supposedly part of the leadership, and who supposedly elect the EC, are instructed that "it is the duty and responsibility of the NC members to back up the EC in such actions." Even if we are not consulted? Even if we disagree? Are the NC members really supposed to quietly accept the discipline of the EC against the members who elected us? Is the EC trying to make NC members behave relative to the NC not so long ago?

The EC proposal should be a lesson to us. It tells us that the NC majority of last spring (of which I was one), erred at the NC meeting in the spring of 74. At that time, a majority of the NC clearly repudiated the hysterical, bureaucratic proposal of the EC which would have imposed discipline on the EC members in dealing with its supposed parent body, the NC.

Believing we had put the quietus to this nonsense--this desperate substitution of organizational means for political leadership--several of us, I among them, voted to table the matter to (as the minutes will show) the NC meeting which was to follow the summer convention. We interded thus to avoid a public rebuke to the EC. But we erred. The EC proposal of that time should have been cleanly and openly repudiated. We should have been less concerned about face-saving.

We have paid the price for the error. First the ED "Neglected" to put the matter on the NC agenda as directed (and maneuvered so that it could not arise at the last NC until it was too late). Secondly, the EC's bureaucratic, administrative mode recurred, this time in the form of the assertion of the right to "receivership."

It is time to put an end to the matter. We must cleanly reject the EC proposal on receivership. And we must take off the table the EC proposal of last spring, and vote it down.

VOTE: 2 for, many against, O abstentions. FAILED

SF Motion Page 3--delete last sentence in first paragraph

Vote: for 10, against GS, MD, KM, CW, BW, BR, JG, JF, abstentions DF, BP, JT SF Motion page 4, paragraph 2, delete starting with "a problem..." and ending with "verbal way." INSERT "The failure to develop a collective and collaborative branch leadership capable of guiding its external work, developing its members' understanding of our national perspectives, bringing our industrial work into the center of branch life and integrating new members into the organization. It is not surpising therefore that a number of branch members view the national organization and the local exec as alien bodies which function in mysterious and arbitrary ways."

Vote: for 10, against BW, CW, JG, KM, JT, DF, Abstentions BP, BR, JF, EE, GS. PASSED

SC Discussion. 3 minute round, limited to 8 speakers

SECOND SESSION, SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 15: Workers Power Delegates: Same as above, except Bob M. (for Wendy W) GS Prestation 20 minutes "Workers Power"

3 minute discussion round, summary 10 minutes

Vote: for 18, aginst SF, abstentions MP, DM, LD PASSED

THRID SESSION, SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 16 morning: "Political Effects of the Crisis" Seating: Same as first session, except: Mark L (for Wendy W.) Absent, David M. Presentation: JG 20 minutes.

4 minute discussion round, summary 10 minutes Vote: All for PASSED

page 3 FOURTH SESSION, SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 16 afternoon: "Working session on unemployment campaign." Seating: Same as first session, except, Mark L. (for Wendy W.) Jack T. Presentation 15 minutes discussion round 3 minutes, summary 7 minutes FIFTH SESSION, MONDAY FEBRUARY 17 Seating: All present I. Convention Agenda MD Presentation 5 minutes 20 minute discussion round, 3 minutes each Motions: JG Motion--Part 3--add "to be decided at April NC" Vote: For, many, against SF, abstentions JW, BH, GS, KP, MP PASSED SF Motion -- Add China Vote: For KB, DM, LD, SF Against Many, Abstentions O FAILED JF Motion -- That the convention discuss turning the IS into a multi-racial organization and the turn to the black movement. Vote: For Many, Against O, Abstentions WW, MD PASSED MP Motion -- EC will attempt to organize preliminary discussion of "Building IS as multi-racial org" for next NC. Vote: For Many, Against 0, Abstentions EE. PASSED Vote on agenda as ammended: For ALL, PASSED II• Adding GS to EC MD Presentation 5 minutes 20 minute discussion round, 3 minutes each Vote: For ALL PASSED III. THEORETICAL JOURNAL JT Presn tation 7 minutes for EC postion MS Presentation 5 minutes 6 speakers, 3 minutes each Vote: For EC motion: KP, MD, DF, JW, CW, BW, KM, JG, BH, BR, GS, WW, EE For MS motion: MP, MS, KB, JF, ML, DM, LD, SF Abstentions O EC MOTION PASSED Text of MS motion on Theoretical Journal: 1. That we publish a TJ beginning in the fall. 2. That EC be mandated to establish an editor and a full editorial board for next meeting of NC 3. That editorial board not be restricted to members in Detroit. motion FAILED Organizational Motions: SF Motion--Ec is instructed to organize a full NC meeting for the evening immediately preceding the convention so the NC can properly fulfill its leadership role in the organization. We should avoid the situation of the 1974 convention where there was to properly organized NC meeting before or during the convention. Vote: For Many, Against 0, Abstentions 1 PASSED SF Motion -- No major document or major admendment shall be submitted for formal approval to the 1975 convention unless that document or amendment has been submitted to the branches with sufficient time for discussion. Vote: For Many, Against, MP, KB, Abstentions DF, MD PASSED

GS Motion--1. The NC takes responsibility for assuring that the WP circulation campaign is carried out. Toward that end, NC members will make sure that each branch appoint a responsible person as WP circulation coordinator and that that comrade report to the Editor after each issue, sales and selling experiences.

2. The NC has correctly discussed many important political questions that must be brought into Workers Power. Toward that end every NC member should talk to the Editor about areas of specialization and writing. Unless the national political leadership of the IS begins to write more seriously for WP many of these political questions will not be taken up seriously.

Vote: on 1.--For Many, Against 0, Abstentions 0 PASSED

Vote on 2--For Many, Against 0, Abstentions 0 PASSED BW Motion--from the February NC Women's Caucus: The NC endorses the March 1 conference on Building the Working Womens Movement. Furthermore, we ask all NC members to go back to their branches and help build the conference and bring contracts to it. (West coast comrades excepted)

Vote: For Many, Against O, Abstentions MP, KB, LD PASSED

IV. COMMITTEE REPORTS

Democratic Party Study Group--JG report

- A. Youth Committee Report -- ML
- 1. Discussion of national Red Tide, what is happening in different branches
- 2. Progress of Red Tide newsppeper, where it is, where it is going
- 3. Discussion of dues structure for dual members.
- 4. Internal education, the setting up of a national RT educational program. Dual members in relation to.
- 5. Finances

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- 6. Building the national Red Tide through the 3 branches Seattle, Cleveland, NY.
- 7. Dual members responsibility, motion passed
- 8. Merry P's document on relationship of IS to RT
- 9. Additions to the committee, from NY
- 10. How the crisis affects young people.
- MOTIONS TO BE REPORTED ON:
- 1. Motion that someone from New York be added to the committee by the EC.
- 2. That MPs document be voted on by the IS and RT ECs and then placed in the membership handbook which is coming out as the stated position of the relationahip between the 2 organizations

3. Amendment to MP document--Education of dual members whose primary responsibility of work is to the Red Tide will take place through the RT educational program and will be considered to be carrying out the IS program in this manner. This means that dual members are not required to attend both IS and RT educational programs in regard to the Trautman program.

- TO BE VOTED ON:
- 1. Responsibilities of dual members #2 proposal of MP
 - Vote: For Many, Against O, Abstentions BP PASSES

2. That Seattle, Cleveland and New York are instructed to set up youth committees which will make it their business to build a Red Tide in their cities. All other branches are instructed to assign at least one person to keep an eye out for possibilities of youth work and keep in touch with Red Tide.

Vote: For Many, Against 0, Abstentions 0 PASSED

3. Education of dual members whose primary responsibility of work is to the Red Tide will take place through RT educational program and will be considered to be carrying out the IS program in this manner. This means that dual members are not required to attend both IS and RT educational programs in regard to the Trautman program.

Vote: For ALL, Against 0, Abstentions 0 PASSED 4. Dues Structure as explained by Michael

Vote: For Many, Against O, Abstentions O PASSED

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Amendment to MP document--Delete last 2 sentences Para 2

At the local level IS branches cannot issue directives to local branches of Red Tide to engage in activities. In situations involving political disputes over activities in an area which are not resolved through collaboration and where there is insufficient time for the political questions to be resolved by the national organizations, the local IS branch has final authority. Problems in the relationship between IS and Red Tide branches should be appealed to the national organizations.

Vote: PASSED all for by the NC Youth Committee

B. Trade Union Committee Report--KM Present--KM, JW, DM, KS, SK, WT Agenda--Sperseniority, Evaluation of Network, UFW, Louisville

Items proposed but not discussed--dissolution of NY AFT group into broader formation, DM article on future of auto industry, Overtime campaign in UAW, Functioning of committee

Items tabled, refered, etc--JW directed to present next committee with motions on function and functioning of committee. Motion on aid to Louisville AFT work by ^{Na}tional Fraction, tabled to EC.

The committee also heard reports on all indus: trial fractions. Compensatory Treatment on layoffs--EC motion voted on

Compensatory Treatment and CLUW functioning--thrust of motion voted on Vote: 3-1 (DM), 1 (KS)

UFW--Two motions put forward, the numbered points in Margaret J's response to UFW Mailing $\frac{\mu}{h}$ 17, (recommended by EC) and a motion by DM

MJ-EC Motion:

l. That the IS publish the proposed UFW pamphlet and continue regular WP coverage $% \left[{{\left[{{{\rm{T}}_{\rm{T}}} \right]}} \right]$

2. The branches reappoint fraction convenors who will be responsible for communicating with the national fraction and seeing that UFW work becomes a part of the work of the industrial fractions.

3. Wherever possible comrades be directed to introduce support resolutions in their unions calling for regular financial support, AFL-CIO support for secondary boycott and try to get active support organized in their locals.

4. The national fraction continue to put out regualr mailings

5. All branches be required to assign an appropriate number of comrades to the arena to in tervene as much as possible, rather than merely a "contact" person who will report when things are getting interesting again.

DM Motion--That the IS UFW fraction be disbanded and that our work in the farm boycott be limited to C.alifornia--with the exception of resolutionary and similar intervention in IBT, AFT and other appropriate union situations.

Vote (by NC Trade Union Ctte): MJ-EC 3 (KM, JW, KS)

DM 2 (DM, SK)

Trade Union Session at the NC Presentation by JW for EC motion 5 minutes Presentation by DM 5 minutes

Motions:

KB Motion--Amendment to EC document--strike sentence "But it is the employers who have been responsible for discrimination and who are to blame for the present situation."

3 Paragraph, strike phrase "by the employer" in first sentence 1 speaker for and against amendment

2 speakers for and against EC motion.

Vote: KB Ameandment: For KB, Against All Rest Abstentions JF, ML, LD, SF, DF

Vote: EC Document For All Rest, Against KB, DM, LD, Abstentions ML, MS

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DF Sta tement for the minutes--I voted for the "Layoffs and Compensatory Treatment" motion with which I agree in principle. I have some reservations about whether the demand that no white male workers lose their jobs--ie that there be a "larger work force than is needed to get out production--is actionable. Our support for special demands protect: ing jobs won in struggle by blacks and women should not be conditioned on guarantees that no white or male workers will therefore lose their jobs. If demanding this guarantee only creates confusion among workers rather than forwarding the struggle, we will have to re-assess it. But I am for aggressively implementing the motion in practice.

CLUW Motion: The NC recommends to the CLUW fraction steering committee that at the next National Coordinating committee mmeeting of CLUW, where a discussion on Compensatory and super seniority is scheduled, we introduce our program on the layoffs compensatory treatment, seniority Mtc, including defending the ... idemands of the women in volved in the suit against GM at Fremont. Furthermore, we will introduce motions and discussions at each branch where we are involved.

Vote: table to EC--PASSES

UFW Presentation KM 5 minutes -- for MJ-EC motion and pt. 5

Steve C 3 minutes for DM mtion

MP 3 minutes for explanation

SF 3 minutes

Vote: EC-MJ motion tabled to EC For 0, Against Many Abstentions ? FAILED Motion to table pt 5 to EC. For 4, Against Many, Abstentions 1 FAILED MJ-EC Motion For Many, Aganist MS, BW, LD, DM Abstentions MP, SF PASSED

Motion to accept Trade Union report

Vote: For Many, Against 0, Abstentions LD PASSED

C. Organizational Committee Report Bill H.

1. National dues structure, motion -- already voted on

2. Motion--The political functioning of all IS members visiting o^r living in a given area including national functionaries is under the control of the local executive body unless functioning under specific instructions from the EC

Vote: FAILED For MP, BH, SF, LD, ML, EE, JF, KB, KP Against DF, MS, JW, CW, BW, KM, JG, JT, DM, GS, MD, WW Abstentions BR Vote On motion to table to EC also failed 9-11-1

3. Motion--that the EC present the next NC with a preliminary s¹ate for the new NC to be discussed in executive seession. Branches and members are free to send in nominations and motivations to the EC if they so choose. This slate in April is preliminary and may be changed between April and the convention.

Vote: For MP, KP, MS, MD, BH, BR, SF, LD, ML, EE, JF, KB Against CW, BW, KM, JG, JT Abstentions JW, DM, WW, GS, DF PASSES 4. The NC establishes a staff Policy Appeals Committee. A staff member or staff

members of the IS who have complaints or desire changes in conditions involving remuneration or working conditions shall take these to the EC or its designated political body which may be appealed to the EC. If the member still is not satisfied with the decision of the EC the question may be appealed to the Staff Policy Appeals Committee whose decision will be inal. Committee to be Mark-D, Steph-D, Sandy-Chicago.

Vote: Table to EC For 11, Against 7, Abstentions 4 PASSED

SF Motion--EC should organize discussion on candidate membership. Vote: For 5, Against Many FAILED

Motion to accept Organizations Committee Report.

Vote: For MP, MD, KP, KB, JF, EE, DM, ML, LD, SF, JT, BR, BH, JW Against GS, JS, KM, BW, CW, DF Abstentions MS, WW. PASSES

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Motion, GS--EC re-evaluate the way the Committees function in context with the whole
NC
DF Motion to rule GS motion out of order
Vote: For Majority, Against Few

Motion to approve national secretary Report SF Motion to dvide out section III--Role of NC and EC functions Vote: (National Secretary Report) For Many, Against O, Abstentions LD, DM PASSED Vote: (Section III) For Many, Aginst SF, DM Abstentions LD PASSED

EE Motion--Due to the lack of clarity on the National Secretary Report and the lack of focus in the NC discussion on the turn from propaganda to agitiation, NC members should beg in these discussions in their branches. The EC will clarify by the next NC what is concretely meant by this t urn in terms of our day to day work.

Vote: For JF, EE, DM, JW, SF, ML, KP, MS Against 11, Abstentions BH, WW, LD FAILS

JG Motion--That the EC will clarify the turn to agitation. Vote: For ALL PASSED

DM Motion--Committee be set up for sole purpose of settling KL appeal to NC on salary Vote: For 10, Against 5, Abstentions 7 PASSED

SF Motion--The National Secretary shall provide a more refined analysis of our recent recruitment in terms of social composition.

Vote: For Many, Against JW, Abstentions O PASSED

SF Motion--The EC shall explain the role of the National Organizer in general terms. The EC shall also explain why specifically Glyn was chosen as natoional organizer. Voete: For ALL PASSED

Sta tement for the minutes on voting on National Secretary Report--We voted for the National Secretary Report on the "turn to agitation" si nce we are in agreement with the bulk of the report and since the discussion on the first section is a continuing one. Signed, Ken S, Enid E, Mike P, Bill

D. Left Committee Report EE Presentation 10 minutes Motion--Left Committee recommends that the EC put someone in charge of coordinat ing travel to these groups. Vote: For ALL PASSED Report adopted

Vote: For Many, Against LD, Abstentions O. PASSES

E. Educational Committee Report by JT Motion--the Education Committee should be restructured after next NC elections to be more geo graphically representative Vote: Table to EC PASSED Motion: Summer school to be on black left

Vote: For ALL, PASSES

Motion to accept report

Vote: For ALL, Against 0, abstentions 0 PASSED

F. International Committee

DF motion to forgo verbal report for written to go in minutes Voete: For Majority Passes

A DJOURNMENT!

EC MINUTES 2/27

O.NATSEC REPORT.

The EC will recommend to our contacts in Ann Arbor that they move to Detroit for one month, with the perspective of the mnoving to Chicago or Pittsburgh depending on job prospects which will be explored in the meantime.

A successful forum was held in Philadelphia, attended by about 40 people.

Comrade LD has informed the LA exec that he is resigning from the IS. There are three factors involved in this decision: (1)his political differences with the organization and our labor perspective; (2)the fact that since the resignation of the forter SC leadership he feels even more politically isolated in the IS, although he disagrees with the course taken by the former SC; (3)the fact that with the organization tightening up politically, although he feels this is correct in itself it makes it even more difficult for him to organize as a very small minority. We have been promised a letter from LD but it has not yet been received.

1.BAY AREA LETTER. We received a letter from the BA exec raising questions about the recruitment of the former SC. It is attached, with our answer to the questions raised.

2.FUND DRIVE. Immediately following the Convention, the NC voted for a second fund drive in April, to be internal rather than publicized in the paper etc. Quotas for this drive have been approved by the EC and will be sent out.

3.PITTSBURGH. Report by MD on trip to Pittsburgh. The turnout at the forum was small (bad weather, some contacts working), but discussion was very good. MOTION: The EC will attempt th arrange trips to Pittsburgh every couple of weeks. PASSED.

4. NEW YORK. KM \notin will make a trip to NY for a couple of weeks in order to work with the exec and assist the branch.

5. CLEVELAND. The EC has held a series of discussions on resolving problems in the Cleveland branch. We expect to have a statement xx soon.

6.THE NATIONALIZATION DEMAND XX IN AUTO. The following motiom was submitted to the EC by the Detroit branch exec:

We recommend to the EC that our response to the Chrysler statements about a permanent 40% cut in production and workforce be an intensification of work around our present program. We still believe that the central demand for our work be jobs for all. Townsend's statements now make it more important to raise our program, including nationalization. Nationalization must be raised as the logical outcome of demanding jobs. Where possible the question of nationalization should be raised and explained in our rank and file leafletd and bulletins in the manner it was raised in the unemployed presents. (Also) we request WP to run a major piece be what nationalization means.

MOTION(JG):(i)We accept the exec motion. ALL FOR (ii)Greater emphasis should be placed on nationalization under workers' control than in the past, given the probable closure of plants, possible bankruptcy of Chrysler and the planned 40% reduction in the workforce. PASSED ALL FOR (iii)Workers' control in this context should be explained as defense of conditions, rather than as co-determination or a s xXXXX a transition to power. PASSED 4-0-1 (JT)

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EC MINUTES 3/5

1. WOMEN's CONFERENCE. Long discussion evaluating the highly successful women's conference last weekend in Cleveland. The main point in the discussion was that the conference conveyed the sense of a movement event, rather than a sect conference, and that the issues discussed and the whole dynamic reflected that of a developing movement. We hope to be able to carry through similar events elsewhere in the coming period.

2.VISIS TO DETROIT. MOTION(JG): The EC is for initiating a program of bringing comrades to Detroit for cadre development and training. This is particularly important for comrades entering industry. Before beginning a thoroighgoing program, we will experiment with a number of differjent formulas. To begin with a few comrades will be brought in for two weeks or so; this will be the general time period for these visits on an initial experimental basis. Programs of disdussion, xxxxfx specific training etc. will be tailored to individuals' needs. JT is in charge of over-all coordination of this program. PASSED ALL FOR 3.UAW OVERTIME CAMPAIGN. REport by JW. Plans for demonstrations in Detroit and several other cities are in progress.

4.CLEVELAND. A statement by the EC on the problems of the Cleveland brangh, and how we are resolving the situation, is attached to the minutes.

5.BLACK COMMISSION. Initial presentation and tentative proposal by MD; decision tabled one week for consideration in terms of what personnel the EC should be committed to the Commission.

6.NATSEC REPORT. Attached.

ASSESSMENT OF THE NC MEETING -- REPORT BY THE EC

The purpose of this report is to sum up the advances made by the February NC meeting, and to indicate the areas of weakness that remain in the discussions and in the leadership of the organization, including both the NC and EC.

We considered two sessions in particular to be basically unqualified successes: (i)the Workers Power session and (ii)the session on the political **xrixix** effects of the crisis. The WP session and the decision to plan for weekly publication represented one of the most important conclusions from the presentation made by the EC on the turn toward agitation.

The fact that the decision for weekly publication was taken by an overwhelming vote and with considerable enthusiasm reflects, in our view, three / important things about the IS and its cadre today. Forst is the fact that the organization and its leadership have xxxxx gained a real understanding of what the paper means as the organizer of our work - and the fact that the paper must always be ahead of the organization in its ability to put forward a line and to provide leadership in the struggle. Second is the fact that WP is now recognized as an effective revolutionary socialist newspaper, which has begun the process of becoming a real workers' paper, and which can be used as this kind of organizing tool. Third is the fact that the process of using the paper in this way - the regular sales, distribution inside a few factories, systematic contact work organized around the paper andworking to get our own contacts to distribute and use the paper as their own - has actually begun in a number of branches, with the others scheduled to follow. We believe this discussion was decisively successful in the sense that all the possible political problems that might stand in the way of going weekly have been resolved, and the only remaining difficulties are technical ones which we are cont/fident can be overcome.

The session the political effects of the crisis in the US was also successful from a number of standpoints. First, it was a successful opening up of the main political discussion we will introduce at the Convention: the emergence of a sharpening crisis and political changes that open up a concrete perspective for working class revolution in the United States. The document presented by JG and the discussion around it both helped to prepare us theoretically for what some of the changes in the next couple of years may be, and also gave a clear political context for the necessity of rapid changes in the IS itself. We also felt the discussion was a success in that XXXX other NC members had their own valuable contributions to make, and also in that immefiate steps were taken to follow up by establishing a study group to closely analyze the changes inside the Democratic Party and their implications. We believe that this reflects the presence of considerable political talent in the IS that can be used and can make a real contribution to this work.

There were other general aspects of the NC meeting which we think should be recognized a s steps forward. The NC meeting discussed the right questions, i.e. the most pressing issues confronting us today. Second, there was more real discussion and interchange within the NC on the issues discussed. Third, the discussions themselves were overall more political and on a higher level than in the past. Taxix This measurable improvement in the functioning of the NC is a reflection of the changes that have already begun occurring in the organization.

There were a couple of other specific decisions taken that we considered **game** indications of real progress. The NC's decision to take up and settle the strategy for building the working women's movement at the next meeting - in order to allow room on the Convention agenda for the critical issue of the black movement and building a multi-racial IS - is a step that recognizes the importance of taking up and resolving vital issues, so that new and equally vital issues that confront us can be taken up without delay. We have already taken the first steps to reestablish the Black Commission which will have key responsibility for doing the work needed to produce the convention document on this issue.

Secondly, the discussion (although brief) on the theoretical journal reflected real seriousness and a sense of priorities on all sides. We are glad that the recognition of the critical importance of theory, in the light of a turn toward agitation which can lead to all kinds of problems unless the cadre is continually developing and hardening itself theoretically, is agreed on. There also seemed to be a real agreement, including among those comrades who felt that the TJ should be the top priority now, that we cannot accomplish everything at once and must make real choices. Because of \sharp this, we are now confident that the questiokn of TJ ublication is agreed upon in principle and that the issue can be closed until our resources, hopefully in the near future, enable us to make a serious proposal with details, personnel and publication dates spelled out.

The other main political sessions at the NC had both strong and weak points. The section of the NATSEC Report discussion devoted to the turn toward agitation reflected, in our view, the extent to which this turn has already begun. However, there were some misunderstandings due in part to some lack of clarity in the EC's presentation. Clearly our initial formulation "the turn from propaganda to agitation" caused some comrades to believe we were implying sharply delineated "stages" of propaganda, agitation, etc. Of course there are no such clean stages either in the class struggle, or in the development of a revolutionary group. Even more important, the point we should have stressed much more clearly is that turning towards agitation also points to the development of propaganda in the real sense: i.e. propaganda that really gives leadwrship to a workers' vanguard rather than just expressing an analysis and view of the world. Leadership in minimal struggles today is what opens workers to revolutionary politics, to our propaganda and program. That is the way workers can be recruited to the IS, as we believe can and must be done today.

The other section of the NATSEC Report discussion, on the relationship of leadership to the branches etc., had a less clear political focus. This may have been because a large part of it centered around the question of receivership, which we did not view as the main issue. For us, the key notion is that in developing genuine democratic centralism it becomes the responsibility of the leading national bodies to ensure that agreed-upon perspectives and programd are carried through by the branches, and that they are assisted in this through whatever help, initiatives and interventions are required. Again, we felt this discussion was positive insofar as it reflected a process which has already begun to occur - and whose necessity we think is widely recognized by the IS membership. Even in the short time since the NC meeting, we believe we have been proven correct in raising this issue, the need for greater leadership to xxxxxpitsh ensure politically coherent and unified functioning. We have learned that effective EC political intervention in branches where there are serious problems must be undertaken before these problems generalize and result in paralysis of branches and their work. We are now committed to fulfill our obligations to assist and intervene in branches where this is necessary,

Finally, it was cleat that the least satisfactory session of the NC was the discussion around committee reports. The most serious problem arises when committee reports include substantive and often very important motions which are then to be discussed and voted on with totally inadequate preparation and almost no time for consideration. At this NC meeting the problem came up particularly in terms of the organization committee, which reported out several motions on or-

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ganizational procedures which may have very substantial consequences in our functioning. In at least one case, the motion on travellers and local execs, we consider the proposal to be radically wrong even though it was posed in terms of an entirely unobjectionable "general principle." Under the circumstances, in which any serious clarification or discussion of the actual content was impossible, this led to strained nerves and the virtual breakdown of the meeting. While this may well have kanning been the primary fault of the EC we believe it was essentially built in to what is at present an untenable procedure.

Therefore, in the next few weeks the EC intends to come up with a proposal for restructuring the discussions of committee reports at NC meetings so that the α ginal constructive purpose of the committees - organizing NC members into specific areas of the ongoing direction of the organization - can ve more effectively accomplished.

We continue to believe that the turn discussed by the February NC meeting is the crusial step needed at this moment to take toward building a revolutionary party. It is, clearly, only the first of many. The NC voted that the political ideas embodied in the turn proposed by the EC should be clarified through further reports and discussions initiated by the EC. The leadership of this NC and EC must now be judged on our ability to provide this clarification, to organize a full pre-Convention discussion throughout the organization, and to deepen the conception of the turn **xxxxxxx** by providing initiative and example in the work.

EC STATEMENT ON THE CLEVELAND BRANCH

Many members of the organization will be aware that for a considerable period there have been severe internal problems in the Cleveland Branch. There is an extent to which these problems pre-date the very formation of the branch in 1973, and although all problems of this kind have a political core, there is no doubt that personal disputes have hardened them considerably. It is also the case, that the inability, until very recently, of the EC to intervene politically and decisively to solve this problem in the past accounts for the extreme solution that the EC is now applying.

All sides in this dispute are agreed that matters had to be brought to a head. Indeed, it was only the effort made by both sides after the recruitment of Modern Times that delayed the final reckoning this long. In the event the fuse for the final explosion was provided by a secret meeting of ten members of the branch three weeks before the Cleveland Working Womens Conference at which it was decided that this majority grouping would use its power to replace CW as organizer. This decision was transmitted immediately to the EC and it was decided that in the best interests of the whole organization, no action would be taken by any party on this decision until the conference was over.

It must be understood that the decision of the ten to replace the organizer is symtomatic of the fact that the branch was totally polarized between the ten and four of the remaining five branch members (ie, AG, BW, CW, DP). It cannot be seen as an isolated instance of a branch merely deciding quite xxxxixxix constitutionally, to change one of its earlier decisions. The fact that a secret meeting took place and that the EC was immediately informed proves what the EC was already aware of through its own experience with the branch. That is, that the two sides had reached the stage where it was virtually impossible for them to work together. If the EC had not intervened with a clear position at this stage then its previous irresponsibility would have become nothing short of criminal neglect.

The EC therefore decided that it should strongly oppose the firing of the organizer on clear political grounds, make an attempt to convince the ten of this position and bring the national organizer into the branch to give guidance and in the final analysis direction on the recreation of a unified and outward looking branch based on the same organizer, a new exec and a most certain change in the indefensible political method of the branch. In the event of being unable to win this position, a position which would have been clearer than before and had the chance of changing the prevailing relationships between the four and the ten, the EC felt it had no choice but to remove the four from the branch.

Members should be clear what this position means because in the event the EC did lose its position when the branch voted 10-1, in the absence of the four, to replace the organizer. In this situation there is no doubt that the EC has the right to enforce its decision on the branch, even before that decision has gone before the NC for ratification. In deciding not to follow that course, deciding that such a course would be damaging to the organization as a whole, the EC was accepting a clear political defeat. The four comrades in question have consistently and conspicuously worked for the line passed by the convention, NC and EC. They have used their undenlable talents to give the line some concrete form. Two of these members are NC members and national leaders of the organization and will continue to be that after they have left the branch. The EC accepts the major burden of responsibility for waht has developed over a long period in Cleveland. But the EC's well merited self-criticism will not be allowed to hold back the turn it is leading in the organization. Indeed it feels that if this turn had been made earlier the present situation would not have arisen in Cleveland and that now the turn is underway there will be no repeats of the Cleveland situation. The EC will also make every effort to guide and assist the new branch in Cleveland and do all in its power to ensure that in Cleveland, as in every other branch, the fantastic opportunities of the present period are fully realized.

EC statement on the Cleveland branch

It will no doubt be whispered that the EC position on the Cleveland organizer arises out of their personal relationship. As long as we are this small and have such a well developed grape-vine, such gossip will always exist. It is, however, totally removed from the facts of the matter. The support of the EC for CW as organizer, their support for the other three comrades who are totally identified with his political record was taken solely on political grounds. These grounds are a s follows:

There is a very real sense in which CW was the first organizer in the whole country who saw the job in the Leninist sense as a political leader of the branch, an initiator of political activity and the exec. member with most responsibility for generalizing the political experience of the branch and whole organization for the benefit of the members. Other organizers have since followed this lead, but there is no doubt that the four have been victims of this unsupported pioneer work. It is not easy to be the first organizer who refuses to see his job as **EXEX** secretary to the branch, administrator/lackey and independent arbitor on the large range of non-political problems that arise in any branch. Not easy, but vital if the organization is to make the turn to a Bolshevic, combat, workers organization.

Despite the problems of the branch it was under the leadership of CW that the Cleveland branch actually gave a lead to the whole organization. The first rand and file conference of 100 people in June 1974 which started a healthy turn in other branches was the initiative of the minority. The same is true of the recent successful working women's conference which was a victory for the whole organization. Under CW's leadership the branch achieced a level of WP sales which put it in advance of the present circulation drive and turn to the weakly. It was from Cleveland that the first serious regional work wad developed in the organization and this was largely the result of the organizer's initiative. Such regional work, especially with the small independent political groups which are dotted around every region in the country is a vital necessity in an organization which has aspirations to lead the working class and still has such few branches.

The ability of the IS though its branches and press to relate in any way to the important miners' strike of last year was due to CW and in that area of industrial work in shich he has been able to exercise considerable political influence, ie AG's trade union work, we have had the sort of developments which will be a model for industrial work in every other area and industry.

It is not the EC's intention to give an exhaustive list of CW's accomplishments, nor will they git involved in a prolonged debate on the subject. We are merely giving examples to demonstrate that the majority in a branch may not be politically correct when they use their power to remove their organizer on what were at best marginal and vague political grounds. This is Boubly the case when all parties are conscious of the fact that this can only result in the eventual removal of his supporters as well. It is the majorities right and duty to take that action which it feels is appropriate. It is the EC's right and duty to oppose that if it feels it is **immume** incorrect. The EC being unable to convince the branch at this stage was doing its job, albeit reluctantly, when it decided to break the paralyzing deadlock by bringing the four out of the branch.

The EC does not believe that CW or the other three comrades were perfect. The majority, as well as making the relatively untemportant attack on the organizer's political style has pointed to genuine failings in relation to organizing the work of some of the fractions. Comrades should be aware that these failings existed, but are undoubtly complicated by the fact that the national leaders of the steel and IBT fractions are in the branch and are part of the majority grouping. The EC feels that the organizer was also unable to create a branch that was habitable for real workers and and though in the polarized situation in the branch it is impossible to pin all the blame on any one individual or group, there is no Goubt that in the final analysis it is the organizer who accepts all responsiblity for all branch matters.

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EC statement on the cleveland branch

That however is no longer the key question. The EC is in support of CW, but failure to break up the situation would have meant an eventual loss of experience, dedicated and talented cadres that the group cannot afford to loose. The EC's responsibility can only be to the orgnizzation as a whole, such a loss would have harmed us and we could not allow even the risk of that. We made that the key question. It is also the case that such losses would have accured on the other side if the EC had decided to enforce its views, losses before the comrades involved had even had the opportunity to prove their way points in practice in a branch over which they had clear political control.

Those then are the reasons for the position the EC took in relation to the Cleveland situation. Those are the reasons the EC withdrew the four when its position was defeated. We recommended to the four that they movem to Detroit, a sloution which meant considerable personal sacrifice for all four. Because of the importance and recent success of the industrial work (an assessment shared by all branch members), because that work would be impossible to continue outside Cleveland, and because they felt it was impossible to be in the branch, AP and DP asked permission for a three month leave of absence in Cleveland to consider the position. The EC granted it on the understanding that the industrial work would continue under the direct control of the national industrial organizer, that in every other field there would be a total leave and that at the end of the period they would either move to Detroit or return as ordinary members of the branch. The EC is not trying to hide the fact that this is an exceptional organizational solution, but anyone who is aware of the work of these commades or has met them and therefore appreciates their talent will not condemm the EC for making exceptions to ensure that some of our best industrial xxkrxix work is not lost.

CW and BW have agreed to move to Detroit as soon as is physically possible. The EC feels that the excellent work that BW is performing as Women's Commissioner will be even more fruitful when organized from the political center of the group. It is no accident that the comrade chosen to be the national leaderx in this field has made most progress in her cwn xxixx region in terms of CLUW work, this will not be lost. It is no accident that the very successful working women's conference was organized mainly by the four in the branch which contains the Women's commissioner. This progress must be developed by the national office and BW is vital to this task.

CW will be a staff member of Workers Power, a member of its editorial board, and will also act as a regional organizer in the midwest under direct EC control. In practice this means that we are in a position to strengthen the already considerable political breadth and journalistic talent on the paper and also have, for the forst time, someone who has the time and ability to make the "left" campaign work. In the short term it also means that regional work in Buffalo, Akron, Cincinnati. Dayton and the mining areas which were previously the responsibility of the branch and for lack of resources never carried through one now be brought to fruition by CW. The move to the weekly paper and the vital necessity of repid geographical growth in this period makes this job vital. There is no better candidate for it than CW and though we would have preferred that he could take it on under better circumstances, particuarly not circumstances made untenable by EC failures, the EC has absolute and total confidence in CW to successfully lead in these areas.

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Bay Area Letter on the Resignation of the SC

The resignations of most of the former Socialist Collective members is obviously a great loss to the I.S., not so much in numbers but in the loss of several potential (black) cadre. Given the fact that the I.S. will be relating to similar grouping both now and in the future, we must be very clear about our orientation toward them. Clearly, then, a sober evaluation of our experiences with the SC is in order. What follows is an attempt to raise some questions about our own role in this affair.

This letter is the result of the Bay Area membership meeting where the resignation of the S.C. was announced. During the discussion many questions were raised. Although there was no consensus reached, the exec was asked to formulate the sense of that meeting.

Some questions which were brought up were: Was it correct to put Scer's immediately upon our National Executive bodies? Although we certainly should publicize and attempt to capitalize on the recruitment of the SC, wasn't the claim of the "historical" nature of this "fusion" an overly inflated analysis of the SC's joining? Finally, considering their differences on the curcial subject of blacks and independent organization, and their fears of doing "just black work, what was done and what was decided about their relationship to our black work? In other words, though there was an understandable aversion by the SC to exclusively doing black work, was there at the same time an understanding that it was crucial for them to takke a lead in recruiting and radicalizing potential black cadre?

At this point, the really important questions involve our own role. Did we have to lose most of the SC or could it have been avoided? What, if anything, would we do differently?

In the tape sent out to the branches, a number of EC members state that we made virtually no mistakes with the SC, that we "gambled" and lost, but that we would do it just the same again, etc. Perhaps they're right, but a number of questions remain.

Was the SC recruited too quickly? While it is true that they were anxious to join us and we certainly wanted them to join badly, shouldn't we have engaged in some common <u>trade union work</u> to see if there was a genuine basis for joining? After all, ourjoint work in LA revolved around Wounded Knee and the SLA, hardly typical of our arena work. Political discussions are important and necessary, but shouldn't we have anticipated serious problems precisely around our trade union work? True the SC agreed to a class struggle union perspective, but was there much agreement on what that meant concretely, in everyday practice? Just a quick perusal of the SC's leaflets on trade union matters indicates how far apart our approach had been.

Such joint work then could have provided us, hopefully, with a genuine political basis for their joining, and giving it all the publicity it deserved without the embarrassment of their quitting 3 months later. There is such a thing as <u>pre-</u><u>mature</u> recruitment of groups with sectarian politics

The integration of the SC members would be made even more difficult by the fact, now recently announced by the EC, that the Sc was primarily a clique around Joe. Does the fact that they were willing to disperse themselves throughout the country make that much difference, especially given the fact that they were 'virtually the only black members of the IS?

Aren't these reasons enough for establishing a period of joint work before recruiting the group? And, once in, was there much time spent on their political integration in all branches where they were members? At the same time, did the comrades treat their point of view seriously, even if in disagreement, before they Bay Area Letter on SC Pg. 2 formed the Socialist Caucus?

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In no sense are these questions posed rhetorically or to embarrass anyone. The point is to analyze past events so that our own functioning can be improved insofar as possible. In no way, either, do we want to imply that the IS was mainly at fault here. At the same time, it is important to learn from such experiences--good or bad. At times we have been concerned that some members of the EC have accused the membership of conservatism or even racism for even raising some of these cuestions about the SC rather than clearly answering the questions. We therefore request that the EC, if it has not already done so, write up an evaluation of this whole episode, responding to these and other questions raised by other comindes.

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Bay Area Exec for the Membership

RESPONSE TO THE BAY AREA LETTER ON THE RESIGNATION OF THE SC

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The following is in response to the questions raised by members in the Bay Area branch in the foregoing Bay Area letter. The questions will be answered as they come up.

(1) "Was it correct to put SCers immediately on our National Executive Bodies?" Yes, to have not done so would have ensured that there would he no integration or assimilation of any or all of the SC. Integration had to be done at all levels of the organization, not just at the rank and file level. Since no question was raised as to whether or not the SCers put on those bodies were qualified, I can only assume that the comrades raising this question do not think that any of the SCers should have been put on those bodies in any case. Clearly the joining of such a group significantly changes the IS, more than just recruiting 15 additional comrades. It was very important to make clear that were were interested in integrating them at all levels, especially since they had cadre that were very qualified to be leaders of the IS. I find it interesting that to my knowledge no one in the Bay Area voted against adding the two SCers to the NC, given this question.

(2) "Wasn't the claim of the 'historical' nature of thes 'fusion' an overly inflated analysis of the SC's joining?" How can such a question be answered? If the 'fusion; had worked, then it would have been ' historical' step forward for the IS, as I'm sure everyone recognizes. Since it didn't, now we have to take the lumps on that. It seems to me that generally the problem in the IS is a lack of confidence in the organization too little aggressiveness, and even a sense of embarrasment about putting IS forward, and not the reverse.

(3) "What was done and what was decided about their (SC) relationship to our black work?" As comrades are aware, the balck question was discussed many times, both theoretically and practically with the SC. At all times we made it clear that their joining would play an important role in recruiting blacks to the IS. They understood, that they would **pixy** have to play a major role in recruiting and radicalizing black contacts. The problems came about in working this out in practice - specifically - the organization supporting and backing up work in the black community, and contact work assignments. There were difficulties, but in my opinion, they arose not becase there was a lack of understanding or because we did not make our politics clear, but because of the differences on the black question, and the lack of sensitivity by the organization as a whole in this situation. Overtime, which we didn't have, I believe that these problems could have been solved.

The rest of the questions deal with differences on labor and raise the question that if there had been more joint work, specifically trade union work, reprior to their joining, with the SC the events which occured could have been prevented. Presumably this means either we wouldn't have recruited them because we coudn't agree on trade union work, or that the major differences could have been ironed out. What the comrades are saying is that their recruitment was "premature".

The comrades in the Bay Area are generally, I assume, famaliar with the work of the LA branch, and more precisely what that work was last summer when the joint work with the SC was going on. And, if this is the case, then they should be aware, that the only real trade union work that was going on in LA at that time, and that on a very small scale, was teamster work. The proposal for joint trade union work in LA simply wasn't possible, no matter how desirable that would have been, or how much comrades may have wished it to be so. Secondly, the dynamics of the SC were not something that we had any control over, and it was the attack on them by the Communist Party and the Pan Africanists that brought them **KENEXXEX** close to us, made them realize that they couldn't exist as a small group of revolutionaries in LA and needed a national organization. It was following this attack that the first real proposals for joint discussions, etc developed. As soon as that dynamic developed the proposals for more joint work even in the trade unions, even if it had been possible would have been sectarian and so seen by the SC. Comrades must understand that the dynamic during the joint discussions here in Detroit following the convention was such that they wanted to join, and that during the first 3-4 sessions of those

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make sure that 11 differences came out and that nothing was fudged over. Every specific trade union question that we knew about, that they had taken a position on was gone over in detail - the UFW and CLUW. On the UFW after discussing this question in detain, the SCers said they basically agreed with our position, that the earlier paper they had written was based on the information they had at the time, which happened to be a IBT **REXENTION** newsletter. On CLUW, some differences remained, but it seemed that these could be worked out in practice. Some of the SC criticins of the auto work while they were here following the convention, appeared to be similar to some of those that some of us in the national leadership had of our work at that time, eg that we had to find a way to raise our full politics with the contacts we had made in the course of our trade union work. It was only much later, around the time of the November NC that we began to understand that their disagreements were clearly qualitatively difference from any criticisms that some of us had had: that they flowed not from fundamental agreement with class struggle unionism and our perspectives, but from another perspective of absuract

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discussions it was the IS that was holding back, questioning every detail, in order to

criticisms that some of us had had: that they flowed not from fundamental agreement with class struggle unionism and our perspectives, but from another perspective of absuract propaganda which had little or no understanding of how consciousness is raised. While this was one tendency of theor politics all along, by this time it was clearly the only one. Since it took some three months for those fundamental differences to become clear, and that in the context of our most developed industrial work (auto) the comrades in the Bay Area must be saying that we should have had a long period (6 months, a year) of work together in the IBT in LA to see if we could have worked together, and be in the xxx same organization. That comrades, would have meant that they x never would have joined, and maybe that is your answer. It is quite true that if you never take chances you never lose, but then again, you won't win either. Lastly, and most important, we stated at the beginning when they joined, and when they resigned, that one of the important things was for some of their cadre to get industrial jobs in the industries where we work, so that we could see where the real differences were, if there were any and attempt to work those out in practice. And we all know, that due to the matieral conditions that proved to be impossible, and probably would have been in LA as well. The reason why this last point is so important is the following: Those comrades in the organization for the past 5 years would do well to remember some of the abstract and weird discussions we went through before we entered industry and began to understand what revolutionary work in the trade unions was all about. No wonder that the SCers positions were abstract - so were ours, and hence the importance of work together especially in the more developed areas of our trade union work, which was not possible in LA, even if it had been easy to get into the IBT, get class one licenses, etc.

There were a few other points raised in the context of the questions around joing work: (1) X the implied question as to whether or not the EC was aware that much (although not all - there are several important exceptions) of the SC was a clique around Joe. Yes, we were aware of that problem, again it was our hoep that rk through joint work, especially in industry that the clique aspects of the group would be broken up, just as many of the cliques that have existed in the IS in the past have been broken up for through political work. Putting Joe on the Ec and moving the SC geographically was essential if that clique was ever to be dissolved. (2) was there much time spent on the political integration in all branches they were members, and did IS comrades treat their differences seriously before they formed the Socialist Caucus? In every branch there was time px spent on political integration - the SCers were brought into the branch leaderships, education, fractions work, and in Detroit at least, a program of discussions on the nature of our work was set up, which they didn't want, and whichwere therefore discontinued. Political differences were taken seriagly, the point was we disagreed and in discussions in the branches and individually, they could move no one, not even the newest of least developed member of IS. It was when this became clear that they formed the Socialist Caucus and began to consider (privately of course) splitting from IS.

I find it somewhat interesting that the questions raised were none that came to mix my mind. I believe that there were small mistakes made, like sending some of

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the SCers to Boston, or to the South, without first having integrated them into the branches, and I am sure others could be found. None, including the **EXEX** questions raised by the Bay Area comrades would have changed the fact that the SC split over fundamental political differences in terms of perspectives for building a working class revolutionary movement and party.

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Having answered these questions, I have a brief statement to make, and then a couple of questions of my own which I address to the Executive Committee of the Bay Area branch under whose name these questions were sent out. It seems to me that the only concludion that one can draw from these questions is that the comrades were "embarrased" because we could not keep the SC after being so enthusiastic about their joining, and therefore that we shouldn't have recruited them without months and months of joint trade union work in LA where such joint work at that time would have been practically impossible. In effect, what these questions add up to is that we shouldn't have taken the "gamble" or that we should have made it such a sure thing that it wasn't a gamble at all. I, and speaking here form the entire EC and the majority of the organization I believe, disagree. We will have to take many gambles in the process of building a revolutionary workers movement and a revolutionary party. This one will be small in comparison. Some we will win, and some we will lose, but if we are not prepared to take such gambles then we should just close up shop now and try to find some comfortable niche for ourselves rather than spend all of this time on politics. It is basically a question of conservatism - a fear of taking chances, a lack of confidence in the IS that it can recruit groups with differences and integrate them into the organization. This is not a slap at any comrade, but a political characterization that clearly comes through a careful reading of the questions raised.

Now, for my questions to the exec: Did the exec have a position on the resignation of the SC, or were they newtral, couldn't make up their minds? And if they did have a position (eg agree basically with the EC position but have questions like Michael L (LA) who responsibly raised them to the February NC meeting, or disagree with a clear political statement) why wasn't it so stated in the letter? From reading the questions submitted by the exec for the branch, one can only assume that they didn't have a position. Does the exec think that it has a leadership role to play on such an important question, or does leadership mean that you just mirror the views of the membership and take no posi0 as a body even if that body is divided? Did the exec attempt to answer any of these que tions to the membership when they were raised, and if so, why wasn't that so stated, or do they agree with the direction of those questions, which if I may restate, come down to the fact that we shouldn't have recruited the SC? These questions are quite serious ones for any executive boyd. They go to the heart of the role of political leadership in a revolutionary organization. The EC requests that the Bay Area exec answer these questions with the seriousness and time which we have spent in answering the questions on the resignation of the SC by the Bay Area branch.

One last point: The EC called for branch meetings to be held as soon as the SC had resigned. We did this for a specific reason: to prepare the organization to defend itself both from the danger of demoralziation, and from all kinds of charges that might be hurled at us by political enemies. In other words, we considered the organization km to be in a combat situation. In these circumstances, it is perfectly justified to raise a disagreement if you believe the EC's line is wrong, and therefore will hurt the organization rather than protecting it. If you disagree, you should state your difference and take responsibility for it. Or you can even keep silent. But for an political leadership body to take no position on how to defend the organization, but just to raise questions - that comrades, we believe is wrong.

Marilyn Danton National Secretary

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