

## **REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE**

# **Evaluation of the Work of Mao Tsetung**



Since World War 2 the International Communist Movement and the socialist world have suffered a grave crisis. Almost all the communist parties which belonged to that movement openly adopted a revisionist line; and almost all the countries where socialist construction had begun have restored capitalism or are on the road to doing so, as is the case with China. The Soviet Union, the first country where the proletariat took power, has been transformed not only into a state capitalist regime, but also into an imperialist superpower, currently one of the main enemies of the peoples of the world.

The future of the Marxist-Leninist movement, and of world socialism, is linked to the correctness of the authentic communists' analysis of the basic causes of this immense, sustained and extremely grave setback for the revolutionary proletarian movement. What has happened confirms the dialectical character of all development; neither Marxism nor socialism advances in a straight line, but like all processes, through contradictions. Marxism advances through line struggle, opposing the various forms which the bourgeois and petty bourgeois line assumes; socialism, through class struggle, confronting the old bourgeoisie, and the new bourgeoisie which arises within socialism itself, including within the vanguard party.

It is important to consider that under socialism the class struggle acquires an unprecedented profundity, because we are not dealing with one class simply replacing another, as in previous systems, but rather with the elimination from society of classes themselves, with all

their ideological manifestations, in order to advance to communism, classless society. The most important thing in analyzing what happened is to show who has betrayed Marxism and how, as well as the errors committed by the authentic Marxists in the struggle against them. Such an analysis, which is both critical and self-critical, will show that it is neither authentic Marxism nor real socialism which have failed in their objective of advancing to classless society, to communism. In their confrontation with the bourgeois lines and with the old and new bourgeoisie, what they have lost is only a battle in the stage of the transition to communism. This analysis, together with laying bare the mistakes committed by the revolutionaries and the distortions of Marxism perpetrated by the revisionists, will be a stinging reply to the bourgeois ideologues, who, by showing how the revisionists have abandoned the basic principles of Marxism and by presenting the oppressive state capitalist regimes as "socialism," claim that Marxism and socialism have failed. A correct analysis of what has occurred will restore the confidence in Marxism and socialism which broad sections of the people have lost because of revisionism's betrayal of both, and once again will arm the proletariat and peoples of the world with the only scientific and revolutionary theory which can make it possible for them to put an end to exploitation.

An important aspect of the analysis of what happened which Marxist-Leninists must make, concerns the process of the struggle between classes and between lines that occurred in China, culminating, temporarily, in a coup by those sectors who seek to restore capitalism there and

# Evaluation . . .

transform China into an imperialist superpower. This investigation and analysis of what happened in China is particularly important, not only because it involves a quarter of the human race, but also because in that country, for almost 20 years, there was a prolonged struggle, under the leadership of Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Marxist-Leninists, against the revisionist line that was imposed in almost all the communist parties after the 20th Congress of the Soviet CP, and against the restoration of capitalism.

There can be no investigation and analysis of the events in China without evaluating the actions and ideas of Mao Tsetung, who played an outstanding role not only in that revolutionary process, but also in the International Communist Movement.

In consideration of the interest among our people and the peoples of Latin America and the world in general in understanding what happened in China and in evaluating the ideas and actions of Mao Tsetung, the Revolutionary Communist Party of Chile has decided to make public the results of its investigations in this matter, thus contributing to the debate which has broken out. Our Party, even though it does not have all the information which it would be desirable to have in analyzing and judging these facts, is not starting from complete ignorance, nor still less from negative prejudices about the revolutionary advances in China and the role of Mao Tsetung. Our long-standing support for the Chinese Revolution and Mao Tsetung's ideas have been based on concrete knowledge of that revolution and the ideas which led it, and the utilization of those experiences and ideas in our own anti-revisionist, revolutionary struggle.

We believe that in order to make a correct and principled analysis of the Chinese experience and Mao Tsetung's ideas, without falling into either a pragmatist interpretation that judges the validity of those experiences and ideas on the basis of their temporary defeat; nor into an idealist and metaphysical interpretation that does not take into account the real development of the class struggle and the objective contradictions, it is necessary to make a twofold comparison of Mao Tsetung Thought, which guided these ideas and this experience. It is necessary to judge it in relation to, on the one hand, the essential principles of Marxism-Leninism, as an application of these principles to China's concrete reality and as a legitimate development of some aspects of these principles, and on the other hand, in relation to the objective difficulties encountered in its application to the complex reality of Chinese society. Both comparisons permit an evaluation of the role played by errors of application or possible deviations from Marxism in the temporary defeat suffered by the Chinese revolution, as well as the role played by the objective difficulties which stood in opposition to the successful development of that revolutionary process.

In analyzing Mao Tsetung's ideas, one runs up against a particular difficulty regarding those works which were published unofficially during the Cultural Revolution, and Volume 5 of his works which was edited after Mao's death by the revisionist clique which now holds power. Revolutionary ideas can be also used with a reactionary class spirit, and quoted out of context, adulterated or openly falsified. This is exactly what the revisionists do with Marxism. Lenin, in his work *State and Revolution*, begins by analyzing this problem of the deliberate distortion of the ideas of revolutionary thinkers, both by the bourgeoisie and by phony revolutionaries, who take ad-

vantage of their prestige in order to fool the masses. This work of forgery was especially intense with respect to Mao Tsetung Thought, due not only to the tremendous prestige of his ideas, but also his own prestige as leader of a quarter of humanity's revolution and as eminent ideologist and leader of the world revolution. Mao Tsetung himself (like the other great Marxist ideologists) on many occasions had to call attention to and fight these distortions. Such forgeries in no way compromise his works—on the contrary, they clearly demonstrate their revolutionary significance and the reactionaries' and opportunists' hatred of them. It's clear, for example, that in Volume 5 there are notable discrepancies with other versions of these materials which became known during the Cultural Revolution: omissions, dubious versions, phrases and even whole paragraphs that did not appear in them. We could point out numerous examples which lead one to think that while Volume 5 and other works edited without Mao's supervision contain some of Mao's ideas, they also contain many and at times subtle falsifications. Taking into account, therefore, the reactionary essence of the clique which now rules China, which Mao fought all his life, and which has already shown that step by step they are carrying out a plan to disparage his ideas and accomplishments (calumnies against the Great Leap Forward, against the Cultural Revolution, revoking of measures to restrict and eliminate the bourgeoisie which had been applied by Mao, the rehabilitation of many counter-revolutionaries who opposed him, etc.), it seems to us completely unjust to make use, without a critical spirit, of their version of Mao Tsetung's writings to criticize his ideas. Our Party has not accepted those documents, except for those concepts which are coherent with his works as a whole, which is an attitude adopted even by the academic specialists in Chinese history who bend every effort to safeguard their reputation for objectivity, and who do not accept the authenticity of all these texts. We should add, nevertheless, that even these revisionist falsifications done with the purpose of using Mao's prestige for their own ends cannot darken the essentially correct and revolutionary content of his ideas which are contained in these writings.

Together with the precautions which are necessary in analyzing Mao Tsetung's ideas (so as not to attribute falsifications to him), the investigation into the objective difficulties that their application faced must be carried out with dialectical materialist criteria. We think that there are two basic aspects that must be taken into account so that such an analysis will be based on materialism and dialectics. On the one hand it's necessary to analyze that process in the international context within which its various stages developed; on the other hand, it's necessary to consider the particularities of Chinese society and the real contradictions—objective and subjective—which occurred in that process. Otherwise, one will fall into a one-sided, metaphysical and idealist analysis, considering Mao, for example, "omnipotent," and thus attributing everything that happened in China to him, and then searching his works in a forced way to find formulations which might seem to explain the reactionary course which the politics of that country took, and even attributing to him the paternity of openly anti-Marxist theories (such as that of the "Three Worlds") which are in complete contradiction with his long-standing views and which he never formulated either in writing or in speaking.

In our judgement, the most serious consequences of an incorrect analysis is not just the disparaging of a great revolutionary leader, but also the negation of the important contributions he made in the application and develop-

ment of Marxism-Leninism, both in his leadership of the struggle for revolution and in his fight against international revisionism and to build and develop socialism.

## I. THE PROBLEM OF THE PROLETARIANIZATION OF THE PARTY

The first important problem we think should be considered in judging the difficulties which the Chinese Marxist-Leninists faced is the class composition of that country. On the eve of the Communist Party of China's foundation, out of the country's population of 427 million, there were scarcely a million and a half industrial workers. Of these, more than 78% worked in light industry and transport. The industrial working class, therefore, represented less than .4% of the total population, with little more than .1% working in sizable plants. In 1939, 10 years before the seizure of power, there were only a little more than two and a half million workers in fairly developed plants, that is, scarcely .5% of the population. In 1949, the year of liberation, there were three million industrial workers out of a population of almost 550 million, that is, little more than .5%.

Here we find a gigantic contradiction which must be resolved to correctly lead the revolution: the formation of a leading party, a proletarian vanguard, capable of leading hundreds of millions of people, in a country in which the proletariat was extremely weak. It was necessary to mobilize and lead these hundreds of millions in the various phases of the civil war as well as in the war against Japanese imperialism's invasion and the domination of China by other imperialist powers; it was necessary to lead and administer in certain periods liberated zones which in 1945 had almost 100 million inhabitants; to lead an army which in 1946 had two and a half million combatants. All of this inescapably required a party with many members, with deep roots among the masses. This necessarily large party could not be built predominantly of workers because of that class' weak development in China. In April 1945, when the Seventh Congress of the CPC took place, it already had 1.21 million members, reaching 2.7 million in 1947. After liberation, in 1951, there are 5.8 million members, while the whole industrial working class reaches this figure, approximately, the following year. In 1956, the year of the CPC's Eighth Congress, there are more than 10.7 million members, a number which surpasses by more than a million the total number of industrial workers that year, but which represents scarcely 1.74% of the total population. In the year 1958, the beginning of the Great Leap Forward (and this is one of the many merits of that initiative), the number of workers increases from about 12 million (in 1957) to more than 20 million. This number shrinks, however, in the years 1959-61 because of the natural calamities of those years and of the sabotage of industrial projects carried out by Soviet and Chinese revisionists. This maximum number, nevertheless, is only less than 4% of the population. In Russia, in contrast, 14 years before the October Revolution, according to the figures reported by Lenin in his book "The Development of Capitalism in Russia," there were 2.8 million workers in manufacturing, railroads, metallurgy and mining, that is, 2% of the total population of the time (projected on the basis of the 1897 census).

The weakness of capitalist development in China and consequently of the proletariat meant that after the agrarian reform, the petty bourgeoisie was transformed into the overwhelmingly predominant sector of the

population in that country. In effect, in 1954 the rural petty bourgeoisie made up 30% of the agrarian population, that is, some 150 million people. The rest of the agrarian population (about 350 million people), made up of the proletarian and semi-proletarian poor people of the countryside, was also transformed into small owners when it received land. To this enormous mass of the agrarian petty bourgeoisie are added some 50 million small merchants, artisans, employees, intellectuals, students, etc., of an urban character.

Mao Tsetung, therefore, and the Chinese Marxist-Leninists, were obliged to build the extremely large party that was indispensable for them, without being able to bring into it a vast proletarian contingent. In the year 1956, which marks the going over to socialist construction, the CPC has 1,502,814 worker members, that is, only 14% of the total membership; 7,417,459, that is 69.1%, of peasant origin; 1,255,923, or 11.7% of its members, are intellectuals; and 558,188, that is, 5.2%, come from other social strata.

To resolve this serious contradiction, Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Marxist-Leninists could only apply (and did apply) the following measures: 1) maximum efforts to fortify the ideology of the proletariat, Marxism-Leninism, in the party's ranks; 2) ideological combat against the manifestations of bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideas within the party and the removal of the anti-party factions which were established around those ideas; 3) the carrying out of permanent campaigns to rectify the style of work and of criticism and self-criticism to correct erroneous methods and ideas; 4) facilitating the entry of workers into the party and restricting (especially after the triumph of the revolution), the entry of other social sectors. These, essentially, were the possibilities for resolving this contradiction, and there is conclusive proof that Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Marxist-Leninists put them into practice intensely. Can it be that there is someone who would put forward that, given the unfavorable class composition due to China's backwardness, the revolution shouldn't have been carried out until the development of capitalism forged a numerous and advanced proletariat? Our party thinks that this alternative was unacceptable, and that one of the great merits of Mao Tsetung and the Chinese revolutionaries is that the people's democratic revolution and the socialist revolution were carried out under these extremely difficult conditions.

Regarding the spreading and study of Marxism, from the beginning of the revolution until his death Mao Tsetung always insisted on the necessity to train the CPC (and not just the party, but also the masses themselves) in Marxism-Leninism, and he promoted concrete measures for this. This process of the assimilation of Marxism in China runs up against serious objective difficulties, inherent in such an immense population and the great size of the country, and in the very low cultural level inherited from colonial and semi-feudal oppressive regimes. A very high percentage of the masses and the party members during important stages of the revolutionary process are illiterate, and the difficulties inherent in the Chinese language impede the translation, distribution and comprehension of the classic Marxist texts. In overcoming these difficulties, an extremely important role is played by Mao Tsetung's works, which apply the principles of Marxism to Chinese reality, in clear and simple language, utilizing images and symbols belonging to Chinese culture, without altering their essence.

## II. THE ROLE OF MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGY

As for his appraisal of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung not only encourages its spread, but also constantly calls for its use, not in a dogmatic way, but as an indispensable instrument for analyzing the concrete reality of China. In 1938, in his work "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War," he points out: "Generally speaking, all Communist Party members who can do so should study the theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, study our national history and study current movements and trends; moreover, they should help to educate members with less schooling. The cadres in particular should study these subjects carefully, while members of the Central Committee and senior cadres should give them even more attention. No political party can possibly lead a great revolutionary movement to victory unless it possesses revolutionary theory and a knowledge of history and has a profound grasp of the practical movement.

"The theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin is universally applicable. We should regard it not as a dogma, but as a guide to action. Studying it is not merely a matter of learning terms and phrases but of learning Marxism-Leninism as the science of revolution. It is not just a matter of understanding the general laws derived by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin from their extensive study of real life and revolutionary experience, but of studying their standpoint and method in examining and solving problems. Our Party's mastery of Marxism-Leninism is now rather better than it used to be, but is still far from being extensive or deep. Ours is the task of leading a great nation of several hundred million in a great and unprecedented struggle. For us, therefore, the spreading and deepening of the study of Marxism-Leninism present a big problem demanding an early solution which is possible only through concentrated effort. Following on this plenary session of the Central Committee, I hope to see an all-party emulation in study which will show who has really learned something, and who has learned more and learned better. So far as shouldering the main responsibility of leadership is concerned, our Party's fighting capacity will be much greater and our task of defeating Japanese imperialism will be more quickly accomplished if there are one or two hundred comrades with a grasp of Marxism-Leninism which is systematic and not fragmentary, genuine and not hollow."

Further on, Mao says that "we can put Marxism into practice only when it is integrated with the specific characteristics of our country and acquires a definite national form," linking the internationalist content of Marxism with the particularities of China. In this he faithfully applies the teachings of Lenin, who states in his book, "*Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder*," "But while the working-class movement is everywhere passing through what is actually the same kind of preparatory school for victory over the bourgeoisie, it is in each country achieving this development in *its own way*." And further on, "Everywhere we can feel that dissatisfaction with the Second International is spreading and growing, both because of its opportunism and because of its inability, or incapacity, to create a really centralized, a really leading centre that would be capable of directing the international tactics of the revolutionary proletariat in its struggle for a world Soviet republic. We must clearly realize that such a leading centre cannot under any circumstances be built up on stereotyped, mechanically equalized and identical tactical rules of struggle. As long as national and state dif-

ferences exist among peoples and countries—and these differences will continue to exist for a very long time even after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world scale—the unity of international tactics of the Communist working-class movement of all countries demands, not the elimination of variety, not the abolition of national differences (that is a foolish dream at the present moment), but such an application of the *fundamental* principles of Communism (Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat) as will *correctly modify* these principles in certain *particulars*, correctly adapt and apply them to national and national-state differences. Investigate, study, seek, divine, grasp that which is peculiarly national, specifically national in the *concrete manner* in which each country approaches the fulfilment of the *single* international task, in which it approaches the victory over opportunism and 'Left' doctrinarism within the working-class movement, the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, and the establishment of a Soviet republic and a proletarian dictatorship—such is the main task of the historical period through which all the advanced countries (and not only the advanced countries) are now passing."

In 1941, at a cadre meeting held in conjunction with a party rectification campaign being carried out in Yen-an, Mao, recognizing Marxism's contribution to the Chinese revolution, points out, "The twenty years of the Communist Party of China have been twenty years in which the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism has become more and more integrated with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. If we recall how superficial and meagre our understanding of Marxism-Leninism and of the Chinese revolution was during our Party's infancy, we can see how much deeper and richer it is now. For a hundred years, the finest sons and daughters of the disaster-ridden Chinese nation fought and sacrificed their lives, one stepping into the breach as another fell, in quest of the truth that would save the country and the people. This moves us to song and tears. But it was only after World War I and the October Revolution in Russia that we found Marxism-Leninism, the best of truths, the best of weapons for liberating our nation. And the Communist Party of China has been the initiator, propagandist and organizer in the wielding of this weapon. As soon as it was linked with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism gave an entirely new complexion to the Chinese revolution. Since the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, our Party, basing itself on the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, has taken a further step in its study of the concrete practice of this war and in its study of China and the world today, and has also made a beginning in the study of Chinese history. These are all very good signs."

The following year (1942), in the Party School attached to the Central Committee, as part of one of the campaigns to rectify the style of work, with the purpose of ideologically proletarianizing the party, he remarks, "Let us first ask, is the theoretical level of our Party high or low? Recently more Marxist-Leninist works have been translated and more people have been reading them. That is a very good thing. But can we therefore say that the theoretical level of our Party has been greatly raised? True, the level is now somewhat higher than before. But our theoretical front is very much out of harmony with the rich content of the Chinese revolutionary movement, and a comparison of the two shows that the theoretical side is lagging far behind. Generally speaking, our theory cannot as yet keep pace with our revolutionary practice, let alone lead the way as it should. We have not yet raised our rich and varied practice to the proper theoretical plane."

On the eve of the revolution's triumph, in June 1949, in his work "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," Mao once again gives recognition to the role played by Marxism in the victories which had been won, victories which formed one of the greatest epics of revolutionary history. "As everyone knows, our Party passed through these twenty-eight years not in peace but amid hardships, for we had to fight enemies, both foreign and domestic, both inside and outside the Party. We thank Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin for giving us a weapon. This weapon is not a machine-gun, but Marxism-Leninism."

In March 1955, in a National Conference of the CPC, he once again emphasizes the necessity of studying Marxism-Leninism. "We must propagate dialectical materialism among the five million intellectuals inside and outside the Party and among cadres at all levels so that they will grasp it and combat idealism, and we shall then be able to organize a powerful corps of theoretical workers, which we urgently need. That again will be a very good thing.

"We must draw up a plan for the formation of such a corps with several million people taking up the study of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, the theoretical basis of Marxism, and combating all shades of idealism and mechanical materialism. At present there are many cadres doing theoretical work, but there is still no corps of theoretical workers, much less a powerful one. Without such a corps, the cause of the entire Party, the socialist industrialization and socialist transformation of our country, the modernization of our national defence and our research in atomic energy cannot move along or succeed."

In 1956, after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, in the face of the beginning of the public abandonment of Marxism by a series of communist parties, among them the Soviet party, Mao points out to them, "How much capital do you have? Just Lenin and Stalin. Now you have abandoned Stalin and practically all of Lenin as well, with Lenin's feet gone, or perhaps with only his head left, or with one of his hands cut off. We, on our part, stick to studying Marxism-Leninism and learning from the October Revolution. Marx has left us a great many writings, and so has Lenin. To rely on the masses, to follow the mass line—this is what we have learned from them. Not to rely on the masses in waging class struggle and not to make a clear distinction between the people and the enemy—that would be very dangerous."

In the year 1957, a great ideological rectification campaign is undertaken, in order to mobilize the masses to criticize the reactionary ideas and actions which were stirred up in China due to the events in Hungary and Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin. Mao Tsetung is in favor of allowing the rightist forces within the national bourgeoisie, and among the intellectuals and other sectors, to express themselves, for a limited time, even in the press, in order to bring out their reactionary ideas and unmask them before the people, and then launch a big counteroffensive against them. "In general, counter-revolutionary statements will naturally be prohibited. However, if they are made not in a counter-revolutionary form but in a revolutionary guise, you will have to allow them. That will help us see these statements for what they are and wage struggles against them." The great struggle undertaken against these reactionary ideas was at the same time a training campaign in proletarian, Marxist-Leninist, ideology. "The intellectuals," Mao says, "are reluctant to accept Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism was opposed by many people in the past. The imperialists opposed it. Chiang Kai-shek opposed it, day in day out, saying 'Communism is not suited to China's

conditions' and making people afraid of it. It requires time as well as a socialist ideological revolutionary movement for intellectuals to embrace Marxism-Leninism and transform their bourgeois world outlook into the proletarian world outlook. The movement this year is meant to pave the way."

In 1963 Mao launched the Socialist Education Movement to strengthen the study of Marxism and fight the "Party persons in power taking the capitalist road," a movement which would create the conditions for the Proletarian Cultural Revolution two years later. At the same time, on June 14, 1963, "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," directed against the USSR, and a series of Open Letters to that party were published, in defense of Marxism-Leninism and in opposition to Khrushchev's revisionist theses and politics.

During the Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the study of Marxism-Leninism reached massive proportions, unknown before in the history of any country. Suffice it to say that in the ten years after 1966, the year in which that revolution began, Chinese book stores sold 4.8 billion copies of the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao, and study was promoted on a vast scale.

Finally, in the years before his death, once again launching the struggle against Teng Hsiao-ping and those who wanted to reverse the victories of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Tsetung calls anew for intensifying the study and application of Marxism-Leninism, and particularly Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin's teachings on the dictatorship of the proletariat. A tremendous mass campaign is begun, to study and deepen the application of the dictatorship of the proletariat, restricting the remains of bourgeois right which served as the basis to nourish revisionism.

It's clear, then, that in the course of the various stages of the Chinese Revolution Mao Tsetung bent every effort not only to see that Marxism-Leninism was assimilated and applied by the party cadres and members, but also that it was spread to and applied by the vast masses of Chinese people. Without a doubt, this titanic work of spreading scientific socialism, as enriched by Mao himself, is a seed in the consciousness of the honest CPC members and the masses, so that they will rebel against the anti-Marxist theories and practices of the current renegades who have usurped power in China.

### III. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN LINES WITHIN THE PARTY

Another aspect of the ideological proletarianization of the CPC which Mao promoted, although later we'll see that its political significance was even greater, was the struggle he led both against the manifestations of the bourgeois lines in the party and the factions which formed around those lines. With a profound understanding of dialectics, Mao Tsetung put forward the consolidation of the party as taking place through the solution of the contradictions which arose within it, contradictions which are inherent in every process in the universe. As Lenin, Stalin and Mao pointed out, the class contradictions in society are reflected within the communist parties, giving rise both to erroneous views which reflect aspects of the different manifestations of the bourgeois line, and to factions, organized around the bourgeois line, which are antagonistic to the party. The recognition of this reality, inherent not only in the history of all communist parties and the very International Communist Movement, but in the universally dialectical and con-

# Evaluation . . .

contradictory development of reality itself, is a question of principle for any dialectical materialist. Marx and Engels called for not being content with interpreting the world, but rather struggling to transform it in a critical and revolutionary manner. Such transformation is impossible without studying and resolving the contradictions inherent within every process, whether it be physical, chemical or social, whether it be a society as a whole or a party which is part of it. It follows, therefore, that in order to develop, a proletarian party has to resolve its internal contradictions in favor of Marxism-Leninism, the interests of the proletariat and revolution. Even more, the working class' vanguard party has to train itself in the struggle between lines, especially in its ideological aspect, in order to combat the bourgeois line among the masses and win them to the party's leadership, and win the advanced among them to the party's ranks. The contradictory development of every process is an objective reality, independent of our will. Will and revolutionary consciousness play their role in investigating the nature of the objective contradictions which arise in order to solve them, and in applying the correct methods to achieve this. At that same time, by acting in this way the effects of bourgeois influence are reduced and diminished, and the development of these contradictions to a very serious level is impeded. The recognition, therefore, that partial or systematic manifestations of the bourgeois line arise within the party is no more than a dialectical materialist approach to the party as a contradictory process. The existence of contradictions is recognized and investigated exactly in order to combat the manifestations foreign to Marxism that arise within the party, and not to enjoy them and accept them as inevitable; it is done in order to oppose the side of the contradiction represented by bourgeois influences with the side of the revolutionary line. Refusing to recognize the contradictory development of the proletarian party (like any process), setting a line without educating the party members in the struggle against the objections and obstacles which the bourgeoisie raises against it, permits the bourgeoisie to take the initiative and undermine the members' consciousness, without a concrete reply to the arguments and intrigues it uses to fight the Marxist line.

In all of his works and revolutionary practice Mao Tsetung has simply recognized this contradictory development of the proletarian party and prepared its members and cadres to resolve the contradictions which arise within it in a correct manner. He never upheld the existence of bourgeois influences within it—still less of bourgeois factions—as a positive thing, nor held that they should be maintained and encouraged. On an international level he unequivocally opposed conciliating with the bourgeois line of Khrushchev and his successors, and undertook a principled struggle against them. Perhaps refusing to recognize that the International Communist Movement also develops through contradictions and through fighting the bourgeois influence that arises within it would have helped advance and consolidate it? On the contrary, one of the decisive factors in the establishment of a revisionist line in the majority of the parties of the old International Communist Movement was an undialectical conception of its development, the members' lack of experience in line struggle, the lack of a critical and self-critical spirit and internal democracy in those parties, and the blind faith of many of the members in those who were setting the line in those parties.

In his conception of how to carry out line struggle

within the party, Mao Tsetung has called attention to the difference between the influence of bourgeois ideas or habits on members who are essentially honest and fall into wrong positions, and the infiltration and generation in the party of factional groups who come together in an open or secret way behind an anti-proletarian line. He has laid out the necessity of drawing a dividing line between those who fall into errors or deviations under the influence of bourgeois views, and those conscious defenders of the bourgeoisie's interests who have infiltrated the party. With the former, we have to struggle and criticize them, so that they can overcome their errors, while at the same time we unite with them to the degree that they are honestly mistaken elements, to reeducate them and help them overcome their errors. The latter we unmask through ideological struggle, we expel them from the party, and we punish them in accordance with their crimes against the revolution. In practice the problem of differentiating between the two is complex. This is particularly so because those who are honest and who have fallen into errors believe, until criticism and education shows them otherwise, that they are right, and they frequently express their points of view vehemently. The factionalists, on the other hand, conscious of their counter-revolutionary work, hide their intentions and in many ways act in secret. Therefore there is the danger of treating enemies like people who are mistaken and of treating like enemies those honest members who have been drawn into error to these enemies' benefit. This differentiation is particularly difficult with hidden enemies who occupy a high position in the party's ranks and take advantage of the authority this gives them to camouflage themselves and draw the members into wrong positions. Only a party which has been tempered in line struggle, in the correct method of resolving contradictions within the party, both among the people and with enemies, is capable of correctly resolving this complex problem. This is why Mao Tsetung attached so much importance to the party's training to resolve these contradictions by, on the one hand, studying Marxist-Leninist principles, and by, on the other hand, all members educating themselves through active participation in the struggle against the various manifestations of the bourgeois line, carrying out criticism and self-criticism, and, when dealing with the defense of principles, daring to "go against the tide." For that reason he opposed the bureaucratic resolution of this type of problem of who is wrong and who is an enemy through mechanical dictates from on high, without a wide debate in which the members, oriented by those who uphold the correct line, differentiate between enemies and mistaken comrades for themselves, and reaffirm their revolutionary positions or liberate themselves if they have been influenced by the wrong ideas. In each struggle it's more important that the members learn for themselves how to distinguish between the correct and the incorrect and between comrades and enemy infiltrators, than that they acquire a blind faith in the infallibility of their leaders to overcome this kind of problem and determine who is Marxist or anti-Marxist.

The concrete problem of how capable Mao Tsetung and the CPC in general really were of discovering the enemies infiltrated among them and their real power, and in fact of making a clear distinction between those who were mistaken and the conscious enemies, and whatever errors they might have committed in that regard in the face of the powerful revisionist current which imposed itself on almost all of the Communist Movement after World War 2 (errors which other great revolutionary leaders also committed), in no way diminishes the validity of Mao's correct statements about how to resolve this type of contradic-

tion, nor of the extremely valuable experiences of the struggle which he waged to resolve them.

During the whole history of the CPC and the Chinese Revolution, Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Marxist-Leninists applied a clear line in order to: detect the contradictions within the party; fight all manifestations of the bourgeois line; make every effort to criticize and reeducate the mistaken members or leaders; and purify the party of the anti-party factionalist elements. The very fact that the ten line struggles are talked about shows these lines were fought against, to remove them from the party, and not tolerated in it. Already in his 1928 article about "The Struggle in the Ching Kang Mountains," Mao remarks, "During the revolutionary upsurge (in June), many careerists took advantage of the Party's open recruitment of members and sneaked into the Party, with the result that the membership in the border area rapidly rose to more than ten thousand. Since the leaders of the branches and district committees were mostly new members, good inner-Party education was out of the question. As soon as the White terror struck, the careerists defected and acted as guides for the counter-revolutionaries in rounding up our comrades, and the Party organizations in the White areas mostly collapsed. After September the Party carried out a drastic house cleaning and set strict class qualifications for membership."

In 1938, in his work "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War," Comrade Mao says, "As for Chang Kuo-tao's organizational line, it violated all Party principles, disrupted Party discipline and carried factional activity to the point of opposition to the Party, the Central Committee and the Communist International. The Central Committee did everything possible to overcome Chang Kuo-tao's iniquitous and erroneous line and to frustrate his anti-Party activity, and also tried to save Chang Kuo-tao himself. But as he stubbornly refused to correct his mistakes and resorted to double-dealing, and subsequently even betrayed the Party and threw himself into the arms of the Kuomintang, the Party had to take firm measures and expel him." And then he adds, "In the struggle against deviations, we must give serious attention to opposing double-faced behaviour. As Chang Kuo-tao's career shows, the greatest danger of such behaviour is that it may develop into factional activity."

Later, in 1939 he remarks, "In applying the policy of recruiting intellectuals in large numbers, we must undoubtedly take great care to prevent the infiltration of those elements sent in by the enemy and the bourgeois political parties and to keep out other disloyal elements. We must be very strict about keeping out such elements. Those who have already sneaked into our Party, army or government organs must be firmly but discriminatively combed out on the basis of conclusive evidence."

In his article, "Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing" he states, "Two terms used to appear in the articles and speeches of many comrades, one being 'ruthless struggle' and the other 'merciless blows.' Measures of that kind are entirely necessary against the enemy or against enemy ideology, but to use them against our own comrades is wrong. It often happens that enemies and enemy ideology infiltrate into the Party, as is discussed in Item 4 of the Conclusion of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*. Against these enemies, we must undoubtedly resort to ruthless struggle and merciless blows, because the scoundrels use these very measures against the Party; if we were tolerant of them, we should fall right into their trap. But the same measures should not be used against comrades who occasionally make mistakes; to them we should apply the

method of criticism and self-criticism, the method indicated in Item 5 of the Conclusion of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*."

In April 1944, in his work "Our Study and the Current Situation," he says, "It should be stated that as a result of the series of changes since the Tsunyi Meeting the factions which formerly existed and played an unwholesome role in the history of our Party no longer exist. In our present study of the two lines within the Party, it is absolutely necessary to point out that these factions did exist and did play an unwholesome role. But it would be wrong to think that factions with the same erroneous political programmes and organizational forms still exist in the Party, after all the changes brought about by so many inner-Party struggles—the Tsunyi Meeting of January 1935, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in October 1938, the enlarged session of the Political Bureau in September 1941, the Party-wide rectification movement in 1942 and the campaign begun in the winter of 1943 for the study of the past struggles between the two lines within the Party. The old factions are gone. What is left is only the remnants of dogmatist and empiricist ideology, which can be overcome by continuing and intensifying our rectification movement." Here Mao Tsetung is referring, of course, to the six line struggles before the triumph of the revolution, which ended with the defeat of these factional groups.

In 1953, Mao continues this struggle to purify the party of poisonous elements. In his essay, "Combat Bureaucracy," directed at the party, he states, "For our Party and government, bureaucracy and commandism are a big problem not only for today but for a long time to come. In terms of social origin, it reflects the survival in our Party and government of the reactionary style of work (an anti-popular style of work, a Kuomintang style of work) of the reactionary ruling classes in dealing with the people. If we strengthen and improve our role and methods of leadership, then bureaucracy and commandism, which are harmful to the people, will gradually diminish and many of our Party and government organizations will be able to break away sooner from this Kuomintang style of work. And the sooner will the many bad people who have infiltrated our Party and government organizations be combed out and the many bad deeds still evident today be eliminated." And he continues, "Typical cases of bureaucracy, commandism and violations of the law and of discipline should be widely exposed in the press. Serious offenders should be punished by law, and when they are Party members they should also be dealt with according to Party discipline. Party committees at all levels should make a determined effort to punish and clear out of Party and government organizations those violators of the law and of discipline who are bitterly hated by the masses, and the worst among them should be executed so as to assuage the people's anger and help educate the cadres and the masses."

Later on, in 1955, the first line struggle after the triumph of the Revolution takes place against the faction created by Kao Kang. In his opening speech before the National Conference of the CPC, Mao says, in this regard, "As you comrades all know, the emergence of the anti-Party alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih was by no means accidental, but was an acute manifestation of the intense class struggle in our country at the present stage. The criminal aim of this anti-Party alliance was to split our Party and seize supreme power in the Party and the state by conspiratorial means, and thus pave the way for a counter-revolutionary come-back. Under the unified leadership of the Central Committee, our Party has smashed the anti-Party alliance and become still more

# Evaluation . . .

united and consolidated. This is an important victory in our struggle for the cause of socialism."

And then he adds, "For the purpose of building a socialist society, the Central Committee deems it necessary at this juncture to set up a central control commission in accordance with the Party Constitution to replace the old Discipline Inspection Commission. Its aim is to tighten Party discipline in the new period of intense class struggle, step up the struggle against all kinds of violations of the law and of discipline and in particular guard against the recurrence of cases like the Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance which seriously jeopardizes the interests of the Party."

The same year, showing the complexity of the problem of how to prevent infiltration of hidden reactionaries into a party which was so large and in a society in which the specific weight of the proletariat was so small, Comrade Mao points out regarding this, "The masses of people are very much in need of this material [the evidence against the Hu Feng clique, published in the *People's Daily*]. How do counter-revolutionaries employ their double-dealing tactics? How do they succeed in deceiving us by their false appearances, while furtively doing the things we least expect? All this is a blank to thousands upon thousands of well-intentioned people. On this account, many counter-revolutionaries have wormed their way into our ranks. The eyes of our people are not keen, they are not adept at distinguishing good people from bad types. When people operate in normal conditions, we know how to tell the bad from the good, but we are not adept at seeing through those who operate in unusual conditions. The Hu Feng elements are counter-revolutionaries who put on a disguise to hide their true features and to give a false impression." Then he adds, "As for many of the individuals in the Hu Feng clique, they were able to deceive us because our Party organizations, state organs, people's organizations, cultural and educational institutions or enterprises failed to make a strict examination of their records before admitting them. It was also because we were in a stormy period of revolution in the recent past and people of all sorts tried to get close to us as we emerged the victors; so inevitably the waters were muddied, the bad became mixed with the good, and we have not yet got around to sifting them thoroughly. Furthermore, success in spotting and clearing out bad elements depends on a combination of correct guidance from the leading organs with a high degree of political consciousness on the part of the masses, but in this regard our work in the past was not without shortcomings. These are all lessons for us."

Finally, we also know—and we won't go into this now, since we analyze it further on—the criteria with which Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Marxist-Leninists fought against the revisionist current headed up first by Liu Shao-chi as well as Lin Piao and his followers. As long as they limited themselves to putting forward wrong positions and didn't reveal their counter-revolutionary countenance, the struggle against them was carried out by means of criticism. As soon as it became clear that it wasn't a question of mere deviations but rather of a tendency with reactionary aims, Mao Tsetung himself clearly unmasked them and launched a struggle to the death against them, counteracting their influence by mobilizing the broad masses. He points out, in fact, "Those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army and various spheres of culture are a bunch of counter-

revolutionary revisionists. Once conditions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. . . they are faithful lackeys of the bourgeoisie and the imperialists. Together with the bourgeoisie and the imperialists, they cling to the bourgeois ideology of oppression and exploitation of the proletariat and to the capitalist system, and they oppose Marxist-Leninist ideology and the socialist system. . . . Their struggle against us is one of life and death, and there is no question of equality. Therefore, our struggle against them, too, can be nothing but a life-and-death struggle, and our relationship with them can in no way be one of equality."

We believe, then, that throughout Mao Tsetung's works and his ruthless concrete struggle against the opportunists inside and outside the Party, an entirely correct line and great teachings for the revolutionary movement shine through, and they must be preserved. It wasn't he who favored the existence of contradictions, the arising of deviations or anti-party factions. On the contrary, he carried out a consistent struggle against them until his last days, purifying the party at each point when he was able to foresee that what was being dealt with wasn't just a question of ideological errors. The size of the CPC and Chinese society determined the complexity and breadth of these problems and made it impossible for Mao Tsetung, leading the Marxist-Leninists, to resolve them during his lifetime—which, considering exactly these factors, makes the gigantic battle he waged stand out even more sharply.

In the Soviet Union, too, the line struggle within the Bolshevik Party was extremely complex, and the result was unfavorable there too, since the revisionists have temporarily come to power. If we rely on what is laid out in the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*, even just in relation to what happened in that party after the seizure of power, it is established that:

In 1918, as the *History* indicates, the " 'left'-wing communists" took over the party's Moscow Regional Bureau. That same year, Lenin declared in the CPSU's Seventh Congress, "the severe crisis which our Party is now experiencing, owing to the formation of a Left opposition within it, is one of the gravest crises the Russian revolution has experienced."

In 1919, at the Eighth Congress of the CPSU, Bukharin and Pyatakov put forward a program of opposition with a line opposed to that of the Marxist-Leninists on the national question, the peasant question, etc. At that same time, there arose the so-called "Military Opposition" group, which, while it opposed Trotsky in these matters, also had opportunist ideas. On their part, Saprionov and Ossinsky headed up another faction which denied the leading role of the proletariat in the Soviets.

The Ninth Congress of the CPSU took place in 1920. The *History* tells us, "But not all members of the Party were of the same mind as the Central Committee. The small opposition groups—the Trotskyites, 'Workers Opposition,' 'Left Communists,' 'Democratic-Centralists,' etc.—wavered and vacillated in face of the difficulties attending the transition to peaceful economic construction. There were in the Party quite a number of ex-members of the Menshevik, Socialist-Revolutionary, Bund and Borotbist parties, and all kinds of semi-nationalists from the border regions of Russia. Most of them allied themselves with one opposition group or another."

At the Tenth Congress all these groups put forward anti-Marxist views, and the Congress ordered "the immediate dissolution of all factional groups. . . non-observance of the congress decision to be followed by unconditional and immediate expulsion from the Party." In

1921, in fact, the first party purge was carried out against "rascals, bureaucrats, dishonest or wavering Communists, and of Mensheviks who have repainted their 'facade' but who have remained Mensheviks at heart." According to the *History*, 170,000 members are expelled, that is, 25% of the total membership. Nevertheless, as we'll see, the main opportunist groups continue operating within the party.

In the fall of 1923, the *History* tells us, at the Twelfth Congress of the CPSU, Trotsky "mustered all the anti-Leninist elements in the Party and concocted an opposition platform against the Party, its leadership and its policy."

In January of 1924, in the Thirteenth Conference of the CPSU, Stalin fought the opposition's views. Nevertheless, the *History* points out, "The Trotskyites did not cease their subversive work." In May of this same year, they are condemned again by the Thirteenth Congress of the CPSU, but still they are not liquidated.

In April 1925, at the Fourteenth Conference of the CPSU, the Trotskyites raise their theory of the "permanent revolution." Bukharin, for his part, puts forward an openly rightist line. In December of that year, the Fourteenth Congress of the CPSU is held, and according to the *History*, "The situation within the Party was tense and strained. Never in its history had there been a case when the whole delegation from an important Party centre like Leningrad prepared to come out in opposition to their Central Committee." And then it indicates, "Though defeated at the Congress, the Zinovievites did not submit to the Party. They started a fight against the decisions of the Fourteenth Congress."

"In the summer of 1926," the *History of the CPSU* continues, "the Trotskyites and Zinovievites united to form an anti-Party bloc, made it a rallying point for the remnants of all the defeated opposition groups, and laid the foundation of their secret anti-Leninist party." "They tried to get the Party members to discuss [a platform]." Still, this didn't prevent the main factionalists from presenting a statement against factional activity to the Central Committee, in order to fool it. "Nevertheless," the *History* indicates, "the bloc continued to exist and its adherents did not stop their underhanded work against the Party. They went on banding together their anti-Leninist party, started an illegal printing press, collected membership dues from their supporters and circulated their platform."

In November 1926, at the Fifteenth Party Conference, once again the majority condemns them. Nevertheless, in 1927 they raise an opportunist platform called the "Platform of the Eighty-Three." It was discussed and defeated in October 1927. Then they try to organize public protest demonstrations in Moscow and Leningrad, on November 7, the anniversary of the Revolution no less. For that reason, on November 14, 1927, Trotsky and Zinoviev are expelled from the party. In December of the same year, the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU ratifies that expulsion.

Nevertheless, the *History of the CPSU* points out that some time after the Fifteenth Congress, "The majority of the expelled accepted the terms of reinstatement and made public statements in the press to this effect. Desiring to be clement with them, and loath to deny them an opportunity to once again become men of the Party and of the working class, the Party reinstated them in its ranks. However, time showed that, with few exceptions, the recantation of the 'leading lights' of the bloc of Trotskyites and Zinovievites were false and hypocritical from beginning to end." Meanwhile, aside from those infiltrating the Party, there arose another rightist group

headed by Bukharin and Rykov, and, "At a meeting of the Central Committee they advanced a new anti-Party platform."

In 1934, Kirov, a top-level leader of the CPSU, is assassinated. The Moscow trials then begin, lasting until 1937. "The trials," the *History of the CPSU* indicates, "showed that these dregs of humanity [Bukharin, Radek, etc.], in conjunction with the enemies of the people, Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, had been in conspiracy against Lenin, the Party and the Soviet state ever since the early days of the October Socialist Revolution." They were finally accused and convicted of having sold out to the German fascist espionage services. The *History of the CPSU* concludes, "The Soviet court sentenced the Bukharin-Trotsky fiends to be shot."

From that time on, there is no record of any new manifestations of the struggle against factional groups within the CPSU. The dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist construction in the USSR seem to develop without significant obstacles from within the CPSU. Nevertheless, little more than two years after Stalin's death, with the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, one discovers that it has fallen into the hands of revisionists who already had high-level positions within it; that these revisionists, after slandering Stalin, raise an anti-Marxist platform for the whole International Communist Movement worldwide; that they begin to rush to restore capitalism in the USSR and transform it into an imperialist superpower; that in all the so-called People's Democracies of Eastern Europe, except Albania, the revisionist line is supported and capitalism is restored; that in almost all the parties of the old International Communist Movement the majority of the leaders and militants submit to the revisionist line of Khrushchev and his successors. It has been more than twenty years since these events, and still there is no word of a significant struggle led by Marxist-Leninists against revisionism in power and the state capitalism, either in the USSR or in the countries tied into the Warsaw Pact.

As we'll see later on, the revisionist bourgeoisie which restores capitalism in the countries where the proletariat had seized state power is not the old bourgeoisie nor a new bourgeoisie arisen from small-scale production, but rather a bourgeois sector of a new type which has been incubated in, or has infiltrated into, the leadership of the communist parties themselves, and which has its economic base in the management of the state economy, creating a state capitalist regime. Clearly this is a matter of a reactionary current generated within the International Communist Movement itself, whose development and objectives could not be exercised by Lenin, nor Stalin, nor Mao Tsetung nor other leaders in the countries where they took power. Its predominance in almost all the communist parties of the capitalist world as well could not be prevented by the Marxist-Leninists within them. It is in this context that we have to analyze the struggles waged against this current by Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Marxist-Leninists, without abandoning the purpose of deeply investigating the causes which gave rise to this current.

#### IV. THE CONTRADICTIONS WITH THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE

In China the advance to socialism and communism had to be achieved in a colonial, semi-colonial and feudal society. These conditions demanded that before the establishment of socialism there had to be a previous stage, a people's democratic revolution, in order to liberate the coun-

# Evaluation . . .

try from imperialism, do away with the remains of feudalism, and put an end to the rule of the big bourgeoisie linked with imperialism. This process was carried out on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance and in alliance with sectors of the national bourgeoisie, under the leadership of the proletariat. With the expulsion of imperialism from China and the overthrow of the feudal forces and the big comprador bourgeoisie tied to imperialism—that is, with the complete triumph of the people's democratic revolution in regard to the question of political power—in order to go on to socialism, the national bourgeoisie must be maintained for a relatively long period of time to develop the productive forces and the proletariat. This situation gives rise to a complex problem in the class struggle: on the one hand, it was necessary to allow capitalism to develop to a certain extent, controlled and subordinated to the already socialized sector of the economy; on the other it was necessary to stop the bourgeoisie's tendency to transform itself into the ruling class, both economically and politically, and to liquidate it as a class in both aspects, step by step, in order to go over to socialism. Since this process strongly influenced the class and line struggle which took place in China, it's important to investigate how Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Marxist-Leninists acted to resolve it. Although Mao Tsetung considers the peasantry the main force in the Chinese revolution (because of its relative weight within the population), and the people's democratic revolution had to be carried out in alliance with the national bourgeoisie, at the same time he makes it perfectly clear that only under the leadership of the working class and its party can that revolution succeed. In 1936, for example, in his work "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," he points out, "The masses of China's peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie wish to take an active part in the revolutionary war and to carry it to complete victory. They are the main forces in the revolutionary war, but, being small-scale producers, they are limited in their political outlook (and some of the unemployed masses have anarchist views), so that they are unable to give correct leadership in the war. Therefore, in an era when the proletariat has already appeared on the political stage, the responsibility for leading China's revolutionary war inevitably falls on the shoulders of the Chinese Communist Party. In this era, any revolutionary war will definitely end in defeat if it lacks, or runs counter to, the leadership of the proletariat and the Communist Party." The next year he insists, "It is a law confirmed by Chinese history that the Chinese bourgeoisie, which may participate in fighting imperialism and feudalism in certain historical circumstances, vacillates and turns traitor in others, because of its economic and political flabbiness. Thus it is history's verdict that China's bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism is a task that can be completed, not under the leadership of the bourgeoisie, but only under that of the proletariat. What is more, it is possible to overcome the bourgeoisie's inherent vacillation and lack of thoroughness and to prevent the miscarriage of the revolution only by bringing the perseverance and thoroughness of the proletariat in the democratic revolution into full play. Is the proletariat to follow the bourgeoisie, or is the bourgeoisie to follow the proletariat? This question of responsibility for leadership in the Chinese revolution is the linchpin upon which the success or failure of the revolution depends."

Mao insists on this basic point in almost every work written before the conquest of power. Nevertheless, Mao

Tsetung did not rest content with simply laying out the necessity for proletarian leadership in general, but rather made an important dialectical development of the different methods used in relation to the bourgeoisie's unstable and changing behavior. In his article "Introducing *The Communist*," he says, "On the one hand, it is necessary to combat the error of neglecting the possibility that the bourgeoisie may join in the revolutionary struggle at certain times and to a certain extent. It is an error of 'Left' closed-doorism to regard the bourgeoisie in China as being the same as in the capitalist countries, and consequently to neglect the policy of forming a united front with the bourgeoisie and maintaining it for as long as possible. On the other hand, it is also necessary to combat the error of identifying the programme, policy, ideology, practice, etc. of the proletariat with those of the bourgeoisie, and neglecting the differences in principle between them. The error here consists in neglecting the fact that the bourgeoisie (and especially the big bourgeoisie) not only exerts an influence on the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, but does its utmost to influence the proletariat and the Communist Party in a strenuous effort to destroy their ideological, political and organizational independence, turn them into an appendage of the bourgeoisie and its political party, and ensure that it will reap the fruits of the revolution for itself or its political party alone; this error also consists in neglecting the fact that the bourgeoisie (and especially the big bourgeoisie) betrays the revolution whenever the revolution conflicts with its own selfish interests or with those of its own political party." Then he speaks of the necessity of carrying out a policy of alliance and struggle with the bourgeoisie, and says, "Unity here means the united front with the bourgeoisie. Struggle here means the 'peaceful' and 'bloodless' struggle, ideological, political and organizational, which goes on when we are united with the bourgeoisie and which turns into armed struggle when we are forced to break with it. If our Party does not understand that it must unite with the bourgeoisie in certain periods, it cannot advance and the revolution cannot develop; if our Party does not understand that it must wage a stern and resolute 'peaceful' struggle against the bourgeoisie while uniting with it, then our Party will disintegrate ideologically, politically and organizationally and the revolution will fail; and if our Party does not wage a stern and resolute armed struggle against the bourgeoisie when forced to break with it, our Party will likewise disintegrate and the revolution will likewise fail."

Already, before the triumph of the people's democratic revolution, Mao Tsetung sees that the hegemony of the proletariat is an indispensable condition not only for the triumph of this stage of the revolution, but also, even more so, of the socialist stage. "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" indicates, "Except for the Communist Party, no political party (bourgeois or petty-bourgeois) is equal to the task of leading China's two great revolutions, the democratic and the socialist revolutions, to complete fulfilment. From the very day of its birth, the Communist Party has taken this twofold task on its own shoulders and for eighteen years has fought strenuously for its accomplishment. It is a task at once glorious and arduous. And it cannot be accomplished without a bolshevized Chinese Communist Party which is national in scale and has a broad mass character, a party fully consolidated ideologically, politically and organizationally. Therefore every Communist has the duty of playing an active part in building up such a Communist Party."

On the eve of the complete countrywide conquest of power, in June 1949, Mao Tsetung clearly defines the

kind of power to be established with the people's democratic revolution, and at the same time, the continuing and insuring of proletarian leadership within that state power. In his work, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," he says, "The people's democratic dictatorship is based on the alliance of the working class, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and mainly on the alliance of the workers and the peasants, because these two classes comprise 80 to 90 per cent of China's population. These two classes are the main force in overthrowing imperialism and the Kuomintang reactionaries. The transition from New Democracy to socialism also depends mainly upon their alliance."

"The people's democratic dictatorship needs the leadership of the working class. For it is only the working class that is most farsighted, most selfless and most thoroughly revolutionary. The entire history of revolution proves that without the leadership of the working class revolution fails and that with the leadership of the working class revolution triumphs. In the epoch of imperialism, in no country can any other class lead any genuine revolution to victory. This is clearly proved by the fact that the many revolutions led by China's petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie all failed."

Right after this he explains why, during a certain stage in *China*, it is necessary to maintain an alliance with the national bourgeoisie, under the hegemony of the proletariat: "The national bourgeoisie at the present stage is of great importance. Imperialism, a most ferocious enemy, is still standing alongside us. China's modern industry still forms a very small proportion of the national economy. No reliable statistics are available, but it is estimated, on the basis of certain data, that before the War of Resistance Against Japan the value of output of modern industry constituted only about 10 per cent of the total value of output of the national economy. To counter imperialist oppression and to raise her backward economy to a higher level, China must utilize all the factors of urban and rural capitalism that are beneficial and not harmful to the national economy and the people's livelihood; and we must unite with the national bourgeoisie in common struggle. Our present policy is to regulate capitalism, not to destroy it. But the national bourgeoisie cannot be the leader of the revolution, nor should it have the chief role in state power. The reason it cannot be the leader of the revolution and should not have the chief role in state power is that the social and economic position of the national bourgeoisie determines its weakness; it lacks foresight and sufficient courage and many of its members are afraid of the masses."

After the seizure of state power, at every step of the way Mao Tsetung reaffirms the leading role of the proletariat, especially during the years when the transition to socialism was being accelerated throughout the whole economy. In 1953, in "Criticism of Liang Shu-ming's Reactionary Ideas," he proclaims, "We firmly stand for the leadership of the proletariat over all and sundry (workers, peasants, industrialists and businessmen, the nationalities, democratic parties and people's organizations, industry, agriculture, political and military affairs, in short, everything) and for both unity and struggle. If you want to sound us out, then this is one thing you will learn, a thing which is fundamental in nature. This is no trifling matter, is it?" This hegemonic proletarian leadership is progressively converted into proletarian dictatorship, as the country advances to socialism and the bourgeoisie opposes it. In "On the Ten Major Relationships," written in 1956, while Mao Tsetung is in favor of the continued existence of some parties which represent sections of the national bourgeoisie, as a way to force

them to cooperate and to unmask their opposition to socialism, he also clearly declares, "But at present we cannot do without the proletarian party and the dictatorship of the proletariat and, what is more, it is imperative that they should be made still more powerful. Otherwise, we would not be able to suppress the counter-revolutionaries, resist the imperialists and build socialism, or consolidate it when it is built. Lenin's theory on the proletarian party and the dictatorship of the proletariat is by no means 'outmoded,' as alleged by certain people. The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot but be highly coercive." And the same year, in his speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, he indicates, "Our state organs are organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

Mao's line in regard to the national bourgeoisie is profoundly materialist and dialectical. Its purpose is to skillfully resolve the contradiction which the advance to socialism presents in a backward country like China, with its strong feudal remnants: on the one hand, to take advantage of the continued existence of the national bourgeoisie which is necessary in order to develop the productive forces which the state was not able to immediately take into its own hands, and on the other, to restrict the bourgeoisie's development, incorporating its enterprises into the state sector step by step, in the form of joint enterprises, and firmly combating its reactionary ideas and activities. This line was on its way to complete success, if it hadn't been for the interference by the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie which had arisen within the party and the state, and which to a large extent sabotaged this process so as to obtain an ally for their sinister purposes, in this way openly revealing their plans to establish state capitalism.

Mao Tsetung's point of departure is that the principal contradiction in China after the triumph of the people's democratic revolution is the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and that this is, in essence, an antagonistic contradiction. In March 1949, in his Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee, in opposition to Liu Shao-chi's formulation that the principal contradiction was "between the advanced socialist system and the backward productive forces," Mao indicates that "After the country-wide victory of the Chinese revolution and the solution of the land problem, two basic contradictions will still exist in China. The first is internal, that is, the contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie. The second is external, that is, the contradiction between China and the imperialist countries." In many works, furthermore, among them "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," he indicates the antagonistic nature of this contradiction. Nevertheless, even the essential character of a contradiction has two aspects. An antagonistic contradiction has a non-antagonistic aspect as well, and *under certain conditions* it can be dealt with and even resolved by non-antagonistic methods. This is because every property of a contradiction (in this case its antagonism) can be transformed into its opposite. It is exactly the possibility of this transformation, under the conditions of an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle in a backward country, that permits the formation of a united front with certain sections of the bourgeoisie whose antagonism with the proletariat is less profound than that of imperialism or the big bourgeoisie. This property also permits, if correct methods are applied, the possibility that in a country which has carried through the revolution against imperialism, feudalism and the big bourgeoisie, the proletariat can resolve its contradictions with the national bourgeoisie or part of it by non-antagonistic methods, for a certain time and under certain conditions. This possibi-

# Evaluation . . .

ty of transforming the character of a contradiction into its opposite, the dominant, antagonistic aspect into a non-antagonistic one, although developed and applied in a masterful way by Mao (without in any way reducing dialectics to a mere inversion of opposites), was laid out by the creators of Marxism and by Lenin himself. Actually, in his "Conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic*," Lenin says: "*Dialectics* is the teaching which shows how *Opposites* can be and how they happen to be (how they become) *identical*,—under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another,—why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." From a materialist and dialectical viewpoint, Lenin indicates that this possibility of transformation has to be judged in accord with concrete conditions and not in an absolute, abstract and metaphysical way.

In his article "The Junius Pamphlet," Lenin points out: "That all dividing lines, both in nature and society, are conventional and dynamic, and that *every* phenomenon might, under certain conditions, be transformed into its opposite, is, of course, a basic proposition of Marxist dialectics," warning further on, nevertheless, that this must be judged according to concrete conditions so as not to fall into sophism in the name of dialectics. When, for example, Lenin refutes Kautsky, who put forward the "peaceful road to socialism," citing the fact that Marx and Engels referred to such a possibility in the 1860s in England and the United States, Lenin doesn't refute that possibility (which would in fact mean resolving an antagonistic contradiction by non-antagonistic means) in absolute terms, but rather points out the concrete conditions which led them to consider that possibility at that time, conditions which had ceased to exist completely by the time Kautsky invoked it. On the other hand, the same materialist and dialectical spirit led Lenin, despite the antagonistic nature of the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in Russia under the concrete conditions that existed in September 1917 of the proletariat's great power and preparations for insurrection, to think about the particular and momentary possibility of resolving the antagonistic contradiction of the seizure of power in a peaceful way, without an insurrection, as he states in his article, "The Tasks of the Revolution." Engels himself, for his part, calls attention to the fact that, while in France the antagonistic contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the feudal nobility was resolved through violent revolution, in England, on the other hand, "in 1869 the revolution was brought to a close by a pact between a part of the nobility and the bourgeois."

It follows, then, that Mao's views on treating the contradiction between the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie in a non-antagonistic way under the conditions, first, of people's democratic dictatorship under proletarian leadership, and later the dictatorship of the proletariat, were correct for China's concrete reality, even though the contradiction between the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie is an antagonistic one. Furthermore, in order to have capitalist production while the socialist sector of the economy was being strengthened, there was no other way except to make the maximum efforts to maintain this kind of solution, which, of course, didn't depend just on the proletariat, but on the attitude of the bourgeoisie as well. Mao correctly strove to maintain this relationship with the bourgeoisie, without ceasing to

eliminate capitalism step by step and to fight all the bourgeoisie's reactionary efforts. Extremely valuable lessons can be drawn from this policy of unity and struggle with the national bourgeoisie, especially for the countries that must pass through the stage of people's democratic revolution, and these can't be discarded because of the temporarily negative results of the Chinese Revolution which are due to the traitorous and reactionary actions of another kind of bourgeoisie arisen and developed within the Chinese Communist Party and state.

One has to take into account that the Chinese revolutionaries had to resolve the problem of advancing to communism in struggle against the remains of the reactionary forces overthrown through the people's democratic revolution (the comprador big bourgeoisie and the landlords), the various imperialist powers which had interests in China (especially U.S. imperialism), the national bourgeoisie, and the new type of bureaucratic bourgeoisie which arose within the socialist economy itself. After the 1949 triumph of the people's democratic revolution, the CPC Central Committee under Mao Tsetung's leadership laid out an 18-year plan for carrying out socialist transformation in the city and countryside. Speaking "On the Cooperative Transformation of Agriculture" in July 1955, Mao Tsetung states that the Central Committee "intends to accomplish the plan, in the main, in eighteen years. The period of a little over three years from the founding of the People's Republic of China in October 1949 to 1952 was spent on rehabilitating the national economy. In the sphere of agriculture, in addition to agrarian reform and the restoration of production, during this period we greatly extended the organization of agricultural producers' mutual-aid teams in all the old liberated areas, where we also began to form semi-socialist agricultural producers' co-operatives and gained some experience. Next followed the First Five-Year Plan, which began in 1953; nearly three years have elapsed since then, during which our agricultural co-operative movement has been spreading all over the country and our experience growing. The period from the founding of the People's Republic of China to the end of the Third Five-Year Plan covers eighteen years. In that period, we intend basically to accomplish the socialist transformation of agriculture together with socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation of handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce. Is this possible? Soviet experience tells us that it is entirely possible. In the Soviet Union the Civil War ended in 1920 and the collectivization of agriculture was completed in the seventeen years from 1921 to 1937, the main part of this work being done in the six years from 1929 to 1934." Nevertheless, at the end of 1955, Mao sums up the development of cooperativization in the countryside, concludes that it has amply exceeded previous calculations, and makes the decision to accelerate the whole process of socializing the country. In his "Prefaces to *Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside*," he says, "In my report of July 31, 1955 on the co-operative transformation of agriculture, I put the number of peasant households in co-operatives at 16,900,000, but in the space of a few months that number has been exceeded by well over 50 million. This is a tremendous event. This event makes it clear to us that we need only the calendar year 1956 in order basically to complete the semi-socialist co-operative transformation of agriculture. In another three or four years, that is, by 1959 or 1960, we can in the main complete the transformation of semi-socialist co-operatives into fully socialist ones. This event makes it clear to us that we must try to accomplish the socialist transformation of China's handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce ahead of schedule in order to meet

the needs of an expanding agriculture.”

Mao Tsetung compiles the experiences of the peasant masses in the cooperative movement, and at the end of 1955 prepares a book with more than 100 notes which sum up reports done in various regions of the countryside (Volume 5 only includes 43 of these). Already the ferocious opposition being carried out by opportunist elements within the CPC stands out very clearly, with all kinds of “revolutionary” arguments for stopping the socialization movement in the countryside and even, in fact, for dissolving many cooperatives. Already, in May 1953, Mao Tsetung is forced to demand that “all documents and telegrams sent out in the name of the Central Committee can be dispatched only after I have gone over them, *otherwise they are invalid*,” because Liu Shao-chi and his followers, who had argued against speeding up cooperativization, gave orders behind Mao Tsetung’s back to stop that movement and ordered the dissolution of the cooperatives. In alliance with the bureaucratic bourgeoisie that longed to consolidate a state capitalist regime, the national bourgeoisie prepared to furiously oppose the plans to accelerate the advance to socialism. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie, born and raised within the Communist Party itself, was particularly encouraged by the rise to power of Khrushchev and his accomplices in the Soviet Union, with whom they certainly had long-standing secret links. The national bourgeoisie had already been strongly hit at the end of 1951 by the mass campaign launched in the capitalist enterprises against bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts and stealing economic information. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie, in the process of consolidating itself, for its part was hit by the campaign against corruption, waste and bureaucracy.

In October 1955 Mao Tsetung calls a meeting with the Executive Committee of the National Federation of Industry and Commerce, and in November of that year, a conference of party delegates working in the transforming of capitalist industry and commerce. At the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee in October of the same year, he had stated, “Agricultural co-operation will enable us to consolidate our alliance with the peasants on the basis of proletarian socialism and not of bourgeois democracy. That will isolate the bourgeoisie once and for all and facilitate the final elimination of capitalism. On this matter we are quite heartless! On this matter Marxism is indeed cruel and has little mercy, for it is determined to exterminate imperialism, feudalism, capitalism, and small production to boot. In this respect, it is better not to have much mercy. Some of our comrades are too kind, they are not tough enough, in other words, they are not so Marxist. It is a very good thing, and a significant one too, to exterminate the bourgeoisie and capitalism in China, a country with a population of 600 million. Our aim is to exterminate capitalism, obliterate it from the face of the earth and make it a thing of the past.” At the Seventh Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, a resolution is passed to completely transform capitalist industry and commerce into joint state-private enterprises, eliminating private enterprises. Between January 1956 and the end of that year the entire branches of 112,000 private industrial enterprises and 400,000 commercial enterprises are transformed. The capitalists thereafter receive a fixed interest of 5% of the value of their property expropriated by the state, until this interest is completely abolished by the Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966.

Despite the resounding blows waged against the national bourgeoisie in its economic base, the class struggle against it continues. In his 1957 work “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,” Mao

Tsetung indicates, “The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the various political forces, and the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the ideological field will still be protracted and tortuous and at times even very sharp. The proletariat seeks to transform the world according to its own world outlook, and so does the bourgeoisie. In this respect, the question of which will win out, socialism or capitalism, is not really settled yet.” Mao puts forward a two-fold method to develop the struggle in the ideological sphere: one regarding the counter-revolutionaries overthrown by the people’s democratic revolution, and the other regarding wrong-thinking intellectuals, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. “As far as unmistakable counterrevolutionaries and saboteurs of the socialist cause are concerned, the matter is easy, we simply deprive them of their freedom of speech. But incorrect ideas among the people are quite a different matter. Will it do to ban such ideas and deny them any opportunity for expression? Certainly not. It is not only futile but very harmful to use crude methods in dealing with ideological questions among the people, with questions about man’s mental world. You may ban the expression of wrong ideas, but the ideas will still be there. On the other hand, if correct ideas are pampered in hothouses and never exposed to the elements and immunized against disease, they will not win out against erroneous ones. Therefore, it is only by employing the method of discussion, criticism and reasoning that we can really foster correct ideas and overcome wrong ones, and that we can really settle issues.

“It is inevitable that the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie will give expression to their own ideologies. It is inevitable that they will stubbornly assert themselves on political and ideological questions by every possible means. You cannot expect them to do otherwise. We should not use the method of suppression and prevent them from expressing themselves, but should allow them to do so and at the same time argue with them and direct appropriate criticism at them. Undoubtedly, we must criticize wrong ideas of every description. It certainly would not be right to refrain from criticism, look on while wrong ideas spread unchecked and allow them to dominate the field. Mistakes must be criticized and poisonous weeds fought wherever they crop up.”

In order to temper the masses of people, under the party’s leadership, in the struggle against the influence of bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology, the slogan “Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend” is launched. This is an orientation whose purpose is to promote “progress in the arts and sciences and a flourishing socialist culture in our land. . . . We think that it is harmful to the growth of art and science if administrative measures are used to impose one particular style of art or school of thought and to ban another. Questions of right and wrong in the arts and sciences should be settled through free discussion in artistic and scientific circles and through practical work in these fields. They should not be settled in an over-simple manner.” The next month, in his speech at the party national conference on propaganda work, he adds, “Truth develops through its struggle against falsehood. This is how Marxism develops. Marxism develops in the struggle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology, and it is only through struggle that it can develop.”

The policy of broad debate among the people, along with the policy of discussion, criticism and self-criticism within the party to fight incorrect ideas, is one of Mao Tsetung’s important contributions, with great significance for socialist construction and the creation of

# Evaluation . . .

the conditions to go on to communism. In essence, this is a question of the broad masses of the people, guided by the party and Marxism, educating themselves and liberating themselves through discussion and through becoming conscious of what is right and what is wrong, of what is positive and what is reactionary. The mission of the proletarian party is to create the conditions for the working class and the masses to become conscious and take charge in all ideological and political matters, in order to make itself unnecessary as a leading party and create the conditions for the withering away of the state. In order to go forward towards these objectives (first laid out by the creators of Marxism), it is necessary to eliminate unnecessary division of labor, to eliminate the differences between manual and mental labor and between the city and the countryside, both within the leading party and the masses. It is impossible to advance in these spheres if the leading party settles things in a paternalistic fashion and dictates to the masses about what's right and wrong, about what's progressive and what's reactionary. As a vanguard detachment, the party cannot monopolize consciousness and reasoning and replace the masses, because this would only perpetuate the need for its existence indefinitely. On the contrary, it must create the conditions for the masses to think for themselves by confronting wrong ideas, and for them to reason correctly, by guiding the discussion and convincing them of the correct ideas, of the superiority of Marxism in opposition to the opposing ideologies. In the capitalist world, there is an analogy regarding trade union leadership. There are leaders who act correctly, freely imparting their knowledge to the masses, teaching them to think for themselves and to uncover all the exploiters' tricks, to organize themselves and take initiative, so that if these leaders fall in the struggle, the masses will not be paralyzed and unable to act. In sum, they play a leading role, striving to make themselves less and less indispensable and helping the masses to liberate themselves. On the other hand, there are leaders who, in order to perpetuate their positions, transform their knowledge into private property, strive to be indispensable forever and do nothing to encourage the initiative of the masses and their ability to liberate themselves. The same thing can happen with a communist party in power or with specific leaders within the party. This paternalistic policy becomes a serious danger if these party leaders or the party itself depart from the revolutionary line and the proletariat and people haven't been trained to distinguish between right and wrong, between the advanced and the reactionary, through active participation in ideological struggle. The establishment of a revisionist line in almost all the countries where the proletariat had won state power is testimony to this fact.

## V. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST CHINESE REVISIONISM

Naturally, the indispensable condition for the education of the masses in this ideological debate is the existence of a solid communist party, armed with Marxism-Leninism. Without a vanguard that convinces and orients the masses in the course of debate against incorrect or reactionary ideas, there is the risk that these ideas will triumph. In China, the correct method of debate among the people taught by Mao and the Chinese Marxist-Leninists would have had great success, if it hadn't been

for the infiltration and revisionist degeneration of the CPC at all levels. Mao Tsetung did not realize the real extent of this, until the struggle against Soviet revisionism. Not to have detected this previously is the most serious criticism that can be made of him. But clearly neither Lenin nor Stalin foresaw the magnitude reached by this new type of revisionism arising from within the communist party itself with the goal of establishing a new system of exploitation, in the form of state capitalism. The acceleration of economic development under socialism, the centralization of the economy in the hands of the state, and the possibility of planning that economy constitute an immensely powerful economic base for a revisionist current that sets out to use these means to exploit and oppress the people through state capitalism. By comparison, the efforts of the overthrown bourgeoisie to make a comeback, or the engendering of a bourgeoisie through small-scale ownership, are dangers of minor scale. Engels had an intuition of this danger. In his Introduction to Marx's *The Civil War in France*, he calls for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat, once power has been conquered, to prevent "the transformation of the state and the organs of the state from servants of society into masters of society," and as "an effective barrier to place-hunting and careerism." Lenin, also, in his "Report on the Party Programme" at the Eighth Congress, warned, "The tsarist bureaucrats began to join the Soviet institutions and practice their bureaucratic methods, they began to assume the colouring of Communists and, to succeed better in their careers, to procure membership cards of the Russian Communist Party. And so, they have been thrown out of the door but they creep back in through the window." Nevertheless, no leader really foresaw the extent of the problem, no longer a matter of the infiltration of enemies in the party and in the state, but of the corruption of elements that in the past may have been revolutionaries, who got used to the advantages that power could offer and began to want to consolidate and expand their privileges in opposition to the people. One of the merits of the great debates and ideological and political mobilizations Mao promoted on the mass level, even though, for the time being, they didn't attain the strength necessary to crush the counterrevolutionaries who had infiltrated and grown up in the CPC and the Chinese state, is that in the course of such struggles, it forced them to expose themselves in all their reactionary features.

Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Marxist-Leninists, as we've pointed out, find themselves facing not only the reactionaries overthrown by the revolution, and the national bourgeoisie, but also a hypocritical revisionist current that hides its sinister purposes and that occupies a dominant role in the Chinese party and state. Mao only starts to be on guard against this, although without suspecting its real magnitude, as the features of those who had taken control of the CPSU and state power in the USSR, were being revealed after 1956. Moreover, the problem he faces is not an isolated case in China, but a real secret revisionist international whose members mutually support each other, as we'll see later on.

At first, the representatives of this bureaucratic bourgeoisie taking form become known in the party through their reactionary views, although they hide behind arguments with which they pretend to defend the revolution. The majority of them are successful in hiding their factional secret work for a long period of time. In general, their objectives are to infiltrate, deform and corrupt the party and the organs of power, and to oppose the development of socialism in the city and the countryside so as to protect their own plans for capitalist restoration and seek out allies among the national bourgeoisie and

other even worse reactionaries.

As we have indicated, after the triumph of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, there was already a deep divergence between Mao Tsetung and Liu Shao-chi (one of the main revisionist ringleaders) regarding the principal contradiction now that the People's Republic had been founded. In a note sent in 1952, in which he refutes the head of the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, who presented the national bourgeoisie as an intermediate class, Mao again insists that, "With the overthrow of the landlord class and the bureaucrat-capitalist class, the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie has become the principal contradiction in China..." This insistence notwithstanding, in October 1957, he finds himself obliged to reiterate this formulation, and points out that the Eighth Congress of the CPC had presented the principal contradiction as between "the advanced socialist system and the backward social productive forces." He adds, "This formulation is incorrect."

It's well known that Liu Shao-chi and his followers want to stop the revolution at the stage of People's Democracy and, abandoning the theory of the class struggle against the bourgeoisie, hold that the development of the productive forces will lead to socialism. In a meeting of the Political Bureau held in 1953, Mao has to combat the slogan spread by Liu Shao-chi and others—"firmly establish the new-democratic social order"—with which they want to oppose the advance of socialist construction.

Starting in the '50s, Liu Shao-chi and his clique oppose, in word and in deed, the cooperativization movement through which the countryside was advancing toward socialism. Naturally, they present their reactionary arguments wrapped in pseudo-Marxist phraseology, pretending to defend the interests of the masses of peasants and to oppose "rash leftism" in the cooperativization movement. In the same way, hiding his real intentions with pseudo-Marxist arguments, he opposes the accelerated advance of the socialization of industry, commerce and handicrafts in the cities. On May 12, 1949, in the First Youth Congress, Liu Shao-chi declares that it is necessary to greatly develop capitalism and that the number of factories, workshops and machines is more important than the ownership system. On another occasion he points out, "When in the future China has industrial overproduction, then it will be time to construct socialism."

After the elimination of private industry, commerce and handicrafts is in the main completed in 1956, Liu Shao-chi and his followers change tactics and begin to declare that with these transformations, the class struggle in China has ended. For example, in 1957, in a conference of party cadre in Shanghai, he asserts that "The bourgeoisie has been essentially eliminated..." and that "in China the class struggle has essentially ended." Nevertheless, he continues to go all out to stimulate capitalism in the countryside and city, using as always, pseudo-Marxist arguments. In 1961, he asserts regarding the peasant economy, "We don't fear that capitalism will get out of hand, the free market must be maintained." And, the following year, in his conversations with cadre going to the basic units, he states: "In the last years the peasants have not benefitted from the collective economy." In a speech in 1963 he indicates, "It is necessary to carry out enough of a retreat in industry and agriculture, and at the same time to establish more and more family production and individual operations programs." This declaration is seconded by Teng Hsiao-ping through his now-famous phrase: "As long as we can raise production, we can revert to individual exploitation. It doesn't matter if a cat is

black or white, as long as it catches mice."

These and other reactionary statements covered over with phony Marxist language are implemented under the pretext of "defending the interests of the masses" and opposing "'left' errors." Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Marxist-Leninists combat them through sharp criticism in the bodies of the party, still unaware of the sinister purposes that inspired their promoters. Such struggle is extremely complex, since the revisionists—as we will see—occupy important posts in the party and the state, and have secured the support of a vast bureaucracy in the middle echelons of both. Even more, they rely on the secret support of the revisionist current that is establishing itself with similar designs on an international scale.

Teng Hsiao-ping, for his part, especially when he wins control of the post of General Secretary of the CPC, busies himself with patiently infiltrating sworn followers and sowing corruption among the party cadre as well as in state enterprises of various types. In 1951, a special system of rewards for functionaries is created. It is perfected in 1955 and 1956, establishing many categories which bribe and buy the loyalty of numerous bureaucrats at various levels. In this way a series of rewards for "special" jobs are created, to be distributed by the leaders. Special schools are created for the children of cadre, who later play the role of unleashed provocateurs during the Cultural Revolution. Added to that is the unjust system of selection for the universities, through exams that in fact favor the children of the bourgeoisie and social sectors that in the past monopolized culture. In the industrial, commercial and agricultural enterprises, one-man management of the director and the technocrats who surround him is reinforced, without the control of the party committee and the masses. At the same time, the system of material incentives is used broadly as a means of corrupting certain sections of the masses. Through these and other methods, the bureaucrat bourgeoisie in formation is forging its base of support in the party and state (as well as the armed forces) in tens of thousands of middle-level cadre and separating the Marxist-Leninist section of the party from the masses.

To aid this work of corrupting the party, Liu Shao-chi republishes his book *How to Be a Good Communist* and distributes it on a vast scale. Counting, for good reason, on the corruption of the party that they are carrying out, he calls for "Subordinating personal interests to the interests of the party absolutely and unconditionally," and adds, "The interests of the party above all, that is the most important principle that commands the thought and the action of all communists," without considering the principles and the interests of the proletariat and the people, which are the party's reason for existence. In this way, pushing blind subordination to the party, they prepared the conditions to keep those who would not be bribed from rebelling when they began to openly use it as an instrument of capitalist restoration. At the same time, he justifies the methods of corruption that were being promoted, under the pretext that "To fulfill the tasks of the party, it is necessary to secure for members the indispensable conditions of material life, of work and instruction, that allows them to perform their duties with tranquility." At the same time he pushes careerism in joining the party, declaring that "It isn't bad that some people look for support in the Communist Party, that they come to find a solution for their problems." He maintains, on the other hand, that if "the revolutionaries of other epochs... could turn against the exploited classes to oppress them, this could never happen with the proletarian revolution and the Communist Party," in this way put-

# Evaluation . . .

ting up a smokescreen in anticipation of the open treason they prepared. For his part, Teng Hsiao-ping's report on the modification of the party statutes presented to the Eighth Congress of the CPC contains a whole presentation in which he proclaims the extinction of social classes, maintaining that "Abolishing the old procedures for admission to the party has become necessary due to the fact that the concept 'distinction between social elements' has become void of its old meaning or is about to lose all meaning."

In his speech at the Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region Party Committees, held in January 1957, Mao begins his criticism of the careerism and corruption spreading in the party. "One kind of problem arises among our own ranks. For example, some cadres now scramble for fame and fortune and are interested only in personal gain. In the discussion of the grading of cadres, there were instances where a cadre would not be satisfied with a rise of one grade, even a rise of two grades still left him weeping in bed, and perhaps only a three-grade promotion could get him out of bed. The fuss they kicked up has settled the question. This business of grading cadres, have done with it! Let wages be roughly evened out, with slight differences here and there. In the old days, the government of the Northern warlords had a prime minister by the name of Tang Shaoyi. Years later he was magistrate of Chungshan County, Kwangtung Province. If a prime minister in the old society could serve as a county magistrate, why on earth can't our government ministers do likewise? In this regard, those who fuss over their rank and can be graded up but not down compare poorly, in my opinion, with this old mandarin. They vie with each other not in plain living, doing more work and having fewer comforts, but for luxuries, rank and status. At present, this kind of thinking has grown considerably in the Party, and the matter demands our attention."

In this speech, together with criticizing those who oppose the process of socialization in the countryside, he analyzes certain disorders which broke out among students and intellectuals in China echoing the events in Hungary, inspired by Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin. Mao Tsetung is in favor of allowing those among the people who are discontented to express themselves, in order to compile their just criticisms and mobilize and awaken the consciousness of the masses in the fight against the reactionary ideas they express. He thinks that it is even necessary to give a certain rein and means of expression to the reactionary sectors of the national bourgeoisie so that they can "let loose their poison," in order for the masses to come to know and fight them better. Of course the purpose is to effectively combat and sweep away these unhealthy tendencies in society. "Bad trends in society must definitely be overcome. Whether inside the Party, among the democratic personages or among students, bad trends, that is, mistakes which are not those of a few individuals but which have developed into trends, must definitely be overcome. The way to do so is through reasoning. So long as the reasoning is not convincing and only a few words of condemnation are used, these trends will go from bad to worse." And he adds, "In our state which is a dictatorship of the proletariat, poisonous weeds should of course not be allowed to spread unchecked. Whether inside the Party or in ideological or in literary and art circles, we must endeavour to make sure that fragrant flowers and Marxism occupy the chief and dominant position. Poisonous weeds and what is non-Marxist

and anti-Marxist must be kept in the subordinate position." Regarding counter-revolutionaries, the line is different, he indicates. "Counter-revolutionaries must be eliminated. Where this task has not yet been completed according to plan, it must be completed this year, and if there are still loose ends to tie up, the work must be finished next year without fail."

The most reactionary sectors of the national bourgeoisie fall for this trick. Thinking that the facilities for expressing their criticisms which they encounter are a sign of weakness, they leave the purely academic field completely and launch unbridled attacks against the party and socialism. In this way many who before had claimed to accept socialism out of fear are unmasked before the masses. A concentrated counterattack against them is taken up among the masses, demolishing their reactionary arguments and exposing them as the reactionaries they are. In this struggle, for the first time, the party rectification campaign against bureaucratism, sectarianism and subjectivism which had been launched in May 1957 acquires an open character through the participation of the masses using *dazibaos* (big-character posters). Mao will put the systematization of this experience to good use later, during the Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The revisionists in the party conduct themselves prudently and avoid going all out in inciting the bourgeoisie to attack, since they fear exposing themselves and they plan to take the fortress from within. They also fear the criticisms of bureaucracy raised by the masses. Nevertheless, some elements in the party are exposed for their reactionary positions. "Among Party and League members the waverers have already deserted to them or are contemplating desertion." And in July 1957, Mao indicates, "The aim of rectification is to guide the struggle in such a way as to set right the political orientation, raise the ideological level, overcome shortcomings in work, unite with the broad masses, and isolate and split the bourgeois Rightists and all other anti-socialist elements. The bourgeois Rightists referred to here include those who have sneaked into the Party and the Youth League and whose political complexion is exactly the same as that of the Rightists outside; they have betrayed the revolutionary cause of the proletariat and launched wild attacks against the Party, and therefore must be fully exposed and expelled in order to preserve the purity of the ranks of the Party and the Youth League."

Mao Tsetung had initiated the party rectification campaign with a speech, made two months before it began, at conferences of cadres in Tsinan and Nanking. There again he launches into a severe warning against the symptoms of corruption in the party. "Since our victory in the revolution, the revolutionary will of some of our comrades has been waning, their revolutionary enthusiasm has been ebbing, their spirit of whole-hearted service to the people has been flagging, and so has the death-defying spirit they displayed in the days of fighting against our enemies; at the same time, they are clamouring for position and for the limelight, becoming particular about what they eat and wear, competing for salary and scrambling for fame and gain—all these tendencies are growing." And in October 1957, in his speech at the Thirteenth Session of the Supreme State Conference, he says, "The socialist revolution is new to us all. The revolution we carried out in the past was only a democratic revolution, which was bourgeois in nature. It only destroyed imperialist, feudal and bureaucrat-capitalist ownership, but not individual ownership or national capitalist ownership. Thus many people could pass the test of the democratic revolution. While some were not really keen on a thoroughgoing democratic revolution and barely managed to come

through, others were willing to work hard for it and passed the test all right. The test now is socialism and it is hard for some people. Take for example that Party member in Hupeh Province who was originally a farm labourer. For three generations his family had to go beggling. Liberation brought him a new life, he grew well off and became a cadre at the district level. However, he complained bitterly about socialism and strongly disapproved of agricultural co-operation; he demanded 'freedom' and opposed the state monopoly of the purchase and marketing of grain."

Still Mao Tsetung was not able to see just how deep this corruption—generated by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie then taking shape—went among a great number of intermediate cadres, nor the profoundly reactionary nature of China's Khrushchevs. In the January 1957 speech mentioned previously, he continues to interpret the camouflaged reactionary views put forward by the revisionists in high places or their followers of lesser rank as errors and vacillations. He indicates, for example, "Most cadres in our Party are dissatisfied with the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and think it went too far in attacking Stalin. That is a normal feeling and a normal reaction. But a few cadres started to vacillate. Before it rains in a typhoon, ants come out of their holes, they have very sensitive 'noses' and they know their meteorology. No sooner had the typhoon of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU struck than a few such ants in China came out of their holes. They are wavering elements in the Party who vacillate whenever something is astir. When they heard of the sweeping denunciation of Stalin, they felt good and swung to the other side, cheering and saying that Khrushchov was right in everything and that they themselves had been of the same opinion all along." Further on he says, "Some Party members who have come through many tests, now find it difficult to pass the test of socialism...When agricultural co-operation was being carried out, again some people in the Party opposed it. In short, there are high-ranking Party cadres who have vacillated and cannot pass the test of socialism." Evidently, until that time, Mao did not know the identity of reactionary interests (and secret links) which existed between those "vacillating" high-ranking officials of the Chinese Communist Party, and Khrushchev and his successors in the Soviet Union and other countries where socialism was betrayed, who also were able to fool Stalin in regard to their real aims.

In any case, right after the start of the the 1957 rectification campaign, there are a series of measures designed to combat bureaucracy in the party, state and the various kinds of enterprises. In his remarks before the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, Mao had pointed out, "There are several hundred thousand cadres at the level of the county Party committee and above who hold the destiny of the country in their hands. If they fail to do a good job, alienate themselves from the masses and do not live plainly and work hard, the workers, peasants and students will have good reason to disapprove of them. We must watch out lest we foster the bureaucratic style of work and grow into an aristocratic stratum divorced from the people. The masses will have good reason to remove from office whoever practices bureaucracy, makes no effort to solve their problems, scolds them, tyrannizes over them and never tries to make amends. I say it is fine to remove such fellows, and they ought to be removed."

Further on, synthesizing the opinions of the masses in the rectification campaign, it is resolved that leading cadres (including in the Communist Party, unions, administration and in the Young Communist League) must

take part in manual labor regularly. They must identify themselves with the workers in their daily life and resolutely get rid of the privileges which separate them from the masses. Great efforts are necessary to reduce and simplify the organizational framework and reduce the number of personnel in the organizations of the party, administration, and trade unions, as well as those in the enterprises who are unnecessary and unproductive. Attention has to be paid to training cadres from among the ranks of the workers and to making full use of the activists and cadres who take part in production full or part time. Special efforts have to be directed toward the creation of tight links between technical and administrative personnel and the workers. Regulations which stand in the way of production and block the workers' initiative should be resolutely revised and abolished. Workers' assemblies, under the leadership of the party committee, are a good means for drawing workers and employees into management and combating bureaucracy. After summing up this first experimental phase, this method should be fully employed in the current rectification campaign and generalized throughout the country. According to Central Committee instructions, the workers' assemblies have the following functions and powers: 1) to examine and discuss the report on the factory's work presented by the director; to examine and discuss the plant's production plan, finances, technology, work and wages, as well as the main measures to carry out the plan; to make proposals; 2) to examine and discuss the use of bonuses, the welfare, medical assistance and union funds, and the funds designated by the administration for job safety, as well as other expenditures designated for the workers' welfare. On these questions, decisions can be made and put forward to the enterprise administration or other concerned sectors to be implemented, as long as these decisions don't contradict the instructions and directives of the higher level bodies; 3) to propose the removal of leading cadres in the enterprise to the next highest level administrative body, when necessary; 4) to make proposals to the higher body when the workers' assembly disagrees with its decisions.

It is emphasized that the full use of big character posters is necessary so that the workers and employees can widely express their views. Such big-character posters, with their simple form and lively style, are very good for mobilizing the masses. They are sharp and clear, intense and lively in their criticism of mistakes by the leading personnel and the workers themselves and in making proposals to rationalize the work. The big character posters can be gradually transformed into an important permanent communications medium through which criticism and self-criticism can spread throughout the factories, offices and schools.

This guidance, which represents a serious blow against the soil nourishing the bureaucracy the revisionists had been creating in the party and state, awakens deep enthusiasm among the masses, and inspires terror among the opportunist bureaucracy and its leaders, who sabotage it in every way possible. In the huge Anshan steel works alone, in 1958 the workers put up a million big-character posters and carry out 360,000 technical innovations. Still, these anti-bureaucratic measures could be implemented effectively only during the period of the upsurge of the Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

## VI. THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD

Relying on the enthusiasm of the masses, in 1958 Mao Tsetung launches the Great Leap Forward to speed up

# Evaluation . . .

socialist construction on the basis of appealing to the consciousness, initiative and enthusiasm of the masses. The Chinese revisionists and their network of bureaucrats, as well as their Soviet instigators, are horrified by the idea of advancing socialist construction and especially of doing it by bringing the consciousness and the initiative of the masses into full play, and they prepare to sabotage this line completely. Despite their sabotage, the Great Leap Forward leads to an impressive advance, in production and the creation of new industries, in more fully socialist forms of production in the countryside through the integration of the cooperatives into the People's Communes, and especially in the conscious involvement of the broad masses in socialist construction. Starting in 1958, work is begun on a thousand industrial and mining complexes, including 45 very large ones. Seven hundred of these begin production during the course of that year. Steel production goes up 49.5% over the previous year, reaching eight million tons (11 million tons if the steel produced by more primitive means is taken into account, although it is not of the same quality). Coal production reaches 270 million tons, doubling the 1957 output. Grain production reaches 250 million tons, which is 35% more than in 1957. Cotton production rises to 1.1 million tons, a 28% increase. Millions of peasants are drawn into industrial production, considerably increasing the working class' weight in society.

True, in regard to the economic aspect, errors are made, and Mao Tsetung recognizes and takes responsibility for them. Among them is not having combined the gigantic push forward of the masses with more thorough planning, not having taken into account the weakness in China's transportation system, in terms of the huge advances in production. In addition, there is no objective calculation of how agriculture will feed the millions who are drawn into urban industrial production. Nevertheless, the main problems arising during the Great Leap are due to the concentrated sabotage carried out against it by both the Chinese revisionists and their Soviet accomplices, and the tremendous natural disasters which took place between 1959 and 1961. In August of 1960, Khrushchev orders the withdrawal of 1,390 Soviet experts who had been advising various industrial projects in China, cancels 257 joint scientific and technical projects and blocks the construction of another 300 plants, especially in heavy industry. The bureaucracy, for its part, working for the Chinese revisionists, promotes speculation: loans, hiring of labor, skimming public funds, etc. At the same time, they promote "leftist" measures to discredit the movement, just as they did later on during the Cultural Revolution. Added to all of this, and in the context of the Soviet-U.S. double blockade against China, there are the serious natural disasters which occurred between 1959-1961. After the tremendous drought of 1959, the next year floods and typhoons devastate 150 million acres of land—half of the total area under cultivation—and damage another 60 million. Roads and railroads are greatly disrupted. A severe famine sweeps China.

In 1959, the emerging Chinese bureaucratic bourgeoisie launches an all-out attack against the general line for socialist construction, using the errors made in the Great Leap Forward as a pretext and basing itself on the difficult conditions of life, worsened by natural disasters. Peng Teh-huai, an open agent of the Soviet revisionists who had already proposed to "modernize" the Chinese army with Soviet weapons to make it dependent on the Soviet revisionists, launches a ferocious attack on the

Great Leap Forward, calling the mobilization of the masses "petty bourgeois fanaticism." He goes so far as to make open calls for Soviet intervention, claiming that "if the Chinese workers and peasants weren't so good, a Hungary-style incident would have occurred here and Soviet intervention would have been necessary." This Defense Minister and member of the CPC Political Bureau, in charge of the Party Central Committee's Military Commission, sends a letter with his criticism of the Great Leap to the Soviet CP and meets with Khrushchev to plot in May 1959. This renegade had strong ties to Kao Kang, who'd been unmasked at the end of 1953. Khrushchev defends both of them at the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU, showing the links between his clique and some sectors of the Chinese bureaucratic bourgeoisie who sought to establish state capitalism there as well. Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping throw themselves into the attack against the Great Leap. Teng declares that "donkeys go slower, true, but they rarely have accidents." Liu Shao-chi is named President of the Republic on April 27, 1959. Although they are not able to cut Mao Tsetung out, because of his support among the masses, they isolate him to the maximum. In 1959 Mao can't get the party's daily to publish a report by Chang Chun-chiao on bourgeois habits in the party. In January 1960, Mao comments on the "Anshan Charter," written by steel workers who demand the application of principles which go against one-man bureaucratic management, but the party Secretariat doesn't consider it "urgent" to publish this document.

The Eighth Session of the Eighth Central Committee takes place August 2, 1959, and Mao Tsetung launches a strong attack against Peng Teh-huai. There he says, "Coming to Lushan, I have noticed three things: we have accomplished great things; many problems still remain to be resolved; the future is bright. But right away a new series of problems has arisen with right opportunism launching a frantic attack against the Party. There's no more 'communist wind' . . . nor fantastic exaggerations. At the present time, the problem is not to oppose the 'left,' but to oppose the right . . . After several months of struggle against left tendencies, it's natural that a right tendency should appear. True, there have been shortcomings and errors, but we've corrected them. Still they continue to demand corrections. They seize hold of that and attack the general line to try to overthrow us." As is widely known, in that meeting Mao Tsetung threatens to return to the countryside and organize an army against the government if the reactionaries are installed. The revisionists, frightened, give up and accept sacrificing Peng Teh-huai in order to save their positions.

With the pretext of correcting "economic errors" and "rationalizing" production, throughout the '60s the revisionists bring back material incentives and drive the masses out of participation in the administration of the enterprises, going back to the domination of managers and technicians. At the same time they send rectification teams to the countryside which knock down many revolutionary leaders and demand that the masses not disturb the work of the cadres installed by them. In 1962, under the cover of a classical work and commentaries on it, they begin to attack the party's line and demand Peng Teh-huai's rehabilitation. For his part, Lu Ting-yi, who was in charge of education, attacks the Great Leap Forward and the part-time work, part-time study schools established during that period.

Mao Tsetung continues his struggle. At the Peitaho meeting in 1962, he repeats the call, "Never forget class struggle." In May 1963 he formulates a 10-point document to launch a Socialist Education Movement, and then

a 23-point document with the same purpose. He emphasizes, "The important point in this campaign is rectifying those people within the Party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road. . . . Some of those people in authority taking the capitalist road do so openly, others act behind the scenes. Some of those who support them are at lower levels, some are at higher levels. . . . At the higher levels, there are those who oppose building socialism in the communes, the neighborhoods, the districts, and even in the work of provincial and Central Committee departments." Then he says, "On the whole, the Party's line is not being applied now, there's no concern for the revolution and socialist construction. . . . If we don't remedy this, some day a Petofi Club-type organization will be formed."

## VII. THE PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION

As is well known, at the end of 1965, the first battles of the Proletarian Cultural Revolution are initiated, though still on the ideological plane (criticizing articles containing thinly veiled proposals for Peng Teh-huai's restoration). The Cultural Revolution is a gigantic mobilization of the masses that begins with the youth, later drawing in the working class and the peasants, to overthrow the revisionists who dominate the party and state, and seize back the portions of political power they have usurped. At the same time, it is an endeavor to sweep away their reactionary policies in the fields of production, education, culture, and in regard to the general line for socialist construction, which they oppose. In fact, the CPC is divided into two leading centers, two headquarters: the bourgeois and the proletarian. The bourgeois headquarters, as will be seen in the course of the Cultural Revolution and, especially, through the events after the death of Mao, has a strong base of support among the middle cadres of the party, the armed forces, and the state in general. The corrupting work of the revisionist leaders has borne its fruit. In the Soviet Union as well, after Stalin's death, the bourgeois headquarters proves to be dominant in the CPSU. Something similar occurs in the communist parties in the capitalist world. In most of them, the revisionist leadership, the majority of the party functionaries, and a great part of the membership adhere to Khrushchev's line. The Marxist-Leninists (including some party leaders in a few exceptional cases) constitute a minority, who end up breaking with the revisionists in order to form an authentic Marxist-Leninist communist party. In both the capitalist world and the socialist countries, the revisionists support and actively aid each other in their struggle against the Marxist-Leninists. The Marxist-Leninists begin to support each other as well.

The basic difference, nevertheless, compared with the revisionists who occupy a dominant position in the communist parties of the socialist countries, is that there they hold power: they control the economy, propaganda, the military, etc. It is not enough, therefore, to fight them ideologically and politically, to draw a line of demarcation between the camps and expel them from the party or break with the party if they control it. In the socialist countries it is necessary to mobilize the masses to throw them out of power in the party and the state. It is a real class struggle, in which, according to circumstances and the power they've usurped, it is necessary, in order to overthrow them, to pass through stages, as in any class struggle, to isolate the most dangerous enemies and make temporary alliances with those that may be less dangerous.

A leading party is indispensable in any revolutionary

battle. In this battle against revisionism in the countries where it has succeeded in seizing key parts of state power, a leading party, a communist party, is also necessary. But a very serious contradiction presents itself here, since the revisionist control of an important or decisive part of state power comes from the important or decisive positions (as we believe was the case in China) they occupy within the vanguard party. How can Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Marxist-Leninists be blamed for not having used the CPC as the leading nucleus in the Cultural Revolution? How could they have, if that party was decisively dominated by the revisionists? In the capitalist world, could we Marxist-Leninists make use of the old structure of the communist party in most cases? Didn't we have to do factional work, fight against revisionist oppression in those parties, strive to rescue the maximum number of honest members and, finally, break with the revisionists? On the contrary, if there is anything we should reproach the Chinese Marxist-Leninists for, given what happened after Mao's death, it is not having realized and thoroughly estimated the breadth of the base of support the revisionists had in the CPC, especially among the middle-level cadre—or having done so too late. Throughout the Cultural Revolution and after, they continue to speak of the leadership of the CPC, but, in fact, what is being referred to is a handful of revolutionary leaders led by Mao and of the members who followed them, intermixed with numerous middle cadre and even members committed, openly or secretly, to the revisionists, even after their main ringleaders were overthrown. In the old communist parties of the capitalist world, for a certain period (before the split) we Marxist-Leninists had to fight a similar battle, only there it wasn't dealing with the complex problem of taking back state power.

Speaking in the name of a party which they actually legitimately represent, but was already profoundly infiltrated and divided, in order to win back the CPC Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Marxist-Leninists have no choice but to mobilize the masses against "the bourgeois representatives who have infiltrated the Party, the government, the army, and the various fields of culture. . ." who are "a bunch of counterrevolutionary revisionists." Given the immense power the revisionists hold in the party and the state, the Marxist-Leninists have to make use of Mao's great influence among the masses, and even depend on Lin Piao and the Armed Forces, despite the fact that Mao had differences with him in the past and disapproved of the dogmatic methods (as Mao expresses in a 1966 letter to his wife) with which Lin takes advantage of Mao's prestige and work for his own ends. In view of the extent to which Mao was isolated in the years before the Cultural Revolution and the power achieved by the revisionists, this alliance with Lin Piao (which even goes as far as the aberration of having to designate him Mao's successor at the Ninth Congress) appears justified and inevitable. Mao's statement to the Albanian leaders—"The Party and the state had been usurped by the renegade Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping group and the victories of the Chinese revolution were in danger"—was totally real and objective and expresses the enormous obstacles the Marxists faced in regaining power. In regard to Lin Piao, there is the fact that only in the '70s was he discovered to be a conspirator, presumably in league with the Soviet revisionists.

It was necessary to lead the masses to smash the revisionists under the conditions of a divided party in which the revisionists (open and hidden) occupied decisive positions; of depending on the Armed Forces led by a hidden traitor who pursued his own plans and with many com-

# Evaluation . . .

mands secretly tied to his conspiracy; and of a very large number of middle-level party and state cadres who, as the facts have shown, defended their petty privileges and were with the revisionists. Although Mao and the Chinese Marxist-Leninists relied on the fervent support of the masses, between them and the masses there was a whole intermediate apparatus that sabotaged their directives, stirred up the contradictions among sectors of the masses, promoted "left" tendencies and, in general, went all out to gut the content of the Cultural Revolution or to derail it.

The fact that the first group of five in charge of leading the Cultural Revolution later would be unmasked as revisionists working to derail it is eloquent testimony to this situation, although this isn't the only nor definitely the most important example. Then, the very revisionists who are in the process of being unmasked, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, form many "work teams" which go to the masses to "promote" the Cultural Revolution. In reality, what they do is repress the revolutionary leaders and party members and work to discredit the movement by promoting the overthrow of a large number of middle-level cadres, in order to turn the spearhead away from themselves. At the same time they repressed the masses' opinions, accusing anyone who opposed them of being a revisionist, fomenting endless disputes between various groups of the masses, and in every possible way sabotaging the concentration of forces against the main enemies. These teams operated for almost two months, eliminated only in August 1966 with the issuing of the famous "16-point Decision," with Mao's guidance for the Cultural Revolution.

The second group in charge of leading the Cultural Revolution includes Chen Po-ta and Tao Chu, who was later overthrown for being an agent of Liu Shao-chi. Taking advantage of his position in that group, he creates "liaison agents" who go out to the centers of the mass struggle and provoke serious splits, even fomenting armed conflicts between various Red Guard forces, who were divided into three general headquarters. Tao Chu works to prevent any discussion of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping's counter-revolutionary "work groups" and his own "liaison agents," to keep them from being unmasked. The broadening of the target to include all cadres, and the extremist phraseology, not only scares these cadres even more into the arms of those who really were the main target of the Cultural Revolution and who were opposed to it, but also provokes big splits and confusion among the masses around defending some cadres and criticizing others. Many middle-level cadres become accomplices in cutting off the contacts between the Red Guards and the working class so as to keep the working class from taking the leadership of the movement. Chen Po-ta, as is well known, was part of Lin Piao's secret plot. Finally, it should be said that the true character of the plot the revisionists were hatching was revealed to the Chinese Marxist-Leninists and Mao only through the polemic against Soviet revisionism and learning how the revisionists had established state capitalism, as well as through the course of the Cultural Revolution. For a long time it is thought that they are fighting for the restoration of traditional capitalism and not of a state capitalism disguised as socialism. For the same reason, the base of support they have created among a vast sector of middle-level party and state cadres on the basis of privileges and bribes is not sharply seen at first. One of the symptoms of the seriousness of that corruption is the conduct of the

children of cadres, grouped together in special schools. They organize a United Action Committee, defend the idea that they are revolutionaries by birth since they are the children of cadres (they launch the slogan, "A revolutionary father, a brave son; a reactionary father, a scoundrel son"), and stage fascist-style attacks on revolutionary organizations. Evidence collected against them since then shows that they were financed by high-ranking party officials. In any case, their conduct and views reveal quite a bit about their parents' mentality. In many provinces they have no hesitation about using various kinds of bribes and intrigues to divide the masses and block anyone who demands their overthrow: the Agriculture Minister himself promotes these practices in Peking and in the countryside; in Shanghai and other places, special bonuses are paid to the workers, different wage grades are created to favor their followers, they paralyze production and encourage paid trips to the capital, and, with the aid of high-ranking cadres, promote the reinstatement of lower-ranking cadres overthrown by the masses. The better part of the Party Central Committee, with links to middle-level cadres in both open and disguised ways, oppose their dismissal. Chou En-lai plays a decisive role in this defense of cadres repudiated by the masses.

## VIII. THE NECESSITY OF A RETREAT

In August 1967, after a nationwide tour, Mao Tsetung sees confirmed just how much "the cadres had lost touch with the masses," and for that reason, the lack of a revolutionary party solidly based on a large body of rank-and-file leaders, capable of leading the process of the Cultural Revolution. On the other hand, those cadres' administrative experience is necessary to prevent economic chaos and safeguard the country's external security. The new leaders who have come forward from among the masses in many ways lack administrative experience. He sees confirmed, too, that the masses are divided. This is because of the deliberate actions of cadres in league with the revisionists, as well as the work (still unknown at that time) of armed forces elements linked to the Lin Piao plot, who were playing the role of "arbitrator" in conflicts among sections of the masses. The problem Mao faces, in all its magnitude, is that he lacks a leading party he can fully rely on to deepen that process. Even cadres loyal to Marxism are viciously attacked by those who are carrying out intrigues among the masses, many times turning the masses against them without justification. He is forced, for that reason, to "reduce the movement" of the Cultural Revolution, as he expressed it in a conversation in July 1967, trying as hard as possible to save its political and ideological achievements. In fact, he is forced to compromise, on the one hand, with Chou En-lai, who uses all his ability to defend the party "apparatus," and on the other hand, with Lin Piao, who, through the army, insures, for his own reasons (unknown at that time) the chances of avoiding the mass confrontations promoted by those striving to derail the Cultural Revolution. He calls on the masses to unite and form *provisional* organs of power, made up of veteran cadres, representatives of the masses and members of the armed forces directly designated by the Military Commission. The organization of communes as organs of power directly derived from the masses, as proposed by the 16-point Cultural Revolution programmatic document and established in Shanghai, should be abandoned. Upon suggesting to the Shanghai leaders that they replace the Commune with a three-in-one committee, Mao expressly points out to them the necessity of a leading party to keep

advancing. "Do we still have a need for the Party?" he asks. And he answers: "We still need a steeled nucleus to strengthen us on the road that lies ahead," he says. Thus, in China, Mao faces a problem similar to that seen after Stalin's death in the Soviet Union, most of the Eastern European People's Democracies, and the capitalist world itself: the lack of parties whose high and middle-level leaders have a solid communist consciousness.

At the same time, he strives for the principled unity of the masses on the basis of a profound criticism of the revisionists' reactionary line. He puts forward the necessity of rebuilding the party, even with all the limitations of having to keep many bureaucratized cadres and the rehabilitation of cadres overthrown by the masses, which is promoted by those who take advantage of this consolidation to reinfiltrate these cadres. In the Communiqué of the Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee held in October 1968, Mao is quoted as saying, "The party organization should be composed of the advanced elements of the proletariat; it should be a vigorous vanguard organization capable of leading the proletariat and the revolutionary masses in the fight against the class enemy," and for this reason it must "get rid of the stale and take in the fresh," and, the communiqué adds, "conscientiously do the work of party consolidation and party building." The publication *Red Flag* at that time speaks of "a transfusion of proletarian blood" into the party, and indicates that "only by developing a party consolidation movement, a mass movement and not one that takes place behind closed doors, can we guarantee that the communist organizations at various levels will really be led by people loyal to Mao Tsetung, to his Thought and to his proletarian revolutionary line."

On the other hand, Mao Tsetung strives for the working class to take full leadership of the movement, so as to restrict the petty-bourgeois tendencies which arose during the first few months of the Cultural Revolution—which its enemies took full advantage of. Already, in the July 1967 conversations, Mao Tsetung had emphasized that the principal aspect of the Cultural Revolution was the participation of the masses of workers and peasants. He said, "After the working meeting of the Central Committee the emphasis was on criticizing the bourgeois reactionary line. As the criticism of this line aroused the revolutionary enthusiasm of many revolutionaries, the revolutionary intellectuals and the young students were the first to achieve consciousness, which is in accordance with the laws of revolutionary development. In January of this year the Shanghai workers rose, as did the workers of the whole country and the peasants too, when the January Storm swept across the country. The development of the movement showed that the workers and peasants are still the main force—the soldiers are only workers and peasants in uniform, so that workers, peasants and soldiers are, at root, workers and peasants. Only when the broad masses of workers and peasants arose was all that bourgeois stuff thoroughly smashed; while the revolutionary intellectuals and the young students had to fall back into a subsidiary place." Then he makes the call to "bring into full play the leading role of the working class in the great cultural revolution and in all fields of work." Furthermore, he points out, "In carrying out the proletarian revolution in education, it is essential to have working-class leadership. . . . The workers' propaganda teams should stay permanently in the schools and take part in fulfilling all the tasks of struggle-criticism-transformation in the schools, and they will always lead the schools. In the countryside, the schools should be managed by the poor and lower-middle peasants—the most reliable ally of the working class."

Mao Tsetung's isolation, along with that of the Chinese Marxist-Leninists who identify with his objectives, becomes accentuated because of the necessity of stopping the vast mass mobilization of the Cultural Revolution, due to the lack of a really solid leading party nucleus to lead it to the complete achievement of its objectives. The necessity of relying on Chou En-lai, who does not reveal his strong links to Teng Hsiao-ping until after the Lin Piao plot, prevents the revolutionaries from intervening in China's foreign policy. Chou En-lai, as is well known, jealously defended the Central Committee Liaison Department cadres involved in foreign affairs. As all the Marxist-Leninist parties can verify, the rebels in the Liaison Department were removed very early. Minister Chin Yi is kept in office despite the masses' serious criticisms of him. Still, Marxist-Leninist principles and the line formulated by Mao in his polemic against the Soviet revisionists are essentially upheld until the Tenth Congress of the CPC, where Chou En-lai presents the main report on international affairs. Chou indicates at that Congress, "Stalin said, 'Leninism is Marxism in the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution. . . .'" and adds, "the era has not changed. The fundamental principles of Leninism are not outdated." The struggles of the peoples of the world are emphasized, and he quotes Mao, saying, "The people, and the people alone, are the motive force of world history," which contradicts what his collaborator Teng Hsiao-ping is to say the next year at the United Nations. He denounces "the two hegemonic powers—the U.S. and the USSR." In this speech there are also some secondary elements which could be interpreted as a subtle anticipation of Teng Hsiao-ping's ideas, but the thrust of the speech conforms to China's previous international line.

The already weak situation of the Marxist-Leninists who, although they can get their ideas across through certain propaganda media, lack a solid means for leading the masses, becomes even worse when Lin Piao's plot to grab power is discovered in 1971. This conspiracy's deep ramifications in the armed forces, the party and other state organisms forces the already weak Marxist-Leninist forces in the party to put even more emphasis on their temporary compromise with those who had opposed carrying the Cultural Revolution any further or who were openly or secretly linked to the revisionist forces. In addition to the internal danger, there is the open threat of the Soviet leaders, to whom Lin Piao seems to have been linked, who concentrate a huge number of troops on China's border and send many warships to cruise off China's coastline. At this point, forces who had been overthrown as revisionist ringleaders begin to reappear, not only in the lower-level bodies, as had already begun to happen during the height of the Cultural Revolution, but also in the top leading bodies. In April 1973 Teng Hsiao-ping reappears for the first time at a public banquet. Shortly after, he regains his post as Vice Premier. In August of that year he is reinstated as a member of the CPC Central Committee. By 1974 he has infiltrated the Political Bureau and assumes responsibilities in the reorganization of the armed forces, which shows the connection between his return and the necessity of neutralizing Lin Piao's influence. In April of that year he feels strong enough to lay the foundation of his reactionary "three worlds" theory at the United Nations. In January 1975, at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Central Committee elected at the Tenth Congress, he succeeds in being designated Vice Chairman of the Central Committee. The same month, at the Fourth National People's Congress, which Mao Tsetung does not attend (it seems he didn't attend the Tenth Congress either), Teng is named Vice

# Evaluation . . .

Premier and Chief of Staff of the armed forces, assuming the functions of the Premier because of Chou En-lai's illness. In December 1973 the armed forces commanders had already been changed and many elements who were main targets of the Cultural Revolution begin to be rehabilitated. Between July and October 1975 alone, the Army Chief of Staff who had been overthrown, the Rector of Peking University, the ex-mayor of Shanghai and many others are rehabilitated.

## IX. THE BETRAYAL OF MAO TSETUNG'S INTERNATIONAL LINE

The preparations for Nixon's visit to China and Chou En-lai's efforts to get China into the UN take place in the context of the serious internal threat arising from the Lin Piao plot in September 1971, and of the intensified threat from the Soviet Union. Nixon's visit takes place five months after the discovery of Lin Piao's plot. We don't know the tactical reasons which might have motivated Mao to accept the meeting with Nixon. In any case, a mere meeting with a chief enemy under certain tactical conditions does not imply a concession of principles. The same has been done by other great revolutionary leaders. Mao Tsetung also had discussions with Chiang Kai-shek, which certainly didn't mean giving up the struggle to overthrow him. In October 1972, on the occasion of the twenty-third anniversary of the Chinese Revolution, China's main newspapers publish an editorial which says, "Opposition to the bullying and hegemonism of the two superpowers has come to be a common demand of the peoples." "Certain countries strictly controlled by Soviet revisionism or U.S. imperialism also strive to put an end to this dependency." "During the last year, our country has continued to thoroughly apply Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs. We have developed our relations of friendship, aid and cooperation with the other socialist countries. We firmly supported the struggle of resistance against U.S. aggression and for national salvation carried out by the people of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; we supported the just struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America to win and safeguard their national independence and defend their state sovereignty." "For the revolutionary movement of the world's peoples, the future is bright but the road tortuous. To win victory in their revolutionary struggle the world's peoples must rely chiefly on themselves to gradually raise their level of consciousness and sense of organization in the course of the struggle, and step by step integrate the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with revolutionary practice in their own countries. We have always upheld the revolutionary struggles of the world's peoples and it is in the peoples that our hopes are placed." "In the rather favorable international situation, we should strive still more to fully apply the revolutionary line and policies formulated by Chairman Mao for international affairs. We should unite with the other socialist countries and the proletariat worldwide, with all peace-loving peoples and countries which oppose bullying, to resolutely fight imperialism and social-imperialism's policies of aggression and war." Mao's meeting with Nixon, then, is still within the context of an international policy which is essentially correct and profoundly different from that formulated two years later by Teng Hsiao-ping at the United Nations.

We believe that our "Open Letter" to the CPC, pub-

lished at the end of 1977, with which we broke relations with its present leadership, clearly showed that Mao's ideas on international policy, as contained in both his past works and the polemic he developed against Soviet revisionism, not only have nothing to do with the "Three Worlds" theory, but are its complete opposite. Furthermore, China's concrete foreign policy during the height of the Cultural Revolution, when Mao's instructions and guidance dominated it, is essentially correct and in full solidarity with the world's peoples and the Marxist-Leninists. In that document, after comparing both lines and showing how Teng Hsiao-ping's line is in essence the same as that of the Soviets, except with its own hegemonic ambitions, after abundant documentation, in summing up we indicate:

"In his works and in the writings of the polemic, Comrade Mao holds that: the imperialist colonial political rule continues under the form of neo-colonialism through its lackeys; that national liberation is achieved through the class struggle inside the country subjugated by imperialism, by a revolution against this imperialism and internal forces which support its rule; that this revolution of national liberation can be successful only if led by the proletariat, and not by the bourgeoisie; that no liberation can be achieved through simple measures of economic independence put forward by the bourgeoisie; that the motive force of history is the class struggle, expressed in our time by the people of the world led by the proletariat and their vanguard parties; that the proletariat in the advanced capitalist countries must defeat the local monopolist bourgeoisie to conquer power and build socialism, as well as to fight the superpowers; that 'the view which blots out the class content of the contradiction between the socialist and the imperialist camps and fails to see this contradiction as one between states under the dictatorship of the proletariat and states under the dictatorship of the monopoly capitalists' is unacceptable; that the existence of the socialist states has changed the character and the perspective of the national liberation movement, which under proletarian leadership marches towards socialism and not to capitalist 'development' under bourgeois dictatorship; that the socialist states must practice proletarian internationalism as the core of their foreign policy, and never subordinate it to peaceful coexistence, still less to chauvinism or hegemonism; that it is possible to prevent a new world war through the peoples' struggle and carrying revolution through to the end; that it is necessary to strongly fight both the American imperialist and the Soviet social-imperialist superpowers, opposing them with the united front of the people of the world led by the proletariat."

Teng Hsiao-ping, on the contrary, holds that "colonial political rule has basically disappeared and that there are only 'remnant' forms of colonialism; that it is possible to 'safeguard' and 'consolidate' the independence through some changes in the 'international economic relations'; that national liberation will be achieved through the actions of the countries of the 'third world', basically accepting as such the bourgeois governments, lackeys of imperialism and oppressors of the people; that these bourgeois forces which control the governments of the countries of the 'third world' are not only the leading force of national liberation but also the 'motive force propelling the wheel of world history'; that the proletariat of the capitalist advanced countries of the so-called 'second world' must ally with their own monopolist bourgeoisie and strengthen the military pacts and other instruments of the domination of U.S. imperialism and their own monopolist bourgeoisies, under the pretext that an attack from so-

cial-imperialism is 'imminent'; that the socialist camp does not exist and that China, despite being socialist, belongs to the 'third world', which is basically made up by countries subjected to colonial or neo-colonial rule under the U.S. or the social-imperialists; that the countries of the 'third world', 'like' China, can bring about economic development to end their 'situation of poverty and backwardness' without carrying out the national liberation revolution or the socialist revolution; that China's foreign policy is fundamentally one of peaceful coexistence and not a policy based on proletarian internationalism; that a Third World War is inevitable and imminent, and that the allies of the U.S. imperialism must improve their armaments, armies and military pacts to confront social-imperialism, and for this reason the brakes must be put on the class struggle."

This is a question, then, of two diametrically opposed lines, one guided by Marxism-Leninism and the other by revisionism. Mao, in his polemics against the Soviets, openly and publicly fought the same line now put forward by Teng. Mao Tsetung has never defended Teng Hsiao-ping's opportunist theses, neither publicly nor privately as far as we know. It seems to us totally unfounded to think, without the slightest evidence, that Mao would make a 180-degree turn in his international line in the last years of his life. Furthermore, it seems inconceivable to us that a proven and consistent Marxist like Mao Tsetung, without any personal ambition, would turn into a complete revisionist and a renegade to his own ideas and life. Even from a practical point of view it is unthinkable that Mao Tsetung would turn over nothing less than the task of formulating a complete change in his international line to Teng Hsiao-ping against whom he was to initiate a new struggle, for the purpose of unmasking and overthrowing him, during these same years (as actually happened), and about whom he had declared, "he makes no distinction between Marxism and imperialism: he represents the bourgeoisie."

The only logical hypothesis about what happened is that because he was in an absolute minority among the leadership and party cadres who had been infiltrated on a grand scale by the revisionists even though they didn't dare overthrow him because of his great influence among the masses (and were waiting for him to die so that they could take advantage of his prestige), Mao no longer had much influence in the leadership of the party and especially on its international policy. What is more, there are signs that a struggle was waged against Teng Hsiao-ping's ideas on international policy, although not publicly. After Mao's death the revisionist leaders themselves indicate, in an article in *Peking Review* #45, "In our own country there are persons who frantically oppose Chairman Mao's theory of the three worlds. They are none other than Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-chiao, Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan, or the 'gang of four'. Hoisting a most 'revolutionary' banner, they opposed China's effort to unite with all forces that can be united, and opposed our dealing blows at the most dangerous enemy. They vainly tried to sabotage the building of an international united front against hegemonism and disrupt China's anti-hegemonist struggle, doing Soviet social-imperialism a good turn." In this way they try not only to falsely attribute this revisionist theory to Mao Tsetung—which they never dared to do while he was alive—but also to spread the absurd idea that those who were recognized as Mao's closest collaborators in the Cultural Revolution and in his last struggle to overthrow Teng Hsiao-ping were, because they were against the "Three Worlds" theory, "against Mao" on such an important matter, and that Mao, on the other hand, was struggling to overthrow Teng Hsiao-ping, with

whom he "agreed" on international line despite having stated that he "makes no distinction between Marxism and imperialism." Obviously, this is the clumsiest of lies and an absurd supposition.

The clearest proof of Mao's reduced influence within the CPC "apparatus," despite his prestige among the masses, after the revisionist reinfiltration following the Lin Piao plot and the concessions that he was forced to make in this difficult situation, is that Teng Hsiao-ping, dismissed from office "unanimously" at Mao's insistence following the Tien An Men Square incident after a prolonged and patient campaign against the restatement of his reactionary views and his opposition to the gains of the Cultural Revolution, is returned to all his posts a few months after Mao's death, also unanimously (after the arrest of those who followed Mao).

## X. THE STRUGGLE BEGINS AGAIN

As he takes up the struggles that arise in the wake of the discovery of the Lin Piao plot, Mao's plan is perfectly consistent with what he had seen confirmed during the Cultural Revolution, which led him to put a halt to its deepening. The CPC on all levels can't be cleaned out and rebuilt because of the revisionist reinfiltration which followed the inevitable compromise meant to thwart Lin Piao's plot. In order to once again launch the struggle against the revisionists, Mao Tsetung focuses on China's internal problems, the clearest and most directly comprehensible for the masses of people. He begins to fight all Teng Hsiao-ping's efforts to put economism in command, over and above class struggle, and his systematic efforts to overturn the gains of the Cultural Revolution—as he has done on a grand scale since Mao's death—whether it be in education, the factories or the countryside. Step by step Mao works to create the consciousness to revitalize the mass mobilization. At the same time, summing up the experiences of the Cultural Revolution which had faced a serious obstacle in many middle-level cadres, and even among a certain section of the workers who were manipulated by them through economic incentives, he proposes to focus the new struggle not only on combating revisionist formulations, but also on the whole unequal social and economic base which the top revisionist leaders had used to influence a series of middle-level cadre and gain their support. The way to resolve the problem is to reinforce the dictatorship of the proletariat and through it eliminate step by step the remains of bourgeois right which served as the basis for the privileges that those cadre who opposed the masses were defending. The formulation he uses to initiate this struggle is perfectly clear in this respect, and it shows us, at the same time, the conclusions which he had arrived at regarding the obstacles the Cultural Revolution faced. "Why did Lenin speak of exercising dictatorship over the bourgeoisie? It is essential to get this question clear. Lack of clarity on this question will lead to revisionism. This should be made known to the whole nation." "Our country at present practises a commodity system, the wage system is unequal, too, as in the eight-grade wage scale, and so forth. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat such things can only be restricted." And he adds, indicating what he judges to be the soil which nourishes the high-ranking revisionist leaders, "Therefore, if people like Lin Piao come to power, it will be quite easy for them to rig up the capitalist system." Furthermore, he points out, "Lenin spoke of building a bourgeois state without capitalists to safeguard bourgeois right. We ourselves have built just such a state, not much different from the old society:

# Evaluation . . .

there are ranks and grades, eight grades of wages, distribution according to work, and exchange of equal values. What is different is that the system of ownership has changed." In the same way, he says, "Lenin said that 'small production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale.' They are also engendered among a part of the working class and of the Party membership. Both within the ranks of the proletariat and among the personnel of state and other organs there are people who take to the bourgeois style of life." Already at the First Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the CPC—systematizing the fundamental obstacle faced by the Cultural Revolution and the need to carry it out anyway—he indicates, "Apparently, we couldn't do without the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, for our base was not solid. From my observations, I am afraid that in a fairly large majority of factories—I don't mean all or the overwhelming majority—leadership was not in the hands of real Marxists and the masses of workers. Not that there were no good people in the leadership of the factories. There were. There were good people among the secretaries, deputy secretaries and members of Party committees and among the Party branch secretaries. But they followed that line of Liu Shao-chi's, just resorting to material incentive, putting profit in command, and instead of promoting proletarian politics, handing out bonuses, and so forth. But there are indeed bad people in the factories. This shows that the revolution is still unfinished." Lenin indicated a similar perspective when he declared in April 1918, "Yes, by overthrowing the landlords and bourgeoisie we cleared the way but we did not build the edifice of socialism. On the ground cleared of one bourgeois generation, new generations continually appear in history, as long as the ground gives rise to them, and it does give rise to any number of bourgeois. As for those who look at the victory over the capitalists in the way that the petty proprietors look at it—they grabbed, let me have a go too"—indeed, every one of them is the source of a new generation of bourgeois."

Through systematizing what had happened in the Soviet Union and other countries controlled by the revisionists as well as the events both during and after the hottest period of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Tsetung arrives at a clear understanding of the intentions of the arising new bureaucratic-state bourgeoisie and of the soil that feeds it, the survival of bourgeois right, which persists in the socialist period of transition to communism. During the 1964 Socialist Education Movement Mao had already pointed out, "Transformed or on the way to becoming transformed into bourgeois elements sucking the blood of the workers, how could these leading authorities taking the capitalist road understand the need for socialist revolution well enough? These people are the target of the struggle, the target of the revolution; it's impossible to rely on them in the Socialist Education Movement." And directly taking on Teng Hsiao-ping and his followers shortly before his death, he points out, "With the socialist revolution they themselves come under fire. At the time of the co-operative transformation of agriculture there were people in the Party who opposed it, and when it comes to criticizing bourgeois right, they resent it. You are making the socialist revolution, and yet don't know where the bourgeoisie is. *It is right in the Communist Party*—those in power taking the capitalist road. The capitalist roaders are still on the capitalist road." And on another occasion, he says, "After the

democratic revolution the workers and the poor and lower-middle peasants did not stand still, they want revolution. On the other hand, a number of Party members do not want to go forward; some have moved backward and opposed the revolution. Why? Because they have become high officials and want to protect the interests of high officials."

It's not necessary to demonstrate here that the line applied by Teng Hsiao-ping after his last rehabilitation is the complete antithesis of everything the Cultural Revolution was fought for. They've not only brought back material incentives, the old system of selection in the schools, putting production above class struggle, the establishment of the old system of management in the factories and repressive regulations, the consolidation of the differences in bourgeois right, but they've even given the capitalists back rights which were taken away from them even before the Cultural Revolution. The main revisionist ringleaders, among them Peng Chen (the first to be overthrown), Liu Shiao-chi's wife and many others, have been vindicated. Even Peng Teh-huai has been posthumously eulogized. An article criticizing one of Mao's closest collaborators, now in prison, goes so far as to call the previous period an "ideological fascist dictatorship" and calls for the reversal of the "wrong verdicts" by "a certain supreme leader." Thus, the continuing praise between clenched teeth for Mao Tsetung and taking advantage of his prestige to sell revisionism's rotten wares is no more than one more proof of Teng Hsiao-ping & Co.'s refined hypocrisy and cynicism. It also shows that his chauvinist, aggressive, hegemonistic and unprincipled international line through which they seek to transform China into an imperialist superpower is completely consistent with his internal line for capitalist restoration—fought by the Cultural Revolution under Mao's planning and direction. This confirms the complete antagonism between Teng Hsiao-ping's international line and Mao's objectives of opposing the restoration of capitalism in China through the Cultural Revolution and his subsequent struggle against Teng Hsiao-ping, and consequently, against all hegemonistic and chauvinistic designs for China, as Mao emphatically stressed.

## XI. CONCLUSIONS

We think that in the period since World War 2 the International Communist Movement faces a revisionist current which has both profound differences and common essential features, as a defender of the system of exploitation, with that of the time of the First and Second Internationals. Present-day revisionism not only objectively favors the domination of the traditional bourgeoisie, by holding the proletariat back from making revolution, but also itself aspires to become a new bureaucratic bourgeoisie through a state capitalist regime disguised as socialism. According to the circumstances, it pursues this course both in alliance with certain sectors of the bourgeoisie as well as in opposition to other sectors of the traditional bourgeoisie. This new revisionist current has been given a decisive impulse by the establishment of state-capitalist (and even imperialist, in the case of the USSR) regimes in countries where the proletariat had conquered state power. In this transformation of socialism into state capitalism, serious ideological errors—committed in socialist construction, in the role of the vanguard party and in the relation of the party to the proletariat and the masses of people in general—all have their effect.

We are convinced that the experience of the Cultural Revolution and the ideas and line of Mao Tsetung that in-

spired it, which represent both Marxism-Leninism's application to the reality of that country and its development, contain extremely valuable lessons for fighting the present revisionist trend and deeply analyzing the motive causes of capitalist restoration in a series of socialist countries, and preventing this from happening in the future. We think Mao's insistence on the importance of applying Marxism-Leninism and its universal principles to the concrete reality of each country, avoiding dogmatism, as well as revisionism and empiricism, is very important; we think his dialectical conception of the party and his method of distinguishing the character of contradictions within the party as well as his method of dealing with them, are very valuable; we consider extremely important his concept that, with the guidance of leaders who should facilitate this process and not "resolve" it in a paternalist way, all the members of the party should participate and get educated through their active participation in the struggle against the errors that arise in the party, helping to correct them, and against the anti-party factions, to eliminate them; we consider of greatest importance his idea of developing, the struggle among the masses of people, particularly the proletariat, under the ideological leadership of the party, in such a way that the masses themselves learn to identify and fight against their enemies, and free themselves from their influence; we consider of enormous importance his concept that the masses, under the leadership of the party, must more and more take in their own hands the affairs of state, defense, the economy, planning, their well being, the management of the enterprises, education, art, culture, and all spheres of society; we consider decisive in the transition from socialism to communism the importance Mao gave to the role of ideology and revolutionary consciousness, and measures to fight bureaucratization of the cadres and their separation and opposition to the masses, such as the need for the masses, especially the proletariat to have an important influence in building the party and in the correction of errors committed by its members; we consider decisive his conception of the necessity, under socialism, through strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat, to restrict the remains of bourgeois right that constitute a

soil nourishing the growth of new sections of bourgeoisie and revisionists, including in the communist party. Finally, we believe that in Mao's ideas and the practice of his life there are many other concepts of revolutionary importance, among them, most basically, his correct dialectical materialist treatment of problems. We are not saying that Mao invented all these formulations, though he made valuable contributions of his own, but without doubt, he carried their development and application to a higher level. This enabled him, in the very complex reality of China and leading a country of hundreds of millions of people and a party of tens of millions of members, to profoundly advance in socialist construction, ideologically and politically exposing modern revisionism on an international scale and combating it relentlessly in China for the almost 20 years since the restoration of capitalism in the USSR and other socialist countries. We believe that Mao, inevitably, as also happened with the other great Marxist leaders, committed errors in terms of concrete appraisals, but never deviated from Marxist-Leninist principles. And all Marxist-Leninists share the responsibility for the temporary defeat, in as much as we did not know how to discover and reveal the particularities of modern revisionism which took over in almost all the old communist parties. The CPC, because of the class composition it inherited from Chinese society and the other enormous objective difficulties for its ideological and material proletarianization, could not be an exception in this process that took place on a world scale. The ultra-reactionary politics of the present Chinese leadership are one example of the fierce enemies that Mao had to face until his death, which underlines even more his merits and his revolutionary courage.

We are certain that the protracted struggle unleashed by the Chinese Marxist-Leninists led by Mao against international revisionism and revisionism in their country is a seed that will bear fruit in the future, and the Chinese Marxist-Leninists will regroup and put themselves at the head of the proletariat and of the glorious and fighting people of that country and, inspired by the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and of Mao Tsetung, once and for all sweep away the revisionist garbage.

#### Correction

In the Oct.-Nov. 1979 issue of *Revolution*, one line is missing at the end of the first paragraph on page 38. The last four lines should read:

"country could only lead to directing the proletariat's struggle away from the revolutionary program of waging civil war against the bourgeoisie."

## Complete Sets of REVOLUTION Bound in Two Volumes

VOLUME 1: The Revolutionary Union to the Founding of the RCP USA, 1973-75

VOLUME 2: The RCP USA, 1975-78

—Deluxe Library Binding, Indexed—  
**\$100 per set**

**SPECIAL OFFER:** If you send us a complete set we will bind it for \$50.00. Inquire about the availability of back issues to complete your set

(VERY LIMITED QUANTITIES)

Please prepay all orders to: RCP Publications, P O. Box 3486, Merchandise Mart, Chicago, IL 60654. Include \$0.50 postage on all orders under \$10.00. Illinois residents add 5% sales tax.

