

A. Lozovsky's First Speech *

BEFORE every plenum, before every congress, we repeatedly consider Trade Union tactics and after heated discussions we work out a single line for the whole international Communist movement. Why do we bring so much passion to these discussions? Because we are deciding the question of the methods of winning the masses over to the cause of the revolution. Those disagreements which arise are not disagreements in principle: they are disagreements between people who think alike, who are struggling in a united front against the right-wingers, conciliators and Trotskyists; disagreements over one question—the organisation of the unorganised. Such disagreements are quite natural in practical work, and in considering our tactics we must not be perturbed by the circumstance that some right or left-wing wanderer seizes one or another of us by the tail of his coat and attempts to exploit an isolated phrase or proposal for his own purposes. Let the “friends of Communism” and the anti-Communist elements disturb themselves over our discussions of vital issues,—they will not make any capital out of our disagreements. By their anxiety they show that they are incapable of independently facing up to a single question.

Now I turn to the essence of the question confronting us.

WHAT IS NEW IN THE SITUATION.

From the contribution which comrade Piatnitzky made to our discussion it follows that there is nothing new in the situation, that it is quite sufficient to carry on what we have previously been doing, to carry out what we have previously decided, and everything will be well. I do not doubt that if we had carried out fully the decisions of the First Congress of the Comintern, we should have resolved all the difficulties, because the chief decision at that congress speaks of the necessity for an international republic of soviets. Then we would, of course, have had no difficulties and these burning disputes would not have arisen.

Well, and according to the way in which comrade Piatnitzky enunciated the situation, there is no new element, but we have congress decisions, we have extremely good instructions and resolutions,—occupy yourselves with carrying them out, and the deed is done. That is the chief defect of his contribution. Comrade Piatnitzky offers us pills to remedy an earthquake, and as is well known, pills are of very little help in such a situation. Undoubtedly we have some kind of new period in the development of the class struggle. We should not be properly carrying out our task as leaders of the Comintern and the Profintern if we did not see that some kind of new phase has occurred in the workers' movement, in the class-relationships in the capitalist world, and that we have to adapt our policy to this new movement. Only that can explain the tactics which we adopted at the fourth Profintern congress.

What is the new element and what are the reasons which have compelled us again to raise the problem of the leadership of the economic struggle. The new element arises from the fact that the several years of intense application of capitalist rationalisation and the resultant intensification of class antagonisms, has engendered in the working class sufficient antagonism to enable them to pass from defensive to offensive battles.

In those battles, whether they be of defensive or offensive character, the whole machinery of social-democracy and the reformist Trade Unions constitutes a strike-breakers' organisation. In order to obtain the maximum improvement of their situation, the working class must act against the strike-breaking machinery of the reformist T.U.s, which has grown stronger with the growth of capitalist rationalisation. It is this strike-breaking which has grown stronger as a result of the growth of capitalist rationalisation, that has confronted us with the problem of the new tactic. We put forward new tactics at the Fourth Congress of the Profintern. But does it follow from the situation as comrade Piatnitzky states it that it was necessary to propose

* Speech at the E.C.C.I. T.U. Commission, 28/2/29.

new tactics at that Congress? Yet there is no disputing the fact that we did propose and introduce new tactics. Was it not here, in this very hall, that we waged big discussions when preparing for the Ninth Plenum of the E.C.C.I.? And what were those discussions about? They circled around the fact that at that time we were aware of the new factor which had arisen in the workers' movement. We were groping for new tactics, for new methods of struggle; and at the Fourth Congress of the Profintern we applied the instructions of the E.C.C.I. Ninth Plenum, to struggle with all our powers to obtain an independent leadership of the economic struggle without and against the reformist unions. That is the new factor which we contributed at the Fourth Congress of the Profintern. Does that follow from what comrade Piatnitzky said? Not in the least: form your nuclei, win the factory committees, win the unions, he declared. We know all that. But if that was all that had to be done, why did the decisions of the Fourth Congress put the entire revolutionary T.U. movement in the centre of attention? Why did the Sixth Congress of the Comintern confirm our decisions? Evidently there was some new element in these decisions, and Piatnitzky does not see that, he does not see the political changes which have occurred, and he has proposed that we should continue what we have been doing. In that case there was no point in the congress assembling, there was no point in estimating the new element which has been introduced by capitalist rationalisation, and there is no point in talking of the decisions of the Fourth Congress of the Profintern.

But if comrade Piatnitzky stands by the point of view expressed in those decisions,—and he does stand by that point of view—it is quite incomprehensible why he does not take any step, or draw any conclusion from our decisions, why he gives no answer whatever to the problem of how further to direct the economic struggles. He has an answer: when you have won over all the workers in the factories everything will be fine. But we knew that even before the First Congress of the Comintern. And that is why I am not in the least satisfied with the answer which comrade Piatnitzky has vouchsafed.

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNORGANISED.

I was represented by comrade Piatnitzky as proposing that instead of work in the Trade Unions and the workshops we should set up some sort of mutual aid societies. He represented it thus: we wanted to organise the unorganised, but we didn't want to work in the enterprises! But what are the unorganised,—“lumpenproletariat”? Hence he confronted us with the dilemma: either work in the enterprises or organise the unorganised. He literally said that instead of work at the enterprises it was proposed to occupy ourselves with the organisation of the unorganised and the setting up of mutual aid societies. As though the unorganised did not work in the enterprises!

In order to map out sound tactics for the imminent gigantic economic battles, we must take into account something to which Piatnitzky pays no attention whatever, namely, that, as the result of capitalist rationalisation, unskilled workers are now playing a considerably larger part in production, and the overwhelming majority of these workers are unorganised. The question of the unorganised workers did not arise because we had invented it. Piatnitzky must admit that the problem of the unorganised was different in 1925 from the problem as it presented itself several years ago. Everyone of us knows why this problem occupied chief place in the consideration of the Comintern and the Profintern. Capitalist rationalisation has brought changes in the various strata of the working class, unskilled labour, women and youths have been drawn into production, and the overwhelming majority of these new strata are unskilled workers; just as they have an important part in production, so also are they important in both economic and the political battles. It is impossible to direct the economic battles at the present moment without pondering over the problem of how to draw the unorganised into the struggle, even where there is a relatively high percentage of organised.

I remind you of the very interesting discussions which took place in Jena in 1913 between Rosa Luxemburg, Scheidemann and Huysmans on the question of the rôle of the unorganised in the political and economic battles,—of what was to be done with the un-

organised, and how. Scheidemann and Huysmans held the view that an unorganised worker and a backward worker were synonymous. Rosa Luxemburg argued that the experience of strikes shows that the unorganised play a considerable rôle, and that such a contemptuous attitude indicated a failure to understand the rôle of the unorganised and a lack of desire to stand at the head of the masses and to lead them into battle.

That is how Rosa Luxemburg answered Scheidemann at that time. Was she right? Yes, she was right. If you take the problem of the unorganised at the present time, it is quite evident that the situation has changed and that the matter has gone considerably farther, because the process of capitalist rationalisation during the last few years has effected enormous changes in the structure of the working class, and this category of workers has begun to play a dominating rôle in the process of production.

Our discussions have been most intense chiefly around the question of Germany. But permit me to remind you that Germany is not the centre of the earth. We take certain other countries and we see there that the question of organising the unorganised has come up against colossal opposition. During the preliminary consideration of this problem, before the Ninth Plenum of the E.C.C.I., was not my proposal to organise the unorganised in America subjected to an attack? Wasn't I called a schismatic when I proposed that in America the unorganised should be organised into new unions? That was in this hall in January-February, 1928.

Comrade Piatnitzky: I spoke in dependence upon the conditions.

Comrade Lozovsky: That was at the beginning of 1928. We discussed the question of whether it was necessary to organise the unorganised into new unions in America, and the entire American delegation was resolutely against the proposal. On this question there was unity between the majority and the minority in their delegation. They argued furiously, they argued foaming at the mouth, they accused me of schism, they put forward a whole series of manifestoes, theses, and so on. But when we raised the question, the Comintern recognised that in America it was

necessary to enter upon the organisation of the unorganised, upon the creation of new unions, because the majority of the working class was unorganised, because in the main spheres of industry the workers were unorganised.

If we ignore America and take a number of the European countries, so far as it concerns countries with a split T.U. movement, the issue would appear to arouse no question. There would appear to be no doubt that in France, Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, and Jugo-Slavia, it is necessary to attempt to unite the unorganised around the revolutionary unions. But it is necessary to remember what colossal opposition we have had to endure in our parties even in these countries. And among the members of the Comintern and the Profintern views were expressed that the enrolment of new members and the consolidation of our ranks was in contradiction to the tasks of the unity of the T.U. movement, we overcame this with the greatest difficulty.

Now the issue would appear to be clear as it affects Czecho-Slovakia and France, *i.e.*, countries with a split T.U. movement. But if we take all the other countries, we find that the majority of the workers are unorganised. There are only a few countries in Europe where there is a more or less high percentage of organised workers.

I repeat that in regard to countries with a split T.U. movement there is no dispute between us. We all agree that in such countries it is necessary to organise the unorganised into the Red Unions.

But take the countries where the Union movement is not split. Comrade Piatnitzky outlined for us what, in his view, has to be done. First, it is necessary to work in the unions; secondly, it is necessary to work in the factory committees; thirdly, it is necessary to unite those who do not wish to join the unions in the International Workers' Relief and into the union of Red Front Fighters. That is fine. But what is to be done with all those who remain outside these organisations? Comrade Piatnitzky approached this question only from the organisational aspect, forgetting the political situation and giving an incomplete, unsatisfactory reply even from the organisational aspect.

The question is not as to whether we must continue the work in the unions, the factory committees, etc. Of course we must. If that is the only problem with which we are confronted we can cut the discussion short at once, for that issue was decided long ago. Neither is it the question of what we have to do in the T.U.s. That, too, is a question that was decided several years ago. Before us is the question of what to do with the unorganised, how are they to be united; but Comrade Piatnitzky, instead of answering what we are to do with the unorganised, whose specific importance is growing in the political and economic battles, gives us the address of certain organisations in the nature of the Red Front Fighters, or International Workers' Relief, and thinks that he has then solved the problem! Pardon me, but the problem is only just beginning at that stage.

TRADE UNION LEGALISM IN GERMANY.

In such countries as Germany we have now to start from two prerequisites which are very essential to our tactics. The first prerequisite consists in the circumstance that despite the decision of all the congresses, despite the decision of all the Comintern Plenums and the repeated indications of both Internationals, a considerable amount of fetishism exists in our ranks in regard to the Trade Unions. Legalism and constitutionalism still persist in regard to these organisations. "The Union has decided," "I hold a T.U. card,"—and the German Communist is immovable. This is most dangerous in regard to Communist tactics generally, but particularly so when we are adopting new tactics. This legalism, this vestige of bureaucratic psychology which exists in the working class, still has place even in our C.P.s and this is reflected most clearly in the right wing and the conciliators. It is also reflected in the everyday work of our party, where a considerable number of functionaries vote for the decisions of the Fourth Congress of the Profintern and the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, but in practice do not apply 10 per cent. of those decisions, because their legalism, the fear of the bureaucracy, outweighs the rest,—and this is most dangerous from the aspect of the conquests of the masses. The

fear of expulsion often determines the line of conduct of many Communists in Germany. What prevents our party from winning the masses? Only this one thing prevents it. And amongst the right-wing this legalism has now been formulated into a complete theory. What is the philosophy of the right-wingers? They say: "We know that the unions ought to direct the economic battles. As there are unions in Germany, they ought to direct these battles." But this is the purest metaphysics, because those unions which exist in Germany do not direct the struggle, but sabotage it. And here we have the manifestation of fetishism, the failure to understand that the reformist unions are fetters on the workers.

I ask, where is the most backward, the most reactionary part of the working class to-day? That part of the working class which is organised in the reformist unions and follows the reformist leadership is the most consciously reactionary part of the working class.* In the process of struggle we succeed in wresting a certain part of the workers away from Social-Democracy, but now, the workers following Social-Democracy are sabotaging the movement. From a number of examples we have had the experience of tens and hundreds of thousands of unorganised workers moving ahead of the workers organised in the reformist unions, who have been held back by the gigantic union machinery. Furthermore, the unorganised frequently move ahead of certain Communists, who are enchained by Social-Democratic ideology.

HOW SHALL WE FIGHT THE EXPULSIONS?

The second very essential prerequisite is that a split in the unions in Germany is approaching. To fail to see this is to commit a crime against the German proletariat. There are two ways out, two possibilities of avoiding a split: carry out the policy of the right-wing Communists, and then our adherents will not be expelled. If we submit to all the rules, they will not expel us. But if we carry out the line which we ought to carry out on the basis of the decision of the Profintern and Comintern, we shall be expelled not in dozens and hundreds, but in thousands and

* Concerning this formula, see Com. Lozovsky's second speech.

tens of thousands. We are moving towards this. Many Communists do not realise that we are moving towards this. They are so afraid of the possibilities of a split that they do not wish to think of this theme; they do not want to see the circumstance that the Social-Democrats will expel thousands of Communists and revolutionary workers. Of course the Social-Democrats will carry out these expulsions intelligently; they will exploit thousands of methods. But there are Communists who will then say: let the Communists be expelled in thousands, but the workers following us must remain in the reformist unions. If we consider the situation like that, we shall not see the majority of workers under our leadership.

We are confronted with the clear prospect of a split in Germany, and to do nothing to prepare our party, to prepare our ranks for the necessity of placing themselves at the head of parallel unions in the events of mass expulsions by the reformists would mean that we should be caught in confusion, and would be shattered for several years to come. And the views held by many comrades will not lighten our party's preparations for those battles, they will not help our party to survive the mass expulsions and splits and to retain its influence on the masses.

What must be done to ensure the retention and even extension of our influence among the masses during the intensification of the struggle against the bourgeoisie and the social democratic elements and reformists? In what direction must we travel, what tactic has to be adopted in Germany? In Germany we have only a kernel of organised Communists in the unions. Every Communist nucleus acts through one or another party organisation. But the T.U. organisations which are under our influence (the districts and local sections of the unions) have no inter-connection: they are connected politically, but not organisationally. In Germany we do not possess a broadly organised opposition inside the reformist unions. We have only organised party factions, which are interconnected by party discipline and party instructions. But those non-party workers inside the unions who follow us, who support our slogans and tactics, who vote for our candidates, and follow us in

the economic battles, are not organisationally connected with us or among themselves, and every blow at the C.P., every expulsion of Communists, organisationally severs the Communists from both this mass of workers organised in the unions and from those workers who are outside the unions, but who move with us politically.

The first step in Germany ought to be the organisation of a revolutionary opposition, the consolidation of all the opposition on the basis of local organisations: if we have twenty local sections behind us in the metal-workers' unions, thirty organisations in the chemical-workers' union, fifty organisations in the miners' union, etc., the first task is to organise these local organisations industry by industry on an all-German scale, to unite them in what form you like. But it must be done at once; it is our preliminary task.

When the opposition is organised and closely connected with its Communist vanguard, the expulsion of one or two thousand Communists will be considerably more difficult, for it will involve the expulsion of tens and hundreds of thousands of workers who follow us. And this is not done in Germany because one can hear such arguments as: "We shall begin to organise the opposition and we shall be expelled for doing so. Then a split is inevitable." If we approach the question from this angle we cannot stir a foot.

Before me is an article from *Vorwaerts*. "A revolutionary opposition against the Unions." In that article there is talk of the struggle against the Communists' new tactics for directing the economic struggles. On the basis of an analysis of the Social-Democratic press I assert that by raising the problem of independent direction of the economic battles we have struck Social-Democracy a deadly blow. And consequently they will attempt to hit back, to seize us by the throat. Here we must either retreat or advance further. That is why the problem of the unorganised is closely connected with our new tactic. If we wish to carry out an independent direction of the economic battles and to put forward our independent lists in the factories, we must be ready for mass expulsions and splits.

But how much time was absorbed in attempting to overcome the fear of the Ger-

man C.P. to putting forward independent lists! Do you think, comrade Piatnitzky, that we have now got over that fear? Not in the least. We have not got over it because the average German Communist officials who vote for the decision of the Fourth Congress of the Profintern, think to get out of revolutionary work by this vote, thus, when the question of work in the factories arises, or attempts are made to organise the unorganised against the Social-Democrats, they fail to take part in this. We have hundreds of examples. And you think that if we mobilise the entire party, so that every Communist should know now, by working through the unorganised, the entire reformist machinery can be beaten during elections or conflicts; this will be achieved without attempts on the part of the reformists to force a split? No. The line has to be continued for the independent leadership of the economic battles, or we must retreat. In the latter case all will be plain sailing, of course.

I maintain that what comrade Piatnitzky proposes will never get us forward. Of course there is nothing wrong in insisting that we have to win the factory committees, to work in the unions or subscribe to a hundred resolutions declaring that we ought to do this and that. That is not the question arising at the moment. No one ever denied all that. One has to be as brazenfaced as *Against the Current* to write that Lozovsky is proposing resignation from the unions. In my article printed in the *Communist International* I said that together with energetic work in the unions it is necessary to raise the question of what to do with the unorganised. But the right-wingers, wishing to draw a red herring across the trail, begin to clamour that I propose resignation from the unions. That is the purest bosh. I wish to give an answer to the question of how to organise the unorganised, and I want the comrades present at this session not to dodge that answer, for when comrades talk about International Workers' Relief that is no answer. They do not know what to do with the unorganised, and they give the address of the International Workers' Relief, but they themselves do not believe that this can provide anything actual in the sense of uniting the broad masses of unorganised workers.

THE UNORGANISED AND THE REFORMIST UNIONS IN GERMANY.

During the Ruhr conflict our comrades put forward the slogan: "Unorganised, join the reformist unions," as though the reformist unions were better than the Christian and the Hirsch-Duncker unions. I consider that that slogan is unsound. It is a distortion of our line, and yields nothing! it deludes the workers; it is a diversion instead of a way out. Take the Ruhr for instance. During the Ruhr conflict 213,000 workers were locked out, of whom 64,000 were organised and 149,000 were unorganised. When we reproach the reformist T.U. bureaucracy with carrying on negotiations behind the workers' backs, with organising strike-breaking, with demanding compulsory arbitration, and simultaneously tell the workers to join these unions, every unorganised worker must regard us as maniacs. When we have to lead an army into battle we must not disorganise it, but when, during a battle, we tell the workers to join the reformist unions, it is equivalent to disorganising our own ranks.

Then what is to be done? If we possess a mass movement, even in such a country as Germany, where there are tens and hundreds of thousands of organised workers, the task consists in maintaining our influence with them, not only during but after a strike. What happened in the Ruhr? There they acted in exactly the way comrade Piatnitzky proposed. He made his prophecies on the basis of the past, he expounded what our comrades in the Ruhr had done. In his opinion this is the ideal, and we get the result that, standing at the head of a mass movement, having got tens of thousands of unorganised workers to follow us, we obtained only 1,500 new members for the party. A splendid acquisition! We obtained 4,000 members in the International Workers' Relief,—also an acquisition; and what further? Where are the rest? Where have the other tens of thousands of workers disappeared to? According to Piatnitzky's theory they are not to be organised, because to organise them connotes occupying ourselves with the "organisation of the unorganised," "instead" of "working in the enterprises." Then what are we to do in regard to the unorganised? Shall we again wait two or three

years, until there is another strike or lockout, for them to follow us? Then, after a fresh conflict, lose them again for several years, and so on. This sort of thing is no use to us, it is holding back from an active policy, it is floating with the current.

ORGANISE THE OPPOSITION AND FORM
COMMITTEES FOR STRUGGLE.

When we work actively in the unions we win a certain amount of support, consequently we must take the following steps: first we must organise the opposition, *e.g.*, in the metal-workers' union, on an all-German scale; the same in regard to the miners and other industries. Thus we shall obtain a basis for resistance in every industry. Then we must take the next step and unite all the opposition in a single *bloc*.

Secondly: We must organise the tens and hundreds of thousands of unorganised workers; no economic conflict can be carried through successfully if we fail to mobilise and carry with us these unorganised workers. We shall try to organise them in associations more simple than are the trade unions. Here it is not the name that is important, but the fact that the Communists are uniting the unorganised and putting themselves at their head. I proposed to unite the unorganised in mutual aid societies in the case of a strike, or in societies for struggle against lockouts. You did not like the name. But why did you boggle at the name? The whole point of the matter is that under whatever name you like, under any trade mark you like, tens of thousands of unorganised should be organised. Either we direct them during economic battles or we are merely talking. I think our German comrades were not talking but genuinely worked with the unorganised. They received 1,500 workers into the party, 4,000 into the Workers' International Relief, and several thousands into the Red Front Fighters, but if as the result of an economic struggle they succeed in gaining another ten thousand, and unite them in order that henceforth they shall struggle in an organised way, that will be a gigantic step forward by comparison with the present situation. I ask you, which is better: to organise the unorganised in any society whatever under what name you

like, than not to organise them at all? I maintain that if you go to the average unorganised worker after a lockout, and say you have been thrown out of the factory, no one but we offered you any assistance, come and we'll organise some society, you will pay contributions and you will receive aid during conflicts, I think the unorganised will respond. If we organise a society for mutual aid during strikes, a society for struggle against lockout, we shall get those workers who were unorganised, and who will remain unorganised if we do not capture them.

But when this is proposed, you say: if you organise them you will have to leave the unions. Why? The unorganised workers must be organised in whatever way is possible. But you want to draw up an ideal plan for yourselves and receive all guarantees for the future. You say draw the unorganised into the reformist unions, put ourselves at the head of the unorganised, and conquer the Trade Unions. That is a scheme, an empty scheme, and nothing will come of it. We shall let another year go by, but sooner or later we shall have to occupy ourselves with this work if we wish to direct the T.U. movement.

Many comrades suffer from yet another doubt: what will come of all this! Possibly the result will be an independent union? Yes, possibly in the future an independent union will be the result, because in Germany, owing to the reformists, we are on the brink of a split; tens of thousands of workers will be thrown out of the unions by them.

Comrade Heller: According to your own argument, the unorganised are not all of them backward, but in certain instances they are the foremost of the workers. Why do you want to set up a primitive form for them?

Comrade Lozovsky: Among the unorganised there are both forward and backward elements. Inasmuch as we have the fact, which no one has refuted, that there is a change in the structure of the working class, that the unorganised are playing a big rôle during battles, and inasmuch as no one has shown that the tactics laid down by the Fourth Congress of the Profintern has given no results,—if all this is so, where have the tens of thousands of workers got to? If after the strike we had confronted these workers, who

had followed us, with the question of setting up an independent organisation,—let it be but a society for mutual aid—we should have had behind us part of the workers. But now, as a new struggle is beginning, we must win them again.

Are these tactics in contradiction with our tactics of winning the T.U.s? Not at all. There are evidently differences between us when we talk of the conquest of the unions. When I speak of conquering the unions I speak of the conquest of the majority of the workers; but certain comrades at the Fourth Congress of the Profintern spoke of the conquest of the reformist machinery, and there are still comrades who talk about the conquest of the reformist machinery.

Once we talk of the conquest of the majority of the workers, of the fact that the T.U. machinery is a strike-breaking machinery, it is quite evident that the further work for winning a majority of the workers in the unions, must be carried on energetically. But does this free us from other problems? The trouble is that many comrades think that in this way they settle everything. Work in the T.U.s is still not a complete answer to the question, it is only part of an answer to actual problems. The organisation of the unorganised is not solved by the slogan of winning the workers who enter the reformist unions.

My last point: From Piatnitzky's speech you got the following: look at France and Czecho-Slovakia, see the miserable state the work is in there. So don't create new unions! But is it any better in Germany? And if it is, why is it? You get to the conclusion that wherever there are revolutionary unions the situation is worse; and better where there are no revolutionary unions. That is where your argument leads you to. But in reality you have turned everything inside out. You did not put the question thus: where the party is weak, it is bad inside the reformist unions, and the revolutionary unions are bad also. Everything depends on the party, and not on the form of organisation, whether it is independent unions or opposition.

OUR INDEPENDENT LINE IN THE TRADE UNIONS AND FACTORIES.

Comrade Piatnitzky ended his speech by

suggesting that Lozovsky is proposing tactics through which work in the T.U.s and factories must be abandoned and the creation of new unions commenced. But that has nothing whatever in common with my proposal. I did not propose that we should renounce our work in the unions, but that we should increase it tenfold, should carry it on with still greater energy, at the same time giving an answer to the question of what we are to do with the unorganised. But you provide no answer to the question of what is to be done with those unorganised workers who march under our leadership. You will go on marking time for several months and then come to the same conclusion. There is no other way out. Our aim and task is to organise the unorganised by all means and with all resources, to place ourselves at their head, and to lead them into battle.

That is why it seems to me that comrades will do well not to paint terrifying pictures on the wall; also, instead of occupying themselves with inventing the idea that I want us to cease our work in the unions, should get my viewpoint well into their minds: Communists must work in the reformist unions, must work in the factories, must carry out independent tactics and simultaneously they must find an answer to the question of how to organise the unorganised. You have not given any answer; for the answer that the unorganised are to enter the reformist unions is no answer to the new problem. It is a repetition of the old slogan in a changed situation, and it will not withstand the least criticism.

A. LOZOVSKY'S SECOND SPEECH.*

Certain views put forward by Comrade Gusiev in the Trade Union Commission force us to concern ourselves seriously with several problems, even though the Comintern discussed them long ago. I will begin with the problem which determines all the rest: that of the tasks of the Trade Unions.

In his speech, Comrade Gusiev made statements along this line: the Red Unions are now set the task of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie; this is the task of the sec-

* Speech at the Second session of the E.C.C.I. T.U. Commission, 16th May, 1929.

tions of the Profintern. By this alteration the T.U.s are transformed into organs directing the mass political and economic offensives. In another part of his speech the speaker spoke with bitterness of the Red Unions being set the task of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie. Comrade Gusiev said all this with the special object of proving that I do not know either the ABC of Communism or the ABC of the T.U. movement, since I have given expression to such "heretical" ideas more than once in speeches and articles.

Hitherto we had thought that the revolutionary T.U.s were distinguished from the reformist unions by the fact that they did set themselves the task of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie, and that those unions which do not set themselves that task are reformist unions. So we had been taught hitherto, and until now this has been elementary to every Communist; we have been taught this during the whole ten years of the Communist International, and the Comintern taught it to the whole international workers' movement. And now, ignoring the decisions of all the congresses of the Communist International, ignoring the history of our party, ignoring the whole practice of the Comintern over long years of struggle, Comrade Gusiev declares that to set the T.U.s the task of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie is a deviation, is a retreat from the correct line. But with what then should the T.U.s concern themselves? With only the economic struggle? I maintain that that kind of formulation is a revision of the entire line of the Comintern, is a revision of Marxism, a revision of Leninism. I don't want to overburden the attention of the Commission by citing dozens of quotations from the decisions reached by congresses of our party; those decisions which were written on T.U. and on general issues by Lenin himself. But I cite only two quotations from the decisions of the Second and Fourth Congresses of the Comintern in order to show how muddled is Comrade Gusiev.

In the resolution of the Second Congress of the Comintern: "*The Trade Union movement, Factory Committees and the Third International*," par. 4, we read:

"Communists in all countries must join the unions in order to make them conscious organs

of the struggle to overthrow Capitalism and for Communism."

You see that from Gusiev's viewpoint the Second Congress of the Comintern formulates the tasks of the T.U.s unsoundly. But I must say that the Comintern remains stubborn in its "errors." In the decisions of the Fourth Congress of the Comintern we find the following "heretical" formulation:

"Trade Unions which do not set themselves general class tasks, *i.e.*, tasks directed to the annihilation of the capitalist system, are the best buttresses of the bourgeois order and bourgeois society, despite their proletarian composition."

THE ROLE OF THE TRADE UNIONS.

I could add considerably to the quotations and quote extracts from the decisions of the Fifth and Sixth Congresses of the Comintern, from all the plenums, and so on, but the foregoing are sufficient. If in the eleventh year of the Comintern, speeches are made which declare that the task of overthrowing the Bourgeois State is not that of the Trade Unions, the only explanation which I can find to it is that Comrade Gusiev wishes to discover some deviation, some syndicalism; or that someone is ostensibly usurping the functions of the Party. Comrade Gusiev ought to be awarded a prize for his invention. The Party and the Comintern are struggling for the leadership of all the mass organisations of the proletariat, the unions included. The T.U. is the gear for driving the non-party masses into the struggle against the power of the bourgeoisie. Why do we struggle for the leadership of the unions? In order to transform them into a weapon for the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie, *i.e.*, in order with their aid to realise the objects which the Comintern sets itself. Comrade Gusiev has openly maltreated the whole issue with the sole object of accusing me of some deviation or other. But even when setting yourself such a task, Comrade Gusiev, you need to be more cautious, you mustn't get confused over questions which have been settled for the whole international Communist movement. All this is as clear to a Communist as is twice two are four, yet Gusiev asserts that in my speech at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern on the question of the Programme of the Comin-

tern, I gave an unsound formulation of the question of the tasks of the T.U.s. My "unsound" formulation consisted in my confronting the Unions with the task of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie. The attempt to cover oneself behind the argument that something thrusts the Party into the back seat or mixes up the functions of the Party and the unions will not withstand the least criticism. In the eleventh year of the existence of the Comintern there is no point in repeating what is the ABC of Communism. And the primacy of the Party and its leadership of all organisations is an elemental truth for every Communist. When we say that the unions must set themselves the task of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie, we mean by that that it is a question of the revolutionary unions, and that only revolutionary Communist leadership can set itself such tasks. If the union does not set itself these tasks it is a reformist union, and consequently its leaders are reformists, not Communists.

The question of the place of the T.U.s in the class struggle of the proletariat is raised by this. It would have seemed that this question was clear to all Communists! But as Comrade Gusiev wishes to advance his doubts, or his errors, on this question, under the flag of the Comintern, it is necessary to speak of this matter. The starting point for us is the Party. On the eve of the October revolution, we had to settle, quite concretely, this question of the rôle of the unions in the general class struggle of the proletariat. Lenin said dozens of times at congresses, and not only T.U. congresses, but congresses of the Party also, that without the unions we could not have maintained the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, because the unions were the organisations which drew the non-party masses into the struggle and rendered the party's leadership of the working class, and the vast peasant masses, as a whole more easy. The Unions have their own specific tasks, of course, but the dispute between Reformism and Communism throughout the whole history of the international workers' movement, and long before the war, took the line of discussing the place which the Unions had to occupy in the general class struggle of the proletariat. On this issue there was a dispute between the

Radical wing of the old Social-Democracy and the professional union workers and those of the right-wing in the workers' movement. For we Communists there is not the least shadow of doubt that the party must lead, that it is the motive force, the inspiration, the leader of the masses, that the task of the Communist T.U. workers consists in bringing the Communist tactics, the Communist tasks to the non-party masses in a language which they understand, in expounding those same ideas and tasks in T.U. terminology, in popularising our Communist ideas, in drawing new sections and new members into the stream of the Communist movement in order to realise the tasks set by the Communist Parties and the Comintern.

THE REFORMIST AND THE REVOLUTIONARY UNIONS.

As Comrade Gusiev evidently set himself the task of inventing something new at all costs, he has made yet one other discovery. That discovery consists in suggesting that the reformist and revolutionary unions are one and the same. That is what he said in his speech. If the reformist and revolutionary unions represent one and the same thing, why raise a partition and why conquer the reformist unions? In order to prove his argument Gusiev said that the Czech revolutionary unions and the reformist unions represent one and the same thing and that there is the same situation in France.

I must declare myself in the most decided fashion against such a distortion of facts. In Czecho-Slovakia a certain section of the workers which came over to us from Social-Democracy has turned back to them. In France there have been instances in which the leading comrades carried on an unsound, opportunist line. But since when have we identified the leading elements with all the membership? Even if there have been a number of opportunist errors in France, even if a certain number of former leaders have abandoned the revolutionary tactics in Czecho-Slovakia, does it follow that the reformist and the revolutionary unions are one and the same? Are theories of this type really going to bring any advantage to the Communist International? For if we take Comrade Gusiev's point of view, we have to delete all

the decisions of the congresses of the Comintern. Comrade Gusiev has a very original outlook on revolutionary and reformist unions. When it is a question of the reformist unions he distinguishes between the upper ranks and the membership, but when he speaks of the revolutionary unions he does not draw any such distinction. He asserts that the entire revolutionary union is not distinguished from the reformist union. If we set ourselves the task of winning the majority of the members of the unions, if we want to lead the masses, if we want to direct the unions, if we set ourselves the task of overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie with the aid of the Trade Unions, how can we come to the T.U. Commission of the Executive Committee of the Communist International with that kind of declaration? I think it is dangerous to the highest degree. Why did Gusiev do it? In order to depreciate the revolutionary T.U. movement, in order to show that there is nothing outside the bounds of the reformist unions, and that that which does exist is in no way different from the reformist unions. He adopted all this in order to make unsound tactical proposals, which withstand criticism just as little as do his theoretical discoveries.

THE UNIONS AND THE STRIKE COMMITTEES.

In his speech, Comrade Gusiev raised the question of the relationships between the unions and the strike committees. He said that the unions are subsidiary organisations in relation to the committees of action. I ask first and foremost, what unions? The reformist unions? Obviously not. For in relation to the committees of action, which as you know, arise in revolutionary fashion, the reformist unions can fall into no kind of subsidiary situation whatever. That issue is settled not by theses but by the correlation of forces. So that evidently it is a question of the revolutionary unions, wherever we have such. Now listen to what we get as the result. We take on ourselves the initiative in setting up committees for struggle; then, having created committees for struggle, which in Comrade Gusiev's words are temporary, we subordinate the unions, which, also according to Gusiev, are permanent organisations, to these temporary organisations. What does

such a situation involve? It involves the revolutionary unions being thrust out of the field of struggle. When we formulated these same problems for the international conference on strike strategy, we pointed out that the revolutionary unions must prepare the conditions for the establishment of strike committees, must put their best and most active workers into them, must work in close contact with them, and so on. Why does Comrade Gusiev transform the unions into subsidiary, auxiliary organs?—he has not explained why. When he tries to give an explanation he relies on the argument that the unions organise only a part of the workers, whilst the committees for struggle organise all the workers. I should hardly have said that that explanation explains anything whatever. What are the committees of action that unite all the workers? If they unite all the workers of a certain factory or a certain area, does that mean that the revolutionary unions are to disappear or to be transformed into subsidiary organisations? All this is the purest of abstractions. Instead of a realist study of the economic battles, instead of an estimate of experience, both positive and negative, an abstract scheme is drawn up. All organisations are placed in a kind of table of precedent.

Instead of drawing lessons from the experience of the gigantic class struggle of the past year we are offered a scheme, and Comrade Gusiev thinks that the Comintern, instead of having a study of vital experience, can restrict itself to the creation of abstract, dead schemes. What is our main task when we set up committees of action? It is to transform these committees into genuine organs of struggle against the bourgeoisie and against the reformists. If the unions are in the hands of the reformists those committees for struggle are also organs for struggle against the reformist unions, for the latter act against strikes, sabotage them, and so on. But if there are revolutionary unions in the country, as there are in France, for instance, which prepare for the struggle, which do everything to ensure a successful consummation of the struggle, the committees of action, together with the revolutionary unions, have to carry out the tasks with which they are confronted. The committees, created with our aid and on

our initiative, must draw new sections of the workers into the revolutionary unions. The work and influence of the committees must be shown in a growth of the unions. For Comrade Gusiev himself says that the committees are temporary organisations, whereas the unions are permanent organisations. If the unions are permanent organisations and the committees merely temporary, then we get a table of precedent which you have established. We summon committees of action in order to draw all workers into the struggle, but we are interested in consolidating our influence, and that can be done only provided we reject such formulæ as Gusiev proposes. We need here not a table of precedent. From that aspect this abstraction would appear to elucidate something, but politically it gives us nothing whatever. (Gusiev: It is political, but you understand it bureaucratically.) Bureaucratism consists in constructing abstract schemes instead of vital life, and life rides roughshod over those schemes. I ask, is Comrade Gusiev's presentation of the issue a step forward? Does it help our Communist parties in the sense of defining the tasks, in the sense of eliminating a number of disputed and altogether insufficiently elucidated problems? Does it provide those parties and those Communists who have still only a small experience, with the possibility of exploiting international experience, exploiting the positive and negative sides of our struggle, and of applying it to this or that country? Obviously not.

TRADE UNION LEGALISM.

The next question is that of trade union legalism. Comrade Gusiev is against T.U. legalism. But what is T.U. legalism? Where does it begin and where end? How are we to struggle against it? All this comrade Gusiev leaves unexplained. I quote one passage from his speech concerning Czecho-Slovakia. When Hais organised the "putsch" in the I.W.F. the Czech comrades were confronted with the question of what to do in the matter. The machinery was in Hais's hands, the bourgeois law was on his side. Our comrades raised the question that if Hais, enjoying the support of the State, retained the I.W.F. for himself, we should have to create new unions, inasmuch as the great majority of

the workers were on our side. Comrade Gusiev was against this, he considered that it would be possible to knock Hais out of his position by exploiting the statutes, as though, in accomplishing his coup, Hais did not know that he was committing an anti-statutory act. Comrade Gusiev was against a revolutionary decision of the question. He was for subjection to Hais. This is what Gusiev said at the T.U. Commission:

"I regard the question of the unions thus: There is a certain fortress, we are inside that fortress, but inside that fortress there is also a redoubt, a last refuge, a tiny inner fort. And Hais has planted himself inside that fort. Our task consists in organising the worker masses to storm that fort. It appears on the basis of the constitution that this is possible. There is a clause which says that one-third of the membership of the union can demand the summoning of an extraordinary congress, and the administration is obliged to comply. Meantime, the overwhelming majority of the union membership is in our hands. We have only to call one-third, and within six weeks we can call a new congress. But certain ardent Czech comrades tell us: 'You want to remain in one union with Hais, with the same Hais who has captured the offices, the money and so on. That is capitulating to Hais.' But we answer: To remain in the fortress which we had occupied cannot in any sense be capitulation. To abandon it would be real capitulation."

This military analogy with redoubts reminds me of the gases which are employed in warfare in order to throw a smokescreen of invisibility over everything. If you translate all this into the simple Russian tongue, it means: "Hais has carried out a coup, but we shall rely on the statutes. He has taken possession of the fortress and is exploiting the fact that the Bourgeois State and law are on his side. We shall not call a congress of revolutionary unions in spite of and against Hais, for we shall carry on our 'siege' although the overwhelming majority of the workers are on our side." Isn't that trade union legalism? Weren't the "ardent Czech comrades" right when they declared that inasmuch as Hais had carried out a coup, and violated the basic principles of proletarian democracy, it was necessary to summon a congress against him.

and, if necessary, to change the name of the organisation, as Hais, operating through the police, wanted to keep the old name for himself and his officials. I have to add that the Comintern also accepted the viewpoint of these "ardent Czech comrades." In reality, what was the situation in Czecho-Slovakia? The overwhelming majority of the members of the unions were on our side, when Hais carried out a coup and seized the offices with the aid of the police. What were we to do? Wait until Hais was pleased to subject himself to the statutes? Isn't that T.U. legalism? Isn't that a failure to realise that we have to take into account not the statutes, not the legality, but that we have to apply revolutionary methods, as Bolsheviks do in such circumstances?

Our Czech comrades correctly pointed to the necessity of calling a congress of the I.W.F. against Hais as quickly as possible. We in the Comintern said to them: You wish to call a congress too quickly. Perhaps it would be better if you waited a month, in order to carry out preparatory work among the masses. Our comrades in Czecho-Slovakia did not entirely agree with this, but they carried out our advice. I allow of the possibility that we were not right, perhaps it was necessary to call a congress immediately. In any case one may dispute as to the expediency of calling that congress despite the constitution or the statutes within two weeks or a month, but there cannot be the slightest doubt that Gusiev's theory of the redoubt is a theory of passivity. That theory involves the recognition under any conditions of those who are at the head of the union, irrespective of the fact that the overwhelming majority of the members are on our side. I ask, what is the point now, in the eleventh year of the Comintern's existence, of inventing such a theory of "redoubts," a theory which ties our hands? Is it necessary to the International Communist movement? Not in the least. In practice that theory leads to capitulation. It is one of the innumerable abstractions unacceptable to the Comintern. Life forces us to take other roads. It forces us to break constitutions, to summon congresses against the will of the leaders. That is a matter of time, place, and circumstance. Consequently, any abstract

theory of that kind is dangerous, it confuses our party, it can only spread demoralisation among the ranks of the Communists.

THE QUESTION OF NEW UNIONS.

The next question to which I should like to draw your attention is that concerning the new unions. I have to enter into agreement with Comrade Gusiev on the issue of whether it is necessary to set up societies for mutual aid against lockouts, etc., in Germany. Let us grant that this is an error on my part, that it is not expedient to set up such societies in Germany at the present time. That is not a question of principle. On that question, as on all others, the final word belongs to the Comintern. It is the right of every one of us before the plenum to raise one problem or another, to consider them; the proposals may be accepted or rejected, but there is nothing special about all that. But what does Comrade Gusiev make of this issue? Instead of saying that it is inexpedient to set up this or that organisation in Germany, he pronounces himself altogether against any kind of new unions, formulating his argument thus: "In places there are also attempts to organise new unions." Thus he condemns any attempt to create new unions. But I must bring to the knowledge of the commission, and of Comrade Gusiev, the fact that not only are attempts being made, but in America new unions are already set up. I must further remark that this is in accordance with the decisions of the Ninth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. and the Fourth Congress of the Profintern. Are you against this or not? If you are against it, say so openly; if you are in favour, then say so openly, too. You have said that under certain conditions new unions may be set up even in Poland. On the question of new unions we need not general formulae, but we need definitely to say where, and what kind of unions are to be formed. To pronounce yourself altogether against new unions is to reject the decisions of the Ninth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. and the Fourth Congress of the Profintern. It means that you are declaring yourself against that which, in definite corresponding circumstances, it is expedient to do even in Poland, as well as in other countries. Your formula completely rejects the possibility

of setting up new unions. We may dispute whether to organise one or five unions, whether to organise them in this industry or that, or in Poland say. But we cannot now argue as to the principle; for we are not drawing up a "general" resolution with an unknown application. Our resolution has to be an instruction for the party. Can you go to our parties with that kind of general declaration? That would mean that we have to permit something which we have already done, as in the United States. Grant that little has been done, but that little is done on the decisions of the Comintern and the Profintern. We know that both the minority and the majority of the American C.P. declared themselves against the creation of new unions, but afterwards they had to admit the soundness of our position. Something real is expected of the T.U. Commission, not merely a general formula, but a practical answer to the question of what has to be done. It is necessary to point out the definite road and the best methods of putting our decisions into force.

ORGANISING THE UNORGANISED NOT ONLY A GERMAN QUESTION.

Further, on the organisation of the unorganised. On this issue Comrade Gusiev reproaches Merker, Hay, Heckert, and of course myself. What is the issue here? If we put the issue as Comrade Gusiev does, it will be an answer only for Germany, as Comrade Vasiliev rightly remarked. But the problem of organising the unorganised is not merely a German question. We are confronted with the gigantic world problem of organising the unorganised. There are countries with an illegal T.U. movement, there are countries with a split T.U. movement, and the Comintern will not start from the aspect of what happened in the Ruhr in resolving the problem of organising the unorganised for the whole world. Germany is of great importance; but on this problem one has to take the country into account, as well as the situation, the state of the T.U. movement, the extent of our influence, the number of organised, and so on. In regard to France, to Poland, the Balkan countries, Japan and Latin America, you cannot resolve this problem as you resolve it for Germany. I ask you, can we settle such a

world question just according to the German pattern, instead of studying experience, exploiting experience, and applying our own experience in accordance with the special conditions of each country? Obviously not! For if it is true that in many strikes the unorganised are no less active than the organised, and in certain cases even more active, it is also true that this problem is not only a German problem, and the larger the number of unorganised in any country the more vital this problem becomes for us. Can we crop them all with the same clippers? Let us grant that on this question, as it affects Germany, Lozovsky put forward an unsound proposal. Can we therefore draw the deduction that this problem does not exist on a world scale? Yet that is what Comrade Gusiev did. This question is actual and vital to the highest degree; all our parties are awaiting an answer. They want to know what to do, and how to do it; and all the new elements which we can contribute; the smallest grain of experience in this regard, is of enormous importance. Grant that on certain questions we are feeling our way; grant that in this regard we even make certain mistakes; an answer has to be given.

In connection with this I should like to touch upon yet one other question arising out of the relationships between the organised and the unorganised in the forthcoming struggles. In Comrade Gusiev's speech there is the sound statement that in a number of instances the unorganised were extremely active, and part of them have been ever more active than members of the revolutionary unions. Is it necessary to draw any conclusions from this? It seems to me that it is. How do you explain the fact that the organised, especially in the reformist unions, are less active than the unorganised? First and foremost it is explained by the gigantic pressure of the reformist organisations. The gigantic machinery of the unions sabotages, disorganises, demoralises the workers. The trade union and Social-Democratic organisations, and their press, act on the workers in the sense of propagating a renunciation of struggle, they enlarge the difficulties; stimulate in the workers distrust of their own strength; they adopt measures against the active elements, and generally transform the workers organised under their

control, into a brake upon the whole movement.

The second cause of the increased activity of the unorganised consists in the fact that there has been a change in the relationships of the various categories of workers in production. An enormous number of untrained and half-trained workers have been drawn into industry, and in the majority of cases these are unorganised. Capitalist rationalisation is establishing an objective situation favourable for their revolutionary development. The organised workers are in the great majority of cases skilled workers. They have a higher standard of existence, won over the course of a number of years. Thus what is the result? The skilled workers have won definite conditions of labour; the unskilled, unorganised workers, owing to capitalist rationalisation, find themselves under the gigantic pressure, and it is natural that they should reveal greater activity than the skilled workers who have passed through the reformist school. These conditions create the situation in which the section of the workers organised in the reformist unions are a brake upon further moves forward. In discussing this question, at one of the sessions I gave utterance to an assumption which may evoke a number of misunderstandings. I say, and I am not in the least afraid of saying openly, that on this question I gave an incorrect formulation, and that incorrect formulation has to be amended. I could only wish that Comrade Gusiev would do the same in regard to all the points in his speech to which I have referred. In my speech at the Commission on 28th February, there is the following passage:

"I ask, where is the most backward, the most reactionary part of the working class today? That part of the working class which is organised in the reformist unions and follows the reformist leadership is the most consciously reactionary part of the working class. In the process of struggle we succeed in wresting a certain part of the workers away from Social-Democracy, but now the workers following Social-Democracy are sabotaging the movement."

How much is there that is unsound and how much that is sound in this statement? The soundness consists in the statement that the

brake to the movement is Social-Democracy, that the section of the workers organised in the reformist unions lags behind the unorganised and lags behind because the organisation is in the hands of the reformists. The unsound part of the statement consists in the fact that such a formulation may give the impression that all the workers in the reformist unions are reactionary. I did not mean to imply that all the workers in the reformist unions are reactionary, and I did not think of saying that.

ARE THE UNIONS A DRAG ON THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT.

In Comrade Gusiev's speech is the following phrase: "According to Lozovsky the unions are now negative elements in the workers' movement." Which unions? If it is the reformist unions that are in question, I am convinced of the truth of that. I ask you: Is the American Federation of Labour a plus or a minus to the American workers' movement? (Gusiev: Both a plus and a minus!) Do us the favour of saying wherein it is a plus. You must add that the reformist unions of Germany are a plus to the development of the revolution in Germany. The history of the last ten years has demonstrated the contrary. You must add that the P.S.P. unions are a plus in Poland. I think the comrades do not fully realise all the importance of this question. With the growth of economic battles at the present time it is more advantageous to have to deal with a less organised section of the workers than with the more organised section, in so far as that organised section is under the influence of the reformists. If on the eve of 1917 there had been Menshevik unions, do you think it would have been easy to accomplish the revolution? Our plus was the fact that the overwhelming majority of the workers was not organised in reformist unions. We created unions in the process of the struggle and in the process of the revolution, and consequently they have quite a different appearance from the unions in the old capitalist countries. The minus in the German revolution was the fact that when that revolution broke out in 1918 there were a strong Social-Democracy and strong reformist unions there, which not only restrained the

development of the revolution but even sabotaged, undermined, the revolutionary movement and turned it into the channel of bourgeois democracy. This is why one has to approach the reformist unions, the P.S.P., the Christian-Democratic, the Hirsch-Dunker, the Christian and the rest, not from the abstract, not from the aspect of unions in general, but from the aspect of what they really represent at the present time. If we approach the problem from this aspect we have much to think about. The moment has arrived when it is necessary to define the formula of the conquest of the unions. There was a time when this formula would appear to have aroused no doubts whatever. But I maintain that so much material and so much disagreement has accumulated around the question of winning the unions that it is necessary to consider exactly what it means. What is the essence of T.U. legalism, which has found its clearest expression in the views of the right-wing in Germany? It is, that by the conquest of the unions, they mean the conquest of the union machinery, whereas we have always understood it to mean the conquest of the union members. Consequently, a clarification of the formula along this line can bring only advantage, and in this regard I am in agreement with Comrade Gusiev's further formula, because it says more exactly what has to be done and how it is to be done. (Moirov: But how can it without the machinery?) The conquest of the reformist unions is impossible, because the controllers of the machinery are reformists. We can dismiss the reformists from their positions; we can, if we have sufficient power, replace the reformists with Communists. But that is not conquering the machinery, that is knocking out the reformist operators of the machinery.

THE POSSIBILITIES OF CAPTURING THE REFORMIST UNIONS.

What are the possible limits to our conquest of the separate reformist unions? I think that in Gusiev's speech those limits are considerably overestimated. Experience has shown that where we win the majority of the workers the Social-Democratic officials drive out that majority, on the basis that the workers are in the union for the benefit of the reformist

bureaucrats, and not that the bureaucrats are there for the benefit of the workers. If we want to have a perfectly sound estimate of the direction in which the development of our unions will proceed, and of the further struggle with the reformist bureaucracy, we have to say: In those countries where the T.U. movement is still compact, where there are still considerable masses in the unions, a growth of our influence in the unions, and the consequent intensification of the struggle between us and the reformists will lead to a split, for the reformists do not intend to allow us to master the unions by democratic means. On this theme Comrade Gusiev has made very exhaustive statements. He reproached me for expressing the view that a split is near, even in those countries where it does not exist at all at the moment. He considered my assertion inaccurate, but he thinks so only because he takes no account of the facts. All the time he bases his views on Germany, he sees only one union and one area, he does not see or want to take into account what is happening in other countries. Is it true or not that during the last few months more than 2,000 selected persons have been expelled in Germany? What is the meaning of this? They are not expelling tens of thousands of workers, but they are expelling those the workers trust. As soon as a Communist is elected he is expelled. If a whole administration is conquered it is superseded by a commissary. We must decide the question of how we are going to support our comrades when elected. Shall we insist upon them remaining in office or shall we capitulate? If we stand by them, and if the masses support the expelled Communist, the reformists will not hesitate to expel a complete local organisation. Is that not a split, in your opinion? Are not those the splitting tactics which are now being applied to the water-workers by the reformists in Germany? Do not the events in Scotland show splitting tactics on the part of the reformists? Haven't the reformists split the Garment Workers' Union in Britain because the London section of that union engaged in and won a strike? If we want to struggle against expulsions and not surrender our positions we must carry the fight through to the end. I think our comrades in the Ruhr did

not act correctly in the question of the expulsion of the miners' union. They were late in their action. But in Berlin the water-workers' union took up a correct position. It is true that in the Ruhr also, our comrades recovered later, but all the same they let time go by. With the intensification of the struggle that situation will grow more frequent, not through any fault of ours, but it will grow more frequent. Failure to see that involves closing one's eyes and comforting oneself with illusions.

Further in his speech, Comrade Gusiev, not noticing the importance of the existing economic struggles, says: "Lozovsky does not see the new factor, namely, that economic battles are political battles, and that in the committees for struggle we have organisations of a new type, which unite the economic struggle and the political." This new factor which, ostensibly, I do not see, was expounded by me in those theses on strike strategy which were adopted at the Strasburg conference several months ago. It was expounded by me in a whole series of articles, and Comrade Gusiev knows that. For there are printed documents, and there is no point in attempting to maintain the assertion that I do not

understand the link between the economic and the political battles.

THE THESES FOR THE TENTH PLENUM.

Finally, the last question concerns the nature of the theses which we should prepare for the Tenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

The Theses of the Tenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. must deal with the problem of trade union tactics as they affect the most important countries. They must draw the lessons of our experiences during the struggles of the past few months. The resolution which we drew up for the International Conference on Strike Strategy, assembled all the experiences of the international strike movement, and should be adopted by the Plenum.

We do not need to deal with problems which were settled ten years ago, such as the rôle of the unions in the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. That is not the problem which interests the International Communist Movement at the moment.

The task of the theses relating to the second item on the agenda: "On Economic Struggles," is to analyse our past experiences and guide all parties on the basis of those experiences. The theses must be definite, and they must be international in application.