

Question of the day

QUESTION—*The New York Post* claimed in an editorial on Nov. 29 that there is a "huge gulf between the Republican Formosa-Firsters and the Administration" on foreign policy. Is this true?

ANSWER—The gulf is about as huge as a bathtub.

This is what the GOP so-called Formosa-Firsters say themselves, now that the loud talk of the election campaign is over. On Nov. 29 Sen. Wherry of Nebraska said: "There is no room for partisan politics in this critical international situation." Sen. Wiley of Wisconsin said on the same day: "Little things must be forgotten in order to meet the challenge of the hour."

The "huge gulf" is seen to consist of nothing more than "little things" and "partisan politics."

Every essential element of U. S. foreign policy is supported by both capitalist parties. The N. Y. Times reminded its readers of this right after the GOP election victory and pointed out that Truman's



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policy had originally been adopted by the Republican 80th Congress.

What difference is there between Truman's Formosa policy and that of the Republican Formosa-Firsters? The Formosa-Firsters clamor for open outright seizure of Formosa by the U. S. Truman is for "neutralizing" Formosa. Either way the U. S. 7th Fleet and 13th Air Force is in Formosa and the U. S. Government is preventing by armed force the return of Formosa to its motherland, China.

The objectives of Truman and the GOP on grabbing Formosa are the same, their methods slightly different. The approach of the GOP is to steal Formosa outright while Truman thinks that too crude and favors the more subtle swindle approach.

How tiny the "huge gulf" really is, is shown by the relationship between Truman and the arch Formosa-Firsters of them all—Gen. MacArthur. James Reston, chief N. Y. Times diplomatic writer, said on Nov. 29 that "in the dispute between the cautious policy (with respect to the U. S. Army advance toward the Manchurian border) proposed by the British and French and the bold policy sponsored by Gen. MacArthur, the President backed MacArthur nearly every time . . . the Administration's decision (was) to back the MacArthur strategy and to ignore the warnings of influential UN members . . . he feared a break with his Korean commander."

The "huge gulf" seems to be between the facts and the N. Y. Post.

The difference between Truman and MacArthur in the Far East could be described as follows: MacArthur is in the driver's seat of a car speeding at 100 miles an hour. Truman sits alongside and orders MacArthur to slow down—to 95 miles an hour.

There are differences in the war camp both inside the United States and between the US government and its European imperialist allies, but they are not of a fundamental character. Nevertheless they are of great importance for the peace movement.

These intra- and inter-imperialist differences have to do with the speed of war preparations, comparative readiness to unleash war, desire to safeguard imperialist investments such as the British in Hong Kong which leads them to have a somewhat different approach to China than the U. S. government, etc. These contradictions are all based on imperialist self-interest, are temporary, vacillating and will always be resolved in favor of imperialism, unless there is a strong and powerful peace movement which can take advantage of them.

The way to do that today is to give a new powerful impetus to the movement for an end to the war in Korea, the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the negotiation of a peaceful settlement by the UN in which People's China must take its rightful seat, and the banning of the A-bomb.

(Readers are urged to send questions to John Gates, 35 E. 12th St., New York 3, N. Y.)