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MARX'S DEBT TO HEGEL Pages of Agelow Plutings The topic for today, Marx's Debt to Hegel/ neither merely academic, now pertagent only to the historical period of Marx's lifetime.

From Africs to Hungary the struggle for freedom has transformed reality and pulled Hegelian dialectics out of academic halls and fully history books to the living stage of history.

It is true that this transformation of Hegel into a contemporary has been via Marx. But one needs only look at Russian Communism's attack on transformation" Hegel to see that they are perverting Marx and, above all, fighting tax to suppress the struggles of freedom against their state capitalist rule. It is because they recognize the so-called mystical Absolute, "the negation of the negation", as the revolution against themselves, that Hegel remains so alive and worrisome to the Russian rulers today. Ever since Zhdanov in 1947 demanded that the Russian philosophers find "a new dislectical law" that of "criticism and self-criticism" to replace the Hegelian law of contradiction, and through the 21st Congress of the Russian Communist Party where Khfushchev was declared "the true humanist", the attack on both Marx(and his maclear indebtedness to Hegel) and Hegel as the alleged mystic has been continuous. One thing these intellectual bureaucrats sense correctly --HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF THE ABSOLUTE AND THE INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM ARE NOT AS FAR APART AS WOULD SEEM ON THE SURFACE. The Ideal and the Real are never far spart.

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It is this which Mapx gained are from Hegel. It is this which resolutions the young Marx, once he broke from bourgeois society, to break also with the vulgar communists of his day who thought that one negation—the abolition of private property—would spell out a new society. He insisted—and this again is central to Hegel's philosophy—that the alienation of man does not end with abolition of private property unless what is most alien of all—the later of man as an appendage to a mechine—is abrogated, and the place of the motive force of calitalist society—extraction of surplus value—11 present the full and freedevelopment of the individual." It is this which rasbled

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The pluri-dimensional in Hegel, his presupposition of the infinite capacities of man to grasp through to the "Absolute" not as something isolated in heaven, but as a dimension of the human being tirental man that the standard that the same that the same tradition both of those who preceded him and those who followed, excetally karry. To my mind, it is wrong, however, to consider Herel's Absolute as a rentatement, enriched it is true, but a restatement nevertheless of Aristotle's Absolutes. Absolutes.

Because Aristotle lived in a society based on slavery, his Absolutes had to be that of "Fure Form" -- mind of man would meet mind of god and contemplate how wondrous things are.

On the other hand, because Herel's Absolutes emerged out of the French Revolution which but an end to serfdom, the Bondsman, as Hegel put it, "gaining a mind of his own", Hegel's Absolutes breathed the saithly sir of freedom. Even when Harrark Rest one read Absolute Mind as God, no one can escape the earthy quality of the unity of theory and practice and grasp through to the Absolute Reality as man's attainment of total freedom, inner and outer.

Freedom is something one gets by overcoming bondage and the process of acquiring freedom man gets to know all his true potentialities. Freedom is not only his point of departure in temporal history. It is his point of return in "Spirit".

This is what makes him so contemporary. This is the link not only with Merstreinskanskanskanskans but our day.

The collapse of the Socialist International at the time of the outthe collapse of the Socialist International at the time of the outbreak of World War I when he returned to the philosophic foundations of Marxism in Hegel, the revolutionary element of the dislectic of Marxism in Hegel, the revolutionary element of the dislectic was not superimposed upon Hegel by Marx; it is in Hegel himself.

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There are academicians who likewise consider Marx so strange a progeny that, where they do not deny indebtedness of Marx to Hegel, do most emphatically stress perversion to the point of non-recognition. Whether the shock of recognition will come upon us at the end of this telk regains to be seen, but it is clearly discernible in Marx.

There are two stages of absorbing and transcending Hegel in Marx's intellentual development. The first is when he breaks with the Young Hegelians and the Hegelian Early was in the period also when he wrote of dehumenizing the ides. It was in the period also when he wrote both his Criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right and the Critique of the Hegelian Dislectic. In the first Essay, in stating that Man makes religion; religion does not make man... Man is no abstract being, squatting outside the world, he discovers his materialist outlook; It is not the concci usness of man that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their existence.", but that that is no confining wall to the "subject" striving to remake the world can be seen from his own answer as to why did he Marx, become a radical. "To be a radical," wrote Marx, "is to grasp the matter by its rect. Now the root of mankind is man."

Ideas do not float somewhere between heaven and earth outside of the brain in the head of the body of man living in a certain environment and at a specific historic period. Indeed Hegel himself would be incomprehensible if we did not keep in front of our minds the historic period in which he lived—that of therrench Revolution and Napoleon. It is this self-movement fo men making their own history that gives the drive to the Hegelian dialectic.

It is true that Hegel himself treated objective history as if that were the development of some world-spirit, and treated self-development of mind as if the head could indeed be disjointed from the ment of mind as if the head could indeed be disjointed from the body, but the greater truth is that he had his pulse on human history both present and past and indeed this bond of continuity of present and past, in which you also see the attraction exercised by the future on the present, is the mainspring of the dialectic. As your J. Bailie has put it: when he introduced the PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND:

MIND:
"Movements of human history which have marked epochs in the development of the human race are treated as typical or permanent embodiments of attitudes of mind...(it is) the life history of the human spirit."

It is this great work of Hegel--which remains a landmark in all human thoughout for any and every age, ours especially--that Marx underbook to analyse to settle his debt to Hegel. Marx was not one to forget his intellectual debts either to classical political economy or philosophy, especially the latter, without which as his closest collaborator, Friedrich Engels puts it, "there would have been no scientific socialism."

Marx's Critique of Hcgel is at the same time the greatest tribute to that most encyclopeedic mind of Europe and a critique of the most serious of the materialist critics of Hegel: Feuerbach who had regarded "the negation of the negation only as the contradiction of philosophy with itself." Marx, on the other hand, shows that principle to be the expression of the movement of history itselfs albeit in abstract form, and proposes "to explain the critical form of this movement which is still uncritical in Hegel." First, and most importantly, says Marx, to the extent that the PHENOMENOLOGY holds fast to the alienation of Man

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It is true that Regel worked out all the contradictions in thought alone while in life all contradictions remained, multiplied, intensified the state of the contradictions and plagued society and its thinkers, who, in the view of Marx, only became "prize-fighters" for capitalist ideology. But, first, Marx did not separate ideology and economics as if the latter were the any fundamental and the former mere "show". Marx's contention is that they are both as real as life--throughout CAPITAL, as we shall show in a moment, Marx's castigates the "fetishism of commodities" not because these relations of production appear as mere "things", but because that is what indeed they are; so preverse are human relations under capitalismthat.

Machine is master of man; not man of machine.

Marx's main point was that the driving force of the dislectic was man himself; not just his thought, but the whole of man, and that, whereas the capitalist and bourged ideologists, because of their place in production which makes them defend the status quo, have a false ideology, the proletariat because of his place in production, is the "negative principle" driving to resolution of contradictions, is, as Lukacs put it, "both subject and object of its proper knowledge. The unity of theory; and 'praxis' is then only the other face of the historical/situation which makes self-knowledge and knowledge coincide."

In a word, if we are to return to "pure" philosophic language, sans the class atruggle reality, Marx accused Hegel for not having truly surmounted the duality of thought and being, of theory and practice, of subject and object; of having remained a prisoner of Kant on this decisive point and that his dialectic was thus simple appearance, pure phenomenoly that had not gone to the actual, interior dialectic of the historic process, and that he, Marx, was carrying to its concrete, actual meaning the Hegelian conception of a spirit-phenomenon.

Mark did not know the young Hegel. belowerhearheartered to whom the second discoveries have uncovered Hegel's First System and, in seeing Hegel bn his First System before be escaped to his ivory tower, we can see that Hegel's description of industrial labor is indeed reminiscent of Mark. It is Hegel, not Mark, who wrote:

"The more "chanized labor becomes, the less value it has and the more the individual must toil....The value of labor decreases in the same proportion as the productivity of labor increases...The faculties of the individual are infinitely restricted and the consciousness of the factory worker is degraded to the lowest level of dullness." Hegel could not see the positive in that negative—that the very deprivation of his human senses would drive the degraded labor "to seek universality"—and abandoned his First System. I myself think there is no more dramatic moment in intellectual history than that where the young Hegel, having described the phenomenon of alienated labor under capitalism, turned away from it never to return to it in this form.

It is this which Marx saved and developed -- and the actual proletarian revolutions which were not characteristic of Hegel's time but were of Marx's helped him see where that other genius could not see if even he had not compromised with Prussianism. null becomes as an example of the same and the same a

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It is here that we come to the second stage of/indebtedness
to Hegel, which he didn't get a chance "to write out" as he did
his Early Philosophic Essay but which he did realize in that creative
act of theory, CAPITAL.

HEGEL'S AND MARX'S"ABSOLUTES"

On the face of it it would seem that no greater contrast, indeed absolute opposition, exists than that between Marx's CAPITAL and Hegel's PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, and yet it has been rightly stated that CAPITAL is a concrete Phen., that is to say, an analysis of that CAPITAL is a concrete phen., that is to say, an analysis of a specific historic period, that of capitalism, with its notions.

Marx had finished, or rather broken off his Gritique of the Hegelian Dialectic, just as he reached the absolute Idea, Absolute Mind. Although Marxists swear by "the dialectic" as method, they mean a tool to be used -- and I might add abused -- and not as a philosophic perpective based on the unity of theory and practice.

"It is not so much <u>from as through</u> slavery," wrote Hegel in his History of Philosophy, that "man acquired freedom."

It is true that Hegel himself threw a mystical veil over his philosophy by treating it as a closed onotological system. But freedomnization and anterpresentation of the separated himself completely from those to whom the road to the Absolute was pure intuition or belief, as with Jacobi, or like "a shot out of a pistol", a bare unity of subject and object as with Schelling as this by a parameter of the separated by Profes Bettle of Loeds University. This by a parameter of the second object is the prince of being the second object.

Indeed it would be a complete migresding of Hegel's philosophy were we to think that his Absolute is either a mere reflection of the separation between the philosopher and the world of material production or or that his Absolute is the empty absolute of intuitivists from Fichte to Schelling, whose type of abstracted, as Prof. Baille of this University has so brilliantly out it, "possessed objectivity at the price of being inarticulate."

Whether, as with Hegel, Christianity is taken as the point of departure, or whether --as with Marx --the point of departure is the material condition for freedom created by the Industrial Rebolution, the essential element is this; man has to fight to gain freedom; thereby is revealed "the negative character" of modern society. Now the principle of negativity was not Marx's discovery-be merely named it: the living worker --the discovery of the principle was Hegel's.

Mark's re-discovery of the Absolute came out of the concrete development of capitalism itself which solit the Absolute into two:

(1) Mist Mark called the general absolute law of capitalist development, the unemployed army.

That was the negative feature of capitalism that would cause its collapse.

(2) But Mark saw the positive element in this negative, the workers who would become the "gravediggers of society" and the whose aspirations and activity stirred "new passions" which made them the force for the creation of the new society and thus bring about "the negation of the negation."

Again, "Praxis" is not Marx's discovery—he merely designated praxis as the class struggle activity of the proletariat. Praxis in Hegel's theory, let us not forget, stands higher than the "Idea of Cognition" because, as he puts it, "it has not only the dignity of the universal, but is the simply actual."

In the end Spirit itself finds that it no longer is antagonistic to the world but is indeed the indwelling spirit of the community. As Prof. Kroner has shown in his analysis of Hegel's intellectual development, and as Hegel himself put in his Early works, "The absolute moral totality is nothing else than a people ... (and the people who receive such an element as a natural principle HAVE & MISSION OF APPLYING IT." (my emphasis."

When, Lenin, in his re-discovery of Hegel, said that none of the Marxists, himself included, had in the previous linearity understood CAPITAL because it is impossible to understand xxxx its lettchapter without the whole of the Logic, he recognized the need for ix each generation to reinterpret both Marx and Hegel for himself. To him, the core of the dislectic was the unity of opposites.

For us, in 1959, it is the Absolute Idea, the unity of theory and practice, the total outlook, the philosophy which comes closest to our day, and, in Marx's day, impelled him to call his philosophy HUMANISM.

For our day, this humanism has gained a much greater urgency. The Humanism of Regel may not be the most obvious characteristic, and in part was hidden even from Marx, although Lenin in his day caught it in Hegel's Descritpion of the Doctrine of the Notion "as the realm of Subjectivity OR freedom."

The genius of Hegel achieved the seemingly impossible

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It is this dimension of the human personality which Marx saw in the professional truggles of the professions and that would once and for all put an end to all class divisions and open up the vast potentialities of the human being so alienated in class societies, so degraded by the division between mental and manual, that not only is the worker made into an appendage of a machine; but the scientist builds on a principle which would lead to fix complete impasse. For, as he put it, "To have one basis for society and another for life is a priori a lie."

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