

GPO 3-5-21 1949

I have been going over some notes in the German. It is an experience.

IN THE GERMAN ORIGINAL THE EMPHSES ARE CONTINUALLY, CONTINUALLY, CONTINUALLY ON SELF & MOVEMENT. The actual underlined, italicized emphases, Reading the English ed. give you an entirely different impression, entirely different. The ques. therefore is why did Plekhanov who must have read it in German miss that completely? why did Lenin 1st in 1914 grasp that... historic reason.

What does Plekhanov do? He explains instead of explaining his. by ideas. He explains his. by eco. dev. for the matter of the 18th c. French he substitutes eco. dev. for individual man he substitutes social man for spiritual reflection. Hegel substitutes formula for reflection or explanation. But the method remains explanation. Explanation is contemplation. You look at all

obj. & say that it is the cause of something else. But the obj. never moves of itself by its own negativity, creating, developing with its own dialectic. It remains a ding-an-sich. Hegel is through with the method of explanation. & by 1915 so is Lenin. See notes p.17.

There are certain nodal points I am concerned with. The section on the Infinite. I, pp. 161-9 then the transition to Being-for-Self & to Death. I feel that Lenin, notes, p.16, was trying to get at something there, couldn't quite make it & that we can make it today. Why are exs. of dia. always from the realm of Being?

Then what is the difference between Hegel's concept of Ground & his concept of Abs. Substance. I don't think this is an academic ques. If we can break the back of these, I think we can do the commentary on the Logic, stage by stage, a wonderful beginning for which is the Nevada document. We have to do that, or have it clear in our minds for Marcuse. He has some pretty good ideas on it, but he didn't quite make it. We have to take it further. Bet. Being-for-Self & Essence intervenes quantity. Bet. Ground & Abs. Substance intervenes Existence, Appearance, Actuality.

I think it is the diff. betw. bourgeois rev. & socialist rev., bet. Plekhanov & Lenin, bet. vulgar & marxist. And what made it clear for L was 2nd Int., as today Stalinism makes it clear for us.

***** RE Bukharin, p.2

From beginning to end, Bukharin is admittedly writing sociology explaining general laws of human evolution for which for him apply to all the particular historical forms. For him sociology has a truth independent of history. If, for ex., sociology est. the general doctrine that the forms of govt. depend on the forms of eco., the historian must seek & find, in any given epoch, precisely what are the relations & must show what is their concrete specific expression.

The material for drawing sociological conclusions & making sociological generalizations, for those conclusions are not made up of whole cloth, but are derived from the actual factory of his... Sociology in its turn formulates a definite point of view, a means of investigation, or, as we now say, a method for his.

THIS is in diametrical opp. to the Hegelian Marxist method. Hegel would say that this is the synthetic method of abstract identity, requiring that all given material come from external reflection.

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Wm. J. D. 1961

Lenin, from the moment that he begins his notes on Hegel, is constantly reiterating that the forms are not external & attached to the content. (e.g. Notes, p. 4) At the very end he reaffirms the unity of deductive & inductive in CAPITAL. Marx, at the moment he begins his critical study of relative s.v. insists on the unity of his logical (p. 353).

At the very end in Vol. III, p. 1030 he says: "The conception which regards only the conditions of distribution historically, but not the conditions of production...rests on a misconception, an identity of the process of social prod., with the simple labor process, such as might be performed by an abnormally situated human being without any social assistance. To the extent that the l.p. is a simple process bet. man & nature, its simple elements remain the same in all social forms of dev. BUT every historical form of the process develops more & more its material foundations & social forms."

Bukharin
Dialectical Materialism
refutes
phenomena
appearances
nature
Reflected
Law
Mediation
Self-moving Form
Content
Opposites
Law
Smith & Ricardo
Reduction
Form
Opposites
Law
Capital
Notes
Hegel

Bukharin begins with the concept of law as uniformity & regularity. With this abstract conception of law, there can be included under law (& the following are actual exs. which NB uses) the dev. of wkg. class under cap., cap. crises, night following day, the relative increase in quan. of beer consumed annually in Bavaria & leaves of break not owing on pine trees, p. 20.

Contrast this conception of law to Hegel's conception (pp. 128ff). At a given stage in the dev. of a society based on contradiction, the phenomena or immediate existents "appear" i.e., they are no longer in & for themselves but only posited (p. 128). Hence they have in themselves the negativity of Reflection which is the nature of essence, i.e., the contradictions in the immediate phenomena, the necessity of transition into opposite appears.

Law is the reduction (NB this concept of reduction) of this negativity to self-identity & indifference to external content. The realm of laws is the quiescent content of Appearance, Appearance is this same content but presents itself in unquiet change (as) Reflection into other. It is Law as Negative & just changing Existence, the movement of transition into opp., of self-transcendence & regress into unity. Law does not contain this side on UNquiet Form or of negativity. Appearance, therefore, as against Law, is the totality for it contains Law, but also more, namely the moment of Self-moving Form." (II, 193-194)

Since Law is not based upon the self-moving Form, its content is only empirically derived & a proof is still required, that is, a mediation for cognition, that the law not only operates but is necessary. The law as such does not contain this proof & its obj. necessity. Consequently, Law is only the positive & not the negative essentially of Appearance.

In the latter, the content determinations are moments of Form, as such pass over into their Other & in themselves are just as much not themselves but their Other. In law then the positedness of one side is the positedness of the other, but yet their content is indifferent to this relation, & in itself, does not contain this positedness. Consequently, altho Law is essential Form, it is not yet Real Form reflected into its sides as Content." (p. 134)

NB the emphasis upon this fetishism of law in Lenin's notes, p. 36 Capital cannot be understood without this concept of Hegel. In CAP. what Marx attacks in Smith & Ricardo is precisely the reduction of the form of value with its contradictions & transition into opp., to the law

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~~Process 1~~ → U

of value or determination of value by labor-time. Throughout Marx deals with the form of appearance (Erscheinungsform) of the process of self-expansion of value, i.e., the contradictory self-movement of cap.

Thus the essence of Hegel's attack on the method of abstraction. The latter collapses immediacy into self-relation, self-relating negativity into immediate self-relation, it equalizes mediation & transforms into immediate identity.

Bukharin, having est'd. this abstract conception of law, begins immediately, almost as if he were following step by step Hegel's analysis of the method he is employing to ask: "If uniformity... may be observed in the phenomena of nature & society, we may well ask what is this uniformity?" (p.21) i.e., he has to begin looking around empirically for content....

~~12-10-54~~ Bukharin can conceive of 2 types of uniformity: teleology & cause. His hostility to self-activity or self-determination is absolute. Teleology for him is conscious purpose. Causality, for him, is one event, cause, being followed by another event, effect. His thinking is confined with these categories - the 1st that of intell. planning, (what Hegel calls self-determination applied only externally, (p.391) the 2nd that of uniformed matter. In this respect he has not moved from the ancient Greek dichotomy of form & matter, philosophers & slaves. As with all vulgar materialism there is for him "no diff. at all in regard but the social sciences & the sciences concerned with nature." (p.29) He is thus trapped in the fundamental alienation of philosophers in class society of identifying men & things.

"On the basis of this identification the law of the centralisation of cap... is not an 'empirical law' but a real law of natural science. If prod. units are competing with large ones, the victory of the latter is inevitable." (p.50) CONNECTION

THE TENDENCY TO TOTALITY IS MECHANISM. (P. 376.)

His degradation... of the specificity of a particular form of appearance to an abstract identity with an earlier stage absolutely precludes any comprehension of the process of centralisation of cap. as the specific form of appearance of cap. Anything in cap. society which is not characteristic of Natur thus becomes the product of reflection.

The essential diff. bet. Lenin of 1908 & the Lenin of 1915, or bet. vulgar mat. & dial. mat. may be seen in Hegel's analysis of the relation bet. mechanism & teleology.

The basic premise of mechanism is the Ind. of the Thing-in-a-for-itself, its Obj-ity, (p.347) Objectivity is the collapse into immediacy of the self-repeating negativity of the Notion.

Buckner presupposes the thing-in-itself
Buckner, *Parerga, 1935-11* = College in the Immediacy.

Syllogism

Ignorance & knowledge. The difference bet. uborg'd. society & org'd. Communist society, his opposes, is that in the former, "the result obtained (social phenomena) does not coincide with the wishes of many persons." Or as M & E frequently said, social phenomena are ind. of the consciousness, the feeling & the will of individuals." (p.39)
In Communist society, "all the relations bet. men will be obvious to each & the social relation will be org. of all their wills...." (p.41)

Hegel in 1908 expressed precisely this point of view in the most fundamental terms, describing dialectics as the dev. from ignorance to knowledge, or of what is in itself into what is for us. p.77.

What is presupposed in this concept is the ind. of the Thing-in-itself. Kant is attacked not for the conception of the Thing-in-itself, but only for his scepticism regarding the possibility of ever knowing the Thing-in-itself. (pp.84,89,99,242)

Such a conception of the Thing-in-itself is necessarily complemented by a conception of the end as subjective i.e., mechanism. External relation & indiff. of objects, is the other side of the coin to teleology as based upon an extra-mundane understanding. (pp.374-5) Hegel, in fact, the concept of end is arrived at from the conception of mechanism. (p.380). Hence, it remains infected with the idea of an external obj. opposed world which it presupposes, but it also contains a higher truth, namely, determination of the manifoldness of the objects by a unity which is in & for itself.

LL p.376: "Adequacy to End now manifests itself in the 1st place as something higher in general, as an understanding which externally determines the manifolded.... In Mechanism they become essential thru the mere form of necessity.... But in Teleology the content becomes imp. for Teleology presupposes a Notion, that is, something determinate in & for itself & THEREFORE self-determining."

This indiff. to specific content on the part of Mechanism precludes a recognition of the historical specificity of the prol. & requires a recognition of the his. specificity of the prol. requires the identification of the prol. with all sorts of trivial exs. The exs. NB uses in his discussion of teleology & mechanism are such trivialities as heads & tails, a circle of people who have org'd. to sing together (pp.41-3 when such trivial exs.)

as Hegel so rightly says, mechanism seems to offer more freedom than teleology. (pp.376-7) On the other hand, content is decisive to a dial. conception of teleology. (p.380)

H: "Thus the End-Rel. is more than Judgment; it is the syllogism of the ind. & free Notion which thru Obj-ity binds itself together with itself."

How can this binding together of objectivity with itself be accomplished. At 1st "the end is the subj. Notion as essential tendency & impulse towards external self-positioning. In this process it is saved from transition." (p.381) Having reached itself from Obj-ity & THEREFORE at 1st only in its immediacy, it is at 1st "finite, altho formally it is infinite." (p.382)

It can only overcome this subj-ity & finiteness by proceeding to cancel the presupposition of the End--that is, the immediacy of the Obj. & to posit the Obj. as determined (thru) the Notion. This negative attitude of the Object is equally a negative attitude to itself, a cancellation of the subj-ity of the End." (pp.382-3) By doing this, End becomes transformed from "an end in itself in activity." p.386

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Acknowledgement

Negativity

Syllogism

Motiv.

Obj-ity

Point

together

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now
I think that Hegel, as Lenin realized in 1915, began to lay down the
principle of his mat., i.e., a transformation of the sub-j-ity of purpose
by means of which upon negating the obj. opp. of subj. end to external
obj. is only 1st negation (p. 387) 2nd negation takes place THRU the means
in this rel. bet. 1st & 2nd negation we have the relation bet. vulgar
materialism. The vulgar materialist never gets beyond opp. of subj. end
to external obj.

Middle
At 1st Notion & Obj-ity are connected only externally
in the Means, which insofar is a merely mechanical obj.
But insofar as "Means is the obj. which stands on the side
of the End & contains its activity, then the mechanism which here operates
is also self-return of obj-ity into the Notion, which, however, is
already presupposed as End; insofar the negative attitude to the obj. or
the activity insofar the negative attitude to the obj. of the activity
which is adequate to the end is not external, but is the change & the
transformation of obj-ity in itself into the End." (p. 387)

Middle
And as Hegel goes on to
say "The Means however is the external middle of the syllogism which
is the realization of the end.... In his tools man possesses power over
external nature, even altho according to his Ends, he frequently is
subjected to it."

"But the end does not only remain outside the
Mechanical process; it also preserves itself within it & is its
determination.... but the simple abstraction of determinateness in
its truth is the totality of the negative--the concrete Notion which
posit's externality within itself." (p. 388)... This (1915 L) ~~conception~~ conception
of instruments of labor is the only conception ~~conception~~ which
enables us to escape preoccupation with determination of
magnitude of value which in turn leads immediately to preoccupation
with problems of distribution."

To sum up so far: We have the rel. bet. abstract & concrete
the following forms:

- 1 Abstract & Concrete: Rev. as an abstraction
- 2 " " Law as abstraction to which
appearance is reduced
- 3 " " Natural science as an
abstraction to which human
- 4 " " Abstract understanding super-
imposed on concrete.
- 5 " " Remaining at 1st negation & not
going on to 2nd negation, contemplation & calculation vs. productive
negativity.

2d 5/5/78 Entleiby there was a third letter
since above is p. 6 & only other p. 9 here &

(p. 13)

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6 (G's p/3)

New

All the pitfalls involved in subsuming dial. mat. under vulgar mkt. leap to the eye as soon as Bukharin begins to deal with "Society" (Ch. IV). He begins the ch. by introducing us to the individual as "something like anything else." We encounter not only simple bodies, which hence impress us as constituting units (for ex., a sheet of paper, John Smith) but also meet with compound units, intricate

units (ibid., p. 83 (84?)) It sounds incredible this identification of

John Smith with a sheet of paper & a cow, but there it is in bl. & wh. & in i

decently as all the positivism of bourgeois thinking.....

Thus NB's presupposition from which he never moves is the division of labor in society, i.e., pvt. labor. What relates this pvt. labor to the mkt. outside the workers: "All these wks., peasants, colonial subjects, even engineers, overseers, foremen, organizers are placed in various corners of the globe... And when classes of commodities pass from one country to another, from factory mkt. all this constitutes a material bond bet. all these persons." (p. 91)

As for what Marx calls div. of labor in the workshop, this, according to NB, is the rel. of individuals in time & space. "In other words, they are distributed thru the factory as distinct physical bodies; they are therefore in certain physical, material relations in time & space.... men give out energy & turn out a material product... also having its 'psychological' aspect" (p. 91).

Bukharin does not even begin to suspect the "essential" distinction which Marx makes bet. div. of labor in society & div. of labor in workshop. (I, p. 389) neither planned despotism over men "who form mere parts of a total mechanism belonging to the capitalist". (nor Marx's transition from vulgar to dial. at, revealing that the mechanism of the workers in the div. of labor of cap. prod. is a form of self-estrangement.

ALSO PART OF NB. Letter? *Why do you make changes?* *Carefully* *you should*
Logically, NB's thinking is in terms of a movement to a more integrated absolute substance -- Lenin's is in terms of a NEW BEGINNING which will determine the end.

Lenin wrote the preface to NB's book in 1915 Dec. They are both against KK's conception of ultra-imp. By 1916, he is writing his own book & taking issue with Bukh. all over the place because *nothing had in NB's mind except p.tly. Dr. Feuerbach's Eastern Philosophy*. Now for some abstract observations.

I think NB's is using the method of thought of Essence--Identity, Opp. Ground, all going to Abs. Substance. Then at the end the prol. takes over this Abg. substance.

Hence, to be noted & carefully thought out is the way that Hegel deals with the Notion AT THE BEGINNING, after Abs. Substance.

Deals with Spinoza, Leibniz & Kant AT THE BEGINNING of the Doctrine of the Notion. Insists that the dialectic of the realm of Notion is the movement of U, P, and I, rather than as in Being-- Qual., Quan., & Measure; & in Essence--Identity, Opp., Ground, *and Dialectic, not Substance*.

THAT is, breaking down 102

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I suspect that the his. content of the logical forms of Universality, Particularity & Individuality is U--Christianity, P--Bourgeois Democracy, Individuality -Socialism.

I suspect also that in the dev. from Judgment to Syllogism is combined the dev. from the party of 1903 to Soviets of 1917. The syllogism destroys opp. bet. sub-unity & obj-ity.

The polemic in the realm of the Motion... is against the U as fixed particular (i.e., the U must be posited as P, but if the P is posited as U, the diff. becomes isolated) & also against destroying the individuality of the modes by getting to the ats. like a shot out of a pistol.

Development is absolute mediation of the U. P.I.
Isn't this the logic of Self-determination when growing internationalization?
Destruction of state machine when bourgeois state has reached highest stage of org?
Incl. dev. of commodity prod. in Draft Program when state-monopoly cap., reached Brest-Litovsk
NEP when prol. state owns m.p. etc.etc.

From S-C WR:

Elite Party ~~wishes~~ seeks to place ~~the~~ ^{the} disposal of party as prol. is at disposal of cap.

+ re Pablo-Germany end of any phil. method most serious of all theories of retrogression.

(gripped most terrible of all logics the logic of empiricism)

undisciplined verbiage -- shifting generalization.

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Sociology
Concepts

P 376
It deals with
totally Mechan.

P 591
Collage of
self class of society
notional

Well -
reality is applied
only C. social
exist -
in society

MOS
Synthetic

Synthetic
ideating - all
given come → C. reflection

N.B. thought Sociology, did, a "methodology"

Low in N.B.s concept

→ 1. negativit

2. self-destruction

Pass b not i. negativity - As against P. difference of this, for
contains both, N. negative, self-destr

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