

(Handwritten notes: "Supply", "On theological sense of Hegel's thought", "15 Vol. 1964", "by Karl Löwith", "Translated from Ger. by David E. Green, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, NY, 1964; 1st ed. in Zurich 1941; foreword by author signed Sendai, Japan, Spring 1939")

THIS IS ABSOLUTELY THE MOST BEAUTIFUL AND PROFOUND WORK ON HEGEL AND MARX DESPITE HIS ANTI-MARXISM & IN A GREAT SENSE ALSO ANTI OR AT LEAST NON-BEGLIANISM AND TOTALLY PRO-CHRISTIANITY. Such profound understanding of "enemies" is certainly not true of a single person writing nowadays.

Foreword, "In contrast to academic reticulation of Hegel's system by scholars of Hegel..."
"...even if only to be able to transcend an age as an age, a point of view is necessary which will transcend the bare events of the age. The process of shift of meaning is never concluded, because, in his, it is never determined at the beginning what will result at the end. The purpose of these studies is solely to point out the decisive turning point between Hegel's consummation & Nietzsche's new beginning, in order, with the light of the present, to illuminate the epoch-making significance of an episode which has fallen into oblivion."

PART ONE

I The Eschatological Meaning of Hegel's Consummation of the His. of the world & the Spirit

p.31: "For Hegel, the his. of phil. is not a process parallel to or outside of the world, but the 'Geist of world his.' What dominates both equally is the Absolute in the form of 'worldspirit', the essence of which is movement, & hence his. of historical theological discussions."
Historical-political writing & ethical systems "in which the unconditioned power of his. is presented as 'time which conquers all.' & 'primal destiny.' Here we read for [1st] time of the 'world spirit' which has knowledge of itself in every form, either crude or highly developed, but in any case, 'resolution.' In every nation it gives expression to a 'totality of life.' Then follows phenomenology, as the basis of the unfolding of the spirit (of the cultural) p.32 stages of knowledge, where the systematic stages of thought & his. relationships are even more inseparable, since they have no empirically determined relationship, but rather interpenetrate."

p.32: "On the principle of freedom of the spirit Hegel also constructs the his. of the world, with a view toward a fulfilled end."

p.35: "But because Hegel displaces the Christian expectation of the end of the world of time into the course of the world process (the absolute) of faith into the rational realm of his., it is only logical for him to understand the last great event in the his. of the world & the spirit as the consummation of the beginning."

Q Hegel, Briefe, I, 194 (p. 403, ftn 38) "when the realm of ideas has been revolutionized reality can no longer resist."

On p. 43,

Heine: "The heads which phil. has used for reiteration can be cut off later by the rev. for whatever purposes it likes. But phil. would never have been able to use the heads cut off by the rev. if the latter had preceded it."

p.78

FROM H TO N, -P.2

Marty
Reason
Reality

Nature

after NC's lecture

and much more

As a
rule,
this is
thought
he has
Marx
Macedon
through
the
classical
drama

II.Old Hegelians, Young Hegelians, Neo-Hegelians
Lt with all's attention to Mr's view of div. of world of theory & practice into 2
c.K.Marx (1818-1883) mutually exclusive totalities

p.92 "Of all the left-wing Hegelians, he was not only
the most radical, but also the only one who was
a match for Hegel in conceptual acuity & also
in erudition." How well schooled he is in Hegel.

is shown less by his early writings referring directly to Hegel, which were
influenced by Feuerbach, than by Das Kapital. The analyses presented in this
wk., altho far removed from Hegel in content, are unthinkable without the incor-
poration of Hegel's manner of reducing a phenomenon to a notion."

Mr's
p.92: His 1st & also last criticism of Hegel begins with an antithesis to
Hegel's consummation. The guess which moves Mr in his dissertation concerns
the possibility of a new beginning after that conclusion.

Here Lt with quotes from Marx's doctoral dissertation: "Greek phil. seems
to encounter what a good tragedy should not encounter: a feeble ending.
With Aristotle, the Macedonian Alexander of Greek phil., the obj. his.
of phil. in Greece comes to a halt. Epicureans, Stoics, skeptics all seem an
inappropriate postscript, completely out of proportion to their mighty premises.
1/1/13 (then, after showing that "decomposition product" of Gk phil became
archetypes of Roman spirit, Mr continues: "Furthermore, is it not
a remarkable phenomenon that new systems appear after the Platonic
& Aristotelian philosophers who made phil. all-inclusive, systems
which do not depend upon these previous ample intellectual forms,
but rather, reaching further back, turn to the simplest schools:
in physics, to the natural philosophers; in ethics, to the Socratic school?"

(Then, after the parallel to Hegel & what can come after his
all-incl. system? Obviously, only after a radical disengagement
of Hegel's phil. through a "suspension" of it which will also
"realize" it. Now with summarizes Mr, thusly: "PHIL. IS ALWAYS
SUCH A 'NODAL POINT' WHEN its abstract principle has become totally concrete, as
in the case of Aristotle & Hegel. When the possibility of cont'd. dev. in a
straight line is interrupted; a full circle has been described. 2 totalities now
stand confronting each other: an all-incl. phil. & opposite it, the actual world of
complete non-phil. For H's reconciliation with reality was not within reality,
but only with it, in the element of comprehension. Now phil. must turn outward
& engage the world." p.93) For Hegel's principle is also Mr's principle (the unity
of reason & reality, & reality itself as a union of

essence & existence. Therefore, Mr is forced to attack
in 2 directions: against the real world & against existing phil.
This is so because he seeks to unite both in an all-incl. totality of theory &
practice." Q Mr: "Here we can see the curriculum vitae of a phi. narrowed down
to its subj. point, just as the death of a hero can be
made to tell the story of his life."

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Sub-1

From 2 to 5 - p.3 (ftn/p.186 re Kierkegaard: "his uniqueness of this movement cannot be pinned down by such vague terms as 'irrationalism' [not a mere byproduct of his pol.-eco.analyses; they are] p.98 re Mr's his.studies: "they are an essential component of his basic conception of the entire human world as being historical..." p.99: "With regard to the fct. of phil.to reality, Marx took up a 2-fold positions he opposed the practical demand of a simple segregation of phil.... The one side believes that Ger.phil.does not belong to reality & would like to abrogate phil.without realizing it. True critic must do both. It is a critical analysis of the modern state at the same time a dissolution of prev. pol. consciousnesses, the final, most universal expression of which is H's phil. of right....(p.100) This dial.unity in Mr's evaluation of Ger.phil.& reality differentiates him from both Old & Young Hegelianism, which still lacked the practical or material viewpoint necessary for the comprehension of the real his. of the world."

P12

Q. Mr's Ger.Ideology (section on Feuerbach re Young Hegelians): "The polemic against Hegel & against each other is limited to the fact that each takes a page of the Hegelian system & turns it against the whole as well as against the pages taken out by the others."

P12

Lowith also recognizes effect of Marx's discovery on his opponents as well as followers: "In opposition to this entire Ger. ideology, Mr developed his materialist view of his., which has since determined the thought of non-Marxists anti-Marxists more than they themselves realize" Q. Mr against "Abstract empiricists" & their "lifeless facts." Marx declares this conditionality of all his existence alone to be unconditional. Hegel's metaphysics of the his. of the spirit is developed THEREBY TO THE MOST EXTREME POSITION POSSIBLE, MADE TEMPORAL & PLACED IN THE SERVE OF HIS." (p.115) The term existenz, schelling, concrete, essential, real, spiritual, material after everything is first shown in this definition and not in the others.

(NB NB NB Lowith is also excellent on Kierkegaard p.110ff: "If Kierkegaard is not taken as a mere exception but as an outstanding phenomenon WITHIN the his.movement of his age, it becomes clear that his 'INDIVIDUALITY' WAS NOT AT ALL INDIVIDUAL, but a widespread reaction to the contemporary condition of the world.")

Applause

Beautiful

See part on Schelling on p.115f & listeners to his (1841) Berlin lecture incl. Kierkegaard, Bakunin, Engels & Durckhardt... & on p.118: "In Schelling, the problem of being in the anti-Hegelian movement arrived at the point where Heidegger once more took it up. For who could deny that the 'facticity' of Dasein which lies in the brute fact of Dass-Sein, that Geworfenheit & Entwurf correspond to "immediate existence" & "breaking away" from this necessary accidents?"

P12

Ftn.204 , p.414: "Only 1 inadequate attempt has been made to work out the his.connection bet. Heidegger's phil.position & that of both Kierkegaard & Mr: the essays of M. Beck & H. Marcuse in the special issue devoted to Heidegger's Sein und Zeit of Philosophische Hefte No.1 (Berlin, 1928)"

Let. 7 & cont.

Re "exhaustion" of Hegelian phil. & return to Kant, p.120: "seen in the context of the real total course of the century, however, this apparently so unmotivated return to Kant can be explained: THE BOURGEOIS INTELLIGENTSIA HAD CEASED IN PRACTICE TO BE AN HISTORICALLY ORIENTED CLASS, thereby losing the initiative & impact of their thought."

Rufurbishing of Hegelian Phil. by the Neg-Hegelians, B.Croce's distinction bet. "dead" (re not only phil.of nature & religion but logic) & living (obj.spirit) to the extent that its abs.systematic claim can be reduced to an his.claim:

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From H to N-p.4

(p.6) Then you Hegel is for us the
gen. & for goal of the criticism
(other) reaction - & from
fallen (or Russell) stuff
in our world, & now you

Contrary to all expectations, Hegel seems to be resurrected. After no new printing for 80 yrs Logic appeared in 2 new complete editions posthumous wks. published together with commentary on early wks + Hegel lexicon & LIP, WHICH ALREADY PASSED COUNTING. — p.60
than 50 studies were listed bet. 1926-31.

Hegel Society & Hegel Congresses

27.2.1931 The 7. conv.
with its destruction
from now, but an
historical effect

2nd & 3rd Hegel Congresses, 1931, attended both by e.g. Kroner & Lunacharsky!!!

as against the forgetting of Hegelianism in Ger. "In Russia the Hegelianism of the '40s, in the form of nihilism, Maximilienism, underwent conti-
p.152 nitive dev. down to the present & MADE-NIS." In '31 3 congresses on occasion of centenary of Hegel's death, in Moscow & others in Rome Berlin. "In spite of their mutual antipathy, they belonged together as had the Hegelian right & left of the previous century...". That these 2 dogmatic & mutually opposed critics of Hegel were both under the spell of his concepts demonstrates the power of the spirit which could produce such extremes."

P.152e "The difference bet. Hegel's "system of wants" & Marx's "criticism of pol. eco." is shown by the fact that Marx attacks as an alienation of man from himself what Hegel views as a positive component of all activity: self-renunciation.. The result of this movement (in Hegel's word) of the spirit is mediation at every stage bet. its own being & all other beings" a tendency to become proportionate to itself in the otherness of its own being." (SL#123). (In contrast to Hegel's view of mod. domestic vs. slave) Marx concludes from the system of prod. that really exists that even a (particular) activity can surrender the entire man, even tho he legally his own master since nobody compels him to sell his labor." (p.153) "For Marx the wage earner incorporates the U problem of bourgeois society, the eco. nature of which consists in the production of a impersonalized world of merchandise.

p.154: "A phenomenological analysis of this universal problem is given in the 1st chapter of Das Kapital in which Marx exhibits the ~~commodity~~ character of merchandise (rd: it's most annoying to have the translator constantly use merchantile merchandise where Marx used commodity) he sees revealed the basic ontological structure of our entire physical world" its commodity-form value-form (here Lowith refers reader to Lukacs) after which for "the human" point instead of mere fits. in Marx, Lowith goes back to 1842 debate on theft of woods. (NB NB Lowith also refers back to dissertation where Marx called alienation, externality, as "materialism" hence referred to himself as idealist. Then to Get. Ideology Thence to Jewish form of commodities.)

In "Estrangement as the Source of Hegel's Reconciliation" Lowith traces Hegel's reconciliation with that which is, where in 1st system Sept. 14, 1800 he decides upon "agreement with the age" Nevertheless estrangement remains presupposition. The other presupposition is purity as the predetermined goal. Same at Bonn & Frankfurt "Hegel experienced this 2-fold presupposition of the absolute as the primary source of the need for phil. Then comes Hegel's analysis of world crisis in an epoch of transition. (p.163) Hegel anticipated many features of that criticism which Marx developed fully later."

p.165: Hegel "How blind are those who would like to believe in the continued existence & endurance of institution, constitutions, laws which no longer agree with the needs of mankind, from which spirit has fled."

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Part Two Studies in the His. of the Bourgeois-Christian World
I. The Problem of Bourgeois Society
II. The Problem of Work

P.274 Lowith says that the 1844 MSS & Ger. Ideology "are the most significant event in the His. of post-Hegelian phil." - but
Lowith's (or his translator's) translation of Marx is worth noting: (ftn. (e. Phen. ch.)"1. The object as such presents itself to the consciousness and vanishing
2. The alienation of self-consciousness produces reification.
3. This alienation has a positive meaning as well as negative.
4. It has the aspect of the obj., of its self-removal, has the positive meaning, or comes to know the worthlessness of the same, through its alienation of itself as an obj. or as the object for the sake of the inseparable unity of proactivity.
4. It has this meaning not only for us or in itself but for its own self.

6. This also implies the converse aspect of it likewise abolishes & refutes this alienation & objectification, thus keeping its otherness as such."

And in the text itself Lowith summarizes Marx's position, thus (p.279):
"Hegel's self-consciousness flatters itself with the illusion that its active knowledge in its otherness has reconstituted the self, because it knows nothing of any real externality; it knows only a recoverable alienation of itself. But the fact that self-consciousness is at one with itself in its own otherness means that man possesses his true human nature in the existing order of law, politics & economics. The merely theoretical abolition of alienation in practice leaves the alienated world exactly as it is. Hegel's apparent criticism which formally denies the existing powers while actually assuming their content is a false positivity, a phil. dissolution & restoration of empirical reality... What he describes is not a human process at all: it is divine process within man, & its actual subj. is A. I."

And Lowith even sees the true nature of materialism as Marx conceives it: "Material" in this context does not refer to an 'eco. basis' but rather the physical, obj. existence of real men & things.... But Lowith insists that, when he turns to Marx's statement that the obj. conditions must 1st be abolished to achieve wholeness of man, "This incidental modification which turns 'abolition' into destruction differentiates Marx methodologically from Hegel, & to this extent represents a basic divergence; for the rest, he takes over H's CATEGORIES & PRESENCE/NOTION IN MATERIAL FORM, EVEN IN CAPITAL." (Reference is to I,1,6. Also ftn. 62 on p.436 CAP. III, 166.) "This reduction of dialekt. negation to a one-sided concept of simple destruction is typical of the radicalism of all the leftwing Hegelians...." By the way, Marx, in 1844, Lowith is very profound also on sociology & even defends, in a way, Engels's claim to the prolet. being heir to Ger. phil., saying: "However repugnant this statement might appear to bourgeois phil., it was not without foundation. Ever since the turn of the c. it has been the basic weakness of bourgeois education that it has been the education of an educated class, bldg. a wall of separation against the wkg. class. Closing the spiritual horizon for the universal problem of work." AND THE FTN. 73 (p.436) is to Heidegger's concept of care, which, "in accordance with its theological origin in Augustine's cura, HAS NO CREATIVE OVERTONES."

III. The Problem of Education

Lowith's remark (p.289) that Hegel still considered humanistic education that which educated man for life in the polis reminds me of Marx's quotation from H. on education in a ftn. in CAP., where he says it is curious for a bourgeois to say that he says about educ. & everyman, but, hurrah, etc. He calls von Humboldt's "humanism", "aristocratic educ. individualism."

~~LOUTH AGAIN p.92~~ How well schoolboy he (Mx) is in Hegel is shown less in his early writings referring directly to Hegel, which were influenced by Feuerbach than by CAP. The analyses presented in this work, so far removed from Hegel in content, are unthinkable without the inc. of Hegel's manner of redressing (TRANSFORMING) what the heck is the d.^r. word (d) a phenomenon into a notion." COMMITTING NOTION

~~Mr-determined actual course of his by changes in material world but basically original dialogue with H remained after his transition to criticism of the soc....The ques. which moves Marx in his dissertation concerns the possibility of new beginnings AFTER the conclusion~~

~~p.93 For Hegel's principle is also Mx's principle: the unity of reason & reality~~
~~reality itself as a union of essence & existence...~~

~~D. D. Hay~~
~~From hand~~
~~ms. rev. p. i.e. practical-critical~~
~~activity which contributes most to the creation of~~
~~the human world. With Marx the will to change the world does not mean~~
~~direct action alone, but at the same time a criticism of previous interpretations~~
~~of the world.~~ TRANSFORMATION OF BEING & CONSCIOUSNESS

~~***** For ex., the pol. is to be transformed both as actual eco. system & as eco. theory, for the latter is the consciousness of the former~~

~~***** "Using Engels' procedure, popular Mxisu has simplified the dial rel. b/t theory & practice by freezing it upon the abstract mat. basis, at the rel. of which to the theoretical 'superstructure' can be inverted with equal ease, as M. Weber shows. If, ON THE CONTRARY Mx's ORIGINAL INSIGHT IS ADHERED TO THEN EVEN...."~~

~~***** TOGETHER WITH PHIL. ECO. CRITICISM STANDS IN THE SERVICE OF HIS ***** THIS IS THE STARTING-POINT FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF Mx's PECULIARLY "HIS" MAT.... entire human world as being b/t referred at one time to "ABSTRACT EMPIRICISTS" to whom life is a collection of p.102 lifeless facts... Marx declares this conditionality of all his experience alone to be unconditional. Hegel's metatheory of his own spirit is developed thereby to the most extreme position possible, MADE TEMPORAL & PLACED IN THE SERVICE OF HIS.~~

~~From this his. point of view Mx sees all previous his. in the role of mere "prehis," leading up to a total transformation of the existing eco. situation, the w^e in which man produce their physical & intell. life. To this "NODAL POINT" in the his. of phil. there corresponds a POINT OF INTERSECTION in his. S^c of the world bet. future & the past/~~

~~154 Q Mercantile merchandise commodity use value exchange value surplus value~~
~~P.125: A phenomenological analysis of this "universal" problem is given in the 1st portion of CAP, in which Marx exhibits the concrete character of every prod. IN COMMODITIES HE SEES REVEALED THE BASIC ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF OUR ENTIRE PHYSICAL WORLD, its COMMODITY FORM. IT CHARACTERIZE BOTH ALIKE.~~

~~Thus CAP, also is more than merely a criticism of pol. eco.; it is also criticism of bourgeois society guided by cap. eco., the "ECO-CELL" of which is the commodity form assumed by all products of labor. (RD INCL. LPITSELF)~~

~~"To discover the process which led to this perversion Marx undertook his analysis of the 'fetish appearance' of the mod. social conditions of labor in the 'fetish nature' of commodities... FETISHISM INSEPARABLE FROM THE PROD. OF COMMODITIES. It is possible to alter price of commodities but not commodity form"~~

~~Commodities men's m^r - 1
L. D. O. C.~~

Hegel's metaphysics of The Spirit 14615

*is being built to its most extreme position possible
with the result made temporal & placed in the service of the
whole world.*

of DIALECTIC

p.92. Mr's first and last criticism of Hegel begins with an ANTI~~THESES~~^{THESIS} to Hegel's consummation. The question which moves Mr in his dissertation concerns Hegel beginning AFTER the conclusion."

p.93. Two totalities now stand confronting each other: an all-incl. phil. & opposed to it, the ACTUAL WORLD of

*complete non-phil.
THIS 2-EDGED BEHAVIOR IS THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE DIV. OF THE ENTIRE
WORLD OF THEORY & PRACTICE INTO 2 MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE TOTALITIES....*

*p.95: "H's system is seen as a single abstract totality, having as its OTHER side,
A TOTAL IRRATIONALITY.... Therefore the
new way of philosophising is aware of itself only in contrast to the
complete system; it does not yet understand that*

*ITS OWN DISSOLUTION of
Hegelian phil. is the most appropriate realization of the latter. For H's
principle is also Mr's principle: the unity of reason & reality & reality
itself as a union of essence & existence.... attacks in 2 directions... because
he seeks to unite BOTH IN AN ALL INCL. TOTALITY OF THEORY & PRACTICE....*

*On the other hand, one can argue backwards from the nature of the REV to
the HES character of Hegelian phil. Q Mr: "Here we see the curriculum vitae
of a phil. narrowed down to its subj. point, just as the death of a hero
can be said to tell the story of his life."*

*"Mr had such a radical understanding of the NEW SITUATION he could dev. from a critic of the H phil. of rt. to
the author of CAP."*

*p.96: BECAUSE H's phil. does not incl. the world of theory
(and of practice, essence and existence)
it must necessarily compare itself with what exists & accommodate itself. The
entire concrete content of what is to be comprehended is always PREdetermined
for it by what—in the sense of that which exists—'is'.*

*"THE DIAL. OF THEORY &
PRACTICE forms the basis not only Mr's criticism of the idealistic phil. of
the spirit BUT ALSO of his criticism of FEUERBACH'S MAT.PHIL....
Now mat. understand REV. It is a critical critical activity, which contributes
most to the creation of the human world.... With Mr., the will to change the
world does NOT mean direct action ALONE, but AT THE SAME time CRITICISM OF PREVIOUS
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE WORLD, A TRANSFORMATION of being AND consciousness; for
pol.eco.' is to be transformed both as actual eco.system & eco.theory, for
the latter is consciousness of the former."*

p.97: If, on the contrary, (rd, contrary to Engels freezing rel.of theory to
practice on abstract material 'basis')*

*Mr's original insight is adhered to, then even H's 'theory' can be seen as
PRACTICAL. For the deeper reason why Hegel's theory allows the content
of his comprehension to be advanced WITHOUT SEEKING TO ALTER IT thru 'criticism'
lies NOT ONLY in what it 'interprets' but in what it strives for as practical
goal. Hegel's comprehension sought to make its peace with reality. "PROMETHEAN*

*Heel
Körnig
Peace
with
Reality*

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NB While in Ger. H underwent colipse "in Russia the Hegelianism of the 40s in the form of nihilism materialism & idealism underwent accintuous dev.down to the present aside his..." (p.135)

Phil. in service of his
becomes
an anticipated future

Q Mx I, p.669: "it is therefore the duty of his...the beyond of truth having vanished, to est. the truth of this world. Philosophy is in the service of his. Its primary duty, once the sacred image of human self-strangement has been unmasked, is to unmask self-strangement in all its unholy forms..." Together with phil... eco. criticism stands in the service of his. THIS IS THE STARTING POINT FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF MARX'S PECULIARLY "HIS." MAT. His historical studies...are not a mere by-product of his pol.eco.analyses; they are an essential component of his basic conception of the ENTIRE HUMAN WORLD AS BEING HIS."

Phil. & Rev.
p.99 With regard to the rel.of phil. to reality, Mx took up a 2-fold position: he opposed the practical demand of a simple negation of phil., also the merely theoretical criticism of the pol.party.. TRUE CRITICISM MUST DO BOTH...

p.102 Q Mx on real his.--I believe it is from Ger. Ideology.

Phil. in service of his becomes an anticipated future

P.128: "Hegel did not claim absolute validity for system; rather, as a result of his HIS.knowledge, he was more the master of systematic thought than anyone before or after him. In his unification of all previous his., the accent does NOT lie on the previous//accented by Kroner, as the past of, to the FUTURE were intended. RATHER, the accent is on the entire thus far now", that is "finally", the world-spirit has come; and this-entire is deliberate GOAL...

p.129: He, more than anyone else, encounters the present in an his. context based on the recollective past. IT IS NO ACCIDENT THAT HIS IMMEDIATE SUCCESSORS CARRIED HIS PHIL. INTO AN ANTICIPATED FUTURE, only to view their own per. from that point of view as "his." in the opposite sense of the word.

Phil. always in reality

While H brought into the PRESENT what had been & had come to be in the past, the criticism of the existing order by the Young Hegelians brought into the present, from the opposite direction, the task of the future.

Phil. as an ever present
agent in reality

p.129: the absolute claim can be explained from the fact that H lived IN the consciousness of having grasped the absolute for the 1st time, as it SHOULD be grasped IF IT IS TO HAVE ANY INFLUENCE ON REALITY, namely, as "constantly relativizing itself." The Absoluteness of his system would then consist in ABS. RELATIVISM, because Hegel, - in contrast to Kant -- represents the ABSOLUTE AS AN EVER PRESENT SPIRIT, IMMANENT IN REALITY.

NOT mere
MIRROR
Every
task

"In any case, a basic evaluation of H's meaning for the present has to proceed from the fact that he was the 1st to make phil. aware of itself as the thought of time; this thesis affect the ENTIRE REL. of phil. to the his. reality of our times. The JOINING of the temporal character of phil. to its substantial content guarantees the PERMANENT IMP. OF HEGEL. Every phil. is the self-consciousness of its age, but this does mean that it is a mere (p.130)mirror of its age, BUT RATHER THAT EVERY GENERATION MUST UNDERTAKE THE TASK OF PHIL. WITH NEW STRENGTH & IN ITS OWN WAY PRECISELY BECAUSE THERE IS NO philosophia perennis in any external sense of eternity...."

thus phil. becomes
an eternally LIVING ACTIVITY
on FUTURE, phil. becomes the consciousness of the age, & CONTINUITY becomes the principle of the his. process...

I find
an eternally growing activity

p.133: For H the Fr. Rev. was the great event; but he intentionally overlooked the possibilities arising from it, even though in his own per. it was obvious that the AGE OF REVOLUTIONS WAS JUST BEGINNING."

Wolff's *Philosophy* *on Phenomenology* *Review* *Eden 7 Sub-Eng. Feb.*
1958 P/E Obj. phil. Int.

his science all the way in which knowledge appears, their phen., ..alone." (p.808)

as they manifest themselves;
So that His. Science form know not only the recollection but "the Golgotha of the Spirit, alone".

Lowith, summarizing Mr., p.277

"Crucial for an understanding of H's viewpoint on w.

is the phenomenology in whose various forms, ~~one & the same movement~~, appears again ~~again~~ in the dial. of consciousness & self-consciousness. By means of this "intell. construction", whose principle is "Noble negation", Hegel ingeniously transcends real human expression & alienation, depersonalization & estrangement. The phenomenological movement therefore comes to an end with AI. Thus the entire his. of alienation & the entire withdrawal of alienation are nothing but the his. of prod. of abstract, i.e., ~~abst.~~, thought. (III, 2, 159) (TR) Estrangement, which is the actual concern of alienation & its abolition, is conceived as the diff. bet. alienation & its abolition, is conceived as the diff. bet. her se & pro se, bet. consciousness & self-consciousness, bet. obj. & subj. within which the real material contrasts vanish. All other contrasts & options of these contrasts are merely manifestation, the hull, the exterior form of these contrasts which alone are of interest, which comprise the sense of other, profane contrasts. It is not that human nature becomes depersonalized.

... "Like alienation, the appropriation of human abilities, considered as mere objects, is simply a movement of thought.... The vindication of the obj. world of man... therefore this appropriation or insight into this process, is brought forward by Hegel in such a fashion that materiality, religion, pol. power, etc. are spiritual objects; for only the spirit is able to know man and man N, & the true form of the spirit is the thinking spirit."

.... Instead of returning to man our historically determined world of real objects as self-generated, H dialectically equates the obj. of consciousness with self-consciousness.... H's self-consciousness FLATTERS ITSELF WITH THE ILLUSION THAT ITS ACTIVE KNOWLEDGE IN ITS OTHERNESS has reconstituted the self, because it knows nothing of material externality; it knows only a RECOVERY OF ALIENATION OF ITSELF. (Here Lowith refers to Mr.'s summation of AK & retranslated in Ith. 52, p. 435 n2. The alienation of self-consciousness produces selfification....)

But the fact that self-consciousness is at one with itself in its own OTHERNESS means that man possesses his true human nature in the EXISTING ORDER OF LAW, POLITICS, & economics. The merely theoretical abolition of alienation in practice leaves the alienated obj. world exactly as it is. HEGEL'S APPARENT CRITICISM, WHICH FORMALLY DENIES THE EXISTING POWERS WHILE ACTUALLY ASSUMING THEIR CONTENT, IS A FALSE POSITIVISM, a phil. dissolution & restoration of empirical reality.... What Hegel describes is not a human process at all: it is a divine process within man & its actual subj. is AI.

"A corporeal mat..." *Ideas*
ON THE BASIS OF HIS CRITISM OF HEGELIAN SPIRITUALISM
MY DEVELOPED THIS "MAT. VIEW OF HISTORY AS THE ONLY TRUE NATURAL HIS..." The 1st formulation of his. mat. as a naturalistic humanism is determined by the criticism which takes as its starting point, ~~not~~ the Abs. Spirit but anthropological nature. Therefore the real abolition of alienation (p.280) cannot come about in a non-obj. or spiritualistic fashion, but only through an 'obj. action' which alters EXISTING conditions.

See also "In spite of this basic reflection of the 'standpoint' of Hegel's phenomenology, Mr.'s criticism is positive, recognizing H's distinctions, retaining them, & furthering their realization. "HEGEL'S PHEN. IS ??ITS OWN HIDDEN CRITICISM" TO THE EXTENT THAT IT PORTRAYS THE ALIENATION OF MAN--even if

... appears only in the form of spirit, it contains within it
the critical elements of man's self-generation. H frequently prepared & worked out in a manner
which reflects his Hegelian standpoint. The "unhappy consciousness", the "honest
consciousness", the "struggle of double consciousness", etc. these individual
situations contain, though in alienated form, the critical elements of
SUCH AS RELIGION, THE STATE, BOURGEOIS LIFE, ETC. ENTIRE SPHERES

The greatness of H's phen. lies in its
comprehension of "man's self-generation as a process.... Thus H views work as
man's development in "prosperity" // / / / Aside of from this positivism of idealistic
speculation, H achieved an abstract understanding of the essential action of man
AS he generates himself in the world. Within his speculative system, he made
distinctions which reach the nub of the matter. "He had an "estranged insight"
into real depersonalization, estrangement & reappropriation of man BUT REAL REAPPROPRIATION
CAN COME ONLY THROUGH THE "DESTRUCTION" of the estranged condition of our obj. work

(RD Then Löwith notes that "the incidental modification
which turns "abolition" into destruction DIFFERENTIATES MARX methodologically from Hegel".
This extent represents a basic divergence" but I do not understand since both
use "abolition", not "destruction"- but Marx of course means genuine abolition
not just in thought. But then, Löwith continues "for the rest, he takes over H's
categories & reserves them, in material form, even in DAS Kapital.

"COMMUNISM" too is constructed according to
the concrete of Hegelian ph. It is intended as the realization of the dial.
unity bet. ind. action & depersonalization which is the outcome of H's HIS OF PHIL.
(refers here to CAP. I.6, labor process) It is the practical way in which man,
living in society, keeps the entire obj. world in subjection, as self-generated & also
remains himself in his OTHERNESS... a total return of man who has become a stranger
to himself within the obj. world which he has generated... (p.281)

"True C-ism on the other hand as Marx the Hegelian
conceives it is a reappropriation of human nature.... Within this context (cap.)
it is a "genuine resolution" of the conflict bet. existence & essence,....
It is the riddle of his solved."

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