Marx- Fram The Preliminary Work For His Ph. D. Discertation-1839 if.

The premise of the ancient s is the deed of nature; that of the moderns is

is the deed of the spirit.

The fight of the sneight occuld only end when the visible heaven, the substantial bond of life m the weight of political and religious existence was destroyed, for fature must be broken into me two so that spirit dan become one..... but modern philosophy unscals the word, consumes it in the hely fare of the spirit, and as a fighter of spirit with spirit, not as an apostate fallen and particularised by the weight of nature, effects it universally and dissolves the forms which de not allow the universal to break through."

Marz-"Aus Der Hheinescher Zeitung" - Way 1342

From the point of view of the idea, it is self-evident that the freedom of the press has quite another justification than the censorship, for freedom of the press is itself a form of the ideas of freedom, is a positive good, while censorship is a form of lack of freedom, the polemic of a philosophy of appearance. A parely negative nature.

mee transh the philosophy of essence, a purely negative nature."

Threedon is so much the essence of man that even its opponents reglize it, in the how found its reality; that they want to appropriate it to themselves of seally ornement, what they reject as an ornament of human nature.

ind of freedom has therefore always existed, only at one time as a special privilege, another time as a unibersal right.

It is not a question as to the whether thefreedom of the press should exist, for it always exists. It is a question of whether freedom of the press should be

the privilege of some men or the privilege of the human spitit. It is a question of whether what is not the right for more side should be the right of another."

Marx- July 1842

"First of all the question is posed: should philosophy also speak about religious matters in newspaper articles?"

become questions as newspaper questions interest the public, they have become questions of the time... Then it is not a question whether they should be spoken but where and how they should be spoken of, whether in the secrecy of the family and the hotel, the school and the church but not by the press; by the opponents of philosophy but not by the philosophers, whether in the dim language of private talk, but not in the clear language of the public underlanguage of private talk, but not in the clear language of the public understanding; then it is a question what whether what lives kalence in actuality belongs in the realm of the press; them it is a general question of whether athe press should be a real press, i.e. a free press. The second question we separate so mpletely from the first: Is politics a

The second question we separate so mpletely from the first: Is politics at to be treated philosophically by the papers in a so-called Christian state? When religion has become a political quantity, an object of politics, it seems almost no mention is needed of thefact that the papers not only may speak of political subjects but also must. In advance it seems the wisdom of the world, philosophy, have more right toconcernitions with the realm of the world, the state, only, have more right toconcernitions with the realm of the world, the state, then the wisdom of the other world, religion. It is not a question of philosophically or unphilosophically, withe prejudices of without, with consciousness or without, with logic or without, which religion or half, the state will be philosophical about. When religion is made a theory of the state, then religion itself is made a kind of philosophy."

"Where you presume tost nd so high above seligion that you are justified in outting off the general spirit of religion from its positive determination, what have you to repreach in the philosophers when they may want to complete this seperation whelly and not half way, when they call the general's spirit of

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Marx- July 1842 (con't)

religion not the Christian but the human spirit."

Debates on the Law Regarding Theivery of Wood - Oct. stc. 1842, by Marx

Dur whole presentation has shown now the Lauding has debased the emboutive power, the administrative authority, the existence of the defendent, the idea of the state, crime itself and punishment to a material means of private interests. We will find it logical that the judicial judgement is also treated as a mercal means and the power of law of judgement as superficial prolimity."

The lauding has completely fulfilled its determination. It has, whereto it was convoked, representeded a sefinite participar interest and treated it a final purpose. That it has thereby stamped on rights is a simple result of its project, for interest is according to its nature more blind, nore immederate, more one-sided, in a word, lawless instinct, and can the laudious give laws to

"The Rhimelanders mixt conquer the landed class, interparament conquer the owners of the forest. To them must be assigned legally not only the representation of particular interest but also the representation of the interests of the province and both projects are occitradictory, in a case of collision, we must not stop a moment from satisficing the representation of particular interests to the interests of the province. The meaning for right and law is the most meaningful provincialism of the Rhimelander, but it is delf-ovident that special interests denot know any fatherland, any province, any general or secret spirit."

perty in Kamischatka as in the khims province. If wood and wood owners as such give laws, these laws are distinguished only as to the geographical location and the language in which they are given. Thus rejects/materialized this cin against the holy spirit of the people and humanity is a direct consequence of that doctrine which the "Preusaiche Staatszeitung" preaches to the languages, to think in a law shout wood only of wood and forest and not to solve the individual material problemspolitically, i.e. not in connection with the whole reason and ethics of the state." (305-4)

The Liveral Opposition in Hanover- Nov. 1642

advocate neither the fundamentla state law of 1833 nor return to the law of 1819 but has to strive for a completely new, form of state corresponding to a moseper and more penetrating freer popular consciousness.

Fay 1848

" I am net at all specking of the incapacity of the rulers and of the merits of the servents and rags subjects who allow everything to happen as God a makes it; as and nevertheless both are together already enough to bring about a catastrophe. I bring to your attention that the enemies of Philistinism, in a world all thinking and all suffering men have reached an agreement, for which the means were earlier absent, and that even the system of passive prepagation of the old subjects gains recruits every day for the service of the mean new humanity. The system of gain and trademof possession and of the exploitation of men is leading such factor than the increase in the population to a breach within the present society, which cannot sanctify the old system because in general it does not senetify and create, but only exists and enjoys. The existence of suffering humanity which thinks and of thinking humanity which is oppressed must become of necessity unen joyable and undigestible for the passive and thoughtlessly enjoying animal world of the Phillistines.

For our part the old world must be complately exposed to the light of day and the new one positively, elaborated. The longer the ovents of thinking humanity allow time to think and of suffering humanity tour collect themselves the more completely will the product step into the world, the product which the present bears in its loins.

September 1848 In brackets / / the quotes are from Mahring's P. 88

Much greater than the external obstacles appear the inner difficulties. For if there is no doubt about the whonce, there is more confusion about the wither and General anerchy has broken out amoungst the reformers, and all them would be compelled to admit that they have the advantage of the new movement that we do not seek to anticipate the new world degretically but rather to diper cover it in the criticism of the old. Up to now the philos colors had the solution of the riddle lying ready in their writing deaks, and all the set stupid external world had to do was to close its eyes and open its mouth to rec-sive the cadyphaked pie of absolute actions. Philosophy has to one seculars and most striking proof of this is that the philosophic manacistax consciousne eive the coadypbaked but the coughly. It is certainly max make not our task to build up the future in advance and to settle all problems for all time but it is just as certainly our task to criticize the existing world shamesphir ruthlessly. I mean ruthless. ly in the sense that we must not be afraid of our own conclusions and equally

unafraid of coming into conflict with the provailing powers."

Marx had no desire to unfurl and degmatic standards, and communism as preache by Dabet, Dezamy and Weitling he regarded as a A dagmatic dogmatic abstraction. Whether one liked it or note the chell interest of contemporary Germany was in religion and only accordly in poblitics. It was no use presenting them with with a ready-made system such as was contained in the Journey To Icaris, one must

begin with them just as they are./

On the other hand I am not for planting a dogmatic hanner in opposition. We must help the dogmutists to make their own theses oldar. Communism is e dogmatic abstraction, by which I moun not some imagined and possible communism but the actually existing af communism of Cabet, Dezamy, Weitling etc. These communisms are themselves only a partial appearance of the humanist principle, infected by its opposite, private essence. Transcendance of private property me and and communism are therefore in no way identically and communism has seen of necessity and not accidentally other socialist teachings, like those of Pourier, Proudhom etc. because it is only a specialone-sided actualization of the socialist prenciple..

" And the whole socialist principle is again only the enemsided which concerns the reality of thohuman occords. We have equally to concern ourselves with the other side, with the theoretical existence of man, religion science of etc. to make these missions and objects of our criticism, " (p. 573

" Our motto must thus be: Reform of consciousness not through dogma but through the analysis of the mystical, in itself unclear consciousness, appearing now as religious now as palitical. It will then be shown that the world has Aong had the dream of something and must only possess the consciousness of it in order to possess it actually. At will them be shown that it is not a question of a grat break between past and future but of the completion of the thought & of the past. It will finally be soom that humanity does not begin a new labor but consciously brings its old labor to existence. "(p.575)

MARK-Critique Of Hegel's Philosophy Of Right- March August 1843 (Mehring- Marx, Appendix; Pp. 568-570)

First of all concerning the "logical pantheistic mysticism" of Hegel: Reality (with Hegel) becomes a phenomenon, but the idea has no other content apart from this phenomenon. It has also no other purpose but the logical one of being the eternal real spirit in itself. This paragraph contains the whole mystery of the Hegelian philosophy of law and of the Hegelian philosophy in geng

eral. (p.408)

It is important that everywhere Hegol makes the idea the subject and the actual real subject, for instance, political populations, the predicate. (p.418) in each element, whether it is the State or enture whilst real subjects, in this case the prolitical constitution becomes merely their names, so that only the appearance of a real recognition is present. They are had remain unconceived because they are not conditions conceived in their specific essence. (p.412)

He (Hegel) does not develope his thought from the things but from the thing according to a completed thought at one with itself in the abstract sphere of logic. The aim is not to develope the definite idea of the political constitution but to arrange it as a link in its own history (as an idea), an obvious mystificat-

ion." (p.41E)

"Just because Regel proceeds from the predicates of the general definiting instead of from the real and nevertheless a hasis for those delimiting exist, the mystic idea becomes this basis. This is Hegel's dualism, he does not regard the general as the real essence of the real suitable to existing definite, or the real Ens(being) as the real subject of infinity. (p. 426-7

Thus Marx critically dissolves the mysticism of the Hegelian idealist dislection lays bare that its process in allitis dotails and domands a dislection based on reality, that is to say a materialist dislection. This represents a tremaindous and fundamental advance not only on Hegelian idealist, but on all idealist whilst still retaining the trational that is to say material nucleus of the

Hegelian dialectic. Thus an advance Devond Feurbach also.
The State and bourgoeise society: What is therefore the power of the proletits essence brought into existence. What remains to the political State in contradiction to this essence? The illusion that it determines where it is itself det-

Private property is the general/category, the general State bond. " (p. 580) The contradiction of the representative constitution of formal democracy: The representative constitution (compared/with the corporative) represents a certain progress because it is athe frank, unfalsified and logical expression of moments state conditions. It is the unhidden contradiction. (p.492)

The contradiction as it is expressed in the deputy: They are formerly deputized, but immediately they are really som they are no longer deputies. They are supposed to be deputies, but they are not." (p.542)

Harx was able for the time being, to give solution of the contradiction only in general outlines: "The political republic is a demogracy within the abstract State form, The abstract State form of democracy is therefore the republic.

Hegel prodects generally from the separation of the state and from the separations in itself, and the separations of the state and itself, and the separations of the state and state and state and the separations of the state and state and state and state and state and the separations of the state and the separations of the state and the separations of t

really becomes the particular interest and not merely, as with Hogel, in the idea in the abstraction, and this is possoble only if the particularinterest becomes the general int rest." (pp.457-8)

"Governmental power is the most difficult to develope. It belongs to the whole people to a far greater degree than the legislative power." (p.484)

And when the many of the work of the stand