

Questions appended to Dialectics

SCIENCE & LOGIC, pp. 377-8

"Causality according to natural laws is ~~not~~ not the only one from which all the phenomena of the world may be derived; it is necessary to assume another causality through freedom in order to explain them."

"The antithesis is: --There is no freedom, but everything in the world happens ~~solely~~ ^{natural} according to laws...."

"It is said that this proposition is self-contradictory because natural law consists just in this, that nothing happens without a cause sufficiently determined a priori, ~~in~~ which cause thus contains an absolute spontaneity; --that is, the assumption which is opposed to the thesis is contradictory because it contradicts the thesis."

"In order to prove the antithesis it has to be posited that there is a freedom as a particular kind of causality--a freedom to initiate ~~any~~ state and hence also a series of consequences of ~~the~~ state." (It's the page in which Lenin calls attention to the fact that Hegel is talking against Kant.)

(Hegel says "because self-determination is applied to them only externally" (p. 391) or what we would call intellectual planning, they are only means to an end, not an end in themselves.)

g.p. *Dialectics of Freedom*

*Nature is sub. to L. Thus it has unaltered
laws whereas Man is free, i.e. self-determined.
The difference bet. Th. & P. thus
reflects diff. bet. Causality, Freedom* 14300