LEON TROTEKY, 1535-1940 period.

I. Hove from L.O. to 4th;
1955; "if they will learn"

THE MILITARY, 4/8/23: The most powerful proletarent of Europe the arrival of Hitler to power... This is the fact on which we must base all fature calculations.

The German proletariat will rise again, Stalinism never.

(Fragedy of German Prol., 3/14/53-Prinkipo)

5/6/33:

spearly all those opposing (to call for new party in Germany, ff) object to the ocmarison of August 4, 1914 with Mar. 5,1933: the social democrats, you see betrayed the proleonacionally a by that came nearer to the seats of power, the Stalinists, however, idid not know how to defend the prole almoded in jails. This difference is of course very essential a not accidental. But we don't have to exagainate its political significance.

The liquidation of the Ger. CP is only a stage. It will not stop there. If

other sections of the Scmintern leniency of his. Otherwise they are doomed. (Collapse of CPG/and Our Tasks, Frinkipo, 4/9/33)

THE MILITANT of Sep. 2, 1933 carries a front page Demand the 7th Congress... Demand the Comintern leader THE MILITANT of Sep.16,1933 announces "New Forces for L.O....

"From the permicious Nat. Spc. of Stalin new forces learn the lessons of inest-imable value which help them find their way to the intilism of L & T."

Bopt.23,1933: JOINT DECLARATION FOR NEW INTIL.

The Third Int. .fell victim of a chai of his. contradictions...The isolated position of the prol. dic. in a backward country gave an extraordinary power to the ever more conservative and nationally-limited Soviet bureaucracy... Comintern proved not only incapable of fulfilling its historic role but became more & mer of an obstacle in the way of bev. movepe

Despite its 14 yr. experience despite the experience gained in gigantic battles, despite the moral support of the Seviet state and the plentiful means of propaganda, the C.P. of Germany revealed....an absolute revl incapacity. & had thereby shown conclusively that despite the heroism of many of its members it become totally incapable of fulfilling its historic role....

*The new Int. will inscribe on its banner as one of its most important task the defense of the Soviet state from imperialism and internal counter-revolution.

THE MILITANT, same issue, carries Delcaration of ILO to Left Socialist Conference:

"It fell victim to our contrism which is based on the theory a practice of socialism in one country; in a word it was wracked by a system of errors which entered into history under the name of Stalinism.....

"If the lesson of the German catastrophe did not help the Stalinist bureaucracy, nothing will help it. New national parties and a new intil is necessary.....

The Comintern is capable only of decomposing and destroying prol. organizations, but not of strengthening and educating them. The opporation which we have in the presupposes an honest attitude to facts, ideas, mutual comradely criticism and respect for each other......

state capitalism of the type of the Am., Ital., or Ger. type is to ignore the main ques. of the social order, namely the property character and to open the doors wide to false and dangerous conclusions.

oriticism of Stalilism does not exclude but on the contrary prescribes a united front with the Sov. bureaucracy against to common enemies.

The following issue, Sept. 30, 1933, carries DECLARATION of NC of CLA (O) FOR A NEW PARTY AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL! (likewise based on the fact that the CI failed "to draw any lessons from this historical catastrophe."

FOURTH INT'L. July 1943 reprints July 15, 1933 Declaration of LT, in a new translation by John G. (It was also pub'd. in Militant Cot. 1933) but the quotes here are from FI): IS IT NECESSARY TO BUILD THE CPS and the INT'L. ANEW:

as infallible the policy which guaranteed the victory to Hitler, but has prohibited all discussion of what had occurred. And this shameful interdiction was not violated, not overthrown. No national congresses; no internat. congress; no discussions at party meetings; no discussion in the press! An organization which was not roused by the thunder of fascism and which submits docilely to such outrageous acts of the bur. demonstrates thereby that it is dead and that nothing can ever revive it....

"The fact that 2 parties, the SD & the Communist, which arose helf-a-century apart and both of which proceeded from the theory of Marxism and the class interests of the prol.

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could have come to such a gad end: the one through base treaches the other through bankrupto, can engender pessimistic moods even among the advanced workers. Where is the guarantee that a new revolutionary selection will not suffer the same fair?

The victory of fuscism seizes tens of millions. Political programosas are accessible only to thousands or tens of thousands; who, coreover, feel the pressure of millions...

section of these workers (those who are leaving Pnd/ff)a section of whom left the Comintern with indignation, while the maj. did not belong to the Comintern even in the best years, that they formally accept the leadership of the Stalinist bureaucrecy, which is incapable of forgetting or learning anythin is to occupy onesel? with Quixotism and only to hinder the formation of the prol. Yanguard.

socialism, then without the regeneration of a genuine prol. Int'l will not be able, with their own forces alone to regenerate the Bol. Party & to save the dic. of the prol....

"The Stalinism, insofar as they remain in power, will have all the less opportunity to evade the united front as the dangers, both domestic & foreign, become more acute, & as the ind. org. of the world prol. vanguard becomes a greater force....

"In particular & especially it applies the policy of the united front in order to defend the USOR against external intervention & internal counter-rev."

THE SU & THE FI, Oct. 1 1934 (Glasgow pamphlat, 1934) On that day when the new Int. will demonstrate to the hus. wkrs. not in owners but in action that it it alone, stands for the defense of the wkrs. state, the position of the B-Lists inside the SU will change within 24 hrs. The new Int. will offer the Stal. bur. a united front against the common for And if our Int'l represents a force, the bur. will be unable to evade the united front in the moment of danger. What then will remain of the many yrs. encruetation of lies & slander?

WHITHER FRANCE? (3/25/55)p.105: "But we say to those socialists who sincerely hope to find a rev. force in the CI: you are cruelly deceived. You do not understand the his. of the CI, which for the past 10 yrs. has been a his. of errors, catastrophes. capitulations & bur. degeneration catastrophes, capitulations & bur. degeneration

FI, Oct. 1938 A GREAT ACHIEVEMENT: "It is of course no accident that after 15 yrs. of progressive demoralization, the Comintern revealed its complete internal rotteness at the moment of the approaching world war, i.e. precisely at a time when the prol. is most urgently in need of its intil. rev. unification.

THE CASE OF LEON TROTSKY, Summation by LT, p.475:"It was only the fatal policy of the Kramlin, &the complete inability of the Comintern to draw any lessons from the tragic experience of Gar.

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II-Capitalist accumulation and "decline" of proletariat

J, this is much, much more difficult to trade. As in case of underconsumptionism, he espoused here something of which he never made into a theory; although it was implicit in all he did; moreover the writing was during depression or at the very tail end; still for what it is worth here are a few quotes and counterpositions:

1938, DEATH AGONY OF CAPITALISM 'TABKS OF THE FOURTH p.5: "MankInd's productive forces stagnate. Already new inventions & improvements fail to raise the level of material wealth.... Growing unemployment in its turn, deepens the financial crisis of the state & undermines the unstable monetary systems.

"In the historically privileged countries, i.e., in those where the bourgaoisis can still for a certain period permit itself the luxury of democracy at the expense of actional accumulations 'Great Britain, France, U.S., etc.)..."

p.8: "."The crisis of the prol. leadership having become the crisis in manking's culture. "

The introduction "The General Causes of the Present War" of MANIFESTO OF THE FI ON THE IMPERIALIST WAR is wholly underconsumptionist but since there he does not link the stagnation to actual stagnation of "matwrial wealth", but only to standard of living, there is no point to quote.

The most telling of his statements is of course from IN DEFENSE OF MARXISM: "Under conditions of decaying capitalism the proletariat grown neither numerically how culturally. There are no grounds, therefore, for expecting that it will sometimes rise to the level of the rev. tasks." But there too this is hedged with "If we grant as true that the cause of the defeats is rooted in the social qualities of the prol. itslef, then the position of modern society will have to be acknowledged as hopeless." Then follows the previous quotation, which is in turn followed by "Altogether differently does the case present itself to him who has clarified in his mind the profound antagonism between the organic, deep-going insurmountable urge of the toiling masses to tear themselves free from the bloody sapitalist chaos & the conservative, patriotic utterly bourgeois character of the outlived labor leadership/ We must chose one of these two irreconcilable conceptions." (pp.12-13) The irreconcilability however is a purely subjective estimation of the proletariat since "Under conditions of decaying capitalism grows neither numerically nor culturally."

And, of course, there is the background of Russia whose "unprecedented" should prove it workers state & here he uses Stalinist statistics & Stalinist method, p .6-7THE REV. BETRAYED:

The vast scale of industrialization in the SU, as against in background of stagnation and decline in almost the whole capitalist world, appears unswaverable in the following gross indices. Industrial production in Ger., thanks solely to feverish war preparations, is now returning to the level of 1926. Production in GN, holding to the apron strings of protectionism, has raised itself 3 or 4 % during these 6 yrs. Ind. prod. has declined in the US approximately 25%; First place among capitalist countries is occupied by Japan, the is furiously arming herself & robbing her neighbors. Her index lades before the synamic dev. in the S.M. Her ind. prod. has incr. during the same per. approximately 52 times, or 250%.

1936

I'll begin with Russia first since that can be easiest dismissed a the work has already been done. If we take the per. of dev. that is comparable, because both countries then had plans, 1932-37, we find that even in value figures, which amount to very little, the claimed rise of Stalinism is 236%; that of the more reliable Japanese value statistics, 176%, while at the high point of Japanese industrialization, 1940, the achievement was 253% as compared to index of 1931-33. All in sll, despits the richness of Russia's natural resources, and the poorness of Japan's, Japan is concaded to have made the greatest conomic progress. Sources: Conditions of Economic Progress, Colin Clark Industrialization of Japan amendatuo, 1930-40

Economic Strongth of Japan Isoshi Asshi Industrialization of Western Pacific Kate Mitchell.

In any case, in per capita production, which LT saw did not measure up to the advanced countries & around which the whole 3rd year plan was built, Russia in 1937, the year of publication of Rev. Betrayed, stood lower not only that Germany & USA, but also Japan. The easiest thing for physical growth of Russia is to use Statistical Abstract, 1913-1940 I published in NI,12/42

Now the lowest point of depression on a world scale and in USA (and not excluding Russia which has not to this day recovered the slaughter of stock in 1932, the fall of wheat price, etc. etc.) was 1933. From that year until the outbreak of war, although it had never regained full production relative to capacity or relative to 1929; there was not, at the time of the outbreak of WWII & production in full swing, a full stagnation; there was for example a new industry airplane; there was an upswing in 1937 and then another slump, etc., but none of it was even, not even the stagnation, and there was growth of capital accumulation. First high point since the war(then we'll go back) In 1944-45, there were 65 mln. in civilian &mil. occupations (12 mln.army) as compared

(12 mln.army) as compared to 47 mln. empl. in 1940; gross national product was twice as large as in fairly prosperous 1940; \$200 bln. as compared with less then\$100 bln. Mfg. capacity was up 56% over '39.

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1909-1944, mfg., minerals & agric for this 35 yr. per. incr. 496% 254% 167%

1939-44 wast increases of course in "war mfg. industructes; employment in iron & steel rose 500,000; in nonferous metals 200,000; ordnance non-existent in 1939 employs 700,000 fm '44. Transportation equipment ind. had most desmatic expansion, a jum from 725,000 to 5,200,000.

Nation's mfg. facilies in existence in 1939 had cost about \$40 bln, to build. To this was added by June '45\$26 bln. of new plant and equipment. Shipbldg. facilities before war \$162 mln. of productive facilies; at the end of this war it had \$742 mln. dellars of usable facilies or 4 & times that of 1939. Atomic power entirely new bomb project \$2 bln. cost.

Expenditure for Capital Gds., 1920-39 Iin Mln.s), annual av. for each per. of 5 yrs: 1920-4 1925-9 1930-34 1935-59 \$17,286 Total cap. good. \$12,428 \$8,215 Proc.feeilities

7.456 10.112 6,889 5,272 Mirg.

Patricular Res Better take it as 20 yr. intervar per (1920-39) gross expenditures for capital goods averaged a little more than \$12 bln. annually, or 15% of national gross production;

dehydration, quick freezing.

6) New applications of atomic energy & fissionable products in medicine & power prod.

AND YET LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN WHAT IS THE PROBLEM: (America(s AND YET LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IS WHAT IS THE PROBLEM: (America(s) Needs & Resources, Dewhurst & Associates, 1947, p. 552:

"On the contrafy! the doubling of our dollar volume of output during the defense & war per. can be accounted for almost entirely by higher prices, more workers, and longer working hours. Of the total incr. of almost \$102 blm. in g gross nat. product bet. 1940 & 1944, at least \$51 bln. reflected higher prices, while nearly \$45 blm. came from the expansion of our working force by more than a third and \$16 bln. from longer wkg. hours. The remaining \$11 blm. could be acc't. for by an average increase of less than 1.5% a year in output per manchour for the eco. as a whole during the 4-yr. per-MUCH LESS than the annual incr. in productivity during the 2 immediate pre-war decades. However, if, as seems possible, the assumed av. price incr. of 32% bet. 1940-1944 understates the actual rise in prices & costs, there may have been no increase--OR rise in prices & costs, there may have been no increase -- OR AN ACTUAL DEGREASE -- in over-all productivity in the war yrs. (my emphasis,ff)