

THE ACTIVIST

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not be avoided if we wish the clashes between serious thinkers to generate light as well as heat. And this means that we have to look at molecular studies, with their grubbing and their tests of significance and their deliberately imposed blindness to human issues, a necessary adjunct of sociology, no matter how important it is for sociologists to keep the genuine sociological problems in focus."

We need critics, but to make the

anti-empirical "sociological imagination" and "structural criticism" advocated by Mills the standard of sociological excellence would have as ruinous effects on sociology as the similarly angry search for simple answers has recently had on a major political party. There is a striking parallel between a nominating speech which urged those with misgivings to overlook his obvious shortcomings and consider the candidate as a

"whole man" and one paper in this book which says Mills' books should not be judged solely by their accuracy but by their ability to make us take a fresh look at our situation.

Irving Louis Horowitz (ed.), *The New Sociology: Essays in Social Science and Social Theory in Honor of C. Wright Mills*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. 512 pp. \$8.50.

Reason and Revolution vs Conformism and Technology

By RAYA DUNAYEVSKAYA

Professor Marcuse's new and highly original book, *One-Dimensional Man*, is not, as the title might suggest, just one more journalistic work on the alienation of modern man. Again, despite its subtitle, "Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society," Professor Marcuse, far from limiting his study to that of ideology, tries to go to the root of positivistic one-dimensional philosophy, in the automated productive process itself. Indeed, in his attempt to restore the great power of "negative thinking," and to center attention on the dialectical development in

the objective world, as well as in the field of thought, Marcuse "subverts" conformism both in being and in thought. In his Introduction, entitled "The Paralysis of Criticism: Society Without Opposition," he states his aim modestly enough: "My analysis is focused on tendencies in the most highly developed contemporary societies . . . I am projecting these tendencies and I offer some hypotheses, nothing more." Nevertheless, no one who has read the book can put it aside without hearing a ringing challenge to thought to live up to a historical commitment to transform "techno-

logical rationality" into a truly real, rational, free society.

A dualism, however, pervades the book's three major parts: "One-Dimensional Society," "One-Dimensional Thought," and "The Chance of the Alternatives." On the one hand, the author is weighted down by full awareness that the transformation of reality cannot be achieved in thought; it must be consummated in practice: "In other words, society would be rational and free to the extent to which it is organized, sustained, and reproduced by an essentially new historical Subject." (p. 252) On the other hand, Professor Marcuse stresses over and over again, the totality of the conditions that "militate against the emergence of a new Subject." (p. 252) His pessimism is not merely psychological; it is deeply rooted in his concept of "technological rationality," in his attitude that the proletariat has not lived up to its historic task, in his questioning, where not rejecting outright Marx's concept of the proletariat as the "Subject" that would negate "the advanced industrial society." No wonder that Marcuse's studies were developed outside of the range of workers' voices opposing the one-dimensional condition of automated labor.

There is one single exception to this pervasive condition of Professor Marcuse's book: worker's pamphlet, *Workers Battle Automation* by Charles Denby, who happens at the same time to be the editor of *News & Letters*, to which Marcuse likewise refers in the Introduction. In referring, however, to the inhuman

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labor conditions Denby describes, Professor Marcuse not only stresses that "this form of drudgery is expressive of arrested, partial automation" (p. 25), but he leaves out entirely the central point of the pamphlet, the division between the rank and file and the labor leadership in their attitudes toward Automation. Had Marcuse not followed his reference to the pamphlet by many references to bourgeois studies which maintain the exact opposite—that "the organized worker . . . is being incorporated into the technological community to the administered population" (p. 26), that labor and management alike have become part of a "technological rationality"—the absence of any illustrations of a division *within* labor could have been dismissed as irrelevant to the development of Marcuse's thesis. But this is not the case. Quite the contrary.

To demonstrate that there are no negative forces, at least none that challenge the new forms of totalitarian administrative control, Professor Marcuse marshals quotations from Charles R. Walker's study, *Toward the Automatic Factory*, to the effect that the workers themselves allegedly "desire to join actively in applying their own brains to technical and production problems which clearly fitted in with the technology" (p. 30); he cites Jean-Paul Sartre to demonstrate his own point as to the manner in which "The machine process in the technological universe breaks the innermost privacy of freedom and joins sexuality and labor in one unconscious, rhythmic automation—a process which parallels the assimilation of jobs." (p. 27) No less than forty-one footnotes in this one sub-section, entitled "The Closing of the Political Universe," go to prove that "in the most successful areas of automation, some sort of technological community seems to integrate the human atoms at work" (p. 26) so that "Dominion is transfigured into administration" (p. 32) and "containment of social change" (pages 22-48) is effected.

It should not be necessary to add that it is not a question of the veracity of any scholars, least of all that of Professor Marcuse. It is a question of the voices one hears, the sights one sees, the feelings one experiences depending on which side of the production line you stand. In the case of Marcuse, the failure to hear this powerful oppositional voice at the point of production itself, has led

to the view that the new forms of control have indeed succeeded in containing workers' revolt, to the point of so transforming the antagonistic structure of modern industrial society that "A comfortable, smooth reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails . . ." (p. 1) without opposition.

To this reviewer, the brilliance of Marcuse's analysis rests, rather, in the sections dealing with thought, literature, and Beat ways of protest. Listen, for example, to this: "The reign of such a one-dimensional reality does not mean that materialism rules, and that the spiritual metaphysical and bohemian occupations are petering out. On the contrary, there is a great deal of 'Worship today—this week,' 'Why not try God,' Zen, existentialism, and beat ways of life, etc. But such modes of protest and transcendence are no longer contradictory to the status quo and no longer negative. They are rather the ceremonial part of practical behaviorism, its harmless negation, and are quickly digested by the status quo as part of its healthy diet." (p. 14) Professor Marcuse further demonstrates that the one-dimensional thought which is "systematically promoted by the makers of politics and their purveyors of mass information" is by no means limited to the United States, although that is the main focus of his study. "This totalitarian logic of accomplished facts has its Eastern counterpart," he writes. "There, freedom is the way of life instituted by a communist regime and all other transcending modes of freedom are either capitalistic, or revisionist, or leftist sectarianism." (p. 14)

What Marcuse calls "the language of total administration" shows itself forth nowhere more tragically, and yet hilariously, than "in productive union . . . of the Welfare State and the Warfare State." (p. 19) Its end result is the "institutionalized desublimation . . . achieved by the one-dimensional society." (p. 79) Marcuse then describes the ghoulish nuclear war games simulated a la instructions by the "Game Director" of the Rand Corporation: "The rockets are rattling, the H-bomb is waiting, and the space flights are flying, and the problem is 'how to guard the nation and the free world' . . . It is comforting to hear that the game had been played since 1961 at RAND 'down in our labyrinthine basement — somewhere under the Snack Bar.' . . . Obviously, in the realm of the Happy Consciousness, guilt feeling has no place,

and the calculus takes care of conscience." (pp. 81, 82)

It becomes clear that, taken as a whole, *One-Dimensional Man* tries to synthesize philosophy, economics and literature—indeed, the whole realm of culture (linguistics included)—with the categories of experience. That is to say, instead of relating economic structure to "ideology," or "false consciousness" (in the strictly Marxian meaning), as substance and manifestation, Professor Marcuse wishes to deal with epistemology, with the whole theory of knowledge and its categories. Toward that end, he proceeds from the "One-Dimensional Society," which occupies nearly a half of the book, and which already has analyzed the superstructure as well as the structure of society, directly to "One-Dimensional Thought," which focuses on modern philosophy separately.

We had already been introduced to the emergent pattern of one-dimensional thought and behavior: "The trend may be related to a development in scientific method: operationalism in the physical, behaviorism in the social sciences." (p. 12) Now Marcuse restates his critique within the process of the development of philosophic thought itself from its origins in the dialectics of Plato to the science of Whitehead and the absurdities of Wittgenstein. "The totalitarian universe of technological rationality is the latest transmutation of the idea of Reason . . . the process by which logic becomes the logic of domination." (p. 123) As against this, dialectics would reveal the true antagonistic structure of reality and of thought trying to grasp this reality: "If man has learned to see and know what really is, he will act in accordance with truth. Epistemology is in itself ethics and ethics epistemology. . . . To the extent to which the experience of an antagonistic world guides the development of the philosophical categories, philosophy moves in a universe which is broken in itself (*déchirement ontologique*)—two-dimensional. Appearance and reality, untruth and truth (and, as we shall see, unfreedom and freedom) are ontological conditions . . . Philosophy originates in dialectics; its universe of discourse responds to the facts of an antagonistic reality." (p. 125)

Professor Marcuse presumes a goodly amount of knowledge on the part of his readers. But it appears to this reviewer that this part is especially important to the college stu-

dents daily exposed to (if not brain-washed by) the pragmatist, vulgarly empiric, positivistic, not to mention the success philosophies of the day. As against Wittgenstein's language games, where ordinary language "is really sterilized and anesthetized" (p. 198), and as against "pure" science, science without telos, Marcuse does appeal to the transcendent view, but from first to last, he stresses that his critical theory is "opposed to all metaphysics by virtue of the rigorously historical character of the transcendence." (p. xi) The transcendent is not in heaven, but on earth; the historic is *transitory, human, actual* as against only the potential and inherent. It is precisely, however, when Marcuse reaches the stage of freedom where he once again questions Marx's concept of the proletariat as the liberating force, and where pessimism once again overcomes his view of "The Chance of the Alternatives" which forms the last part of his work. He thus returns to what he stated at the beginning, which was very nearly a built-in presupposition: "Today's fight against this historical alternative [Marx's concept of the "abolition

of labor," RD] finds a firm mass basis in the underlying population and finds its ideology in the rigid orientation of thought and behavior to the given universe of facts. Validated by the accomplishments of science and technology, justified by its growing productivity, the status quo defies all transcendence." (p. 17)

Two elements—one from theory, and from the objective world—save the critical philosophy that Professor Marcuse expounds. One is that the critical theory refuses to abdicate and leave the field "to an empirical sociology which, freed from all theoretical guidance except a methodological one, succumbs to the fallacies of misplaced concreteness. . . ." (p. 254) If even the philosopher should see only the hopeless, Marcuse maintains, he would nevertheless, wish "to remain loyal to those who, without hope, have given and give their life to the Great Refusal." (p. 257)

The other moment of hope is of much greater import since it is both objective and subjective and has the force to undermine the status quo: ". . . underneath the conservative popular basis is the substratum of the

outcasts, and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colors, the unemployed and the unemployable . . . their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not. Their opposition hits the system from without and is therefore not deflected by the system; it is an elementary force which violates the rules of the game and, in doing so, reveals it as a rigged game." (pp. 256-57)

There are those who think that the time for the all-dimensional man passed with the Renaissance. There are others, like this reviewer, who think his time is first coming. And there are the conformists whose total indifference to discussion of anything pluri-dimensional is likely to bury *One-Dimensional Man* without ever getting a serious dialogue around it started in the academic world. I trust the youth will not let this happen. Thereby they will become part of history-in-the-making in the realm of thought.

ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN by Herbert Marcuse (Beacon Press, Boston, 260 pp., \$6).

Reunion and Reaction

By JONATHAN EISEN

The author who seeks to add to our understanding of the American racial crisis undertakes a formidable task. He has a long, and distinguished list of predecessors; he has a numerous, if not so distinguished, set of competitors in the journalists who have rushed to meet the demand for civil rights literature. The gloomy and the hopeful of the history and present of the American Negro have been recited. The psychological *malaises* produced by slavery and segregation, on both sides of the racial line, have been plumbed. What then remains to be said, in comparison with what remains to be done?

It may seem harsh to judge *My Face Is Black* by such criteria. It is, after all, a popular book, written with clarity and sensitivity. *Habitues* of the literature and action of the civil rights movement can hardly afford to forget that such books are needed. Yet any milder standards would not

do justice to *My Face Is Black* or to its author. C. Eric Lincoln is a sociologist of standing, a poet of some talent; it is not in him to write a book which merely reviews old facts and insights.

My Face Is Black has all the facts: the history of racial indignity and Negro protest; the struggle against self-hatred and the menace of Negro chauvinism. Indeed, the tone of menace dominates the book. Lincoln is fearful, and justly so, of the "counter-backlash": Negro hatred of whites replacing "tomism" as a form of communication between the races, the collapse of the dream of racial brotherhood in the moment of victory over slavery.

The sense of menace is an indication of the new temper of the civil rights movement. Victory over white racism is assured. The Dixiecrat inspires indignation but no longer fear. Assured of triumph, the victors need

only fear one another: animosity and strain begin to show in the phalanx of the movement for racial equality.

Yet there is more than fear in Lincoln's book: there is faith. The faith appears not only in Lincoln's direct discussion of Christianity, which he regards as the true lodestar of the American Negro, whatever the betrayals of its white votaries. Lincoln's conviction appears as well in his analysis of history, which gives to the moments of tragedy the stature of drama, the quality of being points in a great epic moving toward a resolution in which past folly is transfigured in a triumphant future.

Lincoln's history is more than a struggle for racial equality; equality with oppressors and the perpetrators of injustice is not to be valued. Indeed, it is the very *egalitarianism* of the Muslim movement that he fears: two equal and oppressing races are no improvement on one. "If the

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Youth, Philosophy and Revolution

Raya Dunayevskaya

THE REVOLUTIONARY INTERNATIONALS, 1864-1943, Edited by Milroad M. Drachkovitch, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, Calif. \$6.95.

The sin of sins, in the eyes of the editor of the volume under review, is to be young. It seems that to be young—whether you are a socialist or not, but “especially Socialist youth”—is almost a sure guarantee that you will take the primrose path leading straight to Bolshevism. All this, and more, the reader will learn from Professor Milroad M. Drachkovitch, who, this time as author, (in collaboration with Branco Lazitch) assures him that the world enthusiasm generated by the birth of the Communist International in 1919 was all “a historical misunderstanding,” based on “emotional rather than ideological grounds.” (p.161) These emotions made non-Communists “oblivious of the fact that . . . civil war and revolutionary warfare were integral parts of Bolshevik strategy.” (p.162) Which is, no doubt, why they were “drawn to Bolshevism by the prestige of the only successful revolution.” (p.161)

(Dear readers, disregard any contradictions; better is yet to come.) We are informed that, where these non-Communists — from pacifists to anarchists and from syndicalists to socialists as well as some real innocents — weren't “ignorant” or didn't come either from “backward countries” or “the most backward parts” or “politically underdeveloped regions” of a country, yet nevertheless showed their “political immaturity” (p.163) by succumbing to “the fascination of revolutionary power.” (p.160) To emphasize just how “attractive” had been “the Bolsheviks' activism” (“especially true of Socialist youth” p.162), the authors conclude ponderously and,

though with hindsight, use the tone of prophecy: “It was no accident that the overwhelming majority of Communist leaders in the period between 1919 and 1921 were under thirty years of age, and many of them under twenty-five.”

Lest any *ACTIVIST* readers despair that, being younger than even twenty-five, they are beyond redemption, let me hasten to inform them that the venerable Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, is all too eager to save “both the layman and the professional historian.” In the Preface, the editor assured us that the aim in presenting these papers from a conference on the one hundredth anniversary of the founding of the First International was to introduce one and all “to new facets of an extremely complex phenomenon.” So there is nothing to fear. Just how comparative these “comparative historic studies” are can be gleaned from the insensitive dragging in of a tragedy of historic proportion just to get a whack at Lenin: “With respect to the German Communists whose leaders opposed the creation of the Third International as premature, Lenin enjoyed a great stroke of political good luck (!) in the assassination by a ‘class enemy’ (1) in 1919 of Rosa Luxemburg and Leo Jogiches.” (p.161)

Having taken up five and one-half pages for this type of mood setting, the reader has a right to expect that Professors Drachkovitch and Lazitch should be ready to get down to the facts of the case. It turns out, however, that the section, “The Shaping of the Comintern,” begins, not with a discussion either of the first Congress of the Comintern, or the Russian Revolution which created its foundation, but by a return back to 1902: “The events of October 1917

in Russia,” they write as if they had just finished interviewing Lenin, “confirmed Lenin in the correctness of his 1902 view, set forth in *What Is To Be Done?*, that spontaneity was the main enemy of the working-class movement . . .” (p.164)

It would be hard to find anywhere more errors compressed into one-half of one sentence. (2) First of all, Lenin had never said, written, or thought that “spontaneity was the main enemy of the working-class movement”—not in 1902, not in 1905, not in 1917, not in 1919, and not when he died in January, 1924. The spontaneity, or rather lack of it, that Lenin deplored in 1902, was the alleged fact that the workers couldn't “spontaneously” come to Marxism; that “professional revolutionaries” had “to bring” socialism to them. The 1905 Revolution, however, led Lenin to enthuse: “The working-class is instinctively, spontaneously, Social-Democratic.” Far from 1917 having confirmed Lenin's alleged position that “spontaneity was the main enemy of the working-class movement,” Lenin was so thoroughly disgusted with the leadership of his “vanguard party” that was supposed to bring socialism to the masses—and precisely for not understanding the directions of the spontaneous actions of the workers—that he wrote it; “I am compelled to tender my resignation to the Central Committee . . .” and threatened, instead, to go directly “to the sailors.” (3)

Now then—and for the purpose of the subject at hand, the second point is more important than the first — why did Professors Drachkovitch and Lazitch drag 1902 into a discussion of 1919? The reader is compelled to plod through 30 more pages of this type of rewriting of history before there is another reference to *What Is to Be Done*. He is told that what really dominated Lenin's revolutionary thought from 1902 until the founding of the Third International was “obsession with power.” (p.194) Moreover, he developed all these ideas which brought about “the isolation of Russia in or-

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der to (sic!) prevent its contamination by infidels—these were Lenin's legacy to the Comintern. Stalin simply exploited the full potential for evil of practices that were well-established in Lenin's lifetime." (p. 194; emphasis added).

Stalinist totalitarian practices thus emerge "naturally" out of Lenin's theoretical preoccupation, nay, veritable obsession with power. Note also that: (1) Once you have claimed that Stalinism is the outgrowth of Leninism, you need not reveal that Lenin left a Will which called Stalin "rude and disloyal" and asked the Party "to remove him." (2) Thus, it is as nothing to fail to deal with the period from Lenin's death in January, 1924, to Trotsky's expulsion in November, 1927, as a Great Divide between the early years of the Comintern that inspired revolutionary world response, and the Stalinism which was soon to generate a counter-revolution. Instead, you can call the period, simply, "Interregnum," and statistically reel off those years as if no fundamental changes occurred within the International as a result of objective developments outside it. (3) Above all you need pay no attention to the overriding economic and political changes which transformed the early worker's state into its opposite, a state-capitalist society and *therefore* transformed the Comintern into nothing but an outpost of state-capitalism, dubbed "socialism in one country." It is so much easier to state that "personal (sic!) differences" between Lenin and Stalin notwithstanding, Stalin carried out Lenin's line, making the CI into the tool of one man.

With all those burdens out of the way, you have but one question left to answer: was the Third International "the only legitimate heir of the First, and the redeemer of the sins of the Second?" (p.198) Here our authors at first begin modestly: "The problem is of course complex, but it can be reduced to a relatively simple proposition." Then our specialists in reducing complex questions to non-existent ones continue: "Inasmuch as Marxism in theory and practice was both deterministic and voluntarist, revolutionary and reformist . . . (and) Marx himself was . . . a Blanquist and an anti-Blanquist, a supporter of the bourgeois republic in France and the inflamed avenger of the Paris Commune . . ." (p.199)

All that is needed is a label: Marx's "dual nature" (p.200). "Dual Nature" speaks for itself, and it takes in Marx, Lenin and Stalin. Now this is indeed a magical feat that far surpasses the story of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde who were such absolute opposites that, though they were one person, the author still had some explanations to make.

Magical indeed is the rewriting of history. It is time to journey back to the beginning. Since 100 years stand between the 1960's and the 1860's, any analysis of the First International is bound to be more objective. Part I of the Revolutionary Internationals is more or less objectively written and has the further advantage of giving the reader a more rounded view of the historic period by including one essay of a hitherto unexplored aspect—"Secret Societies and the First International" by Boris L. Nicolaesky—as well as the most lively piece of writing in the volume—"The Anarchist Tradition" by Max Nomad. Unfortunately, the main burden of the section, of necessity, falls to the subject at issue, "Rise and Fall of the First International" by Jacques Freymond and Miklos Molnar. Despite the greater objectivity of approach and marshalling of facts, (as compared to the analyses of the Third International), the essay is hampered by its underlying philosophy -- if so bland an attitude as theirs can be called a philosophy.

One would never know, from reading this article, that the authors are dealing with that exciting decade, the 1860's, which, according to Marx, opened a new world epoch of struggles for freedom the moment John Brown made his attack on Harper's Ferry, comprised the Civil War in the United States which "sounded as the tocsin for the European working class" (4) and culminated in 1871 in the Paris Commune, the first workers' state in history. Where Karl Marx held these views, Messrs. Freymond and Molnar not only never mention John Brown, but hardly deign to speak of the Civil War, much less give credit to the IWA for having influenced its course toward the abolition of slavery. Instead, here is how they introduce the one phrase from Marx on the subject: "Marx went so far as to claim that the founding of the IWA was what decided Palmerston "to avoid war

with the United States.'" (p.26). It is not unusual for Europeans to discount the American roots of Marxism (5), but these writers stoop to psychology: "Marx hoped in 'compensation' for the 'ideological concessions' to reap the benefit of the new 'power' (Macht) that the IWA was beginning to be on the international scene." (p.26)

Despite the fact that these authors show that "throughout Europe and the United States, and during the large strikes of 1868 and 1870 and the Paris Commune of 1871, several hundred thousand workers proclaimed their allegiance to the IWA" (p.21), Professors Freymond and Molnar not only conclude that the IWA wasn't all that effective, but proceed to downgrade significance of the Commune, which, they tell us, "was not so much an insurrection provoked by general social unrest as an outgrowth of the frenzied state of a besieged and starving Paris." (p.31)

So here we are, back at the old dogmatism—the backwardness of the proletariat—from which intellectuals find it very nearly impossible to break loose. What is paramount in the minds of the essayists is their opposition to the International's Resolution that the building of a proletarian political party would henceforth be considered "indispensable for assuring the triumph of the social revolution aiming ultimately at the abolition of all classes."

Whatever the reason they took such a roundabout way of stating their opposition, here is what the dialectic means to Professors Freymond and Molnar: First, they quote Engels' evaluation of the IWA: "The Commune was beyond doubt the intellectual child of the International . . . For ten years the International channeled European history in one direction—the direction of the fu-

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ture . . . I believe the next International . . . will re-establish our very principles (a truly common theoretical program," (Letter to Sorge, Sept. 12-17, 1874). They seem almost to agree with "the lucidness of this clear (sic!) application of historical materialism, calling it "the rough outline of a thesis." (p. 23) Whereupon they are off in search of an "antithesis!" (p.23) Naturally, it must be an objective, verifiable fact, reality itself. Although this turns out to be their subjective evaluation of the Paris Commune, they nevertheless accept it as objective. Not only that, the "antithesis" becomes, simultaneously, the "synthesis," not to mention that it was an *a priori* judgment in the first place: "his (Marx's) real adversary was not Bakunin or any other leader, but the nearly physical resistance of the environment." (p.30)

Yet I dare say that even Professors Freymond and Molnar were surprised to find to what uses Professors Possony and Niemeyer put the "dialectic" (6) in evaluating the Third and Second International, respectively.

Professor Gerhart Niemeyer, author of "The Second International: 1889-1914," builds up a straw man he calls the "Second Reality:" "German Social Democracy — the very term indicates its character as a little world unto itself—former 'a state within a state.'" (p.104) Having aroused the apparition of "a state within a state," and thrown in, for good measure, that, although with the expulsion of the Anarchists, the Second International thought they had exorcised "the ghost of revolutionary radicalism" but didn't, the lofty professor is ready for the broad jump that does violence to history, theory, and reality: "Without the International, European labor might have become an integrated part of the existing society . . . The revolutionary and utopian ideology, however, stood in the way of this development. It created fears and counterfears, and these helped to nourish the fascist and Nazi movements as much as they nourished the Communist movement." (p.126)

McCarthy couldn't have done better, and he wasn't even a professor. Professor Possony, however, does him one better in the climactic final article of the whole volume, entitled "The Comintern as an Instrument of Soviet Strategy." There he not

only reiterates the same thematic slander—upon the authority of a Nazi — that "the Communist movement provided a model for the National Socialist struggle" (p.212), but he rolls this history back from the Stalin to the Lenin period: "The cooperation between Communists and German nationalists had a long history dating from Imperial Germany's aid to Lenin during World War I." (p.211) Nor does the Director of the International Political Studies program of the Hoover Institution stop there. He returns to the period prior to the Nazi victory: "Naturally the Communists did not help the Nazis merely because they wanted Hitler to win." (p.218)

Pardon me, dear reader, if I stop here. Not being as adept as the professors in this symposium at seeing Machivellian schemes everywhere, this type of tailoring of history to suit one's prejudices makes me gag. For those of us who fought Stalinism from its birth, and broke also from Trotsky when he called for the defense of Russia, the totalitarian pattern of the rewriting of history and amalgam-building is all too familiar. Frankly, the hatchet job under review merits no review. I did it for only one reason—the complete confidence I have in the New Left youth not to submit to brainwashing, either via the tomes issued by the multiversities or to the courses these institutions of "higher learning" offer on "Marxism-Leninism." Instead, if I may, I should like to direct their attention to an international symposium by writers from both the East and the West on Socialist Humanism, edited by Erich Fromm. In my contribution to that symposium I dealt with precisely the type of writing Professor Drachkovitch wrote and edited: "Let us not debase freedom of thought to the point where it is no more than the other side of the coin of thought control. One look at our institutionalized studies of "Marxism-Leninism" as the 'know your enemy' type of course will show that, in methodology, they are not different from what is being taught under established Communism . . .

(7) The espousal of *partijnost* (party principle) as a philosophic principle is another manifestation of the dogma of 'the backwardness of the masses.' . . . This is not an academic question for either the East or the West. Marxism is either a theory of liberation or it is nothing.

In thought, as in life, it lays the basis for achieving a new human dimension, without which no society is truly viable."

Because it is the new human dimension today's youth are striving for, and because they are creative in bucking the multiversity's attempted stranglehold on them, I do not doubt that they will yet reverse the tendency of academia to assist the bourgeoisie in its descent into the total bankruptcy of thought.

FOOTNOTES

(1) That a historian, in 1966, should use quotation marks around the words, class-enemy, in a reference to the murderers of Rosa Luxemburg and Leo Jogiches is, in itself, a condemnation of the study under review. For the most objective study of that year, 1919, in Germany, see *Rosa Luxemburg* by J. P. Nettie (Oxford University Press).

(2) The second half of that sentence reads "and that the victory of the revolution could be secured only by 'the centralization of the most secret functions in an organization of professional revolutionaries.'" It is characteristic of the sloppiness of the work of these authors that all their references fail to specify which edition of the works of Lenin they are citing—and, for their information, there are many editions. In any case, it is in none of the editions, either English or Russian or French of the *Selected Works*, Vol. I, pp.339-8. Indeed, that volume does not contain "What Is To Be Done?" Very obviously, "the centralization of the most secret functions in an organization of professional revolutionaries" — whatever it meant for 1902—fell through in 1917 as Zinoviev and Kamenev published the date of insurrection. However, Kerenky, even as the Tsar, could not possibly stop "secret functions" when they are being executed by the spontaneity of the masses.

(3) Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. VI, p. 232, Am. ed. 1943. (International Publishers)

(4) Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, p.14. (Charles H. Kerr, Chicago, 1933)

(5) For the American roots of Marxism, both historically, and theoretically, see Chapter 5, *Marxism and Freedom*. (Twayne Publishers, N.Y., 1964) For the American roots in the Second International and the European attitude, see Chapter 1, Vol. III, Part I, *The Second International* by G. D. H. Cole (London, 1963).

(6) Professor Possony's venom against Bolshevism, for example, is of such a fanatic nature that it even includes Hegel whose alleged "laws of dialectics" Communism used. Thus: "But even the highly disciplined 'Bolshevized' Communist movement could not be switched as the laws of dialectics demands. If (Communist power) was all in line with the insight which Lenin drew from Hegel's philosophy of history 'Dialectics equals the destroying of oneself.'" (pp.221-22) Which ignorance of the dialectic ought to make poor Hegel turn in his grave 133 years after his burial.

(7) See especially Princeton University's Graduate Program (Spring Term, 1962-63) for "Marxism and Communist Ideologies" where the only biography of Marx is the slanderous C. Spriggs; the only book by Trotsky is "Terrorism and Communism." The "standard" work seems to be that erudite work by the professor who teaches the course and who has authored a work that considers the class struggle a "myth" which Marx propagated so he could glorify the proletariat but that in fact it was only "the end product of his philosophy of alienation." (Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx by Robert Tucker, Cambridge University Press, 1961). No wonder the European Marxistologist, George Lukatsch, though he too is anti-Bolshevik, considered such American analysis "a sort of intellectual counterpart to the late Mr. Dulles' weekly sermon on the evils of Communism." (Surrey), No. 50, January, 1964)

THE ACTIVIST

A Student Journal of Politics and Opinion



Nuclear War With China in 1972?

Thomas M. Conrad

"It may turn out that the net effect of China's emergence as a nuclear power will be a step in the direction of a less dangerous world."

JOIN: A Community Union

Michael James

"Calling oneself a revolutionary does not mean splitting for the hills of Latin America or spouting doctrines. For us, being a revolutionary means working to build radical constituencies acting in their own self-interest."

NSA and the CIA

Robert Kuttner

"Anti-Americanism is deeper and more cynical than most diplomats realized, which should surprise only those used to dealing with sycophants . . . There was no bubble to burst."

The Obsolete Press

Joseph A. Barbato

"The most drastic innovation of the last 25 years was the dropping of the period from the front page logo of The New York Times. Can the press report the real grievances of a radical movement and long remain loyal to the existing community structure?"

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suitable for revolutionary politics. Rather, it requires us to search out, and perhaps it also makes possible, new forms of political action. But that is subject matter for another book.

Miss Colish Replies:

Mr. Walzer's rebuttal suffers from the same problems which characterize his book as a whole: (1) the tendency to jump to conclusions and (2) the tendency to assume that repetition of his thesis constitutes proof of it. The fact that I take exception to Mr. Walzer's conclusions,

and, more importantly, his methods of arriving at them, is not evidence that I am a positivist. I do not oppose generalizations on principle; I merely oppose inadequately supported ones.

Secondly, Mr. Walzer's kind restatement of the four points on which his thesis rests does not automatically endow them with more credibility than they had before.

Mr. Walzer may, more justly, complain that I am criticising him because I do not share his methodological assumptions. To which I can only reply that the test of an argument is not the degree to which it convinces people who already agree with you.

being basic not only for analytical purposes, but also as "an approach to create and use organizations," Strong points to the existence of contradictions "between the top and the bottom, and within Party committees. These cleavages can and should be resolved through discussion and argument." Disregard the fact that the man whom Strong is quoting and summarizing is the very one who is now accused of having "taken the road to capitalism," and the fact that in the so-called Cultural Revolution you hear only one voice, that of Mao, and that, far from this being a "discussion" with a co-leader of the Chinese Revolution and the President of the People's Republic of China, it is a fantastic, unsupported accusation. Indeed, Tracy Strong chooses to show no awareness at all of the fact that here the "resolution" of "contradictions" assumes the form of a Kafkaesque trial with youthful hooligans serving as accuser and judge as well as executioner. Evidently, the theory must under no circumstances be jammed up against reality, neither that of today, nor of the past. During the seven weeks in 1957 when "minority opinion" was "perhaps encouraged," the extensive documentation in the Chinese press shows that, in the majority, the criticism was from the left, not the right of Mao.

Strong proceeds on his contradictory, merry way, undisturbed by reality except as it is reported to him by such long-standing and renowned Mao apologists as Anna Louise Strong whom he quotes to verify his contention that "the theory of contradictions provides a clue, this time as the basis of behavioral norms." In face of the reality that the voice of Mao and his cohorts are the only voices heard, she "reports" that the so-called Cultural Revolution resides in "the control by the masses through unlimited criticism and debate . . ."

(Miss Dunayevskaya, a frequent contributor to *The ACTIVIST*, is writing in reply to Mr. Strong's review, "Cadres and Communists," that appeared in our last issue. Because of the length of the exchange, Mr. Strong's reply will appear in our next issue—Ed.)

Cadres and Communists: A Dissent

Raya Dunayevskaya

Tracy Strong has used the occasion of his review of Franz Schurmann's *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (ACTIVIST No. 18 Winter 1966-67) as a point of departure for an analysis of the officially labelled "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." He, along with writers in the daily press, shortens it to the designation "Cultural Revolution," and, along with Mao apologists, considers it to be "precisely what the name implies—that it is in the broadest sense cultural . . . The Red Guards must be seen as a means to prepare the proper coming together of opposites—and for this to happen the opposites must first be recognized. Without such a process there can be, according to Mao's rather Hegelian dialectic, no progress, no *Aufhebung*."

In order to follow the circuitous route of Strong's reasoning, we will, for the moment, leave poor Hegel turning in his grave at the designation of Mao's Confucian-Stalinoid vulgarizations of the dialectic concept of contradiction as "rather Hegelian dialectic." Obviously, the reviewer was concerned with achieving a certain symmetry in his analysis which, from the very start, called attention to "the principles of Mao's On Contradiction ('two combines into') . . ."

So enamored had Strong become of this definition, which is crucial to his analysis, that he repeats it when he comes to the next set of contradictions between an alleged antipathy of the Chinese who although they invented the mandarin are still supposed to have an antipathy toward organization but were forced, "in the process of modernization," to "become partisan of precisely this 'organization' which historically they despised. This is a contradiction only in appearance ('two combines into one')."

Like calling black white, and white black, there is just no limit to what one can do with contradictions in general, and combining "two into one" in particular. The failure of the Great Leap Forward is declared "more importantly [to have] succeeded in organizing the countryside along a cadre line." Should the 600 million Chinese peasants fail to appreciate that "victory" as a substitute for food and the endurance of near-starvation, one can admit failure "in many economic senses!" That assuages the hunger, or at least lets you remain true to the theory "two combines into one."

Along with Liu Shao-sh'i, whom he quotes on the question of that all-inclusive concept of contradiction as

After all, wasn't it "the masses" who put a dunce cap on Liu Shao-sh'i, made him "discuss" by reading the quotations from "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung," which he had no doubt helped to ghost write while he was Mao "closest comrade-in-arms." "The Thought" had been gone over by his wife who was now unceremoniously (but didactically) labeled a "prostitute."

Tracy Strong has achieved his symmetry of contradictions and reached the climactic conclusion (with which we began), that "The Red Guards must be seen as a means to prepare the proper coming together of opposites," without once showing any awareness of the fact that his much beloved slogan, "two combines into one," is the very one *against* which the present "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" is directed. The definition had been useful to Mao when he was stressing unity in China and in the Communist world. It became useless when he had to justify splits in the Communist world and breaking with his own leadership cadre in China. Thereupon the slogan was attributed to Yang Hsien-chen, slated for purge. The slogan was reversed and the "proper" Maoist definition of contradiction presently is "One divides into two."

Let us now return to Hegel's concept of contradiction and see what Mao has reduced it to, philosophically and politically. Central to Hegelian philosophy is, of course, the concept that contradiction, not harmonious increase and decrease, is the creative and moving principle of history; that all development results from *self-movement*, not organization or direction by external forces. In his "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic," Marx singled out "The greatness of Hegel's *Phenomenology* and of its final result—the dialectic of negativity as the moving and creating principle." He insisted that, despite the fact that Hegel seems to deal only with stages of consciousness and not with Man himself. Despite his idealism, the concept of alienation—con-

traditions and their resolution through "negation of the negation"—was objectively, historically grounded, though expressed in "estranged form." Marx concretized the concept of contradiction as the reality of the class struggle: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles" proclaimed the Communist Manifesto, and Marx proceeded, in theory and in life, to show that "the negation of the negation" can be realized only through revolution.

When Lenin, in turn, felt compelled to return to the origins of Marxism in Hegel's Science of Logic, he, too, singled out contradiction as the crucial principle of development: "Briefly the dialectic can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. Thereby is the kernel of the dialectic grasped, but that demands explanation and development." The "explanation and development" followed (for his rediscovery of Hegel occurred in the period of the first world war which had caused the collapse of the established Marxist International) in his concretization of the transformation of competitive capitalism into its opposite, monopoly imperialism, and transformation of a section of labor into its opposite, "the aristocracy of labor" which was the underlying reason for the betrayal of the Second International.

From Hegel to Marx to Lenin we thus see a straight line of development of the concept of negativity (contradiction) as objective, historic, and then, in opposition to Hegelian dehumanization of ideas, as rooted in the class struggle. All this was changed by Stalin who denuded the dialectic of its class roots and had Zhdanov demand that "criticism and self-criticism" become "the new dialectic law." Mao's "originality" consisted of adding to the Stalinist concept he took over a further measure of voluntarism which would make "the masses" throughout the world see nuclearly-armed imperialists as "paper tigers" and those in China work and sweat so that, with or without modern technology, they make "one day equal 20 years."

Space does not permit me to go into greater detail on the subject of Mao Tse-tung whose development I have analyzed over a period of nearly two decades. For the purpose of the comments on Tracy Strong's review, to which the concept of contradiction is central, it will suffice to

quote what I said when Mao Tse-tung brought his 1937 "theory," On Contradiction, up to the "reality" of 1957:

"The lowest of all today's sophists is the head of the Chinese Communist Party and State, Mao Tse-tung, who recently (June 18, 1957) caused a world sensation with his speech, 'On Handling Contradictions Among People' in which he proclaimed, 'Let a hundred flowers bloom. Let a hundred schools of thought contend.' Mao has ridden this single track, which he calls 'Contradiction' ever since 1937. At that time, he directed his attack against 'dogmatists' who refused to reduce all contradiction in the anti-Japanese struggle and submit to 'the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.' In 1952, Mao introduced a new set of definitions into 'Contradiction,' this time applying it to those who opposed the Chinese Communist Party taking sole power in China. By June 18, 1957, after editing with a heavy hand the speech he delivered on February 27th to the Supreme State Conference, he reduced the struggle of class against class to a contradiction among 'the people' while he became the champion, at one and the same time, of the philosophy of a hundred flowers blooming and one, and only one Party, the Chinese Communist Party ruling. Outside of the exploitative class relations, nothing so clearly exposes the new Chinese ruling class as their threadbare philosophy."

Since then, especially beginning with the public start of the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1960, we had, first, a yet newer definition of contradiction as "two combine into one." This was changed again in 1963, when he began to challenge Russian Communist leadership of the Communist world parties by splitting them, as "one divides into two." We do not doubt that these, in turn, will be transformed into some new opposites as objective conditions change and Mao needs new "philosophic" support for his political gyrations.

It is a sad commentary on our life and times that even the new left, if we are to judge by Tracy Strong's "Cadres and Communists," feels no compulsion, when analyzing established Communism's claims, to return to the original sources of "Marxism-Leninism"—Marx and Lenin—and measure the claim against what the founders proclaimed.

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A Student Journal of Politics and Opinion

1968 and Beyond

Hal Draper

Charles Hamilton

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Michael Rossman

Howard Zinn



"How Could They Do This to Me?"

Wilson C. McWilliams

Of the Teachers, by the Teachers...

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The Cold War Revisited

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Books and Reviews

Raya Dunayevskaya

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thetical new program costs a great deal, and we do not know in advance whether it will work, the obvious thing is to set up pilot projects. These pilot projects are experiments and require experimental controls. Most children and schools must go on in the old ways to serve as bases of comparison. But as soon as a few schools are selected and controls set up, there is immediate prejudgment of the effectiveness of the experimental programs. "Why can't our children have special curricula, smaller classes, the new methods?" Before the experiment can be tried, it becomes a subject for political pressures, collective bargaining, and mass demonstrations. The result is that at the end it is impossible to tell whether schools with the new programs are better or worse than schools without them.

The conclusion is inescapable: experimental programs that do not encompass entire cities are probably doomed because the application of essential controls—meaning that most children will not be helped immediately—is interpreted as just another example of discrimination at the control sites in the black areas. The moral of this story for public policy must also be understood. Action must precede exact knowledge. Racial problems must be approached through big programs that cover large areas. No one can say that large-scale programs will prove effective. What can be said is that there is no hope of learning or accomplishing anything from miniature experiments. The size of the laboratory must begin to approach the enormity of the problem.

PHILOSOPHY IN REVOLT

Raya Dunayevskaya

The Alienation of Reason, by Leszek Kolakowski, Doubleday, 1968.

The name of Leszek Kolakowski, the most original and most controversial philosopher in Poland, first came to the attention of the American public in 1956, when the questions he had raised as well as the Marxist Humanism he tried to reestablish came into head-on collision with official Communist doctrine. By the time the intellectual ferment in Poland reached its climax in the Hungarian Revolution, philosophy and revolution had indeed become inseparable. The Communist state labeled his views as "Revisionist" and Professor Kolakowski came under violent attack. The recent ferment in Poland again coincided with youth unrest and revolutionary economic crises, not only in Poland but in Czechoslovakia as well. This time a strong dose of anti-Semitism was injected into the attack on Professor Kolakowski. He was expelled from the Communist

Party, removed as head of the History of Modern Philosophy at the University of Warsaw, and banished from the University.

Under the circumstances, it is only natural that the reader approaches a work by Kolakowski on several levels simultaneously. On one level runs a succinct narrative history of positive thought which differs quite sharply from academic texts on that subject in this country. There is nothing dogmatic about the views presented either from a Marxist or bourgeois vantage point. The deceptively simple style and the emphasis on the informational aspects of this history of a philosophic system—so bent on "pure experience" and "demystification" of Reason and seemingly so far removed from the concerns of Communism—do seem to add up to a subject with no relevance to Communism. By the time the reader reaches the last sentence of the work, however, he is startled by the reality, the timeliness, the oppressive presence of something unstated but implied. "The philosophical work of our day," Kolakowski concludes, "has found itself caught—to a great extent under the influence of positivist criticism—between the philosophy of life and the lurid Manichean vision." (p. 219)

It is then that the reader wants to retrace his steps. It is then he notes the title of the book, *Alienation of Reason*, and begins to see that the author's critique of Positivism is an implied critique also of totalitarianism. It seems that Kolakowski is also asking the reader to work out for himself some of the implications of this critique for "our day."

It is a challenge to confront the book on this level, especially since it is harder to decipher the Aesopian language of contemporary political tracts than the code-words of, say, Tsarist tracts. When, after the Revolution, Lenin republished works written under the eyes of the censor, he had only to remind his readers that "Japan" meant Russia, and "scientific philosophy" meant Marxism. But even if we decipher Kolakowski's elaborate and cautious inferences, we have not gotten to the heart of the matter: for this is a serious and original study of Positivism "in itself," and transcends its obvious relevance to "state capitalism" in general, and Poland in particular.

"It is possible to begin the history of European positivist thought almost anywhere," the author informs us, "for many strands we regard as of primary importance in contemporary positivist doctrines had antecedents in antiquity." (p. 11) Space forbids a reviewer from attempting to follow the author in covering the breadth and scope of the work. I shall therefore limit myself to the central points which, in the view of Kolakowski, entitled Positivism to be considered in its "diachronic unity," despite the many transformations in each historic period not

only from antiquity to Hume, but especially from August Comte who coined the words, "positive philosophy," to our day when it still exists under the shortened term, Positivism.

"Positivism," writes Kolakowski at the very start of his analysis, "is a collection of prohibitions concerning human knowledge." (p. 9) The chief of these prohibitions is any consideration of universal concepts like Reason. The demotion of Reason as an autonomous sphere, if not its outright rejection, meant the discarding of everything but "verifiable" facts and the elevation of science to the status of religion. Along with the elevation of science, this "philosophic, or, if you wish, anti-philosophic revolution," has signalled the "doing away with subjectivity." It is against this that Kolakowski's critique is directed.

This is the source of Kolakowski's anger as a philosopher and a human being: "The primary aim of this subjectivism without a subject was to formulate the idea of a 'pure' experience" (p. 104) as if thought is no more than a reflex "like a knee jerk." Indeed, Positivism had pledged "to track down those elements in the current scientific image of the world that had been 'thought into' it." (p. 104) Positivism was determined to root this out, considering that metaphysics as a whole belongs in the dustbin of pre-scientific pseudo-problems. The trouble was, as Kolakowski demonstrates, that Positivists eliminated not only "metaphysics" but knowledge as well, including all truths that, while more meaningful than science, were not empirically verifiable. Their abandonment of metaphysics, he concludes, "applies not only to ontological and epistemological reflection but to the historical and humanistic disciplines, which the positivists lump together with metaphysics." (p. 198)

Thus, positivist theory gave up the potentialities of mankind for "facts" and anything that was not at that moment a fact had to be discarded. Ernest Mach, a founder of Empirio-Criticism at the turn of the century, went as far as declaring the atom a mere "mental artifice." As against this type of mechanical materialism, Karl Marx, who lived when Newtonian mechanics dominated the age, declared that "To have one basis for life and another for science is *a priori* a lie." We have been living under this lie ever since; the cultural crisis manifested in the philosophy of positivism cannot be seen outside of the historic circumstances that gave rise to it. Kolakowski implies, but does not explicitly state, that, at its very birth, "positive philosophy" was a conscious reaction against Hegel's "negative philosophy," against a dialectic, that is, which did not affirm reality but negated it, and, by extension, the status quo. Stahl, the German counterpart of Comte, openly proclaimed his intention to destroy Hegelian

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philosophy because he discerned within it "the principle of revolution." It is true that Positivism destroyed also the metaphysical illusions in natural science and thus freed the scientific temper of the age. Kolakowski holds on to this merit of Positivism, rejecting, however, its worship of science. Toward the end of the work this rejection rises to a crescendo of emotion:

"Suffering, death, ideological conflict, social clashes, antithetical values of any kind—all are declared out of bounds, matter we can only be silent about, in obedience to the principle of verifiability. Positivism so understood, is an act of escape from commitments, an escape masked as a definition of knowledge, invalidating all such matters as mere figments of the imagination stemming from intellectual laziness. Positivism in this sense is the escapist's design for living." (p. 210)

And again:

"The language it imposes exempts us from the duty of speaking up in life's most important conflicts." (p. 210)

The reader must always bear in mind that when Kolakowski writes about speaking out on today's conflicts, "our day" is never only a point of time, but also a point on the map of Europe, specifically the Communist state of Poland. Moreover, he must say what he has to say in terms of his subject matter, Positivism. The Positivist attitude to "metaphysics" is, precisely, the Communist attitude. When Positivists, like Communists, ascribe the continued existence of "metaphysics," not to any defeat in their own doctrine, but to "human stupidity," Kolakowski can answer both at once:

"They are not seriously interested in finding out why the social results of their work are so insignificant, nor why people continue to ask questions that science cannot answer." (p. 198)

This reviewer considers the above chapter, "Logical Empiricism: A Scientific Defense of Threatened Civilization," the most important chapter of the book. Both in its attack on science, "technological efficiency," and "the pragmatic interpretation of truth," as well as in the way the author relates Positivism to the specific historic period between the two world wars, Kolakowski is crying out his opposition:

"Logical empiricism, then, is the product of a specific culture, one in which technological efficiency is regarded as the highest value, the culture we usually call 'technocratic.' It is a technocratic ideology in the mystifying guise of an anti-ideological scientific view of the world, purged of value judgments." (p. 202)

"It is an act of emancipation from troublesome philosophical questions, which it denounced in advance as fictitious; it also frees us from the need to study history . . ." (p. 203)

But, suddenly, Kolakowski sees merit in Positivism:

"The sheer rigor of the positivist rules had awakened intellectuals to their own responsibilities, and in my opinion have been of practical aid in contracting attempts to blur the boundaries between the position of the scientist and the obligation of the believer." (p. 206)

Anyone who is acquainted with Kolakowski's most famous work during the 1957 period, *Respon-*

sibility and History, can have no doubt about whom he is castigating. Moreover, Kolakowski returns to his critique of Positivism where institutionalized Communism can certainly see its reflection:

"From the point of view of applied knowledge, the desire for an epistemological absolute, i.e., 'metaphysical certainty,' is fruitless, and those in quest of this certainty were perfectly aware. And yet, we repeat, philosophy has never given up its attempt to constitute an autonomous 'Reason' independent of technological applications and irreducible to purely recording functions." (p. 216)

This quest for Reason and refusal to lose the identity of "Subject" will continue to "create" the individual as "something" quite unique, irreducible, "negative," i.e., revolutionary, and pushing history forward. And Kolakowski, in conclusion, therefore, repeats the question that has been running like a red thread throughout his work:

"How can we account for the peculiar fact that over many centuries human thought has ascribed to 'Reason' the ability to discover 'necessary' features in the world, and for so long a time failed to see that these features are figments of the imagination? . . . the vast amounts of energy squandered in these explorations and the extraordinary tenacity with which they were carried on are worth pondering, all the more because the explorers were perfectly aware of the technological inconsequence of their efforts." (pp. 215, 216)

The reviewer must end with apologies to the reader for not letting him in on Kolakowski's highly original views on the very topic that would no doubt most interest the American reader—the chapter on Pragmatism. He will need to read this for himself and, since it is a field with which he is familiar, have the special pleasure of comparing his views with those of Professor Kolakowski. He will, in any case, find this experience especially rewarding because the excellent translation by Norbert Guterman will make him forget that he is reading a translation.

Raya Dunayevskaya is the author of Marxism and Freedom: From 1776 Until Today, and numerous articles and pamphlets on philosophy, Marxist Humanism, labor, and politics of developing nations. She is Chairman of the National Editorial Board of News and Letters.

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THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS

Geoffrey Blodgett

Twelve Against the Empire, by Robert Beisner, McGraw-Hill 1968.

The Spanish-American War lasted four months. It was, as John Hay wrote to his friend Teddy Roosevelt in a rare moment of euphoria, "a splendid little war," nobly begun, intelligently fought, and happy in its outcome. T.R. of course agreed, and shared Hay's satisfaction with most Americans. For a people parched by thirty years of peace, our contest with Spain over Cuba in the summer of 1898 slacked the bloodthirst and provided an important psychic experience. The last American war of the nineteenth century, for all the stupidities and inefficiencies of its prosecution (Hay in his glee neglected these) was also the last to match the schoolboy vision of personal valor: wide-brimmed hat, bandana at the neck, silver bayonet; the rattling infantry charge, uphill, captured in a quick sketch by Remington. Bully? For millions, yes. General Sherman had earlier remarked that war was hell. But there are tiers to the inferno, and from our perspective this first American descent into overseas imperial warfare does seem almost splendid in its summer brevity.

There was a time when historians wrote off the war with Spain as a passing aberration, a blithe moral holiday from national innocence. More recently it had been interpreted as the beginning of the end of innocence, marking the emergence of the United States as an imperial world power of the first rank. This assessment seems more realistic, among other reasons, because it more accurately catches the mood of 1898. Alert contemporaries sensed that they had arrived at a new day, and that the time had vanished when they could know, in the bitter phrase of House Speaker Thomas Reed, that "the sun did set on our dominions and our drum-beat did not encircle the world with our martial airs."*

Victory over Spain had saddled America with an empire from the Caribbean to the China Sea. What to do about it was a pressing and divisive issue, touching off one of the most prophetic political debates in our history. The Senate resolved the quarrel before it was half over by ratifying a treaty with Spain which gave Puerto Rico and the Philippines to the United States. But the vote was a near thing, and the best estimate is that had the Senate been

*This and all subsequent quotations are taken from the book under review.