


The Battle for Production

By **SAMUEL ADAMS DARCY**



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209

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THE BATTLE FOR PRODUCTION

To Invade Europe Now

By **SAMUEL ADAMS DARCY**

WHAT PRODUCTION MEANS FOR VICTORY

THE job's begun! Increasing numbers of American planes, tanks, ships and guns are leaving the production plants to see service against the unholy trinity of gangsters that make up the Nazi-Fascist-Japanese militarist Axis. The pictures of these in our newspapers and newsreels have made us all happy.

But think! While the democracies are producing so are the Axis warmakers. They have several years' start on us. A great United States Army general said over 100 years ago that he wins the war who gets to the battlefield "firstest, with the mostest men." That's basically still true. We must only add to the "mostest men," the "mostest equipment." Are we getting that "mostest" ready for action "firstest," that is, ahead of the enemy?

We are a proud people who have proud achievements. In peacetime the United States produced 54 per cent of the world's manufactures. That ability ought to have given us the self-confidence to buckle down to the task of turning out vast industrial plants to outproduce the Nazis in war

implements. Instead we got the wrong idea that the job is an easy one—that we'll lick the "inferior Japanese, the stupid Nazis and the clownish Mussolinis" without half trying. The employers did not want to stop the usual business routine of profit making, and the pro-Nazi red-baiters of the Westbrook Pegler stripe find a reactionary press that is only too glad to pay them to disrupt our anti-Hitler unity. The peacetime grudges and conflicts of all sections of the population were not easy to abandon, to unite against this most dangerous, cunning and powerful enemy. The people don't want to be apathetic—that is a libel against our fellow citizens. They are for the moment confused by the anti-labor propaganda and aren't sure of what needs to be done.

But now all are realizing that we are being forced against the wall. It took disastrous losses at Pearl Harbor, Manila, and the rest of the Far East; it took the sinking of our ships by enemy submarines only a few miles from our own bathing beaches; it took the heroism of the Soviet people, to wake us up.

Now that we are awake we must get to the job quickly and with understanding. We must know how much of a job we have ahead of us. Labor has an especially great responsibility. The world solidarity of labor is showing itself in the efforts of the workers of Europe and Asia who are, with unmatched heroism, trying to slow up and destroy the Nazi industrial plants. Daily we hear of executions of these magnificent fighters. We must keep faith with them. Ours is the job to produce the maximum for the anti-Axis armies. International May Day can have no better dedication than to this task of increasing production. May Day has always been marked by downing our tools. This year it is marked by increasing our use of the tools.

That's our purpose in this booklet.

The Executive Office of the President, Office of Emergency Management, has written us to say that since our entry into the war, "the distribution of information concerning plant expansion, construction, etc., has been discontinued." But even without every last minute production figure we know:

1. That we did not get enough aid to the Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore, the Dutch Indies, China, and all the rest of the Far East.

2. Even more important, we are not fulfilling our promises to get adequate material to the main anti-Hitler East European front. The newspapers published semi-official Washington estimates that we were shipping considerably less than was pledged.

Above all, the lack of adequate war production is used as a reason for not opening up the crucially needed western front against Hitler in Europe. The excuse is not justified. Even our present production is enough for that. But we must not allow even this excuse to remain by so stepping up production as to take it away entirely.

3. Our own armed forces complain of insufficient anti-aircraft guns, insufficient tanks, airplanes, etc.

Hitler's is a lost cause. It awaits only the ending of our blundering and stumbling and the proper realization of our full production capacities. The democracies have a great superiority of man power—three-fourths of the world are on our side. If this great mass of mankind is adequately armed, the victory over the barbarians will be assured. America's war potentials in production can provide the necessary arms.

That makes it necessary for us to unite as a nation, find the weak spots in our anti-Hitler effort, and utilize every force available for that purpose. Are we doing it? Read what follows and judge for yourself.

Nineteen forty-two is the critical year. It is the "Gettysburg" year of this war. Speed is urgent. We must hurry! If we lose our opportunity to act decisively in 1942 we will pay a much greater price in years to follow.

THE PRESIDENT'S PLEDGE IS OUR SACRED OBLIGATION

On January 1, 1942, President Roosevelt, acting for the United States, joined with the representatives of twenty-five other nations in a solemn pact, to do everything necessary to insure victory against the Nazi-Fascist armies, and to make no peace until that victory is assured for all.

The heart of the pact is the declaration of the twenty-six nations that (we quote from the original text):

"Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world, declare:

"(1) Each government pledges to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the tripartite [Axis] pact and its adherents with which such government is at war.

"(2) Each government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies."

This pledge of our President to the other twenty-five nations who are our allies is the sacred obligation of every American.

Every American, who loves democracy, progress and freedom wanted our President to make such a pledge. No one must now shirk in doing everything necessary to its successful execution.

To each of us it means that we will ourselves and we will insure that all others make such necessary contribu-

tions in labor and self-denial, as are necessary to "*employ*" our "*full resources, military or economic,*" to win the war.

The President has shown that he means business. A few days after the signing of the pact he submitted to the Congress a plan of work to win the war. That was contained in two documents—his address to Congress on the State of the Union, and his budget message. In these messages he pointed out that other countries at war were using 50 to 60 per cent of their national incomes for that purpose. If we were to employ our economic resources to the full we had to do the same. In the several years previous to this, we had made increased appropriations for war purposes. But we kept the greatest part of our economy as a peace economy. The new plan, the President said,

"... is an instrument for transforming our peace economy into a war economy. This transformation must be completed with minimum friction and maximum speed. The fiscal measures which I outline in this message are essential elements in the nation's war program."

That sets our task. What does it mean in simple total figures?

In the prewar period our national income ranged (except in the worst depression years) between \$60,000,000,000 and \$85,000,000,000. Of this our normal governmental budget ran between \$4,000,000,000 and \$5,000,000,000. In the years of greatest relief and other anti-depression expenditures, our total budget reached an all-time high total of about \$9,000,000,000. Thus, in the prewar period, the percentage of our national expenditure for these purposes was between 6 and 13 per cent.

Under the plan submitted by the President, the national income would probably exceed \$100,000,000,000. But the single item of war needs would use up at least \$56,000,000,000 of the total. Thus, almost 60 per cent (instead of

6 to 13 per cent) would go for the government's war expenditures. That is what makes it a war economy.

Modern warfare in its essential character consists of each side manufacturing the most munitions and auxiliary war materials and delivering it to the front. Each army then hurls those materials at its opponents. Whichever army gains the initiative, seizes the offensive and uses the best strategy to hurl the most materials, of the most destructive quality, with the greatest accuracy, wins the battle.

We are the greatest manufacturing nation in the world. In the prewar period we manufactured more goods than all other countries in the world put together. That puts upon us the greatest responsibility of insuring adequate materials which all our allied armies need to fight.

Labor, more than any other strata in our society, can insure the success of that program. Labor must be given a full opportunity to contribute all it can, of brawn and brain, for that purpose. And, on the other hand, labor in America, organized 11,000,000 strong—the strongest trade union movement in the capitalist world (*i.e.*, outside of the Soviet Union, where trade union membership totals 24,000,000)—must contribute its full share to the achievement. All classes must take that example and, uniting as a nation for the common purpose of inflicting a crushing military defeat on Hitler and his barbarian hordes, must unselfishly give all that is required. Let's discuss that point further.

ISN'T THE ENEMY WEAK?

The most dangerous mistake we can make is to underestimate our enemies. Yet newspaper writers and some government officials, who indulge in wishful thinking, or propagandists who want to put us off guard, are spreading a false optimism, a pollyanna attitude as regards the alleged weakness of the Nazi-Fascist powers.

"Isn't it a fact," they say, "that Japan is lacking in natural supplies of raw materials, such as iron ore, oil, etc.?"

"And isn't it a fact that the Russians are driving the Nazis back on the East European front?"

"And won't these facts, plus the internal weakness of the Japanese, German and Italian governments, bring about their automatic collapse soon?"

The first two statements are facts, but it is easy to draw far-fetched, one-sided and erroneous conclusions from them. That's why the third statement is wrong—so very wrong that, if we do not correct it, we will not be able to arouse our people to an all-out war effort.

Archibald MacLeish, the poet who heads the Office of Facts and Figures, is an example. He published a report on January 22, 1942, which declares that the United States in 1942 will produce as much war material as the Nazis did in the previous five years combined. Similarly, the *New York Times* (issue of Dec. 12, 1942) carries an article which sets forth the overwhelming superiority in materials of the allied democratic powers as against the Nazi-Fascist countries. You have no doubt seen similar reports.

They are very misleading. A large number of factors must be taken into consideration before we can properly evaluate the meaning of such figures. Let's review the chief of these and thereby better judge the relation of forces.

The first thing to remember, as a premise for all else, is that the mere total figures of production are not the decisive thing—what is decisive is the question of how much material is delivered to the field of battle. That is not the same as mere excess of production alone. In the Far East, for example, the battlefields are close to Japan; but they are a long way from the United States. To fight Japan, we must not only produce the materials that are actually employed on the battlefield but several times that amount of

men, ships and material which is consumed in the process of transportation of men and supplies over the vast reaches that intervene between our factories and the scenes of battle. Thus, to meet Japan as an equal in the Far East, we must produce for General MacArthur's forces four or five times as much as Japan needs for her troops. And to exceed Japan's forces, as we must, the totals are even greater.

Secondly, consider the chief front of the war in Eastern Europe: The first year in which the Soviet Union exceeded Germany in total volume of industrial goods produced was 1936. But that did not yet give the U.S.S.R. the necessary decisive advantage. The Soviet Union in area is forty times as big as Germany. To produce steel for her railroads to cover the distances between her borders, she needs a steel production that meets this forty times larger span of territory. That is approximately true of all production of industrial products. Of course, the prewar excess of industrial production in the U.S.S.R. over Germany was nowhere near that figure, being only slightly greater. Third, consider that Germany already had a built up plant for her industrial needs, that dates back several decades. There were many years prior to 1936 when Germany produced a great deal more than the U.S.S.R. Russia was able to begin building her plant on a serious scale only in 1929, twelve years after overthrowing the tsar. Also consider that in the first months of the Soviet-Nazi war the Red Army found it necessary to retreat, surrendering a great part of her industrial areas. Even though the Nazi armies, thanks to the Soviet scorched earth policy, did not thereby capture all the raw materials and industrial assets, great volumes were deducted from the resources of the Soviet Union. And fourth, consider that the defeat of the smaller European countries by the Nazis and the base betrayal by the French ruling classes gave to the Nazis the entire industrial plant of Europe, which is today

supplementing the manufactures of German industry. And, as all know, the war industries of France, Czechoslovakia (particularly the famous Skoda works), of Belgium, Holland, Austria, etc., were very great.

From these simple facts we can measure the great advantage in equipment that the Nazis have over the Red Army. The full measure of the valor, unity and genius of the Soviet people and their leader Stalin can be understood only if we realize that the magnificent victories they have won over the Axis forces were gained despite the handicap under which they are laboring.

Such victories might prove temporary unless we in the United States can make up for the shortages of material under which the Red Army must fight. That means not only turning out as much material for the Red Army as is necessary to bring it up in strength to the German army, but also creating the transportation equipment (ships, rail equipment, manpower) necessary to deliver those arms and munitions to a battlefield which is 6,000 to 12,000 miles from our manufacturing centers. And above all, opening the second front in Western Europe now, in these weeks!

These simple facts bring home the thought that it is not merely how much the total production of the democracies is as against the Axis powers, but which army has the greatest volume of the best equipment on a particular battlefield.

There is one more decisively important reason why any reliance on Axis shortage of raw materials is foolish and unrealistic. Particularly Germany and Japan used the years prior to the outbreak of the war to buy, mostly from the United States, and store up enormous stocks of war materials, so that for some time to come they will have a sufficient supply for their war needs. It was estimated at the beginning of the Far Eastern war that Japan had at least one year's supply of oil on hand. She had three years' supply

of scrap steel. Everyone knows the tremendous purchases of steel, scrap iron, copper, tin, rubber, etc., which Japan had stored against just such an emergency as this. Since then, the new territory she seized in Malaya, Borneo, China, the Philippines, etc., has, due to the failure of the British and American business men and military authorities to apply the scorched-earth policy with the thoroughness necessary, yielded Japan additional supplies of these materials. If that is true of Japan, it is several times more true of German seizures in France, Holland, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and other countries. In addition to all these sources of supply, Germany still gets great iron ore and other supplies from allegedly neutral Sweden, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and possibly some Latin American countries.

During the latter part of January, 1942, Charles Will Wright, foreign minerals specialist of the Department of Interior, published a report in which he surveyed the availability of the key war materials to Germany:

"When one sums up the annual output of minerals, metals and fuels since 1932 in Germany, and adds to these figures the output of the areas acquired by Germany during the last two years, the results indicate that Germany today is surprisingly well supplied with minerals for essential military needs. . . . Coal output in German controlled areas is about one-half of the world's production or more than sufficient for all purposes. Her collapse due to failure of oil supplies cannot be forecast with assurance at this time. . . . Western and central Europe has always been primarily a coal burning area; fuel oil has been consumed chiefly by the merchant marine, the national navies and the petroleum industry. Naval requirements under present conditions are relatively small. . . . With 78 million barrels or more of petroleum and petroleum substitutes at its disposal, and military needs and essential industrial needs given preference, Germany appears to be in no immediate danger of the failure of her military machine for lack of gasoline and

lubricants. . . . In 1940, 46% of the world's iron ore was produced in the countries now controlled by Germany. . . . German controlled areas accounted for 44% of the world's output of pig-iron in 1940. . . . The areas now tributary to Germany produced 27.5% of the world's manganese ore output in 1940. . . . [Chromite] stocks on hand will probably meet all necessary requirements during the next few years. . . . Aluminum plants in German controlled Europe will have a total capacity of 560,000 tons by the end of 1941, compared with approximately 580,000 tons in the U. S., Canada and Great Britain. . . . Germany is amply supplied with bauxite, essential to aluminum manufacture. . . ."

Thus the report runs through all the materials essential to war production. There may be some dispute as to the completeness of this or that detailed material under discussion. The Soviet Union has recaptured some of the territory seized by the Nazi Army. There can be no doubt, however, that the situation as a whole warns us away from any dependency on any automatic collapse due to shortage of raw materials, and emphasizes that we can rely only on a crushing military defeat of the Hitler hordes.

From these facts, the great preparations made and the huge stores accumulated and seized by the Nazi-Fascist powers for this war, the geographical nearness of the battle-fronts to their manufacturing centers and the long distances from ours, the aid they are getting from Pétain and other traitorous Quislings, it must be clear to all of us that, in addition to seizing the offensive, we will have to produce many times as much material as that produced by the Axis powers, in order to meet and defeat them. And for this we must arouse ourselves and utilize every ounce of energy, every pound of material, and every last resource so as to equip our own troops and those of our Allies, if we are to avoid falling before the merciless, brutal, gangster Nazi hordes that are threatening civilization today.

All false optimism, all illusion of an easy victory, all reliance on the automatic collapse of the enemy, must be pushed aside and treated as the propaganda of the enemy to lull us into a false sense of security so that their kill might be easy.

There is no man in the world who knows more about the main theater of war, the East European front, than does Joseph Stalin. Even his enemies concede that. It is significant that in his address to his people and to the world, delivered on Moscow's Red Square on November 6, 1941, he emphasized his reliance, not on any automatic collapse of the Axis powers, but states on the contrary that

"... it is necessary to crush the military might of the German invaders; it is necessary to annihilate to a man all the German occupationists who have penetrated our country in order to enslave it."

The enemy knows its danger. Its strategy is to deliver shattering blows against us and our allies, in rapid fire succession *before* the potential power of the United Nations is unleashed in action. The *offensive now in 1942* to defeat the enemy's strategy is key to all else. Can we get ready in time? We must! That is urgent! We must quickly arouse and get to the task. 1942! Hurry!

WHAT IS NEEDED TO DO THE JOB?

It is clear that we cannot rely on the automatic collapse of the Axis powers. We must look to our ships, tanks, airplanes and guns and be sure that they are plentiful enough and of the quality to do the job. How much must we do?

The President, after careful consideration, announced in his budget message that for 1942 and 1943 it will take 18,000,000 tons of new merchant shipping, 185,000 new planes, 120,000 new tanks, and 55,000 new aircraft guns.

It isn't difficult to say these figures. But do you realize how much of a job that is?

Consider the first item, for example—18,000,000 tons of new merchant shipping. Our entire merchant fleet, accumulated over many decades of our history, just prior to the war in 1939 totaled about 11,000,000 tons. Now the President wants us to build, in two years, not only as much shipping as we accumulated in the entire history of our country previously, but a great deal more. The total is staggering. It is in addition to the great building now going on for the U.S. Navy.

Need we do it? It is obvious that if we are to deliver material to the scenes of battle in the Far East, in Europe and in Africa that enormous fleet is necessary. It is all the more necessary since England, in the first two years of war, lost almost half her merchant fleet and we must make up that deficiency. The new U-boat campaign is causing the loss to the United Nations of tens of thousands of tons of additional tonnage. And the Nazis have been accumulating ships and stand a chance of getting at least part of the French fleet.

Now pause to consider—the merchant fleet is not for actual battle purposes. It is only for the purpose of transporting the necessary materials for battle to fields that are adjacent to the Axis countries. For purposes of those battles the Nazi-Fascist governments need only a small percentage of the fleet that we need. We need that vast tonnage over and above that which is necessary to the Axis countries, to meet them properly on the field of battle.

Or consider the rubber industry: In 1940 the world production of rubber totaled 1,390,661 long tons. Of this, the Malays, which are now in Japanese hands, produced 1,353,052 long tons. Thus 97½ per cent of the world's rubber supply is now in the hands of the Japanese. The United

States was always the chief rubber consumer. Vital war industries such as the automotive, chemical and others can continue only if their supply of rubber does not fail. We are therefore now confronted with the gigantic task of creating a synthetic rubber industry where practically none existed before.

Or consider planes: In 1939 we produced a total of 2,400 planes. In 1940 we increased our production to 5,800 planes. Under the President's plan we must produce in 1942 a total of 60,000 planes or about ten times as much as the high years of 1940, and in 1943 a total of 125,000 planes, or about twenty-two times as much as 1940.

Or consider tanks: In 1941 we made about 5,000 small tanks. For 1943 we must make 75,000 tanks, a great part of them of large size. That's an increase in production of about twenty-fold.

Or consider machine tools: In order to carry through all other parts of the program we must create factories and manufacturing equipment where none existed before. Above all else that means machine tools. In the boom year of 1929 our machine tool industry turned out \$185,000,000 worth of products. In 1932, the year of depression, that fell to only \$22,000,000 worth. We have already increased that so rapidly that in 1941 the industry turned out \$765,000,000 worth and in 1942 it will have to reach about \$1,500,000,000 worth, or about eight times the total of the great boom year of 1929.

Our army, navy and air force may reach 10,000,000 men before victory is ours. That is a tremendous total of men. Many now engaged in production will be called to the front. That will create yet more problems in achieving our production program. The great army of men and our naval forces, the offensive strategy we must achieve, and the armaments we must create, as our guarantee of Nazi defeat.

That gives you an idea of the task we have undertaken. And it indicates not only what is required of the country as a whole but what is required of each individual American, if the plan is to be realized in sufficient material to steam-roller the Nazis to their defeat.

Is it possible to accomplish these tasks? There can be no doubt that it is. But it will require tremendous effort, considerable sacrifice by all classes in society and, above all, the maximum unity of the entire nation. Our experiences in this connection are the subject of the following chapter.

We have here tried to give you an idea of the immensity of the war production plans for 1942 and 1943. But, as a matter of fact, we had already begun work on a war production program, though on a smaller scale, almost two years ago, in the summer of 1940. How did we make out with that plan? We are sorry to have to say that we did not do so well. Blunders, greed for profit, selfishness and deliberate sabotage brought our first efforts at a war production program to accomplish only a small part of what was aimed at. It is necessary to understand what was wrong if we are not to repeat the errors in 1942 and 1943. The President already indicated that he knows there was a good deal wrong when he removed the people grouped around Knudsen in the Office of Production Management (O.P.M.) and replaced them with a new command headed by Donald Nelson.

Every intelligent person will realize, however, that the mere displacement of one leadership by another doesn't solve all problems. It is necessary also to judge what had been done that was wrong, or what had not been done, that should have been, so that we understand what measures are necessary to take for the coming period until victory is ours.

THE TIME WE'VE LOST

Prior to the President's New Year addresses we had been working on a three-year plan, which was adopted in 1940, for which Congress had appropriated \$63,000,000,000 as follows:

July 1, 1940, to June 30, 1941—\$17,000,000,000

July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942— 23,000,000,000

July 1, 1942, to June 30, 1943— 23,000,000,000

Thus for the first year \$17,000,000,000 was appropriated. But, as a matter of fact, in the first fourteen months of the above plan (when \$19,000,000,000 should have been turned to munitions), for reasons we will discuss later, only \$10,000,000,000 was spent. And out of this about half was actually used directly for airplanes, tanks, munitions, etc.—the other half being consumed by the building of factory buildings, barracks, and such other things as are necessary to launch the war program. For the entire three years \$63,000,000,000 was appropriated. But as late as the attack on our bases at Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, that is, eighteen months after the program was launched, out of that \$63,000,000,000 appropriated, only \$35,000,000,000 were even let out in contracts! It is clear from this that there was no intention by those who controlled the execution of that first three-year plan of war production to make any serious effort to complete it.

What had happened that brought this bad result?

Let's start with the people in charge of the job. President Philip Murray, in his report to the National Convention of the C.I.O. (page 5), points out that:

"A horde of the representatives of the large corporations descended upon Washington and attempted to assume complete control of our defense effort through the dollar-a-year

men within the Office of Production Management. This group became a super-government, not responsible or responsive to the needs or demands of the people of the country."

The theory upon which these dollar-a-year men were chosen was that they were the experts who would know how to insure the mobilization of industry for the war effort. Actually they all turned out to be financial manipulators for the great monopolist trusts, whose chief concern was that the companies from which they came should get the contracts and that those contracts should be as profitable as possible.

Instead of drawing all industry into the war effort, their work for their own companies was so effective that (report of Thurman Arnold, Assistant Attorney General, Jan., 1942),

"... three-fourths of all our vast war contracts have been let to eighty-six concerns."

The excuses for this scandalous situation were endless. But they all fall by the weight of their own fallaciousness when one fact is considered: In order to get a war contract owners of plants must satisfy the requirements of a very hard-boiled body called the Army and Navy Munitions Board. By mid-1941 this board had already certified 11,819 plants as worthy of contracts. But to December, 1941, only 6,657 plants, chiefly those owned or controlled by the monopolist trusts, were given any defense work to do. And even until the January, 1942, removal of Knudsen and conferees from dominant control hardly 20 per cent of our nation's industry was actually engaged in war work.

The dollar-a-year men and the great monopolist trusts did everything they could to prevent increased production, except insofar as it meant increased profits for them without threatening their monopoly. They sabotaged efforts to

speed the building of new plants by stalling for weeks on contracts. They resisted attempts to convert to war purposes industries devoted to producing peacetime consumers' goods that could be dispensed with, and they succeeded in blocking all efforts to give war contracts to small plants, operated by smaller employers.

In the auto industry alone untold war supplies that could have been produced were not because the auto magnates stalled on beginning the conversion. After the tools and dies were completed for the 1941, and again for the 1942 model cars, for example, the tool and die makers were allowed to go to work on the assembly line instead of being put to work on the badly-needed tools and dies for tanks, airplanes and parts, etc.

Though every available hand can be usefully engaged in war production, we had, due to the above situation, in April, 1942, an unemployed army of about 5,000,000 people. And there are another 10,000,000 workers, Negro people, women and youth, who are available for employment but have been stopped from entering industry by the various restrictions and failure to provide opportunity. Fifteen million available workers idle—while monopoly holds production down and shortages exist everywhere!

It is clear from this that the nation's defense needs were held back—but not so the profits of the capitalist monopolists who shared in the control.

In the summer of 1940, when this program was first launched, there was a suggestion that possibly the government would have to take a hand in the production program since it contemplated increases in production beyond the present capacity of industry. The capitalist-controlled newspapers, the Chambers of Commerce and the employers' associations raised a howl to the heavens that this threatened "socialism," that Roosevelt's interfering with their monopo-

list control was "really introducing fascism at home while pretending to fight it abroad." That the profit motive was sacred and was hereby endangered. The Administration hastened to reassure them. And Congress passed a series of measures to "protect private enterprise."

"Protect" meant that the capitalist owners got the following:

First they got the Vinson-Trammel Act suspended. This was a law on our statute books which limited profits on naval and aircraft contracts to 7 and 8 per cent. That left them the right to profit without limit. Secondly, they got the right to deduct 20 per cent for new plant depreciation instead of 10 per cent, thereby artificially reducing the amount of profit shown on their books, and reducing the amount of taxes they would have to pay. They made no pretense that their plants will really depreciate at the rate of 20 per cent each year. The excuse for this concession was that they would be laying out so much money for new plants, that should the war end soon, and war contracts thereby stopped, they risk losing their investment.

As a matter of fact this was a false pretense. Practically none of the corporations built new plants with their own money. Some were built with government funds and turned over, practically as a gift, to these corporations to operate.

Ford, for example, got a \$20,000,000 plant that way. Probably the best example is the Aluminum Company, one of the most complete monopolies. For eighteen months they refused to expand the production in their own plants. A Congressional investigation disclosed that they even gave Germany more favorable conditions for obtaining aluminum than the United States because that brought the most profit. Finally, after Secretary of Interior Ickes and others made a public scandal of this situation, the U.S. Government decided to build seven new aluminum plants, with

public monies. They then gave these plants to the aluminum trust to operate! The terms were that if there is a profit—after the monopolists have collected all the overhead and padded administration payrolls they could get—the trust gets an additional 15 per cent. But here's the payoff—there is a clause in the contract which provides that the trust need not operate the government-built plants at more than 40 per cent of capacity.

And this is the "risk" the monopolists used as an excuse for abolishing the Vinson-Trammell Act, which limits profits—plants at government expense, administration costs guaranteed, 15 per cent of any profit on top of that, and the trust is guaranteed that it can keep production down in government plants while keeping their own at full capacity!

Other new plants were put up with the guarantee by the government that should the necessity for war production cease the government will buy them so as to fully protect the investor. Still other plants were put up with loans from the federal government's Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which were to be repaid not out of the profits of the corporation as a whole, but of the new plants working on government contracts! Thus again costing nothing to the capitalist owners.

We can see that the pretense of "risking" capital was not based on fact.

People everywhere became alarmed because those in charge of the production program in Washington were permitting, or helping, the need to defend our country to be turned into a gigantic profit-making scheme for a few rich capitalists. To put a quietus on their protest Congress passed the Excess Profits Tax. This, promised the Congressmen, would gather into the national treasury all corporate profits above a certain "legitimate" profit. But the poll tax and corporation-dominated Congressmen and Senators suc-

ceeded in so writing the law that the promise of limiting profits was not fulfilled.

The new law that was passed and is now in force provides that if a company made no profits in the 1936-1939 period, the first 8 per cent of its profits are exempt from this new tax. Also that if they did make profit, they should be allowed to make as much profit on the new war contracts as they made in 1936-1939 before the tax becomes operative.

How does this work out? Take the Chrysler Corporation for example: They got, at first a \$56,000,000 and then another \$100,000,000 tank plant from the government. This firm made big profits in 1936-1939. Under the Excess Profits Tax now in operation they are allowed a 27½ per cent profit before the government can collect any excess profits taxes!

We have already shown how production was lagging, but profits accumulated and are accumulating phenomenally. For the first nine months of 1941 profit returns from 350 leading industries, representing the bulk of the employers, show that their profits increased 27 per cent over the same period of 1940. Some industries benefited more than others. For example, metal companies increased profits for this period by 58 per cent; machinery industries by 44 per cent; rail equipment by 43 per cent; automotive industry by 32 per cent; petroleum products by 32 per cent, etc., etc. The salaries of employees were jacked up to as much as \$14,000 a week—yet the profits soared even above that.

On November 27, 1941, the government price statistician announced that costs on government contracts rose, in the first seventeen months, by \$2,000,000,000. Of this, labor costs represent \$350,000,000. Thus, the government paid to a few employers about \$5 for every \$1 paid to the hundreds of thousands of workers in their plants.

Some capitalists made a stab of trying to deny that they

were making enormous profits. On January 25, 1942, the National Council of Shipbuilders issued such a denial. But hardly more than a week later J. E. Barnes, legal representative and lobbyist for one of the largest shipbuilders, the Todd Shipyards Co., broke down before the Senate Naval Committee and admitted that on a \$40,000,000 investment his firm made \$20,000,000 profit within a year.

While this scandalous thievery was going on rich capitalists, through the newspapers and writers which they control, such as the Scripps-Howard and Hearst and other papers, raised a howl against the efforts of workers to get some increases in wages in order to meet the rising cost of living. In some cases, through conniving, they succeeded in lowering wages (as in the West Coast shipbuilding industry where through setting up a coastwise contract they cut Bethlehem shipyard workers from double time for overtime, which they had been getting for years, to time and a half), and then raised a howl that labor was betraying the country because they struck against such piracy. In the face of these fantastic profits how hypocritical is the demand that labor surrender the 40-hour week! They pretend that the 40-hour week limits production. That's ridiculous. It simply means that after the first 40 hours overtime begins The number of hours worked is limited only by a worker's strength and health. The divisionists assert that France had a 40-hour week and that this was the cause of her downfall. This is ridiculous. It is answered by one of the great employers of France, Paul Louis Weller, head of the Gnome Rhone, France's largest producer of airplanes, who said that the traitorous French Government gave them orders for airplanes sufficient only for six hours a week.

We believe that all strikes should be avoided. The C.I.O. and the A. F. of L. have already achieved considerably in this direction. We must do all that is humanly possible to

avoid losing a single hour's production for the war. But we must note the hypocrisy of the employers and capitalist press attacks on labor. Let us compare the losses for the first ten months of 1941, as between those caused by workers fighting against being victimized by greedy employers and employers not utilizing the unemployed. We have the following figures issued by the Government Bureau of Labor Statistics:

	<i>Man days of labor</i>
Losses by strikes	21,460,000
Losses by unemployment	1,570,000,000

These figures speak for themselves. And they do not include the incalculable losses due to stalling for more profitable contracts, and failure to utilize the many millions of Negro, women and youth workers who would enter industry if given a chance by the employers. And, incidentally, they indicated that the attack on labor was not aimed to improve the situation in production but rather to discredit labor, so that it could not take its proper place in the councils of the leadership of the anti-Hitler effort. Of that, we'll speak more later. Above all they do not list the losses due to resistance to conversion of industry. At this writing the automobile industry is losing 2,000,000 man hours of work daily due to idleness caused by refusal to convert in time. And finally, they do not include the losses caused by the monopolist trusts hogging all the contracts and crowding out the smaller businessmen. During September, 1941, alone, over 30,000 workers lost their jobs because small plants, of twenty employees or less, were denied materials for civilian production under our priority laws, and denied war work by the greed of the big capitalist employers. We have in the United States 185,000 manufacturing establishments. Of these 133,000 employ twenty workers or less. They account for 10 per cent of all workers now—and given an

opportunity they could increase their plants to a considerable degree. Instead a great many of them are being put out of business by monopolist practices.

Just as the maximum industrial production possible is needed for the war effort, so the maximum agricultural production is required. Food, cotton, wool, leather, etc., are all vital to winning the war. Yet there are hundreds of thousands of farmers, who, but for the lack of fertilizer, spray, feed, or tools and animals could multiply their production several times, and are not doing so. The great food corporations and their lobbyists who hold vast stores concentrate on getting higher prices—not especially increased production. The finance capitalists holler against the “burden of farm relief” while they are pocketing untold profits.

At the turn of the new year 1942 several committees of the House and Senate submitted reports, making the above points in elaborate detail with a great mass of supporting testimony and other factual material. None of these bodies could escape the conclusion that the dollar-a-year men headed by Knudsen and associates and the great capitalist monopolist corporations to whom Knudsen was catering were at fault.

The President then did two things which by implication gave recognition to the fact that our production program was in bad shape and that its leadership needed changing—he delivered to Congress his address on the State of the Union and his budget message which defeated the resisters and provided for an all-out production program, and he set aside the leadership of Knudsen and his monopolist associates and put at the head of the battle for production a War Production Board headed by Donald Nelson, who presumably would bring about a changed situation.

WHAT MUST BE DONE NOW?

The President's messages proposed revision of the original three-year plan. At the time of his 1942 New Year addresses to Congress eighteen months of the time of that plan had elapsed. For the remaining six months of the 1942 fiscal year a series of deficiency measures were proposed which increased the appropriations for all branches of the defense effort. For the fiscal year 1943 (July 1, 1942, to June 30, 1943) he proposed that instead of the \$23,000,000,000 voted in the original three-year plan, \$56,000,000,000 be allotted to defense.

And to insure the success of the new plan Donald Nelson was put in complete charge of the entire work, other production agencies being either combined under Nelson's new War Production Board (W.P.B.) or liquidated as non-essential.

All this can only be considered preliminary to the real thing—namely, so reorganizing the war production procedure as to accomplish the President's plan. What must be done to achieve that?

Three Congressional commissions, one department of the executive branch of government, and several reports by responsible and authoritative trade union commissions all went into these questions. These included the Congressional bodies popularly known as the Truman, Tolan and Vinson Committees; the report submitted by Assistant Attorney General Arnold; and the reports made by C.I.O. President Philip Murray to the national convention of his organization, as well as similar reports made by a number of other authoritative and responsible trade union bodies.

Here is the significant thing: although all these reports stem from very widely different sources, they all agree on the essentials of what has been the cause of the failure of

the work under Knudsen. We have already briefly detailed their main features in the previous chapters. If we summarize these criticisms, upon which all the reports agree, then what needs to be done will become more clear. Let us first consider the findings of the Congressional committees. They can be summarized as follows:

1. Dollar-a-year men have been an obstacle to an all-out war effort. Some, like Standard Oil's men, treasonably gave production secrets for synthetic rubber to the Nazis and hid them from the U.S. DuPont acted in the same way with Nazi firms. Gen. MacArthur's men found on the fragments of Japanese bombs in the Philippines the name "Ford" stamped on them.

2. The automotive factories and the Army and Navy procurement offices have blocked mass production of planes.

3. The auto industry is resisting complete conversion to production. Machines are yet idle in Plymouth, Chrysler, Dodge and other plants in others as well as the auto industry.

4. Companies (like Bethlehem Steel) have made "outrageous" demands upon the government which held up and is holding up expansion of production.

5. A few big companies have received most of the war contracts while thousands of smaller plants get none.

6. Steps to meet the shortage of metals have been stalled by the monopolies who are speculating on forcing up the prices.

7. Private shipbuilding companies especially, but also other manufacturing plants have been making tremendous profits, while succeeding through connivance in preventing the expansion of government plant facilities.

These criticisms are so well supported in the voluminous documents and testimony at the Congressional hearings that they are indisputable. The new set-up headed by Donald

Nelson had the facts before them. They must act on that basis with the greatest speed. This is being written three months after Mr. Nelson took office. Possibly it is too soon to judge. But it must be said that all the necessary actions have not yet been taken. The outstanding decisive action so far was the shut-down of the automobile industry, and the rationing of rubber and other materials carried through by the Office of Price Administration headed by Leon Henderson. But even these don't mean all-out conversion. There is ample proof that the automobile magnates are even now conniving to hold back the conversion process, in order to put over the proposition that the existing plants be allowed to stand idle, and that war production be introduced only in new plants especially built for that purpose. To the degree that they achieve this, or any part of this aim, they are sabotaging the all-out effort to complete the entire production program. New plants cannot begin to fill the war orders now on hand. Even after converting all present facilities from non-essential production to wartime production it will take a radical reorganization of production methods to accomplish the tasks the President set for our country. To allow a single plant to escape use for the President's war plan is to condemn it to failure in advance.

Labor has been fighting to realize the President's proposals. It has already voluntarily given up a great many hard-won privileges, such as the right to strike and premium pay for Sunday work. With but minor exceptions, it has buried the issues which cause internal strife within its ranks. In many industries it has offered to work longer hours, at faster speed, and has accepted other conditions which burdened their work. Out of their great and rich experience as the country's producers, labor has adopted a series of proposals to insure the success of the war effort. The first of these was advanced by the Congress of Industrial Organiza-

tions almost two years ago, in the late summer of 1940, when they pointed out the lack of adequate raw materials, the shortage of certain specially trained workers, and the need for action to correct these weaknesses. Utilizing the habitual snootiness of the upper classes toward labor, the employers who opposed the all-out effort succeeded in having these C.I.O. proposals pigeonholed. Everything the trade union leaders warned against has since come true. It speaks for the fact that labor, as much as or more than any other part of the population, has brain as well as brawn to contribute to the war production effort.

Even before Japan's treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor, several proposals were brought forth by trade union leaders for increased production. Since then, the initiative taken by the progressive unions has produced the necessary plans for overcoming the weaknesses that exist. We list some of these proposals:

- Murray Industrial Council Plan
- Reuther Plan for the Auto Industry
- Bridges' Waterfront Plan
- Metal Mining Plan
- Farm Equipment Plan
- Electrical Industry Plan
- Communications Industry Plan

These plans have not been adopted but an advance was made after Donald Nelson's magnificent call for all-out production in his first nationwide broadcast.

In many plants, following Nelson's suggestion, joint labor-management boards to increase war production are already set up and others are being set up.

This is something new in the life of the workers in our country. If labor's representatives are to contribute the best that labor can offer, it will be achieved only if they voice the common opinion of the memberships they represent arrived

at after the freest and most democratic discussions within the working class and the trade unions.

What are the more common obstacles in the way of increased production in most plants on which workers' representatives ought to make proposals?

The 168-Hour Work Week: In his speech of March 10 Donald Nelson pointed out that many of the war plants do not utilize the full working week and that full utilization of the working week would practically double the man-hours being put into military production.

There are many explanations which the managements give for this. But each obstacle to full utilization which they point out can be met by proposals of the workers. For example:

(a) Working the machine 168 hours a week increases the danger of breakdown of equipment: That danger can be met by increasing the number of maintenance men on the floor of the factory so that those things necessary to keep the machines in good running order are attended to in good time. In most plants the maintenance staffs set up for old production schedules are now insufficient.

(b) There is over the country as a whole an inadequate supply of skilled labor: But very few plants are taking the initiative to train workers for production. Many managements limit themselves to seeking workers already skilled in the handling of machinery. Proper training programs should be created in each plant so that workers of less skill can acquire greater skill and workers not yet in the plant because of lack of qualifications can be trained in the simpler processes of production. In San Francisco the Pile Drivers Union set an excellent example for the rest of the country by setting up union training classes, where unskilled workers were taught how to splice cables and other such necessary skilled tasks as that industry requires.

(c) Some managements point out that the greater utilization of equipment brings increased spoilage of materials: In the greatest measure this is true only in such cases where the hours have been lengthened for workers beyond their strength. Such increase of hours is not yet necessary. There is still an adequate labor supply. Although there is no exact survey, it can be conservatively said that there are ten to fifteen million workers available in the nation who are not yet employed in industry. This would include Negro workers, now being systematically excluded; women workers who in the depression years were driven out of industry and never encouraged to come back; young workers who have left school but have no trade and therefore remain unemployed. In some areas available labor power is not used because no war plants have been located. They should be. Such an area as this is the anthracite region of Pennsylvania. Some few years ago this area employed 160,000 miners. Even with the increased war demand it now employs hardly more than 90,000. There is great depression in that area, but no war contracts. The location of several large war production enterprises there would find favorable circumstances by the nearness to coal, good transportation and a great supply of labor power.

With an adequate training program which would tap this vast reservoir of labor power for industry all our immediate aims to utilize full plant capacity can be achieved without lengthening the hours for those workers already in the plants.

In addition to these measures, the health of the workers and their proper housing must be taken care of by the plants, so that there is a reduction in the number of hours lost due to illness.

The problem of drawing the reserve labor power into production will become all the more acute during the coming summer months when some workers will have to take

vacations in order to renew their ability to work at maximum efficiency. Such vacations need not mean any cut in production if the reserve labor power is now trained for production.

THE PROBLEM OF SPEED-UP

(a) Increased production must not mean unreasonable speed-up in the plants: Speed-up beyond the workers' capacity to produce will bring great losses to production due to spoilage, accidents and explosions in the powder plants. Reports from many of the large factories indicate that due to improper organization of work the workers' time is not fully utilized. In some plants simple tools in sufficient numbers are not available for all workers. The lack of sufficient micrometers, for example, to test the measurements of parts means that these are apportioned one to many workers, so that one worker may have to wait idly at another worker's machine until the micrometer becomes available. Labor's representatives must insure adequate tools for the workers in the plants. This is an easier problem to solve than the very much more difficult problem of retooling and plant conversion and can be met quickly with simpler measures.

Even more serious is the situation where workers are laid off or forced to stand around idle in some departments because the supply of material is inadequate. In many cases this is not due to a real shortage of materials but rather to improper transportation and other supply organization. Steel mills in several parts of the country have been forced to bank their furnaces and are faced with complete shutdown of war production unless they can obtain an immediate supply of scrap iron, which is being held by large speculators to force the price up above the present set ceiling. Managements, unless they are for the war effort with all their hearts and souls, are indifferent to this waste

of time in their plants. Under their "cost-plus" contracts with the Government this waste of time, by increasing the cost of production, also increases their profits. In almost all cases they operate on a profit which is calculated at 6 or 8 or 10 per cent above the cost. Those employers who think only of their profits are therefore not disturbed by workers being forced to waste time in the plants. But the workers, having so much at stake in this war, must, through their representatives on the joint production boards, do everything they can to eliminate this wastefulness.

(b) In some plants where employers do not work on a "cost-plus" contract they force increased production and speed-up and then cut the piece rates of the worker. This discourages workers from their best efforts. Representatives of labor on the joint production boards must make prior agreements with the managements against such cutting of piece rates when production per worker increases.

Naturally, every industry has its own peculiarities and will require special measures to increase production. We have cited the above examples because we find them to be the more common problems on which labor's representatives should prepare themselves so that they are equipped to make a contribution on the Joint Labor-Management Production Boards. The ordinary measures to increase production such as the use of score boards, creation of competition among various departments or with other similar plants, awarding of prizes and premiums, are well known and will no doubt be considered.

We cannot leave this discussion without making some comment upon the important question of morale among the workers and the civilian population in general. There has been some criticism of the Office of Civilian Defense, for their engaging in such activities as bowling, dancing, entertainment, etc., in order to bolster morale. It is obvious that the divisionist elements misuse this question in order

to attack the war effort of the Administration. It is also obvious that there can be no objection to such activities as long as they do not replace the more urgent needs of the civilian population in the war effort.

But it is also a fact that necessary activities, which would give the civilian population strength and self-confidence, and thereby raise their morale to a great degree, are being neglected. The Soviet Union for many years, in preparation for this war emergency, created facilities for factory workers and other civilians whereby they learned how to handle a rifle and shoot accurately; how to assemble and repair machine-guns. Prospects for the army were taught the general practice of army organization and the manual of arms.

This had two positive sides: first it so strengthened the civilian population that when the young men were drafted into the army the necessary training time within the armed forces was considerably cut because they were already equipped with a lot of the necessary knowledge to become soldiers; and secondly, it gave that self-confidence to the population which an armed mass of people have with which to meet any enemy. There is no better contribution to morale than this training to the people as a whole. Naturally with this go the other activities, such as air-raid defense measures and training, the civilian collection for war needs, for Red Cross, the armed forces, scrap metal, etc., etc., and also entertainment. While these latter activities do not strictly come within the jurisdiction of the Joint Labor-Management Boards in the factories, as outlined by Donald Nelson, yet where the possibility exists surely either the properly constituted Joint Factory Boards or workers' factory committees, or the unions, in cooperation with the proper civilian and military authorities should try to initiate as great a part of this civilian defense program as is found feasible. The Joint War Production committees in the factories, like the national War Labor Board, open up

new vistas for a democratic, all-out, anti-Hitler war effort. A great responsibility lies with the working class, and more particularly with the trade union movement. Our fulfillment of that responsibility will insure that victory will come to the United Nations.

And shouldn't this also bring home to the entire Administration in Washington that labor has been excluded from all governmental participation? Although constituting by far the most numerous class in the country, providing as they are the bulk of the men for the army, yet bearing the burden of the need for war production, and making the greatest sacrifices in their standards of living for the victory, labor is systematically excluded from every government department.

The continuance of this contemptuous attitude toward labor can only strengthen Hitlerism. It will be a continued obstacle to achieving an all-out effort to win the war.

Such involvement of labor is not advanced as a solution of the class struggle or the social question. It is a war emergency measure, aimed to get a real all-out anti-Hitler effort. The big finance capitalists have all been partners of Nazi corporations in the recent past. That is an established fact for Standard Oil, General Motors, General Electric, du Pont, Knudsen, Rockefeller and others. Labor's share in the general direction of war effort policies would insure that the old Nazi influence on these great monopoly capitalists would not hold production back.

What would labor strive for if put in the position that the Murray Plan provides? The statements of policy contained in the speeches of the trade union leaders, the resolution of the trade union bodies, and the stated position of all working class organizations leave no room for doubt. We can summarize the chief points as follows:

1. It would press the measures for pooling of resources

for speedier production and for conversion of industry to war needs.

2. It would speed the building of new plants and help devise ways of expanding the old ones.

3. Labor would initiate measures for utilizing the labor power of 15,000,000 new workers, now not in industry—including Negro women and young workers. It would speed the setting up of a training program to overcome the shortages in the skilled crafts. It would make possible a three-shift day, seven-day week production program.

4. It would insure the spreading of war contracts to small business and draw them into the war effort—instead of destroying them by forcing them into bankruptcy, as is now the case.

5. It would insure the maximum production by the smaller farmers, who now cannot produce the maximum for lack of fertilizer, spray, feed, equipment or animals. It would protect the farmers against the processors, the warehouses, elevators, railroads, and other middlemen who keep the farmer from making his farm pay adequately.

6. Labor participation would insure that, in the rationing of materials, real luxuries would be sacrificed first, and the needs of the masses would be sacrificed last. The rationing would be democratically administered with a minimum of hardships to the great mass of consumers.

7. It would ensure that those thrown out of work by priority assignments or by dislocation due to conversion of industry would be put back to work at the speediest possible time—and that they would not become demoralized by economic need while waiting for work.

8. Labor's representatives would be a check on the profits-above-all employers, the Nazi sympathizers, and the anti-Administration spiteful reactionaries. It would protect the interest of the millions from labor's ranks and the country

as a whole who enter the army and would urge the greater democratization of our armed forces.

9. It would insure that the cost and sacrifice necessary to the achievement of this program would be equitably distributed among all and not in favor of those rich who can afford to hire lobbyists and lawyers who intrigue in Congress to shift the cost to those who can least afford it.

10. Finally it would insure that the grand strategy of the war, worked out by Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt, which provides for concentration of the main forces on the destruction of Hitler, would be carried out through the adequate delivery of material such as was promised the Soviet Union. It would do away with the situation which now exists, where those who have kept monopoly of the war effort to the exclusion of labor hate our ally, the Soviet Union, more than they do Hitler and Nazism, and are sabotaging the delivery of supplies to the anti-Hitler front in Eastern Europe. And, most crucial of all, it would work for moving in on Hitler now in the spring and summer of 1942.

Realization of these measures would give us and our allies that all-out production effort which, combined with the superior man-power of the democracies, would decisively change the relation of forces and give us the superior power needed to crush the Axis enemy. It would make possible the training of civilian prospects for the army in rifle and machine gun practice, elementary military theory and activity, so as to reduce the training period necessary in the army and speed putting our forces in the field.

In each industry labor, which is free from any expectation of personal profit from this war, would not hesitate to propose such measures as would insure the achievement of the war production program, overcoming the motives of greed and avariciousness which blind some employers to

the needs of the defense of our country. A great many questions need immediate consideration for an all-out war effort, but are not getting it because of the refusal of the owners to consider anything but profits.

For example, the unified government direction and subordination of the railroad industry to the war effort is a key requirement without which success of the entire war effort is threatened; the need for applying the scorched-earth policy in America's outposts, which is frequently prevented by the owners whose selfishness causes large amounts of matériel to fall into enemy hands; these are illustrations of the great advances which labor participation would make to insure an all-out effort for the war.

It is because many employers are not reconciled to an all-out war effort that they stubbornly and wilfully resist the participation of the representatives of the great trade union movement of our country, 11,000,000 members strong in organization, and many millions more tied to the trade unions by common interests, sympathy and family relationship. The statements of labor leaders indicate the possibility of working out a joint labor program which would be the best insurance of the success of the war effort. Of course this representation won't be given the workers on a silver platter. They must fight for it. America's foremost authority on trade unionism, William Z. Foster, stated this question in a speech delivered in Chicago in January, 1942, as follows:

"Another very necessary war measure is to grant the workers full representation in all government boards and other regulative bodies, from the Cabinet on down. Only if this is done can the workers make their full contribution to the national war effort. Today almost the whole government war machinery is monopolized by representatives of the employers. It is worse than absurd, for example, that the great American trade union movement, over 11,000,000 strong, has not even a single member in President Roosevelt's Cabinet.

"Organized labor also has the imperative duty, as a basic war necessity, to unify itself. In its support of the war the labor movement is hampered at every turn by the division within its own ranks. The C.I.O. and A. F. of L. should confer together nationally, work out labor's war program, with regard to foreign policy, national unity, production, civilian defense, etc., and then they should cooperate loyally to put it into effect. Organizational unity of the labor movement will come later, probably out of this war-time cooperation. Here in Chicago the trade unions have recently given one of the many current fine local examples of the possibilities and advantages of A. F. of L., C.I.O. and Railroad Brotherhood cooperation on war issues. Another form which labor unity should take is for the two great national trade union centers to affiliate to the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee. This step would do much to bring about the much-needed closer cooperative relations between the American and Soviet Governments." *

The aims of the Communist Party in this war can be summarized in one short phrase—the crushing defeat of Hitler and his allies. All that we have and stand for is in this period contributory to that task. We believe the President has set this task clearly. We subscribe to his stated plan of work as contained in the message to Congress on the State of the Union and the budget, to win the war. It is for this reason that we believe that those who fought Hitler from his political birth, namely, the working class, must be given a share—not only of the labor, but also of the direction of the anti-Hitler effort. It will put into the anti-Hitler effort Hitler's most uncompromising enemies, those who never had any relationship with German, Japanese or Italian imperialism except to fight it as a pestilence and a scourge. American labor must astound the world with our ability to produce war supplies. We must exceed all that has ever been attempted. Ours is a key responsibility.

* William Z. Foster, *From Defense to Attack*, Workers Library Publishers. pp. 12-13.

The Administration is committing the error of coddling Hitler's friends. Some indeed pretend they are now for victory in the war. But isn't that how Pétain in France, Quisling in Norway, Wang Ching-wei in China, all acted? We are referring to Lindbergh and General Wood of the pro-Hitler misnamed America First Committee. Many of the leading members of this committee are now convicted Nazi spies, including the flier Laura Ingalls. Yet defeatists like Wood have been given posts in the War Department. Isn't that an unbelievably stupid policy for one who is leading a struggle against Hitlerism as President Roosevelt is? In the relation of forces within our country doesn't that strengthen the hand of the appeasers, instead of destroying them?

And while Hitler's friends are being coddled, Hitler's bitterest enemies are being persecuted, driven from posts they held in the national war set-up, and in some cases imprisoned or, having been imprisoned under the anti-Soviet hysteria engendered by the pro-Nazi Martin Dies and conferees, are still kept there.

The outstanding case is that of Earl Browder. In the late 1920's he went to China to encourage those people to resist Japan. He had confidence that, though the American people were then largely indifferent to the fate of China, their fundamental democracy would soon make us see our common cause against Japanese imperialism. At that time, however, the leader of the Chinese government and ruling party was Wang Ching-wei, a Japanese agent who has since openly proclaimed himself that. If Browder's identity became known in China, Wang's agents and the Japanese would have beheaded him.

Browder took the precaution of using another name on his passport. It was not a false passport. His ancestors came to this land at the beginning of the 1600's. How could a man, an American of such long standing, be charged with

a false passport? The falsity consisted in that he did use a different name. Many notables do that. Years later he applied for a passport under his own name. The blank asked whether he had a previous passport. No doubt believing that the question referred to another passport under the name of Browder, he answered, "None." This was construed as perjury. Such mistatements occur in tens of thousands of cases. Few are ever given more than the instruction to correct the fact. A few were punished with very small fines. Browder, under the anti-red hysteria stirred up by the Nazi sympathizers and their friends, was given the astounding and unprecedented sentence of four years and a \$2,000 fine. That was the final touch to prove that the technicality was only a pretence. Thus a staunch anti-Japanese militarist devotee and anti-Hitler warrior lies in Atlanta Penitentiary, while Hitler's friends and agents are given posts in the War Department.

How does our Commander-in-Chief, anti-Hitler fighter that he is, square that in his conscience? Does he believe that he is appeasing the foe? That it will bring him an earlier victory against his Nazi-fascist Axis enemies? Doesn't he know that Daladier, Blum and others in France followed that very policy and are today paying for that folly? Hasn't that unhappy experience warned progressives against trying to appease Hitler's sympathizers? Must we also go through that experience?

Does that sound remote to American ears? It probably did also to the people who felt so sure of themselves in Paris, London, Singapore, Manila, Honolulu, Warsaw and Vienna. But surely the loss of thousands of men and dozens of ships only a few miles from our centers of population on the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts should wake us to an all-out struggle. And, as one feature of that all-out struggle, the most uncompromising enemies of Hitlerism, headed by Earl Browder, should be amnestied from prison and the good

friends of Hitler cleaned out of the strategic government posts which they are using and will ever use to hamper the defense effort.

OUR STAKE IN THIS WAR—FREEDOM!

It has often been said that every generation must win anew its right to be free. This is our war for that right. It could be said that we might in an earlier period have secured our freedom without need for such great sacrifice as that which we must now make. We could have stopped Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese militarists in their first steps to conquer the world in Manchuria in 1931, Ethiopia in 1935 and Spain in 1936. The Communist Party has a clear conscience in that it has on each of these previous occasions tried to arouse the American people to the danger. We did not succeed on those occasions. Our efforts were frequently met with indifference and sometimes with persecution and imprisonment. We have already told how as early as 1929 our General Secretary, Earl Browder, went to China in an effort to arouse the people there. In August, 1936, he warned that,

"The Japanese militarists conquered Manchuria, are dismembering China, are plotting to seize the Philippines and wage war against the United States."

William Z. Foster, Robert Minor and all the thousands and thousands of their followers picketed the consulates of the Japanese-Nazi-fascist militarist clique, advocated alliance with the Soviet Union, held indoor and outdoor meetings and distributed leaflets appealing to the intelligence of the people of America. But our appeasers, Hearst, the Scripps-Howard press and their tools in and out of our Government, were able to use their powerful press to pull the wool over the eyes of our fellow Americans, the radio to clog their ears and red-baiting Nazi propaganda to distract

their attention. Failing to arouse our nation to the danger at the time of the Nazi-fascist invasion of Spain, 3,000 of the finest young men out of our small ranks formed the Abraham Lincoln Battalion and for three solid years fought with like-minded men from all parts of the world to hold the Nazi-fascist troops at the gates of Madrid. Of these men 1600 gave their lives in that struggle; they never returned, but lie buried in Spanish soil, a monument to Communist devotion to the struggle against Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese militarists, for world freedom.

This is our war—the war of the common people, the worker, the farmer, the Catholic, the Protestant, the Jew, and the Negro. All of these have suffered Hitlerite terror. This is the war of the trade unionists, of the white collar worker, the scientist and the professional man, of the women, those who have felt the Nazi heel on their necks. Some very rich people have shown that they do not believe it is their war. They have tried to appease Hitler, to conciliate him, to grant him concessions, to do everything in their power to prevent an all-out effort to destroy Nazism. Some are influenced by the properties, and bonds and stocks they hold in Germany, Italy or Japan. Some of these, we are sorry to say, still hold office in Washington. Some who were business partners of Hitler in automotive plants, glass plants, chemical and dye works and still have vested interests in German industry have been placed by misguided judgment into positions of power in our production program. These have given only words, which are cheap, to the support of the war. They would sooner sacrifice every word of the Declaration of Independence before giving up one item of their profits or privileges. Many of them secretly sympathize with Hitler and wish they could bring him here to crush the worker, the farmer, the Negro, the common citizen whom they regard as “inferior” and whom they hate.

It is not their war—despite the fact that some of them hold important offices. But it is our war, the people's war! We must not say we will not sacrifice all that is required for the success of this war until every last employer does likewise. That way we will lose our war.

INVADE HITLER NOW—OPEN A SECOND FRONT!

We must give everything that is required. China and above all the Soviet Union are already sacrificing hundreds of times more than we are, in this battle which is also ours. All the United Nations must carry a greater share of the burden. That means us too. We must push aside those who stand in the way of uniting the nation for an all-out effort. Those who cannot be made to see our nation's needs must be discarded. Those who refuse to see our nation's anti-Hitler needs and are devoted only to their own greed and desire for personal power or their sympathies to Nazism must be made inoperative. Our struggle to unite our nation will be a struggle against those elements which are alien to our national interest.

It is sad to see that in Washington the Administration, which under President Roosevelt has in the main begun to make a real all-out war effort, is permitting various departments of the government to persecute the staunchest anti-Hitler elements, friends of Spain, anti-Nazis and Communists and allows them to be eliminated from posts of responsibility while the Lindberghs, General Woods, Dieses and Knudsens, apologists, appeasers, friends of Hitler and his former business partners, are either appointed or permitted to retain high offices. Some will lose faith because of this fact. But there is no reason to. This condition is a monstrosity which will be destroyed by the growing national unity of our country against Hitlerism abroad and Hitler's friends within our borders.

When Abraham Lincoln took office in 1861 his Administration at first also tolerated those who were tools of the South and permitted the most devoted fighters against slavery to be eliminated from office. But that great man of the people had faith in this nation, in its workers and farmers, in its democracy. It took two years to go from the defeat at Bull Run with McClellan, Cameron and Valladingham in national leadership, to the victory at Gettysburg and Thaddeus Stevens and the incorruptibles and uncompromisers and the Emancipation Proclamation.

We have today a great trade union movement, 11,000,000 strong, whose morale is high, which can give that fortitude, courage, devotion and clearheadedness and disperse those who would conciliate and negotiate for a new state of world affairs with the Nazis, fascists and Japanese militarist war-makers. Only a crushing defeat of Hitlerism and his gangster allies would save humanity and civilization. We have just passed through Pearl Harbor and Manila, through Guam, Singapore and Hong Kong. Our fellow citizens are for the moment stunned and bewildered by these defeats. We must not allow them to make us pessimistic. They should only be the alarm that makes us spring to action. To go from these to an all-out victory we may have to dump Hitler's friends wherever they may be, including those members of the Congress of the United States who have helped them, such as Martin Dies and Hamilton Fish. The more than 95 per cent of our people who are anti-Nazi must quarantine the less than 5 per cent who are not.

Everything to support and strengthen our national unity against the Nazi-Fascist-Japanese military warmongers!

Everything to make successful the pact of the United Nations led by the United States, the Soviet Union, England and China!

Everything to defeat Hitler's agents and tools in the United States!

Hurry! Hurry! Time is urgent! We must act quickly!

All out for all-out production!

Hurry!

Invade Hitler now! Open the Western Front in Europe immediately!

Everything for victory!

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